Nuclear Security
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat Gao ID: GAO-05-611 July 15, 2005A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"--modeled on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-611, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-611
entitled 'Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat' which was released on July
26, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
July 2005:
Nuclear Security:
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis
Threat:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-611]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-611, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site
containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for
the site and nearby communities. DOE‘s Office of the Under Secretary
for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE
operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that
contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary
force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces
are meeting DOE‘s existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions
DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the
terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat
(DBT) by DOE‘s implementation deadline of October 2008.
What GAO Found:
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade
nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness
requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces
generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical
fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE
sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment.
However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely
affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For
example, despite the importance of training exercises in which
protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock
terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for
individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises,
nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another
example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the
ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems.
Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO
interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications
as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual.
Security officials stated that improvements were under way.
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include
transforming its current protective force into an ’elite force“”modeled
on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security
technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an
attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between
and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE
management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure
coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear
material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite
force, are in early stages of development and will require significant
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their
completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is
uncertain.
DOE Protective Force Member:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the terrorist
threat contained in the 2004 DBT, GAO is making five recommendations to
the Secretary of Energy to, among other things, address weaknesses with
protective officers‘ equipment and coordinate ESE efforts to address
the 2004 DBT. DOE concurred with the report, accepted GAO‘s
recommendations and provided an update on actions it anticipated taking
to address GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-611.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or AloiseE@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness
Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist:
DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated
Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites:
Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding
Requests for Security:
Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment:
Figure:
Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request:
Abbreviations:
CFR: Code of Federal Regulations:
DBT: design basis threat:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EM: Environmental Management:
ESE: Energy, Science and Environment, DOE's Office of the Under
Secretary for:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
Letter July 15, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles F. Grassley:
United States Senate:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful
terrorist attack on a site containing the material used in nuclear
weapons, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, could have
devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities.
The risks associated with these materials, which in specified forms and
quantities are referred to as Category I special nuclear material, vary
but include theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of
improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear yield; and
the creation of so-called "dirty bombs," in which conventional
explosives are used to disperse radioactive material.
Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an
effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years,
a key component for DOE security programs has been the development of
the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies
the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. DOE issued its
current DBT in October 2004 in response to recommendations in our April
2004 report,[Footnote 1] congressional criticism, and a new review of
intelligence data. The October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist
threat for DOE sites than had previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not
requiring full compliance until October 2008 in order to allow its
sites adequate time to implement measures to defeat this larger
terrorist threat. Private contractors, who operate DOE's facilities,
counter the terrorist threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, a
key universal component of DOE's protective system is a heavily armed
protective force equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night
vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective gear.
The following two major organizations in DOE are responsible for
securing Category I special nuclear material:
* The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately
organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation's nuclear
weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special
nuclear material.
* DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and
Environment (ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as
energy research, basic physical science research, and environmental
cleanup and manages five sites that collectively contain substantial
quantities of Category I special nuclear material.
We reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 and April
2004.[Footnote 2] We found that NNSA needed to improve the management
of its safeguards and security program and that while some action had
been taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
additional action was needed to ensure that DOE's sites were adequately
prepared to defend themselves. Since the attacks of September 11, DOE
has focused on the security of its NNSA sites more than it has on its
ESE sites.[Footnote 3] Consequently, you asked us to determine for the
five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material (1) the extent
to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness
requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to
successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat identified in
the October 2004 DBT by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are
meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies
and other pertinent literature about the factors that affect the
readiness of forces, such as military forces, that are like those
defending ESE sites. We conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE
protective force officers at the five ESE sites that contain Category I
special nuclear material. While the responses from these interviews are
not projectable to the entire universe of ESE protective force
officers, we did speak to about 10 percent of the total protective
forces at the five sites. Even though not projectable, we randomly
selected protective force officers to interview at each site in order
to help assure their independence from the views of site management. We
asked the officers questions designed to determine their readiness to
defend the sites, including questions about their morale, training, and
equipment. We also reviewed the training records of the 105 officers to
determine if key elements of their training complied with existing DOE
training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected firearms and
physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied
with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we reviewed
the equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it met
current DOE requirements. Further details on our interview procedures
and random selection methods are found in the scope and methodology
appendix at the end of this report.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully
defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by
DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October
2004 DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October
2004 DBT with officials in DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance and with officials in ESE's Offices of
Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and
Science. Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by
ESE officials on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT.
Appendix I presents a detailed description of our scope and
methodology. We performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special
nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements.
However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely
affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With
respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed
stated that they believed that they and their fellow officers
understood what was expected of them if the site were attacked by a
terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as
highly ready to defend their site while 20 officers rated themselves as
somewhat or moderately ready. Supporting their views, we found that the
five ESE sites we visited had the required training programs,
facilities, and equipment, and that the 105 protective force members
whose records we reviewed generally complied with existing DOE
standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and
equipment standardization. However, we did identify some weaknesses.
For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which
protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock
terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE does not have a requirement
for individual protective force officers to participate in these
exercises or a requirement that sites track the individual officers'
participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we
interviewed stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise,
only 46 of the 84 protective force officers believed that the force-on-
force exercises they had participated in were either realistic or
somewhat realistic. Additionally, protective force officers often told
us that they did not have frequent and realistic tactical training. In
another example, 66 of the 105 protective force officers, at all five
of the ESE sites, stated that they did not always have dependable radio
communications. However, according to DOE Manual 473.2-2 Protective
Force Program Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be
capable of intelligible two-way communications. Site security officials
stated that improvements were under way and would be completed this
year. Finally, some ESE sites currently do not have the protective
force capabilities found at NNSA sites with similar special nuclear
material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites
with Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored
vehicles. However, only one ESE site with Category I special nuclear
material equipped protective forces with such vehicles at the time of
our review.
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to
take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the
transformation of its current protective force into an elite force, the
development and deployment of new security technologies, the
consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and
organizational improvements within ESE's security program. However,
because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early
stages of development and will require significant commitment of
resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the
2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. Specifically, the status
of these initiatives is as follows:
* Elite forces. DOE officials, and 85 of the 105 protective force
officers we interviewed, now believe that the way DOE sites, including
ESE sites, currently train their contractor-operated protective forces
will not be adequate to defeat the much larger terrorist threat
contained in the October 2004 DBT. In response, the department has
proposed the development of an elite force that would be patterned
after the U. S. military's Special Forces and might eventually be
converted from a contractor-operated force into a federal force.
However, this proposal is only in the conceptual phase, and completing
this effort by the 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely.
