Nonproliferation R&D
NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened Gao ID: GAO-02-904 August 23, 2002The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. In fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program received an average of $218 million per year--a total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs, and the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. The program requires that projects' life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-904, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened
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Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
August 2002:
NONPROLIFERATION R&D:
NNSA‘s Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management
Can Be Strengthened:
Nonproliferation R&D:
GAO-02-904:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Of the $1.2 Billion That the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
Program Received over 5 Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA
National Laboratories:
Two of Three Research Areas in NNSA‘s R&D Program Have No Process to
Identify Users‘ Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor Project
Progress:
Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed by NNSA, but Some
Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Table:
Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA‘s Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program‘s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
NISC: Nonproliferation and International Security Center:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
R&D: Research and development:
Letter:
August 23, 2002:
The Honorable Sonny Callahan
Chairman
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives:
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration‘s
(NNSA)[Footnote 1] Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research,
development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are
intended to strengthen the United States‘ ability to prevent and
respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. The Department of
Energy‘s (DOE) national laboratories carry out most of the program‘s
research, while officials at NNSA‘s headquarters and operations offices
provide general oversight and contracting support and serve as liaisons
to users of the technology developed.[Footnote 2] NNSA‘s program makes
these technologies available to a number of users from federal
agencies--such as the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; the
Customs Service (in the Department of the Treasury); and intelligence
agencies--and to state and local law enforcement agencies.[Footnote 3]
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the federal government
has used technologies developed by NNSA‘s program to, among other
things, monitor air samples from the World Trade Center site for
hazardous chemicals and to assist the cleanup of congressional office
buildings contaminated by anthrax. In addition, the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority has received equipment developed by
this program to detect chemical agents in the Washington, D.C., subway
system (Metro).
As of fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
Program had approximately 220 projects under development. Work carried
out in these projects covers a wide spectrum of activities, ranging
from manufacturing specialized satellite-based sensors that detect
nuclear explosions to exploratory research projects to test whether a
technical idea with a plausible application to a nuclear, chemical, or
biological nonproliferation mission is feasible. The program is
currently divided into three specific research areas labeled as
follows:
* Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Develops and manufactures ground-and
satellite-based sensors and computer software for detecting, locating,
identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions when they occur
underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space.
* Proliferation Detection. Develops, demonstrates, and delivers long-
and short-range sensor technologies to detect the spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies
worldwide.[Footnote 4]
* Chemical and Biological National Security. Develops, demonstrates,
and delivers systems to improve the United States‘ capability to
prepare for and respond to chemical and biological attacks.
This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past
5 years and the program‘s distribution of this funding to the national
laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its three research
areas; (2) extent to which the program identifies users‘ needs and
monitors project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local
agencies of the usefulness of program-developed technology,
particularly in light of heightened homeland security concerns
following September 11, 2001.
Results in Brief:
From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation
and Verification R&D Program received an average of about $218 million
per year, for a total of about $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of the
$1.2 billion was distributed for R&D at three NNSA national
laboratories, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. About 14
percent was distributed to 10 other national laboratories and DOE
facilities. The remaining funding was used for the construction of a
Nonproliferation and International Security Center at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, grants to universities and small businesses, and
cooperative support for other federal agencies‘ counterterrorism R&D
activities--such as R&D for chemical and biological detector technology
conducted by the U.S. Army. In fiscal year 2002, the program received a
significant funding increase. The program was appropriated a total of
about $323 million, which included $78 million from the $40 billion
emergency supplemental appropriations act passed in the wake of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Regarding the amount of funding
distributed by research area in fiscal year 2002,
37 percent of the total $323 million (about $119 million) was allocated
to the Proliferation Detection research area; 26 percent (about $81
million) to the Chemical and Biological National Security research
area; and 23 percent (about $76 million) to the Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring
research area.
Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and
Verification R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users‘ needs
and the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms
of users, NNSA‘s role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them
to, users in the federal government, the intelligence community, law
enforcement, and others. Because of this, it is important that these
users have input to project planning and selection and are kept
involved as projects progress. However, we found that the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area and the Proliferation
Detection research area generally lack a formal process for identifying
users‘ needs during various stages of project development: from input
on which projects to fund, to updates on ongoing research. The research
areas lack this process because, according to program managers and
national laboratory officials, the research in these two areas is, in
many cases, considered to be long-term and the feasibility of the
resulting technology is usually unknown. Thus, these officials believe
that user involvement should not occur until the research is more
mature. However, two separate advisory committees to NNSA reported in
2000 and again in 2002 that successfully transferring new technologies
to users would be aided by opening communications with potential users
as early as possible and continuing these communications through all
phases of the R&D project.
In terms of project monitoring, the program requires that projects‘
life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on
project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and
deliverables. However, we found that many of the projects‘ life-cycle
plans and quarterly reports in the Chemical and Biological National
Security research area and much of the Proliferation Detection research
area did not contain the required information. In the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area, for example, lack of data
occurs because this research area allocates funds to all projects in
the area in a single allotment to each national laboratory rather than
to individual projects (as is done for the other research areas). As a
result, projects‘ life-cycle plans and quarterly reports for this
research area at each laboratory are consolidated into single
laboratory-wide reports from which it is difficult to glean specific
project data. Officials from this research area were therefore unable
to provide us with even a list of their ongoing projects. The program
maintains a program management information system to track the
distribution of funding from NNSA headquarters to individual projects
at the national laboratories. However, the system is not designed to
capture--on an individual project, research area, or programwide basis-
-whether projects are on time or within budget. Instead, program
managers obtain project progress and budget information largely through
personal interaction with project leaders at the laboratories. This
report recommends strengthening project plans, reports, and information
systems to better capture individual project milestones and
expenditures.
Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
developed by NNSA‘s R&D program have found the technology useful, but
some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-
term and short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. According to program officials, long-term
technology needs are not always well understood by users, and current
technologies will eventually become obsolete and/or understood by
adversaries. Therefore, new capabilities through long-term research
must be constantly pursued. However, some users said that, faced with
the continuing terrorist threat, NNSA‘s R&D program needs to
concentrate on communicating with and addressing the immediate needs of
the user and ’first responder“ communities. For example, according to
an official with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
while it is satisfied with the technologies already provided by NNSA,
no federal agency is currently offering the Transit Authority short-or
long-term assistance with its needs for post-attack chemical and
biological decontamination technology tailored to a metropolitan subway
system. Several national laboratory officials and users told us that
this conflict between short-and long-term priorities has created a gap
in which the most important immediate needs of users or highest risks
are, in some cases, going unaddressed in favor of an advanced
technology that can only be delivered over the long-term.[Footnote 5]
To better set priorities and define its role in the post-September 11th
counterterrorism R&D efforts, the director of NNSA‘s R&D program said
that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of Homeland
Security and is working to better ’advertise“ the program‘s projects
and capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security.
Relatedly, to better prioritize and guide counterterrorism R&D efforts
across the federal government, we have previously recommended that a
national counterterrorism R&D strategy be developed with the
participation of federal agencies and state and local authorities to
reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is especially
important as the President and the Congress work toward the creation of
a new Department of Homeland Security that, as currently envisioned,
will assume leadership of federal counterterrorism R&D activities,
including the Chemical and Biological National Security research area
and certain activities of the Proliferation Detection research area.
Within the context of this strategy, this report recommends that NNSA‘s
R&D program work with the Office of Homeland Security (or, if
eventually created, the Department of Homeland Security) to clarify the
agency‘s role in conjunction with other federal R&D efforts and to
involve potential technology users in the R&D process. This
recommendation could assist the program and the Office of Homeland
Security to better leverage R&D funding and the technical knowledge of
DOE‘s national laboratories to meet the short-and long-term needs of
users.
We provided a draft copy of this report to NNSA for its review and
comment. NNSA agreed with the draft report‘s findings and
recommendations.
Background:
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most
serious dangers confronting the United States today and will likely
continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Responsibility for
thwarting this proliferation is shouldered by numerous federal agencies
and by many individual departments within these agencies. Each of these
departments brings a specific perspective, strength, and knowledge base
to bear on an aspect of the large and complex proliferation problem.
NNSA and its Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
Program (R&D program) are key players in the United States‘
nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its
unique understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and
nuclear power, based in large measure on the world-class research,
design, and engineering capabilities to be found in the
multidisciplinary DOE national laboratories that conduct basic and
applied research in many areas--from high-energy physics to advanced
computing. As of May 31, 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program‘s 220 projects were in various developmental stages: from
research conducted to develop an idea and assess the feasibility of
producing a prototype, to field demonstrating a prototype prior to its
transfer to an end user. Some examples of successful research projects
conducted by NNSA‘s Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
include:
* The development of ground-based technology for detecting in real time
short-lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and
satellite-based detectors that are sensitive to x-ray, gamma ray, and
neutron emissions. These projects were developed by the Nuclear
Explosion Monitoring research area.
* Detection equipment, developed by the Proliferation Detection
research area, that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over the
World Trade Center site to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals.
* A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of
congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and equipment
to detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, D.C.,
Metro subway system was developed by the Chemical and Biological
National Security research area.
Of the $1.2 Billion That the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
Program Received over 5 Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA
National Laboratories:
Nearly 75 percent of the $1.2 billion that NNSA‘s R&D program was
appropriated over the past 5 years was distributed to Los Alamos,
Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. According to
program officials, these laboratories received the majority of the
funding because most of the needed expertise for the program‘s projects
is resident at these laboratories. The remaining funding was
distributed to other DOE laboratories and facilities. NNSA‘s R&D
program received a total appropriation of $322 million in fiscal year
2002, with the most funding spent on R&D of Proliferation Detection
projects.
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
Received the Majority of Program Funding:
From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, $1.2 billion was
appropriated to NNSA‘s R&D program. There was little annual variation
in the program‘s funding between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001,
averaging about $218 million per year. (See fig. 1.) However, the
program received a significant increase in fiscal year 2002, and was
appropriated about $323 million--including $78 million the program
received in the
$40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act passed in the
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA‘s Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Funding for fiscal year 2002 includes $244 million in the Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Act for 2002 (P.L. 107-66)--about
$36 million of which was for construction of the Nonproliferation and
International Security Center (NISC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory-
-and $78 million received under the 2001 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks
on the United States (P.L. 107-38).
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data from NNSA.
[End of figure]
Of the $1.2 billion appropriated to NNSA‘s R&D program from fiscal year
1998 through fiscal year 2002, nearly 75 percent was distributed for
R&D efforts at three of DOE‘s nuclear weapons laboratories--Sandia and
Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico ($352.4 million and
$313.6 million, respectively) and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in California ($228.2 million). (See table 1.) Fourteen
percent was distributed to other national laboratories, including,
among others, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington
($85.0 million) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Y-12 Plant in
Tennessee ($35.1 million). Six percent was distributed to universities,
industry (including small businesses), and other governmental agencies.
