Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are Uncertain Gao ID: GAO-04-1097T September 30, 2004Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management concerns persist despite the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as amended, which made states responsible for providing for disposal of class A, B, and C LLRW and made the Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for the disposal of greater-than-class C LLRW. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2004 report, which examined the adequacy of disposal availability for class A, B, and C wastes, and GAO's April 2003 report, which assessed recovery efforts involving greater-than-class-C waste. This testimony examines (1) changes in LLRW disposal availability since 1999, (2) recent LLRW disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the potential effects of any such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the Act in developing regional disposal options for class A, B, and C wastes, and (6) the status of DOE's effort to dispose of greater-than-class-C waste.
GAO's June 2004 report identified several changes since 1999 that have affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal oversight. Specifically, one disposal facility plans to close its doors to most states, but new options are evolving that might offset this shortfall. According to data from the three commercial disposal facility operators, annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years. In conducting this assessment, GAO relied on data from the operators because DOE's national LLRW database was unreliable. The timing and volume of future waste needing disposal are uncertain because of the difficulty in forecasting disposal shipments from DOE and nuclear utilities. At current LLRW disposal volumes, disposal availability for class A waste is not a problem in the short or longer term. Disposal availability appears adequate until mid-2008 for class B and C wastes when, if disposal conditions do not change, most states will not have a place to dispose of these wastes. Nevertheless, users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste if there are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008. While these approaches are costly, GAO did not identify other immediate widespread effects. The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Factors limiting further development include less waste, adequate disposal capacity, rising development costs, and public and political resistance in states designated to host these facilities. DOE has not yet provided a facility for the permanent disposal of greater-than-class-C waste, but it is collecting this material to address security concerns in the interim.
GAO-04-1097T, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are Uncertain
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States
Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Thursday, September 30, 2004:
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE:
Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are Uncertain:
Statement of (Ms.) Robin M. Nazzaro, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-04-1097T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-1097T, testimony before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management concerns persist despite
the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as amended, which made states responsible
for providing for disposal of class A, B, and C LLRW and made the
Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for the disposal of greater-
than-class C LLRW. This testimony is based on GAO‘s June 2004 report,
which examined the adequacy of disposal availability for class A, B,
and C wastes, and GAO‘s April 2003 report, which assessed recovery
efforts involving greater-than-class-C waste. This testimony examines
(1) changes in LLRW disposal availability since 1999, (2) recent LLRW
disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or
anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the potential
effects of any such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the Act in
developing regional disposal options for class A, B, and C wastes, and
(6) the status of DOE‘s effort to dispose of greater-than-class-C
waste.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s June 2004 report identified several changes since 1999 that have
affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal
oversight. Specifically, one disposal facility plans to close its
doors to most states, but new options are evolving that might offset
this shortfall.
According to data from the three commercial disposal facility
operators, annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent
years. In conducting this assessment, GAO relied on data from the
operators because DOE‘s national LLRW database was unreliable. The
timing and volume of future waste needing disposal are uncertain
because of the difficulty in forecasting disposal shipments from DOE
and nuclear utilities.
At current LLRW disposal volumes, disposal availability for class A
waste is not a problem in the short or longer term. Disposal
availability appears adequate until mid-2008 for class B and C wastes
when, if disposal conditions do not change, most states will not have
a place to dispose of these wastes.
Nevertheless, users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize
waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste if
there are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008.
While these approaches are costly, GAO did not identify other
immediate widespread effects.
The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Factors limiting
further development include less waste, adequate disposal capacity,
rising development costs, and public and political resistance in
states designated to host these facilities.
DOE has not yet provided a facility for the permanent disposal of
greater-than-class-C waste, but it is collecting this material to
address security concerns in the interim.
Lowering Radioactive Waste into a Concrete Barrier at a Commercial
Disposal Facility:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
The reports recommended that DOE improve its database and the
management of greater-than-class C wastes. DOE is implementing most of
these recommendations. In addition, GAO suggested that the Congress
may wish to consider directing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
report if LLRW conditions change enough to warrant legislative
intervention.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1097T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at
(202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past and ongoing work on
the management of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW is an
inevitable byproduct of nuclear power generation and of government,
industrial, academic, and medical uses of radioisotopes. LLRW includes
items such as rags, paper, liquid, glass, metal components, resins,
filters, and protective clothing that have been exposed to
radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material. States'
management of LLRW continues to be a concern despite two-decade-old
federal legislation addressing the need for disposal. Under the LLRW
Policy Act of 1980, as amended (the Act), each state is responsible for
providing for disposal of LLRW generated within the state, either by
itself or in cooperation with other states, with the exception of waste
produced by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the nuclear propulsion
component of the Department of Navy. The aim of the Act was to provide
for more LLRW disposal capacity on a regional basis and to more
equitably distribute responsibility for the management of LLRW among
the states. As an incentive for states to manage waste on a regional
basis, the Congress consented to the formation of interstate
agreements, known as compacts, and granted compact member states the
authority to exclude LLRW from other compacts or unaffiliated
states.[Footnote 1]
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing
LLRW disposal sites and has divided the wastes covered by the Act into
categories of increasing levels of hazard exposure, beginning with
class A, followed by class B and C.[Footnote 2] There are currently
three commercial LLRW disposal facilities where these wastes can be
disposed of--the Chem-Nuclear Systems facility in Barnwell County,
South Carolina, the Envirocare facility in Tooele County, Utah, and the
US Ecology facility in Benton County, Washington. DOE is responsible
for disposing of a fourth category of LLRW, known as greater-than-
class-C waste. This latter waste is not generally acceptable for
disposal near the surface like the other three waste classes.
