Radioactive Waste
DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-03-558 May 15, 2003The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, generates radioactive and hazardous wastes in the course of its research dealing with nuclear weapons. The laboratory's new Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility is a $62 million complex that includes buildings designed for both temporarily storing waste and treating it for off-site disposal. Although construction was completed in 2001, the storage building did not begin operating until September 2002, and the treatment buildings remain unused to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the facility, the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, and the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met.
The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new facility occurred because DOE managers did not ensure timely resolution of disagreements with the laboratory over technical issues affecting safety at the facility's waste storage building. Safety documents must be approved by DOE to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities before operations can begin. The review of the storage building safety document lasted a year and resulted in postponement of the review of the safety document for the treatment buildings, which in turn delayed operation of the treatment buildings. The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two main effects. First, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment activities at an older facility, which has fewer environmental and worker protections. Second, the delay in initiating treatment operations has postponed off-site disposal of some of the waste. DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take steps to address the delay in an effort to begin treatment operations at the new facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials believe that meeting the deadline will be challenging. One step that DOE is taking to prevent further delay is to improve its oversight so that any future disagreements are resolved in a timely manner. However, to meet the deadline, the laboratory has compressed the time allowed for other tasks. In this regard, the laboratory has altered the time to prepare for an operational readiness review--a process needed to ensure that the facility will be operated safely--from the normal 6 weeks to 2 weeks. Officials describe the scheduled start date as challenging but achievable. DOE generally agreed with the accuracy of the report. GAO incorporated DOE's comments as appropriate.
GAO-03-558, Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain
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Report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
May 2003:
RADIOACTIVE WASTE:
DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory,
but Challenges Remain:
Radioactive Waste:
GAO-03-558:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-558, a report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy‘s (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in Livermore, California, generates radioactive and
hazardous wastes in the course of its research dealing with nuclear
weapons. The laboratory‘s new Decontamination and Waste Treatment
Facility is a $62 million complex that includes buildings designed for
both temporarily storing waste and treating it for off-site disposal.
Although construction was completed in 2001, the storage building did
not begin operating until September 2002, and the treatment buildings
remain unused to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the
delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the facility,
the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, and the
steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for initiating
treatment operations at the facility can be met.
What GAO Found:
The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not ensure timely
resolution of disagreements with the laboratory over technical issues
affecting safety at the facility‘s waste storage building. Safety
documents must be approved by DOE to ensure the safe operation of
nuclear facilities before operations can begin. The review of the
storage building safety document lasted a year and resulted in
postponement of the review of the safety document for the treatment
buildings, which in turn delayed operation of the treatment buildings.
The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two main effects.
First, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment
activities at an older facility, which has fewer environmental and
worker protections. Second, the delay in initiating treatment
operations has postponed off-site disposal of some of the waste.
DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take steps to
address the delay in an effort to begin treatment operations at the
new facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials
believe that meeting the deadline will be challenging. One step that
DOE is taking to prevent further delay is to improve its oversight so
that any future disagreements are resolved in a timely manner.
However, to meet the deadline, the laboratory has compressed the time
allowed for other tasks. In this regard, the laboratory has altered
the time to prepare for an operational readiness review”a process
needed to ensure that the facility will be operated safely”from the
normal 6 weeks to 2 weeks. Officials describe the scheduled start date
as challenging but achievable.