For example, nearly $240,000 was obligated to the U.S. Army for
chemical and biological agent detection research. Finally, about 5
percent or $58.8 million has been spent from fiscal year 2000 through
fiscal year 2002 to build the NISC at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
This center (that NNSA estimates will cost a total of $63 million
before construction is complete in fiscal year 2003) will provide
consolidated office and laboratory space for nonproliferation R&D
activities that are currently housed in 47 different structures--many
of which, according to NNSA, are old and substandard--across the 43-
square mile Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
Dollars in millions.
Facility: Sandia National Laboratory; 1998: $68.2; 1999: $68.8; 2000:
$71.8;
2001: $66.8; 2002: $76.8; Total: $352.4; Percent: 29.5.
Facility: Los Alamos National Laboratory; 1998: 60.2; 1999: 56.0; 2000:
56.1;
2001: 60.6; 2002: 80.7; Total: 313.6; Percent: 26.3.
Facility: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; 1998: 36.3; 1999:
37.9; 2000:
43.0; 2001: 42.6; 2002: 68.4; Total: 228.2; Percent: 19.1.
Facility: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; 1998: 15.5; 1999:
17.0; 2000:
17.9; 2001: 18.5; 2002: 16.1; Total: 85.0; Percent: 7.1.
Facility: Nonproliferation and International Security Center
(Construction);
1998: 0.0; 1999: 0.0; 2000: 6.0; 2001: 17.0; 2002: 35.8; Total: 58.8;
Percent: 4.9.
Facility: Oak Ridge National Laboratory/Y-12 Plant; 1998: 5.8; 1999:
6.6; 2000:
7.1; 2001: 8.2; 2002: 7.4; Total: 35.1; Percent: 2.9.
Facility: Argonne National Laboratory; 1998: 2.0; 1999: 2.0; 2000: 3.2;
2001:
2.6; 2002: 4.2; Total: 14.0; Percent: 1.2.
Facility: Savannah River Technology Center; 1998: 2.1; 1999: 2.5; 2000:
2.2;
2001: 2.2; 2002: 4.0; Total: 13.0; Percent: 1.1.
Facility: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory;
1998: 2.8;
1999: 2.2; 2000: 1.8; 2001: 1.5; 2002: 1.1; Total: 9.4; Percent: 1.0.
Facility: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; 1998: 1.3; 1999: 1.1;
2000: 1.9;
2001: 2.5; 2002: 2.1; Total: 8.9; Percent: 1.0.
Facility: Brookhaven National Laboratory; 1998: 1.2; 1999: 1.0; 2000:
1.0; 2001:
0.7; 2002: 0.5; Total: 4.4; Percent: Less than 1.
All others; 1998: 14.4; 1999: 7.6; 2000: 8.7; 2001: 15.1; 2002: 25.5;
Total: 71.3; Percent: 6.0.
Facility: Total; 1998: $210.0; 1999: $202.6; 2000: $220.5; 2001:
$238.2; 2002:
$322.6; Total: $1,193.9; Percent: 100.
Note: Totals may not add because of rounding.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data from NNSA.
[End of table]
Proliferation Detection Projects Received the Most Funding in Fiscal
Year 2002:
In fiscal year 2002, R&D activities in the Proliferation Detection
research area received 37 percent of the $323 million appropriated to
NNSA‘s R&D program. The Chemical and Biological National Security
research area received 26 percent and the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
research area received 23 percent.[Footnote 6] (See fig. 2.):
Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program‘s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data from NNSA.
[End of figure]
The Proliferation Detection research area received about $119 million
in fiscal year 2002. The largest single amount ($11.2 million) was
obligated to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for R&D of remote
spectroscopy technology. While many of the specific applications and
characteristics of this technology are classified, the systems
developed are used by several defense and intelligence agencies in a
variety of arms control and treaty verification activities. The
technology developed is particularly useful in identifying chemical
releases associated with proliferation activities. For example, these
systems can be used to detect chemical signatures of agents released on
a battlefield. One of these systems was also used at the World Trade
Center site after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to monitor
for hazardous chemicals that might affect construction workers.
Chemical and Biological National Security R&D efforts received
$81.1 million in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $39.1 million was
spent on demonstration programs of integrated chemical and biological
detection systems. Examples of these systems include the chemical agent
detection system installed in one station of the Washington, D.C.,
Metro subway system and a biological agent detection system that was
deployed at the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.
R&D of Nuclear Explosion Monitoring technologies received $75.6 million
in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $54.5 million was spent primarily
at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories to provide satellite
sensors for monitoring nuclear explosions in the earth‘s atmosphere and
in space. These sensors are installed on U.S. Air Force Global
Positioning System satellites and on Defense Support Program early
warning satellites. The remaining funds in this research area were
spent developing and installing ground-based sensors for monitoring
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underground, and underwater and
for developing computer software used by the operator of the U.S.
system for monitoring nuclear explosions--the Air Force Technical
Applications Center--to analyze data obtained from these sensors.
Two of Three Research Areas in NNSA‘s R&D Program Have No Process to
Identify Users‘ Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor Project
Progress:
In contrast to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, the
Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
Security research areas lack a process to identify users‘ needs and do
not have sufficient information to oversee project progress. For these
latter two research areas, input from specific users is often not
sought prior to funding research projects because the research in these
two areas is, in many cases, considered to be long-term and the
feasibility of the resulting technology is usually unknown. In
addition, although required to have project life-cycle plans and
quarterly reports that contain detailed information on a project‘s time
frames, milestones, users, and deliverables, we found that many of
these plans and reports for the two research areas lacked these data.
