Preventing Nuclear Smuggling
DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports
Gao ID: GAO-05-375 March 31, 2005
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2) current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports.
DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work at seaports identified as high priority by DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative attractiveness to potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation of foreign governments has been difficult in part because some countries have concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. DOE has completed work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate work at 5 other ports. Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with the governments of 18 additional countries and DOE officials told us they are close to signing agreements with 5 of these countries. However, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative's efforts. Developing such a plan would lead DOE to, among other things, determine criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it continues to have difficulties working at higher volume and higher threat ports of interest. Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an estimated cost of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for several reasons. For example, the projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million estimate for the average cost per port, which may not be accurate because it was based primarily on DOE's work at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total costs and time frames will also increase. DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports. Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection equipment's performance and sustainability.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-05-375, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
March 2005:
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling:
DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection
Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-375, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could
smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the
approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S.
seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being
placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this
concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has deployed
radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its
Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the (1) progress DOE
has made in implementing the Initiative, (2) current and expected costs
of the Initiative, and (3) challenges DOE faces in installing radiation
detection equipment at foreign ports.
What GAO Found:
DOE‘s Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work
at seaports identified as high priority by DOE‘s Maritime
Prioritization Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative
attractiveness to potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation
of foreign governments has been difficult in part because some
countries have concerns that screening large volumes of containers will
create delays that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports.
DOE has completed work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate
work at 5 other ports. Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with
the governments of 18 additional countries and DOE officials told us
they are close to signing agreements with 5 of these countries.
However, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the
Initiative‘s efforts. Developing such a plan would lead DOE to, among
other things, determine criteria for deciding how many and which lower
priority ports to complete if it continues to have difficulties working
at higher volume and higher threat ports of interest.
Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was
spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently
plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an
estimated cost of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for
several reasons. For example, the projection is based in part on DOE‘s
$15 million estimate for the average cost per port, which may not be
accurate because it was based primarily on DOE‘s work at Russian land
borders, airports, and seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently
assessing whether the Initiative‘s scope should increase beyond 20
ports; if this occurs, total costs and time frames will also increase.
DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is
currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the
physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports.
Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray,
can affect radiation detection equipment‘s performance and
sustainability.
Figure: DOE-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment at a Foreign Port:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive long-term plan for
the Initiative that identifies, among other things, criteria for
deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if DOE
continues to have difficulties initiating work at its highest priority
ports and (2) reevaluate the current per port cost estimate and adjust
long-term cost projections as necessary. DOE concurred with our
recommendations. DOE is working on a plan for the Initiative and will
reevaluate its cost estimate at the end of fiscal year 2005.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov].
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at
High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan
to Guide Its Efforts:
Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain:
DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing
Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: National Laboratory and Contractor Roles:
Appendix III: Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or Initiated
Work:
Appendix IV: Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in Greece Prior to
the 2004 Olympic Games:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Ports Where DOE Has Completed Installations and Those Where
It Plans to Begin Work or Complete Installations in Fiscal Year 2005:
Figure 2: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands:
Figure 3: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus,
Greece:
Figure 4: Megaports Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal
Year 2004 (dollars in millions):
Figure 5: Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
Detection Equipment:
Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border Crossing
Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a Radioactive Isotope
Identification Device:
Figure 8: Radiation Detection Pager:
Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior to
Receiving Physical Security Upgrades:
Abbreviations:
CSI: Container Security Initiative:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOE: Department of Energy:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:
SLD-Core: Second Line of Defense-Core program:
TEU: twenty-foot equivalent unit:
[End of Section]
Letter March 31, 2005:
Congressional Requesters:
Over the past decade, as terrorist activities have spread throughout
the world, the United States has become increasingly concerned about
the threat posed by unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material.[Footnote
1] Such material could be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists
or countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. According to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2003, there
were 540 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological materials. A significant number of the cases reported by
IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon
or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material
(known as a "dirty bomb"). Even small amounts of nuclear and
radiological materials are worrisome because as little as 25 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium could be used to
build a nuclear weapon, and small amounts can be smuggled across
borders in cars, carried in personal luggage on aircraft, or placed
inside containers aboard cargo ships.
Seaports are critical gateways for international commerce, and maritime
shipping containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between
global trading partners. In 2002, approximately 7 million shipping
containers arrived at U.S. ports carrying more than 95 percent of U.S.
imports by weight from outside North America. Responding to heightened
concern about national security since September 11, 2001, several U.S.
government agencies have acted to prevent terrorists from smuggling
weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas
locations. In 2003, the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration[Footnote 2] initiated its Megaports Initiative
(Initiative), the goal of which is to enable foreign government
personnel at key seaports to use radiation detection equipment to
screen shipping containers entering and leaving these ports, regardless
of the containers' destination, for nuclear and other radioactive
material that could be used against the United States or its allies.
Through the Initiative, DOE installs radiation detection equipment at
foreign seaports that is then operated by foreign government officials
and port personnel working at these ports.[Footnote 3]
DOE's Megaports Initiative coordinates with and complements the
Department of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI).
Under CSI, which began operating in January 2002, U.S. Customs
officials stationed in foreign ports review the cargo manifests of
containers bound directly for the United States and attempt to identify
containers with potentially dangerous cargo, such as explosives or
weapons of mass destruction.[Footnote 4] U.S. Customs officials then
request that the host country's customs officials inspect these
containers before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United
States. CSI and the Megaports Initiative differ in several important
ways. For example, while CSI stations U.S. personnel in foreign ports,
the Megaports Initiative does not. Instead it installs radiation
detection equipment that enables foreign customs officials to improve
the level of sophistication of their inspections by screening cargo for
nuclear and radioactive materials. Also, under CSI, the United States
bears the financial burden for posting its own inspectors at foreign
ports, while participating in the Megaports Initiative requires a
significant financial commitment from a host country because it may
need to hire additional customs agents to operate the radiation
detection equipment DOE provides.
To help decisionmakers identify and prioritize foreign seaports for
participation in the Megaports Initiative, DOE uses a complex model
that ranks foreign ports according to their relative attractiveness to
potential nuclear smugglers. The Maritime Prioritization Model
incorporates information, such as port security conditions, volume of
container traffic passing through ports, the proximity of the ports to
sources of nuclear material, and the proximity of the ports to the
United States and is updated regularly to incorporate new information.
When selecting ports for equipment installations, DOE also considers
other factors, including the likelihood that a potential host country
will agree to participate in the Initiative and the location of
significant world events, such as the Olympic Games. Once DOE selects a
port and the host country shows interest in participating in the
Initiative, program officials may conduct a visit to the port to
familiarize themselves with its operations and layout. Prior to
implementation activities at a selected port, DOE and the host
country's government negotiate an agreement, or memorandum of
understanding (MOU), that outlines the expectations, roles, and
responsibilities of both parties for work at the selected port as well
as the long-term use of the equipment to be installed.[Footnote 5]
As agreed with your offices, we examined (1) DOE's progress in
implementing its Megaports Initiative, (2) the current and expected
costs of the Initiative, and (3) the challenges DOE faces in installing
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. To address these
objectives, we analyzed documentation on the Megaports Initiative from
DOE and its contractors, both at DOE's national laboratories and in the
private sector, and conducted interviews with key program officials. We
also visited completed Megaports Initiative installations at Rotterdam,
the Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece, to observe U.S.-funded radiation
detection equipment and to discuss the implementation of the program
with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary
information, performed a data reliability assessment of the data we
received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from
June 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work
at ports identified as high priority by its Maritime Prioritization
Model because DOE has been unable to reach agreement with key
countries, such as China. DOE has completed work at only 2 foreign
seaports, signed agreements to begin work at 5 others, and is
negotiating agreements with the governments of 18 additional countries.
According to DOE officials, the Initiative's limited success in
initiating work at key ports is largely due to difficulties negotiating
agreements with countries that have ports ranked as high priority by
DOE's model. Gaining the cooperation of foreign governments has been
difficult because some countries have concerns that screening large
volumes of containers will create delays that could inhibit the flow of
commerce at their ports. In addition, some foreign governments are
reluctant to hire the additional customs officials needed to operate
the radiation detection equipment DOE provides under the Initiative. In
fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to begin work in Antwerp, Belgium, and to
complete installations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Algeciras, Spain, and
Freeport, Bahamas. DOE currently plans to complete installations at a
total of 20 ports by 2010. The two ports where DOE has completed
installations include a pilot project in Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
and a full installation in Piraeus, Greece. Both of these ports were
ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by DOE's model.
However, DOE officials believe their work at these two ports has been
beneficial for a number of reasons. For example, the success of DOE's
pilot project at one port terminal in Rotterdam led to a decision by
the Dutch government to fund the deployment of radiation detection
equipment at the port's three remaining terminals. Similarly,
installing equipment at Piraeus contributed to the increased security
in Greece for the 2004 Olympic Games.
