Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials
DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium Gao ID: GAO-05-665 July 20, 2005Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security and reduce plutonium storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be permanently disposed of in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the plutonium from DOE's Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS's storage plan called for storing DOE's standard storage containers and not intact fuel rods. Recent changes in DOE's security requirements have complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to store plutonium. Until DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford will cost an additional approximately $85 million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of the plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct all of the required monitoring activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium monitoring.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-665, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-665
entitled 'Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to
Safely Consolidate Plutonium' which was released on August 19, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2005:
Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials:
DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium:
GAO-05-665:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-665, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and
requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear
weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of
plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear
weapons. Some of this plutonium is contaminated metal, oxides,
solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production
process. To improve security and reduce plutonium storage costs, DOE
plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site
(SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until
it can be permanently disposed of in a geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE
can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS‘s capacity to monitor
plutonium storage containers.
What GAO Found:
DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several
reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium
into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan,
DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive
all of the plutonium from DOE‘s Hanford Site because it is not in a
form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford‘s
plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which
Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to
accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities.
However, SRS‘s storage plan called for storing DOE‘s standard storage
containers and not intact fuel rods. Recent changes in DOE‘s security
requirements have complicated SRS‘s storage plans by eliminating one
facility that DOE planned to use to store plutonium. Until DOE develops
a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to
SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements
that consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford will cost
an additional approximately $85 million annually and will threaten that
site‘s achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of
the plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility
at SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety
systems to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a
monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental
plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the
environment. DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in
another building at SRS that already had the safety systems needed to
work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had
sufficient security to conduct all of the required monitoring
activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety
problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that
it would have SRS‘s storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium
monitoring.
Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE‘s Unneeded
Plutonium:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive strategy to
consolidate, store, and eventually dispose of its plutonium and (2)
ensure that its facilities‘ cleanup plans are consistent with its
plutonium consolidation plans. In commenting on the report, DOE
generally agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-665.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the
Savannah River Site:
DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored
Plutonium at SRS:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site
after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed:
Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories:
Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal
Years 2005-2016:
Figures:
Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's
Unneeded Plutonium:
Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container:
Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers:
Abbreviations:
DBT: design basis threat:
DE: destructive examination:
DOE: Department of Energy:
HEPA: High-Efficiency Particulate Air:
NDE: nondestructive examination:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
Safety Board: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board:
SRS: Savannah River Site:
Letter July 20, 2005:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ed Whitfield:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
Plutonium--a man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in
nuclear reactors and used in nuclear weapons--is very hazardous to
human health and the environment and presents an attractive target for
theft by a terrorist. When the United States stopped producing nuclear
weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories located in numerous
Department of Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the United States.
These facilities included the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky
Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in California, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South
Carolina.
DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed
by the United States for nuclear weapons. The majority is in the form
of pits (the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal, and
oxides while the remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated
metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear
weapons production process.[Footnote 1] To improve security and reduce
costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at SRS in the
event it decides to consolidate its nonpit plutonium for interim
storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's
Unneeded Plutonium:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Nonpit plutonium has particularly dangerous characteristics that demand
special storage conditions. Unlike pits, nonpit plutonium is in forms
that can be easily dispersed. If not safely contained, plutonium can be
dangerous to human health, even in extremely small quantities. Because
it can be highly radioactive, inhaling a few micrograms of plutonium
creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer. Inhaling
larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and death. In certain
forms, plutonium can spontaneously combust in the presence of oxygen at
temperatures above room temperature. Because of these hazards, nonpit
plutonium must be stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the
risk of accidental release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium
must be properly equipped with safety systems that prevent it from
escaping into the surrounding air, land, or water in the event a
container is breached. This report addresses the storage and monitoring
of nonpit plutonium (hereafter referred to as plutonium) at SRS.