DOE generally agreed with the accuracy of the report. GAO incorporated
DOE‘s comments as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-558.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841 or
nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a
Timely Manner:
Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations Postponed Use of Safety
Improvements and Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:
DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents,
but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003
Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations:
Agency Comments and Our Response:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage:
Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent:
Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site
Plan:
Figure 4: New Facility's Treatment Area for Liquid Waste:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 15, 2003:
The Honorable Ellen Tauscher
House of Representatives:
Dear Ms. Tauscher:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has a complex of sites and facilities
for designing nuclear weapons and producing the nuclear components for
these weapons. One part of that complex is DOE's weapons laboratories,
including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Located in
Livermore, California, the laboratory conducts research on nuclear
weapons and other areas in the interest of national security. In
carrying out these activities, the laboratory creates radioactive waste
(such as rags and tools contaminated with uranium or plutonium),
hazardous waste (such as acids and solvents), and mixed waste (waste
with both radioactive and hazardous material). Before this waste can be
permanently disposed of, its contents must be analyzed to determine the
specific physical, chemical, and radiological components, and some of
the waste must be treated so that it meets the acceptance criteria of
off-site disposal facilities. While the Livermore laboratory has been
able to analyze and treat some of its wastes for off-site disposal, it
has not been able to analyze and treat all of the various kinds of
wastes it generates. As a result, some of the waste has remained on-
site since the mid-1980s. The California Environmental Protection
Agency, which regulates the storage and treatment of hazardous and
mixed waste in the state, has given the laboratory permission to store
hazardous and mixed waste in containers outdoors on pads or in tent
structures. In addition, DOE has authorized the laboratory to store
radioactive waste in a similar manner. However, for a number of years
DOE has planned to improve the laboratory's ability to process its
wastes for off-site shipment and thereby reduce the need for on-site
storage.
In the mid-1990s, DOE and the Livermore laboratory began building a new
facility to treat the laboratory's wastes. Called the Decontamination
and Waste Treatment Facility, this $62 million project includes a
building of more than 11,000 square feet for temporarily storing waste
and two larger buildings totaling more than 37,000 square feet for
treating waste for off-site disposal. The new facility is intended not
only to enhance the laboratory's capability to treat waste, but also to
better protect workers and the environment while doing so. Although
construction of the project was completed in June 2001, the storage
building did not begin operating until September 2002, and the
treatment buildings remain unused to this day. In response to your
request, this report (1) identifies the cause of the delay in
initiating storage and treatment operations at the new facility, (2)
identifies the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations,
and (3) discusses the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated
date for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met.
Results in Brief:
The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely way
two technical issues concerning the plan to ensure the safe operation
of the new building for temporarily storing wastes. The first issue
concerned how to categorize the potential severity of hazards faced by
workers, the public, and the environment if wastes stored in the new
storage building were released. This categorization provides the basis
for determining what safety controls are needed to ensure adequate
protection of workers, the public, and the environment from such a
release. The second issue involved whether to include an analysis of
the effect of a potential aircraft crash into the building. Nearly a
year after the safety document was submitted for review and approval,
DOE directed the Livermore laboratory to base its document on a higher-
level category that assumed that if a release of wastes occurred, the
consequences for workers, the public, and the environment could extend
beyond the building to other laboratory areas. Laboratory officials had
preferred a lower-level designation that assumed that the consequences
of an accident would not extend beyond the building. Laboratory
officials had contended that this lower-level designation would cost
less to implement and reduce the amount of nuclear safety oversight the
laboratory would receive. In addition, officials from DOE and the
laboratory agreed that the laboratory would analyze the potential
effect an aircraft crash would have on the building. The laboratory's
position on conducting such an analysis had been that it was
unnecessary because a potential aircraft crash was not a credible
event. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory's storage
building safety planning document delayed the start of treatment
operations.
The delay in initiating treatment operations at the new facility has
had two main effects. First, it postponed the use of the new facility's
safety improvements. Because of the delay, the laboratory has had to
continue treatment operations for longer than planned in the older
facility, which lacks some of the new facility's protections for worker
safety and the environment. For example, some waste is treated at the
older facility in uncovered outdoor tanks, while at the new facility
the treatment operations will be conducted indoors using a ventilation
system that will prevent waste particles from being released into the
environment. Second, the delay in initiating treatment operations has
postponed off-site disposal of some of the waste. Within 6 months of
the facility's becoming operational, laboratory officials had planned
to start treating some of the waste that could not be treated in the
older facility and shipping this waste off-site for disposal. With a
later start-up date, these shipments will be delayed.
DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take three steps
to address the cause of the delay and begin treatment operations at the
new facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials
believe that meeting the deadline will be challenging. First, DOE and
the laboratory implemented a formal process to resolve issues during
the development of the treatment buildings' safety document. Second,
the two issues that led to the delay in approving the storage building
safety document have been resolved in the treatment buildings' safety
document. Third, DOE management said it will improve oversight so that
any future disagreements are resolved in a timely manner. Even with
these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the August 2003
date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings can be met.
To achieve this deadline, the laboratory has compressed the time
allowed for other interim steps. In this regard, the laboratory has
allowed less time than it typically allows to prepare for an
operational readiness review--2 weeks, rather than the normal 6 weeks.
This process is important because it tests the facility's procedures,
equipment, and personnel to ensure that the laboratory will operate the
facility in accordance with parameters set out in the safety document.
DOE and laboratory officials describe the scheduled start date as
challenging but achievable.
In commenting on a draft of this report DOE generally agreed with GAO's
findings.
Background:
DOE has several research laboratories, including the Livermore
laboratory, devoted primarily to DOE's nuclear weapons program.
Organizations or universities under contract to DOE manage and operate
these laboratories. For example, the University of California has
operated the Livermore laboratory for DOE and its predecessor agencies
since laboratory operations began in 1952.[Footnote 1] The Livermore
laboratory has an infrastructure of research, testing, engineering, and
waste management facilities located on the laboratory site in
Livermore, California, a city of about 75,000 people located about 50
miles east of San Francisco. An additional area located about 15 miles
east of the laboratory is used for experimental testing. The laboratory
site's groundwater is contaminated with hazardous substances from past
operations,[Footnote 2] and in 1987, the Environmental Protection
Agency added the site to the National Priorities List of the nation's
most serious hazardous waste sites.
Treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous and mixed wastes are
governed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as
amended (RCRA). Under RCRA, owners and operators of new hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, including federal
facilities, are required to obtain a permit before beginning
construction of the facility. The state of California is authorized to
administer the RCRA program for facilities in California and is
responsible for issuing the permit.
DOE is responsible for ensuring that the nuclear activities at its
facilities are carried out safely and in accordance with law and
regulation. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within DOE, carries out oversight of
nuclear research, nuclear safety, and related activities. DOE's Office
of Environmental Management provides oversight of environmental
restoration and waste management activities, such as the construction
of the new waste treatment facility at the Livermore site. NNSA and
Office of Environmental Management staff from NNSA's Livermore Site
Office are responsible for carrying out these oversight
responsibilities. NNSA staff also administer the contract between DOE
and the University of California, which sets out the parameters and
performance requirements for operating the laboratory.
Radioactive and hazardous wastes at the Livermore laboratory amounted
to about 2,700 cubic meters as of January 16, 2003. The wastes include
low-level radioactive waste,[Footnote 3] transuranic waste,[Footnote
4] hazardous waste, and mixed waste. About one-fourth of the
radioactive waste also contains hazardous substances. The waste is
packaged in containers and is stored outdoors or under tents on asphalt
pads, or inside enclosed or partially enclosed buildings (see figs. 1
and 2). The waste is stored within fenced areas of the laboratory site
where access is controlled. The California Environmental Protection
Agency and DOE have approved storage of the waste in this manner.
Before the waste can be disposed of off-site, much of it must be
treated and repackaged so that it will meet the requirements of
disposal facilities. Because the waste inventory is expected to
eventually decline, the new facility's storage building is designed to
provide less waste storage capacity than the older storage facilities
provide. Most of the older storage facilities will be closed in future
years after the backlog of waste has been disposed of off-site.
Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility
project was placed on hold for a time after its authorization. The
Congress had provided authorization and funding for the project for
fiscal year 1986, but complaints from the public about an incinerator
included in the facility design contributed to DOE's decision to place
the project on hold. Ultimately, the laboratory redesigned the facility
without the incinerator and planned to complete construction of the
facility by the end of 1999.
Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility was
completed in June 2001, approximately 1½ years behind schedule.
Construction was delayed because California regulators took longer than
expected to issue a RCRA permit for the facility. Although laboratory
officials had planned to receive the permit in 1997, an accident
occurred at one of the laboratory's existing waste management
facilities, which exposed workers to higher-than-allowable levels of
radioactivity. According to a California regulator, that accident is
likely to have led the California Environmental Protection Agency to
postpone issuing the permit until an investigation of the accident was
completed. Issuance of the permit was also delayed by a large number of
public comments, which took longer than expected to address. To
mitigate the impact of the delay in receiving the permit, the
laboratory built the facility in two stages. In the first stage, the
laboratory built portions of the facility that did not require the
permit, such as the lobby and offices, which would not handle hazardous
and mixed waste. The laboratory built the rest of the facility in the
second stage after receiving the permit in 1999. The delay in obtaining
the RCRA permit increased project costs by $2.1 million. The increase
was covered by available contingency funds, allowing the project to
remain within budget. Figure 3 shows the site plan of the facility;
figure 4 shows a portion of the interior.
Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site
Plan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: New Facility's Treatment Area for Liquid Waste:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a
Timely Manner:
The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely
manner lingering disagreements about two technical issues. First, DOE
and the laboratory disagreed about how to categorize the potential
severity of hazards faced by workers, the public, and the environment
if wastes stored in the new storage building were released. Proper
categorization is important because it provides the basis for
determining what kinds of safety controls must be in place to protect
workers, the public, and the environment if such an event were to
occur. Second, DOE and the laboratory also disagreed about whether to
include an aircraft crash analysis in the safety document, with the
laboratory maintaining that such an analysis was unnecessary, and DOE
officials taking the opposite viewpoint. DOE managers did not fully
resolve these disagreements for nearly a year. The lengthy time frame
for approving the laboratory's storage building safety document delayed
the start of treatment operations.
DOE and Laboratory Officials Disagreed about Hazard Categorization:
Federal regulations require contractors operating a DOE nuclear
facility to establish controls upon which they will rely to adequately
protect workers, the public, and the environment against the dangerous
materials on-site.[Footnote 5] Before a nuclear facility can operate,
contractors must prepare and DOE must approve a safety document that
identifies and assesses the hazards, risks, and controls needed to
safely operate the facility. Contractors must determine the potential
risk to workers, the public, and the environment of hazards associated
with the facility. They must categorize the level of the facility's
hazards in accordance with DOE requirements. There are three hazard
categories: potential for significant off-site consequences (category
1), potential for significant on-site consequences (category 2), and
potential for only significant localized consequences in the facility
(category 3).
Using the same methodology that the laboratory had used to determine
categorization for existing storage facilities, the laboratory
determined that the new storage building should be given a category 3
classification. The laboratory believed the methodology was adequate
because it had received DOE approval when it had been used before.
Laboratory officials were also concerned that a higher category 2
classification would require them to conduct a rigorous quantitative
accident analysis, which is more costly and might result in more safety
controls and external oversight of storage building operations that
could increase operating costs.
Although the methodology had been approved when used for the
laboratory's existing facilities, some officials within DOE had
questioned its appropriateness, and these concerns surfaced again as
the document was being reviewed for the new storage building. Some DOE
officials believed that the new storage building warranted a category 2
hazard classification, because they saw potential for significant on-
site consequences in the event of a release of the stored materials. In
addition, a May 2001 report by the laboratory's safety document review
group indicated that the laboratory's methodology for determining the
hazard category for some of its existing facilities was inappropriate.