Currently, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan for its
Megaports Initiative, although with limited progress installing
radiation detection equipment at its highest priority ports, a well
thought out plan can be an important guide for its efforts to further
implement the Initiative. DOE uses an annual work plan to guide the
Initiative's efforts and document the scope of work to be accomplished
in the current fiscal year. Additionally, DOE uses its Future Years
Nuclear Security Program, a five-year financial projection, to provide
the Initiative with a long-term cost projection and annual performance
measures of a certain number of ports completed per year. While using
the number of ports completed annually provides a broad measure of the
Initiative's progress, this measure does not take into account whether
the ports where equipment is being installed are of highest priority.
DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model provides a tool to help DOE
officials identify important ports to include in the Initiative.
Developing a comprehensive long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative
would require DOE to, among other things, develop criteria for deciding
how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it continues to
have difficulties gaining agreements to install radiation detection
equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE officials told us that
they will be developing such a plan for the Initiative in the near
future. We believe that a comprehensive long-term plan that includes
better criteria for measuring program success is needed and, as a
result, we are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy that
DOE develop such a plan for its Megaports Initiative.
Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities, but uncertainties may affect the
Initiative's projected costs, scope, and time frames. DOE spent about
$14 million, or 32 percent of program expenditures, on the pilot
project at Rotterdam and completing installations at Piraeus.
Additionally, DOE spent about $29 million on program integration
activities, which are costs not directly associated with installing
equipment at a specific port. Of this amount, about $14 million was
spent on advanced equipment procurement activities, which includes the
purchase and storage of radiation portal monitors for future
installations. The remaining $15 million was spent on such other
activities as the development and maintenance of DOE's Maritime
Prioritization Model, the process of negotiating agreements with
foreign governments, and the testing of radiation detection equipment.
Although DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20
ports by 2010, at an estimated total cost of $337 million, this cost
projection is uncertain for several reasons. For example, the
Initiative's long-term cost projection is based in part on DOE's $15
million average cost per port estimate, which may not be accurate.
According to DOE officials, this estimate was derived primarily from
DOE's prior experience in deploying radiation detection equipment at
Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. DOE officials
acknowledged that the cost of doing business in Russia may not be an
accurate basis on which to estimate the cost of installing radiation
detection equipment in other parts of the world. DOE has not yet
reevaluated this estimate in light of experience gained from its
installations at seaports. By the end of fiscal year 2005, however, DOE
expects to have completed installations at a total of 5 ports and will
have more information with which to assess the accuracy of its per port
cost estimate. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the
Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs,
total costs and time frames will increase. To ensure the most accurate
cost projections possible, we are recommending that DOE reevaluate the
accuracy of the Initiative's average cost per port estimate and adjust
its long-term cost projection, if necessary.
As DOE continues to implement its Megaports Initiative, it faces
several operational and technical challenges specific to installing
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. Certain factors can
affect the general capability of radiation detection equipment to
detect nuclear material. For example, some nuclear materials can be
shielded with lead or other materials to prevent radiation from being
detected. In addition, one of the materials of greatest proliferation
concern, highly enriched uranium, is difficult to detect because of its
relatively low level of radioactivity. In its effort to screen cargo
containers at foreign ports for radioactive and nuclear materials, DOE
faces technical challenges related to these ports' physical layouts and
cargo stacking configurations. To address a part of these challenges at
some ports, DOE plans to outfit a device used to transport cargo
containers between port locations--known as a straddle carrier--with
radiation detection equipment. However, this approach may not work at
all ports, so DOE is pursuing other solutions as well. Additionally,
environmental conditions specific to ports, such as the existence of
high winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation detection
equipment's performance and long-term sustainability. To minimize the
effects of these conditions, DOE has used steel plates to stabilize
radiation portal monitors placed in areas with high winds, such as in
Rotterdam, and is currently evaluating approaches to combat the
corrosive effects of sea spray on radiation detection equipment. We
provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. DOE
generally agreed with our recommendations. DOE is currently working to
produce a long-term plan for the Initiative and plans to reevaluate its
per port cost estimate at the end of fiscal year 2005.
Background:
The Megaports Initiative is part of DOE's Office of the Second Line of
Defense, whose aim is to strengthen the overall capability to detect
and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
materials across international borders. DOE, with the assistance of
several DOE national laboratories and private contractors,[Footnote 6]
generally implements its Megaports Initiative at foreign seaports in
six phases: (1) port prioritization; (2) government-to-government
negotiations and port familiarization; (3) technical site surveys, site
design, and training; (4) final design, construction, and equipment
installation; (5) equipment calibration and testing; and (6)
maintenance and sustainability.
The Maritime Prioritization Model, which is maintained by Sandia
National Laboratories (Sandia), uses unclassified information to rank
foreign seaports for their attractiveness to a potential nuclear
material smuggler. This information is maintained within the model in
several categories that are individually weighted and scored and then
combined to provide each port with an overall score.[Footnote 7] Ports
receiving higher scores are considered more attractive to a nuclear
material smuggler and therefore of potentially higher interest for
inclusion in the Initiative. In May 2004, DOE directed Sandia to
conduct a peer review of the model to determine the validity of its
modeling approach, the appropriateness of the factors used in the
model, and the suitability of the data for selecting and prioritizing
foreign ports for the Initiative.[Footnote 8] The peer review panel
concluded in August 2004, that the approach used in the design and
execution of the model is conceptually sound and provides a relevant,
defensible baseline from which to pursue bilateral engagements for
installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. The
panelists noted that the primary strengths of the model are the ease
with which new sources of information relevant to prioritizing
potential nuclear material smuggling routes can be added and the
transparency of the data and calculations used in the model. Currently,
the model ranks about 120 seaports worldwide, and DOE plans to add an
additional 80 ports to the model in fiscal year 2005. DOE officials
noted that the model will continue to evolve to more clearly consider
both volume and threat. DOE also considers other factors when deciding
which specific ports to engage, such as a potential host country's
level of interest in the Initiative and the location of significant
world events, such as the Olympic Games.
Once DOE selects a port for inclusion in the Initiative, DOE officials
and host country representatives begin to negotiate an agreement or
memorandum of understanding that defines the scope of work and level of
cooperation between DOE and the host country for work at the selected
port or ports. Concurrently, a team of experts from DOE's national
laboratories visits the selected port to familiarize themselves with
the port's operations and layout. Discussions are also conducted, as
appropriate, with major port and terminal operators. In many cases the
port-operating companies, along with terminal operators, have an
economic interest in cooperating with the Initiative, since they have
the most to lose in the event terrorists are successful in exploiting
weaknesses of the maritime shipping network to launch an attack using
weapons-usable nuclear or other radioactive material.
After an MOU has been signed, the technical site survey, design, and
training phase begins.[Footnote 9] Initially, one or more site visits
are conducted to gather technical information to determine the degree
to which cargo can be effectively screened in a port, to assess the
vulnerabilities of the port to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other
radioactive materials, and to estimate equipment needs. These visits
help DOE determine port security information, port traffic patterns,
shipping volume, training needs, and any other relevant information.
Program officials then develop a port security report that analyzes the
flow of container traffic for all port entry and exit gates, as well as
for cargo that arrives at a port on one ship, is offloaded onto a dock,
and then leaves aboard another ship--known as transshipped cargo. DOE
also performs a cost benefit analysis of the proposed equipment
installations at specific entry and exit gates. On the basis of the
results of these assessments, DOE develops a design requirements
package that includes the port's layout, proposed equipment needs, and
installation requirements. This information is used to conduct more
detailed engineering surveys to develop the final design. During this
phase, DOE also begins to provide training to foreign customs
officials, including training at the DOE Hazardous Materials Management
and Emergency Response center located at Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL). The training focuses on radiation safety, the use of
radiation detection equipment, and alarm response procedures. The
training generally consists of a 1-week course with both classroom
learning and simulated field operations. Training is tailored to each
port, and materials are provided in the working language of the host
country.
During the final design, construction, and equipment installation
phase, DOE determines the equipment needs of the port, the specific
placement of the equipment, and any site preparation or construction
work to be done at the port. The equipment that DOE provides through
the Initiative is commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. DOE
provides radiation detection portal monitors, which are stationary
pieces of equipment designed to detect radioactive materials being
carried by vehicles or pedestrians. These portal monitors can detect
both gamma and neutron radiation, which is important for detecting the
presence of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively. In
addition, DOE provides portable radiation detection devices, including
handheld devices that can help assist foreign customs officials conduct
secondary inspections to pinpoint the source of an alarm and to
determine the type of radioactive material present. DOE also provides
radiation detection pagers, which are small detectors that can be worn
on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels in the immediate
area of the customs officials wearing the pagers. DOE installs the
portal monitors at specific locations within the port, such as terminal
entry and exit gates, and integrates the portal monitors with a central
alarm station through the use of fiber optic cable or other methods.