In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium stabilization
and storage that it believes will allow it to safely store plutonium
for a minimum of 50 years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear
effort to stabilize and package plutonium at its sites across the
United States into 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. Under
DOE's standard, once the plutonium is safely packaged, DOE must
periodically monitor the storage containers for changes in the
plutonium's condition, particularly any pressurization or corrosion of
the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a sample of
storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage
containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and
the container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring
program is intended to detect damaged storage containers or
inadequately stabilized plutonium and will help DOE ensure the
continued safe storage of the material.
DOE must also provide security against potential terrorists interested
in the plutonium's value for constructing a nuclear weapon, an
improvised nuclear device, or even a "dirty bomb."[Footnote 2] For many
years, a key component of DOE security has been the development of the
design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the
potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September
11, 2001, the size of the potential threat has increased
significantly.[Footnote 3]
DOE has cancelled two proposed construction projects at SRS that would
have provided plutonium storage and monitoring and would have processed
the plutonium for permanent disposition. In 2001, DOE cancelled a
project initiated in 1995 to build a new facility at SRS, called the
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, that would have provided long-
term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a
secure environment. DOE cancelled the project because it expected to
store the plutonium for only a few years until a facility to process
the plutonium for permanent disposition was available. Instead, DOE
decided to use existing buildings at SRS to package and store the
plutonium until construction of the processing facility was completed.
In addition, in 2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled its
plans to construct the facility that would have processed its most
heavily contaminated plutonium into a form for permanent disposition by
a method known as immobilization. Immobilization involves mixing the
plutonium with ceramics, placing the mixture in large canisters, and
then filling the canisters with high-level radioactive waste that has
been turned into molten glass that then hardens. These canisters would
have then been shipped to a geologic repository for high-level
radioactive waste that DOE plans to construct at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. As a result of the cancellation of the immobilization facility,
DOE has no means for processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium
into a form suitable for permanent disposition.
In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety
Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress in
1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex, reported
that although the facilities DOE plans to use for plutonium storage can
do so safely for a limited time, the facilities do not meet modern
safety standards for long-term plutonium storage. The Safety Board
concluded that DOE's lack of planning for plutonium storage forced SRS
to focus on what can be done with existing facilities, foreclosing
options that may have been both cost-effective and safe. The Safety
Board proposed that DOE conduct a new study of the options for storing
plutonium at SRS. In addition, it advocated the development of a
complete, well-considered plan for permanently disposing of all of
DOE's excess plutonium.
In this context and as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the
extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's
capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. A forthcoming
classified report will discuss SRS's plans for upgrading security to
meet the 2004 DBT.
To evaluate DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium, monitoring stored
plutonium, and providing security, we reviewed plutonium storage,
monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE's Office of
Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), DOE's operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River
Company), and DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services,
Inc.) In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS
produced by the Safety Board. Over the course of our work, we toured
plutonium storage facilities at SRS. During these visits, we
interviewed and received briefings from DOE Savannah River Operations,
Westinghouse, and Wackenhut officials. We also visited plutonium
storage facilities at DOE's Hanford Site, specifically Hanford's
Plutonium Finishing Plant. Hanford currently stores the majority of the
plutonium that could eventually be shipped to SRS. During this visit,
we interviewed and received briefings from DOE Richland Operations
officials. We also spoke with officials from DOE's operating contractor
for Hanford (Fluor Hanford) and Fluor's security subcontractor for the
Hanford Site (Protection Technology Hanford). In addition, we
interviewed officials from the Safety Board, DOE's Office of
Environmental Management, and DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance. Additional information on our objectives, scope,
and methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work from
June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at the Savannah River Site
for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the
plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a
plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, even if this
plan was in place, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's
plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
Specifically, Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of
its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed
nuclear facilities. About one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the
form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods. Because disassembling the fuel
rods would delay cleanup activities, Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan
calls for shipping these rods intact to SRS inside special shipping
containers. However, SRS's storage plans called for storing Hanford's
plutonium in DOE's standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage
containers. SRS's storage plan assumed Hanford would disassemble the
fuel rods and package the plutonium in storage containers. Despite
these inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup
plan and SRS's plutonium storage plans. Instead of developing an
integrated plan for plutonium consolidation, DOE relied upon its
individual sites to independently develop plans to achieve their own
goals. Although SRS's storage facility has sufficient space to store
the fuel rods, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to
ship the fuel rods to SRS. These include obtaining Department of
Transportation-certified shipping containers for the fuel rods and
completing the appropriate safety analyses and documentation for SRS's
storage facility. Changes to DOE's security requirements have
complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE
planned to use to store plutonium. Originally, DOE had planned to use
two SRS facilities to store its excess plutonium. However, both
facilities would need extensive and expensive upgrades to comply with
the new 2004 DBT requirements. In order to save money, DOE has,
therefore, decided to use only one facility to store plutonium. Until
DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for permanent disposition,
additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve
the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium consolidation
could offer. In particular, continued plutonium storage at Hanford will
cost approximately an additional $85 million annually and will threaten
that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup
plan.
