Nuclear Security
DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat Gao ID: GAO-04-701T April 27, 2004A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT.
DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE's sites are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO found that DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats. While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such standards currently do not exist. DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites.
GAO-04-701T, Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, April 27, 2004:
Nuclear Security:
DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New
Design Basis Threat:
Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment Team:
GAO-04-701T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-701T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites
containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons
could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding
communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards
and security program. A key component of an effective program is the
design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among
other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current
DBT obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003.
GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT,
(2) analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified
remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the
threat contained in the new DBT.
What GAO Found:
DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of
themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE‘s sites
are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher
terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world.
Specifically, GAO found:
* DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in
developing an intelligence community assessment”known as the Postulated
Threat”of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE‘s
lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp
debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and
capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of
resources to meet these threats.
* While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did
the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases,
is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community‘s
Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The
new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological,
chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has
selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected
against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for
chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to ’industry
standards;“ however, such standards currently do not exist.
* DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as
issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT
implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans,
that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat
contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE‘s
deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal
year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-701T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202)
512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work for this Subcommittee
on physical security at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized agency
within DOE. Specifically, today we are issuing our report, Nuclear
Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets
the New Design Basis Threat (GAO-04-623).
DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site
containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear
weapons--called special nuclear material--could have devastating
consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because
terrorist attacks against sites that contain special nuclear material
could have such devastating consequences, DOE's effective management of
the safeguards and security program, which includes developing
safeguards and security policies, is essential to preventing an
unacceptable, adverse impact on national security. For[Footnote 1] many
years, DOE has employed risk-based security practices. To manage
potential risks, DOE has developed a design basis threat (DBT), a
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
of terrorist forces. DOE's DBT is based on an intelligence community
assessment known as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the contractors
operating its sites to provide sufficient protective forces and
equipment to defend against the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in
effect on September 11, 2001, had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE
replaced the 1999 DBT in May 2003 to better reflect the current and
projected terrorist threats that resulted from the September 11, 2001,
attacks.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, you asked us to
review physical security at DOE sites that have facilities with
Category I special nuclear material. Category I special nuclear
material includes specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium in forms of assembled nuclear weapons and test devices, major
nuclear components, and other high-grade materials such as solutions
and oxides. Specifically, we examined, among other things, (1) the
reasons DOE needed almost 2 years to develop a new DBT; (2) the higher
threat contained in the new DBT; and (3) the remaining issues that need
to be resolved in order for DOE to fully defend against the threat
contained in the new DBT.[Footnote 2]
To carry out our objectives, we reviewed draft DBTs, the final May 2003
DBT, and DOE policy and planning documents, including orders,
implementation guidance, and reports. We met with officials from DOE
and NNSA headquarters and field offices. We obtained information
primarily from DOE's Office of Security, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, and Office of Environmental
Management; NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Security; and NNSA's
Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program. We visited all three of NNSA's
three design laboratories and its two production plants that possess
Category I special nuclear material, as well as NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation. We also visited the four EM sites that, at the time,
contained Category I special nuclear materials. At each site we met
with both federal and contractor officials and reviewed pertinent
supporting documentation. We also discussed postulated terrorist
threats to nuclear weapon facilities with two Department of Defense
(DOD) organizations: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. We also reviewed The Postulated Threat to U.S.
Nuclear Weapon Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities,
henceforth referred to as the Postulated Threat, which is the
intelligence community's January 2003 official assessment of potential
terrorist threats to nuclear weapon facilities.
We performed our work from December 2001 through April 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, we found that while DOE has taken some important actions in
its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE
struggled to develop its new DBT. The DBT that DOE ultimately
developed, however, is substantially more demanding than the previous
one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE wants to
implement new protective strategies within 2 years, DOE must press
forward with additional actions to ensure that it is fully prepared to
provide a timely and cost effective defense of its most sensitive
facilities. Specifically, we found the following:
* Development of the new DBT took almost 2 years because of (1) delays
in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the
Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon
facilities, (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing
policy, and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government
organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist
threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats.
* While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did
the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases,
is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's
Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The
new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological,
chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has
selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected
against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for
chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry
standards;" however, such standards currently do not exist.
* DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as
issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT
implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans,
that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat
contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's
deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal
year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites.
In our report to you, we made seven recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy that are intended to strengthen DOE's ability to meet the
requirements of the new DBT, improve the department's ability to deal
with future terrorist threats, and better inform Congress on
departmental progress in meeting the threat contained in the new DBT
and reducing risks to critical facilities at DOE sites. DOE did not
comment specifically on our recommendations other than to say that the
department would consider them as part of its Departmental Management
Challenges for 2004. DOE has identified the DBT as a major departmental
initiative within the National Security Management Challenge.
Background:
Category I special nuclear materials are present at the three design
laboratories--the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New
Mexico; the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,
California; and the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New
Mexico--and two production sites--the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas,
and the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, operated by NNSA. Special
nuclear material is also present at former production sites, including
the Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the
Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. These former sites are now being
cleaned up by DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM).
Furthermore,[Footnote 3] NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation
transports these materials among the sites and between the sites and
DOD bases. Contractors operate each site for DOE. NNSA [Footnote 4] and
EM have field offices collocated with each site. In fiscal year 2004,
NNSA and EM expect to spend nearly $900 million on physical security at
their sites. Physical[Footnote 5] security combines security equipment,
personnel, and procedures to protect facilities, information,
documents, or material against theft, sabotage, diversion, or other
criminal acts.
In addition to NNSA and EM, DOE has other important security
organizations. DOE's Office of Security develops and promulgates orders
and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department's safeguards and
security programs. DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance supports the department by, among other things,
independently evaluating the effectiveness of contractors' performance
in safeguards and security. It also performs follow-up reviews to
ensure that contractors have taken effective corrective actions and
appropriately addressed weaknesses in safeguards and security. Under a
recent reorganization, these two offices were incorporated into the new
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. Each office,
however, retains its individual missions, functions, structure, and
relationship to the other.
The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but
include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or test device at or near
design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of
producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon,
and the potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal.
Because of these risks, DOE has long employed risk-based security
practices.
The key component of DOE's well-established, risk-based security
practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the
characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT has
been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence
community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the
Postulated Threat. The DBT considers a variety of threats in addition
to the terrorist threat. Other adversaries considered in the DBT
include criminals, psychotics, disgruntled employees, violent
activists, and spies. The DBT also considers the threat posed by
insiders, those individuals who have authorized, unescorted access to
any part of DOE facilities and programs. Insiders may operate alone or
may assist an adversary group. Insiders are routinely considered to
provide assistance to the terrorist groups found in the DBT. The threat
from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained
in the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a
multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from site
to site, all protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a
defense-in-depth concept that includes sensors, physical barriers,
hardened facilities and vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary
protective forces equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night
vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective gear.
Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE Category I special
nuclear material sites are designed to accomplish the following
objectives in response to the terrorist threat:
* Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, such as
the creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may employ a
protection strategy that requires the engagement and neutralization of
adversaries before they can acquire hands-on access to the assets.
* Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices that
terrorists might seek to steal, DOE requires the prevention and/or
neutralization of the adversaries before they can complete a specific
task, such as stealing such devices.
* Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear material
(instead of a nuclear weapon) is the likely terrorist objective, DOE
requires that adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and
that DOE protective forces recapture the material as soon as possible.
This objective requires the use of specially trained and well-equipped
special response teams.
The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly
examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment
is a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and
quantitative techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and
arrive at effective protection of specific assets, such as special
nuclear material. To conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other
things, subject matter experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer
modeling to simulate attacks; and force-on-force performance testing,
in which the site's protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a
group of mock terrorists.
The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a
classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In
addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection
strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally
acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to
accept. Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk
management approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical
assets--in this case Category I special nuclear material--and mitigate
the risks to these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk--high,
medium, and low--are assigned classified numerical values and are
derived from a mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group's
capabilities with the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of
the site's protective forces and systems.
Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low
risk level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a
significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low
risk level. Compensatory measures could include such things as
deploying additional protective forces or curtailing operations until
the asset can be better protected. In response to a September 2000 DOE
Inspector General's report recommending that DOE establish a policy on
what actions are required once high or moderate risk is identified, in
September 2003, DOE's Office of Security issued a policy clarification
stating that identified high risks at facilities must be formally
reported to the Secretary of Energy or Deputy Secretary within 24
hours. In addition, under this policy clarification, identified high
and moderate risks require corrective actions and regular reporting.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its
safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are
performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments
and are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also
require field offices to comprehensively survey contractors' operations
for safeguards and security every year. DOE's Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance provides yet another check through
its comprehensive inspection program. All deficiencies identified
during surveys and inspections require the contractors to take
corrective action.
Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in
Developing the Postulated Threat and DOE's Lengthy Review and Comment
Process:
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials
realized that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a
1998 intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. The September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger groups of terrorists, larger
vehicle bombs, and broader terrorist aspirations to cause mass
casualties and panic than were envisioned in the 1999 DOE DBT. However,
formally recognizing these new threats by updating the DBT was
difficult and took 21 months because of delays in issuing the
Postulated Threat, debates over the size of the future threat and the
cost to meet it, and the DOE policy process.
As mentioned previously, DOE's new DBT is based on a study known as the
Postulated Threat, which was developed by the U.S. intelligence
community. The intelligence community originally planned to complete
the Postulated Threat by April 2002; however, the document was not
completed and officially released until January 2003, about 9 months
behind the original schedule. According to DOE and DOD officials, this
delay resulted from other demands placed on the intelligence community
after September 11, 2001, as well as from sharp debates among the
organizations developing the Postulated Threat over the size and
capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to
meet these threats.
While waiting for the new Postulated Threat, DOE developed several
drafts of its new DBT. During this process, debates, similar to those
that occurred during the development of the Postulated Threat, emerged
in DOE. Like the participants responsible for developing the Postulated
Threat, during the development of the DBT, DOE officials debated the
size of the future terrorist threat and the costs to meet it. DOE
officials at all levels told us that concern over resources played a
large role in developing the 2003 DBT, with some officials calling the
DBT the ’funding basis threat,“ or the maximum threat the department
could afford. This tension between threat size and resources is not a
new development. According to a DOE analysis of the development of
prior DBTs, political and budgetary pressures and the apparent desire
to reduce the requirements for the size of protective forces appear to
have played a significant role in determining the terrorist group
numbers contained in prior DBTs.
Finally, DOE developed the DBT using DOE's policy process, which
emphasizes developing consensus through a review and comment process by
program offices, such as EM and NNSA. However, many DOE and contractor
officials found that the policy process for developing the new DBT was
laborious and not timely, especially given the more dangerous threat
environment that has existed since September 11, 2001. As a result,
during the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only
required to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT,
which, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized
was obsolete.
The May 2003 DBT Identifies a Larger Terrorist Threat, but in Most
Cases is Less Than the Terrorist Threat Identified by the Postulated
Threat:
While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the
previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is
less than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence
community's Postulated Threat. The Postulated Threat estimated that the
force attacking a nuclear weapons site would probably be a relatively
small group of terrorists, although it was possible that an adversary
might use a greater number of terrorists if that was the only way to
attain an important strategic goal. In contrast to the Postulated
Threat, DOE is preparing to defend against a significantly smaller
group of terrorists attacking many of its facilities. Specifically,
only for its sites and operations that handle nuclear weapons is DOE
currently preparing to defend against an attacking force that
approximates the lower range of the threat identified in the Postulated
Threat. For its other Category I special nuclear material sites, all of
which fall under the Postulated Threat's definition of a nuclear
weapons site, DOE is requiring preparations to defend against a
terrorist force significantly smaller than was identified in the
Postulated Threat. DOE calls this a graded threat approach.
Some of these other sites, however, may have improvised nuclear device
concerns that, if successfully exploited by terrorists, could result in
a nuclear detonation. Nevertheless, under the graded threat approach,
DOE requires these sites only to be prepared to defend against a
smaller force of terrorists than was identified by the Postulated
Threat. Officials in DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance disagreed with this approach and noted that sites
with improvised nuclear device concerns should be held to the same
requirements as facilities that possess nuclear weapons and test
devices since the potential worst-case consequence at both types of
facilities would be the same--a nuclear detonation. Other DOE officials
and an official in DOD's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence disagreed with
the overall graded threat approach, believing that the threat should
not be embedded in the DBT by adjusting the number of terrorists that
might attack a particular target.
