Homeland Security
DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies Gao ID: GAO-04-653 May 24, 2004Success in the war against terrorism requires the United States to effectively research, develop, and deploy technologies to detect and respond to the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the ability to use laboratories owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct research and development (R&D) of these advanced technologies. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan and coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies, (2) how DHS plans to use DOE's laboratories to carry out its R&D, and (3) what controls DHS is establishing to monitor projects at DOE's laboratories.
DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies, and some gaps remain in its coordination with other federal agencies. According to DHS officials, the department has not completed a research strategic plan because it has spent much of the time since its March 2003 creation organizing the Science and Technology Directorate, developing policies and procedures, and hiring necessary staff. DHS has worked with some interagency R&D groups and has signed a memorandum of agreement with DOE establishing policies for resolving priority conflicts at DOE's laboratories, but gaps remain in its efforts to coordinate and establish partnerships with other agencies conducting homeland security R&D. Failure to complete a strategic plan and to fully coordinate its research efforts may limit DHS's ability to leverage resources and could increase the potential for duplication of research. DHS's research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE laboratories. These five laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories-- received over 96 percent of the $57 million DHS invested in research at DOE's laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90 percent of the $201 million for fiscal year 2004. At the time of our review, the remaining DOE laboratories would receive DHS R&D funding primarily through competition with the private sector and academia. Although federal acquisition regulations generally prohibit DOE's laboratories from competing with the private sector and academia for federal funding, some competition can occur under specific circumstances. For example, DOE's laboratories can respond to R&D solicitations with the private sector and academia for broad scientific study for advancing the state of the art or for increasing knowledge. Some DOE laboratory officials feel that if DHS focuses on short-term, applied research, their laboratories' ability to attract and retain top scientific talent and build and maintain laboratory facilities may be threatened. In response to concerns from Members of Congress and officials from DOE's laboratories, DHS announced in March 2004 that it would review its policies for working with DOE's laboratories. DHS officials have also agreed that it is necessary to make long-term investments in laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring R&D complex for homeland security. DHS is making progress developing the project management tools it will use to monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. Monthly reports will discuss project accomplishments and concerns that could affect the execution of the project. Quantitative performance metrics are also being developed for these monthly reports to gauge differences between budgeted and actual cost and schedules of R&D work performed. Also, DHS plans to conduct regular peer reviews of projects to assess how technical approaches being followed by R&D projects match DHS's requirements.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-653, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
May 2004:
Homeland Security:
DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies:
[Hyperlink, http: //www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-653]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-653, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Success in the war against terrorism requires the United States to
effectively research, develop, and deploy technologies to detect and
respond to the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) the ability to use laboratories owned by the Department of Energy
(DOE) to conduct research and development (R&D) of these advanced
technologies. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether DHS has completed
a strategic R&D plan and coordinated its efforts with other federal
agencies, (2) how DHS plans to use DOE‘s laboratories to carry out its
R&D, and (3) what controls DHS is establishing to monitor projects at
DOE‘s laboratories.
What GAO Found:
DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to identify priorities,
goals, objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security
technologies, and some gaps remain in its coordination with other
federal agencies. According to DHS officials, the department has not
completed a research strategic plan because it has spent much of the
time since its March 2003 creation organizing the Science and
Technology Directorate, developing policies and procedures, and hiring
necessary staff. DHS has worked with some interagency R&D groups and
has signed a memorandum of agreement with DOE establishing policies for
resolving priority conflicts at DOE‘s laboratories, but gaps remain in
its efforts to coordinate and establish partnerships with other
agencies conducting homeland security R&D. Failure to complete a
strategic plan and to fully coordinate its research efforts may limit
DHS‘s ability to leverage resources and could increase the potential
for duplication of research.
DHS‘s research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE
laboratories. These five laboratories”Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence
Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories”
received over 96 percent of the $57 million DHS invested in research at
DOE‘s laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90
percent of the $201 million for fiscal year 2004. At the time of our
review, the remaining DOE laboratories would receive DHS R&D funding
primarily through competition with the private sector and academia.
Although federal acquisition regulations generally prohibit DOE‘s
laboratories from competing with the private sector and academia for
federal funding, some competition can occur under specific
circumstances. For example, DOE‘s laboratories can respond to R&D
solicitations with the private sector and academia for broad scientific
study for advancing the state of the art or for increasing knowledge.
Some DOE laboratory officials feel that if DHS focuses on short-term,
applied research, their laboratories‘ ability to attract and retain top
scientific talent and build and maintain laboratory facilities may be
threatened. In response to concerns from Members of Congress and
officials from DOE‘s laboratories, DHS announced in March 2004 that it
would review its policies for working with DOE‘s laboratories. DHS
officials have also agreed that it is necessary to make long-term
investments in laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring
R&D complex for homeland security.
DHS is making progress developing the project management tools it will
use to monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. Monthly
reports will discuss project accomplishments and concerns that could
affect the execution of the project. Quantitative performance metrics
are also being developed for these monthly reports to gauge differences
between budgeted and actual cost and schedules of R&D work performed.
Also, DHS plans to conduct regular peer reviews of projects to assess
how technical approaches being followed by R&D projects match DHS‘s
requirements.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) complete a
strategic R&D plan, (2) ensure that this plan is integrated with
homeland security R&D conducted by other federal agencies, (3) develop
criteria for distributing annual funding and for making long-term
investments in laboratory capabilities, and (4) develop guidelines that
detail how DOE‘s laboratories would compete for funding with private
sector and academic entities. In commenting on the report, DHS agreed
with our recommendation to complete a strategic R&D plan, but did not
explicitly agree or disagree with our remaining recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-653.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202)
512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Has Not Completed a Strategic Plan to Determine Its R&D Priorities,
and Gaps Remain in Its Efforts to Coordinate with Other Federal
Agencies:
DHS Faces Challenges Using DOE's Laboratories:
DHS Is Making Progress in Developing Controls to Manage Its Research
Efforts at DOE's Laboratories:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project Management Controls:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Tables:
Table 1: DHS's Research Portfolios:
Table 2: DHS R&D Funding Distribution, Fiscal Years 2003-2005:
Table 3: DHS R&D Funding Distribution to DOE's Laboratories, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOE: Department of Energy:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSARPA: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
PART: Program Assessment Rating Tool:
R&D: research and development:
Letter May 24, 2004:
The Honorable Pat Roberts:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Success in the war against terrorism requires the United States to
effectively research, develop, and deploy advanced technologies--or
countermeasures--to detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass
destruction. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--through its
Science and Technology Directorate--conducts research, development,
testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to
strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to
nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. Created by Title III of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Science and Technology Directorate
is responsible for, among other things, preparing a strategic plan for
developing countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats. In addition, the act
requires DHS to coordinate the federal government's efforts to identify
and develop these countermeasures.
Before DHS was created in March 2003, much of the R&D of nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical countermeasures was managed by
the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation
and Verification Research and Development Program.[Footnote 1] In
August 2002, we reported that NNSA's program faced challenges balancing
the short-term needs of the users of these technologies and looking
beyond the horizon at advanced technologies.[Footnote 2] Specifically,
we noted that some users of technologies developed by NNSA's program
were concerned that the program's focus was on long-term research,
potentially ignoring immediate technology needs for the war on
terrorism. We also reported that NNSA's program did not have adequate
information on milestones, costs, and deliverables to monitor projects'
progress. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the chemical
and biological R&D work of NNSA's program to DHS, along with some of
NNSA's nuclear smuggling R&D.[Footnote 3] NNSA retains responsibility
for R&D on remote sensing and other technologies that analyze the
global spread of nuclear weapons and technology. Similarly, NNSA is
responsible for R&D on space-and ground-based sensors that defense and
intelligence agencies use to verify and monitor arms control treaties.
Much of the R&D work previously managed by NNSA and now managed by DHS
occurs at laboratories owned by the Department of Energy (DOE). DOE is
responsible for the world's largest laboratory system of its kind. The
mission of these 22 government-owned and contractor-operated
laboratories has evolved.[Footnote 4] Originally created to design and
build atomic bombs, DOE's laboratory system has since expanded to
conduct basic and applied research in many disciplines, from high-
energy physics to advanced computing. While federal, state, local, and
private entities traditionally could use the capabilities of DOE's
laboratories, DOE research had the highest priority. However, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the right to use DOE's
laboratories, and the laboratories the right to accept and perform work
for DHS, on an equal priority with DOE research. This parity has led to
questions about how DOE and DHS will resolve conflicting priorities, if
any, in the use of laboratory staff and resources for R&D.