In addition, DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the
condition of the plutonium that is in storage containers as required by
DOE's storage standard. According to the Safety Board, the facility at
SRS that DOE plans to use to store the plutonium is not equipped to
conduct the needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because
this storage facility lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and
filtration, DOE's standard storage containers cannot be removed from
their outer packaging--35-gallon steel drums used to ship the
containers to SRS. The only facility at SRS that can be used to safely
remove the storage containers from their outer packaging, monitor them,
and, if necessary, restabilize and repackage the plutonium, has closed
in preparation for decommissioning. Without a monitoring capability
that would detect whether the stored plutonium is becoming unstable and
damaging the storage containers, DOE faces increased risks of an
accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm workers, the
public, and/or the environment. Because SRS's storage facility lacks
the capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to
construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that
already had the ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with
plutonium. However, this building would not have had sufficient
security to conduct all of the monitoring activities required by DOE's
storage standard. In addition, the Safety Board has reported that, like
the storage facility, this building lacks adequate fire protection as
well as having other serious safety concerns. Given these challenges,
DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility
upgraded to allow storage and monitoring activities to be centralized
in one facility.
We are making recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a
comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and
disposition and that its facilities' cleanup plans are consistent with
this strategy.
We presented a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its
comments, DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that
its recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation
Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear material. Upon
completion of this plan, DOE stated that it will ensure that its sites'
cleanup plans are revised accordingly. DOE also provided technical
comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
Background:
SRS was constructed in the early 1950s by the DuPont Company under
contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE)
to produce tritium and plutonium-239 for use in nuclear weapons.
Covering 310 square miles along the Savannah River and encompassing
land across several counties in South Carolina, the site historically
has supported five nuclear reactors, two chemical separation plants, a
heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication
facility, a tritium extraction facility, and waste management
facilities. During the cold war, SRS was the only source of tritium in
the United States and supplemented the production of weapons-grade
plutonium at DOE's Hanford Site. Although SRS no longer produces
plutonium, some of its missions continue, such as the extraction of
tritium for nuclear warheads. SRS is currently managed under contract
to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company.
To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and
inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard
for the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.[Footnote
4] This standard establishes the stabilization and packaging
requirements for plutonium. Stabilization occurs by heating the
material to remove moisture that could lead to a buildup of pressure.
This buildup of pressure increases the risk of rupturing a container.
Plutonium containers designed to meet this standard consist of an inner
and outer container, each welded shut. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The inner container is designed so that it can be monitored for a
buildup of pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography,
that do not damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to
fire, leakage, and corrosion. Each storage container can hold a total
of 5 kilograms of material, but a maximum of 4.4 kilograms of the 5
kilograms can be pure plutonium. The remaining material is chemical
impurities such as chlorides and fluorides that are mixed with the
plutonium.
Plutonium stabilization and packaging is completed at Rocky Flats,
Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers
from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once
completed, DOE estimates that it will have nearly 5,700 plutonium
storage containers being stored at locations across the United States
that could eventually be shipped to SRS. (See table 1.)
Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site
after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed:
Site: SRS;
Number of storage containers: 2,935.
Site: Hanford;
Number of storage containers: 2,275.
Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory;
Number of storage containers: 342.
Site: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
Number of storage containers: 135.
Total;
Number of storage containers: 5,687.
Source: SRS.