Once installation is complete, the equipment is calibrated and tested
before being turned over to the host country's government. DOE
officials calibrate the equipment to optimal specifications for the
detection of weapons-usable nuclear material. The settings, which
determine the equipment's sensitivity, are based on a number of
factors, including the level of background radiation of the location,
the type of cargo handled at a specific port, and the potential use of
shielding. Once the equipment is calibrated and tested, the host
country's customs officials can begin to screen cargo containers for
radiation. When a container is scanned, an alarm will sound if the
equipment detects radiation. A monitoring system logs which monitor set
off the alarm, the date and time of the alarm, the alarm type, the
gamma and neutron count for the alarm, any indications of tampering, an
average reading of the background radiation of the area, and takes a
photograph of the container's identification number. If determined
necessary, the customs official then conducts a secondary inspection
with a handheld radiation detection device to identify the source and
location of the radiation. If the radiation profile of a scanned
container's contents matches the profile of consumer goods that are
known to contain natural sources of radiation,[Footnote 10] foreign
customs officers may opt not to conduct a secondary inspection.
However, the profile of consumer goods can appear different from the
typical profile if the container is not uniformly packed with this item
or if the container is filled with a combination of consumer goods. If
the customs officials cannot determine the content of the container
after the screening with a handheld radiation device, they may manually
inspect the container or request assistance from other agencies within
their government. Concurrent with the calibration and testing phase,
DOE national laboratory experts travel to the host country to provide
specific in-country training to foreign customs officials in the proper
use of the radiation portal monitors as well as portable radiation
detection equipment.[Footnote 11]
Once DOE fully turns the equipment over to the host government, the
project moves to the maintenance and sustainability phase. Typically,
DOE plans to fund 3 years of sustainability activities at each port.
These activities include providing refresher training for foreign
customs officials; general maintenance of the radiation detection
equipment; spare parts; and, as negotiated with the host country,
periodic evaluation of alarm data and port procedures to ensure that
the equipment is being operated properly. DOE wants the U.S. government
to be informed of any incidents or seizures that occur as a result of
using equipment provided by the Initiative. Additionally, other
technical data may be exchanged to assist technical experts from both
DOE and the host country in their ongoing analysis of the operational
effectiveness of the systems. To date, data sharing provisions have
been incorporated into the agreements signed by DOE and host country
governments.
DOE's Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at
High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan
to Guide Its Efforts:
DOE's Megaports Initiative has made limited progress in beginning to
install radiation detection equipment at seaports identified as high
priority by its Maritime Prioritization Model. According to DOE
officials, the Initiative's limited success in initiating work at
certain ports is largely due to difficulties negotiating agreements
with foreign governments, in particular with countries that have ports
ranked as high priority by DOE's model, such as China. Further, DOE has
completed work at only two ports, both of which were ranked lower in
priority than other ports by DOE's model. Given DOE's limited success
in installing radiation detection equipment at most high priority
ports, it is particularly noteworthy that the Initiative does not have
a comprehensive long-term plan that describes how DOE plans to measure
program success, overcome obstacles it faces, and achieve the goals of
the Initiative.
DOE Has Signed Agreements to Begin Work at Only 2 of the 20 Highest
Priority Ports Identified by an Earlier Version of Its Prioritization
Model:
DOE has had difficulty reaching agreement with some countries where
high-priority ports are located, such as China, due to a variety of
political factors often outside of DOE's control. DOE has completed
work at two ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five
others, two of which were ranked in the 20 highest priority ports by
DOE's model.[Footnote 12] According to DOE officials, some foreign
governments have been hesitant to participate in the Megaports
Initiative for two main reasons: possible interruptions to the flow of
commerce at their ports and reluctance to hire the additional customs
agents necessary to operate and maintain the radiation detection
equipment DOE provides.
First, some foreign governments have concerns that the flow of commerce
at their ports could be disrupted by participating in the Initiative in
both the short-and long-term. For the short-term, some foreign
governments have expressed concern that the flow of commerce at their
ports could be disrupted during the installation of radiation detection
equipment. A related long-term concern is that, by agreeing to
participate in the Initiative, the host country's customs officials
will be screening large volumes of cargo containers, which could lead
to delays or disruptions to the flow of commerce at the port. To
address these concerns, DOE provides prospective Initiative
participants with information on how the radiation detection equipment
would be installed and operated in the country, including information
on the design, construction, training, and implementation processes. To
alleviate concerns about construction issues, such as the placement of
radiation portal monitors, DOE analyzes the natural choke points that
occur in a port and seeks to install equipment at these locations to
avoid the interruption of commerce. According to a DOE official, to
avoid delays in port operations during installation of equipment,
construction work is often performed at night so that normal port
operations are not impeded. To further demonstrate how the radiation
detection equipment is installed and operated, DOE officials show
prospective Initiative participants a video or arrange site visits to
the port of Rotterdam, where DOE has completed equipment installations
in a pilot project at one port terminal, so that they can witness port
operations and have an example of how the equipment will be operated in
their country.
A second impediment to negotiating agreements with foreign governments
is their reluctance to hire additional officials (generally customs
agents) to operate and maintain the equipment DOE provides through the
Initiative. Although some foreign governments have large numbers of
personnel at their ports to regulate imports and exports, others lack
the staff necessary to both perform other port functions and operate
and monitor the radiation detection equipment DOE provides. For
example, the Dutch government expressed this reservation before it
agreed to participate in the Initiative, and Dutch officials told us
that they will need to hire and train an additional 40-60 customs
agents when radiation detection equipment is installed at all port
terminals in Rotterdam. The need for additional workers, combined with
limited financial resources, may prevent some countries from
participating in the Megaports Initiative. However, DOE officials told
us that they do not believe that this impediment would prevent a
foreign government's participation in the Initiative.
DOE officials told us that they are in the process of negotiating with
the governments of 18 countries to gauge their interest in
participating in the Initiative. According to DOE officials, the
Initiative has primarily focused on engaging countries that have ports
ranked in the top 50 by DOE's model, but it also pursues ports of
special interest that may be ranked lower than 50. DOE plans to begin
work at Antwerp and to complete the installations in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, Freeport, Bahamas, and Algeciras, Spain by the end of fiscal
year 2005,[Footnote 13] but complications may prohibit DOE from meeting
this goal. For example, a DOE official told us that program officials
are currently in the process of determining the impact of the December
2004 tsunami disaster on DOE's planned work at the port of Colombo, Sri
Lanka. According to a DOE official, resources for project construction
and materials may be affected. If so, DOE may not be able to complete
installation of radiation detection equipment at this port in fiscal
year 2005. Additionally, on March 10, 2005, DOE and the government of
Singapore signed an agreement to include the port of Singapore in the
Megaports Initiative. DOE officials also told us that they are close to
signing agreements to initiate work in five additional countries.
Figure 1 shows the location of the ports DOE completed in fiscal year
2004 and those it plans to complete in fiscal year 2005.
Figure 1: Ports Where DOE Has Completed Installations and Those Where
It Plans to Begin Work or Complete Installations in Fiscal Year 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOE Has Completed Installations at 2 Ports That Were Ranked Lower in
Priority Than Other Foreign Seaports by DOE's Model:
DOE has completed work at only two ports: Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
and Piraeus, Greece, both of which were ranked lower in priority than
other foreign seaports by DOE's model. The port of Rotterdam, which is
the largest in Europe and handles an estimated 40 percent of all
European shipments bound for the United States, became part of the
Initiative on August 13, 2003, when DOE signed an MOU with the Dutch
government. DOE installed a limited number of vehicle radiation
detection portal monitors at the largest of Rotterdam's four terminals,
which ships an estimated 87 percent of all of Rotterdam's cargo
destined for the United States (see figure 2). Initially, DOE planned
to install monitors at all four terminals at Rotterdam. However, as
discussions with Dutch officials progressed, the Dutch government
decided to limit its level of involvement in the Initiative by
permitting DOE to install monitors at only one of Rotterdam's four
terminals. Additionally, DOE trained 43 Dutch customs officials at its
training center at PNNL and conducted additional onsite training for
other Dutch customs officials. DOE also provided over 20 pieces of
handheld radiation detection equipment for use in conducting secondary
inspections.
Figure 2: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOE officials told us that they consider the installation at Rotterdam
a pilot project and believe it to be a success because, as a result of
their experience with it, the Dutch government agreed to pay for the
installation of radiation detection equipment throughout the rest of
the port. Dutch government officials told us that they plan to complete
the full installation of radiation detection equipment at all four
Rotterdam terminals by 2006. Although this type of cost-sharing
arrangement is not an established objective of the Initiative, DOE
officials believe that they may pursue other such pilot projects when a
host government requests limited assistance from DOE. DOE completed the
pilot project and the radiation detection equipment was fully turned
over to the Dutch government in April 2004. During fiscal year 2005,
DOE plans to conduct additional training on secondary inspection
methods at Rotterdam for between 20 and 30 Dutch customs officials and
will continue to provide equipment support and maintenance. Beyond
fiscal year 2005, DOE's involvement at the port will likely be limited
to training and technical consultations on future equipment
installations made by the Dutch government.