Other federal agencies also conduct R&D related to homeland security.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) carries out basic and
applied research on bioterrorism countermeasures through the National
Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. The Department of Defense conducts research on biological
and chemical countermeasures, primarily for protection of military
forces. The Technical Support Working Group, jointly operated by the
departments of State and Defense, oversees an interagency R&D program
to rapidly develop and deploy counterterrorism technologies for use by
federal, state, and local agencies.
This report examines (1) whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan
and coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting
homeland security R&D; (2) how DHS plans to use DOE's laboratories to
carry out its responsibilities for R&D on nuclear, biological, and
chemical detection and response technologies; and (3) what controls DHS
is establishing to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables
for R&D conducted at DOE's laboratories. In addition, you asked us to
report on how NNSA's program has changed its project management
controls since our August 2002 report. NNSA has made several
improvements to its project management controls as a result of our
August 2002 report. Information on these improvements is presented in
appendix I.
Because DHS was undergoing its initial organization at the time of our
review and still developing plans, policies, and procedures, our
examination of DHS's strategic planning and coordination activities
focused on interviews with officials from DHS, NNSA, and DOE's
laboratories on their R&D activities and their interactions with one
another. To determine how DHS plans to use DOE's laboratories, we
obtained the R&D proposal guidance that DHS provided to DOE's
laboratories and the criteria that DHS used to review these proposals.
We also obtained the results of a DHS-sponsored peer review of DOE
laboratory proposals. We reviewed federal acquisition regulations and
statutory requirements governing the operation of DOE's laboratories.
To obtain DOE's laboratories' views of DHS's plans, we conducted focus
groups with program managers and researchers at seven DOE laboratories.
We selected five DOE laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence
Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories--
because they accounted for most of the funding DHS distributed to DOE
laboratories. We selected the remaining two laboratories--Argonne and
Brookhaven National Laboratories--because they also conduct homeland
security R&D for DHS, NNSA, or other federal agencies. Appendix II
presents our scope and methodology in more detail. We conducted our
review from August 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to identify priorities,
goals, objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security
technologies, and gaps remain in its efforts to coordinate with other
federal agencies that conduct homeland security R&D. Specifically:
* According to DHS officials, since its March 2003 creation, the
department has not completed a strategic plan for R&D because it has
spent much of the time organizing the Science and Technology
Directorate, developing policies and procedures, and hiring necessary
staff. When DHS was first organized, many of the staff in the Science
and Technology Directorate were personnel temporarily detailed from
other executive branch agencies and from DOE's laboratories. According
to DHS officials, they needed time to bring more permanent staff on
board. In the absence of a strategic plan, DHS obligated money for R&D
on nuclear, biological, and chemical countermeasures for fiscal years
2003 and 2004 and developed a budget request for fiscal year 2005 based
on funding priorities established by DHS program managers, who relied
on their knowledge of current threats and capabilities. DHS officials
acknowledge that developing the department's plan for R&D is important
for ensuring strategic direction and told us that information developed
through their strategic planning process will be used to develop DHS's
annual budget requests to the Congress.
* DHS has worked with some interagency R&D groups and has signed a
memorandum of agreement with DOE establishing policies for resolving
priority conflicts at DOE's laboratories, but gaps remain in its
efforts to coordinate and establish partnerships with agencies such as
NNSA, HHS, and the Department of Defense. For example, NNSA officials
provided DHS with copies of the fiscal year 2004 project proposals that
NNSA received from DOE's laboratories to develop radiological and
nuclear countermeasures. However, DHS officials awarded 2003 and 2004
funding to DOE's laboratories without taking similar steps to
coordinate with NNSA officials because they had limited time after the
department's organization in March 2003 in which to decide on project
funding. In some cases, DHS and NNSA may rely on the same capabilities
at DOE's laboratories to conduct similar work on nuclear and
radiological countermeasures. Consequently, failure to coordinate
efforts may limit the agencies' ability to leverage resources and could
increase the potential for duplicative research efforts. Furthermore,
DHS officials told us the department needs closer partnerships with HHS
agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
National Institutes of Health. These agencies are responsible for much
of the basic biological research that DHS will depend upon to develop
its technologies, especially biological countermeasures. The
Department of Defense's programs to develop biological and chemical
countermeasures may also be applicable to DHS's efforts.
We are recommending that DHS ensure that it completes its strategic
plan and appropriately integrates the plan with research efforts
conducted by other federal agencies so that governmentwide priorities
can be established, gaps can be identified, duplication can be avoided,
and resources can be leveraged.
DHS's research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE
laboratories. These five laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence
Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories--
received over 96 percent of the $57 million DHS invested in research at
DOE's laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90
percent of the $201 million for research at DOE's laboratories for
fiscal year 2004. At the time of our review, the remaining DOE
laboratories were to receive R&D funding from DHS primarily through
competition with companies and academia. Although federal acquisition
regulations generally prohibit DOE's laboratories from competing with
companies and academia for federal funding, some competition can occur
under specific circumstances. For example, DOE's laboratories can
respond to R&D solicitations with companies and academia for broad
scientific study for advancing the state of the art or increasing
knowledge. According to officials from some of DOE's laboratories, the
relationship between their laboratories and DHS has been strained
because of inadequate communication and DHS's lack of clear and well-
defined criteria for designating the five DOE laboratories that receive
most of DHS's funding. In response to these concerns, DHS's Under
Secretary for Science and Technology stated in a March 2004 letter that
DHS would conduct an internal review and convene an external panel to
reconsider its policies surrounding DHS's interactions with DOE's
laboratories. At the time of our review, it was unclear to what extent
these reviews would affect DHS's policies for using DOE's laboratories.
Like NNSA, DHS faces the challenge of balancing the immediate needs of
users of homeland security technologies with R&D on advanced
technologies for the future. DHS intends to focus much of its R&D
efforts on short-term, applied research projects, although it will
dedicate some funds to long-term advanced concepts research. Some DOE
laboratory officials believe that a focus on short-term, applied
research may threaten their long-term ability to attract and retain top
scientific talent, build and maintain laboratory facilities, and
develop effective technologies. Furthermore, they are concerned that
many of the successes in developing technologies in the short term at
DOE's laboratories have relied upon substantial investments in
facilities, personnel, and advanced concepts research over the long
term. DHS officials agreed that it is necessary to make long-term
investments in certain laboratory capabilities in order to create an
enduring complex for homeland security R&D. We are recommending that
DHS develop clear and well-defined criteria for distributing funding
for long-term investments in laboratory capabilities and develop
specific guidelines that detail the circumstances under which DOE's
laboratories would compete for funding with private sector and academic
entities.
DHS is making progress in developing the project management tools it
will use to monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. DHS
officials have told us that each laboratory will complete a monthly
report for each of its R&D portfolios--such as nuclear and radiological
countermeasures, chemical countermeasures, and biological
countermeasures. These reports are to contain (1) data on project cost,
schedule, and scope and (2) discussions of project accomplishments and
concerns that could affect the execution of the project. DHS is
developing quantitative performance metrics for these monthly reports
to gauge differences between budgeted and actual cost and schedules of
R&D work performed. DHS also plans to conduct regular scientific peer
reviews of projects to assess how the technical approaches being
followed by R&D projects match DHS's requirements.
We presented a draft of this report to DHS, NNSA, and the Department of
Defense for comment. With regard to our recommendation to complete a
strategic R&D plan, DHS agreed that such a plan is critical to the
success of the department. DHS did not explicitly agree or disagree
with our remaining recommendations, but provided additional information
on its strategic planning and coordination activities and on its
relationship with DOE's laboratories. NNSA had no comment on the draft
report, but noted that it is in contact with DHS to assist the
department in its coordination efforts related to the use of DOE's
laboratories. The Department of Defense had no comments on the report.
Background:
Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established a
Directorate of Science and Technology within DHS that is headed by an
Under Secretary for Science and Technology. Among other things, the
directorate is responsible for:
* developing, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, a
national policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals,
objectives, and policies for, and coordinating the federal government's
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats;
* establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting
national basic and applied research, development, testing, evaluation,
and procurement of technology and systems for, among other things,
detecting and responding to terrorist attacks; and:
* developing and overseeing the administration of guidelines for merit
review of R&D projects throughout DHS.
The act requires the directorate to conduct its basic and applied
research, development, testing, and evaluation through both
"extramural" and "intramural" programs. Extramural programs consist of
R&D activities conducted through grants, cooperative agreements, and
contracts between DHS and colleges, universities, private research
institutes, and/or companies. Intramural programs draw upon the
expertise of federal laboratories. Under the act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security may establish or contract with any federally funded
research and development center. In addition, DHS may use the
capabilities of DOE's laboratories through a joint sponsorship
agreement between DHS and DOE, a direct contract between DHS and DOE's
laboratory, a "work for others" basis,[Footnote 5] or any other method
provided by law. However, unlike a traditional "work for others"
arrangement whereby DOE's laboratories can accept work only if it does
not interfere with DOE missions, DOE's laboratories are authorized to
accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with the
laboratories' other missions.