Our testimony today is based on two reports: (1) our June 2004 report
in which we examined the adequacy of LLRW disposal availability for
class A, B, and C wastes;[Footnote 3] this report updated a 1999
report, in which we found that states were not developing new disposal
facilities and that within 10 years the only facility available to
waste generators in most states for class B and C wastes could be
full,[Footnote 4] and (2) an April 2003 report addressing the status of
DOE's program to dispose of greater-than-class-C waste.[Footnote 5] As
you requested, our testimony examines the findings and conclusions of
these reports and offers a perspective on the effectiveness of the Act.
Specifically, our testimony examines (1) changes in LLRW disposal since
1999 that we identified in our 2004 report, (2) recent LLRW disposal
volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or anticipated
shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the potential effects of any
such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the Act in developing
regional disposal options for class A, B, and C wastes, and (6) the
status of DOE's effort to dispose of greater-than-class-C material.
In summary:
In June 2004, we identified several changes since 1999 that have
affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal
oversight. These changes include South Carolina's decision to close the
Barnwell facility to noncompact states by mid-2008, issuance of a
license for the Envirocare facility to accept class B and C wastes
pending approval by the Utah legislature and governor, the potential
licensing of a new facility in Texas, and the state of Nebraska's
litigation settlement with the Central Interstate Compact for reneging
on its compact obligations to build a new facility. We also identified
changes in federal agency monitoring of LLRW management. DOE no longer
has appropriated funds to provide technical assistance to the states,
and the annual requirement that DOE report to the Congress on LLRW
disposal was terminated effective 2003. Furthermore, in the late 1990s,
NRC decreased its involvement in LLRW because no disposal sites were
being developed.
Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years; however,
the timing and level of future volumes needing disposal are uncertain.
According to data provided by the three commercial LLRW disposal
facility operators, disposal volumes grew to about 12 million cubic
feet in 2003, an increase of 200 percent over 1999. Class A waste
accounted for 99 percent of the disposal volume--DOE's cleanup program
generated about 78 percent of the total class A waste. The Envirocare
facility disposed of 99 percent of the nation's class A waste disposed
of in commercial facilities in 2003 while the Barnwell facility
disposed of 99 percent of the class B and C wastes that went to
commercial disposal. We relied on data from these operators because the
national LLRW database maintained by DOE lacked data on the
department's waste shipped for commercial disposal and had other
deficiencies. Even if the data problems are resolved, uncertainties
will remain regarding the timing and volume of LLRW needing disposal in
the future, which will largely depend on the disposal decisions made by
DOE and nuclear utility companies.
There appears to be enough disposal availability to serve the nation's
needs at least until mid-2008, when generators in many states might
have a shortfall in disposal availability for their class B and C
wastes. Disposal availability for class A waste is not a problem in the
short or longer term, provided that the Envirocare facility continues
in operation. According to Envirocare, the disposal facility can take
20 years or more of such waste under its current license. Capacity at
the Barnwell and Richland facilities, which are licensed to accept all
three classes of LLRW, is more than sufficient to serve the needs of
the 14 states within the compacts served by these facilities. However,
South Carolina has enacted legislation to terminate noncompact states'
access to this facility after mid-2008. This action will affect the 36
states that currently rely on Barnwell to dispose of their class B and
C wastes but are not members of the Atlantic compact.
Users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste
generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste if there
are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008. These
approaches, however, can be costly, with a higher financial burden on
some licensees than others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we
did not identify other effects of any shortfalls in disposal
availability that might have wider implications.
The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B and C wastes. As we previously
reported, several reasons account for this lack of progress: decreased
waste generation, adequate disposal capacity, the rising cost of
developing disposal facilities, and public and political resistance in
states designated to host these facilities.
We reported in April 2003 on DOE's lack of progress in providing a
permanent disposal facility for greater-than-class-C waste. DOE created
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project as an interim step toward meeting
its obligation under the Act. The project provides secure storage for
material that could be particularly attractive for use in a
radiological dispersion device, or "dirty bomb." As we reported, the
project has experienced a number of problems. For example, we noted
that DOE had inadequate capacity to store certain isotopes,
particularly sources containing plutonium-239 that in sufficient
quantity could be used to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon. Such
sources, in some cases, were not being securely stored and most holders
of the material expressed their desire to dispose of it as quickly as
possible.
The two reports discussed in this testimony contained a number of
recommendations. In our June 2004 report on disposal availability, we
recommended that the Secretary of Energy halt the dissemination of
information in its national LLRW database as long as the database has
shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability. DOE decided to leave
the database online but has added a notice to users of the database
regarding inaccuracies and is taking steps to identify and update
erroneous data. Our report also suggested that the Congress might wish
to consider directing NRC to report to it if LLRW disposal and storage
conditions should change enough to warrant consideration of new
legislation to improve the reliability and cost-effectiveness of
disposal availability. Our April 2003 report on DOE's Off-Site Source
Recovery Project recommended that DOE (1) determine whether the
priority given to the recovery project was commensurate with the threat
posed by greater-than-class-C sealed sources, (2) provide, as soon as
possible, storage space for sealed sources containing the isotopes
plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium-137 with the appropriate level
of security, and (3) initiate the process to develop a permanent
disposal facility for greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, develop a
plan to help manage this process, and develop a plan to ensure the
continued recovery and storage of greater-than-class-C sealed sources
until such a disposal facility is available. As a result of our
recommendation, DOE moved the program and realigned management
responsibility for the project out of the Office of Environmental
Management and into the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
in order to better address the national security risks posed by these
materials.[Footnote 6] To date, over 10,000 sources have been
recovered, but more still need to be collected. In addition, DOE has
added more storage space and is again recovering sources containing
plutonium-239. DOE is also planning to conduct the initial
environmental analysis required to develop a permanent disposal
facility for this waste.