The report concluded that the hazard category for the facilities needed
further evaluation.[Footnote 6]
DOE and the Laboratory Also Disagreed about the Need for Aircraft Crash
Analysis:
DOE and the laboratory also disagreed over whether to include an
aircraft crash analysis as part of the storage building safety
document. DOE had issued a standard in October 1996 that provides
facilities an approach for performing an analysis of the health and
safety risks to workers on-site and the public in the event of a
release of material resulting from an aircraft crash. This standard
applies to facilities that contain significant quantities of
radioactive and hazardous material.[Footnote 7] The standard also
applies if special circumstances exist, such as a facility's being
located near significant numbers of people. The laboratory is located
next to residential areas in the city of Livermore.
Both DOE and laboratory officials believed they had a logical basis for
their positions on the aircraft crash analysis. DOE officials believed
that an aircraft crash analysis should be included in the storage
building safety document because of the laboratory's proximity to
residential areas and the Livermore airport; an increase in airplane
traffic in the area; and the potential for a release of radioactive
material in the event of an aircraft crash into the storage building,
which would pose potential health and safety risks to workers and the
public. Laboratory officials, on the other hand, said their previous
calculations for an existing storage facility determined that such a
crash was not a credible event, and therefore an analysis was not
required. They contended that the same finding was valid for the new
storage building, as well.
Review of the Safety Document Lasted a Year:
In June 2001 the laboratory submitted the storage building safety
document to DOE for review and approval. Review of the safety document
was scheduled to last approximately 4 months. However, the safety
document was not approved until June 2002, a year later. During the 1-
year period, the laboratory submitted the safety document to DOE three
times, and each time DOE rejected it. Although the project was falling
behind schedule, DOE field managers responsible for the timely approval
of the safety document did not take steps early on to resolve the
situation. This occurred in part because some DOE officials supported
the laboratory's efforts to justify a lower category 3 hazard
classification. They concurred with the laboratory that a category 2
hazard classification would require a more detailed quantitative
accident analysis, which would be more costly and would result in more
safety controls that could increase operating costs and oversight of
its storage building operations. In addition, the laboratory believed
that a category 3 hazard classification would provide an appropriate
level of safety.[Footnote 8]
In May 2002, the DOE manager responsible for overseeing laboratory
operations took steps to resolve the disagreement over hazard
classification. In a May 10, 2002, letter, the DOE manager directed
laboratory officials to use a category 2 classification for the storage
building. The same letter also stated that DOE and the laboratory
agreed to expedite the review and approval process to accelerate the
initiation of operations at the storage building. DOE and the
laboratory implemented an intensive review process that consisted of a
series of meetings in which the DOE review team and laboratory
officials jointly conducted a line-by-line review and edit of the
storage building safety document. In addition, DOE had determined that
the storage building safety document did not have to include an
aircraft crash analysis provided that the laboratory include the
analysis in the June 2003 update of the document. In the interim, DOE
required the laboratory to include compensatory measures in the
document, such as procedures for public notification and fire
department response time in the event of an airplane crash. DOE
approved the safety document on June 28, 2002.
Because of the longer-than-expected time frame for approving the
storage building safety document, the cost for completing the
facility's safety documents exceeded laboratory estimates by $400,000,
according to a project budget document. However, the laboratory's
project manager stated that the additional cost was covered by the
project's contingency fund reserved for unforeseen circumstances,
allowing the project to remain within budget. The delay in approving
the storage building safety document postponed the review of the safety
document for the other portion of the facility--the treatment
buildings. This delay, in turn, prevented the start of operations at
the treatment buildings.
Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations Postponed Use of Safety
Improvements and Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:
The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two related
consequences. First, because the treatment buildings are not yet
operational, the laboratory has had to continue conducting its waste
treatment activities at the older facility, which lacks some of the new
facility's environmental and worker protections. In addition, the older
facility has fewer capabilities to treat waste and prepare it for off-
site disposal, requiring the laboratory to postpone disposing of some
waste off-site.