In February 2003, DOE and DHS issued a memorandum of agreement that,
among other things, (1) detailed the procedures under which DHS work
would be conducted at DOE laboratories and sites, (2) specified that
DHS will not pay more than DOE pays for administrative or personnel
charges for the work the laboratories conduct, (3) stated that DHS and
DOE will establish appropriate mechanisms to resolve any issues
relating to setting priorities when conflicts might arise at the site,
and (4) stipulated that both departments would jointly determine what
long-term arrangements best serve the needs of both departments with
respect to DOE's laboratories.
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is organized into the
following four offices:
* Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets. Establishes overall
priorities, oversees R&D activities across the Science and Technology
Directorate, and provides policy guidance for how the Science and
Technology Directorate will interact with other DHS entities, such as
Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.
* Office of Research and Development. Manages and executes DHS's
intramural R&D programs.
* Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA). Manages
and executes DHS's extramural R&D programs through competitive, merit-
reviewed grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts with public or
private entities.
* Office of System Engineering and Development. Takes technologies
developed by the Office of Research and Development or HSARPA and
prepares deployment strategies to transfer technologies to federal,
state, and/or local governmental users.
DHS Has Not Completed a Strategic Plan to Determine Its R&D Priorities,
and Gaps Remain in Its Efforts to Coordinate with Other Federal
Agencies:
DHS has not completed a strategic plan to identify its research
priorities for the R&D of homeland security technologies. Instead, to
fund projects, DHS has relied upon its managers to set priorities based
upon their knowledge of current threats and capabilities. In addition,
gaps remain in DHS's efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies
conducting homeland security R&D. Lack of coordination could increase
the potential for duplication of research efforts and limit DHS's
ability to leverage resources with other federal R&D activities.
DHS Is Still Developing Its Research Strategy:
At the time of our review, DHS was still developing a strategic plan to
identify priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for the R&D of
countermeasures to nuclear, biological, chemical, and other emerging
terrorist threats. According to DHS officials, this strategic plan will
establish R&D priorities within and across federal programs and
identify opportunities to leverage the R&D efforts of other agencies.
Completion of this strategic plan has been delayed because, these
officials said, much of the time since DHS's March 2003 creation has
been spent organizing the Science and Technology Directorate,
developing policies and procedures, and hiring necessary staff. Unlike
other parts of DHS, such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and
Secret Service, the Science and Technology Directorate did not obtain
staff from outside of the department when DHS was created. According to
senior DHS officials, a team of only 12 federal employees was initially
responsible for organizing the Science and Technology Directorate. As a
result, the directorate initially relied on personnel temporarily
detailed from other executive branch agencies and from DOE's
laboratories to carry out day-to-day operations. As of January 2004,
the Science and Technology Directorate had grown to a total of 212
staff: 100 DHS employees, 6 Public Health Service Officers, 59
contractors, and 57 employees temporarily detailed from other federal
agencies and from DOE's laboratories.
The Science and Technology Directorate has organized its R&D around a
number of research portfolios: four respond to specific terrorist
threats, four address cross-cutting threats, and four support DHS's
operational units. (See table 1.) In addition, DHS supports other R&D
related activities, including a program that provides fellowships to
university students pursuing careers in scientific research essential
to homeland security and a program to develop capabilities to protect
commercial aircraft against portable anti-aircraft missiles.
Table 1: DHS's Research Portfolios:
Research portfolios focused on specific terrorist threats:
Biological Countermeasures;
Chemical Countermeasures;
High Explosives Countermeasures;
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.
Research portfolios focused on cross-cutting threats:
Threat and Vulnerability;
Testing and Assessment Standards;
Emerging Threats;
Rapid Prototyping.
Research portfolios supporting DHS operational units:
Border and Transportation Security;
Emergency Preparedness and Response;
U.S. Coast Guard;
U.S. Secret Service.
Source: DHS.
Note: In addition to these research portfolios, DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate provides funding for university and fellowship
programs and for research to counter portable anti-aircraft missiles.
[End of table]
In the absence of a strategic research plan, DHS obligated money for
fiscal year 2003 and 2004 and developed a budget request for fiscal
year 2005 based on the personal judgment of managers of each of the
research portfolios from the Science and Technology Directorate's
Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets. (See table 2.) According to DHS
officials, research portfolio managers are experts in their respective
fields and relied on their knowledge of current threats and
capabilities to independently determine priorities for research needs.
In the future, these officials said, portfolio managers will team with
staff from the Science and Technology Directorate's Office of Research
and Development, HSARPA, and Office of System Engineering and
Development to identify research needs, determine priorities, and help
decide where the appropriate expertise resides to develop each
technology--that is, within DOE's laboratories, companies, or academia.
Within each research portfolio, a team will analyze current threats
using information from intelligence assessments, identify gaps in
available technology, and consider how DHS can take advantage of the
R&D efforts of other federal agencies. The Science and Technology
Directorate's senior management will ultimately set priorities for R&D
needs across research portfolios and make final funding decisions.
Table 2: DHS R&D Funding Distribution, Fiscal Years 2003-2005:
Dollars in millions.
Research portfolio: Biological countermeasures;
2003: $362.6;
2004: $285.0;
2005 (requested): $407.0.
Research portfolio: Radiological and nuclear countermeasures;
2003: $75.0;
2004: $126.3;
2005 (requested): $129.3.
Research portfolio: Chemical countermeasures;
2003: $7.0;
2004: $52.0;
2005 (requested): $53.0.
Research portfolio: High explosives countermeasures;
2003: $0.0;
2004: $9.5;
2005 (requested): $9.7.
Research portfolio: Threat and vulnerability testing and assessment;
2003: $36.1;
2004: $100.1;
2005 (requested): $101.9.
Research portfolio: Rapid prototyping;
2003: $33.0;
2004: $73.0;
2005 (requested): $76.0.
Research portfolio: Standards;
2003: $20.0;
2004: $39.0;
2005 (requested): $39.7.
Research portfolio: Emerging threats;
2003: $16.8;
2004: $21.0;
2005 (requested): $21.0.
Research portfolio: R&D conducted for DHS operational units (e.g.,
Coast Guard, Secret Service);
2003: $0.0;
2004: $34.0;
2005 (requested): $34.0.
Research portfolio: Counter portable anti-aircraft missiles;
2003: $0.0;
2004: $60.0;
2005 (requested): $61.0.
Research portfolio: University and fellowship programs;
2003: $3.0;
2004: $68.8;
2005 (requested): $30.0.
Research portfolio: R&D consolidation transferred funds[A];
2003: $0.0;
2004: $0.0;
2005 (requested): $24.1.
Total;
2003: $553.5;
2004: $868.7;
2005 (requested): $986.7.
Source: GAO presentation of DHS data.
[A] As a result of a requirement in the fiscal year 2004 homeland
security appropriations act, DHS's fiscal year 2005 budget request
transfers $24.1 million from R&D activities conducted by other DHS
entities, such as the Coast Guard, and consolidates these R&D
activities within the Science and Technology Directorate.
Notes: In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, DHS spent $44.2
million and $52.6 million, respectively, on employee salaries and
overhead expenses.
This table is presented for background purposes only; therefore, we did
not assess the reliability of these data.
[End of table]
DHS Has Coordinated Its R&D with Other Federal Agencies, but Gaps
Remain:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to coordinate its
research efforts with other federal agencies conducting homeland
security R&D. DHS has coordinated with some interagency groups,
including the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee
for Counterterrorism and National Preparedness. DHS also cochairs a
standing committee on Homeland and National Security in the White
House's Office of Science and Technology Policy. This committee
identifies key areas requiring interagency coordination in the
formulation of R&D agendas. DHS has also worked with the Technical
Support Working Group--an interagency working group of representatives
from over 80 federal agencies that is jointly overseen by the
departments of State and Defense. The Technical Support Working Group's
mission is to facilitate interagency R&D for combating terrorism,
primarily through rapid research, development, and prototyping. The
Technical Support Working Group managed DHS's initial round of
solicitations to private and academic researchers seeking proposals for
chemical, biological, and radiological countermeasures.
DHS has also coordinated some of its R&D projects with other federal
agencies. For example, DHS is now responsible for BioWatch, a federal
program that monitors about 30 major cities for chemical and biological
threats. BioWatch is executed jointly by DHS, DOE's laboratories, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. According to DHS officials, DHS has also coordinated
with the Department of Defense on BioNet, a federal program that links
U.S. military installations with local communities in efforts to detect
and respond to the use of biological agents. DOE and DHS have signed a
memorandum of agreement that provides a framework for DHS to access the
capabilities of DOE's laboratories and establishes policies for
resolving conflicts over research priorities. DHS officials also noted
that the Science and Technology Directorate has a liaison to DOE who
worked for DOE and NNSA for over 20 years and is familiar with their
programs.
