Homeland Security
Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Gao ID: GAO-02-927T July 9, 2002Title III of the proposed Department of Homeland Security legislation would task the new department with developing national policy and coordinating the federal government's research and development efforts for responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and development programs and other activities, including those of the Department of Energy (DOE). If properly implemented, this proposed legislation could lead to a more efficient, effective and coordinated research effort that would provide technology to protect our people, borders, and critical infrastructure. However, the proposed legislation does not specify that a critical role of the new department will be to establish collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of government and to develop a strategic plan for research and development to implement the national policy it is charged with developing. In addition, the proposed legislation is not clear on the role of the new department in setting standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies so that users can be confident that the technologies they are purchasing will perform as intended. Some of the proposed transfers of activities from DOE to the new department are appropriate, such as the DOE's nuclear threat assessment program and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory. However, the transfer of some DOE research and development activities may complicate research now being done to accomplish multiple purposes.
GAO-02-927T, Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, July 9, 2002:
Homeland Security:
Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002:
Statement of (Ms) Gary L. Jones
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-02-927T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss several
aspects of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The proposed legislation
would bring many federal entities with homeland security
responsibilities into a Department of Homeland Security in an effort to
mobilize and focus assets and resources. Title III of the proposed
legislation would task the new department with developing national
policy for and coordinating the federal government‘s research and
development efforts for responding to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also transfer to the new
department responsibility for certain research and development programs
and other activities, including those of the Department of Energy
(DOE).[Footnote 1]
In my testimony today, which focuses on Title III of the proposed
legislation, I will address (1) the need for clarification of certain
roles and responsibilities of the new department and (2) our
observations on transferring certain activities of DOE to the new
department. Our testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing
work on national preparedness issues,[Footnote 2] as well as a review
of the proposed legislation.
In concept and if properly implemented, this proposed legislation could
lead to a more efficient, effective and coordinated research effort
that would provide technology to protect our people, borders, and
critical infrastructure. However, the legislation does not address many
issues that could impact the Department of Homeland Security‘s
potential effectiveness. For example, while it is tasked with
coordinating federal ’civilian“ research, the new department will also
need to coordinate with the Department of Defense and the intelligence
agencies that conduct research and development efforts designed to
detect and respond to weapons of mass destruction. Further, the
proposed legislation does not specify that a critical role of the new
department will be to establish collaborative relationships with
programs at all levels of government and to develop a strategic plan
for research and development to implement the national policy it is
charged with developing. In addition, the proposed legislation is not
clear on the role of the new department in setting standards for the
performance and interoperability of new technologies so that users can
be confident that the technologies they are purchasing will perform as
intended. Lacking this, the Department of Homeland Security may not be
able to efficiently and effectively focus the research and development
resources of the federal government to address the most important
terrorist threats.
Regarding the transfer of certain activities of DOE to the new
department, we believe that some of the transfers proposed in the
legislation are appropriate, such as DOE‘s nuclear threat assessment
program and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML). However,
we are concerned that the transfer of certain DOE research and
development activities may complicate research currently being
performed to accomplish multiple purposes. For example, some research
programs, such as Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory‘s advanced
scientific computing research program, have broad missions such as
ensuring the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile that are not
easily separated into homeland security research and research for other
purposes. Furthermore, in some cases, such as the energy security and
assurance program activities at DOE, the legislation does not clearly
indicate exactly what research would be transferred.
Background:
In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming
years, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security provides a
unique opportunity to create an extremely effective and performance-
based organization that can strengthen the nation‘s ability to protect
its borders and citizens against terrorism. There is likely to be
considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of the homeland
security functions, including reducing risk and improving the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of these consolidated agencies and
programs. Realistically, however, in the short term, the magnitude of
the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require
substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make
it fully effective.
Recently, we testified that Congress should consider several very
specific criteria in its evaluation of whether individual agencies or
programs should be included or excluded from the proposed department.
Those
criteria include the following:
* Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or
program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
* Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being
considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives
with the other agencies or programs being consolidated?
* Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered
for the new department create synergy and help to leverage the
effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new department as a
whole? In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts?
* Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being
considered for the new department improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating
duplications and overlaps, closing gaps and aligning or merging common
roles and responsibilities?
* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or
program being considered for the new department contribute to or
leverage the ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of
critical information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions
and activities related to homeland security?
* Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or
program being considered for the new department effectively meld with
the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and
approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies.
* Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing
components to the new department? What is the impact on agencies with
homeland security missions left out of the new department?
Federally sponsored research and development efforts, a key focus of
the proposed legislation, enhance the government‘s capability to
counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist
threats by providing technologies that meet a range of crisis-and
consequence-management needs. Research and development efforts for
these technologies, however, can be risky, time consuming, and costly.
