Nuclear Nonproliferation

Safeguarding nuclear material that can be used in nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States, Russia, and other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and other newly independent states inherited about 650 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in forms that are attractive to thieves. This report discusses (1) the number of buildings that have received nuclear material security systems and the amount of nuclear material that is protected under those systems and (2) the program's costs so far, the amount of program funds that did not go directly to program activities but have been paid in Russian taxes, and the estimated cost to complete the program. The Department of Energy has identified 332 buildings in Russia and other newly independent states that require nuclear security systems. As of February 2000, Energy had installed security systems in 113 buildings, most of which contained small amounts of nuclear material suitable for use in weapons. This report addresses the effectiveness of the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program in reducing the proliferation risk posed by the theft or diversion of nuclear material and the ability of Russia and the newly independent states to operate and maintain the upgraded security systems.

GAO noted that: (1) DOE has identified 332 buildings that require nuclear security systems in Russia and the other newly independent states; (2) as of February 2000, DOE had completed the installation of security systems in 113 buildings that mostly contain small quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material; (3) about 50 metric tons of nuclear material are stored in buildings with installed security systems; (4) DOE is installing systems at an additional 72 buildings; (5) this work is scheduled for completion in 2006 and will increase the total amount of nuclear material in buildings with security systems to 400 metric tons; (6) however, DOE has not started work on the remaining 147 buildings and has also suspended work on buildings at a number of sites; (7) most of the buildings where DOE has not started or has suspended work are in Russia's nuclear weapons complex, and Russia has limited DOE's access to these buildings because of security concerns; (8) DOE is negotiating with Russia to gain better access to its nuclear weapons complex; (9) from fiscal year (FY) 1993 through 1999, DOE received $590.7 million in appropriations and spent $481.2 million to improve the security of nuclear material in Russia and the newly independent states; (10) DOE carried over about $86 million in unspent funds into FY 2000 and reprogrammed $23.8 million to other programs; (11) according to DOE officials, the inability to spend funds in a timely manner is due, in part, to the inherent difficulties associated with doing work in Russia, such as building access limitations, that delay the completion of projects; (12) DOE does not know how much of the program funds provided to the sites has been paid in Russian taxes because the Russian tax authorities do not directly tax the program; (13) instead, they tax the Russian sites and sites' subcontractors who receive the program funds; (14) in 1999, Russia passed a new tax law that, according to DOE, should relieve the program from paying taxes; and (15) DOE has not estimated how much funding it needs to complete the program given the increase in the number of buildings that require security improvements and new initiatives that have increased the scope of the program.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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