Furthermore, NNSA‘s R&D program management information system is not
designed to capture whether projects are on time or within budget,
eliminating an important tool that program managers could use to
monitor their projects.
User Input to the Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological
National Security Research Areas Is Limited:
In the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, specific R&D
projects originate in a classified presidential directive that sets
broad guidelines for a U.S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions.
These broad guidelines are then refined through an interagency process
that includes agencies of the Department of Defense and the
intelligence community to leverage resources and prevent duplication.
Specific requirements for technologies are then transmitted to the
Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area and specific statements of
work and memorandums of understanding are signed between the research
area and users of the technology--primarily the Air Force Technical
Applications Center--that specify each party‘s responsibilities. The
Air Force Technical Applications Center has the operational
responsibility for ground-based and satellite-based sensor systems that
provide technical data for verification of nuclear test ban treaties
and nuclear explosion monitoring. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
research area in NNSA‘s R&D program is the principal developer of
technology for the Air Force Technical Applications Center. As such,
the two parties enjoy a close relationship. This relationship has been
facilitated by the fact that some of the test ban treaties the Center
is responsible for monitoring--such as the 1974 Threshold Test Ban
Treaty between the then Soviet Union and the United States that
prohibited underground nuclear explosions above a yield of 150
kilotons--contain detailed monitoring and verification procedures. In
addition, operational requirements documents for the U.S. system for
monitoring nuclear explosions also contain detailed technical
guidelines for researchers conducting R&D for NNSA‘s program to follow.
Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
Security Research Areas Often Do Not Seek User Input before Funding
Projects:
In the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
Security research areas, the process for identifying users‘ needs and
developing R&D projects differs from Nuclear Explosion Monitoring.
Instead of beginning with formal, detailed requirements, projects in
these research areas often are of a more exploratory nature, requiring
several years of work before usable technologies are mature and ready
for real world application. User input is often not sought prior to
funding such research because, according to program managers and
national laboratory officials we spoke with, users are often focused on
their immediate operational needs and are unable to define requirements
for technology whose feasibility is still unknown.
In February 2000 and again in March 2002, advisory committees to NNSA
reported that the diverse environment of users--such as the federal
government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others--
makes the task of transferring the knowledge and technology developed
by the NNSA R&D program especially challenging.[Footnote 7] To maximize
the prospects for successful transfer, the advisory committees
recommended that communications with potential users should be opened
as early as possible and proceed through all phases of the work
(research, development, and demonstration). According to the advisory
committees, it is important that in the earliest phases of concept
formulation, prospective users be made aware of the potential
technological and scientific advances. In addition, uncertainties need
to be communicated as well to minimize surprises. The February 2000
advisory committee report recognized the need for exploratory projects
designed to see whether a technical idea with a plausible application
to a nuclear, chemical, or biological nonproliferation mission is
feasible. In these cases, seeking input from a user of the technology
might not be necessary until technical feasibility has been proven.
However, the advisory committee also reported that, in general, users
should be involved at the earliest stages of the R&D process and
guidelines should be established to define when exceptions to this are
allowed. In addition, involving users at such an early stage may
achieve unexpected benefits. For example, the March 2002 advisory
committee report notes that ’brainstorming with potential end-users can
sometimes lead to innovative ideas for new technologies.“:
In response to the February 2000 advisory committee report, NNSA‘s R&D
program reported that it recognized the importance of involving
potential end users of the technology at the earliest date and that it
would continue to emphasize that relationship.[Footnote 8] Part of the
Proliferation Detection research area--the former Deterring
Proliferation research area--has begun within the past year to
establish a process of regular project reviews with user participation.
Under this process, program managers and potential users conduct
regular reviews of each project before key decisions are made, such as
whether to proceed from exploratory research into product development.
The reviews examine how well the project is linked to user needs, the
strength of the researchers‘ scientific or technical approach, and the
researchers‘ ability to carry out the project effectively and
efficiently. Users are also involved in broader planning initiatives in
this area. For example, program managers consulted with officials from
the Department of Defense, Department of State, Coast Guard, Customs
Service, and agencies of the intelligence community, among others, when
preparing a ’strategic outlook“ for the research area as well as
science and technology ’roadmaps“ that are intended to guide future R&D
activities in this research area. However, this system has not yet been
adopted in the remainder of the Proliferation Detection research area-
-the projects conducting R&D of long-range detector technologies, for
example--or in the Chemical and Biological National Security research
area. Program officials told us that they are looking at ways of
adopting the system across the entire program.
Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological National Security
Research Areas Lack a Transparent System to Monitor Project Progress:
To determine whether strategic and annual performance goals for
effective and efficient use of resources are being met, standards for
internal control in the federal government require that program
managers have access to relevant, reliable, and timely operational and
financial data.[Footnote 9] In 1999, the National Research Council
examined ways to improve project management at DOE. Specifically, the
Research Council reported that DOE‘s project documentation was not up
to the standards of the private sector and other government
agencies.[Footnote 10] The Research Council recommended that DOE should
mandate a reporting system that provides the data necessary for each
level of management to track and communicate the cost, schedule, and
scope of a project.