* New security technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the
effectiveness and survivability of its protective forces by developing
and deploying new security technologies. It believes technologies can
reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and can
provide additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen
of the 105 protective forces we interviewed generally supported this
view and said they needed enhanced detection technologies that would
allow them to detect adversaries at much greater ranges than is
currently possible at most sites. However, a senior DOE official
recently conceded that the department has not yet taken the formal
steps necessary to coordinate investment in emerging security
technologies and that the role of technology in helping sites meet the
new threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department's deadline of
October 2008 is uncertain.
* Consolidation and elimination of materials. ESE's current strategy to
meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on the consolidation and
elimination of special nuclear material between and among ESE sites.
For example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans
to down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful
isotopes at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory--an Office of Science
site. This action would eliminate most of the security concerns
surrounding the material. Neither program office, however, has been
able to formally agree on its share of additional security costs, which
have increased significantly because of the new DBT. In addition,
neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan
to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among the sites and
program offices to consolidate special nuclear material as we
recommended last year in our April 2004 report. In the absence of a
comprehensive plan, completing most of these consolidation activities
by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely.
* Organizational improvements. The ESE headquarters security
organization is not well suited to meet the challenges associated with
implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized
security organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE.
The individual who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been
detailed to the Office by DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance and has no programmatic authority or staff. This
lack of authority limits the Director's ability to facilitate ESE and
DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material down-blending at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other ESE
sites.
In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making five
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy to track and increase
protective force officer participation in force-on-force training
exercises, correct weaknesses with protective force officers'
equipment, coordinate implementation of DOE's various efforts designed
to meet the 2004 DBT, and create a more effective ESE security
organization.
We provided DOE with a copy of our report for review and comment. DOE
concurred with the report, accepted our recommendations, and provided
an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our
recommendations. While we believe that most of DOE's anticipated
actions will be responsive to our recommendations, we are concerned
about DOE's response to our recommendation that it develop a
departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT
requirements. Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE
cited only individual efforts to address the development of an elite
force, the deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the
consolidation of special nuclear material, not the development of a
comprehensive plan. While each of these efforts is important, we
continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the
requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an
integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.
Background:
The Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
comprises nine program offices, including the Offices of Environmental
Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science and
accounts for about 57 percent of DOE's fiscal year 2006 budget request
(see fig. 1).
Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ESE has five sites that collectively have substantial quantities of
Category I special nuclear material. (See table 1.) For fiscal year
2006, DOE requested over $300 million for security at these five sites.
This represents about 70% of the entire security budget request for
ESE. (See table 2.) Contractors operate all of these sites.
Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites:
Responsible program office: Office of Environmental Management;
Site: Savannah River Site;
Location: Aiken, South Carolina.
Responsible program office: Office of Environmental Management;
Site: Hanford Site;
Location: Richland, Washington.
Responsible program office: Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
Technology;
Site: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory;
Location: Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Responsible program office: Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
Technology;
Site: Argonne National Laboratory-West;
Location: Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Responsible program office: Office of Science;
Site: Oak Ridge National Laboratory;
Location: Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Source: GAO.
Note: The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known
as the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005. In addition,
federal oversight of the Idaho National Laboratory has been
consolidated at DOE's Idaho Operations Office. Previously, DOE's
Chicago Operations Office oversaw Argonne National Laboratory-West.
[End of table]
Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding
Requests for Security:
Dollars in millions.
Office of Environmental Management;
Total budget request: $6,505;
Total security request: $287;
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 4%.
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology;
Total budget request: $511;
Total security request: $75;
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 15%.
Office of Science;
Total budget request: $3,463;
Total security request: $74;
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 2%.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
Within DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's
Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to
guide the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE's overall
security policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and
Security Program, which was originally approved in 1995. The key
component of DOE's approach to security is the DBT, a classified
document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats
to DOE assets. A classified companion document, the Adversary
Capabilities List, provides additional information on terrorist
capabilities and equipment. The DBT has been traditionally based on a
classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential
terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. The threat from
terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in
the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a
multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from site
to site, all protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a
defense-in-depth concept that includes the following:
* a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;
* physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;
* numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;
* operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear
material; and:
* hardened facilities and vaults.
Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often
equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment,
body armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces
comprise Security Police Officers that are classified into three
groups: Security Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and
Security Police Officer-III. Security Police Officer-Is are only
assigned to fixed, armed posts. Generally, very few of these officers
are used at ESE sites because of the limited roles they can fill.
Security Police Officer-IIs generally are assigned to posts such as
access control booths, or to foot or vehicle patrols. Finally, Security
Police Officers-IIIs are responsible for operations such as hostage
rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material.
According to federal regulations, Security Police Officers-IIIs have
more demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security
Police Officers-Is or Security Police Officers-IIs. At the ESE sites we
visited, protective forces work for private contractors and are
unionized. The number of qualified Security Police Officers-IIs and
Security Police Officers-IIIs at ESE sites is shown in table 3.
Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment:
DOE site: Savannah River Site;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 551.
DOE site: Hanford Site;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 241.
DOE site: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 149.
DOE site: Argonne National Laboratory-West;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 48.
DOE site: Oak Ridge National Laboratory;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 51.
Total;
Security Police Officers (II and III): 1,040.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness
standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective
Force Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt.
1046, Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the
current Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although
protective forces are expected to comply with the duties and
requirements established in DOE policies, deviations from these
policies are allowed as long as certain approval and notification
criteria are met. Following are the three types of deviations:
* Variances: Variances are approved conditions that technically vary
from DOE security requirements but afford equivalent levels of
protection.
* Waivers: Waivers are approved nonstandard conditions that deviate
from DOE security requirements that, if uncompensated, would create a
potential security vulnerability. As such, waivers require
implementation of what DOE calls compensatory measures. Compensatory
measures could include deploying additional protective forces or
curtailing operations until the asset can be better protected.
* Exceptions: Exceptions are approved deviations from DOE security
requirements that create a safeguards and security vulnerability.
Exceptions are approved only when correction of the condition is not
feasible, and compensatory measures are inadequate.
In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE
protective systems, including protective forces, also must meet
performance standards. For example, DOE sites are required to
demonstrate that their protective systems are capable of defending
special nuclear material against terrorist forces identified in the
DBT. The performance of protective systems is formally and regularly
examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment
is a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and
quantitative techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and
arrive at effective protection of specific assets, such as special
nuclear material. To conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other
things, subject matter experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer
modeling to simulate attacks; and force-on-force exercises, in which
the site's protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of
mock terrorists. In addition to their use in evaluating the
effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes force-on-
force exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary
attacks that can be used to train protective forces.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its
contractors are complying with DOE's safeguards and security policies,
including protective force duties and requirements, and that its
systems are performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-
assessments and are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. In
addition to routine oversight, DOE orders require field offices to
comprehensively survey contractors' operations for safeguards and
security every year. DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance provides yet another check through its
comprehensive inspection program. This office performs comprehensive
inspections roughly every 18 months at each DOE site that has specified
quantities of Category I special nuclear material. All deficiencies
(findings) identified during surveys and inspections require the
contractors to take corrective action.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE security
policies have been under almost constant reexamination and have
undergone considerable change. For example, the department's security
polices have been undergoing a streamlining process for nearly 2 years.
