Weapons of Mass Destruction
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites Gao ID: GAO-03-482 March 24, 2003Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE.
The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-482, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
March 2003:
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to
Improve Security at Russian Sites:
GAO-03-482:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-482, a report to Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Security, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to
poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout
Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the
Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more
than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S.
programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1)
weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3)
dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For
each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites
in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the
primary challenges facing DOD and DOE.
What GAO Found:
The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in
helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass
destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is
not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is
little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future.
DOE plans to help secure Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material by
2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result,
most of DOE‘s expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other
than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed
equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important,
these efforts do not advance DOE‘s objective of protecting all
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material.
DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear
warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies
will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will
secure sites in both of their plans.
DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49
sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs.
Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some
sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement
to implement this assistance have also stalled.
DOD‘s efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction
facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years
before Russia‘s nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has
improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia‘s stockpile
remains vulnerable to theft.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE re-evaluate its plans for securing
Russia‘s nuclear material, and with DOD, develop an integrated plan to
ensure coordination of efforts to secure Russia‘s nuclear warheads.
GAO also recommends that DOD develop criteria to guide efforts to
secure biological pathogens and revisit its decision not to secure
additional chemical weapons sites. DOD agreed with 3 of our 4
recommendations. DOD did not agree to improve security at
additional chemical weapons sites. DOE did not comment on our
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-482.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A.
Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
Letter:
Executive Summary:
Purpose:
Background:
Results in Brief:
Principal Findings:
Conclusion:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Chapter 1: Introduction:
Chapter 2: Lack of Access to Nuclear Material Sites Hinders Program
Completion:
DOE Plans to Secure All Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material by
2008:
DOE Has Made Uneven Progress Securing Nuclear Material in Russia:
Access to Sensitive Sites Remains a Barrier to Completing Security
Improvements by 2008:
Conclusion:
Recommendation:
Chapter 3: DOD and DOE Have Had Mixed Success Protecting Nuclear
Warheads:
DOD and DOE Are Addressing Different Segments of Russia‘s Nuclear
Warhead Sites:
Progress to Improve Security Has Been Mixed:
DOD and DOE Face Challenges in Securing Russia‘s Nuclear Warhead Sites:
Conclusion:
Recommendation:
Chapter 4: Department of Defense Assistance to Secure Former Biological
Weapons Facilities Has Had Limited Results:
DOD‘s Plans for Securing Biological Facilities in Russia Are Under
Development:
DOD‘s Biological Security Projects Have Made Little Progress:
U.S. Biological Security Assistance Projects Face Many
Challenges:
Conclusion:
Recommendation:
Chapter 5: DOD Has Not Focused on Securing All of Russia‘s Chemical
Weapons Storage Sites:
DOD Plans to Address External Security at Two of Russia‘s Seven
Chemical Weapons Storage Sites:
DOD Is on Track to Complete Work at Two Sites by 2003:
Russian Government Wants to Focus on Destruction Not Security;
Transportation Security Is an Impending Challenge:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Sites in Russia That We Visited in July 2002:
Nuclear Material Sites:
Nuclear Warhead Sites:
Biological Pathogens Sites:
Chemical Weapons Sites:
Appendix II: Other Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Material Security
Assistance:
Transportation Security:
Protective Forces Assistance:
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Operations Monitoring
System:
Appendix III: Other Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Warhead
Security Assistance:
Transportation Security:
Nuclear Warhead Inventory System:
Fissile Material Storage Facility:
Guard Force Assistance:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD and DOE Assistance for Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia:
Table 2: Russian Chemical Weapons Storage Sites:
Figures:
Figure 1: Appropriations for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs, Fiscal Years 1992-2003 (dollars in billions):
Figure 2: DOD and DOE Funds Obligated to Security Programs in Russia,
by Type of WMD, Fiscal Years 1992-2002 (dollars in millions):
Figure 3: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with
Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material and Central Alarm Stations in Russia,
January 2003:
Figure 4: Changes in DOE‘s Distribution of Expenditures Between 1993-
2000 and 2001-2002:
Figure 5: Unstable Perimeter Fence at a Biological Site in Russia,
before Security Upgrades:
Figure 6: Wax and String Seal Securing Room with Dangerous Biological
Pathogens:
Figure 7: DOD-Funded Three-fence Perimeter around Buildings at Vector
with Smallpox and Other Dangerous Pathogens:
Figure 8: DOD-Funded Improvements to Central Alarm Station at Russian
Biological Site at Obolensk Used to Monitor the New Security System:
Figure 9: Chemical Weapon Artillery Rounds inside Russian Chemical
Weapons Storage Building at Shchuch‘ye:
Figure 10: Sites GAO Visited During July 2002 Fieldwork:
Figure 11: DOE-Funded Overpack Used to Protect Nuclear Material During
Transit:
Figure 12: DOE-Funded Camera Monitors Nuclear Processing Lab at
MEPhI:
Abbreviations :
BWPP: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention:
CCP: Chemical Concentrates Plant:
CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction:
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
FMSF: Fissile Material Storage Facility:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
ISTC: International Science and Technology Center:
MEPhI: Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute:
MINATOM: Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia):
MOD: Ministry of Defense (Russia):
MOM: (MPC&A) Operation Monitoring:
MPC&A: Material Protection, Control, and Accounting:
OPCW: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons:
SATC: Security Assessment and Training Center:
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Letter March 24, 2003:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management,
the Budget, and International Security
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Akaka:
In response to your request on January 17, 2002, we assessed U.S.
efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-
usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological
pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and other interested
parties.
If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr.
Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov or Mr. Robinson at
(202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov. GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Joseph A. Christoff
Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director
Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Robert A. Robinson
[End of section]
Executive Summary:
Purpose:
The Russian Federation has the world‘s largest stockpiles of weapons-
usable nuclear material, nuclear warheads, dangerous biological
pathogens, and chemical weapons. Poorly secured weapons and material at
sites throughout Russia may provide terrorists and countries of concern
with access to weapons of mass destruction. To address this threat to
U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy
(DOE) have obligated $1.8 billion since 1992 to help improve security
at sites where Russia stores weapons of mass destruction and weapons-
usable nuclear material.
GAO was asked by the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, to report on U.S. programs to help
improve security at Russian weapons of mass destruction sites. To
address these issues, GAO assessed U.S. efforts to enhance security at
sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2)
nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical
weapons.
For each of these areas, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security
threats at weapons of mass destruction sites in Russia, U.S. progress
in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and unresolved
issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian sites.
During the course of its work, GAO reviewed documents and met with
officials from DOD, DOE, and the Department of State, as well as
several ministries from the Russian government. GAO also visited 14
nuclear, biological, and chemical sites in Russia that have received or
will receive U.S. security assistance.
Background:
Weapons of mass destruction and related materials fall into four
categories: weapons-usable nuclear material, nuclear warheads,
dangerous biological pathogens, and chemical weapons.
* Weapons-usable nuclear material is plutonium and uranium of high
enough quality to be used in the construction of nuclear devices.
Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at civilian sites that
produce or store nuclear fuels and materials for civilian application
and research; naval fuel storage sites, where the Russian Navy stores
highly enriched uranium for reactor fuel in submarines and icebreakers;
and the nuclear weapons complex, a network of 10 cities that fabricate,
refurbish, or dismantle nuclear weapons and their components. Most of
the estimated 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material
located in Russia is in the nuclear weapons complex.
* Russia‘s estimated stockpile of 18,000 to 25,000 nuclear warheads are
stored at storage sites, where warheads that are not attached to
missiles or other delivery vehicles are kept in long-term storage; rail
transfer points, where warheads are stored during transport; and
operational sites, where warheads are deployed with missiles or bombs
and become weapons.
* Dangerous biological pathogens such as anthrax, smallpox, and the
plague are stored at an unknown number of research sites throughout
Russia. The Soviet Union had a sophisticated, secret offensive
biological weapons program throughout the Cold War. The program
employed 60,000 people at more than 50 sites.
* Russia stores its declared stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of
chemical weapons at seven sites. Five of these sites store 32,000
metric tons of nerve agent, the deadliest form of chemical weapons,
while two sites store blister agent.
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States
began an effort to keep weapons of mass destruction from falling into
the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For over 10 years,
DOD, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, has had primary
responsibility for many programs that assist Russia in securing,
dismantling, destroying, and safely transporting its weapons. DOE
implements programs to improve security at Russian sites with weapons-
usable nuclear material and nuclear warheads. The Department of State
implements programs to pay scientists who once developed weapons of
mass destruction to conduct peaceful research. From fiscal years 1992
to 2003, Congress authorized $6.4 billion for these programs.
Of this $6.4 billion, DOD and DOE have obligated $1.8 billion to
purchase new security equipment such as fences, access control systems,
and video surveillance systems and to train security personnel. This
equipment helps protect Russian sites from external threats such as
intruders breaking into sites and internal threats such as employee
theft. Through September 2002, about 98 percent of these funds have
been devoted to helping Russia protect its weapons-usable nuclear
materials and nuclear warheads.
DOD originally focused on protecting nuclear warheads and weapons-
usable nuclear material but later expanded its program to help secure
biological pathogens in 1998 and chemical weapons in 1999. In 1995, the
lead responsibility for securing weapons-usable nuclear material was
transferred to DOE. As part of its program, DOE helped secure reactor
fuel that the Russian Navy used to fuel its nuclear submarines and
icebreaking ships and began securing some of Russia‘s nuclear warheads
after the Russian Navy asked DOE for assistance in 1998. In contrast,
DOD currently has programs to help protect nuclear warheads, dangerous
biological pathogens, and chemical weapons.
Results in Brief:
DOE plans to secure all weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by
2008, but the department‘s lack of access to many of the most sensitive
sites in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex represents a significant
impediment to the program‘s continued progress. Over the past 10 years,
DOE has helped protect 38 percent of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear
material and has nearly completed its work at civilian sites and naval
fuel storage sites. However, DOE has only completed work at 14 of 133
buildings in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex, a network of sites
involved in the construction of nuclear weapons where most of the
material is stored.[Footnote 1] Because it lacks access to almost three
quarters of these sites, DOE has shifted spending during fiscal years
2001 and 2002 from installing security systems at buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material to support programs, such as paying to
operate and maintain installed equipment and developing nuclear
security regulations. Although DOE and the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy signed a new access agreement in September 2001, DOE has not
gained access to sites where work is planned but has not yet begun. GAO
recommends that DOE reassess its expedited plans to secure all weapons-
usable nuclear material by 2008.
DOD and DOE have pursued separate approaches to securing Russian
warhead sites. However, neither agency knows the total number of sites
they plan to assist. DOD‘s and DOE‘s programs to help Russia secure its
nuclear warheads were brought under common policy guidance in January
2003. These guidelines generally prohibited assistance to operational
sites due to concerns that U.S. assistance might enhance Russia‘s
military:
capability. DOD plans to improve security at all of Russia‘s storage
sites[Footnote 2] and to complete this work by 2010. DOD has made
limited progress and is unlikely to complete its work as planned
because the Russian government has not provided access to sites or
sufficient funding to support the program. In contrast, until new U.S.
interagency guidelines were issued in January 2003, DOE planned to
complete security improvements by 2006 at 36 Russian Navy sites,
including both storage sites and operational sites (which support
deployed nuclear weapons). DOE has helped secure 33 of the 36 Russian
Navy sites due to cooperation received from the Russian Navy. However,
in response to the January 2003 interagency guidelines, DOE revised its
plans and decided not to provide further assistance to many sites where
DOE has already installed its initial round of upgrades. As a result,
DOE has had to scale back its plans and reconsider its time frames
since the new guidelines limit assistance to operational sites. DOD and
DOE will continue to face several coordination issues, such as deciding
which agency will secure sites identified in both of their plans and
coordinating the type of equipment used and guard force training
provided. GAO recommends that DOD and DOE ensure ongoing interagency
coordination.
After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in
addressing security concerns at the 49 biological sites where Russia
and the United States have collaborative programs. As of December 2002,
DOD had installed upgrades at two sites and plans to upgrade security
at two additional sites. DOD has limited information on the location
and security of sites that house collections of dangerous biological
pathogens in Russia and is thus uncertain which sites should receive
security improvements. Although DOD eventually plans to address
internal and external security threats, it has no time frames for
completing this work. U.S. efforts to secure biological facilities have
faced significant challenges. For example, despite years of U.S.
effort, the Russian government has closed many biological sites to U.S.
security assistance programs. In addition, at least nine Russian
ministries and organizations have ownership or oversight of these
sites, which slows DOD‘s efforts to implement the program. The
biological security program has thus taken longer and accomplished less
than expected. GAO recommends that DOD clearly articulate criteria to
identify which biological sites pose the greatest security risks and
should therefore receive the most extensive U.S. assistance.
DOD‘s efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on helping Russia
build a facility to destroy its extensive nerve agent stockpile rather
than securing the sites where its nerve agent is stored. However, the
destruction facility will not be completed until 2006, and it could be
another 40 years before Russia‘s stockpile would be completely
destroyed. In 2001, DOD began helping Russia secure two sites that
store nerve agent against external threats, which it estimates will be
complete in fall 2003. DOD selected these two sites because they store
nerve agent munitions that are small and easily portable. However, DOD
has no plans to help secure three other Russian nerve agent storage
sites that store 65 percent of Russia‘s declared nerve agent stockpile.
DOD‘s decision to limit its work to two nerve agent sites leaves the
issue of site security over the majority of Russia‘s nerve agent
stockpile unresolved. In addition, even though Russia plans to move its
nerve agent munitions by rail, in some cases hundreds of miles, to the
destruction facility, Russia and DOD have not developed plans to secure
the nerve agent while it is being transported. GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Defense reassess the need for improved security at
chemical weapons sites and work with Russian officials to develop a
plan to secure Russian chemical weapons during transit. GAO also
suggests that Congress consider funding security improvements at the
three remaining chemical weapons sites that have not received U.S.
security assistance.
Principal Findings:
Lack of Access to Sensitive Nuclear Material Sites Hinders Program
Completion:
DOE plans to help secure Russia‘s estimated stockpile of 600 metric
tons of weapons-usable material from internal and external threats by
2008. DOE has determined that 243 buildings in Russia (including
central alarm stations) require improved security systems to better
protect the material from theft. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated additional funds for nuclear
material security in Russia. Because of these additional funds, DOE
shortened its time frame for protecting all weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia from 2010 to 2008.
DOE‘s progress in protecting weapons-usable nuclear material has varied
widely, depending on the type of site. As of January 2003, DOE had
finished installing security improvements at 85 of 110 buildings at
sites that store nuclear fuel for the Russian Navy and sites that
produce or store nuclear fuels and materials for civilian application
and research. In contrast, DOE has only completed work at 14 of the 133
buildings at sites in the nuclear weapons complex that fabricate,
refurbish, or dismantle components and nuclear material for nuclear
weapons. Altogether, DOE has helped protect 38 percent, or about 228
metric tons, of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material. However,
despite years of negotiations, Russia will not let DOE visit or begin
work at nearly three quarters of the buildings in the weapons complex.
Lack of progress at these sites significantly hampers DOE‘s
programmatic goals because weapons complex sites store most of the
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. Because progress in
installing security upgrades to buildings in the nuclear weapons
complex has slowed, the majority of DOE‘s spending in 2001 and 2002
shifted to efforts other than securing buildings, including paying to
operate and maintain security systems already at sites, helping secure
nuclear material during transport, and developing nuclear security
regulations.
Access to sensitive sites, especially in the nuclear weapons complex,
remains a significant challenge to DOE‘s ability to meet its projected
2008 deadline. As set forth in its guidelines for improving nuclear
material security in Russia, DOE requires access to the buildings to
design and confirm the installation of security systems. Despite
repeated efforts, the department has yet to obtain access to sensitive
Russian sites to (1) confirm the type of material to be protected, (2)
design systems that provide adequate security, (3) ensure the equipment
is properly installed, and (4) ensure that the equipment is operated
properly and used as intended. For example, as of January 2003, DOE had
not been able to access 74 percent of the buildings in Russia‘s nuclear
weapons complex. A September 2001, access agreement between DOE and the
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has failed to facilitate the
department‘s access to previously closed sites. In fact, the Ministry
used the terms of the agreement to deny GAO access to two sites in
Russia during its July 2002 visit.
DOD and DOE Have Had Mixed Success Protecting Nuclear Warheads:
DOD and DOE do not know the total number of nuclear warhead sites they
plan to assist because Russia has provided only limited information
about the site locations and security conditions. DOD‘s efforts have
focused on improving security at storage sites under the command of the
12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the branch of
the Russian military specifically responsible for warhead security and
maintenance. In contrast, DOE has focused on improving security at all
three types of sites under the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy.
However, in January 2003, new U.S. interagency guidelines limited the
extent to which DOD and DOE can provide assistance to operational
sites, which support deployed nuclear weapons, out of concern that U.S.
assistance could enhance Russia‘s military capability. DOE will
continue to help secure storage sites and rail transfer points because
the warheads at those sites are stored separate from their delivery
vehicles; the possibility of enhancing Russia‘s military capability is
thus less. DOE has had to scale back its original plans because a
significant number of the Navy sites where it has provided assistance
to date are operational.