Background:
The disposal of LLRW is the end of the radioactive material life cycle
that spans production, use, processing, interim storage, and disposal.
In general, the life cycle starts with the procurement of the
radioactive isotopes that have medical, industrial, agricultural, and
research applications. The isotopes come in either sealed or unsealed
sources. While a metal container shields a sealed source, unsealed
sources remain accessible in a glass vial or other type of container.
Common uses of this radioactive material are in radiotherapy,
radiography, smoke detectors, the irradiation and sterilization of food
and materials, gauging, and illumination of emergency exit signs. In
the course of working with these materials, other material, such as
protective clothing and gloves, pipes, filters, and concrete that come
in contact with them will become contaminated. The nuclear utility
industry generates the bulk of this LLRW through the normal operation
and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and through the
decommissioning of these plants. Some sealed sources can be recycled
for other uses that require less radioactivity. Once these materials
have served their purpose, they become LLRW. Specialized companies or
those licensed to use these materials can reduce the volume and
sometimes the radioactivity level of the waste through processing
before it is either put into a licensed interim storage or a disposal
facility. After a period of storage, some LLRW can decay to the point
that it is safe for disposal in regulated landfill sites. During the
life cycle, there will also be some loss of radioactive materials to
abandonment, misplacement and theft. Figure 1 diagrams the life-cycle
process for radioactive materials.
Figure 1: Conceptual Flow Diagram of Radioactive Sources from
Production to Disposal:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission began to encourage the
development of commercial LLRW disposal facilities to accommodate the
increased volume of commercial waste that was being generated. Six such
disposal facilities were licensed, two of which, the facility in
Washington State, licensed in 1965, and in South Carolina, licensed in
1971, remain open today.[Footnote 7] Each of these facilities is
located within the boundaries of or adjacent to a much larger site
owned by DOE. The third facility in Utah is about 80 miles west of Salt
Lake City. Utah initially licensed the Envirocare facility in 1988 to
accept naturally occurring radioactive waste. In 1991, Utah amended the
license to permit the disposal of some LLRW, and the Northwest Compact
agreed to allow Envirocare to accept these wastes from noncompact
states. By 2001, the facility was allowed to accept all types of class
A waste. Because of its higher radioactive content, greater-than-class-
C waste cannot be disposed of in these commercial disposal facilities.
Instead, the Act requires DOE to provide a facility for disposing of
all greater-than-class-C radioactive waste.
Currently, 10 compacts include 43 states: the Appalachian, Atlantic,
Central, Central Midwest, Northwest, Midwest, Rocky Mountain,
Southeast, Southwestern, and Texas:
compacts. Seven states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, are unaffiliated. Figure 2 shows the state LLRW compacts and
unaffiliated states.
Figure 2: State LLRW Compacts and Unaffiliated States:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Since 1999, LLRW Disposal Availability and Federal Oversight Have
Changed:
In June 2004, we identified a number of important changes that had
occurred since our 1999 report; these changes have affected, or might
affect, future disposal availability for these wastes and federal
oversight of states' LLRW management. Changes that might have
implications for long-term disposal availability include the following:
* In 2001, South Carolina enacted legislation restricting the use of
the Barnwell disposal facility to generators in the three-member
Atlantic compact after mid-2008. In the past, the state legislature
has changed its position on restricting access to this facility, both
closing and reopening the facility to noncompact member states over
the years.
* In 2001, Envirocare received a license from the state regulatory
authority to accept class B and C wastes pending approval by the Utah
legislature and governor. Currently, the state has imposed a moratorium
on approving the use of this license until February 2005, after a
review of the recommendations of a hazardous waste regulation and
policy task force. The task force is expected to issue its final report
by November 2004. Granting approval for Envirocare to use its class B
and C wastes license could help to alleviate a shortfall in disposal
availability for class B and C wastes.
* In 2003, Texas enacted legislation designating a geographic area in
the state as acceptable for a new LLRW disposal facility, and the state
regulator developed a license application process for this facility. In
August 2004, a private company submitted a license application to the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality for approval to construct and
operate a disposal facility 30 miles west of Andrews, Texas. Current
projections by the state of Texas suggest that the earliest a facility
could be licensed is 2007. Non-compact states' access to this facility
has not been determined. If the Texas facility were allowed to accept
waste nationally, it would mitigate a potential shortfall in disposal
availability for class B and C wastes.
* In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the 8TH Circuit affirmed a federal
district court decision that Nebraska, as a designated host state, is
liable for $151 million in damages for reneging on its obligations to
the Central Compact to build a disposal facility. Since the issuance of
our June 2004 report, the Central Interstate Compact voted to accept a
settlement with Nebraska for $141 million plus interest. Under the
settlement, if Nebraska and other compact members negotiate access to
the proposed disposal facility in Texas, the amount Nebraska would have
to pay would be reduced to $130 million plus interest.