To monitor the progress of NNSA R&D projects by headquarters program
managers, participating laboratories are required to submit, on an
annual basis, project life-cycle plans. These plans are supposed to
contain detailed statements of work that describe the project‘s
contributions to overall program goals, scientific and technical merit,
and the specific tasks to be accomplished. In addition, laboratories
are required to submit quarterly reports that indicate all projects‘
progress to date, issues and problems encountered, milestones and
schedules, and cost data. However, in the Proliferation Detection and
the Chemical and Biological National Security research areas, these
plans and reports are often missing these data, and the program
management information system is not designed to track whether projects
are on time or budget, eliminating an important tool that could be used
to track projects, improve communications across the program, and
provide transparency to other agencies and the Congress.
Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research Area Has Sufficient Information
to Monitor Projects:
Project life-cycle plans for the 10 projects funded in the Nuclear
Explosion Monitoring research area in fiscal year 2002 all contain
information on the project‘s objectives and users of the technology.
They also contain annual statements of work that detail time frames,
milestones, and specific deliverables. Quarterly reports for projects
in this research area detail project expenditures, progress in meeting
milestones, and deliverables completed. Thus, program managers at
headquarters have information to monitor projects in this research area
and the primary user of these technologies--the Air Force Technical
Applications Center--reports that time frames and milestones are
routinely met.
Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological National Security
Research Area Plans and Reports Are Incomplete:
Detailed information to monitor project progress is more limited in the
Proliferation Detection research area. Of the 124 projects funded in
fiscal year 2002, over half of the projects‘ life-cycle plans are
missing information on potential users of the technology, time frames
and milestones, and/or detailed statements of work that specify
deliverables to be produced. For example, a project at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory to detect nuclear materials in transit
received $1.2 million in fiscal year 2002, but the project life-cycle
plan for this project contained no information on users of the
technology, the schedule of the project, or how the funds were to be
expended. In addition, many of the life-cycle plans make no distinction
between users that potentially would receive the technology and users
that are actually involved in the R&D process. Moreover, some projects‘
life-cycle plans have not been recently updated to show the actual
completion of project deliverables. For example, Sandia National
Laboratory has received nearly $120 million since fiscal year 1993 to
develop and demonstrate space-based imaging technology for
nonproliferation treaty monitoring and other national security and
civilian applications. However, its project life-cycle plan has not
been updated with the dates deliverables were received or milestones
that were accomplished since 1999.
Project monitoring is even more difficult in the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area. Rather than funding
projects individually, as is done in the other research areas, annual
funding for projects in this area is consolidated into a single
allotment for each national laboratory conducting research. As a
result, projects‘ life-cycle plans and quarterly reports are
consolidated into a single report encompassing all chemical and
biological R&D activities at a specific laboratory. Obtaining project
specific expenditure, time frame and milestone, and deliverable data
from this consolidated report is difficult. As a result, officials from
this research area were unable to provide us with even a list of their
ongoing projects. According to the program manager for the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area, this problem will be
addressed when individual project reporting is implemented in fiscal
year 2003.
Program-Management Information System Is Not Designed to Track whether
Projects Are on Time or Budget:
NNSA‘s R&D program maintains a program-management information system to
track the distribution of funding from NNSA headquarters to individual
projects at the national laboratories. However, because project funding
for chemical and biological R&D is consolidated into allotments for
entire laboratories, financial information for individual projects in
the Chemical and Biological National Security research area is not
readily available. According to the program manager of the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area, individual project
financial information will be added to the project management
information system in fiscal year 2003. Moreover, the system is not
designed to capture on an individual-project, research-area, or
programwide basis, whether individual projects are on time or within
budget. While in some cases this information is available in projects‘
life-cycle plans and quarterly reports, these documents are only
updated periodically, and program managers lack a system that can
provide, on a continuous basis, data on project expenditures and
schedules. Instead, program managers rely on other means, such as
personal interaction with project leaders at the national laboratories
and other types of project records, to obtain this information.
Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed by NNSA, but Some
Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed:
Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
developed by NNSA‘s R&D program, in general, found the technology
useful and said that they had an effective relationship with the
program. However, some questioned whether the program is achieving the
right mix of long-and short-term research. DOE national laboratory
officials told us that this conflict between short-and long-term
priorities has created a gap in which the most important immediate
needs of users may be going unaddressed in favor of an advanced
technology that can only be delivered over the long-term.
Federal, State, and Local Agencies That Use the Program‘s Technology
Are Generally Satisfied:
Of the 13 agencies we contacted, all have found the technology received
from NNSA‘s R&D program useful and told us that they enjoyed an
effective working relationship with the program. For instance, the Navy
Special Reconnaissance Program works with NNSA‘s R&D program in the
research and development of sophisticated imagery technology that is
used on Navy aircraft deployed throughout the world. A Navy official
said that this imagery technology is routinely used to collect critical
intelligence for policy makers and that the Navy has a very effective
relationship with NNSA. He told us that the Navy regards scientists in
this program as the foremost experts on these complex systems and that
similar efforts conducted by the private sector do not compare in terms
of capability and quality. Similarly, Utah Department of Health
officials said the biological detection equipment demonstrated by the
R&D program at the 2002 Winter Olympics constituted an important tool
in its counterterrorism efforts at the event. These officials told us
that they especially appreciated that they were always treated as an
important client by NNSA‘s R&D program. For example, unlike many
private vendors that approached the department with chemical and
biological detection technology, NNSA‘s R&D program was willing to
share important validation data with the department to verify that the
technology would perform as intended. Likewise, an official with the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority indicated that he had
been impressed by the collaborative work involving the R&D program and
other federal agencies and considered this collaboration a model
relationship between federal and local agencies. Other federal agencies
that told us NNSA‘s technologies are useful included the Department of
State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Air
Force Technical Applications Center, Department of Transportation, and
Federal Transit Administration.