DOD has made limited progress in securing nuclear warheads in Russia.
As of December 2002, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported
installing only about one third of the 123 kilometers of perimeter
fencing that DOD began providing Russia in 1997 for warhead storage
sites at 52 locations. DOD has been unable to install security
equipment to address insider threats at any storage sites because
Russia has not provided access to these sites.
DOE has made significant progress improving security over nuclear
warheads under the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy. Since the
department began its program in 1999, it has installed security
improvements at 33 sites where the Russian Navy requested assistance.
Most of these sites are rail transfer points and operational sites,
such as those where nuclear warheads are attached to missiles or loaded
onto submarines. The Russian Navy has worked closely with DOE, which
has facilitated the quick implementation of the assistance. However,
the U.S. interagency guidelines preclude further assistance to many
operational sites where the department has installed an initial round
of upgrades.
Russia‘s tight restrictions on access to nuclear warhead storage sites
have severely limited DOD‘s efforts to improve security at these sites.
This is in contrast to the progress that DOE has made with the access
it receives from the Russian Navy. DOD and DOE require physical access
to the sites to help design the security improvements and to confirm
that Russia has installed security improvements as agreed before paying
for the work. In particular, they require access to the site
perimeters, entry control facilities, and guard facilities where the
bulk of the security improvements are installed. Lack of access has
completely blocked DOD from installing comprehensive upgrades, the full
set of security improvements that protect against both internal and
external threats of theft. DOD signed an access agreement with the
Russian Ministry of Defense in February 2003 and plans to begin
installing comprehensive upgrades in spring 2003. However, given
previous delays and setbacks in gaining Russia‘s permission to visit
nuclear warhead storage sites, further delays beyond spring 2003 are
possible.
Until the January 2003 interagency guidelines, DOD and DOE pursued
different policies in assisting operational nuclear warhead sites. DOD
and DOE now coordinate their efforts to improve nuclear warhead
security in Russia through an interagency working group and a joint
working group with their Russian counterparts. While the departments
have avoided duplication of effort, they face a number of issues that
will require continued coordination. For example, the departments have
not determined which agency will improve security at storage sites that
they both include in their plans. The departments will also have to
work together to ensure that the different types of equipment and guard
force training they provide to Russia are standardized.
Department of Defense Assistance to Secure Biological Sites Has Had
Limited Results:
DOD‘s plans to secure biological facilities in Russia are based on
limited information about the number of sites, pathogen collections,
and security conditions at these sites. DOD does not know how many
sites in Russia have dangerous biological pathogens and has not
comprehensively reviewed security at the 49 biological sites in Russia
where the United States has collaborative research projects, a number
that includes many former biological weapons facilities. As of January
2003, DOD had focused its security program on sites where Russia allows
the United States access and where DOD had identified dangerous
pathogen collections. However, DOD did not know how many sites it plans
to help secure and had no time frames for completing its work. In
recognition of the vulnerabilities of biological institutes to insider
theft, DOD plans to address internal and external security concerns at
sites where it is providing assistance.
DOD‘s progress in securing Russia‘s biological weapons sites has been
slow due to Russia‘s limited cooperation and the Administration‘s
temporary suspension of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program from
January through August 2002. DOD officials also stated that the
department‘s efforts to help secure biological pathogens started later
than its work to secure other weapons of mass destruction because
biological pathogen security was viewed as a lower priority. Since DOD
began to help secure Russia‘s dangerous biological pathogens in 1998,
it has focused its efforts on providing and installing equipment at the
largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia that have the
most dangerous pathogens and that the Russians have been willing to let
DOD assist. DOD also has begun planning to assist security at two
additional sites. While the installation of fences, sensors, and video
surveillance cameras have enhanced security against external threats at
two sites, these projects did not improve physical security to address
insider threats. As of September 2002, DOD estimated that it had
obligated $14 million to help improve security at 4 of the 49
biological sites in Russia that may require such assistance.
U.S. efforts to help secure former biological weapons facilities in
Russia face many challenges. First, DOD has been unable to work
directly with Russian biological sites due to stalled negotiations on
an implementing agreement to facilitate this assistance. Negotiations
have been slow because nine Russian government organizations have
jurisdiction over sites with dangerous biological pathogens. As a
result, DOD has no single focal point with which to negotiate an
agreement. Second, the Russian government has consistently refused DOD
access to many former biological weapons sites. For example, the
Russian Ministry of Health has not allowed DOD access to five of its
sites, because, according to DOD officials, the Ministry was concerned
that participating in DOD‘s security program would be an admission
these sites had taken part in the Soviet biological weapons program.
DOD Has Not Focused on Securing All of Russia‘s Chemical Weapons Sites:
Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused on the construction of a
chemical weapons destruction facility to help Russia destroy its
chemical weapons stockpile, as required by the Chemical Weapons
Convention. While Russia plans to destroy its chemical weapons by 2012,
lack of progress on construction and financial difficulties make it
likely that it will take 40 years or more to reach this goal. Until
Congress directed it to do so in 1999, DOD did not plan to improve
security at Russia‘s chemical weapons storage sites. With $20 million
in funding, the department plans to install upgrades around buildings,
site perimeters, and central alarm stations. These upgrades will
address external threats at the two chemical weapons storage sites that
store portable nerve agent munitions since these are considered the
greatest threat to U.S. national security. DOD plans to complete its
work in fall 2003. However, it has no plans to extend the program to
three other nerve agent sites or to expand its current program to
address insider threats at the two facilities where it has already done
work.
DOD has made significant progress helping secure two chemical weapons
sites in Russia. As of October 2002, the department had obligated $19.8
million to purchase and install two phases of security equipment. The
first phase, completed in February 2002, consisted of microwave sensors
around individual storage buildings or groups of buildings that,
according to DOD, contain the smallest chemical weapons. Work
installing the second, more comprehensive phase of security upgrades,
began in July 2002. When this work is completed, the perimeters of both
Russian chemical weapons sites will have improved fencing, lights,
cameras, and sensors linked to improved central alarm stations. DOD is
on track to complete its work in fall 2003 as planned, expedited by
good cooperation from its Russian counterparts. After finishing that
work, DOD will have helped secure about 35 percent of Russia‘s
stockpile of nerve agent, the deadliest form of chemical weapons. DOD‘s
work has been expedited by good access and cooperation from the Russian
government. DOD officials state that access has been good because
Russia has declared its stockpile and allows international inspectors
to periodically visit these sites.
DOD‘s decision to limit its work to two chemical weapons sites leaves
65 percent of Russia‘s nerve agent stockpile unsecured. The Russian
government would also prefer to focus on destroying chemical weapons
rather than securing chemical weapons sites. Although Russia has
publicly stated it plans to destroy its declared chemical weapons
stockpile by 2012, it will likely take much longer. As a result, a
large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to
theft or diversion and pose a potential threat to U.S. national
security interests. In addition, Russia will have to move most of its
nerve agent several hundred miles by rail from current storage sites to
the planned chemical weapons destruction facility. However, DOD and
Russia have not begun discussions on the security that will be required
for chemical munitions, as they are moved hundreds of miles from
current storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction
facility.
Conclusion:
Since 1992, the United States has undertaken an unprecedented task:
securing the weapons its former adversary developed for potential use
against the United States and its allies. The $1.8 billion obligated by
DOD and DOE, from 1992 to 2002, has helped improve security at dozens
of sites across Russia. Portions of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear
material, nuclear warheads, dangerous biological pathogens, and
chemical weapons are now more secure against the threat of theft or
diversion. Some U.S. efforts, such as improving security at chemical
weapons and Navy warhead sites, enjoy good support from the Russian
government. As a result, DOD and DOE have been able to install security
upgrades with few problems.
However, helping Russia secure its vast collection of weapons of mass
destruction has often proven to be a difficult and time-consuming task.
Although the United States and Russia have broadly agreed to work
together on this mutually beneficial task, important aspects of DOD and
DOE programs continue to face significant resistance and lack of
cooperation from the Russian government. In some areas, such as
securing many sites in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex, the Russian
government has been unwilling to allow meaningful work to take place,
despite years of U.S. efforts.
Lack of Russian cooperation delays program implementation and has
changed the nature of the assistance the United States planned to
provide. DOE will likely be unable to complete its work in Russia by
2008 as currently planned, in large part because the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy has not cooperated in giving DOE access to many sites
and buildings. DOE has thus spent less than half of its most recent
appropriations to secure buildings with weapons-usable nuclear
material. Furthermore, DOD‘s efforts to secure nuclear warheads have
been limited because negotiations over site access have dragged on for
years.
In addition, some U.S. efforts require revised plans. DOD and DOE are
both working to help secure Russia‘s nuclear warheads; however, until
recently, they have not been following the same policies. DOE has a
comprehensive plan to guide its efforts to secure nuclear material in
Russia but will not be able to complete its work within scheduled time
frames. Although the Department of Defense has been working since 1998
to help secure biological sites in Russia, it lacks a written plan to
help determine the number of sites it will help protect, the kinds of
security upgrades it will provide, and the means of protecting against
the threat of theft from insiders. Finally, DOD‘s efforts to help
secure chemical weapons sites in Russia leaves sites with two-thirds of
Russia‘s deadly nerve agent stockpile vulnerable to theft and have not
considered the security problems of moving several thousand tons of
nerve agent over hundreds of miles to a destruction facility.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
For the program to secure chemical weapons, Congress may wish to
consider allocating additional funds for improving security at three
remaining sites in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received
U.S. security assistance.
Recommendations:
* Given the current lack of access to many nuclear weapons complex
sites, the Secretary of Energy should reassess the department‘s
expedited plans to provide security enhancements to Russian facilities
housing weapons-usable nuclear materials.
* The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated
plan to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia‘s
nuclear warheads work together to address implementation issues such as
determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites
and resolving equipment standardization concerns.
* In developing the department‘s plan to enhance security at Russian
biological sites, the Secretary of Defense should clearly articulate
criteria the department should use to rank the relative threat posed by
different types of pathogens and review the security under which they
are kept to identify the biological sites that pose the greatest
security risks and would therefore have highest priority for and
receive the most extensive U.S. assistance.
* Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia‘s chemical
weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider:
* reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites
in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security
assistance and:
* working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for
securing chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction
facility at Shchuch‘ye.
Agency Comments:
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reproduced in appendix IV. In these comments, DOD concurred with our
recommendations regarding the department‘s efforts to help secure
Russia‘s nuclear warheads and dangerous biological pathogens. DOD
stated that it would act on NSC policy guidelines and work within
interagency working groups to implement our recommendation that DOD and
DOE develop an integrated plan to secure Russia‘s nuclear warheads. DOD
also stated that it would develop formal criteria for prioritizing
assistance to sites with dangerous biological pathogens and renew its
efforts to develop an implementing agreement with the Russian
government. DOD concurred with our recommendation to work with the
Russian government to develop plans to secure chemical weapons during
transport to the destruction facility at Shchuch‘ye. DOD stated that it
is now working with the Russian Munitions Agency to develop these
plans.
DOD did not concur with GAO‘s recommendation to reassess the need for
improved security at three additional nerve agent sites in Russia. DOD
contends that the size and weight of the bombs and spray tanks that
contain the nerve agent make them difficult to steal and that existing
physical security at these sites is sufficient. DOD‘s statement
conflicts with the head of the Russian commission overseeing chemical
weapons destruction who stated on March 6, 2003, that security at these
sites is poor and Russia needs additional money for security
improvements. Accordingly, GAO continues to recommend that DOD reassess
the need for improved security at the three nerve agent sites that have
not received U.S. security assistance.
DOE provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced
in appendix V. DOE did not indicate whether it concurred with GAO‘s
recommendations. The department disagreed with GAO‘s conclusion that
progress had slowed in the department‘s efforts to improve security
over Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material. DOE cited recent
increases in the number of contracts signed with the Ministry of Atomic
Energy as examples of the progress the department has made. However,
GAO‘s work shows that the number of contracts signed is a poor measure
of program progress because (1) contracts are frequently for small
amounts of money, and (2) contracts can finance work for purposes other
than improving security at buildings. In addition, DOE‘s Strategic
Plan, program guidelines, and other documentation track program
progress by the number of buildings and amount of material protected,
not by the number of contracts. We have therefore used the benchmarks
the department uses in its strategic plan to gauge program progress.
DOE also stated that GAO‘s figure of 600 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material in Russia was too low. However, DOE‘s comment
contradicts its strategic plan and recent statements made by the Acting
Administrator for National Nuclear Security Administration in testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee. At that hearing, the Acting
Administrator testified that Russia has an estimated 600 metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material.
[End of section]
Chapter 1: Introduction:
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S.
estimates of the current number of Russia‘s nuclear warheads range from
18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of
the uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices.
Russia also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical
weapons and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous
biological pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development
of those pathogens as biological weapons.
In the closed Soviet system, security systems emphasized heavy
surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who
violated security procedures. The Soviets relied on closed cities and
physical security measures to stem any threats posed by outsiders.
However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent social,
political, and economic changes in Russia not only revealed gaps in the
physical security surrounding sites containing WMD but made evident
weaknesses in Russia‘s ability to deter threats from inside those
complexes. A senior member of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in
1999 that the greatest threat to nuclear warhead security stems from
insider knowledge of security systems and procedures. Both enhanced
insider threat and decreased ability to protect against external threat
have created opportunities for agents from countries of concern to
obtain WMD.
In response to this threat, Congress authorized the Department of
Defense (DOD) to establish the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program in 1992 to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan secure
and protect nuclear weapons. Members of Congress were concerned that
nuclear weapons or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold and that
nuclear scientists and technicians might be persuaded to sell their
knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to develop such weapons.
Between 1992 and 2003, Congress authorized $6.4 billion for a wide
array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs implemented by
DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and other
agencies.[Footnote 3] As shown in figure 1, these appropriations have
been directed into destruction and dismantlement, demilitarization (the
conversion of military facilities and research to civilian purposes),
and security efforts. Most funds have been for programs in Russia.
Figure 1: Appropriations for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs, Fiscal Years 1992-2003 (dollars in billions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Destruction and dismantlement projects, for which $2.65 billion has
been appropriated, are designed to help with the elimination of
nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. For
example, DOD has helped Russia destroy missiles and submarines to meet
arms control requirements and is currently helping Russia design a
destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. In addition,
DOD has financed the destruction of silos that contained
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Demilitarization efforts--projects that encourage Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military facilities and research to
civilian purposes--have been appropriated $1.1 billion. These include
funds to pay scientists of the former Soviet Union who once developed
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems to
conduct peaceful research. Demilitarization funds also support projects
that seek to convert defense facilities in the former Soviet Union to
factories that produce civilian products such as medical treatments.
Security programs have been appropriated $2.65 billion from 1992
through 2002. These efforts help Russia and other former Soviet nations
secure their WMD. For example, DOD and DOE have provided Russia with
fences, sensors, video surveillance systems, and computerized inventory
control systems.
As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a
total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD
material. Most of these funds have been used to help secure nuclear
warheads and nuclear material. Two percent of these funds have been
used to address security threats at chemical weapons storage sites and
institutes with dangerous biological pathogens.
Figure 2: DOD and DOE Funds Obligated to Security Programs in Russia,
by Type of WMD, Fiscal Years 1992-2002 (dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note:The funding figures include spending for site security upgrades
and related programs but do not include funding for destruction of
weapons of mass destruction or employment of scientists. The figure for
nuclear warheads includes funding for the Fissile Material Storage
Facility.
Since 1995, DOD has obligated $796 million to enhance security at
Russian nuclear weapons sites. The department has installed fences,
developed warhead inventory control systems, and upgraded railcars used
to transport warheads. In 1998, DOD expanded its program by providing
assistance to improve security over sites in Russia with dangerous
biological pathogens. As of September 2002, DOD had obligated about $14
million for these programs. In 1999, Congress became concerned about
the threat of chemical weapons and appropriated $20 million for
security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. DOD
had obligated $19.8 million of these funds as of September 2002.
In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to
secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material. In 1995, DOE
established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program. Under MPC&A, DOE has installed modern nuclear security systems
with three components:
* physical protection systems such as fences around the buildings
containing nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where
material is stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage
rooms;
* material control systems such as seals attached to nuclear material
containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the
containers and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into
areas containing nuclear material; and:
* material accounting systems such as inventories of nuclear material
and computerized databases to track the amount and type of nuclear
material contained in specific buildings.