Although coordination has occurred, gaps remain. The relationship
between DHS and NNSA illustrates the potential gaps in coordination.
NNSA officials provided DHS with copies of the fiscal year 2004 project
proposals it received from DOE's laboratories to develop radiological
and nuclear countermeasures. However, DHS officials did not provide
NNSA with any feedback on these proposals, and it is unclear how they
used this information during their own processes for reviewing and
funding research proposals. Moreover, DHS officials awarded fiscal year
2003 and 2004 funding to DOE's laboratories without taking similar
steps to coordinate and share proposal information with NNSA officials.
Senior DHS officials told us that early efforts to coordinate and share
information with NNSA were constrained because they had limited time
after the department's organization in March 2003 in which to make
project funding decisions. According to NNSA and DHS officials,
although DHS's mission focuses on counterterrorism and NNSA
concentrates more on nonproliferation, it is important that the two
agencies collaborate and share information. Because both agencies may
rely on the same capabilities of DOE's laboratories to conduct similar
work, especially on radiological and nuclear countermeasures, the
agencies need a stronger partnership in order to leverage resources and
minimize the potential for duplication of research efforts. In a May
12, 2004, letter commenting on our draft report, DHS noted that DHS and
NNSA staff have had numerous meetings to discuss joint interests in
various R&D topics and that NNSA staff participated in a meeting on
DHS's fiscal year 2004 radiological and nuclear countermeasures
program.
DHS still needs to establish formal partnerships with other federal
agencies that conduct homeland security R&D, and DHS officials
acknowledge the importance of coordinating and developing partnerships
with these federal agencies, as well. For example, DHS officials told
us that they will need to communicate with the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, which
will conduct basic research on biological agents in order to develop
biological countermeasures. In its May 2004 letter to us, DHS stated
that DHS biological countermeasures officials are coordinating with
HHS's Office of Emergency Preparedness. Other R&D projects conducted by
the Department of Defense--especially by the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency--to develop
biological and chemical countermeasures and force protection
technologies may also be applicable to DHS's efforts. In its May 2004
comments on our draft report, DHS noted that the Science and Technology
Directorate works closely with the Department of Defense and other
federal agencies to coordinate biodefense research efforts and critical
biocontainment laboratory infrastructure at the National Interagency
Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland.
DHS Faces Challenges Using DOE's Laboratories:
DHS's research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE
laboratories. At the time of our review, the remaining DOE laboratories
were to receive DHS R&D funding primarily through competition with
companies and academia. According to officials from some of DOE's
laboratories, the relationship between their laboratory and DHS has
been strained because of inadequate communication and the lack of clear
and well-defined criteria for designating the five DOE laboratories
that have received the majority of DHS's R&D funding. DHS also faces
the challenge of balancing the immediate needs of users of homeland
security technologies with the need to conduct R&D on advanced
technologies for the future. DHS intends to focus much of its R&D
efforts on short-term, applied research projects, although some funds
will be dedicated to long-term advanced concepts research. Some
laboratory officials believe that if DHS focuses on short-term, applied
research, their laboratories' long-term ability to attract and retain
top scientific talent, build and maintain laboratory facilities, and
develop effective technologies may be jeopardized.
DHS's Intramural R&D Efforts Are Concentrated at Five DOE National
Laboratories:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 allows DHS to use any of DOE's
laboratories; DHS's R&D program has focused on funding homeland
security R&D projects at five "intramural" DOE laboratories: Los
Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge
National Laboratories. The intramural program is designed to draw upon
the resources of the federal government to conduct work that is
inherently the federal government's responsibility. Such work includes
threat characterization and analysis using classified intelligence
information and R&D work using special nuclear materials such as
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In these areas of inherent
federal responsibility, the private sector lacks the interest or
capability to perform certain R&D tasks.
The five intramural laboratories received over 96 percent of the $57
million DHS invested in homeland security research at DOE's
laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90 percent of
the $201 million for fiscal year 2004. (See table 3.):
Table 3: DHS R&D Funding Distribution to DOE's Laboratories, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
DOE laboratory: Argonne National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: $1,324,185;
Fiscal year 2004: $2,000,000.
DOE laboratory: Brookhaven National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 400,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 1,400,000.
DOE laboratory: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 0;
Fiscal year 2004: 1,750,000.
DOE laboratory: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 0;
Fiscal year 2004: 2,300,000.
DOE laboratory: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 18,300,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 89,500,000.
DOE laboratory: Los Alamos National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 17,100,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 35,200,000.
DOE laboratory: Oak Ridge National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 13,100,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 6,900,000.
DOE laboratory: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory;
Fiscal year 2003: 2,300,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 12,200,000.
DOE laboratory: Remote Sensing Laboratory (Bechtel Nevada);
Fiscal year 2003: 0;
Fiscal year 2004: 13,000,000.
DOE laboratory: Sandia National Laboratories;
Fiscal year 2003: 4,900,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 36,400,000.
DOE laboratory: Savannah River Technology Center;
Fiscal year 2003: 200,000;
Fiscal year 2004: 500,000.
DOE laboratory: Total;
Fiscal year 2003: $57,624,175;
Fiscal year 2004: $201,150,000.
Source: GAO presentation of DHS data.
Note: Total for fiscal year 2004 based on $233,300,000 available. As of
February 10, 2004, $32,200,000 had not been obligated to any
laboratory.
[End of table]
The Office of Research and Development is responsible for managing
DHS's intramural program and will coordinate all work that DHS conducts
at DOE's laboratories. DHS officials told us that, in the future, R&D
with the intramural laboratories would be primarily focused on
scientific-based threat and vulnerability characterizations, in
addition to analysis and design of integrated technology systems. For
example, intramural laboratories may conduct R&D on tools to assist the
intelligence community develop and identify information on emerging
threats. An intramural laboratory may also help identify gaps in
current detection and response technologies and provide information
that DHS and other agencies can incorporate into their R&D programs.
DHS officials told us that they also intend to use the intramural
laboratories as technical advisers to assist with internal strategic
planning and program development. As a result, intramural laboratories
will have access to, and may help shape, internal DHS planning
documents. In an effort to guard against organizational conflicts of
interest and inappropriate use of insider information, the intramural
laboratories will be prohibited from responding to any competitive
solicitations that DHS may sponsor.
DHS designed its extramural program primarily to capitalize on the
strengths of the nonfederal sector. HSARPA and the Office of System
Engineering and Development will manage DHS's extramural R&D efforts
through competitive solicitations. DHS's original plans called for the
remaining DOE laboratories to compete with companies and academia for
contracts under DHS's extramural R&D program. However, federal
acquisition regulations generally prohibit federally funded research
and development centers, such as DOE's laboratories, from competing
with the private sector for federal contracts. According to DOE
laboratory officials, when DHS decided to include some DOE laboratories
in its extramural program, it initially did not provide guidance to the
laboratories that detailed the restrictions on them competing with the
private sector for DHS R&D contracts. However, in a March 2004 letter
to DOE's laboratories, DHS stated that federal acquisition regulations
prohibiting DOE laboratories from competing with companies and academia
will apply to DHS's extramural program. Accordingly, DOE laboratories
are not permitted to directly respond to or participate as a team
member in response to a request for proposals.
Nonetheless, DHS noted that the laboratories will have opportunities to
participate in its R&D efforts. In its March 2004 letter, DHS stated
that federal regulations do allow DOE laboratories to respond to
certain kinds of R&D solicitations--known as broad agency
announcements. Under federal acquisition regulations, agencies may use
broad agency announcements to fulfill their requirements for scientific
study and experimentation directed toward advancing the state of the
art or increasing knowledge, rather than focusing on a specific system
or hardware solution to a particular need. DHS officials told us that
the majority of solicitations through the extramural program would be
conducted through broad agency announcements, thereby allowing DOE and
other federal laboratories to participate. DOE's laboratories, as well
as other federal laboratories, companies, and academia typically
respond to broad agency announcements with "white papers" that detail a
specific research proposal. DHS would then competitively evaluate these
white papers and determine whether DOE's laboratory, a company, or
academia best fulfills a specific R&D need.
Some extramural DOE laboratory officials we spoke with expressed
concern with DHS's decision to split DOE's laboratories into intramural
and extramural groups. Extramural DOE laboratory officials warned that
their laboratories may not be able to maintain certain research
capabilities that could contribute to homeland security R&D if they
could not receive intramural funding. In addition, the officials were
concerned that competition with the private sector could result in
their laboratories receiving limited homeland security R&D funding.
Laboratory officials also said that their particular laboratories
should have been included in the intramural program because of their
unique capabilities and history of successfully developing national
security technologies that could be applied to DHS's missions.