Such efforts also may need to address requirements not available in
off-the-shelf products. These factors limit private and public research
and development efforts for these technologies, necessitating federal
government involvement and collaboration.
Many federal agencies and interagency working groups have recently
deployed or are conducting research on a variety of technologies to
combat terrorism. Recently deployed technologies include a prototype
biological detection system used at the Salt Lake City Olympics and a
prototype chemical detection system currently being used in Washington
D.C.‘s metro system that was developed by DOE. Technologies under
development include new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and
antivirals being developed by the National Institutes of Health. In
addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in
collaboration with other federal agencies, are conducting research on
the diagnosis and treatment of smallpox. Moreover, the Food and Drug
Administration is investigating a variety of biological agents that
could be used as terrorist weapons. Other federal agencies such as the
Department of Defense and intelligence community are engaged in similar
research and development activities, such as research on technology to
protect combatants from chemical and biological agents.
Roles and Responsibilities of the Proposed Department of Homeland
Security Need to be Clarified:
Certain roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security in managing research and development need to be clarified.
Under the proposed legislation, the Department of Homeland Security
would be tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating
the federal government‘s civilian research and development efforts to
counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
However, while coordination is important, it will not be enough.
Federal agency coordination alone may not address the specific needs of
state and local governments, such as those of local police and fire
departments that will use this technology. In our view, the proposed
legislation should also specify that a role of the new department will
be to develop collaborative relationships with programs at all levels
of government--federal, state, and local--to ensure that users‘ needs
and research efforts are linked. We also believe the legislation should
be clarified to ensure that the new department would be responsible for
the development of a single national research and development strategic
plan. Such a plan would help to ensure that research gaps are filled,
unproductive duplication is minimized, and individual agency plans are
consistent with the overall goals. Moreover, the proposed legislation,
as written, is unclear about the new department‘s role in developing
standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies
to address terrorist threats. We believe the development of these
standards must be a priority of the new department.
Shortfalls in Current Research Coordinating Efforts:
The limitations of existing coordination and the critical need for a
more collaborative, unified research structure has been amply
demonstrated in the recent past. We have previously reported that while
agencies attempt to coordinate federal research and development
programs in a variety of ways, breakdowns occur, leading to research
gaps and duplication of effort.[Footnote 3] Coordination is limited by
compartmentalization of efforts because of the sensitivity of the
research and development programs, security classification of research,
and the absence of a single coordinating entity to ensure against
duplication. For example, the Department of Defense‘s Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast Guard‘s plans to
develop methods to detect biological agents on infected cruise ships
and, therefore, was unable to share information on its potentially
related research to develop biological detection devices for buildings.
Opportunities to Improve Existing Legislative Proposal:
Although the proposed legislation states that the new department will
be responsible for developing national policy and coordinating research
and development, it has a number of limitations that could weaken its
effectiveness. First, the legislation tasks the new department with
coordinating the federal government‘s ’civilian efforts“ only. We
believe the new department will also need to coordinate with the
Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies that conduct
research and development efforts designed to detect and respond to
weapons of mass destruction. The proposed transfer of some DOE research
and development efforts to the Department of Homeland Security also
does not eliminate potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
collaboration. Coordination will still be required within and among the
23 DOE national laboratories. For example, our 2001 report noted that
two offices within Sandia National Laboratory concurrently and
separately worked on similar thermal imagery projects for two different
federal agencies, rather than consolidating the requests and combining
resources. In addition, local police and fire departments and state and
local governments possess practical knowledge about their technological
needs and relevant design limitations that should be taken into account
in federal efforts to provide new equipment, such as protective gear
and sensor systems. To be most effective, the new department will have
to develop collaborative relationships with all these organizations to
facilitate technological improvements and encourage cooperative
behavior.
The existing proposal leaves a number of problems unaddressed as well.
For example, while the proposed legislation is clear that the position
of Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures will be responsible for developing national policy for
federal research and development, there is no requirement for a
strategic plan for national research and development that could address
coordination, reduce potential duplication, and ensure that important
issues are addressed. In 2001, we recommended the creation of a unified
strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and suggested
that the plan be coordinated with federal agencies performing research
as well as with state and local authorities.[Footnote 4] The
development of such a plan would help to ensure that research gaps are
filled, unproductive duplication is minimized, individual agency plans
are consistent with the overall goals, and a basis for assessing the
success of the research and development efforts.