In addition, as we pointed out in our April 2004 report, DOE worked for
almost 2 years to develop and issue a new DBT. When DOE issued its
first post-September 11 DBT in May 2003, we recommended that DOE
reexamine it because, among other things, it contained a terrorist
threat that was less than the threat identified in the intelligence
community's Postulated Threat. DOE agreed to reexamine the 2003 DBT and
issued a revised and more demanding DBT in October 2004. The October
2004 DBT significantly increased the terrorist threat to DOE facilities
and required enhanced protection strategies for DOE facilities. Under
the new DBT, sites with Category I special nuclear material will not
have to be fully prepared to defend their sites against the terrorist
threat contained in the new 2004 DBT until October 2008. By July 29,
2005, DOE sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting
quarterly DBT implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost
estimates were still preliminary, but security officials at ESE sites
said that they may require collectively an additional $384-$584 million
over the next several years in order for all ESE sites with Category I
special nuclear material to meet the 2004 DBT.
Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness
Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist:
We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we
interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are
ready to perform their mission of protecting the site's special nuclear
material. Consistent with that belief, the five ESE sites we visited
had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment, and the
105 protective force members whose records we reviewed were generally
meeting the readiness requirements contained in the DOE orders and
federal regulations. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites
that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to
defend their sites. These include protective force officers' lack of
regular participation in force-on-force exercises; the frequency and
quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable
communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, including
protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of
armored vehicles.
Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall
Readiness:
Readiness is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the ability
of forces to deploy quickly and to accomplish specific goals and
missions. In particular, DOD believes that a ready force should possess
a sufficient number of experienced, trained, and properly equipped
personnel. Through realistic and comprehensive training, these
personnel are forged into a cohesive unit that can perform its tasks
even under extreme conditions. DOE orders and federal regulations
establish the framework for ensuring that DOE protective forces are
ready to perform their mission.
ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to
perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we
interviewed stated that they believed that they, and their fellow
officers, understood what was expected of them should the site be
attacked by a terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated
the readiness of their site's protective force as high, while 20
officers rated their protective force as somewhat or moderately ready
to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16 of 105) we
interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites as
low. Two officers were uncertain of their forces' readiness, and two
did not respond to the question.
In addition, the majority of officers we interviewed believed they and
the protective force officers with whom they worked on a regular basis
formed a cohesive unit that would be able to perform their most
essential mission of protecting special nuclear material. Specifically,
of the 105 officers we interviewed,
* 86 reported that they were satisfied with their jobs,
* 73 reported that their morale was high or at least moderately high,
* 91 reported that protective force officers had developed the
necessary teamwork to defend the site against a terrorist attack,
* 84 officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in
their fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and:
* 88 reported that their fellow officers would be willing to risk their
lives in defense of their site.
ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment
Requirements We Reviewed:
As called for in DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is
achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five
sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site
generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges,
classrooms, computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled
them to meet their current DOE and federal training requirements.
Furthermore, each site maintained computerized databases for tracking
individual protective force officers' compliance with training
requirements. To determine if these programs and facilities were being
used to implement the DOE requirements and federal regulations, we
focused on three key areas--firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and
protective force officer equipment.
Firearms Proficiency:
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual states that protective force
officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the weapons that are
assigned to them every 6 months. According to the training records of
the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had met this
proficiency requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M-16
semiautomatic rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this
requirement within the 6 month time frame, 11 officers were all located
at one site with 8 of the 11 officers not meeting the requirement until
2 to 5 months after the required time. According to an official at this
site, 7 of the 8 officers could not complete the requirement in a
timely fashion because the site's firing range was closed for the
investigation of an accidental weapon discharge that had resulted in an
injury to a protective force officer. Although the DOE Protective Force
Program Manual provides guidance that allows for off-site training to
meet requirements, officials noted that a stand-down of all firearms
training prevented training requirements from being met. We determined
that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the requirement for medical
reasons. We were not given reasons why the remaining officers did not
meet the requirement.
Physical Fitness:
Under DOE regulations,[Footnote 4] protective force personnel employed
by DOE contractors who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a
minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two
standards for such personnel--Offensive Combative and Defensive
Combative. All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special
response team members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard which
requires a 1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40-
yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other
protective officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the
Defensive Combative standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no
more than 4 minutes 40 seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in
no more than 8.5 seconds. According to the training records of the 105
protective force officers we reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force
officers had met the standard required by federal regulation for their
position. Two officers who did not meet the requirement were on medical
restriction. The records for another officer showed him as having met
the requirement, but additional records provided by the site showed the
officer had completed the run in a time that exceeded the standard.
Site officials could not provide an explanation for this discrepancy.
Protective Officer Equipment:
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual sets a number of requirements for
protective force equipment. Among these requirements are the following:
* Minimum standard duty equipment. All Security Police Officers are
required to carry a minimum set of equipment, including a portable
radio, a handgun, and an intermediate force weapon such as a baton. In
addition, a mask to protect against a chemical attack must be carried
or available to them. All Security Police Officer-IIs and Security
Police Officer-IIIs must also have access to personal protective body
armor.
* Firearms serviceability. Firearms must be kept serviceable at all
times and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer at least twice a
year to ensure serviceability. All DOE sites with armed protective
force personnel are required to have the services of a certified
armorer who is responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and repairing
firearms.
* Firearms inventories. Issued firearms must be inventoried at the
beginning of each shift, and an inventory of all firearms in storage
must be conducted weekly. A complete inventory of all firearms must be
conducted on a monthly basis.
* Appropriate equipment to counter the DBT. In line with DOE's
performance standards, DOE protective forces equipment must be tailored
to counter adversaries identified in the DBT. To this end, sites employ
a variety of equipment including automatic weapons, night vision
equipment, and body armor.
In most cases, each site's protective forces carried or had access to
the required minimum standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated
that they had access to certified armorers, and each site maintained
the required firearms maintenance, inspection, and inventory records,
often kept in a detailed computerized database. We did not, however,
conduct a detailed inspection of these records nor did we conduct an
independent inventory of each site's firearms.[Footnote 5] The
appropriate policies and procedures were also in place for the
inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites have substantially
increased their protective forces weaponry since September 11, 2001, or
have plans to further enhance these capabilities to meet the 2004 DBT.