Moreover, DHS failed to provide them with any well-defined criteria
that it used to determine which laboratories would participate in the
intramural program. Laboratory officials questioned whether DHS
officials' decisions were influenced by personnel temporarily detailed
from DOE's laboratories, pointing out that the laboratories that sent
most of the personnel temporarily detailed to the Science and
Technology Directorate during DHS's initial organization were the same
laboratories that were later selected to participate in the intramural
program.
DHS officials we spoke with disagreed with these views, stating that
the presence of employees from certain laboratories had no bearing on
the selection of those laboratories for the intramural program.
Instead, decisions regarding which laboratories would become part of
the intramural program were made based on DHS's understanding of each
DOE laboratory's core competencies and the laboratory's ability to help
meet the intramural program's mission requirements. DHS officials told
us that they also considered R&D project proposals that a number of DOE
laboratories submitted based on the laboratories' initial understanding
of DHS's needs and program requirements. DHS officials added that the
decision to split DOE's laboratories into intramural and extramural
groups was a natural choice, given the relative capabilities and
expertise of some laboratories over others. Finally, DHS officials told
us that the extramural laboratories may receive direct funding for
certain tasks or projects if DHS determines that the laboratory has a
critical or unique expertise or capability that fulfills a specific R&D
need. For example, Brookhaven National Laboratory received $1.4 million
from DHS in fiscal year 2004 primarily for R&D on radiological and
nuclear countermeasures even though it is an extramural laboratory.
In letters to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Members of Congress
from Idaho and New York--states where two extramural laboratories
(Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Brookhaven
National Laboratory) are located--expressed concern that DHS's plan to
exclude these laboratories from its intramural R&D activities would not
effectively use each of the laboratories' particular capabilities in
developing homeland security technologies. In response to the these
concerns, DHS's Under Secretary for Science and Technology indicated in
a March 4, 2004, letter to a Member of Congress that DHS would allow
each DOE laboratory to choose whether it wished to be designated as an
intramural or extramural laboratory. In addition, DHS would conduct an
internal and external review of its policies for working with DOE's
laboratories. DHS recently conducted, in conjunction with DOE, an
internal review of these policies. Additionally, the newly created
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, consisting
of experts in homeland security issues, is assessing these policies. At
the time of our review, it was unclear to what extent these reviews
would affect DHS's policies for using DOE's laboratories and whether
any of DOE's laboratories would choose to change their designation as
an intramural or an extramural laboratory.
Some Laboratory Officials Believe that a Focus on Short-Term, Applied
Research May Threaten the Development of Technologies Over the Long
Term:
To effectively use DOE's laboratories, DHS has to balance the immediate
needs of users of homeland security technologies with the future needs
for advanced technologies. DHS officials acknowledged that their
initial efforts have focused on near-term applied R&D and helping
homeland security end users (e.g., state and local first responders and
federal agencies such as the Coast Guard) receive existing technologies
in a timely manner. DHS has directed most of its support for long-term
R&D through investments in university programs and fellowships to
university students to increase their interest in pursuing careers in
homeland security R&D. According to senior DHS officials, much of the
Science and Technology Directorate's funding for homeland security R&D
will be channeled through HSARPA and the Office of System Engineering
and Development. Both of these offices intend to focus their efforts on
short-term applied R&D and testing and evaluation of technologies.
HSARPA plans to spend up to 10 percent of its R&D funds supporting
revolutionary advanced concepts research devoted to developing
breakthrough homeland security technologies, with the rest of its
funding dedicated to developing prototypes of homeland security
technologies with a 6-month to 2-year development horizon. The Office
of Research and Development will conduct both short-and long-term R&D
under its intramural program. However, even long-term projects will be
required to provide short-and medium-term status reports that can be
used to assess a project's progress.
DOE laboratory officials pointed out that, traditionally, DOE's
laboratories have specialized in higher risk, longer-term work. They
were concerned that DHS is focusing on a short-to medium-term
development schedule, which some of DOE's laboratories are not
accustomed to. Some laboratories, especially those in DHS's extramural
program, which will work primarily with HSARPA, may find it challenging
to meet these shorter time frames for R&D.
Some laboratory officials are also concerned with what they believe is
DHS's focus on short-term applied research. These officials believe
that a short-term focus may threaten their long-term ability to attract
and retain top scientific talent, build and maintain laboratory
facilities, and develop effective homeland security technologies. These
officials said that as DHS implements its R&D strategy, it must
recognize the need to make long-term investments at DOE's laboratories.
Furthermore, many of their laboratories' past successes in developing
technologies in the short term have relied upon substantial investments
in facilities, personnel, and advanced concepts research over the long
term. These officials pointed out that reaching a scientific
breakthrough has often required many years of funding to develop, test,
and refine technologies. In addition, their success in attracting top
scientific talent has depended on their laboratory's ability to provide
for job sustainability, sufficient research resources, sophisticated
research facilities, and opportunities to do ground-breaking science
over the long term. They are therefore concerned that if DHS is
focusing on short-term research, this could jeopardize their ability to
create an attractive work environment for recruiting and retaining top
talent to work on homeland security R&D. Some laboratory officials
pointed out that it is expensive to maintain facilities to conduct
homeland security R&D, especially for chemical countermeasures. They
warned that without adequate investment from DHS, their laboratories
may need to focus on other activities and perform work for other
agencies in order to support their laboratory capabilities and
personnel, perhaps reducing the personnel and facilities available for
DHS R&D projects.
DHS officials agreed that it is necessary to make long-term investments
in certain laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring R&D
complex for federal homeland security. Officials from the Office of
Research and Development told us that they intend to use up to 20
percent of their intramural program funds to make long-term investments
at DOE and other federal laboratories. Through targeted investments in
personnel and research facilities, they hope to create an intellectual
base dedicated to homeland security R&D that the nation can depend
upon. DHS recently created the Office of Enduring Stewardship within
the Science and Technology Directorate to consider DHS's long-term
investments throughout DOE's laboratory complex. According to DHS
officials, this office will help determine which capabilities at DOE's
laboratories will require long-term stewardship from DHS.
DHS Is Making Progress in Developing Controls to Manage Its Research
Efforts at DOE's Laboratories:
To determine whether a project's goals are being met and resources are
being used effectively and efficiently, standards for internal control
in the federal government require that program managers have access to
relevant, reliable, and timely operational and financial data. For
example, managers need (1) operational data to determine whether an
agency is in compliance with various laws and regulations and (2)
financial information to develop financial statements for periodic
external reporting, and, on a day-to-day basis, to make operating
decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. Internal
control standards require such operational and financial information to
be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that
permits staff to perform their duties efficiently.
In this context, DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is developing
management tools to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables
for its R&D projects. Using standards developed by the Project
Management Institute,[Footnote 6] DHS's objectives for these project
management tools are to, among other things,
* inform DHS managers and other stakeholders of the status of R&D
projects during their execution;
* provide a standard, regular channel of communications between DHS and
researchers in such a way as to establish trust and transparency
between them;
* facilitate DHS's and researchers' ability to anticipate and manage
change;
* contribute to DHS's assessment of the overall performance of
researchers; and:
* serve as a formal mechanism to ensure effective and efficient use of
taxpayer funds.
Each laboratory conducting R&D for DHS will complete a monthly report
for each research portfolio in which it is engaged. For example, a
laboratory conducting research in the research portfolios for both
nuclear and radiological and chemical countermeasures would produce two
separate monthly reports. In addition, an overall report for all of a
laboratory's efforts will be produced. DHS is providing funding to
organize Centers for Homeland Security that will house administrative
support personnel at DOE's laboratories to help researchers track their
projects.
The monthly reports are to contain summary information on a project's
costs, schedule, and scope. While the exact form this summary
information will take is still being developed, DHS officials told us
that one way the information could be portrayed is as a red/yellow/
green traffic light for cost, schedule, and scope status. For example,
costs would be portrayed as (1) green, if the laboratory's estimate of
the project's total cost is less than or equal to the project's total
budget, (2) yellow, if the laboratory's estimate of the project's total
cost is greater than the project's budget and a corrective action plan
has been approved and implemented, and (3) red, if the project's
estimated total cost is greater than its budget and no corrective
action plan has been approved. Similar status designations would be
made for project schedule and scope.
Quantitative performance metrics are also being developed in a number
of areas and will be used in reports to track differences between the
budgeted and actual costs of the R&D work performed and will measure
schedule variances. In addition, the reports are to describe (1) the
reasons for cost, schedule, and/or scope variances and any corrective
actions underway; (2) important accomplishments during the reporting
period; and (3) issues that could affect the execution of a project.