Also, while the legislation calls for the establishment of guidelines
for state and local governments to implement countermeasures for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism threats, it
is not clear to us what these guidelines are to entail. In this regard,
we believe it will be important to develop standards for the
performance and interoperability of new technologies, something that
the legislation does not specifically address. For example, we had
discussions with officials from the Utah State Department of Health who
prepared for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. These officials said that
local police and fire departments had been approached by numerous
vendors offering a variety of chemical and biological detection
technology for use during the Olympics. However, these state and local
officials were unsure of the best technology to purchase and could find
no federal agency that would provide guidance on the technologies. They
told us that if the science backing up the technology is poor or the
data the technology produces are faulty, the technology can do more
harm than good.
Further, the legislation would allow the new department to direct,
fund, and conduct research related to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and other emerging threats on its own. This
raises the potential for duplication of efforts, lack of efficiency,
and an increased need for coordination with other departments that
would continue to carry out relevant research. We are concerned that
the proposal could result in a duplication of capacity that already
exists in the current federal laboratories.
Transferring Certain Activities of DOE to the Department of Homeland
Security Raises Concerns:
Under Title III of the proposed legislation, a number of DOE programs
and activities would be transferred to the new department. Some of
these transfers seem appropriate. However, in other cases we are
concerned about the transfers because of the potential impact on
programs and activities that currently support missions beyond homeland
security. Finally, in some cases, transfers proposed by the legislation
are not laid out in enough detail to permit an assessment. We discuss
each of these groups of transfers below.
Transfer of Certain DOE Activities Seems Appropriate:
Title III proposes to transfer to the Department of Homeland Security
certain DOE activities that seem appropriate. Specifically, Title III
proposes to transfer the nuclear threat assessment program and
activities of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program in
DOE‘s international Materials, Protection, and Accountability Program
(MPC&A). The threat assessment program and activities, among other
things, assesses the credibility of communicated nuclear threats,
analyzes reports of illicit nuclear material trafficking, and provides
technical support to law enforcement agencies regarding nuclear
material/weapons. We would agree with officials of the Office of
Nuclear Threat Assessment and Detection who view the potential transfer
to the Department of Homeland Security positively. We base our
agreement on the fact that, according to officials from DOE, the
transfer would not have a negative impact on the rest of the MPC&A
program because the functions are separate and distinct. Further, the
transfer could tie the office in more closely with the other agencies
they work with, such as Customs.
Another program that we believe could be appropriately transferred to
the new department is the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML),
located in New York City. This government-operated laboratory operates
under the Office of Science and Technology in the Office of
Environmental Management at DOE. EML provides program management,
technical assistance and data quality assurance for measurements of
radiation and radioactivity relating to environmental restoration,
global nuclear nonproliferation, and other priority issues for DOE, as
well as for other government, national and international organizations.
According to the laboratory director, the laboratory is completely in
favor of the transfer to the proposed Department of Homeland Security
and would fit in very well with it. We believe the transfer is
appropriate because, unlike some other transfers proposed under Title
III, the entire laboratory would be transferred. While it is a
multiprogram laboratory serving several elements of DOE as well as
other organizations, serving multiple clients could continue under a
’work for others“ contracting arrangement whether the laboratory was
housed within DOE or the Department of Homeland Security.
Some Proposed Transfers Give Reasons for Concern:
Title III proposes transferring the parts of DOE‘s nonproliferation and
verification research and development program that conduct research on
systems to improve the nation‘s capability to prepare for and respond
to chemical and biological attacks. The legislation also proposes
transferring a portion of the program‘s proliferation detection
research. This includes work on developing sensors to help the Coast
Guard monitor container shipping at ports of entry. These proposed
transfers raise concerns because much of the program‘s research
supports both homeland security and international nonproliferation
programs. These programs have broad missions that are not easily
separated into homeland security research and research for other
purposes and the proposed legislation is not clear how these missions
would continue to be accomplished. Furthermore, we are concerned that
the legislation does not clearly indicate whether only the programmatic
management and funding would move or also the scientists carrying out
the research. Moving the scientists may not be prudent. This is because
the research is currently conducted by multiprogram laboratories that
employ scientists skilled in many disciplines who serve many different
missions and whose research benefits from their interactions with
colleagues within the laboratory.
In addition, we believe transferring control of some scientists within
the DOE national laboratories to the Department of Homeland Security
could complicate an already dysfunctional DOE organizational structure
by blurring lines of authority and accountability. DOE carries out its
diverse missions through a network of multilayered field offices that
oversee activities at the national laboratories and other DOE
facilities widely dispersed throughout the country. The structure
inherited by DOE and the different program cultures and management
styles within that structure have confounded DOE‘s efforts to develop a
more effective organization. Transferring control of scientists within
the national laboratories could complicate the accomplishment of
homeland security missions and DOE‘s other missions by adding
additional lines of authority and accountability between the laboratory
scientists, DOE, and the Department of Homeland Security. One
alternative would be for the new department to contract with DOE‘s
national laboratories to conduct the research under ’work for others“
contracts. This would allow for direct contact between the Department
of Homeland Security and the laboratories conducting the research
without creating a new bureaucracy. Many federal agencies such as the
Department of Defense and intelligence agencies currently use this
contracting arrangement with the national laboratories.