While the port of Piraeus, Greece, is not one of the largest container
ports in the world and was not ranked as a high priority by DOE's
model, security concerns at the port increased prior to the 2004
Olympic Games in Greece. The heightened importance of Piraeus, which is
about 6 miles from the center of Athens, led DOE to include the port in
the Megaports Initiative as part of its efforts to secure Greece prior
to the Olympic Games.[Footnote 14] Initially, the Greek Atomic Energy
Commission requested assistance from IAEA in identifying ways to
mitigate radiological and nuclear threats during the Olympics. IAEA
then approached DOE to consider including the port of Piraeus in the
Initiative. On October 30, 2003, DOE, the Greek Atomic Energy
Commission, and the Greek Customs Service signed a tripartite agreement
to include Piraeus in the Initiative. Because the design, construction,
installation, training, and equipment testing needed to be complete
before the Olympic Games, DOE executed the project on an accelerated
schedule and, as a result, completed all equipment installations in
July 2004. DOE installed a limited number of vehicle portal monitors at
the cargo terminal in Piraeus (see figure 3), and some portal monitors
(for both vehicles and pedestrians) at the passenger terminal of the
port of Piraeus. Piraeus has one of Europe's largest ferry terminals,
and the Greek government anticipated an increased volume of passenger
traffic associated with the Olympic Games. DOE officials told us that
providing radiation detection equipment to passenger terminals is
normally outside the scope of the Megaports Initiative, but the
potential security issues surrounding Greece's hosting of the Olympic
Games led DOE to provide radiation detection equipment to the Piraeus
passenger terminal. DOE also trained 10 Greek customs officials from
Piraeus at its training center and provided additional in-country
training to 50 Greek customs officials who work at the port. In fiscal
year 2005, DOE plans to provide additional onsite training to Greek
officials, determine whether any additional equipment installations are
necessary, and evaluate any equipment problems that arise.
Figure 3: Truck Passing through a Radiation Portal Monitor in Piraeus,
Greece:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOE's Megaports Initiative Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to
Guide Its Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Ports:
DOE's Megaports Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term plan
to guide the Initiative as it moves forward, which is particularly
important given DOE's recent proposal to expand the Initiative's scope
to include additional foreign seaports. To set the direction for the
Megaports Initiative, DOE currently uses three planning documents: the
Megaports Initiative Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan, the DOE Future
Years Nuclear Security Program, and the Megaports Initiative Strategy
Paper. The Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan is an evolving planning
document that incorporates day-to-day changes in program activities and
documents the scope of work to be conducted in this fiscal year. This
plan also includes a detailed activity-based budget for the current
fiscal year to guide the work of national laboratories and contractors
involved in the Initiative. The Future Years Nuclear Security Program
includes a 5-year financial-based projection of the number of ports to
be completed. Additionally, at a February 22, 2005, meeting to discuss
an early draft of this report, DOE officials provided us with a copy of
the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper. This two and one half-page
document provides a broad vision for the Initiative, and describes some
factors that may affect program success, but it contains few details
about how DOE plans to achieve the goals of the Initiative.
These three documents provide some elements that are needed in a long-
term plan for the Initiative. Specifically, the DOE Future Years
Nuclear Security Program establishes that the long-term goal for the
program is to install radiation detection equipment at 20 ports by 2010
and provides cost estimates for the Initiative.[Footnote 15] In
addition, the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper describes DOE's
approach for determining which ports to target for inclusion in the
Initiative and states that the Initiative's mission is to diminish the
probability of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other
radioactive material in the global maritime system that could be used
against the United States, its key allies, and international partners.
However, DOE's goal of completing 20 ports may not be an adequate
measure toward sufficiently addressing the overall threat of nuclear
smuggling in the international maritime system. As previously stated,
DOE uses its Maritime Prioritization Model to rank foreign ports on
their relative attractiveness to nuclear smugglers and as a tool to
help program officials decide which ports to pursue for inclusion in
the Initiative. DOE has annual performance measures to install
radiation detection equipment at a given number of ports to show
progress towards its long-term goal of completing installations at 20
ports by 2010. While using the number of ports completed annually
provides a broad measure of the Initiative's progress, this measure
does not take into account whether the ports where equipment is being
installed are of highest priority. That is, DOE has not tied its annual
performance measures of completing a certain number of ports to the
model it uses to determine which ports are of highest priority.
In addition, DOE did not meet its fiscal year 2004 performance measure
of completing three ports through the Megaports Initiative. DOE
officials stated that the Initiative did not meet this measure because
of their inability to sign agreements with foreign governments to
install radiation detection equipment. DOE's lack of progress in
gaining agreements with countries that contain high-priority ports has
led it to initiate work at ports that were not ranked as highest
priority by DOE's model. Developing a comprehensive long-term plan for
the Megaports Initiative would require DOE to, among other things,
develop criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports
to complete, or what other actions may be warranted, if it continues to
have difficulties gaining agreements to install radiation detection
equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE officials told us that
they intend to develop such a plan for the Initiative in the near
future.
Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on
Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain:
Since the inception of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003
through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on
Megaports Initiative activities. DOE spent these funds on such
activities as the completion of a pilot project at Rotterdam, the
Netherlands; equipment installations at Piraeus, Greece; the advanced
purchase of equipment for use at future ports; program oversight; and
the development and maintenance of DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model
(see figure 4).
Figure 4: Megaports Initiative Expenditures through the End of Fiscal
Year 2004 (dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
Note: Figures have been rounded.
[End of figure]
As figure 4 shows, DOE spent $13.8 million, or 32 percent of program
expenditures, to complete installations at Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
and Piraeus, Greece. DOE also spent an additional $238,000 on
activities related to future equipment installations in Freeport,
Bahamas. DOE spent $28.8 million on program integration activities,
which are costs not directly associated with installing equipment at a
specific port. Of this amount, $13.7 million was spent on advanced
equipment procurement activities, which include the purchase and
storage of approximately 408 portal monitors and associated spare parts
for use at future installations. DOE also spent $6.6 million on program
oversight activities, such as program cost and schedule estimating,
technical assistance provided by participating national laboratories,
contractor reviews of project work plans, travel coordination, and
translation services. In addition, $1.9 million was spent on other
program integration activities, such as the development of materials
and curricula for training foreign customs agents on the use of
radiation detection equipment.[Footnote 16]
DOE's current plan is to install radiation detection equipment at a
total of 20 ports by 2010 at an estimated cost of $337 million, but
several uncertainties may affect the Initiative's scope, cost, and time
frames for completion. First, DOE uses $15 million as its estimate for
what an average port should cost to complete, but this estimate may not
be accurate. Second, DOE is currently assessing whether the
Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports. Regarding the first
uncertainty, DOE officials told us that the primary basis for their $15
million per port cost estimate was DOE's prior experience deploying
radiation detection equipment at Russian land border crossings,
airports, and seaports. However, DOE acknowledged that the cost of
doing business in Russia may not be an accurate basis for developing
their per port cost estimate, and DOE has yet to reevaluate this
estimate in light of work it has performed installing radiation
detection equipment at ports. Furthermore, the costs of installing
equipment at individual ports vary and are influenced by factors such
as a port's size, its physical layout, existing infrastructure, and the
level of the host country's cooperation with DOE. For example, the port
of Antwerp, Belgium, which is the second largest port in Europe, will
be a much larger, more expensive and complex project than DOE's two
previously completed installations. According to DOE officials, because
of the large physical size of the port, an estimated 60 radiation
detection portal monitors will be required to complete the
installation. The age of the port and the geographic location of some
of the terminals will also create challenges in integrating information
generated from the radiation detection monitors to the central alarm
station where the alarm information will be processed and evaluated.
Additionally, another factor that may affect DOE's installation costs
at a particular port is that, as a result of negotiating agreements
with foreign governments, DOE's level of involvement at specific ports
may vary, affecting the amount of radiation detection equipment DOE
installs and, thereby, its installation costs. For example, although
the port of Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe, the Dutch
government chose to limit the scope of DOE's involvement at the port to
installing equipment at only one of the port's four terminals. This
resulted in DOE's costs at Rotterdam being significantly reduced
compared to what it would have cost to install equipment all four
terminals. DOE officials stated that as future agreements are reached
with foreign governments and more port installations are completed,
additional data will be gathered, which could assist them in refining
the average per port cost estimate. By the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE
plans to have completed installations at a total of five ports and
should have additional information with which to reevaluate the
accuracy of its current per port cost estimate. DOE officials told us
that they plan to reevaluate the cost estimate once these ports are
completed. A reevaluation of this estimate would allow DOE to better
project individual port costs, as well as the total future costs of the
Initiative. However, if DOE does not reevaluate its average per port
cost estimate it will be difficult to accurately determine the total
future costs of the Initiative and future annual funding needs.
DOE also is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should
increase beyond 20 ports. DOE officials told us that DOE did not intend
for the Initiative's initial goal to be static and they believe the
scope of the Initiative will likely increase in the future.
Additionally, these officials stated that if they determine that
installing radiation detection equipment at a total of 20 ports does
not sufficiently reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and
other radioactive materials, they plan to expand the scope of the
Initiative to include a greater number of ports. In its fiscal year
2006 budget proposal, DOE proposed expanding the scope of the
Initiative to 24 ports, but this scope expansion is subject to
congressional approval. If the scope of the Initiative increases, the
total costs and time frames for completion will also increase.
DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing
Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports:
In its effort to install radiation detection equipment at foreign
seaports, DOE faces several operational and technical challenges.