Some of these agencies also told us that they have been approached by
the R&D program with technologies that they neither requested nor found
particularly useful for their missions. Such comments were made by
officials with the Department of State, Navy Special Reconnaissance
Program, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Counter Proliferation Programs, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. However, officials from
these agencies also noted that, although the technologies were not
requested or found useful for their missions, being approached by the
program was useful. This is because the R&D program‘s presentations
helped them understand the capabilities of the program in the event
that these technologies were needed in the future.
A Gap Exists between Users‘ Short-Term Needs and the Program‘s
Long-Term R&D Focus:
Long-term R&D to develop capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond
to terrorism using weapons of mass destruction is essential. However,
some users questioned whether the program was achieving the right mix
between long-and short-term research. Some said that, faced with the
continuing threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction,
NNSA‘s R&D program needs to concentrate on communicating with and
addressing the immediate needs of the user and first responder
communities. For example, according to an official with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NNSA‘s R&D program--along with
other federal agencies conducting similar research--is not currently
offering the Transit Authority assistance with its immediate need for
post-attack chemical and biological decontamination technology
tailored to a metropolitan subway system. An official with the Air
Force Technical Applications Center stated that the focus of the R&D
program needs to be on users‘ immediate needs rather than long-term
advanced research. This official added that the longer a project
continues, the more likely that personnel changes or programmatic
inefficiencies would limit opportunities for the eventual completion of
the project and the successful transfer of technologies to
users.[Footnote 11] Officials from NNSA‘s R&D program disagreed,
telling us that the program is better able to address short-term
requirements only because it has been conducting advanced research on
the concepts underlying technologies required by the users. Often, this
type of advanced research is long-term in nature.
Two officials with the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories told
us that this conflict between short-and long-term priorities has
created a gap in which the most important immediate needs of users or
highest risks may be going unaddressed in favor of an advanced
technology that can only be delivered over the long-term. According to
these officials, there is a disconnect between what the users and the
laboratories believe is the laboratories‘ mission. The laboratories
believe that, by focusing on the long-term, the R&D program is able to
anticipate users‘ long-term needs and look beyond users‘ immediate
requirements. Users feel that they have urgent short-term needs that
cannot wait for long-term development. According to a national
laboratory official, the philosophy of the laboratories must change.
This official indicated that research emphasis must be placed on those
areas where the greatest risks exist, such as from chemical or
biological attack. He strongly cautioned that, although long-term
research is important, it is imperative that the usefulness of this
research be clearly established in advance and as quickly as possible,
given counterterrorism technology‘s crucial importance in the current
war against terrorism.
R&D Program Officials Also Believe That the Program‘s Role in Homeland
Defense Needs to Be Better Defined:
To better set priorities and define its role in the post-September 11th
counterterrorism R&D efforts, the director of NNSA‘s R&D program said
that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of Homeland
Security and is working to better ’advertise“ the program‘s projects
and capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security. We found that such
advertisement has met with limited success. For instance, the
President‘s fiscal year 2003 homeland security budget did not discuss
NNSA‘s role in the research and development of detection technology for
chemical and biological agents, although other federal efforts such as
those conducted by the Department of Defense and the National
Institutes of Health were specifically addressed. In addition, the
fiscal year 2003 homeland security budget stated that DOE was not
involved in bioterrorism research and development even though NNSA‘s
R&D program is requesting $35 million for bioterrorism research in its
fiscal year 2003 budget.
In our September 2001 report, we noted that federal R&D programs to
combat terrorism are coordinated in a variety of ways, but this
coordination is limited by a number of factors, raising the potential
for duplication of efforts among different federal agencies. [Footnote
12] This limited coordination also raises the possibility that
immediate needs may not be adequately addressed. For example, officials
with the Utah Department of Health told us the federal community has
only been responsive in providing technology to detect attacks and has
not offered assistance in responding to an attack that would include
tracking secondary exposure, population quarantine, decontamination,
and cleanup. Therefore, we recommended in the September 2001 report
that a national counterterrorism R&D strategy be developed with the
participation of federal agencies and state and local authorities to
reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is especially
important as the President and the Congress work toward the
organization of a new Department of Homeland Security that, as
currently envisioned, will assume leadership of federal
counterterrorism R&D activities. As proposed, the Chemical and
Biological National Security research area and the nuclear smuggling
and homeland security activities of the Proliferation Detection
research area would be transferred from NNSA to the proposed Department
of Homeland Security.
Conclusions:
NNSA‘s Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program has developed
numerous successful technologies that aid the defense and intelligence
communities and is an important player in the current U.S. effort to
combat terrorism. While users are generally pleased with the technology
the program has provided them, the program‘s management information
system for monitoring its projects--especially for the Proliferation
Detection and the Chemical and Biological National Security research
areas--does not provide adequate information to monitor project
progress. Standards for internal control in the federal government
require that important information such as progress in meeting
milestones, costs, user feedback, and deliverables needs to be
collected and made available more systematically to program managers
and to external stakeholders such as the Congress. Improved project
life-cycle plans, quarterly reports, and information systems that track
project data could be useful for program managers to monitor the
projects in their research areas and to better communicate project
progress to users and to other agencies conducting R&D.