Notes: 1,895 of the storage containers now stored at SRS were
originally packaged and shipped from the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site in Colorado.
[End of table]
In addition to 2,275 storage containers, Hanford has additional
plutonium in the form of fuel rods that were to be used in the now-
closed Fast Flux Test Facility nuclear reactor. These fuel rods contain
enough plutonium that, if they were cut apart and the material
packaged, would require approximately 1,000 additional storage
containers. See pages 11 and 12 for additional discussion of Hanford's
fuel rods.
Until April 2005, SRS's plutonium storage plans called for using two
buildings at the site for plutonium storage and monitoring operations:
Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a
nuclear reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and
tritium until 1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby
condition until its complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor
components were removed and the facility is now primarily used to store
plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used until the
mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to power
space probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store
plutonium.
DOE must provide extensive security for plutonium storage facilities at
SRS because they contain Category I quantities of plutonium. Category I
material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched
uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test
devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium, such as major nuclear components
and recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, such as carbides,
oxides, solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with Category I
special nuclear materials vary but include the nuclear detonation of a
weapon or test device at or near design yield, the creation of
improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear yield, theft
for use in a nuclear weapon, and the potential for sabotage in the form
of radioactive dispersal.
To manage potential security risks, DOE has developed the DBT, a
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
of terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites
to develop security measures designed to defend against the threat
contained in the DBT. While specific measures vary from site to site,
SRS's security measures include:
* a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;
* physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;
* numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, special nuclear material detectors, and
metal detectors;
* operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear material;
* hardened facilities and vaults; and:
* a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with such
items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and
chemical protective gear.
DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the
Savannah River Site:
DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons.
First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a
form for permanent disposition, as required by the FY 2002 defense
authorization act. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional
plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's
plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
Changes to the DBT have complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating
one facility that DOE had planned to use for plutonium storage. DOE is
facing these storage challenges because of its failure to adequately
plan for plutonium consolidation and disposition. Until DOE develops a
permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to
SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements
that plutonium consolidation could offer. For example, continued
plutonium storage at Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85
million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the
milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.
SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to Process the
Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed:
Section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002[Footnote 5] provides that if DOE decides not to construct either
of two proposed plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,[Footnote 6]
DOE is prohibited from shipping plutonium to SRS until a plan to
process the material for permanent disposition is developed and
submitted to the Congress. In 2002, DOE cancelled the plutonium
immobilization plant and, to date, DOE has not developed a plan for the
plutonium that would have been processed in that plant for permanent
disposition. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE has requested $10
million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that would process
this plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design work would be
completed and a plan prepared.
SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium Because
Hanford's Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's Storage Plans Are
Inconsistent with One Another:
Even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had
been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS cannot
currently accommodate some of Hanford's plutonium because Hanford's
accelerated cleanup plans and SRS's storage plans are inconsistent with
one another. DOE approved both plans even though Hanford's accelerated
cleanup plan called for shipping some of its plutonium to SRS in a form
that SRS had not planned on storing.
Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12-
foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE
standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods
were to be used in Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The
reactor has been closed, and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford's
plutonium is currently being stored at the site's Plutonium Finishing
Plant--the storage containers in vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in
large casks inside a fenced area. Hanford was preparing to ship
plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and
demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Although Hanford's
original cleanup plan called for demolishing the Plutonium Finishing
Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to accelerate the site's
cleanup. Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan that was approved by DOE's
Office of Environmental Management now calls for shipping the storage
containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of fiscal year 2006
so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing Plant by the end
of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford planned to ship
the fuel rods intact to SRS.
Nevertheless, SRS's July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that
Hanford would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in
approximately 1,000 DOE standard storage containers before shipping the
material to SRS. At the time the plan was issued, SRS planned to use
Building 105-K and Building 235-F to store plutonium in standard
storage containers and not intact fuel rods. Although Building 105-K is
capable of storing the fuel rods intact, several steps are necessary
before DOE would be able to ship the fuel rods from Hanford to SRS.