We have similar concerns about transferring two other activities to the
new department:
* The advanced scientific computing research program and activities at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are developing supercomputer
hardware and software infrastructure aimed at enabling laboratory and
university researchers to solve the most challenging scientific
problems at a level of accuracy and detail never before achieved.
Research conducted under the program include; designing materials atom-
by-atom, revealing the functions of proteins, understanding and
controlling plasma turbulence, designing new particle accelerators and
modeling global climate change. This program is an integral part of
DOE‘s efforts to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and
secure. This program may be difficult to separate into homeland
security research and research for other purposes.
* The Life Sciences Division within the DOE Office of Science‘s
Biological and Environmental Research Program manages a diverse
portfolio of research to develop fundamental biological information and
to advance technology in support of DOE‘s missions in biology,
medicine, and the environment. For example, it is determining the whole
genome sequences of a variety of infectious bacteria, including anthrax
strains--a first step toward developing tests that can be used to
rapidly identify their presence in the environment.
In both of these instances, the programs serve multiple missions. These
dual-purpose programs have important synergies that we believe should
be maintained. We are concerned that transferring control over these
programs to the new department has the potential to disrupt some
programs that are critical to other DOE missions, such as the
reliability of our nuclear weapons. We do not believe that the proposed
legislation is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and
these other missions would be accomplished.
Transfer of Some Activities Is Unclear:
The details of two other transfers proposed in the legislation are
unclear. First, Title III would transfer the intelligence program
activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These
intelligence activities are related to the overall program carried out
by DOE‘s Office of Intelligence. The Office of Intelligence gathers
information related to DOE‘s missions--energy, nuclear weapons, nuclear
proliferation, basic science, radiological research and environmental
cleanup. To support this overall intelligence program, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, like other weapons laboratories,
conducts intelligence activities. At Lawrence Livermore, the ’Z“
division conducts these activities and has special intelligence
expertise related to tracking the nuclear capabilities of countries
other than Russia and China. Importantly, the ’Z“ division receives
funding from other DOE programs and/or offices as well as funding from
other federal agencies (Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.). According to
officials at DOE Headquarters and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, only about $5 million of the division‘s $30-50 million
budget comes from DOE‘s Office of Intelligence. These officials said
the transfer would most likely affect only the
$5 million that DOE‘s Office of Intelligence directly provides to the
laboratory, but this is not clear in the proposed legislation. As with
other DOE programs discussed in this testimony, the staff that carry
out these activities are contractor employees and it is not clear how
they would be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
Moreover, DOE headquarters and other laboratories also have a role in
intelligence, and the legislation does not propose to transfer any of
their intelligence functions.
Another area of Title III where the details are unclear is the transfer
of ’energy security and assurance program activities.“ These activities
are carried out by the Office of Energy Assurance, which was created in
November 2001 to work with state and local government and industry to
strengthen the security of the United States through the application of
science and technology to improve the reliability and security of the
national energy infrastructure. The national energy infrastructure
includes (1) physical and cyber assets of the nation‘s electric power,
oil, and natural gas infrastructures; (2) interdependencies among
physical and cyber energy infrastructure assets; (3) national energy
infrastructure‘s interdependencies with all other critical national
infrastructures. At the time this testimony was being prepared, DOE and
the Office of Homeland Security were trying to define the scope of the
proposed transfer.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have
at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones
at (202) 512-3841. Gene Aloise, Seto J. Bagdoyen, Ryan T. Coles, Darryl
W. Dutton, Kathleen H. Ebert, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Cynthia Norris and
Keith Rhodes also made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical
and Biological R&D Programs. GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/T-
NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:
November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2,
1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.
GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.:
December 1, 1997.
Disaster Assistance:
Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States
for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington,
D.C.: July 9, 2001.
Budget and Management:
Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.
Washington, D.C.: August 2001.
Managing for Results: Federal Managers‘ Views on Key Management Issues
Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington, D.C.:
August 29, 1997.
Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal
Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7,
1995.
Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles.
GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.
Grant Design:
Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and
Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22,
1998.
Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/AIMD-
95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Sections 301, 302, and 303 of the President‘s proposed legislation
primarily cover these changes.
[2] See ’Related GAO Products“ at the end of this testimony.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for
Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to
Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, GAO/
NSIAD-99-160 (Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999), and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