It is important for the program to seek a balance between addressing
the immediate R&D needs of users and looking beyond the horizon at
advanced technologies for the future. Some users are concerned that the
program‘s focus is on long-term research. As a result, some feel that
the most important immediate risks may be ignored in favor of long-term
research activities being conducted at the national laboratories. While
we agree that maintaining basic research capabilities is critical, the
urgency of the current war on terrorism requires that NNSA‘s R&D
program clarify its role in relation to other agencies conducting R&D,
systematically involve potential technology users in the R&D process,
and seek a balance between short-and long-term activities. The ability
of the program to successfully transfer new technologies to users could
be strengthened by giving potential users opportunities to participate
at every stage of the research and development process. Communicating
with technology users and receiving clear guidance from the Office of
Homeland Security--or the Department of Homeland Security, if
established--on what the highest priorities are and how NNSA and the
DOE national laboratories can play a role in addressing those
priorities could assist program managers in their efforts to prioritize
and plan future R&D work.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program‘s
management of its R&D efforts, we recommend that the Administrator of
NNSA take the following actions:
* Ensure that all of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
Program‘s projects‘ life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain
complete data on project objectives, progress in meeting milestones,
user feedback, funding, and deliverables and upgrade the program‘s
project management information system to track all of this information
to enhance program management by providing timely data to program
managers and assist communications with users and other agencies
conducting R&D.
* Work with the Office of Homeland Security (or the Department of
Homeland Security, if established) to clarify the Nonproliferation and
Verification R&D Program‘s role in relation to other agencies
conducting counterterrorism R&D and to achieve an appropriate balance
between short-term and long-term research. In addition, to improve the
program‘s ability to successfully transfer new technologies to users,
the program should, in cooperation with the Office of Homeland
Security, allow users opportunities to provide input through all phases
of R&D projects.
Agency Comments:
We provided NNSA with a draft copy of this report for its review and
comment. NNSA‘s written comments are presented in appendix II. NNSA
agreed with the draft report‘s findings and recommendations.
Specifically, NNSA said that it will apply the technical capabilities
of NNSA and the national laboratories to work with agencies using
technologies developed by the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
Program to focus on users‘ short-term operational mission requirements
while maintaining the program‘s ability to meet users‘ long-term needs.
In addition, NNSA said that it is in the process of updating the
program‘s management information system and that its efforts to
implement a corporate planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation
system will help address some of the program‘s project management
issues.
We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, NNSA; the
Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State;
the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Office of Homeland
Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate
congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report were Gene
Aloise, Robert J. Baney, Ryan T. Coles, and Melissa A. Roye.
(Ms.) Gary L. Jones
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Gary L. Jones:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past
5 years and the program‘s distribution of this funding to the national
laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its 3 research
areas;
(2) extent to which the program identifies users‘ needs and monitors
project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local agencies
of the usefulness of program-developed technology, particularly in
light of heightened homeland security concerns following September 11,
2001.
To determine the amount of funding received by the National Nuclear
Security Administration‘s (NNSA) research and development (R&D) program
from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002 and the program‘s
distribution of that funding to the national laboratories in the field,
we examined each of the research area‘s financial plans, quarterly
project reports, and project life-cycle plans. In addition, we queried
the R&D program‘s project management information system for detailed
information on each project in the R&D program. We also examined the
R&D program‘s funding projections for fiscal year 2003 and analyzed
NNSA‘s Future-Years Nuclear Security Program report to the Congress,
dated March 2002, which shows funding estimates for fiscal years 2003
through 2007. We further reviewed the Office of Homeland Security‘s
fiscal year 2003 budget report that describes the level of funding
various federal agencies, including NNSA, will be requesting to combat
domestic terrorism.
To determine the extent to which the R&D program identifies users‘
needs and monitors project progress, we analyzed data from several
different sources, including reports and memorandums generated by the
R&D program office, independent reviews done on the R&D program by NNSA
advisory committees, and procedures used in selecting specific R&D
program projects for funding. With regard to R&D program office reports
and memorandums, we reviewed, among other things, the NNSA Strategic
Plan, dated February 2002, and strategic plans prepared by the Nuclear
Explosion Monitoring area, dated January 2002; Chemical and Biological
National Security research area, dated spring of 2000; and Deterring
Proliferation area, dated December 2001. The Proliferation Detection
research area had not yet prepared a strategic plan at the time of our
review. In addition, we reviewed various memorandums outlining NNSA‘s
efforts to develop an integrated programming, planning, budgeting, and
evaluation process. With regard to independent reviews done on the R&D
program, we analyzed several specific studies. These analyses included
the Institute for Defense Analysis‘ study entitled The Organization and
Management of the Nuclear Weapons Program, dated March 1997; the
Department of Energy‘s (DOE) Nonproliferation and National Security
Advisory Committee‘s review entitled DOE Research and Technology
against the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, dated February 2000;
and the NNSA advisory committee‘s report entitled Science & Technology
in the NNSA Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs, dated March
2002.
To obtain the views of federal, state, and local agencies about the
usefulness of the R&D program‘s technology, we interviewed officials at
the Department of Transportation, Office of Intelligence and Security;
Department of State, Office of Technology and Assessments; Navy Special
Reconnaissance Program; Defense Intelligence Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases; Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical and
Biological Defense Directorate; Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Counter Proliferation and Chemical and
Biological Defense; Air Force Technical Applications Center; Federal
Transit Administration; Utah Department of Health; Association of
Public Health Laboratories, Infectious Disease Programs; and Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Counter-Terrorism Development.