DOE has obligated $835 million for these programs since 1995. In 1998,
at Russia‘s request, DOE expanded the scope of its efforts with the
Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to helping secure
nuclear warheads. Since 1999, when DOE started working with the Russian
Navy to protect sites where warheads are stored, DOE has obligated $159
million for this effort.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the
Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, asked us to report on U.S. programs to help improve
security at Russian WMD sites. To address these issues, we assessed
U.S. efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1)
weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous
biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we
assessed U.S. plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in
Russia; U.S. progress in implementing these plans, and the primary
challenges and unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to
secure Russian sites. Our review focused on U.S. efforts to secure WMD
material and did not include U.S. programs to employ WMD scientists or
destroy WMD material.[Footnote 4]
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure weapons-usable nuclear material
in Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOE and the Russian
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). We also visited two sites in
Russia that have received security assistance from DOE: the Moscow
State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Russian naval fuel
storage Site 49. We requested visits to the Novosibirsk Chemical
Concentrates Plant and the nuclear weapons complex facility at Mayak
(also known as C-65), but were denied access by the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy. We were able to meet with managers from these sites
outside their facilities. We also visited Los Alamos National
Laboratory to observe U.S. approaches to securing nuclear material. We
collected and analyzed reports and other publications on nuclear
material security issues from the federal government and
nongovernmental organizations. Our analysis of DOE‘s financial spending
patterns was based on our previous work and budget data on fiscal year
2001 and 2002 appropriations, obligations, and expenditures, which we
obtained from DOE. We met with officials from DOE; Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Ministry of Atomic
Energy in Russia; Gosatomnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory
authority; and site officials from the Moscow State Engineering Physics
Institute, the Russian Navy‘s Site 49, Novosibirsk Chemical
Concentrates Plant, and Mayak.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure nuclear warheads in Russia, we
reviewed program documentation from DOE, DOD, the National Security
Council, and Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National
Laboratories. During our site work in Russia, we visited several
locations related to securing nuclear warheads:
* We visited two Russian Navy sites where DOE had installed security
improvements. During these visits, we toured inside the facilities, saw
the security equipment DOE had installed, and spoke with officials from
the Russian Navy.
* We visited the Fissile Material Storage Facility, where Russia says
it will store plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. At the time
of our visit, the facility was still under construction, so we were not
able to see all of the planned security features in place. During our
visit, we spoke with officials from DOD, which is financing the
construction of the facility, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy, which will operate the site after it is completed.
* We visited a factory in Russia, where the United States pays to have
railcars refurbished and repaired. We saw the factory and met with
factory officials.
* We visited the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC), where
we saw examples of the security systems DOD plans to install at warhead
storage sites in Russia and some of the equipment the Russian Ministry
of Defense uses to screen personnel who work with nuclear warheads.
During this visit, we met with officials from the Russian Ministry of
Defense and DOD.
We also visited a location in the United States where nuclear warheads
are stored to gain an understanding of how the United States secures
its own warheads. During our work, we met with officials from DOD and
DOE, the National Security Council, Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and
the Russian Navy.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure dangerous biological pathogens in
Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOD; the Department of
State; the National Security Council; the Russian Ministry of Health;
the International Science and Technology Center; and four former WMD
facilities where the United States has developed biosecurity assistance
programs. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on
biosecurity issues from the federal government and nongovernmental
organizations, and we met with officials from the United States Army
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases and Sandia
Laboratory to discuss their approaches to biosecurity. We also met with
officials of DOD and the Department of State, the National Security
Council, the Russian ministries of Health and Science, Industry and
Technology, the International Science and Technology Center, and DOD
biosecurity contractors Bechtel and SAIC. We visited all four former
Soviet biological weapons facilities in Russia that now receive U.S.
biosecurity assistance: (1) State Research Center for Virology and
Biotechnology (Vector), (2) the State Research Center for Applied
Microbiology (Obolensk), (3) the Russian Research Institute of
Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and (4) the Pokrov Biologics
Plant (Pokrov). At these facilities, we met with directors and
scientists to discuss biosecurity issues, and we toured the facilities.
Our review of DOD‘s biosecurity program focused on assistance provided
since 1998 to improve the security of biological sites in
Russia.[Footnote 5] DOD has other programs to address the risks posed
by the spread of dangerous pathogens or biological weapons expertise
from Russia, including collaborative research projects with former
Soviet biological weapons scientists and projects to enhance safety at
biological sites. Congressional appropriations for DOD‘s Biological
Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) projects in the former Soviet
Union that include biosecurity, biosafety, and collaborative research
assistance have grown from $17 million in 2002 to $55 million in 2003.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure chemical weapons in Russia, we
reviewed program documents from DOD and the Russian Munitions Agency,
the executive agency in Russia charged with securing and destroying
chemical weapons.[Footnote 6] We visited both chemical weapons storage
sites in Russia that now receive U.S. security assistance: Kizner and
Shchuch‘ye. At these facilities, we met with base commanders and
security personnel, we toured the facilities to observe the installed
U.S. security upgrades, and we were shown U.S.-funded security
equipment for site perimeter upgrades that had yet to be installed. We
collected and analyzed reports and other publications on chemical
weapons security issues from the federal government and nongovernmental
organizations. We visited Anniston Chemical Activity and Edgewood
Chemical Activity to see and discuss the U.S. approach to chemical
weapons security with officials there. We met with officials from DOD,
the Russian Munitions Agency, as well as officials from the two
chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that are receiving U.S.-funded
security upgrades.
We performed our work from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Chapter 2: Lack of Access to Nuclear Material Sites Hinders Program
Completion:
The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to secure all weapons-usable
nuclear material in Russia by 2008. Over the past 10 years, DOE has
made steady progress toward this goal and has nearly completed its work
at civilian sites and naval fuel storage sites. However, DOE has made
limited progress in securing nuclear material in Russia‘s nuclear
weapons complex, a network of sites involved in the construction of
nuclear weapons where most of the material is stored. Because it lacks
access to most of these sites, DOE has shifted its new spending on the
program from improving physical security over buildings with nuclear
material to other programs, such as transportation security and guard
force equipment and training. DOE faces significant challenges to
continued progress with its program, in particular the lack of access
to many of the most sensitive sites in Russia‘s nuclear weapons
complex. Although DOE and MINATOM signed a new access agreement in
September 2001, DOE has not gained access to sites where work is
planned but not yet begun.
DOE Plans to Secure All Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material by 2008:
Weapons-usable nuclear material is highly enriched uranium or plutonium
that can be used directly in a nuclear weapon without further
enrichment or processing.[Footnote 7] This material is considered to be
highly attractive to theft because it (1) is not very radioactive and
therefore relatively safe to handle and (2) can easily be carried by
one or two people in portable containers. Terrorists and countries
seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon.
DOE estimates that Russia has about 600 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material. Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at
three types of sites: (1) civilian sites, which produce or store
nuclear fuels and materials for civilian application and research; (2)
naval fuel storage sites, where the Russian Navy stores stockpiles of
highly enriched uranium to be used as reactor fuel in submarines and
icebreakers; and (3) the nuclear weapons complex, a network of 10
nuclear cities that fabricate, refurbish, or dismantle nuclear weapons
and their components. Most weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia is
in the nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM oversees operations at sites in
the weapons complex and at some civilian sites.
DOE plans to improve security over Russia‘s entire stockpile of
weapons-usable nuclear material to protect against both internal and
external threats by 2008. In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide
criteria for effectively reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in
Russia.[Footnote 8] The guidelines provide a categorization scheme for
ranking the relative threat posed by different types and quantities of
material, which is used to determine the extent and type of upgrades
necessary to secure the material. DOE has determined that 243 buildings
at 40 sites in Russia (including central alarm stations) require
improved security systems to better protect weapons-usable nuclear
material from theft. Although DOE may not yet have identified all
buildings, DOE‘s assessment serves as a relatively stable baseline for
planning, budgeting, and measuring the progress of its assistance.
DOE is installing security improvements that protect against both the
internal and external threats of theft. DOE installs security upgrades
in two phases--rapid upgrades and comprehensive upgrades. Buildings
that contain material of high proliferation threat receive both rapid
and comprehensive upgrades, and buildings with material of less concern
only receive rapid upgrades. According to DOE officials, rapid upgrades
are primarily designed to delay and detect external adversaries. They
include bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing
strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing
controlled access areas around nuclear material; and implementing
procedures that require the presence of two people when nuclear
material is handled. Comprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors,
motion detectors, and closed circuit television systems to detect
intruders; central alarm stations, where guards can monitor cameras and
alarms; and computerized material accounting systems. According to DOE
officials, these comprehensive upgrades secure against both internal
and external threats.
DOE has developed time frames for completing the program, including
schedules for individual sites, to assist in planning and budgeting. In
our February 2001 report,[Footnote 9] we reported that DOE anticipated
completing security improvements in Russia at all buildings with
nuclear material by 2010. In fiscal year 2001, the Congress
appropriated $101.1 million to help protect Russian weapons-usable
nuclear material.[Footnote 10] Congress increased the appropriation for
the program to $163.3 million in fiscal year 2002, and after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further increased DOE‘s
appropriation by $150 million. Because of these additional funds, DOE
revised its time frame for protecting all weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia to 2008. Specifically, DOE plans to complete its
work at naval fuel storage sites in 2006, at civilian sites in 2007,
and at the nuclear weapons complex in 2008.
DOE Has Made Uneven Progress Securing Nuclear Material in Russia:
DOE‘s progress in protecting weapons-usable nuclear material has varied
widely, depending on the type of site. As of January 2003, DOE had
completed security improvements at most of the buildings at civilian
sites and naval fuel storage sites. In contrast, DOE has not started
work at the majority of the buildings in the nuclear weapons complex,
which contains most of the remaining unprotected weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia. Although DOE has now protected 38 percent, or about
228 metric tons, of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material, the vast
majority of the remaining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons
complex where, due to Russian national security concerns, DOE has not
gained access and begun work. Because DOE has been largely unable to
start new work in the weapons complex, most of DOE‘s new spending for
fiscal years 2001 and 2002 was on programs other than installing
security improvements at buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear
material.
Progress in Nuclear Weapons Complex Lags:
As seen in figure 3, DOE has made the least progress in providing
security at Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex, where it has completed
work at only 14 of the 133 buildings, or 11 percent.[Footnote 11] DOE
has not started work at the majority of the remaining buildings in the
nuclear weapons complex because MINATOM has not provided the necessary
access.
Figure 3: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with
Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material and Central Alarm Stations in Russia,
January 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: The figure does not include the status of nuclear security
systems installed by DOE at Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites. See
chapter three for information on DOE‘s program to install security
systems at these sites. The figure includes central alarm stations,
which do not contain nuclear material but are part of the security
system for buildings that do contain material.
As of January 2003, DOE‘s efforts to install security systems at all
three types of sites have protected 38 percent of Russia‘s weapons-
usable nuclear material. The vast majority of the remaining material is
in the nuclear weapons complex, where some buildings hold several tons
of uranium or plutonium. Due to lack of access, DOE is installing
security improvements in the nuclear weapons complex at a much slower
pace than it anticipated when it issued its first cost and schedule
estimate in 2000. At that time, DOE planned to complete these upgrades
by 2010. For example, DOE originally anticipated beginning at least
preliminary work in fiscal year 2001 at Russia‘s four nuclear weapons
assembly and disassembly sites (the most sensitive parts of the nuclear
weapons complex). As of January 2003, according to DOE officials, work
had not begun at any of these sites. Progress at weapons complex sites
where DOE has access can dramatically increase the amount of material
protected. For example, since February 2001, DOE has increased the
amount of material it has secured at the Mayak Production Association,
from 15 metric tons to 28 metric tons.
In contrast to Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex, DOE has made
significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel
storage sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at
these sites. As of January 2003, DOE had completed work at 78 percent
(85 of 110) of the buildings at these locations. DOE‘s progress at the
civilian and naval fuel storage sites has been facilitated by generally
good access to buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material because
Russia has fewer national security concerns about these sites. For
example, at Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, one of the largest
civilian sites, DOE had adequate access to construct a single storage
facility to replace nine dilapidated buildings that stored nuclear
material. Furthermore, at one site in Russia‘s civilian sector where
DOE suspended work in 1999 due to lack of access, negotiations resumed
for providing assistance in 2001, according to DOE officials. DOE has
since been granted access and made several trips to the site and
anticipates beginning work at that site early in 2003.
DOE‘s Increased Funding Went to Other Objectives:
Because progress in installing security upgrades to buildings in the
nuclear weapons complex has been slowed, the majority of DOE‘s
additional funding in 2001 and 2002 shifted to transportation security,
guard force support, and other assistance. These other assistance
efforts included supporting the operation and maintenance of security
systems already installed at sites, converting highly enriched uranium
to a form that cannot:
be used for weapons, and developing nuclear regulations.[Footnote 12]
As seen in figure 4, expenditures for security enchancements at
buildings at civilian, naval fuel, and nuclear weapons complex sites
decreased from the average of 72 percent in fiscal years 1993 to 2000
to 43 percent in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. The majority of DOE‘s
expenditures during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were for activities
other than securing buildings such as securing material during
transport and maintaining previously installed equipment. While these
efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOE‘s goal of
securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable nuclear material
by 2008.
Figure 4: Changes in DOE‘s Distribution of Expenditures Between 1993-
2000 and 2001-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of DOE data.
Access to Sensitive Sites Remains a Barrier to Completing Security
Improvements by 2008:
DOE‘s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable
nuclear material, in particular to buildings in the nuclear weapons
complex, is the greatest challenge to providing assistance to improve
nuclear material security in Russia. As set forth in its guidelines for
improving nuclear material security in Russia, DOE requires access to
the buildings to design security systems and confirm their
installation. However, despite DOE‘s efforts to gain access since 1995,
MINATOM has continued to deny DOE access to buildings in the nuclear
weapons complex due to Russia‘s concerns about national security and
laws that protect state secrets.
As of January 2003, DOE had obtained or anticipated obtaining access to
35 of the estimated 133 buildings in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex
with nuclear material. At the remaining 98 buildings (74 percent of the
total), DOE had no access to design or confirm the installation of
security systems. The level of access changed little since our February
2001 report, which also found that DOE did not have access to about
three quarters of the buildings in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex.
Russian officials in the nuclear weapons complex told us that it is
very unlikely they would ever grant DOE physical access to the most
sensitive areas.
As a result of the lack of access, DOE has not been able to improve
security at many buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material--the majority of the remaining nuclear
material in Russia. DOE has placed much of this material in its highest
threat category and would make it first priority for receiving security
improvements if DOE had access. The lack of access is likely to prevent
DOE from accelerating completion of security improvements in the
nuclear weapons complex from 2010 to 2008. In addition, DOE has not
been able to confirm the installation of security improvements at
several sites in the nuclear weapons complex where it funded security
improvements before a stricter policy requiring access to buildings
receiving assistance was enforced. For example, DOE spent approximately
$1 million to install rapid and comprehensive upgrades at a building in
Snezhinsk (also known as Chelyabinsk-70) where DOE has never had
access. A DOE official said that DOE would not have approved assistance
to that building under the current access policy.
To gain access to buildings in the weapons complex where it had not
been allowed to work, DOE signed an access agreement with MINATOM in
September 2001. In April 2002, DOE stated that this agreement would
enable DOE to begin new work at several buildings in the weapons
complex where it lacked access. However, the agreement did not
facilitate DOE‘s access to these buildings. The agreement only
described administrative procedures, such as specifying which DOE
personnel are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration
of those visits. DOE and Russian officials stated that this agreement
did little to improve DOE‘s access to new buildings, and in some cases,
the agreement reduced U.S. access. In fact, during our July 2002 visit,
MINATOM used the agreement as a rationale for denying GAO access to two
sites in Russia on the grounds that GAO staff were not on the access
list.
DOE is exploring the use of alternative access procedures, as allowed
in its access policy. For example, at Snezhinsk, DOE used video and
photographs instead of physical access to conduct a vulnerability
assessment for part of a building where DOE did not have access. (DOE
officials said that they had access to the rest of the building.)
However, DOE has not yet expanded the use of alternative access beyond
this building. In addition, DOE has proposed building new central
storage facilities at some sites in the nuclear weapons complex as a
way to accelerate security upgrades. Instead of improving security at
many separate buildings, DOE would pay to build or convert one building
to store the nuclear material from other buildings. DOE has agreed in
principle to such an approach, at least at one site in the nuclear
weapons complex, but DOE and MINATOM have not reached a final agreement
or begun construction on a central storage facility.
Conclusion:
DOE has made progress installing improved security systems for 38
percent of the weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. However, DOE
will likely be unable to complete its work in Russia by 2008, as
currently planned, largely due to Russia‘s lack of cooperation on
access to sensitive sites in the nuclear weapons complex. Because DOE
has made little progress gaining access to new sites in the Russian
weapons complex, it has shifted its funding from securing buildings
with nuclear material to other program objectives. These other efforts,
such as supporting the operation and maintenance of the security
systems, are essential to the long-term success of the program and can
contribute to the overall security of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear
material. Nevertheless, the trend toward these supporting activities
raises potential concerns about the program‘s focus and direction.
While these other program activities are needed and relevant, they do
not directly advance DOE‘s objective of securing all buildings in
Russia with weapons-usable material. In addition, in light of Russia‘s
long-standing and continued unwillingness to allow access to most of
the sites in the weapons complex, DOE needs to seriously reconsider its
ambitious goal of protecting all of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear
material by 2008.
Recommendation:
Given the current lack of access to many nuclear weapons complex sites,
the Secretary of Energy should reassess the department‘s expedited
plans to provide security enhancements to Russian facilities housing
weapons-usable nuclear material.
[End of section]
Chapter 3: DOD and DOE Have Had Mixed Success Protecting Nuclear
Warheads:
[End of section]
DOD and DOE plan to improve security of nuclear warheads at Russia‘s
storage sites and rail transfer points, where warheads are stored apart
from their delivery vehicles. However, the departments do not know the
total number of sites they plan to assist because Russia has provided
only limited information about site locations and security conditions.