First, there is currently no Department of Transportation-certified
shipping container that could be used to package and ship the fuel
rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among other things, to
prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under the National
Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K's safety
documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel
rods are stored, they would have to be disassembled prior to processing
the plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack
the capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study
establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of
a facility to process the plutonium for disposition.
Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One Facility at SRS
That DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium Storage:
SRS originally planned to use both Building 105-K and Building 235-F to
store plutonium storage containers. After the DBT was changed in
October 2004, SRS was forced to reevaluate its storage plans. Because
the DBT substantially increases the potential threat that SRS must
defend against, significant additional security will be required for
SRS facilities storing plutonium. SRS projected the total cost of this
additional security at over $300 million. SRS estimated that it could
save more than $120 million by consolidating plutonium in Building 105-
K and not using Building 235-F for storage. Building 235-F was
originally planned to store approximately 1,900 storage containers.
Although SRS officials believe that Building 105-K has sufficient space
to store all of DOE's plutonium storage containers from other DOE sites
in the event that DOE decides to ship additional plutonium to SRS,
DOE's estimates of the total number of containers have varied over time
and may continue to change as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos conduct
plutonium stabilization and packaging operations.
DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation Will Lead
to Additional Storage Costs and Threatens Hanford's Cleanup Plans:
The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the
department's failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation.
DOE has not developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for
plutonium consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its
facilities' requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop
a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to
SRS, and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security
improvements that plutonium consolidation could offer. According to DOE
officials, the impact of continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore will be relatively minor because both laboratories had
already planned to maintain plutonium storage facilities for other
laboratory missions. However, according to Hanford officials, continued
storage at the site could cost approximately an additional $85 million
annually and will threaten the achievement of the goals in the site's
accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically, maintaining storage vaults at
Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant will prevent the site from
demolishing the plant as scheduled by September 2008.
DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored
Plutonium at SRS:
DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition of the
plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE's storage
standard. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K does not have
adequate safety measures to monitor the containers. Therefore, DOE had
planned to construct a monitoring capability in Building 235-F at SRS,
which already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium.
However, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to
conduct all of the required monitoring. In addition, the Safety Board
identified serious safety concerns with Building 235-F. Because of
these concerns, DOE changed its plans again in April 2005 and announced
that it would install monitoring equipment and the necessary safety
systems in Building 105-K.
SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety Measures to
Conduct Plutonium Monitoring:
Under DOE's plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be
periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a
monitoring capability that would detect whether storage containers are
at risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental
plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the
environment. The following two types of monitoring activities are to be
performed:
* Nondestructive examination (NDE): Between 13 and 41 storage
containers are to be tested annually for leaks or contamination and x-
rayed to detect any increase in internal pressure that could rupture a
container.
* Destructive examination (DE): Between 13 and 15 storage containers
are to be punctured and cut open annually. Samples of the gases inside
the container are to be taken and analyzed and the containers
themselves examined for indications of corrosion. In addition, the
material inside is to be analyzed to detect any changes in the
plutonium's condition.
DOE has categorized the plutonium storage containers into three groups
based on their risk of rupturing because of pressurization or
corrosion. (See table 2.)
Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories:
Category: Pressure and corrosion;
Type of monitoring: NDE and DE;
Characteristics: Containers with impure plutonium oxides contaminated
with chlorides. The chlorides make the containers at risk for rupture
due to both pressure and corrosion. Plutonium in these containers may
also contain other impurities such as calcium, iron, magnesium,
silicon, sodium, and potassium, among others;
Number of storage containers: 1,597.
Category: Pressure;
Type of monitoring: NDE and DE;
Characteristics: Containers with impure plutonium oxides without
chlorides, but still at risk of rupture due to pressurization;
Number of storage containers: 1,386.
Category: Innocuous;
Type of monitoring: NDE;
Characteristics: Containers with relatively pure plutonium metal and
oxides with little risk for rupture due to pressure or corrosion;
Number of storage containers: 2,704.
Total;
Number of storage containers: 5,687.
Source: SRS.