DOE Office of Security officials cited three reasons for why the
department departed from the Postulated Threat's assessment of the
potential size of terrorist forces. First, these officials stated that
they believed that the Postulated Threat only applied to sites that
handled completed nuclear weapons and test devices. However, both the
2003 Postulated Threat, as well as the preceding 1998 Postulated
Threat, state that the threat applies to nuclear weapons and special
nuclear material without making any distinction between them. Second,
DOE Office of Security officials believed that the higher threat levels
contained in the 2003 Postulated Threat represented the worst potential
worldwide terrorist case over a 10-year period. These officials noted
that while some U.S. assets, such as military bases, are located in
parts of the world where terrorist groups receive some support from
local governments and societies thereby allowing for an expanded range
of capabilities, DOE facilities are located within the United States,
where terrorists would have a more difficult time operating.
Furthermore, DOE Office of Security officials stated that the DBT
focuses on a nearer-term threat of 5 years. As such, DOE Office of
Security officials said that they chose to focus on what their subject
matter experts believed was the maximum, credible, near-term threat to
their facilities. However, while the 1998 Postulated Threat made a
distinction between the size of terrorist threats abroad and those
within the United States, the 2003 Postulated Threat, reflecting the
potential implications of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, did not
make this distinction. Finally, DOE Office of Security officials stated
that the Postulated Threat document represented a reference guide
instead of a policy document that had to be rigidly followed. The
Postulated Threat does acknowledge that it should not be used as the
sole consideration to dictate specific security requirements and that
decisions regarding security risks should be made and managed by
decision makers in policy offices. However, DOE has traditionally based
its DBT on the Postulated Threat. For example, the prior DBT, issued in
1999, adopted exactly the same terrorist threat size as was identified
by the 1998 Postulated Threat.
Finally, the department's criteria for determining the severity of
radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient.
For example, the criterion used for protection against radiological
sabotage is based on acute radiation dosages received by individuals.
However, this criterion may not fully capture or characterize the
damage that a major radiological dispersal at a DOE site might cause.
For example, according to a March 2002 DOE response to a January 23,
2002, letter from Representative Edward J. Markey, a worst-case
analysis at one DOE site showed that while a radiological dispersal
would not pose immediate, acute health problems for the general public,
the public could experience measurable increases in cancer mortality
over a period of decades after such an event. Moreover, releases at the
site could also have environmental consequences requiring hundreds of
millions to billions of dollars to clean up. Contamination could also
affect habitability for tens of miles from the site, possibly affecting
hundreds of thousands of residents for many years. Likewise, the same
response showed that a similar event at a NNSA site could result in a
dispersal of plutonium that could contaminate several hundred square
miles and ultimately cause thousands of cancer deaths. For chemical
sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to industry
standards. However, we reported March 2003 year that such standards
currently do not exist.[Footnote 6] Specifically, we found that no
federal laws explicitly require chemical facilities to assess
vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities
against a terrorist attack. Finally, the protection criteria for
biological sabotage are based on laboratory safety standards developed
by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and not physical security
standards.
DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May
Affect the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in
the New DBT:
While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently
resolved a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of
its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely
fashion and is still addressing other issues. Fully resolving all of
these issues may take several years, and the total cost of meeting the
new threats is currently unknown. Because some sites will be unable to
effectively counter the higher threat contained in the new DBT for up
to several years, these sites should be considered to be at higher risk
under the new DBT than they were under the old DBT.
In order to undertake the necessary range of vulnerability assessments
to accurately evaluate their level of risk under the new DBT and
implement necessary protective measures, DOE recognized that it had to
complete a number of key activities. DOE only recently completed three
of these key activities. First, in February 2004, DOE issued its
revised Adversary Capabilities List, which is a classified companion
document to the DBT, that lists the potential weaponry, tactics, and
capabilities of the terrorist group described in the DBT. This document
has been amended to include, among other things, heavier weaponry and
other capabilities that are potentially available to terrorists who
might attack DOE facilities. DOE is continuing to review relevant
intelligence information for possible incorporation into future
revisions of the Adversary Capabilities List.
Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation
guidance. In a July 2003 report, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance noted that DOE sites had found initial DBT
implementation guidance confusing. For example, when the Deputy
Secretary of Energy issued the new DBT in May 2003, the cover memo said
the new DBT was effective immediately but that much of the DBT would be
implemented in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. According to a 2003 report
by the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, many
DOE sites interpreted this implementation period to mean that they
should, through fiscal year 2006, only be measured against the
previous, less demanding 1999 DBT.