DOE has scaled back its plans to assist operational sites, which
support deployed nuclear weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S.
interagency guidelines that preclude assistance to most operational
sites out of concern that U.S. assistance could enhance Russia‘s
military capability. DOD‘s and DOE‘s progress in improving security at
nuclear warhead sites has been mixed. DOD has made limited progress
because its counterpart, the 12TH Main Directorate of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, has installed less than half of the fencing DOD
has provided to protect sites against external threat. In addition, the
Ministry has not provided access to sites so that DOD can address
internal threats. In contrast, DOE has improved security at 33 of 36
sites because the Russian Navy has provided sufficient access to these
sites. However, DOE has improved security at some sites that would have
been prohibited from receiving assistance under U.S. interagency
guidelines.
DOD and DOE Are Addressing Different Segments of Russia‘s Nuclear
Warhead Sites:
Russia stores its nuclear warheads at three types of sites--storage
sites, operational sites, and rail transfer points.[Footnote 13] Table
1 provides an overview of plans that the DOD and DOE have to improve
security at Russian nuclear warhead sites.
Table 1: DOD and DOE Assistance for Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia:
Storage sites; Type of site: Sites for the long-term maintenance and
storage of warheads.; Assistance plan: DOD plans to improve security at
all storage sites. DOD has a classified estimate of the total number of
sites.; DOE is addressing security at five Russian Navy storage sites
and plans to improve security at two or more Strategic Rocket Forces
storage sites.
Operational sites; Type of site: Sites that support deployed nuclear
weapons.; Assistance plan: DOD - no plans.; DOE originally planned to
assist 27 Russian Navy operational sites but has scaled back plans to
comply with U.S. interagency guidelines.
Rail transfer points; Type of site: Sites for securing warheads during
transport.; Assistance plan: DOD - waiting for additional information
before providing assistance.; DOE is addressing security at four
Russian Navy rail transfer points and plans to improve security at one
or more Strategic Rocket Forces rail transfer points.
Source: GAO.
Note: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD information.
[End of table]
DOD and DOE both provide assistance to improve nuclear warhead security
in Russia because they work with different branches of the Russian
military. DOD has focused on improving security at storage sites under
the command of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, the branch of the Russian military specifically responsible
for warhead security and maintenance. In contrast, DOE has focused on
improving security at Russian Navy sites, which include storage,
operational, and rail transfer sites, and has recently considered
expanding its assistance to Strategic Rocket Forces sites. DOE efforts
to increase security at operational sites, which support deployed
nuclear weapons, raised concerns in the Administration that security
assistance might enhance the military capability of Russia‘s offensive
nuclear force. However, the Administration did not have a policy
balancing the benefit of increasing security at operational sites
against the possibility of enhancing military capability. In January
2003, U.S. interagency guidelines precluded DOD and DOE assistance to
most operational sites. The guidelines allow the departments to improve
security at storage sites and rail transfer points that support warhead
storage, consolidation, dismantlement, or force reductions, where
security assistance it less likely to enhance operational capability.
The guidelines do not support assistance to operational sites where
mated or unmated warheads may be handled in the course of training or
deployment. While DOD‘s security plans included only storage sites and
therefore complied with the guidelines, DOE has scaled back its plans
to comply with the guidelines.[Footnote 14]
DOD Plans to Improve Security at All Storage Sites:
DOD has focused on improving security at all of Russia‘s storage
sites,[Footnote 15] including both the large national stockpile sites
and smaller sites at Navy, Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases. In
1995, DOD and the Russian Ministry of Defense signed an agreement and
began discussions on improving security at Russia‘s nuclear warhead
sites. DOD chose to focus on storage sites because it works solely with
the 12TH Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which has
jurisdiction over the large national stockpile sites and shares
jurisdiction over the smaller storage sites located at military
bases.[Footnote 16] According to DOD officials, the storage sites may
contain warheads for both tactical and strategic weapons[Footnote 17]
and warheads that Russia has slated for dismantlement.
The 12TH Main Directorate has not provided DOD with information on the
total number or location of storage sites because it considers this
information to be classified or sensitive. However, the Directorate has
stated that it needs 123 kilometers of new perimeter fencing for 52
geographic locations throughout Russia. DOD has used this information
to estimate the total magnitude of security needs at Russia‘s storage
sites and to develop its assistance plan. DOD estimates that security
improvements under this plan will be complete by 2010.
DOD has considered expanding its assistance to rail transfer points,
locations used to transfer warheads between trains and trucks and for
temporary warhead storage. While the U.S. interagency guidelines permit
assistance to rail transfer points, DOD has not yet developed a
security assistance plan for rail transfer points because the 12TH Main
Directorate has provided little information on these sites. DOD
officials stated that warheads are most vulnerable at rail transfer
points. The absence of a security plan for these sites is a significant
gap in DOD‘s current plans for enhancing security around Russian
nuclear warheads.
DOE Is Improving Security at Russian Navy Sites:
DOE is addressing security at 36 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites: 5
storage sites, 27 operational sites, and 4 rail transfer
points.[Footnote 18] DOE estimates that it will complete security
improvements at the existing sites by 2006. However, the U.S.
interagency guidelines prohibited security assistance to most
operational sites. As a result of the guidelines and its own internal
review of assistance to operational sites, DOE has scaled back its
plans for enhancing security at Navy operational sites. At these sites,
warheads may be mated with delivery vehicles in preparation for
deployment or loaded onto ballistic missile submarines. Prior to the
interagency guidelines, DOE officials provided security assistance to
Russian Navy sites because they believed that security improvements to
such sites would not enhance Russia‘s military capability. In 2002, DOE
also began work in response to a request from the Russian Ministry of
Defense for assistance in securing Strategic Rocket Forces nuclear
warhead sites.
DOD and DOE Plan to Address External and Internal Security Threats:
DOD and DOE have plans to provide a range of security improvements to
address both external and internal threats. Examples of security
improvements that protect primarily against external threat include new
perimeter fencing with sensors to detect intruders trying to penetrate
the fence, new guard towers and fighting positions to better detect and
defend against intruders, and reinforced vehicle entrance gates.
Security improvements that protect against both internal and external
threats include access control systems that limit the site personnel
who can enter nuclear warhead storage areas and other systems that
detect unauthorized entry into bunkers by site personnel or outsiders.
DOD and DOE install security improvements in two phases. During the
first phase, DOD and DOE provide quick fixes and rapid upgrades,
respectively, to improve the security of site perimeters to protect
against external threats. During the second phase, DOD and DOE provide
comprehensive upgrades--the full range of security improvements that
protect against external and internal threats. The first phase costs
about $1 million per site and requires little analysis of existing
security conditions. Comprehensive upgrades cost about $10 million per
site and require vulnerability assessments--site-specific evaluations
of the security conditions--to plan and design the improved security
systems. Both DOD and DOE require physical access to a site before
providing comprehensive upgrades.
DOD has other programs to help secure warheads that Russia plans to
dismantle and to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the guard
forces that protect nuclear warhead sites. The programs include
transportation security enhancements, a computerized warhead inventory
system, a facility to store nuclear material from dismantled warheads,
and equipment for guard forces and to test guard forces for drug and
alcohol abuse. For additional information on these programs, see
appendix III.
Progress to Improve Security Has Been Mixed:
DOD and DOE have made mixed progress in securing nuclear warheads in
Russia. DOD has made limited progress in securing storage sites. In
contrast, DOE has made significant progress in improving security at
Russian Navy sites, but many of the operational sites DOE has assisted
would have been prohibited from receiving assistance under the January
2003 U.S. interagency guidelines.
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Improving Security at Storage Sites:
Since beginning discussions with the Russian Ministry of Defense in
1995 on providing security assistance to nuclear warhead sites, DOD has
made limited progress in improving security at the storage sites where
it has focused its efforts. DOD purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter
fencing to meet the requirements defined by the Russian Ministry of
Defense for the storage sites under its jurisdiction. The Russian
Ministry of Defense agreed to install the fencing at its own expense
but has made limited progress in doing so. The fencing consists of
three layers, including sensors to detect intruders, and protects
primarily against threats from outsiders.
DOD began delivering the fencing in late 1997, but the Ministry of
Defense reported in spring 2002 that it had installed about one third
of the fencing--42 kilometers at 52 locations--and was more than 2
years behind schedule in installing the remainder. The Ministry of
Defense has not provided DOD with the location or number of sites where
fencing has been installed, but has indicated only the number of
kilometers of fencing installed. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense
has not updated the amount of fencing installed since spring 2002 or
given DOD a revised estimate of the completion date for installing the
fencing. According to DOD, the Ministry of Defense lacks funding to
cover the cost of paying experienced contractors to install the
fencing, which DOD estimates to be about $1 million per kilometer. DOD
will not pay to install the fencing because the Ministry of Defense has
not provided DOD access to the sites.
DOD has not yet provided comprehensive upgrades--security systems that
protect against internal and external threats--at any of the storage
sites. DOD has tested and evaluated the comprehensive upgrades at the
Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) near Moscow, but Russia
has not provided DOD access to the sites for the purpose of installing
the upgrades. DOD requires physical access to the sites because the
installation of comprehensive upgrades demands a greater level of
design and security expertise. In September 2002, in anticipation of
reaching an agreement on access with the Russian Ministry of Defense,
DOD signed a contract for $83 million to install the comprehensive
upgrades at eight storage sites. According to DOD, work at these sites
is expected to begin spring 2003. DOD was unable to sign this contract
earlier in 2002 as originally planned because, in January 2002, the
administration temporarily suspended the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program after it refused to certify that Russia was complying with arms
control agreements. This resulted in an 8-month suspension of
contracting for new nuclear warhead security projects.[Footnote 19]
DOE Has Improved Security Over Most Russian Navy Sites:
Since DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead
sites in 1999, it has installed security improvements at 33 of the 36
sites where the Navy requested assistance. At all 33 sites, DOE
installed rapid upgrades that primarily protect against external
threats. As of January 2003, DOE had also installed comprehensive
upgrades that protect against internal threats at 8 of the 33 sites. At
five sites, DOE started but had not yet completed comprehensive
upgrades. The rapid upgrades include installing or repairing perimeter
fencing, replacing guard towers around the perimeter of the sites to
provide better protection for the guard forces, and installing vehicle
barriers at entrance gates. The comprehensive upgrades are based on
site-specific vulnerability assessments and include systems to detect
and assess intruders, control personnel access to the sites, and
improve the ability of guard forces to respond to alarms.
The 33 sites that received upgrades include the 5 storage sites over
which the Russian Navy and the Ministry of Defense share jurisdiction.
The remaining sites include 4 rail transfer points and 24 operational
sites--facilities where nuclear warheads are mated to delivery
vehicles, piers for loading and unloading nuclear weapons onto
ballistic missile submarines, and piers where ballistic missile
submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked.
The January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines precluded further DOE
assistance to many operational sites. The guidelines permitted
assistance to storage sites and rail transfer points that support
warhead storage, consolidation, dismantlement, or force reductions.
However, while it allowed for exceptions, the policy prohibited
assistance to operational sites where mated or unmated warheads may be
handled in the course of training or deployment, such as piers where
submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked. The change in policy
reflected concern that U.S. assistance might enhance Russia‘s military
capability. To implement this policy, DOE curtailed its plans to
provide comprehensive security improvements at operational sites where
it had already installed rapid upgrades. In addition, DOE will not
provide further assistance to operational sites that do not meet the
policy‘s guidelines.
DOD and DOE Face Challenges in Securing Russia‘s Nuclear Warhead Sites:
The departments face two challenges in securing Russia‘s nuclear
warhead sites. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not allowed DOD to
have access to Russia‘s nuclear warhead sites. In addition, in spite of
the U.S. interagency guidelines, DOD and DOE face challenges in
coordinating their programs.
DOE Has Had Sufficient Access to Install Security Improvements, but DOD
Has Not:
DOD and DOE require physical access to nuclear warhead sites to help
design security improvements and confirm that Russia has installed
security improvements as agreed before paying for the work. In
particular, they require access to site perimeters, entry control
facilities, and guard facilities where the bulk of the security
improvements are installed. DOD and DOE officials said that they do not
require access inside the bunkers or other areas where nuclear warheads
are stored because they provide minimal security improvements to those
areas.
With the exception of visits to two sites that were used to demonstrate
how DOD would assess security needs and install security improvements,
the Russian Ministry of Defense has denied DOD access to nuclear
warhead sites to install security improvements. This lack of access has
blocked DOD from installing comprehensive upgrades, the full set of
security improvements that protect against both internal and external
threats of theft, despite DOD‘s investment of $35 million to test and
evaluate these security improvements at the Security Assessment and
Training Center near Moscow. In addition, while DOD has purchased
perimeter fencing for the sites, it will not pay for installation
without site access, even though Russia is behind schedule in
installing the fencing with its own funds.
DOD signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense in
February 2003 and plans to begin providing comprehensive security
improvements at eight of the storage sites in spring 2003. The access
agreement provides for limited access by DOD representatives to
Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead sites where the Ministry requests
DOD security assistance. However, given previous delays and setbacks in
gaining Russia‘s permission to visit nuclear warhead sites, additional
delays beyond spring 2003 are possible. For example, the Russian
government approved a law in spring 2002 that would allow DOD access to
nuclear warhead sites; however, negotiations with the Ministry of
Defense on procedures for implementing the law took longer than
expected and prevented DOD from obtaining access to sites as soon as it
anticipated.
Unlike DOD, DOE has obtained sufficient access to Russia‘s nuclear
warhead sites to provide both rapid upgrades and comprehensive security
improvements. DOE has visited most of the Russian Navy nuclear warhead
sites--some sites as many as four times--to gather information to help
design security systems and observe the security improvements it has
paid to install. As part of this review, we also obtained access to two
Navy sites and saw vehicle barriers, perimeter fencing, guard towers,
and entry control facilities provided by DOE. Nevertheless, DOE has not
visited 9 of the 33 nuclear warhead sites where it has provided
assistance. The Ministry of Defense has restricted DOE‘s access to some
of these sites, and according to DOE officials, they have not visited
other sites because they can realistically go to a limited number of
sites each year. DOE officials stated that they plan to eventually
visit all of the Navy sites where they have installed security
improvements. DOD and DOE officials said various factors might explain
why DOE has received better access from the Russian Navy than DOD has
received from the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of
Defense. For example, the Russian Navy may be more willing to provide
access because DOE teams are composed of civilian security experts,
whereas the 12th Main Directorate may be reluctant to provide access to
DOD military personnel. Alternatively, according to DOD officials, the
12TH Main Directorate, under Russian law, may consider its storage
sites to be more sensitive than operational sites.
DOD and DOE Have Coordinated Their Efforts but Have Followed Different
Approaches:
DOD and DOE coordinate their efforts to improve nuclear warhead
security in Russia through an interagency working group and a joint
working group with their Russian counterparts. DOD and DOE have avoided
duplication of effort, but they have not followed uniform policies.
Furthermore, they face several implementation issues that will require
continued coordination.
The interagency working group includes key representatives from DOD and
DOE and reports to the National Security Council. The group formed
after DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead
sites in 1999 and meets at least once a quarter and frequently every
month. The joint working group meets about every 6 months and includes
key representatives from DOD, DOE, the Russian Navy, and 12th Main
Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. DOD and DOE officials
said that their interagency coordination was initially not good but had
improved, and they pointed to these working groups as a positive
development in coordination. Specifically, the officials said that they
had avoided duplication of assistance, a primary objective of the
working groups.
Despite these efforts, DOD and DOE have pursued two different policies
on assistance to operational sites. While it did not specifically have
a policy against assistance to operational sites, DOD focused on
storage sites, where warheads are stored separate from their delivery
vehicles. DOD officials stated that focusing on storage sites helped
avoid potentially difficult policy decisions that could arise from
directly assisting operational military sites. In contrast, DOE
structured its warhead security program based on requests for
assistance from the Russian Navy. Much of DOE‘s security assistance
went to operational sites where warheads are deployed with delivery
vehicles because those were the sites for which the Russian Navy
requested upgrades. Only after U.S. interagency guidelines were issued
in January 2003, 3 years after DOE began providing assistance, did DOE
and DOD resolve this difference and institute a common policy that
balanced nuclear warhead security against the possibility of enhancing
Russia‘s military capability.
While the U.S. interagency guidelines have resolved this primary issue,
DOD and DOE face other coordination issues. For example, DOD and DOE
have not determined which department will improve security at sites
they both include in their plans. The departments‘ plans overlap
because the 12th Main Directorate and the Russian military services
(the Navy, Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces) share jurisdiction over
many nuclear warhead sites. For example, five Russian Navy sites are
storage sites that fall under the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy and
the 12th Main Directorate. The Russian Navy requested assistance for
these five sites from DOE, and the 12th Main Directorate requested
assistance from DOD.[Footnote 20] Similarly, DOD and DOE have not
resolved which department will improve security at the Strategic Rocket
Forces‘ nuclear warhead sites. Initially, DOD included these sites in
its plan, but in 2002 DOE received a request from the Russian Ministry
of Defense for assistance to these sites. DOE is pursuing this request,
has visited two sites, and has requested $24 million from Congress to
help secure Strategic Rocket Forces‘ nuclear warhead sites in fiscal
year 2004.