Safety Improvements Not Realized with Continued Use of Older Treatment
Facility:
Until DOE approves the treatment buildings' safety document and DOE and
the laboratory conduct an operational readiness review, the treatment
buildings cannot begin operations. These tasks were postponed until DOE
resolved disagreements about the storage buildings' safety document. As
a result, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment
operations at the older facility and has not been able to utilize the
safety features of the new facility. Examples of the differences in
safety features between the two facilities follow.
* The new facility has a ventilation system that filters waste
particles from the air in the buildings to prevent the release of
contaminants into the environment; the older facility does not.
* The buildings of the new facility were designed so that all waste
treatment operations are conducted indoors. At the older facility, some
operations are conducted in treatment tanks that do not have covers and
are located outdoors, enabling vapors and waste particles to escape
into the environment.
* Compared with the older facility, the new facility has more areas in
which ventilation systems take in air at a high rate near treatment
equipment to protect workers from exposure to fumes and waste
particles.
Delay Postponed Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:
Because the treatment buildings are not yet operational, the laboratory
has not been able to use the new treatment facility's enhanced
capabilities to prepare waste for off-site disposal. For example, the
new facility has a debris washer that washes mixed waste to remove the
hazardous portion of the waste from the radioactive portion, allowing
each portion to be sent to disposal sites at a lower total cost than
disposing of the mixed waste as a whole. In addition, the new facility
is equipped with a glovebox that enables special handling of the waste
in an enclosed, controlled, and highly ventilated area to treat
"reactive" waste[Footnote 9] that is not acceptable at disposal sites.
Treatment of such waste enables it to meet the acceptance criteria of
disposal sites. The older facility does not have these features.
Since the laboratory cannot yet utilize the new buildings' treatment
capabilities, some wastes have remained at the laboratory rather than
being disposed of off-site. For example, a laboratory official
responsible for waste management activities stated that the laboratory
had planned to begin treating reactive waste within 6 months of the
start of operations at the treatment buildings to prepare it for
disposal. Because of the delay in initiating operations, the laboratory
has postponed treating and disposing of this waste.
DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents,
but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003
Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations:
DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take the following
three steps to address the cause of the delay in approving the storage
building safety document in an effort to meet the August 2003 deadline
for starting treatment operations:
* DOE and the laboratory agreed to hold a series of joint working
meetings to identify and resolve issues during the development of the
treatment buildings' safety document. This action was taken to identify
and address issues or concerns during the development stages of the
document rather than during the document review process. By enhancing
communication, DOE and the laboratory hoped to minimize the possibility
that disagreements would delay the approval of the document and further
postpone the initiation of treatment operations.
* In the treatment buildings' safety document, DOE and the laboratory
resolved the two main issues that led to the delay in approving the
storage building safety document. The laboratory has agreed to limit
the amount of radioactive material it processes during treatment
operations to meet the requirements for a lower category 3 hazard
classification for the treatment buildings. The laboratory also agreed
to include an aircraft crash analysis in the treatment buildings'
safety document.
* DOE's management resolved to strengthen oversight by not allowing any
future disagreements to languish unresolved for long periods of time.
For example, DOE's Livermore Laboratory Site Manager said that it took
too long to resolve the disagreement over the storage building safety
document and that in a similar situation she would take action to
ensure that any disagreement was resolved within 60 to 90 days.
Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the
August 2003 date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings
can be met. The laboratory now has less time available to prepare for
the remaining tasks than it typically allows. Once the laboratory has
submitted and received approval of safety documents from DOE, it must
prepare documents and train staff for the facility's operational
readiness review. An operational readiness review examines the
facility's procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure that the
contractor will operate the facility safely in accordance with
parameters set out in the safety document. Laboratory officials said
that, typically, the laboratory allows 6 weeks of preparation for the
operational readiness review. However, for the treatment buildings, the
laboratory has compressed the amount of time to prepare for the
operational readiness review to 2 weeks in order to meet the August
2003 deadline. DOE and laboratory officials said that the August 2003
deadline is challenging but achievable.