The remaining changes affect federal agency guidance and oversight of
LLRW management by the states. These include the following:
* In 2001, DOE significantly diminished its involvement in guiding and
overseeing LLRW management by the states. DOE's reporting requirement
on LLRW management, as originally required by the Act, terminated
effective May 2000. In addition, DOE's technical assistance activities
under the Act have essentially ended after a period of shifting
emphasis and decline.
* Since the late 1990s, NRC has decreased its direct involvement in
states' LLRW management because no new disposal sites were being
developed and more states have taken on the responsibility for the
regulation of radioactive material from NRC.
Annual LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased, but Future Volumes Are
Uncertain:
Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased significantly in recent
years, primarily the result of cleaning up DOE sites and
decommissioning nuclear power plants. To obtain disposal volume
information, we relied on data from the three commercial disposal
facility operators because the Manifest Management Information System
(MIMS)--the online commercial disposal LLRW database maintained by DOE-
-is not as up-to-date as the facilities' data and has other
deficiencies. Future disposal volumes remain uncertain and will depend
largely on waste disposal decisions by DOE and nuclear utility
companies.
LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased Significantly Since 1999:
Since the beginning of 1999, disposal volumes have steadily increased
to over 12 million cubic feet in 2003, an increase of over 200 percent.
Class A waste accounted for 99 percent of all waste disposed of at the
three commercial disposal facilities. The Envirocare facility received
99 percent of this class A waste, and about 78 percent of this class A
waste came from DOE clean up sites. According to Envirocare, DOE has
increased its shipment of waste to the facility from about 36,000 cubic
feet in 1994 (6.6 percent of the class A waste disposed) to almost 9.3
million cubic feet in 2003 (77.8 percent of the class A waste
disposed). In contrast, disposal volumes of commercial class B waste
declined 47 percent, from about 23,500 cubic feet in 1999, to about
12,400 cubic feet by 2003. Commercial class C waste disposal volumes
were more volatile, changing as much as 107 percent in a single year.
The total annual disposal volume of class C waste alternately rose and
fell between 1999 and 2003, with the annual total reaching over 20,000
cubic feet in 1999, falling as low as about 11,000 cubic feet in 2002,
then rising to over 23,000 cubic feet in 2003. Of the total class B and
C wastes disposed of in commercial facilities in 2003, 99 percent went
to Barnwell.
Concerns about the Completeness and Reliability of National LLRW
Database:
Because of concerns about data completeness and reliability, we did not
use the database that DOE maintains and operates for the LLRW community
and public when we determined recent disposal volumes. Nor did we use
other information in this database to analyze sources of LLRW by state,
compact, and generator type because of shortcomings in its usefulness
and reliability. Instead, we relied on data supplied to us from the
three commercial disposal operators for our analysis because these data
include DOE waste volumes sent for commercial disposal, are more up to
date and are the primary source data input into MIMS.
With respect to data completeness, even though DOE ships large
quantities of LLRW to a commercial disposal facility, this information
is not captured in MIMS. Also, other types of information, such as the
storage of waste and volume of waste reduction, are not collected in
this database. The consensus among the compact and unaffiliated state
officials we surveyed was that they could more effectively regulate and
monitor LLRW in their compacts and states if MIMS offered more
comprehensive and reliable data. Despite these shortcomings, these
officials have sometimes used MIMS data as a convenient source of
information for public, media, and stakeholder inquiries, as a means of
monitoring LLRW within their compact or region, and as an external
check on the LLRW interstate shipment data reported to compact and
state regulators by the disposal operators.
We also identified shortcomings in the reliability of the MIMS
database. We found inconsistencies between what the disposal facility
operators claimed had been disposed of at their facilities and what was
recorded in this database. For example, excluding waste generated by
DOE, the volumes of LLRW reported to us by Envirocare for 1999 to 2003
totaled 10.4 million cubic feet, compared to the 15.7 million cubic
feet reported in MIMS. There were also problems with other kinds of
data in MIMS. States and compacts have also identified discrepancies
that undermine the data's usefulness, particularly regarding the state-
specific information on the origins of waste. For example, Tennessee,
which is the base of operations for companies that transport and
process the waste from generators in other states prior to disposal,
reports that it is erroneously recorded in MIMS as the state of origin
of this waste.
The data DOE puts into MIMS comes from the three commercial LLRW
disposal facility operators in electronic format. DOE pays each
operator varying amounts of money to extract data from the records
accompanying shipments of LLRW that provide information on the volume,
radioactivity level, source, and other information about the waste.
These records are called manifests, and NRC requires their use to track
shipment of radioactive materials. The disposal operator then transmits
some of this information to DOE for entry into MIMS. Each disposal
facility operator is responsible for ensuring the validity of these
data, but DOE's contracts with these operators leave to them what
steps, if any, should be taken to validate the data. DOE takes no
responsibility for verifying the accuracy of the data supplied by the
disposal facility operators. Furthermore, while DOE takes some steps to
ensure that it accurately uploads operator-supplied data into MIMS, it
does not perform other systematic quality checks on the data, such as
"reasonableness" checks, cross tabulations, or exceptions reports. As a
result, the lack of consistent and comprehensive internal controls,
such as controls over information processing, undermine our confidence
in the data output in MIMS for several types of information, including
sources of waste coming from states, compacts, and generator types.
We recommended in our June 2004 report that the Secretary of Energy
halt dissemination of information in DOE's national LLRW database as
long as the database has shortcomings in its usefulness and
reliability. DOE subsequently decided to leave the database online but
has added a notice to users of the database regarding inaccuracies and
is taking steps to identify and update erroneous data.