In response to this confusion, the Deputy Secretary issued further
guidance in September 2003 that called for the following, among other
things:
* DOE's Office of Security to issue more specific guidance by October
22, 2003, regarding DBT implementation expectations, schedules, and
requirements. DOE issued this guidance January 30, 2004.
* Quarterly reports showing sites' incremental progress in meeting the
new DBT for ongoing activities. The first series of quarterly progress
reports may be issued in July 2004.
* Immediate compliance with the new DBT for new and reactivated
operations.
A third important DBT-related issue was just completed in early April
2004. A special team created in the 2003 DBT, composed of weapons
designers and security specialists, finalized its report on each site's
improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. The results of this report
were briefed to senior DOE officials in March 2004 and the Deputy
Secretary of Energy issued guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites
in early April 2004. As a result, some sites may be required under the
2003 DBT to shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be
very costly. This special team's report may most affect EM sites
because their improvised nuclear device potential had not previously
been explored.
Finally, DOE's Office of Security has not completed all of the
activities associated with the new vulnerability assessment methodology
it has been developing for over a year. DOE's Office of Security
believes this methodology, which uses a new mathematical equation for
determining levels of risk, will result in a more sensitive and
accurate portrayal of each site's defenses-in-depth and the
effectiveness of sites' protective systems (i.e., physical security
systems and protective forces) when compared with the new DBT. DOE's
Office of Security decided to develop this new equation because its old
mathematical equation had been challenged on technical grounds and did
not give sites credit for the full range of their defenses-in-depth.
While DOE's Office of Security completed this equation in December
2002, officials from this office believe it will probably not be
completely implemented at the sites for at least another year for two
reasons. First, site personnel who implement this methodology will
require additional training to ensure they are employing it properly.
DOE's Office of Security conducted initial training in December 2003,
as well as a prototype course in February 2004, and has developed a
nine-course vulnerability assessment certification program. Second,
sites will have to collect additional data to support the broader
evaluation of their protective systems against the new DBT. Collecting
these data will require additional computer modeling and force-on-force
performance testing.
Because of the slow resolution of some of these issues, DOE has not
developed any official long-range cost estimates or developed any
integrated, long-range implementation plans for the May 2003 DBT.
Specifically, neither the fiscal year 2003 nor 2004 budgets contained
any provisions for DBT implementation costs. However, during this
period, DOE did receive additional safeguards and security funding
through budget reprogramming and supplemental appropriations. DOE is
using most of these additional funds to cover the higher operational
costs associated with the increased security condition (SECON)
measures. DOE has gathered initial DBT implementation budget data and
has requested additional DBT implementation funding in the fiscal year
2005 budget: $90 million for NNSA, $18 million for the Secure
Transportation Asset within the Office of Secure Transportation, and
$26 million for EM. However, DOE officials believe the budget data
collected so far has been of generally poor quality because most sites
have not yet completed the necessary vulnerability assessments to
determine their resource requirements. Consequently, the fiscal year
2006 budget may be the first budget to begin to accurately reflect the
safeguards and security costs of meeting the requirements of the new
DBT.
Reflecting these various delays and uncertainties, in September 2003,
the Deputy Secretary changed the deadline for DOE program offices, such
as EM and NNSA, to submit DBT implementation plans from the original
target of October 2003 to the end of January 2004. NNSA and EM approved
these plans in February 2004. DOE's Office of Security has reviewed
these plans and is planning to provide implementation assistance to
sites that request it. DOE officials have described these plans as
being ambitious in terms of the amount of work that has to be done
within a relatively short time frame and dependent on continued
increases in safeguards and security funding, primarily for additional
protective force personnel. However, some plans may be based on
assumptions that are no longer valid. Revising these plans could
require additional resources, as well as add time to the DBT
implementation process.
A DOE Office of Budget official told us that current DBT implementation
cost estimates do not include items such as closing unneeded
facilities, transporting and consolidating materials, completing line
item construction projects, and other important activities that are
outside of the responsibility of the safeguards and security program.