DOD and DOE officials said that they do not have a position on which
department should provide security assistance to sites identified in
both their plans. Rather, they said that whichever agency has the best
access and cooperation from their Russian counterpart should install
security improvements. These decisions will be made on a site-by-site
basis in the interagency working group. Since DOD has already purchased
perimeter fencing for the Strategic Rocket Forces sites, DOD officials
said that if DOE provides assistance to those sites, it should avoid
duplication of assistance and use DOD equipment. In addition, under the
current policy guidelines, it is possible that DOD and DOE could both
help secure sites for the Strategic Rocket Forces.
DOD and DOE are also using different vendors to purchase security
equipment for Russian warhead storage sites. For example, DOD and DOE
used different vendors to purchase different alarm communication and
display systems that will perform essentially the same function.
According to agency officials, using different vendors and different
systems can have advantages such as accounting for different weather
conditions. However, they also stated that more training and
maintenance are required if agencies provide multiple, nonstandardized
systems. The Departments do not have a plan to jointly evaluate and
deploy equipment that balances the advantages and disadvantages of
using standardized equipment. DOD officials stated that the equipment
DOE uses should be tested at the SATC, the equipment testing and
evaluation center that DOD established near Moscow. However, DOE
officials said that they believed most, if not all, of the equipment
they provide is standardized with DOD equipment and have not committed
to testing the equipment DOE provides at the SATC.
DOD and DOE may need to coordinate their assistance in other areas to
ensure consistent policy. For example, both agencies provide assistance
to improve guard force effectiveness. DOE is considering developing two
guard force training centers for the Russian Navy, and DOD has provided
assistance to use the SATC as a training center for the 12TH Main
Directorate.
Conclusion:
The approaches that DOD and DOE have taken to improve the security of
Russia‘s nuclear warhead sites are complementary but have key
differences. In particular, DOD has focused on Russia‘s storage sites,
and DOE has focused on Russian Navy sites that, with some exceptions,
are largely separate from the sites receiving DOD assistance.
Furthermore, the agencies‘ different approaches have so far avoided
overlap and allowed the United States to protect a greater number of
sites. For example, DOE has obtained sufficient access to install
security improvements at most Russian Navy sites, including rail
transfer points, which are considered to be more vulnerable to theft
than storage sites. In contrast, while DOD has made limited progress
because it has not yet obtained the necessary access, it has plans in
place to improve security at Russia‘s storage sites if the Ministry of
Defense provides access under its February 2003 access agreement with
DOD.
However, because DOD and DOE have different approaches to achieving a
common objective critical to U.S. national interests, coordination is
essential. DOD and DOE established mechanisms to share information and
avoid duplication, but they did not, until January 2003, have
consistent plans that balance nuclear warhead security improvements
against the possibility of enhancing the operational capability of
Russia‘s nuclear forces. DOD and DOE now have consistent plans to
follow as they implement their programs. However, the departments will
need to work closely together on several areas as they proceed with
their efforts to improve the security of Russia‘s nuclear warhead
sites. Because of the different approaches taken by DOD and DOE, it
will be important to address issues such as agency jurisdiction over
Russian sites, equipment standardization, and common approaches to
training guard forces.
Recommendation:
The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated plan
to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia‘s nuclear
warheads work together to address implementation issues, such as
determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites
and resolving equipment standardization concerns.
[End of section]
Chapter 4: Department of Defense Assistance to Secure Former Biological
Weapons Facilities Has Had Limited Results:
DOD has limited information on the location and security of Russian
sites with dangerous biological pathogens because the Russian
government has provided limited access to and information about these
sites. While DOD plans to address internal and external security
threats at biological sites in Russia, it has no time frames for
completing this work, and it has not determined how many biological
sites in Russia should receive security improvements. After more than 4
years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security
concerns at these sites. As of December 2002, DOD had installed
security equipment at two sites to protect against external security
threats but had not addressed insider threats by increasing controls
over access to materials or improving physical security within labs.
U.S. efforts to secure biological sites in Russia have faced
significant challenges. For example, the Russian government has closed
many sites to U.S. security assistance programs, and the United States
has been unable to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would
expedite DOD‘s ability to provide security assistance.
DOD‘s Plans for Securing Biological Facilities in Russia Are Under
Development:
DOD‘s plans to secure Russia biological sites are based on limited
information about the number, location, pathogen collections, and
security conditions at these facilities. DOD does not know how many
sites in Russia have dangerous biological pathogens. Thus far, DOD has
focused its security program on sites where it has identified dangerous
pathogen collections and where it has access. However, DOD does not
know how many sites it plans to help secure and has no time frames for
completing its work. DOD plans to address both internal and external
security concerns at sites where it has provided assistance.
Russia Inherited Most of the Soviet Union‘s Biological Weapons Network:
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the world‘s largest and
most sophisticated offensive biological weapons program, a program that
developed weapons to spread smallpox, anthrax, plague, and other
dangerous pathogens. Although it had ratified the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972,[Footnote 21] the Soviet Union
secretly continued its biological weapons program for 2 more decades,
employing 60,000 personnel at more than 50 sites. They researched and
developed a broad range of pathogens with varying degrees of lethality
for humans, animals, and plants. In 1992, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin publicly confirmed the
program‘s existence and announced its termination. However, Russia has
not disclosed the locations of all of its biological sites and the
types of dangerous pathogens stored at these sites.[Footnote 22]
In the 1990‘s, Russian security systems and supporting infrastructure
at biological sites deteriorated as the Russian government decreased
funding and reduced staff size. At some sites, perimeter security
systems are more than 25 years old and can no longer be repaired.
Figure 5 shows unstable perimeter fencing around a biological site in
Russia.
Figure 5: Unstable Perimeter Fence at a Biological Site in Russia,
before Security Upgrades:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Additionally, biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect,
making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost
anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over
access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a
lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former
biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored.
Figure 6: Wax and String Seal Securing Room with Dangerous Biological
Pathogens:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD Has Limited Information on the Numbers of Russian Sites with
Dangerous Biological Pathogens:
The Russian government has not provided DOD with a complete inventory
of all the sites in Russia that store dangerous pathogens. The United
States and Russia have collaborative research projects at 49 Russian
biological sites, a number that includes many former biological weapons
facilities. These sites have provided participating U.S. agencies with
opportunities to observe the security needs at these sites.[Footnote
23] However, DOD has projects under way and thus direct knowledge of
the security needs at only 14 of the 49 sites. DOD‘s information on the
other sites is limited because DOD officials have to rely on other U.S.
agencies to notify the department if they observe dangerous pathogen
collections or have biosecurity concerns at the facilities where they
operate. However, U.S. agencies have not received full access to
information at the biological sites because the managers of these
facilities are concerned about Russian national security and want to
conceal former participation in the Soviet biological weapons program,
according to a DOD official.
To help focus its assistance, DOD began work on a strategic plan in
April 2002. As of January 2003, the draft plan had not been approved by
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. The plan is expected to set
policy for DOD‘s biological security assistance and other biological
weapons facility programs, including collaborative research,
biological facility safety projects, and new initiatives to provide
early warning of outbreaks of dangerous diseases in Central Asia. DOD
officials said that after the strategic plan is approved, DOD will
prepare an implementation plan with schedules and deadlines for the
biological security project and other biological weapons facility
projects it implements.
Despite uncertainty over the exact number of biological facilities in
Russia, a DOD official estimated that the department may eventually
help upgrade security at about 20 Russian biological sites housing
dangerous pathogens. DOD plans to encourage Russian ministries to
consolidate biological pathogen collections from smaller centers at
larger facilities and thereby decrease the number of facilities that
store dangerous pathogens. According to DOD, not all former bioweapons
facilities currently have dangerous pathogens and therefore would not
be considered by DOD for biosecurity assistance. Currently there is no
time frame for completing this work.
DOD Plans to Address Internal and External Security Threats:
DOD plans to address both internal and external security threats at
biological sites but to date has focused on protecting against external
threats. Biological sites have unique characteristics that make them
especially vulnerable to internal security threats, however. Experts
have stated that there is a greater threat of potential proliferation
of dangerous pathogens from insiders than from an outside attack
because biological pathogens are small and can be smuggled out of a
site without detection. According to a U.S. biosecurity expert,
managers at Russian biological sites have been slow to acknowledge the
potential of internal security threats. For example, officials at the
Russian biological sites we visited stated that they knew their staff
well and would notice if an individual posed a security threat because
laboratory staff live and work in close quarters. These officials
recognized the potential for insider security threats and said they
would consider measures to mitigate these threats. According to a DOD
official, the department intends to include measures to improve
personnel screening and install systems to keep track of the pathogen
collections.
DOD‘s Biological Security Projects Have Made Little Progress:
U.S. efforts to upgrade security at Russian biological institutes have
been directed at facilities with dangerous pathogens that the Russians
have been willing to let DOD assist. Since 1998, DOD has upgraded
security at the two largest former biological weapons facilities in
Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology
(Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology
(Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security
improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute
of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics
Plant (Pokrov). As of September 2002, DOD estimates[Footnote 24] that
it had obligated about $14 million[Footnote 25] to improve security at
Russian biological facilities.
Biosecurity Projects Under Way at Four Sites:
As of December 2002, biosecurity projects are under way at 4 of the 49
biological sites in Russia that may require assistance. DOD officials
stated that the department‘s efforts to help secure biological
pathogens started later than work to secure other WMD because
biological pathogen security was viewed as a lower priority. Also,
according to DOD officials, relationships with the management of
biological facilities have to be built before they will consider U.S.
biosecurity assistance. Vector, one of the world‘s two declared sites
of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens.
Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes
genetically engineered anthrax. Golitsino and Pokrov were part of the
Soviet Union‘s extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward
the development of plant and animal pathogens. Other sites, including
Russia‘s system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store
various strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more
dangerous pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, but the United States
has no access to them, according to DOD officials.
At Vector and Obolensk, biosecurity projects have improved perimeter
and building entrance security. However, biosecurity assistance
provided at Vector and Obolensk has not addressed the threat of theft
by insiders or improved security over areas where research with
hazardous materials is conducted or collections are stored. At both
sites, biosecurity improvements involved construction and relocation of
fences, installation of electronic sensors, strengthening of entrances
to laboratory buildings where high hazard pathogens were stored or used
in research, construction of guard facilities, and installation of
equipment at central alarm stations. These projects progressed slowly
in part because a second set of threat and vulnerability assessments
was required after DOD found the initial set to be incomplete. At
Vector and Obolensk, a second set of threat and vulnerability
assessments was undertaken in September 2002 by a U.S. contractor and
was completed in December 2002. Figure 7 shows new fencing installed at
Vector and figure 8 shows two cabinets of computer equipment installed
at Obolensk to monitor security video and electronic sensors.
Figure 7: DOD-Funded Three-fence Perimeter around Buildings at Vector
with Smallpox and Other Dangerous Pathogens:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: DOD-Funded Improvements to Central Alarm Station at Russian
Biological Site at Obolensk Used to Monitor the New Security System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The projects at the Golitsino and Pokrov agricultural centers
illustrate the slow progress of biosecurity projects. After 2 years of
discussion and planning, initial threat and vulnerability assessments
began in September 2002 and were completed in December 2002. DOD has
yet to determine when it will begin security improvements at these
sites.
Although DOD‘s slow start and Russia‘s limited cooperation were major
reasons for the lack of progress in biosecurity assistance, DOD
officials point to the suspension of new projects in 2002 as the cause
of further delays. In January 2002, the administration temporarily
suspended the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in Russia when it
refused to certify that Russia was complying with arms control
agreements. This resulted in an 8-month suspension of contracting for
new biological security projects.[Footnote 26] DOD was unable to
obligate funds to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments to
initiate a second phase of security assistance at Vector and Obolensk,
nor was it able to start threat and vulnerability assessments at
Golitsino and Pokrov.
U.S. Biological Security Assistance Projects Face Many Challenges:
U.S. efforts to help secure former biological weapons facilities in
Russia face many challenges. First, DOD has been unable to work
directly with Russian biological sites due to stalled negotiations on
an interministerial implementing agreement. Second, the United States
does not have access to former biological weapons sites. As a result,
the biological security program has taken longer and accomplished less
than expected.
Stalled Negotiations with Russians Have Hampered DOD Work:
The United States cannot efficiently provide assistance to Russian
institutes without having an implementing agreement with the Russian
government. According to DOD officials, an implementing agreement
between all the relevant Russian ministries and DOD would expedite the
installation of security projects because DOD could work directly with
the institutes.
Multiple Russian organizations and ministries have jurisdiction over
the military and civilian centers that were part of the former
biological weapons complex in Russia. Jurisdiction resides in nine
Russian government organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Health,
Science, Agriculture, and Education; the Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences; the Russian Academy of Agricultural Science; the Russian
Academy of Natural Sciences; and Biopreparat, an organization that now
develops pharmaceuticals but previously controlled the Soviet Union‘s
biological weapons technology centers. In addition, the Ministry of
Health has five antiplague institutes and numerous regional field
stations that maintain pathogen collections and had a lead role in the
Soviet Union‘s bioweapons program.
The lack of a single Russian focal point for DOD‘s bioweapons security
projects is a major barrier to successfully negotiating an agreement
between the United States and Russia. Since 1992, an umbrella
agreement[Footnote 27] between the United States and Russia has allowed
U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction projects for biosecurity, biosafety,
and dangerous pathogens, as it has for nuclear and chemical projects in
Russia. However, additional interministerial implementation agreements
are needed to facilitate DOD‘s biosecurity assistance. In 1999, the
Russian Government rejected a draft implementing agreement between DOD
and the Ministry of Health on the grounds that it was not appropriate
for that ministry to enter into an exclusive agreement with DOD. The
Russian government similarly rejected a subsequent U.S.-proposed
implementing agreement between the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and the Russian Ministry of Health. The Department of State
approached individual Russian ministries directly and also suggested
that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sign a separate agreement
with the United States that would allow implementing agreements with
multiple Russian ministries. None of these efforts has been successful.
Without an interministerial implementing agreement, DOD cannot begin to
directly secure Russia‘s former biological weapons facilities. As a
result, DOD has to provide assistance through an intermediary
organization that has an agreement with the Russian government. DOD has
negotiated implementing agreements and avoided this problem in three
Eurasian republics, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and is
finalizing an agreement with Ukraine.
As an alternative to an implementing agreement, DOD has used an
existing program, the International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC), to begin security projects at Russian biological sites.
However, ISTC was implementing hundreds of research projects and was
unable to accord DOD projects as high a priority as DOD wished. ISTC is
an international organization in Moscow founded by the United States,
Russia, the European Union and Japan to engage former weapon scientists
in peaceful scientific research.[Footnote 28] ISTC was created to
prevent the proliferation of former Soviet WMD expertise by offering
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile scientists
peaceful research opportunities and thus discouraging them from
selling their expertise to countries of concern or terrorist groups.
The bulk of ISTC‘s funding pays scientists for their work, with some
limited spending for laboratory equipment or computers.
ISTC agreed to facilitate DOD‘s biosecurity projects in Russia because
the U.S. government had an existing agreement with ISTC that allowed it
to finance a range of research projects and other activities. However,
ISTC‘s procurement system was not set up to handle the large contracts
necessary for engineering and construction projects. In addition,
approval of all ISTC proposals, including the biosecurity proposals,
took time, partly because ISTC had to obtain host-government
concurrence for each proposal from the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the
Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology; the Ministry of Defense
or the Academy of Science. Also, according to DOD officials, a shortage
of administrative and managerial staff at ISTC impeded ISTC‘s efforts
to process DOD‘s biosecurity projects. In 2001, DOD funded additional
staff positions at ISTC to help expedite the processing of its security
projects.
According to DOD officials, until an interministerial implementing
agreement is negotiated, DOD biosecurity projects will continue to be
managed through ISTC. Despite frustration with ISTC‘s slow pace, DOD
officials stated that ISTC‘s role was critical in implementing U.S.
assistance at Russian bioweapons facilities.
DOD Lacks Access to Many Former Bioweapons Sites:
While DOD has identified several former biological weapons sites in
Russia where it would like to provide biological security assistance,
the Russian government has consistently refused to grant DOD access to
certain facilities managed by the ministries of Health, Defense, and
Agriculture. For example, the Russian Ministry of Health maintains five
antiplague institutes and a network of numerous antiplague field
stations. These institutes and stations were part of the former Soviet
system of medical facilities housing dangerous pathogen collections for
research and are completely closed to U.S. assistance programs.
Bioweapons experts have reported that, as part of the Soviet bioweapons
program, the anti-plague network helped identify new virulent strains
of pathogens and participated in research on defensive measures. These
facilities specialized in animal diseases that are communicable to man,
such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and cholera. According to DOD
officials, the ministry was concerned that participation in Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) programs would be an admission that the
antiplague centers had taken part in the Soviet biological weapons
program. DOD also lacks access to four former Ministry of Defense
biological weapons sites. These laboratories were involved in pathogen-
and toxin-related research and maintained large pathogen collections. A
major animal pathogen institute of the Ministry of Agriculture also
remains closed to biosecurity assistance.