Uncertainties Surround Projecting Future LLRW Disposal Volumes:
Notwithstanding problems obtaining comprehensive and reliable LLRW
disposal data, uncertainties remain concerning the timing and volume of
LLRW needing disposal in the future, which largely will depend on the
disposal decisions made by nuclear utility companies and DOE, as well
as on possible changes in regulatory standards for what constitutes
LLRW. For example, officials at DOE told us that projections for sites
now being cleaned up have not proven very accurate, and have tended to
significantly overestimate waste volumes that would require disposal as
LLRW. They cited several reasons for this difficulty: records from
"legacy" sites--former nuclear weapons production sites that DOE is
cleaning up--have not proven to be reliable; the decay rate of known
buried radioactive wastes have often been higher than expected so
wastes that were expected to need disposal as LLRW can instead be
legally classified as radioactive waste mixed with nonradioactive but
hazardous wastes and sent to less expensive disposal facilities;
contractors have become more innovative and skilled in sorting and
segregating hazardous and mixed wastes from LLRW so that a higher
percentage of wastes can be disposed of as hazardous or mixed wastes
rather than LLRW; and some debris and material from site cleanup
projected to be LLRW has no appreciable radioactivity when generated
and can therefore be disposed in sanitary landfills or other non-LLRW
disposal facilities. There are some indications that the volume of DOE
cleanup waste likely to be sent to commercial LLRW disposal facilities
could currently be at or near a peak and could soon rapidly decline as
cleanup at some DOE sites winds down and as cleanup activity shifts to
other DOE sites that have considerable on-site disposal capacity. As a
result, DOE officials expect the use of commercial LLRW disposal
facilities will start declining after 2006 and will stay comparatively
low until another anticipated spike in 2014. DOE officials stressed,
however, that "high confidence numbers" are not yet available because
the department is still in the process of reorganizing and developing
new baselines for its accelerated cleanup projects, and it does not
have a management system in place to develop corresponding waste
projections.
Potential changes to the threshold at which waste is classified as LLRW
are currently under consideration and could affect the amount of waste
needing disposal in the future. The National Research Council and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are separately studying this
issue and considering possible changes that might affect the future
management of LLRW. The National Research Council is studying the issue
because members of its Board on Radioactive Waste Management are
concerned that the statutes and regulations governing LLRW management
may be overly restrictive in some cases, leading to excessive costs and
other burdens on the waste generator and, in other cases, may lead to
an exaggeration of the potential risks posed by these materials. EPA is
examining its existing waste regulations and has begun soliciting
public comment as it considers new rulemaking in this area.
Specifically, EPA is exploring an option with NRC to establish a
regulatory framework that allows some of the lower activity radioactive
waste to be disposed of at non-LLRW disposal facilities. Finally, and
in a similar vein, government and industry LLRW stakeholders have
discussed harmonizing U.S. standards with the prevailing international
standards for LLRW under consideration by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Such a change could prompt U.S. regulators to consider
raising the threshold at which the radioactivity of waste would trigger
regulation as LLRW and would allow for lower activity LLRW to be
disposed of under other regulatory regimes.
LLRW Disposal Availability Appears Adequate Until Mid-2008:
Disposal availability appears adequate to serve the nation's needs at
least until mid-2008, when many states might lose disposal access for
their class B and C wastes. Disposal availability for class A waste is
not a problem in the short or longer term. According to Envirocare
representatives, their disposal site, which accepted over 99 percent of
the nation's commercially disposed of class A waste in 2003, has enough
capacity to accept this waste at the current volume levels for more
than 20 years. The Richland facility has about 21 million cubic feet of
capacity remaining for all classes of waste, which is more than enough
to accommodate the LLRW coming from the 11 states in the Northwest and
Rocky Mountain compacts until the expected closure of this facility in
2056. The Barnwell disposal facility has about 2.7 million cubic feet
of remaining capacity, most of which has been set aside for waste from
generators in the Atlantic Compact until 2050. Barnwell also appears to
have enough disposal capacity to continue accepting class B and C
wastes from other states until mid-2008, when it is scheduled to close
to all but the three Atlantic compact states. According to the Director
of Disposal Services at Chem-Nuclear Systems, the operator of the
Barnwell facility, there should be enough space at the facility to
accommodate the typical 20,000 to 25,000 cubic feet of class B and C
wastes accepted at this facility in recent years. This representative
told us that many generators have already contracted to dispose of
their B and C wastes in the short-term, and any generator outside of
the Atlantic Compact anticipating a need to dispose of these wastes
could still contract for the necessary space until mid-2008.
A number of factors support the likelihood that disposal space for
class B and C wastes will be available at Barnwell until mid-2008, if
disposal volumes do not exceed anticipated levels. Based on current
space commitments at this disposal facility under the conditions of the
volume caps set by the South Carolina legislature, there remains
between 24,500 to 44,500 cubic feet of uncommitted space until 2008.
The amount of space available depends on whether Atlantic Compact
generators use all of their set-aside space through 2008. In addition,
utilities are likely to take more aggressive efforts to ensure
sufficient space for class B and C wastes at Barnwell. Industry
officials said utilities might consider several initiatives and
conditions that could alleviate the diminishing disposal availability
for class B and C wastes. For example, utilities could send class A
waste to Envirocare rather than Barnwell to save the remaining space at
Barnwell for class B and C wastes. In addition, utilities might
increase waste reduction efforts and storage.