We also reviewed how the R&D program works in conjunction with other
federal R&D programs by analyzing NNSA‘s reports and statements,
reports generated by other federal executive entities, and interviewing
individuals who serve on interagency coordinating bodies. With respect
to NNSA‘s reports and statements, we analyzed NNSA‘s Report to the
Congress on the Organization and Operations of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, dated February 25, 2002, and the statement by
the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and
Engineering, NNSA, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, dated April 10,
2002. With regard to reports generated by other federal executive
entities, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget‘s Fiscal Year
2001 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism and the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee‘s report entitled
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism, dated October 2001. We also
interviewed officials who serve on interagency coordinating bodies,
including officials both within and outside NNSA. For instance, we
discussed interagency coordination with the NNSA program managers for
the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Proliferation Detection areas. We
also discussed interagency coordination with officials at the Office of
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter Proliferation and
Chemical and Biological Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and
Department of State.
We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585:
AUG 14 2002:
Ms. Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U. S. General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Jones:
The General Accounting Office‘s draft report GAO-02-904,
’NONPROLIFERATION R&D: NNSA‘s Program Develops Successful
Technologies, But Project Management Can Be Strengthened,“ was reviewed
by NNSA. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was requested to review
the Nonproliferation R&D program to determine (1) the funding received
through Fiscal Year 2002, future years‘ budgets, and how the funding
received has been distributed throughout DOE and the laboratories; (2)
whether there is duplication between this program and efforts conducted
by other agencies; (3) the internal DOE process used to determine which
R&D technologies are funded; and (4) the effectiveness of the
technologies developed by the program, including identification of how
these technologies have been utilized by DOE and others.
GAO concluded that: (1) the program has developed numerous successful
technologies that aid the defense and intelligence communities and is
an important player in the current effort to combat terrorism; (2) the
program‘s management information system for monitoring projects does
not provide adequate information to monitor project progress; (3) while
GAO agreed that maintaining basic research capabilities is critical,
the urgency of the current war on terrorism requires the R&D program to
clarify its role in relation to other agencies conducting R&D,
systematically involve potential technology users in the process, and
seek a balance between short-and long-term activities; and (4) the
ability of the program to successfully transfer new technologies to
users could be strengthened by giving potential users opportunities to
participate at every stage of the process.
We appreciate the fact that GAO acknowledges the Nonproliferation R&D
program‘s efforts in combating terrorism as well as their efforts in
supporting elements of the Department of Defense and Intelligence
Community. While the program is intrinsically linked to the U.S.
Government‘s Nonproliferation Program, we accept the report‘s
recommendation to work with user agencies to achieve the appropriate
balance between near-term and long-term technology development. We will
apply the technical base of the NNSA and the National:
Laboratories to work with those agencies to focus on their operational
mission requirements (short-term focus) while maintaining the ability
to meet these agencies‘ long-term evolving needs. We are in the process
of updating the program‘s management information system. The efforts of
implementing an NNSA corporate Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Evaluation system will go along way to addressing some of these issues.
The upgrade of the management information system will provide yet
another level of detail.
We further appreciate the many positive comments in the GAO draft
report and want to reiterate the fact that the Nonproliferation R&D
program has realized substantial returns of investment over the years.
We will carry that ethic into the new relationships with the Homeland
Security element. We will provide detailed responses to the report‘s
recommendations after the report has been issued in its final form.
Sincerely yours,
Anthony R. Lane Associate Administrator for Management and
Administration:
Signed by Anthony R. Lane:
cc:Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] NNSA was created in March 2000 as a separately organized agency
within the Department of Energy. It is responsible for enhancing the
safety, reliability, and performance of the nation‘s nuclear weapons;
maintaining the nation‘s ability to design, produce, and test nuclear
weapons; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
and designing, building, and maintaining naval nuclear propulsion
systems.
[2] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world.
The mission of its 23 national laboratories has evolved. Originally
created to design and build atomic bombs, these laboratories have since
expanded to conduct basic and applied research in many disciplines--
from high-energy physics to advanced computing.
[3] Other federal agencies--such as the Department of Defense, National
Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
intelligence agencies--share responsibility with NNSA for
counterterrorism R&D efforts and develop complementary technologies
designed to detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass
destruction. For example, the Department of Defense is developing
technology to protect combatants from chemical and biological agents,
and the National Institutes of Health are developing new or improved
vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals in the event of a biological
attack.
[4] Prior to fiscal year 2002, the program had a Deterring
Proliferation research area that developed short-range radiation
detection technologies, advanced nuclear materials analysis methods,
and microtechnologies for detection and analysis of proliferation
activities. In October 2001, the efforts of this research area were
consolidated into the Proliferation Detection research area.
[5] We were given several specific examples by users of risks they
believe are going unaddressed in favor of long-term technology research
at the national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.
[6] Over the course of our review, we analyzed financial data provided
by NNSA dating back to fiscal year 1996 to attempt to find trends in
the distribution of funding to each research area. However, NNSA‘s R&D
program changed how its research areas were organized and how funds
were distributed to them several times since 1996. Therefore, annual
distributions of funding to each research area are not comparable.
[7] Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and National Security
Advisory Committee, DOE Research and Technology Against the Threat of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Review of the Department of Energy Office
of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NN-20) (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2000), and Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration Advisory Committee, Science & Technology in the NNSA
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
1, 2002).
[8] Department of Energy, Report to the Committees on Appropriations
Regarding the Status of Implementing the Recommendations of the
Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory Committee Review of the
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program
(Washington, D.C.: 2001).
[9] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999), and U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control
Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August
2001).
[10] National Research Council, Improving Project Management in the
Department of Energy (Washington, D.C.: 1999).
[11] We were given several specific examples by users of risks they
believe are going unaddressed in favor of long-term technology research
at the national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001).
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