First, the capability of radiation detection equipment to detect
nuclear material depends on such factors as how fast containers pass
through the radiation portal monitors and how near the containers are
to the detection equipment. Additionally, some nuclear materials can be
shielded with lead or other materials to prevent radiation from being
detected. Compounding these challenges, DOE faces technical challenges
related to ports' physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations in
its effort to screen cargo containers for radioactive and nuclear
materials. Further, environmental conditions specific to ports, such
the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation
detection equipment's performance and long-term sustainability.
Several Factors Can Affect the Capability of Radiation Detection
Equipment to Detect Nuclear Material:
Three factors have an impact on the effectiveness of radiation
detection equipment: time, distance, and shielding. The time factor
refers to the amount of time that a radiation detector has to perform
the process of detecting radiological material. For example, trucks
carrying cargo containers are supposed to drive through a vehicle
radiation detector at a uniform controlled speed. Variation from this
program requirement can impact the radiation detection equipment's
performance. The distance between the radiation detection equipment and
the material being scanned also affects the effectiveness of the
equipment. As a general rule, the closer the nuclear material is to the
detector, the better the radiation detection equipment will perform.
Nuclear materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal
is used to shield them. For example, in July 2004, a container that
housed a small amount of radioactive material[Footnote 17] passed
through radiation detection equipment that DOE had installed at one of
the ports it has completed without being detected due to the presence
of the large amounts of scrap metal in the same container. The host
country's government later received information about the container,
which led to the discovery of the radioactive source. The host
country's government raised concerns that the radiation detection
equipment did not register an alarm during a scan of the container and
asked DOE to investigate the incident. DOE national laboratory experts
determined that the radiation detection equipment had been set to
program requirements. As a result, DOE national laboratory officials
and the host country's government decided not to alter the settings of
the radiation detection equipment.
A technical challenge is to detect and identify low-level radiation
sources in the presence of high background radiation levels. Detecting
actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material
is complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern in
terms of proliferation--highly enriched uranium--is amongst the most
difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of
radioactivity. Uranium emits only gamma radiation so the radiation
detection equipment, which contains gamma and neutron detectors, will
only detect uranium from the gamma detector. Plutonium emits both gamma
and neutron radiation. However, shielding of nuclear material does not
prevent the detection of neutron radiation and, as a result, plutonium
can be detected by neutron detectors regardless of the amount of
shielding. According to DOE officials, a neutron alarm can be caused by
only a few materials,[Footnote 18] while a gamma alarm can be caused by
a variety of sources including commercial goods such as bananas,
ceramic tiles and fertilizer and nuclear materials, such as plutonium
and uranium.
Once DOE finishes installing radiation detection equipment at a port
and hands control of the equipment over to the host government, the
United States no longer has control over the specific settings used by
the equipment or how the equipment is used by foreign government
customs officials. Settings can be changed to decrease the number of
nuisance alarms, which may also decrease the probability that the
equipment will detect nuclear material. Additionally, foreign customs
officials may decide not to perform secondary inspections when alarms
sound in order to increase the flow of traffic through a port.
Therefore, the level of effective use of the equipment is unclear.
According to DOE officials, the periodic maintenance DOE national
laboratory official perform on the radiation detection equipment helps
them to ensure that the equipment is set to the optimal calibrations
and operated appropriately. If the equipment settings have been
altered, the DOE officials can inquire about these discrepancies to the
foreign government and work to resolve any problems.
DOE Is Developing Methods to Overcome Technical Challenges Posed by
Ports' Physical Layouts and Cargo Stacking Configurations:
When implementing its Megaports Initiative at foreign ports, DOE has
the specific challenge of trying to screen all cargo passing through a
port. Currently, DOE usually installs radiation detection equipment at
locations within a port where natural choke points occur. These
locations slow down the transport of containers, making them optimal
locations for the installation of radiation detection equipment. At
some ports, however, a high percentage of cargo containers do not leave
the port but are gathered together in the shipyard and then shipped to
another location. DOE is addressing this problem in two ways: (1) by
placing radiation detection equipment within ports to be able to screen
cargo that moves between port terminals and (2) working with Los Alamos
National Laboratory (Los Alamos) to develop a mobile radiation
detection system for screening of this type of cargo. At some ports,
DOE plans to place radiation detection equipment at the exits of each
port terminal so that inter-terminal transport of cargo can be
monitored, despite the fact that the cargo does not leaving the port
itself. Additionally, Los Alamos officials are working to fit radiation
detection equipment onto a straddle carrier[Footnote 19] so that
containers that are awaiting transshipment can be scanned for the
presence of radiation. This carrier would be able to scan containers
stacked three containers high within the shipyard before they are
loaded onto the next ship. The straddle carrier would scan the stacked
containers with its radiation detection equipment to determine if
radiological materials are present and follow-up inspections would then
occur if necessary. See figure 5 for a diagram of the proposed straddle
carrier design modified to carry radiation detection equipment.
Figure 5: Design of Modified Straddle Carrier Fitted with Radiation
Detection Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Los Alamos officials, the modified straddle carrier will
be more effective than a vehicle radiation detection portal monitor
because the distance from the monitor to the container is greatly
reduced, which increases the overall detection capabilities of the
system. Los Alamos officials stated that they plan to test the design
in a foreign seaport in summer 2005. If this testing is successful, DOE
plans to implement this design in other ports that have similar cargo
stacking arrangements and that utilize straddle carriers. However, this
technology cannot remedy the entire problem DOE faces because many
ports stack greater than three containers on top of each other in their
shipyards and not all ports have straddle carriers because they move
their containers with other types of equipment and stack them in
different configurations. According to a DOE official, because the
straddle carrier solution will not work at all ports, DOE will continue
to seek additional solutions to this problem.
Environmental Conditions Can Affect Radiation Detection Equipment's
Performance and Sustainability:
Another technical challenge specific to ports is coping with
environmental conditions, particularly high winds and sea spray, which
can cause problems for radiation detection equipment. Wind disturbances
can vibrate the equipment and interfere with its ability to detect
radiation. For example, after the pilot project at Rotterdam was
completed, the bases of the radiation detection portal monitors DOE
installed had to be reinforced with steel plates to stabilize them
because high winds were causing them to vibrate and reducing their
capability to detect nuclear material. Sea spray may also affect
radiation detection equipment by corroding the equipment and its
components. The corrosive nature of sea spray combined with other
conditions such as coral in the water can accelerate the degradation of
equipment. If the equipment casing becomes corroded, moisture can get
into the equipment and affect its performance and long-term
sustainability. Corrosion and moisture can cause radiation detection
alarms to go off when they should not and not when they should. DOE and
national laboratory officials told us that they are analyzing the
problem to identify methods to alleviate sea spray's adverse effects on
the equipment. At one port where DOE plans to complete installations in
fiscal year 2005, sea spray is a potentially large problem. In December
2004, DOE convened a workshop of U.S. government officials and
contractors to discuss possible solutions to the sea spray problem. At
this workshop, several options for addressing the issue were discussed,
such as installing special stainless steel casings, installing bolts
and other hardware with protective coatings, and using nitrogen-filled
housings to protect the video cameras. DOE officials are considering
the recommendations from the workshop and how they should be
implemented in this port and at other ports where DOE plans to install
equipment.
Conclusions:
DOE uses a threat-and volume-based analysis to determine which foreign
seaports are of highest priority, and we believe that this is a sound
basis for targeting the expenditure of U.S. funds. While DOE has
completed work at two ports, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus,
Greece, both were ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports
by DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model. In addition, DOE has been
unable to reach agreement with many key countries that have ports
ranked as high priority by its model. If DOE continues to have
difficulty gaining agreements to install radiation detection equipment
at its highest priority ports, then this could raise questions about
the Initiative's effectiveness and about how many lower priority ports
to include. Currently, however, the Initiative's long-term goal is to
install radiation detection equipment at 20 foreign seaports regardless
of their priority. This goal is inconsistent with DOE's approach for
selecting high-priority ports and does not provide a reasonable measure
of long-term program success. Considering its limited progress at the
highest priority ports, a well thought out plan can be an important
guide for DOE's efforts in the further implementation of its Megaports
Initiative. However, to date, DOE has not developed such a plan for the
Initiative. Without a comprehensive long-term plan for the Initiative,
Congress may not be able to judge whether DOE is making progress
towards achieving the Initiative's long-term goals or how best to
assist DOE in working toward its goals. DOE officials told us that they
will be developing a plan for the Initiative in the near future, and we
agree that such a plan is needed.
While the cost of installing radiation detection equipment at a port is
dependent on a number of variables, such as the port's size, physical
layout, and existing infrastructure, the costs of installing equipment
at the two ports DOE has completed to date were significantly less than
the $15 million per port cost estimate that DOE used to develop its
long-term cost projection for the Initiative. DOE's $15 million
estimate for the average cost of installing equipment at a port was
based on the department's prior experience installing radiation
detection equipment at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports.