For example, one site provided us with a list of upgrades since
September 11, 2001, including new M-4 carbines, grenade launchers,
Barrett .50 caliber rifles, armor piercing ammunition, chemical and
biological protection suits, and decontamination kits, as well as
additional units that use specially trained dogs (K-9 units) and
portable X-ray machines to detect explosives.
Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist:
While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE
requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force
practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE
protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force
officers' lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises;
the frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of
dependable communications systems; and insufficient protective gear,
including protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the
lack of armored vehicles.
Performance Testing and Training:
According to DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, performance tests
are used to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force
programs and to provide needed training. Performance tests can also
identify protective systems requiring improvements, validate
implemented improvements, and motivate protective force personnel. A
force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which
the protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock
adversary force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies
postulated in the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a
valuable training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE
policy requires that force-on-force exercises must be held at least
once per year at sites that possess Category I quantities of special
nuclear material or Category II quantities that can be rolled up to
Category I quantities.
We asked protective force members whether they had participated in
force-on-force exercises during their service at their site and when
they most recently had participated. Eighty-four of the 105 protective
force officers we interviewed reported that they had participated in a
force-on-force exercise, but 8 reported they had never participated
during their service at the site, and 13 did not respond to this
question. Of the 84 protective force officers that had participated,
* 60 reported participating within 12 months of the interview,
* 10 had participated within the last 2 to 5 years,
* one had participated 13 years ago,
* one could not remember the last force-on-force he had participated
in, and:
* 12 did not respond to the question.
We were unable to verify whether protective force officers'
recollections were accurate because DOE sites are not required to track
individual participation in force-on-force exercises. However, DOE's
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of
protective forces found that the average protective force officer is
only likely to participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to
6 years. DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has
concluded that this frequency is not adequate for the training of
protective forces.
DOE's 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency,
quality, and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary
widely throughout the complex. Our interviews of protective force
officers and protective force managers produced a similar result. For
example, we asked protective force members whether they believed the
force-on-force exercises they participated in were realistic and
challenging. Only 23 of the 84 protective force officers that had
participated in these exercises believed they were realistic while 23
stated they were somewhat realistic. In contrast, 38 officers believed
that the force-on-force exercises they had participated in were not
realistic. Twenty officers did not respond to the question. In
addition, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported that safety
considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force
exercises with some protective force officers stating that they were
limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective
force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells,
climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some
protective force officers at one site reported that for safety reasons
they were no longer allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility
although this position provided a significant advantage over
adversaries approaching the facility. Some contractor protective force
managers agreed that safety requirements limited the kind of realistic
force-on-force training and other forms of realistic training that are
needed to ensure effective protective force performance.
More broadly, most of the 105 protective force officers reported some
negative attitudes about the training they had received. Specifically,
85 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed identified a
number of deficiencies with their training, especially regarding the
frequency and quality of firearms and tactical training. The following
deficiencies were identified:
* 43 protective force officers reported that there was a lack of
adequate firearms training, with 13 officers noting that the only
training they had was when they went to satisfy the semiannual DOE
qualification requirements. Some officers also reported that they did
not have first priority at firing ranges because other local or federal
law enforcement agencies were using them.
* 42 protective force members, including 16 officers who are members of
special response teams, reported that tactical training opportunities-
-where protective force officers move, shoot, and communicate as a
unit--at their respective sites were very limited. A review of the
standard DOE training curricula for Security Police Officer-IIs showed
that these officers currently receive very little tactical training.
Communications Equipment:
According to DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, protective force
officers must have the capability to communicate information among
themselves. The radios these officers use must be capable of two-way
communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be
readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force
personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be
available and maintained in a charged condition to support routine,
emergency, and response operations.
Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported
problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of
the 105 protective force officers reported that they did not always
have dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying
sporadic battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some
locations on site as the two most significant problems. In addition,
some of the protective force officers believed that radio
communications were not sufficient to support their operations and
could not be relied on to transfer information between officers if a
terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two sites
acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio
communications equipment. In addition, some security officials said
other forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones,
and pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that they
could communicate effectively.
Protective Body Armor:
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires that Security Police
Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body armor be stationed
in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to respond to an attack
without negatively impacting response times. At one site, we found that
most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued protective body
armor because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a waiver
to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police Officer-
IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of reasons,
including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries while
wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load
that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of
acquiring the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent
replacement costs, and (4) associated risks of not providing all
Security Police Officer-IIs with body armor could be mitigated by using
cover provided at the site by natural and man-made barriers. According
to a site security official, this waiver is currently being reviewed
because of the increased threat contained in the 2004 DBT.
Special Response Team Capabilities:
Security Police Officer-IIIs serve on special response teams
responsible for offensive operations, such as hostage rescue and the
recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. Special response
teams are often assigned unique equipment, including specially
encrypted radios; body armor that provides increased levels of
protection; special suits that enable officers to operate and fight in
chemically contaminated environments; special vehicles, including
armored vehicles; submachine guns; light machine guns; grenade
launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington 700 rifles and
Barrett .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also issued
breaching tools to allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists
may have gained access.
Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special
response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one
ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another
organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide
a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been
comprehensively performance tested, as called for in the memorandum of
understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the
first comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of
understanding.
Chemical Protective Gear:
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual specifies that all Security
Police Officer-II and -IIIs be provided, at a minimum, with protective
masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological protection.
Other additional chemical protective gear and procedures are delegated
to the sites. At the four sites with special response teams, we found
that the teams all had special suits that allowed them to operate and
fight in environments that might be chemically contaminated. For
Security Police Officer-IIs, chemical protective equipment and
expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated environments
varied. For example, two sites provided additional protective equipment
for their Security Police Officer-IIs and expected them to fight in
such environments. Another site did not provide additional equipment,
but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along with
other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special
response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in
chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided no
additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty
issue long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.
Protective Force Vehicles:
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires that protective force
vehicles exhibit a degree of reliability commensurate with their
intended functions and enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of
routine and emergency duties under all expected weather conditions.
Vehicles must be maintained in serviceable condition, with preventive
maintenance performed at intervals that meet or exceed the manufacturer
recommendations.
Nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers we interviewed
at two sites reported that patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical
condition, and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some
reported maintenance as a significant problem, with one officer
observing that more vehicles were in the shop than on patrol. Some
protective force officers also reported that door handles on patrol
vehicles did not work, which made it difficult for them to enter and
exit the vehicles. A site security official told us that they had never
had problems with the physical condition or maintenance of patrol
vehicles, but did note that they had experienced difficulties in
acquiring new vehicles.