DHS plans to conduct regular merit reviews on a portfolio-by-portfolio
basis--initially twice a year and eventually once a year. For each
review, DHS will charter a panel that will include the cognizant
portfolio manager as well as others, such as members of the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee that was created by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. These review panels will assess how
the technical approach being followed by R&D projects matches the
research portfolio's requirements, the projects' progress to date, and
remaining risk and ways of mitigating any identified risk.
Conclusions:
The creation of DHS represents the largest reorganization of the
federal government in more than 50 years. While we acknowledge DHS
officials' concerns that they have had limited time since the
department's initial organization in March 2003, it is important for
DHS to complete its strategic plan and identify and set priorities for
its R&D efforts as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The
act also requires that DHS coordinate the federal government's homeland
security R&D efforts. More effective integration of research efforts
between DHS, NNSA, and other agencies during DHS's strategic planning
and its annual selection and setting of priorities for R&D projects
could increase opportunities to leverage research efforts and identify
gaps in the federal government's efforts to develop appropriate
homeland security technologies. Effective integration is especially
important for chemical and biological countermeasures, where DHS will
depend upon basic research conducted by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and others.
Effective coordination between DHS and DOE is all the more critical
because the departments must share the capabilities of the extensive
DOE laboratory complex equally, and their mechanism for resolving
priority conflicts at the laboratories has yet to be tested.
We are concerned that DHS's approach to funding R&D efforts may hinder
its ability to use the full capabilities of the entire DOE laboratory
system. Although DHS's decision to target its long-term investments
towards a limited group of DOE laboratories has been explained as a
strategic decision to maximize limited resources, we believe that
annual project funding decisions and long-term investments in
laboratory capabilities should be based on using and supporting the
best science available. These funding decisions should be made using
well-defined criteria that are clearly communicated to every potential
contributor. In addition, while DHS has made clear that DOE's
laboratories are allowed to compete for funding with private and
academic researchers under specific circumstances, the laboratories may
need additional guidance that details how they can comply with federal
acquisition regulations and other restrictions that generally prohibit
competition between federal and private research entities. We are
encouraged by DHS's March 2004 decision to review its policies for
working with DOE's laboratories, but the extent to which these reviews
will affect DHS's R&D activities remains unclear.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that DHS appropriately integrates its R&D of homeland
security technologies with complementary R&D efforts conducted across
the federal government and that the extensive capabilities of DOE's
laboratories can be brought to bear on the R&D of nuclear, biological,
and chemical countermeasures, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
to take the following four actions:
* Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, complete a
strategic R&D plan that identifies priorities, goals, and objectives to
identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats.
* Ensure that this strategic plan is integrated with homeland security
R&D efforts conducted by other federal agencies, such as NNSA, HHS, and
the Department of Defense. This integrated strategic plan should detail
how DHS will work with these agencies to establish governmentwide
priorities, identify research gaps, avoid duplication of effort, and
leverage resources.
* Develop and communicate to DOE's laboratories and other potential
contributors to homeland security R&D efforts well-defined criteria for
distributing annual project funding and for making long-term
investments in laboratory capabilities for homeland security R&D.
* Develop, in cooperation with DOE, specific guidelines that detail the
circumstances under which DOE laboratories and other federal R&D
programs would compete for contracts with private sector and academic
entities. These guidelines should describe the criteria used to select
proposals, detail the method of evaluation, and contain procedures
DOE's laboratories should use to ensure compliance with federal
acquisition regulations and statutory requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided NNSA, the Department of Defense, and DHS with draft copies
of this report for their review and comment. DHS's written comments are
presented as appendix III. NNSA had no comments on the draft report,
but noted that NNSA is in contact with DHS to assist it in its
coordination efforts related to the use of DOE's laboratories. NNSA's
letter is presented as appendix IV. The Department of Defense had no
comments on the draft report.
DHS agreed with our recommendation to create a strategic R&D plan and
noted that such a plan is critical to the success of the department.
DHS stated that its Science and Technology Directorate has launched a
formal, structured strategic planning process that will determine
specific goals for the next 5 years, threats and vulnerabilities, and a
list of prioritized deliverables for fiscal year 2005 through fiscal
year 2010. DHS stated that it expected this plan to be completed in the
early summer of 2004 and that the plan will be reviewed and updated
annually.
DHS did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendation that
this plan be integrated with homeland security R&D conducted by other
agencies. However, DHS did provide information on the ongoing
development of a national plan for homeland security science and
technology by the Homeland Security Council, the National Security
Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and DHS.
According to DHS, this national plan will highlight the high-priority
areas for homeland security in the short-, mid-, and long-term, as well
as lay out the roles and responsibilities for each federal department
and agency with homeland security R&D programs. DHS also provided
additional information on its interactions with NNSA, HHS, and the
Department of Defense that we incorporated into the report as
appropriate. We are encouraged that DHS is taking steps to work with
other federal agencies and interagency groups to develop an integrated
national plan for homeland security R&D.
DHS also provided information on its strategic planning for long-term
investments in DOE's laboratories. For example, as was stated in our
draft report, DHS noted that it requested that the newly formed
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee review
DHS's policies for using DOE's laboratories and make recommendations on
the most effective long-term policy. However, DHS did not respond
directly to our recommendation that DHS should develop and communicate
to DOE's laboratories well-defined criteria for distributing annual
project funding. We continue to believe that communicating the criteria
that will be used to make funding decisions to DOE's laboratories and
other potential contributors to homeland security R&D efforts would
assist them in developing proposals that would best meet DHS's
requirements.
Finally, DHS did not agree or disagree with our recommendation to
develop guidelines that detail how DOE's laboratories would compete for
contracts with private sector and academic entities. As our draft
report stated, DHS noted that it asked each laboratory to decide
whether to participate in the Science and Technology Directorate's
strategic planning and program development processes as an intramural
laboratory or to respond to broad agency announcements open to the
private sector as an extramural laboratory. According to DHS, Argonne
National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and
Sandia National Laboratories have since decided to participate in DHS
R&D activities as intramural laboratories. DHS stated in its comments
that current regulations cover inclusion of the remaining DOE
laboratories and other federal laboratories in normal solicitation
processes. We agree with DHS, and our draft report stated, that federal
acquisition regulations permit DOE and other federal laboratories to
respond to broad agency announcements. However, laboratory officials
told us throughout our review that they have little experience
responding to these types of solicitations. Therefore, we continue to
believe that specific guidelines detailing how the laboratories should
respond to DHS's broad agency announcements would help ensure that
regulatory requirements governing competition between federal
laboratories and private sector researchers are met.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Energy; the
Administrator, NNSA; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report were Ryan
T. Coles, Jonathan G. Nash, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Ann M. Ulrich.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project Management Controls:
This appendix discusses changes the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development Program has made to the controls it uses to monitor project
milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D conducted at the Department
of Energy's (DOE) laboratories since our August 2002 report.[Footnote
7]
The mission of NNSA's program is to conduct needs-driven research,
development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are
intended to strengthen the United States' ability to detect and analyze
the global spread of nuclear weapons and technology. DOE's laboratories
carry out most of the program's research, while officials at NNSA's
headquarters and operations offices provide general oversight and
contracting support and serve as liaisons to users of the technologies
developed. The program manages R&D of space-and ground-based remote
sensing and other technologies used by defense and intelligence
agencies to verify and monitor arms control treaties.
The program is currently divided into two specific research areas:
* Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Develops and manufactures ground-and
satellite-based sensors and computer software for detecting, locating,
identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions when they occur
underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space.
* Proliferation Detection. Develops, demonstrates, and delivers long-
and short-range sensor technologies to detect the spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies
worldwide.
NNSA and its R&D program are key players in the United States'
nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its
unique understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and
nuclear power, based in large measure on the world-class research,
design, and engineering capabilities found at DOE's laboratories. Some
examples of successful research projects conducted by NNSA's
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program include:
* The development of ground-based technology for detecting in real time
short-lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and
satellite-based sensors that are sensitive to x-ray, gamma-ray, and
neutron emissions.
* Detection equipment that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over
the World Trade Center site following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals.
* A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of
congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and equipment
to detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, D.C.,
Metro subway system.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the chemical and
biological R&D work of NNSA's program to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), along with some of NNSA's counter-nuclear smuggling
R&D.
To monitor the progress of NNSA R&D projects by headquarters program
managers, participating laboratories are required to submit, on an
annual basis, project life-cycle plans. These plans are to contain
detailed statements of work that describe the project's contributions
to overall program goals, scientific and technical merit, and the
specific tasks to be accomplished. In addition, laboratories are
required to submit quarterly reports that indicate all projects'
progress to date, issues and problems encountered, milestones and
schedules, and cost data. However, we reported in August 2002 that
plans and reports were often missing these data, and the program
management information system used by the program was not designed to
track whether projects are on time or within budget, eliminating an
important tool that could be used to track projects, improve
communications across the program, and provide transparency to other
agencies and to the Congress.