For example, EM's Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply
with the DBT requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it
will have to:
* close and de-inventory two facilities,
* consolidate excess materials into remaining special nuclear materials
facilities, and:
* move consolidated Category I special nuclear material, which NNSA's
Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to another site.
Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the DBT
requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure of
one facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility
on the site. The costs to close these facilities and to move materials
within a site are borne by the EM program budget and not by the EM
safeguards and security budget. Similarly, the costs to transport the
material between sites are borne by NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation budget and not by EM's safeguards and security budget. A
DOE Office of Budget official told us that a comprehensive, department-
wide approach to budgeting for DBT implementation that includes such
important program activities as described above is needed; however,
such an approach does not currently exist.
The department plans to complete DBT implementation by the end of
fiscal year 2006. However, most sites estimate that it will take 2 to 5
years, if they receive adequate funding, to fully meet the requirements
of the new DBT. During this time, sites will have to conduct
vulnerability assessments, undertake performance testing, and develop
Site Safeguards and Security Plans. Consequently, full DBT
implementation could occur anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal
year 2008. Some sites may be able to move more quickly and meet the
department's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006.
Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat
contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these
sites should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than
they were under the old DBT. For example, the Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance has concluded in recent inspections
that at least two DOE sites face fundamental and not easily resolved
security problems that will make meeting the requirements of the new
DBT difficult. For other DOE sites, their level of risk under the new
DBT remains largely unknown until they can conduct the necessary
vulnerability assessments.
In closing, while DOE struggled to develop its new DBT, the DBT that
DOE ultimately developed is substantially more demanding than the
previous one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE
wants to implement it by end of fiscal year 2006--a period of about 29
months--DOE must press forward with a series of additional actions to
ensure that it is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective
defense of its most sensitive facilities.
First, because the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks suggested
larger groups of terrorists with broader aspirations for causing mass
casualties and panic, we believe that the DBT development process that
was used requires reexamination. While DOE may point to delays in the
development of the Postulated Threat as the primary reason for the
almost 2 years it took to develop a new DBT, DOE was also working on
the DBT itself for most of that time. We believe the difficulty
associated with developing a consensus using DOE's traditional policy-
making process was a key factor in the time it took to develop a new
DBT. During this extended period, DOE's sites were only being defended
against what was widely recognized as an obsolete terrorist threat
level.
Second, we are concerned about two aspects of the resulting DBT. We are
not persuaded that there is sufficient difference, in its ability to
achieve the objective of causing mass casualties or creating public
panic, between the detonation of an improvised nuclear device and the
detonation of a nuclear weapon or test device at or near design yield
that warrants setting the threat level at a lower number of terrorists.
Furthermore, while we applaud DOE for adding additional requirements to
the DBT such as protection strategies to guard against radiological,
chemical, and biological sabotage, we believe that DOE needs to
reevaluate its criteria for terrorist acts of sabotage, especially in
the chemical area, to make it more defensible from a physical security
perspective.
Finally, because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the
threat contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years,
these sites should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT
than they were under the old DBT. As a result, DOE needs to take a
series of actions to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as
quickly as possible. To accomplish this, it is important for DOE to go
about the hard business of a comprehensive department-wide approach to
implementing needed changes in its protective strategy. Because the
consequences of a successful terrorist attack on a DOE site could be so
devastating, we believe it is important for DOE to better inform
Congress about what sites are at high risk and what progress is being
made to reduce these risks to acceptable levels.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Robin M.
Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill also made key
contributions to this testimony.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to
Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003).
[2] We testified on these issues before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, on June 24, 2003. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: DOE's Response to the September
11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, GAO-03-898TC (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2003).
[3] At the time of our review, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site in Rocky Flats, Colorado, was in the process of shipping its
remaining Category I special nuclear material primarily to the Savannah
River Site. This has now been completed. In addition, responsibility
for the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, which is also a Category I special nuclear material
site, was transferred from DOE's EM to DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy
in May 2003.
[4] Federal employees instead of contractors operate the assets of the
Office of Secure Transportation.
[5] Other DOE program offices, such as the Office of Science and Office
of Nuclear Energy operate sites that may contain Category I special
nuclear material. In fiscal year 2004, these program offices expect to
spend $118 million on security.
[6] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Voluntary
Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of
Security Preparedness is Unknown, GAO-03-439 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
14, 2003).
