National Ignition Facility

Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays Gao ID: RCED-00-141 August 8, 2000

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is to produce the intense pressures and temperatures needed to simulate thermonuclear conditions in a laboratory. The Department of Energy (DOE) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory now estimate that NIF will cost about $3.3 billion and be completed in 2008--more than $1 billion above original estimates and six years behind schedule. GAO estimates the cost at closer to $4 billion when research and development costs are factored in. These cost increases and schedule delays are due to poor Lawrence Livermore management and inadequate DOE oversight. The NIF project manager had little experience in directing large projects and had no control over separately funded program components. Although he had been briefed to the contrary, the laboratory's former laser director assured Congress that the project was adequately staffed and funded, on schedule, and within cost. The absence of independent reviews has enabled the costs and schedules to grow undetected. DOE has said that funds from within DOE's existing nuclear weapons budget will be reallocated to pay for NIF overruns. Paying for cost overruns from within DOE program accounts--Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia Laboratories--could significantly affect portions of these laboratories' programs.

GAO noted that: (1) DOE and Lawrence Livermore now estimate that NIF will eventually cost about $3.3 billion and will be completed in 2008; (2) these new estimates mean NIF will cost over $1 billion more than originally planned and take 6 years longer to complete; (3) however, on the basis of analysis of figures from DOE and Lawrence Livermore, GAO estimates that NIF's cost is closer to $4 billion because DOE's estimate does not include all research and development costs from other program areas that are needed to support NIF; (4) furthermore, since significant research and development activities to support NIF remain to be completed and technical uncertainties persist, the cost of NIF could grow even higher and completion could take even longer; (5) NIF's cost increases and schedule delays were caused by a combination of poor Lawrence Livermore management and inadequate DOE oversight; (6) since NIF's beginning, the absence of effective independent reviews has enabled the project's costs and schedules to grow undetected by DOE program officials at headquarters and at Lawrence Livermore; (7) furthermore, none of these reviews has examined both the construction project and its supporting research and development activities; (8) paying for NIF's cost overruns has broad implications for DOE's nuclear weapons program; (9) the Secretary of Energy has said he wants to complete NIF but will not ask Congress for additional appropriations to pay for NIF's cost increases; (10) instead, he announced that the Department will pay for NIF's overruns by reallocating funds from within DOE's existing nuclear weapons budget; (11) however, DOE has not fully disclosed which programs will be cut to pay for NIF, nor when or how this will be done; (12) nor has DOE evaluated how this reallocation will affect components of the nuclear weapons program that might be eliminated, reduced in scope, or extended in order to fund NIF; (13) DOE tried but was unable to secure agreement among its three weapons laboratories that will use NIF--Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia; (14) consequently, DOE's June "interim" cost and schedule plan was not developed by taking into account the many potential impacts on DOE's nuclear weapons program; and (15) in addition, because DOE has not determined how it intends to pay for NIF's cost overruns, the potential impacts on other science programs are unknown.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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