DOD has made some progress in gaining access to one of the four
Ministry of Defense facilities. In August 2002, U.S. Senator Richard
Lugar was instrumental in initiating discussions with the management of
the former Ministry of Defense facility, Kirov-200 (Strizhi), about
potential collaborative research projects, according to a DOD official.
The Russian government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of
the facility from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education.
This institute‘s new civilian status is expected to enable future
security projects with DOD.
Conclusion:
DOD has accomplished little to date to help protect Russian sites with
dangerous biological pathogens because the department has little
information about biological sites in Russia and has received limited
Russian cooperation. Presently, DOD plans to improve security at two
sites that are of lesser security concern than others because the
department has access to those two sites. By targeting sites where it
has access, DOD maintains relationships with the Russian bioweapons
establishment, which is an important objective. However, in the long
term, this approach means that DOD will not be able to improve security
at locations with dangerous pathogens that are of greatest security
concern to the United States. DOD could benefit from DOE‘s past
experience in assessing site security requirements around buildings
with weapons-usable nuclear material. Specifically, DOE developed a
categorization scheme for ranking the relative threat posed by
different types of material, which it used to decide on the extent of
upgrades to be installed at specific buildings. Without complete
assessments of the locations, pathogen collections, and security needs
at sites in Russia that have dangerous biological weapons, DOD will
have difficulty guiding its program.
Recommendation:
In developing the department‘s plan to enhance security at Russian
biological sites, the Secretary of Defense should clearly articulate
criteria the department should use to rank the relative threat posed by
different types of pathogens and review the security under which they
are kept to identify the biological sites that pose the greatest
security risks and would therefore have highest priority for and
receive the most extensive U.S. assistance.
[End of section]
Chapter 5: DOD Has Not Focused on Securing All of Russia‘s Chemical
Weapons Storage Sites:
Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused its nonproliferation efforts on
the construction of a facility to destroy Russia‘s 40,000 metric ton
stockpile of chemical weapons. Because construction of the facility was
taking longer than expected, in fiscal year 2000, Congress directed DOD
to develop additional plans to protect Russia‘s chemical weapons
storage sites. DOD has since developed plans to address external
threats at two chemical weapons sites that store nerve agent in small
portable munitions. DOD plans to complete this work in fall 2003 but
has no plans to extend the program to the five other sites, three of
which store nerve agent and two that store blister agent. As a result,
a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable
to theft or diversion.
DOD Plans to Address External Security at Two of Russia‘s Seven
Chemical Weapons Storage Sites:
In 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC),[Footnote 29] Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000
metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW),[Footnote 30] the implementing agency of the CWC, conducts
inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports its findings to
member states, including the United States. OPCW regularly inspects
Russia‘s chemical weapons stockpile.
DOD has information concerning the quantity, location, and physical
security conditions at Russia‘s declared chemical weapons storage sites
and has plans to address external security at two sites. However,
chemical weapons are stored at seven sites in Russia (see table 2).
Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most
dangerous form of chemical weapon.[Footnote 31] DOD officials stated
that two of these sites, Kizner and Shchuch‘ye, pose the greatest
threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve
agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be
transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store
large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store
blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a
threat to U.S. national security interests.[Footnote 32] Further, a
destruction facility for blister agents funded mainly by Germany began
operation in December 2002.
Table 2: Russian Chemical Weapons Storage Sites:
Site Name: Kizner; Type of agent: Nerve (VX, sarin, soman);
Type of munitions: Small artillery shells.
Site Name: Shchuch‘ye; Type of agent: Nerve (VX, sarin, soman);
Type of munitions: Small artillery shells.
Site Name: Pochep; Type of agent: Nerve (VX, sarin, soman);
Type of munitions: Air-deliverable bombs.
Site Name: Maradykovsky; Type of agent: Nerve (VX, sarin, soman);
Type of munitions: Air-deliverable bombs.
Site Name: Leonidovka; Type of agent: Nerve (VX, sarin, soman);
Type of munitions: Air-deliverable bombs.
Site Name: Kambarka; Type of agent: Blister (lewisite); Type
of munitions: Bulk containers.
Site Name: Gorny; Type of agent: Blister (mustard, lewisite);
Type of munitions: Bulk containers.
Source: Russian Munitions Agency.
Note: The Kizner site also stores some lewisite. The Maradykovsky and
Gorny sites also store some mustard-lewisite mixture.
[End of table]
DOD has focused its efforts on the construction of a chemical weapons
destruction facility at the Shchuch‘ye chemical weapons storage site.
According to DOD officials, the destruction of Russia‘s chemical
weapons stockpile, especially its nerve agents, would significantly
reduce the threat faced by the United States. Planning began in 1994,
and completion of the facility is scheduled for 2006. Russia plans to
destroy all its nerve agent munitions at the facility. As of November
2002, DOD had obligated more than $218 million on the design and
preliminary construction of the destruction facility. Although the
Russian Munitions Agency, which is charged with the safe storage and
destruction of Russia‘s chemical weapons stockpile, plans to destroy
all of its declared chemical weapons by the CWC mandated deadline of
2012, the lack of progress and financial difficulties thus far make it
doubtful that this deadline will be met. Current estimates, based on
the capacity of the facility, indicate that Russia will not be able to
completely destroy its nerve agent stockpile for at least 40 years
unless it builds additional destruction facilities.
In 1999,[Footnote 33] we reported that the Shchuch‘ye destruction
facility was behind schedule and might not fully achieve U.S.
objectives. In response, Congress denied funding for the project in
fiscal year 2000 and directed DOD to address security concerns at
Russia‘s chemical weapons storage sites. Congress appropriated $20
million in fiscal year 2000 for security enhancements at chemical
weapons storage sites in Russia. As a result of this congressional
direction, DOD chose to address the external threat at the two chemical
weapons storage sites in Russia that store nerve agent in small
portable munitions, Kizner and Shchuch‘ye. Figure 9 shows an official
taking inventory of small nerve agent artillery shells at the
Shchuch‘ye storage site.
Figure 9: Chemical Weapon Artillery Rounds inside Russian Chemical
Weapons Storage Building at Shchuch‘ye:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD‘s strategy for upgrading chemical weapons site security to address
external threat at these two sites involves two phases. First, a series
of upgrades were installed around individual buildings. Second,
upgrades will be installed around the perimeter of each site and the
central alarm stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades by fall
2003.
DOD Is on Track to Complete Work at Two Sites by 2003:
As of October 2002, DOD had obligated $19.8 million of its $20 million
appropriation for chemical weapons site security. In November 2001, DOD
began installing the first phase of its security enhancement package
for chemical weapons sites: the installation of microwave sensors and
fencing around individual storage buildings or groups of storage
buildings that contain small portable munitions, according to DOD.
These upgrades cost $220,000 per site and were installed at both Kizner
and Shchuch‘ye. The sensors are the primary deterrent to proliferators
because they alert guards to any access to the protected buildings.
During our visit to these sites, we observed that the U.S.-funded
fences around individual buildings were approximately 3 feet high and
were primarily designed to reduce the number of false alarms caused by
animals. A total of 8 buildings at Shchuch‘ye and 23 buildings at
Kizner have been protected by the first phase of DOD upgrades. This
first phase of upgrades was completed in February 2002.
In July 2002, DOD began work on the second phase of its security
enhancement package at Kizner and Shchuch‘ye. These upgrades include
the installation of enhanced site perimeters with two layers of
fencing, sensors, lights, and closed circuit television cameras and
improved central alarm stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades
by fall 2003. Once these security upgrades are complete, DOD will have
secured 35 percent of Russia‘s stockpile of nerve agent chemical
weapons. The remaining 65 percent of nerve agent stocks are stored at
three sites where no U.S.-funded security enhancements are planned. In
addition, according to DOD officials, no plans exist to install a
personnel reliability program,[Footnote 34] an improved accounting
system, or other equipment to address insider threats at any chemical
weapons storage site in Russia.
Progress in implementing site security upgrades at chemical weapons
storage sites has been expedited by good access and cooperation from
the Russian government. DOD officials stated that access to Russia‘s
chemical weapons storage sites has not slowed the progress of the
program and that they have been able to obtain the information
necessary to perform the work. DOD officials believe that access has
been good because Russia has declared its stockpile and OPCW inspectors
are periodically present. We also had good access to both Kizner and
Shchuch‘ye when we visited Russia in July 2002. We were shown examples
of the upgrades installed around individual buildings at both sites,
saw the equipment for the site perimeter upgrades awaiting
installation, and had access to portions of the site perimeters and
entry control points.
Russian Government Wants to Focus on Destruction Not Security;
Transportation Security Is an Impending Challenge:
DOD officials have expressed concerns about the security of Russia‘s
chemical weapons storage facilities, yet no further security upgrades
are planned. One reason is because the Russian government has expressed
little interest in expanding the security enhancement program. The head
of the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency charged with the safe
storage and destruction of Russia‘s chemical weapons stockpile, stated
that his preference is that the United States fund the completion of
the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch‘ye rather
than improve the security around Russia‘s chemical weapons storage
sites. He maintained that the only real long-term security for Russia‘s
chemical weapons is their destruction, though he was unopposed to an
expansion of the site security upgrade program.
An additional challenge is ensuring that Russia‘s chemical weapons have
adequate security as they are transported to the destruction facility.
DOD has not begun discussions with Russia on the security that will be
required for chemical munitions as they are transferred from storage
sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at
Shchuch‘ye. DOD officials and security experts acknowledge that
dangerous materials are very vulnerable during transport. Because
Russia plans to destroy all of its nerve agent chemical weapons at the
U.S.-funded destruction facility at Shchuch‘ye, Russia will be
transporting thousands of metric tons of chemical nerve agent from five
storage sites, most of which are more than 500 miles from the planned
facility. According to DOD officials, Russia has yet to develop a
practical plan for securing chemical weapons in transit to the planned
destruction facility. The United States already has programs in place
to aid Russia in securing nuclear weapons and material during
transport. Although this security concern will not arise before the
scheduled completion of the destruction facility in 2006, none of the
U.S. officials we interviewed had assessed the potential implications
for security or whether the United States would need to assist Russia
with the expense of transportation and security of chemical weapons
during transit.
Conclusion:
DOD and Russia‘s plans for securing only two chemical weapons sites
appears to be based less on an assessment of the potential long-term
security risks of leaving 65 percent of Russia‘s nerve agent unsecured,
than on a desire to focus on building a destruction facility. With a
lengthy destruction process yet to begin for Russia‘s nerve agent
stockpile, concerns about the security of these weapons will persist.
The further challenge of securing chemical weapons in transit to the
planned destruction facility looms on the horizon, though DOD has no
plans to address it.
Recommendations:
Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia‘s chemical
weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider:
* reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites
in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security
assistance; and:
* working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for
securing chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction
facility at Shchuch‘ye.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Congress may wish to consider allocating additional funds for improving
security at the three remaining sites in Russia that store nerve agent
but have not received U.S. security assistance.
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Sites in Russia That We Visited in July 2002:
During July 2002, we visited 14 sites in Russia where the Department of
Defense (DOD) or Department of Energy (DOE) had programs under way to
help secure nuclear material, nuclear warheads, dangerous biological
pathogens, or chemical weapons (see figure 10 for a map showing the
locations and type of sites visited).
Figure 10: Sites GAO Visited During July 2002 Fieldwork:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Nuclear Material Sites:
We visited three nuclear material sites and met with officials from two
additional sites:
* Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) - MEPhI is a large
university located in southeast Moscow. The institute specializes in
nuclear physics research and training and operates a research reactor
using highly enriched uranium. The institute has a small quantity of
weapons-usable nuclear material on site with DOE-funded security
upgrades. DOE has a pilot project for its Material Protection, Control
and Accounting (MPC&A), Operations Monitoring (MOM) system at MEPhI.
During our visit we observed the installed DOE-funded security
enhancements, saw the MOM system in operation, and spoke with site
officials about their approaches to security, their relationship with
DOE, and their thoughts about the MOM system.
* Northern Fleet Storage Facility Site 49 (Navy fuel) - Site 49 is
located within a Russian Federation Navy Base near the city of
Murmansk. Site 49 is the primary land-based storage facility for highly
enriched uranium reactor fuel used by Northern Fleet submarines and
icebreakers. The Russian Navy stores tens of metric tons of nuclear
fuel at Site 49. DOE has funded security upgrades to the site including
fencing, cameras, and sensors. DOE began work to improve the nuclear
security systems at Site 49 in 1996 and completed work in 1999. During
our visit we observed the DOE upgrades and spoke with site officials
about nuclear material security.
* Technical Bureau of Autotransport Equipment (KB ATO) - KB ATO is an
automotive production facility located in Moscow. KB ATO has contracts
with DOE to install security upgrades for trucks and railcars used to
transport weapons-usable nuclear material and to build shipping
containers, called overpacks, for nuclear material in transit. During
our visit, we observed examples of overpacks purchased by DOE for use
by MINATOM and spoke with site officials about nuclear material
security during transit.
* Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (CCP) - The CCP is a nuclear
fuel fabrication facility located in central Russia. Among other
upgrades, DOE funded the construction of a new central storage facility
for the majority of weapons-usable nuclear material at the CCP. We met
with officials from the site to discuss DOE‘s security upgrades, but we
were not allowed on site due to access problems with MINATOM.
* Mayak (formerly known as Chelyabinsk-65) - DOE has provided a variety
of site security upgrades to the MINATOM nuclear weapons complex
facility at Mayak, which is located in the closed city of Ozersk. We
met with officials from the site to discuss DOE‘s security upgrades,
but we were not allowed access to the site because we were denied
access by MINATOM.
Nuclear Warhead Sites:
We visited five nuclear warhead sites:
* CBC-A2 - CBC-A2 is a Russian Navy site where DOE has provided
security upgrades for the protection of nuclear warheads.
* CBC-A4 - CBC-A4 is a Russian Navy site where DOE has provided
security upgrades for the protection of nuclear warheads.
* Tver Railcar Building Works (Tver) - Tver is a contracting facility
where DOD provided upgrades to Russian railcars intended to transport
nuclear warheads and accompanying support troops. During our visit we
observed the factories where security enhancements were made to
railcars and accompanying troop railcars and spoke with site officials
about transportation security.
* Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) - SATC was constructed
to enable a team of DOD & Ministry of Defense personnel to test,
select, and integrate a system needed to upgrade physical security at
Ministry of Defense‘s nuclear weapons storage sites. SATC is located in
Sergiev Posad‘ (approximately 50 miles northeast of Moscow). A
personnel reliability program (PRP) fixed laboratory and a central
location for guard force training systems are located at SATC as well.
During our visit we observed examples of DOD-funded upgrades that were
undergoing testing, saw the central laboratory for the PRP testing, and
spoke with site officials about the role of SATC in nuclear weapons
security.
* Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) - When completed, the FMSF,
near the MINATOM weapons complex facility of Mayak, will store nuclear
material from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads. When we visited the
FMSF, construction was still under way. We toured the entire site and
had discussions with U.S. and Russian contractors involved in the
ongoing work.
Biological Pathogens Sites:
We visited four biological pathogen sites:
* State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) -
Vector, in the Novosibirsk region, is a former biological weapons
facility involved in scientific research on virology, molecular
biology, and genetic engineering. A collection of viral pathogens that
includes a collection of smallpox strains is maintained at this center.
Vector is one of the world‘s two declared sites of stored smallpox. DOD
has funded extensive physical security upgrades to the facility. During
our visit, we observed the DOD-funded security upgrades and spoke with
site officials about the security of biological pathogens.
* The State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk) -
Obolensk, in the Moscow region, is a former biological weapons facility
involved in scientific research in areas that include molecular
biology, gene engineering, and biotechnology. Obolensk maintains a
large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered
anthrax. DOD has funded extensive physical security upgrades to the
facility. During our visit, we observed the DOD-funded security
upgrades and spoke with site officials about the security of biological
pathogens.
* The All-Russian Institute of Phytopathology in Golitsino (Golitsino)
- Golitsino, in the Moscow region, is a former biological weapons
facility involved in the study of dangerous plant diseases of
agricultural crops that have potential for significant economic impact.
At the time of our visit, DOD had installed no security upgrades at
Golitsino, but it plans to in the future. During our visit, we observed
the existing security conditions of the site, saw examples of the
pathogen collection, and spoke with site officials about the security
of biological pathogens.
* Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov) - Pokrov, in the Vladimir region, is
a former biological weapons facility involved in the production of
veterinary vaccines and diagnostic preparations and retains a
collection of dangerous pathogens. In Soviet times, Pokrov had been
used a production site for smallpox weapons. At the time of our visit,
DOD had installed no security upgrades at Pokrov, but it plans to do so
in the future. During our visit, we observed the existing security
conditions of the site, saw examples of the pathogen collection, and
spoke with site officials about the security of biological pathogens.
Chemical Weapons Sites:
We visited two chemical weapons sites:
* Shchuch‘ye Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Shchuch‘ye) - Russia stores
nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical
weapons at Shchuch‘ye. DOD has provided some security upgrades to
individual buildings and is currently installing upgrades to the
perimeter of the site. During our visit we observed the installed DOD
upgrades to individual buildings; saw the existing entry control points
and perimeter; and spoke with site officials about the planned upgrades
and existing security concerns.