DOE officials acknowledged that the cost of doing business in Russia
may not be an accurate basis on which to estimate the costs of
installing such equipment at other foreign ports. Because DOE has not
yet reevaluated its per port cost estimate to reflect its recent
experience installing radiation detection equipment at ports, the
accuracy of DOE's long-term cost projection for the Initiative is
questionable. By the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have
completed installations at a total of 5 ports, and will have additional
information about the costs of these installations that could assist it
in refining its per port cost estimate and long-term cost projection
for the Initiative.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the
following two actions:
* Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of
the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures
that are consistent with DOE's desire to install radiation detection
equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE
will employ to determine how many and which lower priority ports it
will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty
installing equipment at the highest priority ports as identified by its
model, (3) projections of the anticipated funds required to meet the
Initiative's objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively
spending program funds.
* Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15
million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative's long-term
cost projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term
cost projection for the Initiative.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Department of Energy with a draft of this report for
its review and comment. DOE's written comments are presented as
appendix V. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations. In its
written comments, DOE also provided further clarification on the
evolution of its Maritime Prioritization Model. Specifically, DOE noted
that in the early stages of the Megaports Initiative, it focused on the
20 highest-volume-to-U.S. seaports, which was consistent with the
approach taken by the Department of Homeland Security's Container
Security Initiative. However, when DOE initially briefed us on its
model in July 2004, DOE had changed its prioritization approach and was
focusing almost entirely on a threat-based model. As DOE notes in its
comments, it did not present us with information on modifications to
its model until February 22, 2005, which was after DOE received an
early draft of this report for a factual review. DOE's new port
prioritization approach represents a combination of ports that ship
large volumes of containers to the United States and ports that lie in
regions of interest. DOE also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
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site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.]
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can
be reached at 202-512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report include R. Stockton Butler, Julie
Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Chris Ferencik, and F. James Shafer, Jr.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs"
United States Senate:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Chairman:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Ranking Minority Member:
Energy and Commerce Committee:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We performed our review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports
Initiative at DOE's offices in Washington, D.C; the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in Washington, D.C; the Department of State in
Washington, D.C; Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in Los
Alamos, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in
Albuquerque, New Mexico; and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Additionally, we visited completed Megaports Initiative installations
in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece.
To assess the progress DOE has made in implementing its Megaports
Initiative, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials
from DOE; DHS; Los Alamos; Sandia; DOE's private sector contractors--SI
International and Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler; and a number of
nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security
experts. In addition, in October 2004, we visited the Netherlands and
Greece to interview Dutch and Greek officials and to see the completed
Megaports Initiative installations at the ports of Rotterdam and
Piraeus, respectively. While in Rotterdam, we spoke with officials from
the Dutch Ministry of Finance, the Dutch Customs authority, the U.S.
Embassy in The Hague, and a U.S. official from Container Security
Initiative for the port of Rotterdam. We toured the Megaports
Initiative installations in Rotterdam and observed the radiation
detection equipment DOE installed. When we visited Piraeus, we
interviewed officials from the Greek Atomic Energy Commission; the Port
Authority of Piraeus; the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance,
Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service); DOE's contractors-
-Los Alamos, SI International, and Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler; and
officials from the Container Security Initiative in Piraeus. We toured
the Megaports Initiative installations at both the passenger and cargo
terminals at the port of Piraeus and observed the radiation detection
equipment DOE had installed. Additionally, while we were in Greece, we
toured (1) two border crossings where DOE had installed radiation
detection equipment through its Second Line of Defense-Core program
(SLD-Core), (2) the SLD-Core installations at the passenger arrival
area of Athens International Airport, and (3) a small research reactor
in Athens that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior to
the 2004 Olympic Games.
To better understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model and port
prioritization process, we met with officials from DOE and Sandia
National Laboratories in August 2004 to discuss the components of the
model, the types of data the model uses to rank foreign seaports, as
well as the port prioritization list DOE provided us in July 2004. DOE
and Sandia officials told us that the model was threat-based and that
the overall volume of containers shipped from a given port to the
United States accounted for only 20 percent of the port's overall
prioritization score. In addition, we reviewed a briefing packet on the
model developed by Sandia as well as the report of the Maritime
Prioritization Model Peer Review[Footnote 20] that was conducted in
August 2004 by members of academia, the intelligence community, and
industry experts. We also visited Sandia National Laboratories in
November 2004 and discussed the model and the results of the peer
review report with a Sandia official in charge of the development and
maintenance of the model. While we did not conduct an assessment of the
model, it is worth noting that we were informed by the DOE project
manager for the Megaports Initiative on January 24, 2005, that the port
prioritization list we were using was still the current operational
model that DOE was using for the Initiative. However, when we met with
DOE officials 2 weeks later on February 14, 2005, to discuss their
comments on a review of an early draft of this report they informed us
that, because they had made recent changes to the model, the
prioritization list we had been using was now outdated and no longer
accurate. At a February 22, 2005, meeting, DOE and Sandia officials
informed us that the revised model and port prioritization process,
among other things, (1) reduced the emphasis on the threat of nuclear
smuggling at individual ports and placed a greater emphasis on ports
with a high volume of cargo containers that enter and exit the port by
land, rather than cargo that is transshipped and (2) deemphasized the
risk from spent (used) nuclear fuel in a target country. DOE also
provided us with a new prioritization list that showed its 35 highest
priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked from highest
to lowest priority.
We also spoke with DOE officials about strategic planning and reviewed
DOE documentation, such as the Megaports Program Work Plan for Fiscal
Year 2005 and DOE's Future Years Nuclear Security Program. We reviewed
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the President's
Management Agenda from fiscal year 2002, and several of our previous
reports on strategic planning and related topics.
To assess the current and expected costs of the Initiative, we reviewed
DOE documents detailing program expenditures, projected costs, and
schedule estimates. We reviewed contract data for expenditures through
the end of fiscal year 2004 and met numerous times with DOE agency
officials to discuss the data. We obtained responses from key database
officials to a number of questions focused on data reliability covering
issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the
accuracy and completeness of the data. Follow-up questions were added
whenever necessary. We also reviewed DOE's 2004 Performance and
Accountability Report. A caveat worth noting is that although DOE
gathers and maintains expenditure data reported by contractors
assisting in implementing the Megaports Initiative, rather than
conducting routine follow-up checks to corroborate the data reported by
the contractors, DOE officials noted that periodic follow-up checks
will be conducted, if necessary. In addition, during the course of our
review we found that for fiscal year 2004, approximately $5.45 million
in program expenditures had been inappropriately costed to the
Megaports Initiative, which should have been costed to the SLD-Core
program. As a result, total expenditures for the Megaports Initiative
are $5.45 million less than what is reflected in DOE's fiscal year 2004
financial reports. DOE officials told us that this mistake will be
corrected and reflected in DOE's fiscal year 2005 financial reports. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report based on work we performed.
To identify challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection
equipment at foreign ports, we examined documents and spoke with
officials from DOE, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, and nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation
and port security experts. We also attended a National Academies of
Science conference on non-intrusive technologies for improving the
security of containerized maritime cargo. Additionally, we attended the
National Cargo Security Council conference on Radiation Detection and
Screening.
We conducted our review between June 2004 and March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: National Laboratory and Contractor Roles:
DOE National Laboratories:
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia):
In addition to developing and maintaining the Maritime Prioritization
Model, Sandia also conducts research related to international threat
information, which is used to maintain the Megaports Design Basis
Threat document. This document contains information on both known
maritime smuggling activities and plans by terrorist organizations
seeking to acquire nuclear and other commodities that have parallels to
nuclear smuggling patterns. Related to this, Sandia maintains a seaport
information database and develops port specific background papers to
assist DOE in evaluating ports for engagement. Furthermore, Sandia
officials conduct port familiarization visits and technical site visits
in order to gain a general understanding of port operations as well as
to determine specific information on the physical layout of the port,
security, port traffic, shipping volume, the host country's commitment
level to implementing the Initiative, training needs, and other
relevant information. This information is used to develop vulnerability
assessments, which help DOE determine the most cost-effective locations
at a seaport in which to install the equipment.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL):
PNNL provides specific in-country training to foreign customs
officials, as well as training at DOE's Hazardous Materials Management
and Emergency Response facility. Training includes hands-on instruction
in the use of the radiation detection equipment and systems provided
under the Initiative and covers operation, maintenance, and appropriate
response protocols. To do this training, PNNL purchases presentation
equipment and handheld radiation detection equipment and develops and
maintains training props and related documentation. Training is
tailored to each port and developed and delivered by technical experts
in the form of presentations, manuals, hands-on practical exercises,
field training, videos, and interactive games. In addition, PNNL
provides the Initiative with a certified project manager at each port
who assists the federal project manager in overseeing the
implementation of the Initiative at a given port and is the primary
point of contact responsible for integrating all the work conducted by
the participating national laboratories and contractors.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos):
Los Alamos provides expertise in radiation detection technologies and
is the lead national laboratory for testing and evaluating the
performance of radiation detection equipment. Los Alamos tests the
deployed radiation detection equipment and supports Sandia in
performing site surveys and preparing design requirements documents. In
addition, Los Alamos technical experts analyze portal detection
performance data to ensure the deployed equipment is meeting current
detection requirements. Los Alamos has also conducted equipment testing
in order to overcome challenges associated with scanning transshipped
cargo.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge):
Oak Ridge provides technical assistance at DOE headquarters on the
communications infrastructure associated with the installation of
radiation detection equipment at foreign ports and assists with the
testing and evaluation of radiation detection equipment. Oak Ridge
officials told us that a trainer from Oak Ridge will be provided to
assist in each of the classes conducted for foreign customs officials
at PNNL's Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response
training facility during fiscal year 2005.