We also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of
vehicle protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special
nuclear material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA
sites with Category I special nuclear material currently operate
armored vehicles. However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category
I special nuclear material operated armored vehicles at the time of our
review. One other ESE site was planning to purchase armored vehicles.
DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated
Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008:
To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat
contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials
recognize that they need to take several prompt and coordinated
actions. These include the transformation of current protective forces
into an "elite force," the development and deployment of new security
technologies, the consolidation and elimination of special nuclear
material, and organizational improvements within ESE's security
program. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite
force, are in early stages of development and will require significant
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their
completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is
uncertain.
DOE Proposes Creating an "Elite Force" to Protect Its Sites in the New
Threat Environment:
DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those sites
managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective
forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force officers (74
out of 105) and their contractor protective force managers who report
that they are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat
the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, DOE has
proposed the development of an "elite force" that would be patterned
after the U. S. military's Special Forces. However, creating this elite
force is a complex undertaking and will be a challenge to fully realize
by the October 2008 implementation deadline.
Even before the issuance of the 2004 DBT, DOE had become concerned
about protective force preparedness because of intense demands placed
on protective forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. The need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as
possible following the 2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces
worked extensive overtime. DOE's Inspector General, DOE's Office of
Security and Safety Performance Assurance, and GAO reported on the
potential for large amounts of protective force overtime to increase
fatigue, reduce readiness, and reduce training opportunities for
protective forces.[Footnote 6]
In recognition of this situation, in September 2003, the Secretary of
Energy directed DOE's Office of Performance Assurance and Independent
Assessment, now a part of the Office Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, to conduct a special review to determine the effectiveness
of the management of protective forces and protective force
capabilities. This classified review, which was issued in June 2004 and
covered five NNSA sites and one ESE site, found that the current
organization and tactics of DOE protective forces need improvement to
deal with possible terrorist threats. Historically, DOE protective
forces had been more concerned with a broad range of industrial
security and order-keeping functions than with preparation to conduct a
defensive battle against a paramilitary attacker, as is described in
the 2004 DBT. The June 2004 review recommended a shift to an aggressive
military-like, small-unit, tactical defense posture, which included
enhanced tactical training standards to allow protective forces to
move, shoot, and communicate effectively as a unit in a combat
environment. The review also recommended more frequent, realistic, and
rigorous force-on-force performance testing and training for the
department's protective forces.
Based on this review, the Secretary of Energy proposed transforming
DOE's protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an
"elite force" with training and capabilities similar to the military's
Special Forces units. Subsequently, in June 2004, the Deputy Secretary
of Energy directed the formation of a Protective Forces Working Group
to formally review missions, standards, and current protective force
status as the basis for developing recommendations on policy, training,
and equipment that, if enacted, could serve as the basis for creating
an elite force. This working group consisted of representatives from
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, NNSA, and
ESE's Office of Environmental Management. In August 2004, the working
group recommended a set of near-term actions that could be used to
elevate protective force capabilities. These included instituting more
demanding medical and physical fitness standards, increasing tactical
training, and reorganizing protective forces into tactically cohesive
units. In October 2004, the working group also recommended considering
federalizing DOE protective forces as a long-term option. In January
2005, the Deputy Secretary of Energy endorsed the report's findings and
directed that implementation actions begin.
Most protective force officers we interviewed generally support some of
the ideas embodied in the elite force concept. Specifically, most
protective force officers (74 out of 105) at the ESE sites we visited
reported that they are not at all confident in their current ability to
defeat the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In particular, some
protective force officers believed that they would be outgunned and
overwhelmed by the terrorist force identified in the 2004 DBT. In
addition, some feared they could be surprised by a large terrorist
force because of the sites' security strategy and the physical layout
of their sites. Some sites are already responding to the elite force
concept by increasing tactical training, and others plan to institute
"training relief shifts," which will increase the amount of time
protective force officers have available for uninterrupted training.
Some sites also have ambitious plans for constructing new facilities to
enable increased tactical training.
Nevertheless, despite broad support and some sites' progress, DOE's
proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase.
DOE has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out
high-level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been
formally approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance. The draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have
to undertake and complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop
the elite force envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its
existing protective forces policies to incorporate, among other things,
the increased training standards that are needed to create an elite
force. This may be a time-consuming effort.
As we reported in April 2004, the DOE policy process emphasizes
developing consensus through a laborious review and comment process by
program offices. We found that this policy process contributed to the
nearly 2 years it took the department to develop DOE's first post-
September 11, 2001, DBT. Likewise, DOE has been working on a
streamlined overall security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this
streamlined policy is formally issued, now scheduled for summer 2005,
DOE's draft implementation plans for an elite force call for the new
policy to immediately undergo revision to incorporate elements of the
elite force concept. DOE's Office of Security has not yet identified a
time frame for completing these actions. In addition, DOE officials
believe that broader DOE policies will have to be revised. For example,
DOE security officials, as well as contractor protective force
managers, see some DOE health and safety policies and practices as an
impediment because they do not allow the kind of realistic and
physically demanding training that is required for an elite force.
According to these officials, revising these policies will require
broad, high-level support within DOE. Furthermore, some DOE protective
force requirements, such as medical, physical fitness, and training
standards are mandated by DOE regulations. Changing these regulations,
according to a DOE security official, would require DOE to follow rule-
making procedures. All these protective force policies and regulations,
as well as broader DOE policies are contained in collective bargaining
agreements between protective force unions and protective force
contractors and in protective force contracts, which also will need to
be modified to create the kind of elite force that DOE believes is
necessary to defeat the 2004 DBT.
Some site security officials recognize that they will have to carefully
craft transition plans for currently employed protective force officers
who may not be able to meet the new standards required for an elite
force. Some of these officials have expressed concern about the ability
of some protective force officers to meet more rigorous physical and
training standards that are likely to be part of an elite force. DOE
field security officials and contractor protective force managers
likewise have expressed concern about finding ways for less capable
protective force officers to move into different roles or retire from
service with a sense of dignity. Because all the protective forces at
the five ESE sites we visited operated, at the time, under separate
contracts and separate collective bargaining agreements, there is no
uniform benefit or retirement plan for protective forces, and these
benefits, according to one contractor security official, differ
considerably among sites. Some contractor protective force managers
recognized that they needed such mechanisms as early retirement
incentives and more attractive retirement packages to make the
effective transition to an elite force. They believed, however, that
they would not be able to provide these mechanisms, most of which are
quite expensive, without DOE's help. Officials from the one protective
force contractor, which had a placement and income protection program
for protective force officers who could no longer meet existing DOE
requirements, said that payouts from the program have far exceeded
contributions and that the program will have to be restructured in the
near future.