* Kizner Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Kizner) - Russia stores nearly
2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical weapons at
Kizner. DOD has provided some security upgrades to individual buildings
and is currently installing upgrades to the perimeter of the site.
During our visit, we observed the installed DOD upgrades to individual
buildings; saw the existing entry control points and central alarm
station; and spoke with site officials about the planned upgrades and
existing security concerns.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Other Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Material Security
Assistance:
In addition to improving physical security at nuclear material storage
sites, DOE‘s threat reduction strategy for nuclear material security in
Russia includes several other efforts. These efforts include
transportation security enhancements, assistance to guard forces that
protect nuclear material facilities, and a system to monitor the
operations of security upgrades after they are installed.
Transportation Security:
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during
transit. By providing upgraded security for transport and guard
railcars, specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure
containers --called overpacks --DOE seeks to improve the security of
nuclear material transported within and between nuclear facilities in
Russia. Through fiscal year 2002, DOE has obligated more than $57
million to improve transportation security over nuclear material in
Russia. During our visit to Russia in July 2002, we were shown examples
of the types of overpacks purchased by DOE for use in transporting
nuclear material in Russia. An example of these overpacks can be seen
in figure 11.
Figure 11: DOE-Funded Overpack Used to Protect Nuclear Material During
Transit:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOE has accelerated this program because MINATOM has provided DOE
sufficient access to confirm the need for and use of transportation
security enhancements. According to DOE officials, because such
verification can take place outside of nuclear weapons complex sites,
DOE has not had the same access issues as in its building security
enhancement program.
Protective Forces Assistance:
Many of the new contracts between DOE and MINATOM signed since
September 2001, have been for protective forces assistance at nuclear
weapons complex facilities. As of September 2002, DOE had obligated
over $9 million to provide a variety of equipment for use by the forces
that protect sites that store weapons-usable nuclear material. This
equipment includes such items as bulletproof vests, helmets, response
vehicles, and cold-weather uniforms. The objective of the DOE‘s
protective forces assistance is to ensure that a sufficient number of
organized, equipped, and trained protective force personnel are present
to provide balanced protection against all external threats to Russian
nuclear materials. Similar to DOE‘s transportation security assistance,
funding for protective forces assistance has increased since September
2001, according to DOE officials. DOE has provided the bulk of its new
protective forces assistance to nuclear weapons complex facilities.
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Operations Monitoring
System:
In February 2001, we recommended that DOEdevelop a system, in
cooperation with the Russian government, to monitor, on a long-term
basis, the security systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure
that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal
nuclear material.[Footnote 35] In response to our recommendation, DOE
developed the MOM System. DOE tentatively planned to install MOM
systems at 50 sites by the end of fiscal year 2002. However, by the end
of fiscal year 2002, DOE officials told us that only two MOM systems
were installed at two civilian academic institutes that store nuclear
material. According to DOE, the Russian government supports the MOM
system, yet MINATOM has delayed the implementation of the MOM system at
all sites it controls for nearly 2 years. In a letter from MINATOM,
dated September 13, 2002, a senior MINATOM official agreed with the
principle of the MOM system, but did not grant DOE permission to begin
installation at MINATOM facilities.
The MOM systems use off-the-shelf equipment to allow Russian and U.S.
officials to ensure that nuclear warheads and material are secure;
MPC&A systems are properly staffed and that personnel are vigilant; and
key security procedures are enforced. Through the end of fiscal year
2002, DOE had obligated nearly $14 million for the MOM program. During
our visit to MEPhI in July 2002, we observed the MOM system in
operation. Figure 12 shows a MOM camera in operation at MEPhI.
Figure 12: DOE-Funded Camera Monitors Nuclear Processing Lab at MEPhI:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Other Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Warhead
Security
Assistance:
In addition to improving security at nuclear warhead storage sites,
DOD‘s threat reduction strategy for nuclear warhead security in Russia
includes several other efforts. The efforts include transportation
security enhancements, a computerized warhead inventory system, a
facility to store nuclear material from dismantled warheads, and
equipment to test guard forces for drug and alcohol abuse.
Transportation Security:
DOD is providing assistance to improve the security of nuclear warheads
during transportation by rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites.
According to DOD officials, security experts consider warheads to be
highly vulnerable to theft during transport. DOD has addressed this
threat by providing security enhancements for railcars, hardened
shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect against small arms
fire and other threats, and payment of railway tariffs associated with
transporting the warheads to the consolidation and dismantlement sites.
DOD provided 150 shipping containers to Russia to provide for the safe
and secure storage of nuclear weapons during transportation by rail to
dismantlement and consolidation sites. Warheads are locked inside these
containers, preventing direct access to weapons during transport and
providing accident and theft protection. DOD also provided security and
safety enhancements for 100 nuclear weapon cargo railcars and 15 guard
cars that accompany the cargo cars. For each railcar, DOD paid to
install tampering and intrusion detection sensors, fire detection, and
thermal insulation. DOD continues to pay for the maintenance of these
railcars. The Russian Ministry of Defense has also requested new
railcars because the condition of those that it is currently using is
deteriorating to the point where they can no longer be used. DOD has
not yet agreed to this request, partly because it is concerned that the
new railcars may enhance Russia‘s operational capability for
transporting deployed nuclear warheads.
Since January 2002, DOD has also funded 153 rail shipments to warhead
dismantlement and consolidation sites. DOD estimates these shipments
moved two to three thousand warheads. During shipping, the Russian
Ministry of Defense uses the DOD-provided shipping containers that
protect against theft. DOD pays for the shipping costs, specifically a
tax charged by Russia‘s Ministry of Railways for every train that moves
across its tracks, because the Ministry of Defense says it does not
have sufficient funding to pay for the shipping. DOD justified paying
this tariff because it supports the objective of shipping nuclear
warheads to consolidation and dismantlement sites.
Nuclear Warhead Inventory System:
DOD is also providing a computerized accounting and inventory system
for tracking nuclear warheads scheduled for dismantlement. According to
DOD officials, without such a system, the Russian Ministry of Defense
would not have a centralized capability to track the warheads, which
raised concerns about the potential loss or theft of a nuclear warhead.
In 1995, to address these concerns, DOD and the Russian Ministry of
Defense began work on nuclear warhead inventory management system
connected to a network of 19 sites throughout Russia. DOD has obligated
$45 million on the system but has not yet completed it, and computers
that DOD bought for the system are sitting in warehouses. The project
has suffered from numerous delays on the part of the Russians, and DOD
currently estimates that the project will be completed in 2005.
Additionally, the purpose and scope of the project has changed from the
original plan in 1995 to track all of Russia‘s nuclear weapons. In
2001, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) significantly limited the
scope to nuclear warheads that it plans to dismantle and excluded
warheads that are part of its operational nuclear arsenal from the
system. Finally, the MOD has not granted DOD access to the sites where
the computers will be located, which has hindered DOD‘s efforts to
develop the system and will limit DOD‘s ability to verify how the MOD
uses the system.
Fissile Material Storage Facility:
DOD is paying to construct a facility in Russia--the Fissile Material
Storage Facility (FMSF)--to safely and securely store nuclear material
removed from dismantled nuclear warheads. DOD agreed to finance the
design and construction of this facility for MINATOM because Russia
told the U.S. it did not have adequate secure storage capacity for the
nuclear material from dismantled warheads. To support Russia in its
dismantlement efforts, DOD agreed in 1992 to pay for the design of a
secure facility for the nuclear material and, in 1993, to help build
the facility.
As of October 2002, DOD had obligated $349 million to design and build
this facility, and DOD estimates that the facility is about 90 percent
complete. However, the project has fallen behind schedule, in part
because Russia began placing significant access limitations on U.S.
officials and contractors in May 2002--4 months before the facility was
to be completed. In particular, Russia began restricting the number of
U.S. personnel who can visit the region where the facility is located-
-only 10 Americans associated with the project can be in the entire
region at one time. This restriction has delayed completion by forcing
construction and security engineers, who are involved in every phase of
construction, to postpone necessary trips to the facility. As a result,
DOD currently estimates that it will complete construction of the
facility in December 2003 and that Russia will begin loading the
facility in January 2004.
In April 1999, we reported that DOD lacks clear assurance that Russia
will use the facility to store weapons-grade plutonium solely from
dismantled warheads.[Footnote 36] Specifically, we reported that DOD
would not be able to confirm that the plutonium was removed from
dismantled warheads without an agreement with Russia on measures to
confirm the origin of material in the facility. DOD has still not
reached such an agreement with Russia, and consequently faces the same
limitation with regard to the facility.
Guard Force Assistance:
DOD‘s strategy also addresses the reliability and effectiveness of the
guard forces that protect the nuclear warhead storage sites. To improve
the reliability of guard forces and personnel who have direct or
indirect access to nuclear warheads, DOD has provided the Ministry of
Defense with drug-and alcohol-testing devices, laboratory facilities to
test samples for drug abuse, and polygraphs. According to DOD
officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense has been using the equipment
and has taken seriously the need to improve reliability among its
guards and personnel. To improve the effectiveness of the guard forces
in responding to intruders, DOD is also providing shooting ranges and
other training simulators for using small arms.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000:
MAR 11 2003:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G. Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
Per your request, I am responding to recommendations included in GAO
Draft Report ’Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at
Russian Sites,“ dated February 21, 2003 (GAO Code 320103/GAO-03-482).
My office has reviewed the draft recommendations and concurs with
recommendation 1 and 2, and non-concurs with part of recommendation 3.
Specific comments for each recommendation are attached. In addition, my
staff and Defense Threat Reduction Agency experts will be in touch
through the DoD Office of Inspector General with minor technical
corrections to the report.
In a related development, I am pleased to inform you that on February
21, 2003, DoD signed the Access Protocol and Administrative
Arrangements with the Russian Ministry of Defense that will enable DoD
to press ahead with comprehensive security enhancement projects at
Russian nuclear weapons storage sites.
My point of contact for this report is James H. Reid at (703) 696-7737,
james.reid@osd.mil. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
draft report.
Sincerely,
Lisa Bronson:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation:
Signed by Lisa Bronson:
cc: ATSD(NCB)
Director, DTRA:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2003 GAO CODE 320103/GAO-03-482:
’WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: ADDITIONAL RUSSIA COOPERATION NEEDED TO
FACILITATE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT RUSSIAN SITES“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretaries of Energy
and Defense develop an integrated plan to ensure that their related
programs to help secure Russia‘s nuclear warheads work together to
address implementation issues such as determining which department will
provide assistance to certain sites and resolving equipment
compatibility.
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The National Security Council (NSC) has
established guidelines for DoD and DOE provision of assistance to help
secure Russia‘s nuclear warheads. Also, NSC has established and
oversees interagency procedures for coordinating warhead security
assistance activities between DoD and DoE through a sub-Policy
Coordinating Committee (Sub-PCC) working group. All requests for
assistance are reviewed by the working group. Any plan by either
department to assist with a request that is consistent with the
guidelines must be approved by the working group. If a department
wishes to assist with a request that is not permitted by the guidelines
it must be approved by the Sub-PCC. DoD believes that these procedures
are sufficient to resolve policy and implementation issues as they
arise.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
clearly articulate criteria the department should use to rank the
relative threat posed by different types of pathogens and review the
security under which they are kept to identify the biological sites
that pose the greatest security risks and would therefore have the
highest priority for and receive the most extensive U.S. assistance.
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD will develop formal criteria for prioritizing
biological sites for CTR bio-security assistance in Russia.
Additionally, we have renewed DoD efforts to negotiate a biological
threat reduction implementing agreement with the Russian Federation.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
consider:
* Reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites
in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security
assistance; and:
* Working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for
securing chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction
facility at Shchuch‘ye.
DOD RESPONSE:
* Non-Concur with reassessing the need for improved security at three
additional nerve agent storage sites. These sites contain heavy, bulky,
and difficult to move aerial bombs and spray tanks that make them
unattractive targets for would-be proliferators. We believe this factor
combined with existing physical security measures makes it unnecessary
to consider security enhancements at these sites. However, we are
prepared to brief the Russian Munitions Agency (RMA) on the personnel
reliability program that DoD has helped the Ministry of Defense
establish for individuals who have access to nuclear weapons.
* Concur with working with Russian officials to develop practical plans
for securing chemical weapons in transit. CTR already has been working
with RMA on practical plans for transportation of nerve agent weapons
from storage facilities at Planovy and Kizner to Shchuch‘ye. Security
will not be necessary for air delivered weapons which the current draft
of the Russian plan proposes will be emptied and neutralized at each
storage site, then the neutralization product will be shipped as
hazardous waste to Shchuch‘ye for destruction.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585:
MAR 06 2003:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and Trade:
General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Mr. Robert A. Robinson:
Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Sirs:
The General Accounting Office‘s (GAO) draft report GAO-03-482, ’WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,“ has been
reviewed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The
GAO was requested to report on U.S. programs to help improve security
at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2)
nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical
weapons. We understand that GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security
threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans,
and the primary challenges facing Department of Defense and NNSA.
NNSA appreciates having had the opportunity to have reviewed the draft
report. While the auditors have done a thorough job, NNSA would like to
offer the following comments to clarify points in the draft report. Our
first comment generally addresses the estimates of Russian inventories
of weapons-usable nuclear material. The subsequent comments are
specific to the sections noted.
The estimate of 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in
the Russian nuclear weapons complex given in the report seems very low,
particularly in view of the Russian agreement to sell more than 500
metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States under
the HEU Purchase Agreement. The 600 metric ton figure likely also
excludes weapons-usable nuclear material currently in the form of
Russian nuclear weapons. In 1993 then Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor
Mikhailov stated that the 500 metric tons of HEU offered for the HEU
Purchase Agreement represented less than 40% of the HEU produced in
Russia, suggesting that the Russian HEU inventory was at least 1250
metric tons. If 150 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium is also
available, the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia
is at least 1400 metric tons. This is considerably larger than the
600 ton estimate used in the report. The report should specify which
weapons-usable material is included in the estimate given, or the
estimate should be revised upward.
The report also uses a non-standard definition of weapons-usable
plutonium, by which it means any plutonium containing less than 80
percent of the isotope plutonium-238. This definition includes both
weapons-grade plutonium (8% or less plutonium-242) and reactor-grade
plutonium (more than 8% plutonium-242). Since the quantities of
reactor-grade plutonium may be very large, the estimate of 600 tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia should be further increased
to include the reactor-grade plutonium, or the definition of weapons-
usable plutonium should be revised. A definition of weapons-usable
plutonium which included only plutonium containing less than 80 percent
of the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent of the isotopes
plutonium-241 and plutonium-242 would be consistent with other work
involving Russian plutonium inventories.
The remaining comments are, as stated, specific to various sections of
the draft report. We have repeated the report language, identified the
page number where the language may be found, and have submitted our
specific comments.
1. ’... despite years of negotiations, Russia will not let the
Department of Energy visit or begin work at nearly three quarters of
the buildings in the weapons complex... Because progress in installing
security upgrades to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex has
slowed, the majority of DOE‘s additional funding in 2001 and 2002
shifted to other efforts, including support for security systems
already at sites, security improvements for nuclear material during
transport, and guard force equipment and training“ Executive Summary,
Pg 8.
While DOE agrees that access issues remain a problem we must clarify
that progress continues to be made, particularly in the last several
months, which is contrary to the assertion that work has ’slowed“.
Furthermore, the belief that funding was directed to areas of lesser
importance is entirely incorrect as discussed in the comments in the
next section.
We have signed 24 contracts in the Minatom Weapons Complex since the
beginning of FY 2003, and we expect to sign an additional 42 contracts
in the next 2 months. Just this month we signed design contracts to
protect -80 MT of weapons usable material at the Tomsk 7 Chemical
Metallurgical Plant - a major breakthrough for the program. This pace
is unusually fast for the Minatom Weapons Complex, so we cannot agree
with the assertion that pace has slowed. We do accept that pace is
generally slower in this part of our program, particularly when
compared to work at the civilian Minatom sites, and that
access is the primary reason. Some facilities, such as Russia‘s nuclear
weapons assembly and disassembly sites, have indeed been delayed due to
access issues, but negotiations on remedies continue. DOE has
undertaken a number of innovative strategies to continue making
progress, including the development of new central storage facilities
at C-70 and A-16, that will result in upgrades for over 30 MT of
weapons usable materials. DOE has signed more contracts with the
Minatom Weapons Complex in the last six months than it had signed in
all of FY 2001, which does not represent a slowdown of the program.
2. ’DOS‘s Increased Funding Went to Other Objectives ’ Pg. 31:
’Because DOE has been largely unable to start new work in the weapons
complex, most of DOS‘s new spending for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 was
on program objectives other than its primary objective of installing
security improvements at buildings containing weapons usable materials.