Private Contractors:
TSA Systems:
TSA Systems is a private contractor that manufactures the radiation
portal monitors that DOE installs at foreign ports and also provides
technical support to DOE on the equipment. According to TSA officials,
each site is visited yearly to check the monitors for damage and to
perform routine maintenance. In addition, TSA has modified radiation
portal monitors to address challenges specific to particular ports. For
example, TSA installed stabilization plates on portal monitors at
Rotterdam to deal with high winds at the port.
Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler:
Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler is an engineering and construction company
who was the primary contractor in charge installing equipment at
Rotterdam and Piraeus. Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler also led the
construction of the associated infrastructure to support the radiation
detection equipment at these ports.
Ahtna Government Services Corporation (Ahtna):
Ahtna will be the primary contractor for the design and construction of
future Megaports Initiative installations. Ahtna was not involved in
the installation of equipment in Rotterdam or Piraeus. Ahtna has
entered into a subcontract with the former design build contractor,
Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, to support design and construction
activities at future installations.
Technology Ventures Incorporated:
Technology Ventures Incorporated provides logistical support to DOE's
Megaports Initiative by storing and shipping radiation portal monitors
that DOE procures in advance for installation at future ports.
SI International:
SI International provides DOE with technical support related to the
development and installation of the communications infrastructure
associated with radiation detection equipment installed under the
Initiative. SI International staff provide onsite training to foreign
customs officials in operating and maintaining the communications
systems.
Miratek:
Miratek helps DOE manage and maintain budget and expenditure data for
the Megaports Initiative.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or Initiated
Work:
Rotterdam, the Netherlands:
The Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy (DOE) on August 13,
2003, to include the port of Rotterdam in the Megaports Initiative. The
Netherlands was the first European Union country to join the
Initiative. Rotterdam is Europe's largest port. The volume of
containers passing through Rotterdam is roughly 7 million twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEU) annually, about 6 percent of which is shipped to
the United States.[Footnote 21] Approximately 20 percent of cargo
passing through Rotterdam is transshipped, meaning it does not pass
through any natural choke points, such as vehicle or rail entry and
exit gates. Containers at the port are handled primarily in four
container terminals. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security
began conducting Container Security Initiative (CSI) activities at
Rotterdam in June 2002.
Piraeus, Greece:
The Directorate General of Customs and Excise of the Ministry of
Economy and Finance of the Hellenic Republic, the Greek Atomic Energy
Commission, and DOE signed a tripartite agreement on October 30, 2003
to include the port of Piraeus in the Megaports Initiative. The port is
located in the southwestern Aegean Sea on the innermost point of the
Saronikas Gulf. The port received increased attention because of
security concerns associated with the 2004 Olympic Games. Piraeus was
also considered a significant port for inclusion in the Initiative
because it not only serves as a major seaport for Greece, but also is
the third largest passenger port in the world. The volume of containers
passing through Piraeus is about 1.6 million TEUs annually. In
addition, roughly 11,000 TEUs were shipped from Piraeus directly to the
United States during 2003. Greece was the second European Union country
to join the Initiative and become fully operational. CSI also began
operations at Piraeus in June 2004.
Colombo, Sri Lanka:
The Ministry of Ports and Aviation of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka and DOE signed an MOU on July 20, 2004 to include the port
of Colombo in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the
southwest coast of the country. The port of Colombo has a high level of
container traffic--over 1.9 million TEUs annually. The port uses cranes
to move containers within and out of the terminals. DOE anticipates
using vehicle monitors to screen all containers imported to Sri Lanka,
all export containers originating in Sri Lanka, and all inter-terminal
transshipment containers as they exit the terminals. CSI became
operational at Colombo in June 2003.
Antwerp, Belgium:
The Federal Public Service of Finance of the Kingdom of Belgium signed
an MOU with DOE on November 24, 2004 to include the port of Antwerp in
the Megaports Initiative. Antwerp is the 4TH largest seaport in the
world and the largest port in Belgium. Container traffic through the
port is over 5 million TEUs annually, while traffic to the United
States accounts for nearly 5 percent of the total annual container
traffic through Antwerp. In 2003, Antwerp ranked 9TH in the world for
total volume of container traffic shipped to the United States.
Additionally, there are direct cargo routes from Antwerp to many major
U.S. seaports. The port is geographically split into a right and a left
bank. While the right bank is fully operational, the left bank has two
operational terminals with another two large terminals currently under
construction. When the terminals are completed, the volume of cargo
passing through the port will double. In addition, CSI began operations
at Antwerp in June 2002.
Algeciras, Spain:
The Central Agency for Tax Administration of the Kingdom of Spain
signed an MOU with DOE on December 21, 2004 to include the port of
Algeciras in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the
southernmost tip of Spain adjacent to Gibraltar. It is the 25TH largest
container port in the world with container traffic through the port
being over 2.5 million TEUs annually. The port is strategically
important in its location because, in addition to being a through route
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean, and on to the Far East,
the port lies on the crossroads of the busiest sea-lanes that use the
Suez Canal. Spain's cooperation with DOE currently includes only the
port of Algeciras, the Spanish port DOE was most interested in.
However, the Spanish government wants DOE to consider installing
equipment at the ports of Valencia and Barcelona as well. Currently,
DOE is considering this request, including the possibility of using a
cost-sharing arrangement similar to the one used in Rotterdam. In
addition, CSI became operational at the port in January 2003.
Freeport, Bahamas:
The Ministry of Finance of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and DOE
signed an MOU on December 30, 2004 to include the port of Freeport in
the Megaports Initiative. Freeport has a high level of container
traffic moving through the port. In particular, container traffic to
the United States accounts for over 16 percent of the total annual
container traffic through the port. Additionally, container traffic
being shipped from Freeport accounts for a total of approximately 1.2
percent of all container traffic to the United States. In addition, CSI
is not scheduled to be operational at Freeport.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in Greece Prior to
the 2004 Olympic Games:
In addition to the work done by the Megaports Initiative at the port of
Piraeus, Greece, DOE conducted three other efforts to increase security
in Greece prior to the 2004 Summer Olympics. First, the Second Line of
Defense-Core program installed radiation detection equipment at three
land border crossings and at the Athens International Airport to assist
Greek authorities in preventing nuclear smuggling. Second, the
International Radiological Threat Reduction program helped secure 21
sites around Greece that contain radiological sources that could be
used to make a radiological dispersion device (also known as a "dirty
bomb"). Finally, the International Nuclear Materials Security program
upgraded the physical security around Greece's only nuclear reactor--a
small research reactor used for research and training--located in
Athens.
Second Line of Defense-Core Program:
The Second Line of Defense-Core program (SLD-Core) installed radiation
portal monitors in four locations throughout Greece: three land border
crossing and a large airport. According to DOE officials, the total
cost of these projects was about $15 million. The projects began in
October 2003 and were completed in July 2004. DOE and national
laboratory officials also provided technical assistance and training to
Greek customs officials during the period of the Olympic Games. Figure
6 shows an example of the radiation portal monitors DOE supplied
through the SLD-Core program.
Figure 6: Radiation Portal Monitors at a Northern Greek Border Crossing:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to the training provided through the Megaports Initiative
to Greek customs officials working at the port of Piraeus, DOE provided
detailed training to 20 Greek customs officials who work at land border
crossings at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response
center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Additionally, about
400 Greek customs agents were trained at various sites around Greece.
In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct sustainability work and
additional training at these sites.
Finally, DOE supplied over 450 pieces of handheld radiation detection
equipment some of which were intended for use at Olympic venues. This
equipment included handheld gamma radiation detectors, radioactive
isotope identification devices, and radiation detection pagers (see
figures 7 and 8). According to an agreement between the Greek Atomic
Energy Commission and DOE, after the Olympic Games, these handheld
devices were to be distributed to border locations throughout Greece
that did not receive other DOE assistance.
Figure 7: A Handheld Gamma Radiation Detector and a Radioactive Isotope
Identification Device:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Radiation Detection Pager:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
International Radiological Threat Reduction Program:
Through its International Radiological Threat Reduction program, DOE
spent $780,000 to increase security at 21 sites throughout Greece that
contained radiological sources of a type and size that could be used
for a dirty bomb and to provide additional handheld radiation detection
equipment for first responders in Greece. DOE secured sites that
included facilities with blood irradiator units containing cesium
chloride sources, a large industrial sterilization facility, and
oncology clinics that had medical isotopes used in cancer therapy.
Figure 9 shows a teletherapy unit containing a radiological source,
which is used to treat cancer.