Agency Comments and Our Response:
We provided a draft of this report to DOE and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory for their review and comment. The laboratory
provided its comments through DOE. In written comments, DOE generally
agreed with the accuracy of our report. However, we made changes in
response to two points raised by DOE's Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management. First, concerning the delays in resolving
safety issues, DOE said our draft report omits the fact that the
laboratory had developed a safety document for the treatment and
storage facility as early as 1996 and some of the safety issues had
been unresolved since that time. We recognize that the laboratory had
developed preliminary safety documents in 1996 and 1997 and some of the
safety issues identified at that time remained unresolved until after
they resurfaced in 2001. However, this information does not help
explain why those issues remained unresolved, and it does not address
the cause of the delay in initiating operations at the new facility. We
did clarify in the report that some of the safety issues surfaced in
1996 and 1997.
DOE's second point concerned a statement in the draft report that
shipment of some waste to off-site disposal facilities had been
delayed. The Assistant Secretary said that the treatment and off-site
disposal of legacy waste--the backlog of stored waste from nuclear
weapons research activities--have not been directly postponed by the
delay in obtaining approval of the facility safety documents. However,
we found that the delay in approving the storage building safety
document contributed to the delay in approving the treatment buildings'
safety document. Furthermore, the treatment building cannot operate
until after approval of the safety documents and completion of an
operational readiness review. Certain waste at the laboratory, such as
reactive waste, cannot be treated in the laboratory's older facilities
and has been stored at the site. The laboratory's plan was to begin
treating this waste for off-site disposal within 6 months of initiating
operations at the new treatment facility. Therefore, the delay in
initiating operations at the treatment facility has postponed the off-
site disposal of some waste.
DOE also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate. DOE's written comments on our draft report are included in
appendix II.
We conducted our review from September 2002 through April 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I provides details on our scope and methodology.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Energy and the Director of Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Robin M. Nazzaro
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Robin M. Nazzaro:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To identify the cause of the delay in initiating storage and treatment
operations at the new facility, we reviewed DOE orders and standards
and federal regulations pertaining to safety documents. We also
reviewed safety documents, DOE comments on safety documents, and
internal DOE correspondence discussing disagreements over safety
documents. In addition, we reviewed a DOE memorandum addressing
delegations of authority and also analyzed project schedules to
determine the extent of delays for the Decontamination and Waste
Treatment Facility project. We also analyzed project cost documents to
determine any increases in costs from the delay. Finally, we
interviewed DOE and Livermore laboratory officials about the
preparation and review of safety documents.
To identify the effects of the delay in initiating treatment
operations, we analyzed documents describing waste treatment operations
obtained from the laboratory, and we interviewed Livermore laboratory
officials.
To identify the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date
for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met, we
interviewed DOE and laboratory officials and analyzed a DOE and
laboratory written agreement addressing the development of safety
documents. We also reviewed laboratory presentations on safety issues
made to DOE. Finally, we analyzed the project schedule pertaining to
the operational readiness review.
We also toured laboratory and waste storage and treatment facilities
and obtained data on the types, amounts, and locations of waste at the
laboratory. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585:
APR 25 2003:
Mr. Robin Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Nazzaro:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-03-
558, Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility
at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain.
The Department of Energy (DOE) would like to emphasize that though the
new facilities have features that provide additional environmental and
worker protections, the existing facilities meet all Federal and State
regulations and are both safe for the worker and protection of the
environment. At no time has legacy waste been stored improperly or
workers exposed to undue hazards. Likewise, the new Decontamination and
Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) will not operate until the DOE is
assured that it can be operated safely and in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. It should also be recognized that some
of the existing facilities would remain in operation, following startup
of the new facility, as defined by the Legacy Waste Disposal Plan.