Since our August 2002 report, NNSA has improved the controls it uses to
provide the operational and financial data that its managers use to
monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. The program has
implemented a Web-based project management information system that is
designed to contain the information needed for proposal evaluation,
budget planning, funding decisions, preparation of work authorizations,
responses to congressional inquiries, and other reports on the status
and costs of R&D projects managed by the program. In addition, the
program has emphasized the importance of performance metrics and the
use of the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART). PART is a series of diagnostic questions designed to
provide a consistent approach to rating federal programs. Drawing upon
available performance and evaluation information, the PART
questionnaire attempts to determine the strengths and weaknesses of
federal programs with a particular focus on individual program results.
PART asks, for example, whether a program's long-term goals are
specific, ambitious, and focused on outcomes, and whether annual goals
demonstrate progress toward achieving long-term goals.[Footnote 8]
NNSA's R&D program is also making increased use of project reviews.
Program managers and potential users of technologies developed by the
program conduct regular reviews of each project before key decisions
are made, such as whether to proceed from exploratory research into
product development. The reviews examine how well the project is linked
to user needs, the strength of the researchers' scientific or technical
approach, and the researchers' ability to carry out the project
effectively and efficiently. The reviews also involve outside experts
from the academic or private sector communities with a strong relevant
science background.
DOE is in the process of developing a departmentwide project management
system called the E-Government Corporate R&D Electronic Portfolio
Management Environment. This system will, according to DOE, consolidate
information currently contained in a myriad of existing program
management systems and provide critical project proposal, fund
distribution, and performance data to track research projects from
proposal submission to project closeout. By the end of fiscal year
2004, DOE plans to deploy a module of the project management system
that will allow DOE's laboratories to electronically submit proposals
for new and ongoing R&D. This module will also give DOE managers the
ability to receive, review, and respond to those proposals
electronically. The remaining module of the project management system
that will provide for, among other things, electronic merit reviews;
project tracking and reporting; and program planning, analysis, and
evaluation is scheduled to be deployed by the end of fiscal year 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines (1) whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan
and coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting
homeland security R&D; (2) how DHS plans to use DOE's laboratories to
carry out its responsibilities for R&D on nuclear, biological, and
chemical detection and response technologies; and (3) what controls DHS
is establishing to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables
for R&D conducted at DOE's laboratories. In addition, we report on how
NNSA's Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
program has changed its project management controls since our August
2002 report.[Footnote 9]
To determine whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan and
coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting homeland
security R&D, we interviewed officials from DHS, DOE, and NNSA. We also
received written responses to questions provided to the Office of
Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President.
Because DHS was undergoing its initial organization at the time of our
review, and documented plans, policies, and procedures were still being
developed, our examination of DHS's strategic planning and coordination
activities focused on interviews with agency officials and reviewing
DHS's preliminary planning documents. When officials provided their
views and opinions on various issues as representatives for their
agencies, we attempted to corroborate the information with other agency
officials. In addition, we considered testimony and statements made by
several senior DHS officials during congressional hearings on the
status of DHS's R&D programs. We reviewed the relevant sections of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 that established the responsibilities of
the Directorate of Science and Technology. To better understand DHS's
relationship with DOE, we reviewed a memorandum of agreement between
the two agencies and other documentation that governs DHS's access to
DOE's laboratories. We also interviewed Department of State officials
overseeing the Technology Support Working Group to better understand
DHS's relationship and coordination with this interagency group.
To determine how DHS plans to use DOE's laboratories, we obtained R&D
proposal guidance that DHS provided to DOE's laboratories and the
criteria that DHS used to review these proposals. We also obtained the
results of a DHS-sponsored peer review of DOE laboratory proposals. We
reviewed federal acquisition regulations and statutory requirements
governing the operation of DOE's laboratories to determine the
laboratories' ability to engage in openly competitive solicitations
with companies and academia. We collected and analyzed documents and
correspondence between Science and Technology Directorate officials and
DOE's laboratories that detailed DHS's plans for using DOE's
laboratories. Additionally, we obtained correspondence between Members
of Congress and senior DHS staff concerning the DHS use of DOE's
laboratories. We examined budget information for the Science and
Technology Directorate's R&D portfolios for fiscal years 2003 and 2004
and its budget request for fiscal year 2005. Additionally, we analyzed
the amount of funding each DOE laboratory received from DHS for fiscal
years 2003 and 2004. To assess the reliability of the budgetary
information used in this report, we obtained responses from key DHS
database officials to a series of questions focused on data
reliability, covering issues such as data entry access, internal
control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We
added follow-up questions whenever necessary. We also corroborated the
budgetary data with other sources, such as congressional testimony from
DHS officials, whenever possible. We found no discrepancies with the
data DHS provided. Based on our work, we determined that these data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To obtain the views of DOE's laboratories on DHS's plans, we conducted
focus groups with program managers and individual project researchers
at seven DOE laboratories. We selected five DOE laboratories--Sandia,
Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge
National Laboratories--because they received the majority of all
funding DHS distributed to DOE laboratories and were designated by DHS
to participate in its intramural program. We selected the remaining two
laboratories--Argonne and Brookhaven National Laboratories--because
they also conduct homeland security R&D for DHS, NNSA, or other federal
agencies and, at the time of our review, were designated by DHS to
participate in its extramural program. For the focus groups with the
program managers, we selected laboratory officials responsible for
overseeing R&D on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
countermeasures for NNSA, DHS, and other agencies. We relied upon
laboratory directors and program managers to help identify appropriate
individuals to participate in our focus groups with researchers. Those
selected to participate in the focus groups tended to be senior
principal project investigators responsible for developing homeland
security and nonproliferation technologies at their laboratories.
During each focus group, we asked targeted questions in order to
generate discussion on various issues related to this review, including
questions on the laboratory proposal development processes, the means
of obtaining user input to the R&D process, short-term versus long-term
research, and researchers' views on appropriate levels of monitoring/
oversight/coordination between the laboratories, DHS, and NNSA. In
order to solicit open and candid responses to our questions, we
conducted the focus groups for the researchers separately from the
focus groups with the program managers. More than 90 individuals
participated in these focus groups.
To determine what controls DHS is establishing to monitor project
milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D, we examined documents that
outline DHS's plans to oversee R&D conducted at DOE's laboratories. We
compared these plans to standards laid out in GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government ([Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21], November 1999). We
analyzed DHS's guidelines for developing R&D execution plans and
related documentation on DHS's proposed use of quantitative performance
metrics and merit reviews. To determine how NNSA's program has changed
its project management controls since our August 2002 report, we
interviewed NNSA officials and examined various polices, procedures,
and documents related to NNSA's project management systems. We
considered how NNSA has incorporated the use of performance metrics and
the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool.
In addition, we examined NNSA's plans to use DOE's departmentwide
project management system--the E-Government Corporate R&D Electronic
Portfolio Management Environment.
We conducted our review from August 2003 through April 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
NOTE: The Department of Homeland Security responded to this report with
an incomplete comment letter. They have not responded to date with a
complete comment letter. At least two pages are missing from the
following letter.
Homeland Security:
May 12, 2004:
Mr. Norman J. Rabkin:
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Rabkin:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) draft
report entitled "DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for
Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response
Technologies," GAO-04-653, May 2004, a report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate.
The GAO was asked to determine: (1) whether DHS has completed a
strategic research and development (R&D) plan and coordinated its
efforts with other Federal agencies; (2) how DHS plans to use DOE's
laboratories to carry out its R&D; and (3) what controls DHS is
establishing to monitor projects at DOE's laboratories. Based on its
review, conducted from August 2003 through April 2004, the GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security:
1) Complete a strategic R&D plan;
2) Ensure that this plan is integrated with homeland security R&D
conducted by other Federal agencies;
3) Develop criteria for distributing annual funding and for making
long-term investments in laboratory capabilities; and:
4) Develop guidelines that detail how DOE's laboratories would compete
for funding with private sector and academic entities.
The Department offers the following comments regarding these
recommendations.
(1) Complete a strategic R&D plan: The Department of Homeland Security
agrees that a strategic plan for research, development, testing and
evaluation (RDT&E) is critical to the success of the Department. Since
the initiation of the GAO's review, the Department's Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate has launched a formal, [MISSING PAGE]
requirements, national guidance, operational end-user needs, and the
subject matter expertise of the S&T Directorate's staff. The S&T
Directorate's strategic planning process determines mission space,
strategic goals for the next five years, threats and vulnerabilities,
and a list of prioritized deliverables for FY 2005 through FY 2010. The
output of this process, expected to be completed in early summer 2004,
will be used to guide RDT&E investment decisions for the next five
years. The strategic RDT&E plan will be reviewed and updated annually.