After 2008, disposal availability for the class B and C wastes
generated in the 36 states outside the Northwest, Rocky Mountain, and
Atlantic compacts is more uncertain. Disposal availability for these
states will depend on a number of possibilities, including extending
access to Barnwell beyond mid-2008 or creating new disposal options for
these classes of waste. The Barnwell facility has opened and closed to
noncompact member states before and could again. Given the difficulties
of attracting class A waste to Barnwell because of the high disposal
fees, and the fairly consistent level of class B and C wastes shipped
to this site each year, the facility might not even reach its volume
cap of 35,000 cubic feet per year after 2008. In addition, the set-
aside of 2.2 million cubic feet for Atlantic Compact generators through
2050 may be negotiated downward, freeing up additional space at this
disposal facility. It is also possible that new disposal options will
become available in the future that could alleviate any disposal crisis
for class B and C wastes. Finally, regardless of the outcome,
representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the policy
organization of the nuclear energy industry, said that utilities, the
greatest generator of class B and C wastes, can store these wastes on
site if they have no disposal option.
Any LLRW Disposal Shortfall After Mid-2008 Unlikely to Pose Immediate
Problem:
If after mid-2008, there are no new disposal options for class B and C
wastes, licensed users of radioactive materials can continue to
minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store
waste pending the development of additional disposal options. These
approaches, however, can be costly, with a higher financial burden on
some licensees than others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we
did not identify other effects of any shortfalls in disposal
availability that might have wider implications.
LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Lessen Effects of Any Disposal
Shortfall:
The licensed users of radioactive materials that must eventually
dispose of their LLRW have employed a variety of techniques to both
minimize and process this waste to reduce its volume before storage and
eventual disposal. These techniques include substituting
nonradioactive materials for radioactive materials, separating
radioactive materials from nonradioactive materials, recycling,
compaction, dilution, and incineration. For example, it is reported
that most large research institutions make concerted efforts to find
suitable and appropriate alternatives to the use of radioactive
materials. One university official told us that such efforts have
reduced LLRW generation at his institution by 30 percent in the last 5
years. The Electric Power Research Institute is encouraging nuclear
utilities to use vendor volume reduction programs for resins, the
single largest component of class B and C wastes, to reduce volume.
Some licensees have used processors to super-compact class A waste to
achieve up to a 5,000 percent reduction in volume, or to reduce this
waste to ash through incineration, albeit increasing the concentration
of radioisotopes.
In addition to minimizing LLRW, licensees can decide to store this
waste when no disposal option is available to them. In order to obtain
a license to possess radioactive materials, entities must demonstrate
the technical capability to safely manage them. These entities give
various reasons for storing waste, including allowing short-lived
radioactive materials to decay to innocuous levels to avoid the need
for disposal in a more expensive LLRW facility, the prohibitively high
cost of disposal for some licensees, and concerns about the potential
liability of sending the waste to a disposal site. Universities and
biomedical companies generally rely on storage for decay for their
LLRW, although finding space within large research institutions in
urban settings is more difficult. The high cost of LLRW disposal can
also pose financial problems for some licensees. Over the last 25
years, disposal costs have risen from $1 per cubic foot of LLRW to over
$400 per cubic foot, with projections of well over $1,000 per cubic
foot in the future. For some LLRW, the Barnwell disposal facility now
charges $1,625 per cubic foot. These disposal costs can reach hundreds
of millions of dollars for utility companies that are decommissioning
their nuclear power plants. NRC reported to us that the cost to fully
decommission a plant could run as high as $675 million. Finally, some
licensees will not send their LLRW to disposal facilities because they
are concerned that the mixing of their waste with other waste might
draw them into litigation if the disposal site should ever require
cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (commonly referred to as
Superfund).
While NRC policy favors disposal rather than storage over the long-
term, since the mid-1990s the Commission has allowed on-site storage of
LLRW without a specified time limit as long as it is safe. The
Commission took this approach in part because LLRW can be stored and
the states were not developing any new disposal facilities. NRC's and
Agreement States' (that is, states that have taken over the
responsibility for regulating radioactive materials from NRC) license
and inspection programs help ensure the safe management of stored LLRW.
However, some licensees are concerned that a fire, flood, or earthquake
might cause an unintended radioactive release. If an emergency ever
should arise from stored LLRW, NRC has authority under the Act to
override any compact restrictions to allow shipment of LLRW to a
regional or other nonfederal disposal facility, if necessary under
narrowly defined conditions, and to eliminate an immediate and serious
threat to the public health and safety or to the common defense and
security. Since September 11, 2001, the perception of the risks posed
by potential use of stored LLRW by terrorists has increased. A recent
report found that at least a few radioisotopes of greatest security
concern are classified as LLRW. According to the report, while
radiological dispersal devices, such as a dirty bomb, are not weapons
of mass destruction, they could cause mass disruption, dislocation, and
adverse financial consequences associated with decontamination and
rebuilding. NRC officials told us that as the volume and duration of
stored LLRW increases so might the safety and security risks.
LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Be Costly:
Waste minimization and storage can alleviate the need for disposal, but
they can be costly. The licensees that we interviewed provided many
instances of the high cost of managing LLRW. For example, one
university recently built a $12 million combined hazardous and
radioactive waste management facility, of which two-thirds is devoted
to processing and temporarily storing class A waste. A medical center
official took us to a small (12' x12') LLRW interim storage and
processing room that cost the institution about $150,000 to construct
to meet stringent health and environmental standards. Costs are also
associated with operating storage facilities. Representatives from one
university system told us that the system spends about $100,000
annually to maintain its interim storage building in a remote area of
the state. Added to the cost of building and operating a storage
facility is the cost of securing it. Such costs have been accounted for
in higher utility rates, university overhead charges, drug prices, and
medical treatments. These costs of doing business are more difficult
for some entities to absorb than others. Representatives from several
biotechnology companies told us that the industry, particularly the
smaller start-up companies, are not prepared for the financial cost of
storing and securing LLRW.