1 agree that some of the safety issues (e.g., hazard categorization,
aircraft crash accident) have taken longer to resolve, but the report
omits the fact that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
developed a safety analysis report for this facility and the
Radioactive Waste Storage Facility as early as 1996. Some of the safety
issues laid dormant since that time, remaining unresolved until
resurfaced in 2001. The report makes mention that the cost for
completing facility safety documents exceeded estimates by $400,000. It
is unclear what estimates where used to draw this conclusion given the
fact that safety document preparation has occurred over a multi-year
time frame.
With the recent involvement from my staff, the DWTF Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) review and approval process for the DOE site office has
improved significantly. As a result, I was able to approve the DWTF
Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety Requirements on April 16,
2003.
The DOE is still relying upon the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory to achieve startup of operations at the DWTF as they have
committed to in August 2003. We are approaching these commitments with
the recognition that the first priority is ensuring the new facility is
ready to function in a safe and environmentally sound manner,
protecting the worker, the public, and the environment. It is my
expectation, and certainly achievable, that both the Laboratory's
internal and DOE's independent operational readiness reviews be
conducted in the most disciplined and rigorous manner to support this
priority.
One statement, often made in the report, that we take issue with is
that delays in the safety documentation approval resulted in a
postponement of off-site disposal of some waste. I am not aware of any
instance in which the treatment and off-site disposal of legacy waste
has been directly delayed by safety documentation approval. Existing
treatment capabilities have been maintained at the existing facilities
while the new facility was being made ready. Though the new facility
construction has been completed, the equipment needed to provide
expanded treatment capabilities has not yet been installed, tested, and
operating procedures implemented. These activities do not rely upon
safety documentation approval to be completed. Further, it is unclear
what measures where used to determine that off-site disposal delays
occurred given that the first Legacy Waste Disposal Plan was
established in 2002.
I would like to acknowledge the abilities and professionalism of your
staff. They have made every effort to understand a very complicated
management and technical issue and produce a fair and balanced report.
If you have any further questions, please call me at (202) 586-7709.
Sincerely,
Jessie Hill Roberson,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Signed for Jessie Hill Roberson:
cc: Robert G. Card, Under Secretary Everet H. Beckner,
NA-10 Beverly A. Cook, EH-1:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Robin M. Nazzaro (202) 512-3841:
William R. Swick (206) 287-4800:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Leo G. Acosta, Gary R. Boss, Allen T.
Chan, Nancy L. Crothers, Gary L. Jones, James L. Ohl, Stanley G.
Stenersen, and Yunsian Tai made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOE has continued to extend its contract with the University since
that time under a provision in federal statute that allows contracts
with federally funded research and development centers to be extended
without competition in order to maintain essential research and
development capability. See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (c)(3)(B). The University
of California also operates another DOE weapons laboratory, the Los
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
[2] The site is a former U.S. Navy flight training base and aircraft
rework facility.
[3] The Livermore laboratory's low-level waste has a wide range of
characteristics; it often contains small amounts of radioactivity in
large volumes of material.
[4] Transuranic waste is radioactive waste contaminated with
transuranic elements (i.e., elements heavier than uranium, such as
plutonium) with half-lives greater than 20 years, in concentrations
above 100 nanocuries per gram of waste.
[5] 10 CFR part 830, promulgated in 2001, establishes these safety
requirements.
[6] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Baseline Review of LLNL
Nuclear Facilities Authorization Basis Documents, Final Summary Report
on Issues and Recommendations on LLNL-Authorization Basis Documents,
May 2001.
[7] Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities,
DOE-STD-3014-96, October 1996.
[8] Concerns over safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997 when the
laboratory prepared the preliminary safety documents for the new
facility. DOE required the laboratory to resolve these issues prior to
DOE authorizing facility operations.
[9] An example of reactive waste is material containing sodium metal,
which reacts strongly with water, including water in the air. Such a
reaction could create a large amount of heat, which could cause the
material to ignite.
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