Given these complexities, DOE security officials recently told us that
implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept
will take about 5 years to complete. With this time line, the
development of the elite force will be under way by the new DBT's
implementation deadline of October 2008, but the full benefit of an
elite force, according to DOE's own preliminary plans, will not be
realized until fiscal year 2010.
DOE Believes Security Technologies Can Improve the Effectiveness of
Protective Forces:
DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its
protective forces through the development and deployment of new
security technologies. The department believes technologies can reduce
the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and provide
additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Many of the ESE
sites we visited currently possess some advanced security technology.
For example, all sites operate central alarm stations that often
integrate hundreds of alarms and dozens of sensors, such as video
cameras and infrared and microwave detection systems, as well as
redundant communications systems. Some sites also have thermal imaging
sensors, which can detect adversaries at long ranges and in all types
of weather. Some of these sensors have data links that allow the
information to be rapidly shared. One site deploys classified devices
that can immobilize or delay the movement of an adversary.
DOE officials believe that additional technology can further enhance
site security. The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
is assisting sites in identifying and deploying existing technologies
to enhance protection systems, principally through the following
programs:
* Technology and Systems Development Program. DOE has funded this
program for many years, although funding has been reduced in recent
years. Specifically, DOE provided over $20 million for this program in
fiscal year 2004. However, DOE only requested $14.5 million for this
program in fiscal year 2006-about 1 percent of the entire DOE security
program budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in
developing technologies that can actually be deployed. The Director of
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance recently
stated that DOE has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to
coordinate investment in emerging security technologies to ensure they
are deployed at DOE sites in a timely manner.
* Site Assistance Visit Program. Immediately after the issuance of the
2004 DBT, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
embarked on site assistance visits--a targeted effort to encourage the
use of technologies that could offset the more costly manpower-
intensive approaches needed to meet the more demanding requirements of
the DBT. These site assistance visits focus on new and emerging
security technologies. Each site visit lasts approximately 2 weeks and
consists of exercises and simulations designed to evaluate each site's
preliminary plans for meeting the new DBT and to demonstrate how
technologies can assist in countering the 2004 DBT in a cost-effective
manner. DOE conducted these visits between October 2004 and April 2005.
Four of the five ESE sites we examined have received these visits.
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance completed the
final report on the results of the site assistance visits in May 2005.
DOE plans to use the results of these visits to help justify its fiscal
year 2007 budget.
Even before the site assistance visits, ESE sites were actively
considering advanced security technologies. For example, at least two
ESE sites are considering installing automatic weapons that can be
operated from remote, secure locations--known as remotely operated
weapons systems within DOE. A few ESE protective forces also supported
this push toward technology, especially technology that allows more
timely detection of adversaries. Specifically, 16 of the 105 protective
force officers we interviewed said they needed enhanced detection
technologies that would allow adversaries to be detected and engaged at
much greater ranges than is currently possible at most sites.
ESE's Strategy for Meeting the New DBT Relies Heavily on the
Consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials:
ESE's current strategy for meeting the October 2008 deadline for
compliance with the 2004 DBT relies heavily on the consolidation and
elimination of special nuclear materials between and among other ESE
sites. At all five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear
material, material consolidation and elimination are important goals
for the site and the responsible DOE program office and are
inextricably tied to security plans. However, neither ESE nor DOE has
developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed
cooperation and agreement among the sites and program offices to
consolidate special nuclear material, as we recommended in our April
2004 report. In the absence of such a comprehensive, coordinated plan,
completing some of these significant activities by the October 2008 DBT
implementation deadline is unlikely. In particular:
* Savannah River Site. Currently, special nuclear material is stored in
three separate, widely dispersed areas at the Savannah River Site--an
Office of Environmental Management (EM) site. In November 2004, EM
directed the site to consolidate all its current and future storage of
Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year
2007. This consolidation will free up over 100 protective force
officers who currently guard facilities at the sites' two other areas.
It will also allow for a substantially increased protective force
presence at the single remaining area and could save the site over $100
million in expected costs to implement measures to defend the site
against the 2004 DBT.
* Hanford Site. Hanford, another EM site, had plans to transfer most of
its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of
fiscal year 2006. However, a number of factors threaten to delay this
transfer of material. These factors include (1) NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation's shipping and load restrictions on transporting special
nuclear material across the United States, (2) the Savannah River
Site's inability to store some of Hanford's special nuclear material in
its present configuration, and (3) the Savannah River Site's current
lack of facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford's special nuclear
material. Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to
postpone shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be
resolved. Hanford had begun planning for such a contingency, but the
site will now have to expend additional funds of about $85 million
annually to protect these materials against the 2004 DBT.
* Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Argonne
National Laboratory-West.[Footnote 7] Managed by the Office of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory had removed--by NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation--its currently known Category I special nuclear material
from its single Category I storage facility in May 2005. Removal will
allow a substantial number of its protective forces to transfer to the
nearby Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing
Category I special nuclear material mission. These additional
protective forces will be critical to helping the site meet the 2004
DBT. However, a recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several
other facilities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory may have some previously unrecognized Category I special
nuclear material. Site security officials report that they are trying
to resolve these issues with DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance. If any of these other Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Laboratory facilities do have Category I special
nuclear material, they will require additional protection, which could
severely damage the current DBT implementation plans for both Idaho
sites. In addition, because of its remote location, the robust design
of some of its facilities, its large protective force, and extensive
training facilities, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory is now being evaluated as a potential future consolidation
location for NNSA Category I special nuclear material.
* Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an
Office of Science Site, plans to eliminate its Category I special
material. Current plans call for down-blending this material in place
to less attractive forms and for extracting medically useful isotopes
that may help treat certain forms of cancer. The Office of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology is responsible for this down-blending
program. However, the costs for this program have risen steeply, even
without the additional security costs of the meeting the 2004 DBT. In
addition, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and the
Office of Science have not formally agreed on which program office will
bear the brunt of the estimated $53 million annual security costs
required to meet the implementation deadline for the 2004 DBT. If these
issues can be resolved, down-blending operations are scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2009 and to be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down-
blending operations do not take place, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
will face high additional security costs--approaching an additional $43
million each year, according to preliminary site estimates--as long as
the material remains on-site.