Figure 9: Teletherapy Unit Containing Radioactive Source, Prior to
Receiving Physical Security Upgrades:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Additionally, DOE provided handheld radiation detection equipment to
Greece through the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer
project. Through this project, DOE donated 110 handheld radiological
detection devices that DOE national laboratories had previously deemed
surplus. DOE officials said that Greece was not high on the list of
target countries for assistance through the International Radiological
Threat Reduction program, but because of the increased security needs
for the Olympic Games, DOE expedited assistance to Greece. DOE began
this project in October 2003 and completed the upgrades in May 2004.
International Nuclear Materials Security Program:
DOE spent about $1 million to upgrade the physical security of Greece's
only nuclear reactor--a small, 5-megawatt research reactor located in
Athens known as the Greek Research Reactor-1. DOE and the Greek Atomic
Energy Commission believed that it was important to upgrade the
physical security of this reactor primarily because the reactor is
fueled with a mix of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium.
This site is the only location in Greece with weapons-usable nuclear
material. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission is in the process of
converting the reactor to use only low enriched uranium fuel.[Footnote
22]
To upgrade the physical security of the reactor, DOE installed a new
perimeter detection system that included closed-circuit television,
hardened windows and doors on the reactor building, a new central alarm
station, and enhanced lighting of the building's perimeter. As an
additional security measure, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission shut
down the research reactor during the period of the Olympics Games.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
March 18, 2005:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to have reviewed the Government Accountability Office's
draft report, GAO-05-375, "PREVENTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DOE Has Made
Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest
Priority Foreign Seaports." We understand that this audit was conducted
to determine the progress, costs, and challenges of the subject
initiative.
We acknowledge and appreciate that GAO, after discussions with our
program element, has incorporated changes to the original draft report
that adds clarity to the report. It is important to note that NNSA is
focusing a significant amount of its resources on negotiations with
foreign governments. We have had teams visit over 20 countries to
discuss cooperation and negotiate agreements. In fact, we have
completed agreements and are implementing installations at five
additional ports and expect to sign up to five more agreements in the
next few months as noted in the revised draft report.
Regarding the evolution of the Maritime Prioritization Model, we note
that the model is only a tool to aid program officials in decision-
making and it does provide valuable information to program officials.
The data output obtained from the model, combined with other factors,
such as the willingness of a host country to engage in cooperation with
the U.S., our ability to effectively implement in a given port, the
host country's ability and commitment to effectively operate and
maintain the systems for the long term, and other political factors
significantly influence programmatic priorities. In the early stages of
the Mega-ports Initiative, the top 20 highest-volume-to-U.S. seaports
were the primary focus, consistent with the approach of the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Container Security Initiative (CSI). At
that time we clearly placed high priority on sheer container volume and
therefore focused our efforts on screening as many U.S.-bound
containers as possible. Over time we came to more thoroughly understand
the diversity and complexity of port operations and configurations and
the technical challenges that this presents. As a result, major
adjustments to the model were initiated in the summer 2004. While the
relative ranking of some of the ports on our priority list changed, the
total pool of ports of interest remained largely the same. On February
22, 2005, DOE presented information to the GAO on modifications and
enhancements that had been made to the Maritime Prioritization Model,
including a revised pool of priority ports. The most recent pool of
ports represents a combination of ports that ship large volumes of
containers to the U.S. and ports that lie in regions of interest (i.e.,
threat). We are focusing our efforts on the ports on this list and are
at some level of engagement with over 20 of the included countries.
Given the dynamic nature of maritime shipping, NNSA expects the
priority list will change over time. Port capacities may increase, the
threat could change, and other factors may arise that make a port a
priority for implementation.
NNSA generally agrees with the report's recommendations. We have
attached our specific comments to the report's recommendations. Should
you have any questions related to this response, please contact Richard
Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management at 202-586-
5009.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
Enclosure:
cc: Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
Robert Braden, Senior Procurement Executive:
Karen Boardman, Director, Service Center:
Comments to GAO's Draft Report, GAO-05-375 "PREVENTNG NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation
Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports"
Comment:
NNSA agrees with the recommendations for Executive Action and will take
the appropriate actions to meet the intent expressed in GAO's report.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
"We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the
following actions:"
Recommendation 1:
Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of
the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures
that are consistent with DOE's desire to install radiation detection
equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE
will employ to determine how many and which lower priority ports it
will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty
installing equipment at the highest priority ports as identified by its
model, (3) projections of the anticipated funds required to meet the
Initiative's objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively
spending program funds.
Management Comment:
Concur:
While NNSA does not have a single document that portrays the
comprehensive long-term plan for its Megaports Initiative, we do have
the elements needed to develop the long-term plan in three separate
planning documents. We agree that a comprehensive long-term plan is
appropriate and we are currently working to produce this unified
document.
Recommendation 2:
Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15
million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative's long-term
cost projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term
cost projection for the Initiative.
Management Comment:
Concur:
By the end of Fiscal Year 2005, NNSA anticipates that the Initiative
will have completed installations at five ports. It is at that point
that NNSA will conduct a comprehensive cost analysis to assess the
accuracy of the per port estimate for the Initiative. It is at that
point that NNSA will adjust our long-term cost projections and inform
Congress of same.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate
the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United
States and Russia. GAO-05-57. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce
the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. GAO-
04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Material, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-
426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
(360481):
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Weapons-usable nuclear material is uranium enriched to 20 percent
or greater in uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium
containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less
than 10 percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These
types of material are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.
[2] The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately
organized agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the
nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
[3] DOE's Second Line of Defense-Core (SLD-Core) program, which
installs radiation detection equipment at international land border
crossings, airports, and seaports in Russia and other countries, has
also installed equipment at some Russian ports. These ports are
considered part of the SLD-Core program, not the Megaports Initiative.
As a result, for the purposes of this report, we have not included
discussions of work DOE performed at these ports in Russia.
[4] For additional information about CSI, see GAO, Container Security:
Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to
Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003)
and related GAO products cited at the end of this report.
[5] No installation of equipment may take place before DOE and the host
country have signed an agreement or memorandum of understanding, which
is typically a non-binding political document.
[6] For more information about the roles of each of the DOE national
laboratories and private contractors that participate in the Megaports
Initiative, see app. II.
[7] There are three primary categories within the Maritime
Prioritization Model: (1) country score, (2) port security score, and
(3) shipping lane score.
[8] The Maritime Prioritization Model peer review panel consisted of
members from academia, industry, and federal agencies with experience
in maritime commerce operation, intelligence, and counterterrorism.
[9] To expedite implementation of the Initiative, DOE may choose on a
case-by-case basis to conduct technical site visits prior to the
negotiation and signature of an MOU.
[10] Natural sources of radiation, which are usually relatively
harmless, occur in a wide variety of common items and consumer goods,
such as bananas, fertilizer, and ceramic tiles.
[11] Training provided through the Megaports Initiative is an ongoing
process that begins once agreements are reached with the host country
and continues through the maintenance and sustainability phase for each
port.
[12] At a February 14, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of this
report, DOE officials informed us that revisions had been made to DOE's
Maritime Prioritization Model and port prioritization process, but they
did not provide us with a revised prioritization list. We met with
officials from DOE and Sandia National Laboratories on February 22,
2005, to discuss these changes. These officials informed us that the
revised prioritization model and process, among other things, placed a
greater emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that
enter and exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transferred
from one ship to the port's dock and then onto another ship (known as
transshipment). At this meeting, DOE provided us with a new
prioritization list showing its 35 highest priority ports listed
alphabetically, rather than ranked from highest to lowest priority. The
revisions to DOE's model and prioritization process resulted in a
higher prioritization for some ports where DOE had completed or
initiated work. A more detailed discussion about our work to better
understand DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model and port prioritization
process can be found in appendix I.
[13] See appendix III for profiles of each of the ports where DOE has
completed installation of equipment or is currently initiating work.
[14] DOE also performed other related work in Greece prior to the
Olympic Games. See app. IV for additional information on this work.
[15] In its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, DOE proposed expanding
the scope of the Megaports Initiative to 24 ports. However, because
this is a budget proposal and is subject to congressional approval, the
official scope of the program currently remains at 20 ports.
[16] Once an agreement or memorandum of understanding is reached with a
foreign government to include a port in the Initiative, all past and
present program integration expenditures that can be directly
associated with that port are transferred to an expenditure category
for that specific port.
[17] This particular radioactive isotope is commonly used for medical
practices as cancer treatment and commercially for the sterilization of
food products. Sufficient amounts of this material could be used by
terrorist to construct a "dirty bomb."
[18] According to DOE, cosmic radiation can also activate a neutron
alarm. At Rotterdam, DOE had difficulty identifying the cause of many
nuisance neutron alarms from the radiation detection equipment. After
testing, DOE and national laboratory officials determined that cosmic
radiation was interfering with the calibration of the radiation
detection equipment. DOE national laboratory officials installed a
software program to solve this problem.
[19] A straddle carrier is a piece of equipment used at ports to
transport cargo containers from various port locations.
[20] The Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review took place from
August 17-18, 2004 at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point,
NY.
[21] Twenty-foot equivalent units are a standard unit of measurement
for cargo capacity. One TEU equals a standard container measuring
approximately 20 ft long and 8 ft wide.
[22] We recently reported on research reactors, see GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the
Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United
States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004) and
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce
the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-
04-807 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).
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