No Other Widespread Effects Detected of Shortfall in LLRW Disposal
Availability:
Notwithstanding the cost of minimizing and storing LLRW, we did not
detect widespread national impacts on LLRW generators that have
resulted or might result from any disposal shortfalls. In a survey we
administered to compact and unaffiliated state LLRW officials regarding
documented effects on LLRW generators of any restricted disposal
availability, the officials raised few concerns. We then sought
information from a broader constituency to determine whether any
problems were occurring. We collaborated with medical researchers at
the University of Texas to seek information from two overlapping groups
involved in LLRW management: the approximately 2,000 subscribers of the
RadSafe Listserv, a listserv for radiation safety officers, and the
approximately 6,000 members of the Health Physics Society, a scientific
and professional organization whose members specialize in occupational
and environmental radiation safety. We sought information on any known
cases where there have been or might be adverse effects on research
activities and clinical practice stemming from costs or difficulties
related to the storage and disposal of LLRW. Specifically, we e-mailed
questionnaires asking if these factors have caused or might cause a
discontinuance or disapproval of any research or clinical endeavors to
RadSafe listserv subscribers and placed a notice in the Health Physics
Society's newsletter asking for volunteers to answer the same questions
we sent to the listserv subscribers. We obtained an extremely low
response rate to these questionnaires--14 responses from listserv
subscribers and 6 from Health Physics Society members. Because these
were a nonprobability sample surveys, the results are not generalizable
and can only be used for anecdotal purposes. Of these respondents, only
two said that the difficulties associated with LLRW had adversely
affected research or clinical practice. Several respondents cited the
challenges of dealing with LLRW but also noted that they work around
the difficulties through waste minimization, including substituting
nonradioactive materials for radioactive materials when possible, and
on-site storage as needed. The survey results provided no evidence of
any widespread effects on research activities and clinical practice
stemming from costs or difficulties related to the storage and disposal
of LLRW in the last 5 years. Other published information was largely
consistent with our findings.
Owing to the uncertainties regarding future disposal availability and
the safety and security of storing waste, our report suggested that the
Congress may wish to consider directing NRC to report to it if LLRW
disposal and storage conditions should change enough to warrant
consideration of new legislation to improve the reliability and cost
effectiveness of disposal availability.
The Act Has Not Accomplished Goal of Providing More Region Disposal
Capacity:
The Act has not effectively facilitated the development of additional
regional disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Although a
nuclear industry association estimates that expenditures may now have
reached approximately $1 billion on various facility development
efforts, only one new commercial LLRW disposal facility has been
developed since passage of the Act--the Envirocare facility--and this
facility was not developed at the instigation of the compact in which
it operates. As we reported in 2004, the conditions dampening any
impetus to developing new disposal facilities for class A, B and C
wastes have not changed since 1999. These conditions include a
combination of factors: significant decreases in commercial LLRW
generation, available capacity at the three existing facilities to meet
national disposal needs, and rising costs of developing disposal
facilities. Developing new LLRW disposal facilities also encountered
public and political resistance in states designated to host these
facilities.
DOE Has Not Provided a Disposal Facility for Greater-Than-Class-C Waste
but Is Collecting This Material:
In our April 2003 report, we provided information on DOE's efforts to
recover and dispose of greater-than-class-C sealed radioactive sources.
As you know, since September 11, 2001, there has been a great deal of
concern about the control of sealed sources containing radioactive
material that are used in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry
throughout the United States. The radioactive material in these sources
is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal--such as stainless steel,
titanium, or platinum--to prevent its dispersal. The small size and
portability of the sealed sources make them susceptible to misuse,
improper disposal, and theft. If these sealed sources fell into the
hands of terrorists, they could be used as simple and crude but
potentially dangerous radiological weapons, commonly called dirty
bombs.
Certain sealed sources are considered particularly attractive for
potential use in dirty bombs because, among other things, they contain
more concentrated amounts of radioactive material such as americium-
241, cesium-137, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.
Applications of greater-than-class-C sealed sources include portable
and fixed gauges used by the construction industry for testing the
moisture content of soil, medical pacemakers, medical diagnostics and
treatments, gauges used for petroleum exploration, and government and
private research and development. While a study by the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory estimates that there currently could be about
250,000 to 500,000 greater-than-class-C sealed sources in the United
States, the actual number of greater-than-class-C sealed sources that
are no longer wanted is not known because no one kept track of this
information.
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985[Footnote
8] requires DOE to provide a facility for disposing of all greater-
than-class-C radioactive waste, including greater-than-class-C sealed
sources that are no longer wanted by their owners. A permanent disposal
facility has not yet been developed, but in the interim, DOE created
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project that, since fiscal year 1999, has
been recovering unwanted greater-than-class-C sealed sources from their
owners and temporarily storing them at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico. NNSA officials told us that, to date, the
project has recovered over 10,000 sealed sources.