ESE's Headquarters Security Organization Is Not Well Suited to Meet the
Challenges of the 2004 DBT:
ESE's current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges
associated with implementing the 2004 DBT. First, ESE lacks a formally
appointed senior security advisor or a centralized security
organization. In contrast, NNSA has such a position. Specifically,
Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, which created NNSA, established the position of Chief, Defense
Nuclear Security, to serve as the primary security advisor to the NNSA
Administrator. The Chief is responsible for the development and
implementation of NNSA security programs, including the physical
security for all NNSA facilities. Over the past several years, ESE has
recognized the need for such a position and has sought to fill the
security advisor role through the use of employees temporarily detailed
from other organizations. For example, beginning in 2004, a detailee
from the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has served
as the Acting Director for ESE Security. The current acting director
was preceded by a visiting White House Fellow. However, the position of
the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic authority or staff.
This lack of authority limits the director's ability to help facilitate
ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material down-blending
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other
ESE sites.
Second, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office.
In April 2005, the recently confirmed ESE Under Secretary stated that
ESE was composed of "institutional 'stovepipes'" and that this
structure has hampered strategic management within ESE. ESE has
explored creating a consolidated headquarters security office, but each
of the three program offices we examined continues to maintain its own
headquarters security offices. These offices, however, are organized
and staffed differently. For example, the Office of Environmental
Management's headquarters security office has more than 17 professional
security personnel on staff. In contrast, the headquarters offices of
Science and of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology each have only
one and two security professionals on staff, respectively. For the
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology this situation is
problematic because its security responsibilities are increasing with
the consolidation of two of its sites into the Idaho National
Laboratory and with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's down-blending
program. Indeed, safeguards and security funding is a much larger
percentage of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology's
total budget--$75 million out of a total fiscal year 2006 budget
request of $511 million, about 15 percent--than it is for either the
Office of Science or the Office of Environmental Management. As a
result, according to the EM Security Director and Acting Director, ESE
security, the Environmental Management security office provides
informal support to the other ESE programs offices, including the
Offices of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and Science.
Conclusions:
Successfully defending against the increased terrorist threat contained
in the 2004 DBT will require a significant coordinated effort by DOE,
ESE, and the ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear
material. While ESE sites are not required to meet the requirements of
the 2004 DBT until October 2008, we believe that ESE needs to take
action to correct weaknesses with its current training and equipment
practices. Addressing these issues will put ESE protective forces in a
better position to defend their sites, in the short run, while DOE and
ESE press ahead on the broader initiatives, such as the elite force
concept and materials consolidation that they believe will be necessary
to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT. While we support DOE's and
ESE's broader initiatives, we believe that these initiatives cannot be
successfully implemented without a more strategic approach. Such an
approach will need to include a comprehensive plan for all of the
initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to be supported
by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to
ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have Category I
special nuclear material.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making the following
five recommendations to the Secretary of Energy:
* Develop a requirement for individual protective force officer
participation in force-on-force exercises.
* Require that sites track protective force member participation in
force-on-force exercises.
* Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in protective force
equipment at ESE sites by providing the following where needed:
* dependable radio communications,
* body armor,
* chemical protective gear,
* special response team capabilities, and:
* vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces.
* Develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced
implementation plan for meeting the new 2004 DBT requirements that
includes detailed plans for:
* the creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE
protective force policies and practices,
* the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies,
and:
* the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials.
* Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a security
organization to oversee the development, implementation, and
coordination of ESE, and broader DOE efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE with a copy of this report for review and comment. DOE
stated that it concurred with the report and accepted our
recommendations. In that context, DOE provided an update on the actions
it anticipated would address our recommendations. While we believe that
most of DOE's anticipated actions will be responsive to our
recommendations, we are concerned about DOE's response to our
recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear, fully
resourced implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements.
Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE cited only
individual efforts to address the development of an elite force, the
deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation of
special nuclear material, not the development of a comprehensive plan.
While each of these efforts is important, as we demonstrated in our
report, the success of these efforts requires close coordination across
numerous DOE, ESE, as well as NNSA organizations. We continue to
believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the requirements of
the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an integrated
effort that is built around a comprehensive plan. DOE also provided
three additional technical changes that we have incorporated. DOE's
letter commenting on our draft report is presented in appendix II.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. We also will make
copies of this report available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or
[Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To obtain an overall perspective on how protective forces are prepared
to defend Department of Energy (DOE) sites, we reviewed relevant
literature focusing on Special Nuclear Materials, DOE's protective
forces, and reports by DOE's Inspector General, as well as previous GAO
reports. We conducted multiple rounds of interviews with DOE
headquarters officials and conducted document reviews. We also met with
DOE and protective force officials at five sites under the oversight of
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and
Environment: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory-West, the
Savannah River Site, and the Hanford Site.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting
DOE's existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to
determine current requirements. We also reviewed pertinent literature
about the factors that affect the readiness of military forces. We
conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers
at the five ESE sites. We took several steps to ensure that we selected
protective force officers independently and interviewed protective
force officers with varying levels of experience. We interviewed a
nonprobability sample of protective force officers from all five ESE
sites.[Footnote 8] Even though we are not generalizing to the
population as a whole, at each site we randomly selected the protective
force officers to interview. Random selection protects against
selection bias and helps assure that the officers we interviewed were
independent of site management. Specifically, we obtained a complete
roster of all protective force officers at each site, which included
the name, position, area assignment, and length of service for each
protective force officer and identified the dates and potential time
slots for the interviews during our site visits. We submitted modified
rosters to the security contractor with the potential interview time
slots, and the contractor resubmitted this roster with the availability
of each protective force officer. We then stratified protective force
officers by position, rank, and length of service and assigned them
random numbers from a random number table. We also assigned random
numbers, in sequence from the random number table, to protective force
officers at each site, eliminating random numbers to ensure that no
random number was ever used twice. The random numbers assigned to
protective force officers were placed in chronological order and
officers were selected based on the lowest random number assigned,
their availability during the prescribed time slots, position, area
assignment, and length of service. Lastly, we informed the security
contractor at each site of those protective force officers we wished to
interview prior to our site visit. The structured interviews were
administered by two-person teams to Security Police Officer-IIs and
Security Police Officer-IIIs. We asked the officers questions designed
to determine their readiness to defend the sites, including questions
about their morale, training, and equipment. We also reviewed the
training records and physical fitness qualifications of the 105
officers to determine if key elements of their training complied with
existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected
firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these
officers complied with existing DOE requirements and federal
regulations.