(2) Ensure that this plan is integrated with homeland security R&D
conducted by other Federal agencies: The Department of Homeland
Security, Science and Technology Directorate, covers a wide range of
homeland security-relevant research and development. The Department of
Homeland Security fully recognizes, however, that the S&T Directorate
does not and cannot cover every aspect of homeland security RDT&E. Many
organizations across the U.S. Government contribute to the science and
technology base needed to enhance the nation's capabilities to protect
itself, thwart terrorist acts and fully support the conventional
missions of the operational components of the Department. In the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress directed that "The Secretary,
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall
have the responsibility for ... developing, in consultation with other
appropriate executive agencies, a national policy and strategic plan
for, identifying priorities, goals, objectives and policies for, and
coordinating the Federal Government's civilian efforts to identify and
develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats, including the
development of comprehensive, research-based definable goals for such
efforts and development of annual measurable objectives and specific
targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals for such efforts.":
The development of this National Plan for Homeland Security Science and
Technology is currently underway under the auspices of the Homeland
Security Council (HSC), the National Security Council (NSC), the Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Department of Homeland
Security. This National Plan will highlight the high priority areas and
scientific innovations for homeland security in the short-, mid-and
long-term time periods as well as laying out the roles and
responsibilities for each Federal Department and agency with homeland
security-related RDT&E programs.
The National Plan for Homeland Security Science and Technology will
incorporate much of the strategic planning described in the preceding
paragraphs as well as significant interagency input. Numerous
interagency groups, including the Counterproliferation Technology
Coordinating Committee (CTCC) and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) National Science and Technology Council, have already
conducted gap analyses and strategic planning in some areas of homeland
security-related RDT&E across the U.S. Government. The National Plan,
which will ensure integration of DHS S&T programs with those of other
Departments and agencies, is scheduled to be completed by late summer
2004.
The Report specifically addresses gaps in DHS efforts to coordinate and
establish partnerships with the Department of Energy's (DOE's) National
Nuclear Security: [MISSING PAGE]
the Department of Defense (DoD). Interagency communication is fostered
in the working groups of both the Counterproliferation Technology
Coordinating Committee (CTCC) and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy's National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). S&T personnel
are active participants in several of these interagency working groups
and have begun to take leadership roles in these groups as appropriate.
In addition, DHS and DOE/NNSA staff members working in radiological/
nuclear countermeasures have met fourteen times between July 2003 and
May 2004 to discuss joint interests in various RDT&E topics. DOE/NNSA
staff participated in the DHS kick off meeting for the radiological/
nuclear countermeasures FY 2004 program. In coordination with the HHS
Office of Emergency Preparedness, DHS Biological Countermeasures
personnel have developed a material threat determination process to
support the HHS Bioshield program. DHS S&T Directorate works closely
with the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies to coordinate
biodefense research efforts and critical biocontainment laboratory
infrastructure at the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort
Detrick.
(3) Develop criteria for distributing annual funding and for making
long-term investments in laboratory facilities: Strategic planning in
the S&T Directorate is centered around Integrated Product Teams (IPTs),
which are made up of membership from each of the S&T Offices - Office
of Plans, Programs and Budgets (PPB); Office of Research and
Development (ORD); Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA); and the Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SED) -
with expertise in the particular program or portfolio. The membership
of each IPT works as a team to develop mission space, strategic goals,
and a prioritized list of deliverables. The members of the IPT work
together to determine which entities can best provide the required
RDT&E, National or Federal Laboratories, private industry or academia.
All funding awards are based on technical merit and relevance to the
DHS mission.
The Department of Homeland Security has also requested that the newly
formed Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) review the current policy for accessing the DOE National
Laboratory capabilities and make recommendations on the most effective
long term DHS policy. The policy that has evolved takes into
consideration potential conflict of interest issues, creating an
enduring long term Federal stewardship program where R&D facilities and
trained staff remain top priorities, and coordination of activities
occurs through the Department of Energy. DHS requests a broad,
unconstrained view of all potential options or models to access DOE
national laboratory scientists.
While the current DHS R&D focus is on near term technical solutions for
DHS high priority missions, DOE and DHS have recently formed an
interagency working group to discuss the long term basic science
research needs of both agencies. The DOE Office of Science will examine
its basic research programs that currently address DOE mission
requirements to determine whether any basic research already underway
might also be relevant to DHS long term needs. DHS/S&T will be
conducting an initial review in the
fourth quarter of FY 2004 of the DOE Laboratory Directed Research and
Development funding. These projects are funded in part by DHS, program
dollars and thus must support DHS mission requirements. Based on these
findings, S&T will set policy and criteria for long term investments in
laboratory capabilities.
(4) Develop guidelines that detail how DOE's laboratories would compete
for funding with private sector and academic entities: The Department
of Homeland Security, through Section 309 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, is provided access to the National Laboratories and sites
managed by the Department of Energy to carry out the missions of DHS.
All laboratories and sites are eligible to execute DHS mission-directed
projects through the Office of Research and Development consistent with
S&T mission requirements. All funds allocated to these entities are
performance-based. They will be reviewed annually to assess technical
competency, mission and user-relevancy, and management effectiveness.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the best
use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with statute,
regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a decision
regarding their desired mode of interaction with the Directorate - to
participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and program
development processes or, if otherwise permissible under applicable
law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to certain types
of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories communicated
their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate in S&T's
internal strategic planning and program development processes: Argonne
National Laboratory; Bechtel Nevada; Brookhaven National Laboratory;
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory; Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; Oak
Ridge National Laboratory; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and
the Sandia National Laboratories. A consequence communicated to the
national laboratory directors in advance of their decision is that, as
a result of such participation, a national laboratory will be
ineligible to participate in open solicitations to the private sector
for a period of three years after it ceases engagement in the S&T
strategic planning and program development processes.
The remaining Federal and National Laboratories and sites are able to
submit proposals to S&T solicitations that do not involve direct
competition amongst proposers. Current regulations cover inclusion of
these entities in the normal solicitation process.
We also have a suggested editorial change. For accuracy, the first full
sentence on the top of page 18 should read ". . . radiological and
nuclear countermeasures . . ." based on the mission of the Brookhaven
National Laboratory.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on the draft report "DHS
Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies," GAO-04-653, May 2004. If you have
questions or need clarification regarding our comments, please contact
Mr. Thomas Krones, (202) 401-5861, or e-mail: thomas.krones@a dhs.gov.
Signed for:
Anna F. Dixon:
Director, Bankcard Programs and GAO/OIG Liaison:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585:
MAY 06 2004:
Mr. Gene Aloise
Acting Director
Natural Resources and Environment
General Accounting Office
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to have reviewed the General Accounting Office's (GAO)
draft report, "HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies." We understand that GAO was asked
to determine whether DHS has completed a strategic Research and
Development plan and coordinated their efforts with other federal
agencies; how to utilize our laboratories; and, what controls are in
place to monitor projects at out laboratories.
NNSA has no comment regarding the report. However, we are in contact
with DHS to assist them in their coordination efforts related to the
use of our laboratories. We stand ready to assist DHS in achieving
their Research and Development goals.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Mr. Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management.
He may be contacted at 202-586-5009.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
[End of section]
(360376):
FOOTNOTES
[1] NNSA was created under Title 32 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 as a separately organized agency
within the Department of Energy. It is responsible for enhancing the
safety, reliability, and performance of the nation's nuclear weapons;
maintaining the nation's ability to design, produce, and test nuclear
weapons; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
and designing, building, and maintaining naval nuclear propulsion
systems.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's
Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-02-904 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
[3] In addition, the act transferred DOE's Environmental Measurements
Laboratory, the advanced scientific computing research program and
activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Bio-
Weapons Defense Analysis Center of the Department of Defense, and the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center of the Department of Agriculture to
DHS.
[4] Nine of DOE's laboratories are large, multiprogram national
laboratories that dominate DOE's science and technology activities. DOE
also manages several other, generally smaller, laboratories that
conduct specialized research in a particular program area or were
created to pursue a single issue.
[5] "Work for others" is the performance of work, on a reimbursable
basis, for non-DOE entities by a DOE facility and/or DOE or contractor
personnel. Work for others is intended, among other things, to provide
assistance to other federal agencies and nonfederal entities in
accomplishing goals that may otherwise be unattainable, to avoid the
possible duplication of effort at federal facilities, and to provide
access for non-DOE entities to highly specialized or unique DOE
technical expertise.
[6] See Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management
Body of Knowledge (Newtown Square, Pa.: 2000). This guide has been
approved by the American National Standards Institute.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's
Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-02-904 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
[8] For more information on PART, see U.S. General Accounting Office,
Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program
Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, GAO-04-174
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's
Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-02-904 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
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