[End of table]
A storage container's placement in one of the three groups--pressure
and corrosion, pressure, or innocuous--determines the type of
monitoring a container will be subjected to and how many containers
will be monitored annually. Table 3 shows the number of examinations
DOE plans to conduct beginning in fiscal year 2005.
Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal
Years 2005-2016:
Category: Pressure and corrosion;
Fiscal year: 2007: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2008: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2009: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2010: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2011: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2012: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2013: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2014: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2015: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2016: 14 NDE 14 DE.
Category: Pressure;
Fiscal year: 2005: 25 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2006: 25 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2007: 25 NDE 2 DE;
Fiscal year: 2008: 26 NDE 2 DE;
Fiscal year: 2009: 26 NDE 2 DE.
Category: Innocuous;
Fiscal year: 2005: 2 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2006: 2 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2007: 2 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2008: 2 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2009: 2 NDE.
Category: Total;
Fiscal year: 2005: 27 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2006: 27 NDE;
Fiscal year: 2007: 40 NDE 15 DE;
Fiscal year: 2008: 41 NDE 15 DE;
Fiscal year: 2009: 41 NDE 15 DE;
Fiscal year: 2010: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2011: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2012: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2013: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2014: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2015: 13 NDE 13 DE;
Fiscal year: 2016: 14 NDE 14 DE.
Source: SRS.
Note: According to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan,
gas pressurization and corrosion have been identified as the only
mechanisms that could cause the failure of a storage container. Gas
pressurization would likely be discovered early because gas generation
decreases over time. Therefore, monitoring of the pressure category
will stop after 5 years. Since corrosion is a slower phenomenon and is
considered to have a longer term potential to cause failure, monitoring
on the pressure and corrosion category will continue for 10 years. The
innocuous category has little potential for pressurization or
corrosion, therefore monitoring will stop after 5 years.
[End of table]
Since an accidental release of plutonium would present an extreme
hazard to workers, the public, and the environment, monitoring
activities must occur in a facility that, among other things, is
equipped to confine accidentally released plutonium through effective
ventilation and appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must
have a fire protection system to protect storage containers and prevent
their contents from being released in a major fire. According to the
Safety Board, Building 105-K is not currently equipped with adequate
ventilation or fire protection. Specifically, SRS removed the High-
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that were used when the
building was a nuclear reactor. Such filters could prevent plutonium
from escaping the building in the event of a release from the storage
containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks automatic fire detection
or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium storage containers
cannot be removed from inside the outer packaging used to ship the
containers to SRS. The outer package--a 35-gallon steel drum--is used
to ship a single storage container and is designed to resist damage
during transportation and handling. The outer package confines the
plutonium in the event the storage container inside is breached. In
addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of protection
from fire for the storage container inside. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and,
in some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the
condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage
containers must be removed from their outer packaging. In addition, SRS
plans to establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating
it in a specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the
stored plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of
rupturing a storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be
packaged into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS
currently capable of restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has
closed in preparation for decommissioning.[Footnote 7]
Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented Safety and
Security Concerns:
Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage
containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building
235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was
already equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to
handling plutonium--multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan
systems that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is
further filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside
atmosphere.[Footnote 8] Currently, Building 235-F is limited to
removing storage containers from their outer packaging and performing
nondestructive examinations. If nondestructive examination indicates
pressurization in a storage container, DOE has installed equipment in
Building 235-F that could puncture the storage container to relieve
pressure.
Although Building 235-F has the appropriate ventilation and filtration,
it faced several challenges that would have affected its ability to
monitor plutonium. Building 235-F is not currently equipped to conduct
destructive examinations or to restabilize and package the plutonium in
new storage containers if necessary. In addition, because of changes in
the DBT, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store
Category I quantities of plutonium. According to SRS officials, 972
storage containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium. These
storage containers are in the innocuous monitoring category and are at
low enough risk for rupture that only two randomly sampled containers
are subject annually to nondestructive examination. However, SRS would
have been unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to
monitor their condition, leaving these 972 storage containers
unmonitored. According to SRS officials, security measures could have
been established in Building 235-F should a safety issue have arisen
that required opening a Category I container.
Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety
concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported
the following:
* The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the
building lack fire detection and alarm systems.