Finally, we reviewed the equipment ESE protective forces use to
determine if it met current DOE requirements. For example, we reviewed
the minimum standard duty equipment that was employed at each site. We
also checked to ensure that most sites' armorers were certified as
required by DOE and, for most sites, we inspected armories, inspection
records, as well as firearms inventory procedures. Finally, we reviewed
the types of equipment that some sites are evaluating and/or planning
to purchase.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully
defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE's
implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and
associated guidance documents. We discussed the 2004 DBT with officials
in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and with
officials in ESE's Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology; and Science. Where available, we reviewed
documents prepared by ESE and contractor officials on how they plan to
comply with the 2004 DBT. We discussed DOE's initiative to transform
its current protective force into an elite force with DOE's Office of
Security and Safety Performance Assurance and security officials at all
five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material. We also
discussed site assistance visits and their concentration on security
technology with DOE security officials. Furthermore, we reviewed recent
DOE congressional testimony on the role of security technology and
reviewed the relevant portion of the fiscal year 2006 DOE budget
submission. In addition, we discussed plans for special nuclear
material consolidation with ESE program security officials and site
security officials. Finally, we discussed ESE's security organization
with DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, ESE's
Acting Security Director, and ESE program security offices. We also
reviewed congressional testimony given by the Under Secretary of Energy
at his recent confirmation hearing.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY:
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY:
Washington, DC 20585:
July 1, 2005:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, National Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
This is in response to your correspondence of June 21, 2005 requesting
Department of Energy (DOE) comments on the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO's) draft report GAO-05-611 titled "DOE's Office of
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Coordinated Action
to Meet the New Design Basis Threat."
The Department appreciates the results of GAO's efforts with regard to
this review and concurs in and accepts each of the recommendations as
provided.
We would also like to take this opportunity to provide a brief update
on DOE's current and anticipated actions which, we believe, will
address the recommendations set forth in the report.
GAO Recommendation: Develop a requirement for individual protective
force officer participation in force-on-force exercises.
DOE Resuonse: DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
(SSA) is in the process of revising several elements of DOE's
protective force policy.
SSA advises that these revisions will include specific requirements and
standards for individual officer participation in force-on-force
exercises. SSA expects these revisions to be entered into the DOE
Directives System for Departmental review in December 2005.
GAO Recommendation: Require that sites track protective force member
participation in force-on-force exercises.
DOE Response: The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
(SSA) advises that, as appropriate sections of DOE policy are revised
to establish individual training and exercise participation standards,
requirements for appropriate recording, tracking and review of
individual officer participation will, likewise, be included. These
revisions will also be targeted for a December 2005 submission into the
DOE Directives System.
GAO Recommendation: Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in
protective force equipment at ESE sites by providing where needed:
* dependable radio communications
* body armor:
* chemical protective spray:
* special response team capabilities, and:
* vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces.
DOE Response: ESE will survey each site and ensure that protective
force equipment is compliant with current DOE policy in each case.
GAO Recommendation: Develop and implement a department-wide, multi-
year, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT
requirements:
DOE Response: Site implementation plans setting forth how each site
plans to implement the requirements of the October 2004 Design Basis
Threat are scheduled to be submitted by the end of July 2005.
GAO Recommendation: The implementation plan should include:
* The creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE
protective force policies and practices.
DOE Response: The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
has advised that policy revisions regarding this initiative are
scheduled to be completed for final Departmental approval no later than
the end of December 2005.
* The development and deployment of enhanced security technologies.
DOE Response: To facilitate the Department's efforts to develop and
deploy enhanced security technologies, the Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance (SSA) conducted a series of Site
Assistance Visits (SAVs) at key field sites to explore and recommend
the use of new security technologies that could off-set more costly
manpower-intensive approaches to meet the current DBT requirements. In
addition, SSA has established a Center of Excellence for Technology
Deployment to further ensure that new and recently developed
technologies are rapidly deployed to help improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Department's protection program.
* The transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials.
DOE Response: In February 2005, the Secretary established the Nuclear
Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordinating Committee (NMDCC)
which is chartered to identify opportunities for materials disposition
and consolidation. Chaired by the:
Secretary's National Security Advisor, the NMDCCC is charged with
considering all aspects of material consolidation to include impacts on
operations, transportation assets and realistic schedules.
GAO Recommendation: Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a
security organization to oversee the development, implementation, and
coordination of ESE, and broader efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT.
DOE Response: The Under Security of Energy for Energy, Science, and
Environment recently established the position of Director of Security
for ESE. This position is responsible for overall management,
oversight, and coordination of ESE security programs.
We would also like to take this opportunity to point out three areas of
the report which we believe should be revised for greater accuracy:
1. Page 7 under "Consolidation and Elimination of Materials " the
report states that neither the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
Technology (NE) nor the Office of Science (SC) "has been able to agree
on its share of security costs (at ORNL) which have increased
significantly because of the new DBT."
DOE believes that it is clearly understood by both programs that SC is
responsible for basic security needs at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
and that NE is expected to fund any additional security requirements
associated with the proposed down-blending project.
2. Page 12, paragraph 1, - "DOE believes force-on-force exercises are
the most realistic representation of adversary attacks that can be used
to evaluate the effectiveness of physical protection strategies and
train protective forces."
With regard to training, DOE does believe that force-on-force training
is the most realistic experience we can provide to protective force
members and to tactical leaders to prepare them to meet an actual
attack. However, with regard to evaluating the effectiveness of
physical protection strategies, DOE employs a combination of force-on-
force performance tests together with computer simulations, other
performance testing and expert judgment to determine overall
effectiveness.
3. Page 32, under "Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory - West" - GAO may wish to
reflect that these two sites were officially combined in February 2005
to form the Idaho National Laboratory (still under the management
oversight of NE) and that the material cited to be removed by June 2005
was actually removed in May 2005.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Should you have any questions or need further clarification,
please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-586-7700.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Robert J. Walsh:
Director of Security for Energy, Science and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Don Cowan, Joyce Evans,
Doreen Feldman, Jonathan Gill, Preston Heard, James Noel, Joe Oliver,
and Carol Hernstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report.
(360431):
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004).
[2] See GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its
Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30,
2003) and GAO-04-623.
[3] For example, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance examined five NNSA sites and only a single ESE site in a
recent review. See Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance,
Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (U)
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
[4] 10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A.
[5] Recent firearms inventories by the DOE-Inspector General have
uncovered some problems with DOE and NNSA firearms inventories. For
examples, see the following DOE-Inspector General Reports: Inspection
Report: Inspection of Selected Office of Security and Emergency
Operations Firearms Inventories, DOE/IG-0517, August 2001; Inspection
Report: Inspection of Firearms Internal Controls at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, DOE/IG-0587, February 2003; Inspection Report: Firearms
Internal Controls at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/IG-
0621, September 2003.
[6] Audit Report: Management of the Department's Protective Forces,
DOE/IG-0602, Department of Energy Office of Inspector General, June
2003; Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities
(U), Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, (Washington,
D.C.: June 28, 2004); GAO-04-623.
[7] The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known
as the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005.
[8] Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because in such a sample some elements of
the population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of
being selected as part of the sample.