’ Pg 29:
’...including operation and maintenance of security systems already
installed at sites, securing nuclear material during transport, and
equipping and training guards forces... ’ Pg 31:
’While these efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOS‘s
primary goal of securing all buildings in Russia with weapons usable
material... ’ Pg 31:
These statements are not entirely accurate. As mentioned above, saying
that we have been unable to start new work is inconsistent with the
fact that we‘ve signed 52 contracts at these sites over the last 2
years. Most of these contracts were for rapid upgrades and physical
protection system design.
Regarding the characterization of NNSA‘s primary goal, physical
security at a nuclear facility relies on a cohesive system that
provides for detection of intruders, delay in gaining access to target
material, and response to attempts to do so. These three areas are all
fundamental elements of protection. They apply to security of material
in storage or during transport. Inadequacies in any one of the three
areas can negate the overall effectiveness of the system, and therefore
can reduce or eliminate the benefits of investments in the other two
areas.
NNSA therefore disagrees with the assertion that transportation
security and guard force enhancements ’do not directly advance the
primary goals of securing all buildings in Russia with weapons usable
nuclear materials.“ Regarding investments in transportation security,
nuclear material transport is widely recognized as the most vulnerable
element of a nuclear program. Experts in attack scenario development
employed by the NNSA unanimously agree that the preferred scenario for
planning an overt theft of nuclear material is during transport.
Transporting nuclear material through remote areas can increase
secondary response force times, and provides adversaries with the
ability to select locations with optimal characteristics for ambush,
defeat of secondary responders, and escape. Transport of material
within facilities is also believed to be a more vulnerable situation
than static storage. The idea that NNSA funds spent to enhance
security of Russian nuclear material transport do ’ not directly
advance (DOE) primary goals“ is antithetical to us.
Regarding guard force equipment and training, again, response forces
are a vital component of any nuclear material security system. If a
nuclear material storage building has been upgraded to include
additional delay and detection features, but the guard forces
responsible for interdiction are slow or lack tactical expertise to
succeed, then the system fails, despite the investment in upgrades.
Finally, we believe the suggestion that maintenance and sustainability
of security systems does not advance our primary goals is also flawed.
Many of the systems we install require regular maintenance and
calibration in order to function effectively. We do not agree with the
idea that installing the systems is important, but keeping them
operating is less important.
We also have concerns with the graphical representation used on page
32. The category called ’Site Security“ excludes our work on
transportation security and protective forces, areas we believe are
fundamental elements of site security. The ’Other Assistance“ category
includes these programs, as well as our Material Consolidation and
Conversion (MCC) funding, which is also being deemed to ’not directly
advance (DOE) primary goals“. We must also take issue with this,
because our MCC work is intended to eliminate material balance areas
and material storage locations - the specific subject of the ’Site
Security“ category. At a minimum, MCC should be removed from the
comparison, as the Second Line of Defense (SLD) and Radiological
Dispersal Device (RDD) budgets have, in order to make the comparisons
more focused on traditional MPC&A work.
NNSA believes that the warhead site security work should be included in
the charts. Without that data point there is a false impression that
70% of our ’obligations“ are spent in the ’Other Assistance“ category.
When warhead security work is included in both charts, the charts are
more representative of our actual funding distributions. We have
prepared alternative charts which include warhead security funding, as
well as funding for transportation security and protective forces in
the Site Security category. Material Consolidation and Conversion has
been removed altogether from our charts and consequently the
alternative charts that we have prepared more accurately represent the
evolving distribution of traditional MPC&A funding over time. We will
be glad to submit these charts to you separately. Concurrently with the
revision of the charts, we recommend that the message associated with
the charts be revisited. Defining the DOE ’primary objective“ to be
solely the provision of security equipment for storage buildings will
cause the reader to reach an inaccurate conclusion.
3. ’In contrast, the Department of Energy has only completed work at 14
of 133 buildings at sites in the nuclear weapons complex that
fabricate, furnish, or dismantle components and nuclear material for
nuclear weapons. ’ Pg S.
’As seen in figure 2.1, DOE has made the least progress in providing
security at Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex, where it has completed or
partially completed work at only 26 of the 133 buildings or 20%. ’:
Our current estimate of buildings in the Minatom Weapons Complex
storing weapons usable nuclear material is 87. We presume that the 133
number may include other buildings that are not specifically targeted
for upgrades. Of these 87 buildings, 11 are completed, 24 are partially
completed, 5 have recently been put under contract, and 47 are not
started. We therefore have access issues affecting us at 47 of 87
buildings. Figure 2.1 on page 29 should be revised to reflect this.
Buildings where we have completed or partially completed work account
for 30% of the total.
Figure 2.1 indicates there are a total of 76 buildings that contain
weapons nuclear materials within the Civilian sector. The actual number
of buildings with nuclear materials of interest to the MPC&A program
within this sector is 52. Of these buildings, 34 are completed, 7 are
partially completed, 6 have recently been put under contract, and 5 are
not started.
Figure 2.1 also states there are a total of 34 buildings containing
weapons-usable nuclear materials within the Naval Fuel sector. The
actual number is 21. Of these buildings 13 are completed, 7 are
partially completed and 1 building has not received security
enhancements to date.
We believe the variance in the number of buildings referenced in the
report and those provided by NNSA is caused by counting buildings that
are outside the scope of the MPC&A program or by counting buildings
that don‘t store nuclear material such as Central Alarm Stations or
training facilities.
4. ’...the Department of Energy has not been able to access 74% of the
buildings in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex. ’ Pg 8.
While access remains an issue, based on the information above, the
percentage is actually 54%.
5. ’DOE has scaled back its plans to assist operational sites, where
warheads are stored with delivery vehicles, out of concern that U.S.
assistance could enhance Russia‘s military capability.“:
’In January 2003, DOE resolved this difference and adopted new plans
that balanced nuclear warhead security against the possibility of
enhancing Russia‘s military capability“.
The January 2003 date is inaccurate. NNSA has had a policy of
withholding offers of comprehensive upgrades at roughly half the sites
nominated by the Russian Navy since January of 2002. The primary reason
for the restriction was not a concern with ’operational enhancement“ of
Russian warhead sites but, rather, with estimates of ’residence time“
for warheads associated with these sites. At sites where residence
times are believed to be very low, NNSA does not believe that
comprehensive upgrades are justified.
6. ’DOD and DOE have not resolved which department will improve
security at the Strategic Rocket Forces ’. Pg 46.
We do not believe that the fact that we ’have not determined which
Department will improve security at sites they both include in their
plans“ is a ’coordination issue“. We believe that a rigid distinction
between the ’territory“ of DOE and DOD is a weakness, and a detriment
to our efforts to address U.S. national security threats. DOE and DOD
recognize that the principal limiting factor in our work is access to
sensitive Russian facilities. Gaining access to warhead sites within
the various Russian service branches depends on numerous political,
regulatory, and bureaucratic forces within the MOD and other Russian
agencies that are beyond our control. The DOE/DOD approach to allow
either agency to accept legitimate invitations to work at MOD sites,
without regard to the service branch involved, maximizes the USG
ability to rapidly act on any opportunity offered by the Russians in
this regard. If DOE and DOD were to arbitrarily decide that, for
example, only DOD could work at SRF sites, then the recent invitation
to DOE to engage with SRF would have been rejected, to the detriment of
USG objectives in this area.
We have resolved this issue at the working level. We have agreed to
maintain a flexible approach that best serves US national security
interests. We believe this is an example of exemplary coordination - -
where bureaucratic tendencies to dispute ’turf‘ have been abandoned in
the interests of national security.
7. ’DOD and DOE may need to coordinate their assistance on guard force
training centers. ’ Pg 47:
DOD and NNSA recently agreed to pursue joint utilization of the DOD
SATC and the NNSA Kola Technical Center (KTC) now under construction in
the Russian far north. NNSA will utilize the proposed DOD service
center to be developed in the Russian Far East, to support upgrades
provided for the pacific fleet. NNSA and DOD efforts to
provide system maintenance, testing, and training support have been
effectively combined.
8. ’ Operational sites: Sites where warheads are deployed with their
delivery vehicles“ Table 3.1 Pg 37:
’Deployed“ typically means on a platform, for example, in a silo or on
a submarine. Many of these sites have mated and unmated weapons stored
in bunkers or more importantly, in handling facilities with less
physical protection features that bunkers. They are not all associated
with platforms.
Also use of the term ’deployment“ suggests use of the site for
offensive reasons only. These sites also serve the purpose of force
reduction, including the decommissioning of warheads.
9. ’In contrast, DOE structured its warhead security program based on
requests for assistance from the Russian Navy ’. Pg 46.
NNSA does not work at any site until the Russian Navy has proposed it
as a candidate site. This statement implies that the NNSA upgraded any
sites offered by the Russian Navy, which is not correct, as previously
stated. Since the beginning of the DOE/MOD program NNSA has declined
and/or deferred some sites offers by the RF Navy (CBC A7; PBZ Al, PBZ
El, PBZ C3 included). Since January 2002, NNSA restricted provision of
comprehensive upgrades at sites with issues associated with residence
time of warheads.
10. ’DOE no longer plans to provide assistance to operational sites
where mated and unmated warheads may be handled in the course of
training or deployment (or decommissioning).
Sites proposed by the Russians will be analyzed and accepted or
declined on a case-by-case basis.
11. ’Since DOD has already purchased perimeter fencing for the
Strategic Rocket Forces sites, DOD officials said that if DOE provides
assistance to those sites, it should avoid duplication of assistance
and use DOD equipment. ’ Pg. 47:
NNSA has been actively pursuing this solution with the Russian MOD and
has made it clear that DOD perimeter fencing must be used at sites
where it has been allocated. NNSA is arranging use of this equipment
through its Joint Coordination Group.
12. ’DOD and DOE are providing different types of equipment to Russia
that may not be compatible. ’ Pg. 47.
NNSA has a wealth of experience regarding equipment performance and
maintenance resulting from the fact that it has been installing such
equipment at Russian sites over the last 10 years. NNSA knows that the
elements of the system work together well, and have practical
experience on how the equipment works under a variety of weather
conditions. For these reasons, NNSA does not see a need to test the
equipment but we are willing to do so especially if it gives DOD more
equipment options with which to implement their programs.
It is also important to note that much of the equipment used by DOD and
NNSA is either identical or similar. Most of the problems regarding
system compatibility are associated with the alarm communication and
display (AC&D) software, which must be compatible with all sensors and
assessment in the security system. NNSA does not believe that all
systems need to be compatible with each other since each is a discrete
system located at a particular site.
NNSA has emphasized using Russian equipment whenever possible, and
performs due diligence on all vendors to ensure as best as possible
that they are fiscally sound and will be able to sustain the systems
over the long term. Through practical experience, NNSA knows that its
systems are sustainable in the Russian Federation.
13. ’ A September 2001 access agreement between the Department and the
Russian Ministry ofAtomic Energy has failed to facilitate the
Department‘s access to previously closed sites. ’:
In early 2001, Minatom officials notified the Department that Russian
Security authorities responsible for processing and granting foreign
personnel access to Russian sensitive facilities were insisting upon
the creation of a program specific ’Access Agreement“. The purpose of
the agreement was to establish streamlined procedures to allow US
project teams continued access to sensitive Minatom nuclear facilities.
It was also made clear by Russian officials that without such an
agreement, the Department would no longer be granted access to either
Minatom Weapon‘s or Civilian nuclear facilities. Prior to the September
2001 agreement, a number of trips were canceled by the Russian
authorities preventing MPC&A teams from visiting Minatom facilities.
It is important to note that the access agreement was instrumental in
helping the program maintain access to the buildings where it had
already been granted. However, it was also widely believed that the
agreement would provide a strong legal basis for Minatom to grant MPC&A
teams access to some of the more sensitive buildings within their
complex to install security improvements. Unfortunately, dramatically
expanded access has not materialized to date.
Sincerely,
Anthony R. Lane
Associate Administrator for Management and
Administration:
Signed by Anthony R. Lane
cc: Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
F. James Shafer (202) 512-6002
David Maurer (202) 512-9627:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, Gene Aloise, R. Stockton Butler, Joseph Cook, Lynn
Cothern, Maria Oliver, and Daniele Schiffman made significant
contributions to this report.
(320103):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The actual amount of material protected at weapons complex sites is
classified.
[2] DOD has a classified estimate of the total number of sites.
[3] The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human
Services, and Homeland Security also implement portions of these
programs.
[4] In May 2001, we issued two reports on U.S. efforts to employ WMD
scientists. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE‘s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
Russia‘s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges, GAO-01-429 (Washington, D.C.:
May 3, 2001) and Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department
Oversight of Science Centers Program, GAO-01-582 (Washington, D.C.: May
10, 2001).
[5] For additional information on aspects of DOD‘s programs in this
area, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to
Reduce Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-138
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2000).
[6] In April 1999, we reported that DOD‘s efforts to help Russia
destroy its chemical weapons stockpile was behind schedule. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to
Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/
NSIAD-99-76 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 1999).
[7] Weapons-usable nuclear material is uranium enriched to 20 percent
or greater in uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium
containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less
than 10 percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These
types of material are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.
[8] Programmatic Guidelines for Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities (first published Dec. 1998,
revised Sept. 2001).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security
of Russia‘s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed,
GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2001).
[10] This figure represents new appropriations for DOE‘s International
Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation programs, excluding all
funding for DOE‘s efforts to secure nuclear warheads at Russian Navy
sites.
[11] We used number of buildings as a measure of progress because the
total amount of material protected at each type of site is classified.
[12] For a more detailed discussion of DOE‘s other efforts to secure
nuclear material and related activities see appendix II.
[13] Unclassified U.S. estimates of the number of Russian warheads
range from 18,000 to 25,000.
[14] We have not taken a position on whether security assistance to
nuclear warhead sites enhances operational capability.
[15] DOD has a classified estimate of the total number of storage
sites.
[16] Jurisdiction over operational sites and rail transfer points is
less clear--the Navy, Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces have
jurisdiction over many of the sites, but the 12TH Main Directorate has
been gradually trying to expand its jurisdiction over these sites.
[17] Strategic nuclear weapons generally have an intercontinental range
and fall under U.S.-Russian arms control agreements. Tactical nuclear
weapons generally have a shorter range and smaller yield.
[18] In our February 2001 review of DOE efforts to improve nuclear
material security in Russia, we reported that DOE was improving
security at 42 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites. The number decreased
to 36 because some of the sites include local zones that DOE had
counted as more than one site.
[19] This suspension did not affect DOD‘s ability to execute existing
contracts. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
gave the President authority to waive restrictions that required the
administration to certify arms control compliance by Russia. The
President exercised this authority on January 14, 2003.
[20] DOE has already installed both rapid upgrades and comprehensive
upgrades at one of the sites and rapid upgrades at the other four.
[21] The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits countries
from developing, producing, stockpiling, or acquiring biological
pathogens for offensive purposes. For additional discussion on the
Convention, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Arms Control: Efforts
to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, GAO-02-1038NI
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002).
[22] Biological pathogens are viruses such as smallpox, bacteria such
as anthrax, and toxins such as botulinum toxin. Dangerous biological
pathogens can be genetically engineered and combined with dispersion
technology, such as bombs or artillery shells to create weapons of mass
destruction that cause illness or death in humans, animals, or plants.
[23] In addition to DOD, DOE, and State, U.S. Departments of Health and
Human Services, Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency
have established collaborative research projects at biological sites in
Russia.
[24] Since some DOD contractors work on both biosecurity and biosafety
projects, DOD does not track these projects separately. DOD has
therefore estimated how this assistance is divided between biosecurity
and biosafety efforts.
[25] Although the objectives of biosecurity and biosafety programs
differ, some equipment, such as closed-circuit television and locks for
laboratories that contain dangerous biological pathogens, can enhance
both biosecurity and biosafety. As part of its biosafety projects, DOD
has installed such equipment at two locations in Russia.
[26] The 8-month suspension did not affect DOD‘s ability to execute
existing contracts. Therefore, according to DOD officials, the
department was able to continue implementing chemical and some nuclear
warhead security projects. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 gave the President authority to waive restrictions
that required the administration to certify arms control compliance by
Russia. The President exercised this authority on January 14, 2003.
[27] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and
Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation,
dated June 17, 1992, and extended June 15-16, 1999.
[28] For additional information on ISTC, see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of
Science Centers Program, GAO-01-582 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001).
[29] The CWC, which Russia signed in 1993, prohibits the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of
chemical weapons. The convention entered into force on April 29, 1997,
and requires signatory states to destroy any stocks that they may have
of such weapons over a 10-year period but provides for a possible 5-
year extension. Russia ratified CWC in 1997 and must destroy its
declared 40,000 metric ton stockpile by 2007. Russia has requested a 5-
year extension to 2012. DOD has concerns about the veracity and
completeness of Russia‘s CWC declaration.
[30] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to
Correct Budgeting Weaknesses, GAO-03-5 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2002). The OPCW conducts inspections at chemical weapons storage,
production, and destruction facilities in member states.
[31] Russia‘s nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman.
Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse
transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is
lethal to a human.
[32] Russia‘s blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite,
and mustard-lewisite mixture. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled
but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin.
[33] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than
Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 1999).
[34] A personnel reliability program (PRP) is used to screen personnel
at facilities for drug, alcohol, and other problems through
comprehensive screening.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security
of Russia‘s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed,
GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2001).
[36] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than
Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 1999).
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