In April 2003, we reported that DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project
faced three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. First,
we reported that DOE's Office of Environmental Management, which was
responsible for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project at the time of our
report, had a questionable long-term commitment to the project. The
project did not receive full funding because of other higher-priority
projects, and officials from the Office of Environmental Management
told us that they would have liked responsibility for the project to be
placed in another DOE office because of inconsistencies between the
mission of the project and the main mission of the Office of
Environmental Management to accelerate the cleanup and closure of
contaminated DOE weapons development facilities.
Second, we reported that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was
unable to recover any additional sealed sources containing plutonium-
239 (which, in sufficient quantity, could be used to fabricate a crude
nuclear weapon) because there was no more space at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory that met DOE's security standards for storing these
sources. As a result, about 150 holders (mostly universities) of over
400 unwanted sources containing plutonium-239 were forced to retain
them and keep them properly secured until space became available. In
some instances, sealed sources at these facilities were stored in
unlocked and open rooms, and most holders expressed their desire to
dispose of the sources as quickly as possible. In addition to
plutonium-239, at the time of our report, DOE had not approved a means
for temporarily storing sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137.
Finally, we reported that, as of February 2003, DOE's Office of
Environmental Management had not made progress toward providing for the
permanent disposal of greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, and it
was unlikely to provide such a facility by fiscal year 2007 as it had
planned because it is not a priority within the office. Specifically,
the office had not begun the first step in developing a disposal
facility--completing an appropriate analysis as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing
regulations. Such an analysis would likely take the form of an
Environmental Impact Statement. Officials from DOE's Office of
Environmental Management told us that funding had been provided in
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct an environmental analysis, but
these funds had been reallocated to other priorities.
Our April 2003 report recommended that DOE determine whether the
priority given to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was commensurate
with the threat posed by greater-than-class-C sealed sources and ensure
that adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the costs
of recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as possible.
In addition, we recommended that DOE take immediate action to provide
secure storage space for unwanted sealed sources containing plutonium-
239, strontium-90, and cesium-137. Furthermore, we recommended that DOE
initiate the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for
greater-than-class-C radioactive waste as required by the LLRW Policy
Amendments Act and develop a plan to ensure the continued recovery and
storage of greater-than-class-C sealed sources until such a disposal
facility is available.
DOE has made progress addressing the problems we identified.
Specifically, to address the problem of the low priority given to the
Off-Site Source Recovery Project within the Office of Environmental
Management, DOE transferred the project to NNSA in October 2003. Now
renamed the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program, the project is
managed by NNSA's Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction and is
part of NNSA's larger efforts to secure potential dirty bomb material
worldwide. The project has also experienced funding increases following
the transfer. According to NNSA officials, the project was appropriated
nearly $2 million in fiscal year 2004 and received an additional $3.5
million that was transferred by the Secretary of Energy from the Office
of Environmental Management. In addition, the project completed
spending from an additional $10 million that the Congress appropriated
in August 2002 as part of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States.[Footnote 9] In total, the project spent about $8 million in
fiscal year 2004. In our view, funding for this effort must be
sustained for the foreseeable future to continue progress in the
recovery of material that potentially could be fabricated into dirty
bombs.
With regard to the continued recovery of sealed sources containing
plutonium-239, NNSA completed the security requirements for accepting
additional plutonium-239 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. NNSA
officials also told us that additional storage capacity has become
available at the Nevada Test Site for additional plutonium-239 storage.
The project began recovering plutonium-239 sources in November 2003. As
of September 2004, the project has recovered over 260 sources
containing plutonium-239. Although the project estimated at the time of
our report that there were over 400 unwanted plutonium-239 sources,
NNSA officials told us that about 400 additional excess sources have
been identified that will be recovered. Recovered sources are stored at
Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site until they are
eventually shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New
Mexico, for permanent disposal. According to an NNSA official, these
shipments are due to begin in April 2005.
According to NNSA officials, the project started recovery of large
strontium-90 sources in February 2004 and has recovered four of the six
known large strontium-90 sources in the United States. The project
plans to recover the remaining two large strontium-90 sources in fiscal
year 2005. For cesium-137 sources, NNSA officials told us that they are
currently working to find commercial partners to leverage existing
disposal and recycling options for this material and to securely store
cesium-137 sources in the interim.
Finally, in response to our recommendation that DOE initiate the
process to develop a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-
class-C radioactive waste, DOE transferred the responsibility for
developing the environmental analysis from the Office of Environmental
Management to DOE's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health. DOE
plans to publish an Advance Notice of Intent to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement. This Environmental Impact Statement
will evaluate disposal options and other considerations. However, DOE
has been unable to tell us when the Advance Notice of Intent will be
published or when DOE expects to complete the Environmental Impact
Statement.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841. Gene Aloise, Ryan T. Coles, Daniel Feehan, Doreen
Feldman, Richard Kasden, Thomas Laetz, Ilene Pollack, Leslie Pollock,
Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to
this testimony.
(360521):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Generators of LLRW located in compact or unaffiliated states that
do not have their own disposal facility can contract with a disposal
facility in another compact if this compact allows them to do so.
[2] Radioactive waste is classified by type of radionuclide (e.g.,
americium-241) and concentration of radioactivity (often measured in
curies per gram).
[3] GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in
the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Shortfalls.
GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004).
[4] GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing
Disposal Facilities, GAO/RCED-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
1999).
[5] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure
Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-483
(Washington, D.C. April 15, 2003).
[6] NNSA has combined the recovery project with other nonproliferation
activities under the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program.
[7] Under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, four other
commercial disposal facilities were licensed in the 1960s, including
facilities in Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, and New York.
[8] Pub. L. No. 99-240.
[9] Pub. L. No. 107-206.