* The building's nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been
removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile
material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained
nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality
accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable
radiation source that can be lethal to people who are nearby.
* A number of the building's safety systems depend upon electrical
cables that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their
estimated life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may
crack, increasing the potential for failure.
* SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could
present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.
* The building's ventilation system still contains plutonium from its
previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space
probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for
example, during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers
in the building.
Because of its concerns about Building 235-F's safety, the Safety Board
reported in December 2003 that DOE should not plan extended storage of
plutonium in this building and that it may be preferable from safety
and cost perspectives to pursue plutonium storage elsewhere at SRS. The
Safety Board suggested that DOE consider several options for plutonium
storage, including constructing a new facility or installing safety
systems such as fire protection and filtered ventilation in Building
105-K.
Similar to the problems that DOE faces with plutonium storage, the
department's monitoring challenges are illustrative of its failure to
adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive
strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its
storage standard, DOE's plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art
storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety
Board had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE's plans have
subsequently changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15
million to begin modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it
would only use the building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE
plans to install the necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment
in Building 105-K.
Conclusions:
DOE has not yet developed a comprehensive plan that is necessary to
consolidate and eventually dispose of its excess plutonium. Instead, it
has changed its consolidation, storage, and disposition plans numerous
times. Furthermore, DOE has relied on its individual offices, sites,
and facilities to independently develop plans to achieve their own
goals rather than developing an integrated plan for the consolidation
and permanent disposition of all of its excess plutonium. Specifically,
DOE headquarters approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and
SRS's plutonium storage plans without resolving conflicts between them.
Moreover, we agree with the Safety Board that DOE's lack of careful
planning has forced SRS to focus on what can be done with existing
facilities, eliminating options that may have been both more cost-
effective and safer than current plans. DOE has instead pushed forward
with plans to use a 50-year-old building at SRS to perform functions it
was not designed for. As a result, DOE is currently not able to
consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. Because it is unable to
consolidate its plutonium, DOE faces additional costs in excess of $85
million annually to securely store plutonium at its current locations,
and its cleanup goals for Hanford are in jeopardy.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure the continued safe and secure storage of DOE's excess
plutonium inventories, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take
the following two actions:
* Develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and
disposition of DOE's excess plutonium. In particular, this strategy
should assess the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all
of DOE's sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy
should analyze the environmental impact, national security
implications, costs, and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and
eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities and/or at
a new storage facility constructed at one of its sites.
* When this comprehensive strategy is completed, we further recommend
that the Secretary of Energy ensure that each of DOE's facilities'
cleanup plans are reviewed to ensure that each site's cleanup goals and
time frames are consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy
for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment.
DOE's letter is presented as appendix II. DOE generally agreed with our
recommendations and stated that a Nuclear Materials Disposition and
Consolidation Coordination Committee was formed earlier this year to
provide a forum to perform nuclear materials disposition and
consolidation planning. The objectives of this committee are to develop
a plan that would provide the necessary security for DOE's nuclear
material, identify paths for disposition, and reduce security and
program costs. DOE stated that this committee would produce a strategic
plan that would encompass the comprehensive strategy called for in our
first recommendation. DOE also stated that the cleanup plans for its
sites would be revised accordingly following completion of the
committee's strategic plan.
DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we incorporated into
the report as appropriate. These technical comments focused primarily
on DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium at SRS, the availability of
sufficient storage space at SRS, and DOE's ability to monitor stored
plutonium. Specifically, DOE emphasized in its technical comments that
it has no plans at this time to further consolidate any plutonium at
SRS. We recognize that a final decision to consolidate plutonium has
not been made. However, it is important to note, as was stated in our
draft report, that both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's
storage plan assumed that DOE's surplus plutonium would be consolidated
at SRS and that both plans were approved by DOE headquarters without
resolving conflicts between them. We believe DOE's comments that it has
no plans to further consolidate any plutonium at SRS reinforce our
recommendation for a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation,
storage, and disposition of DOE's excess plutonium.
Regarding the availability of sufficient storage space at SRS, DOE
stated in its technical comments that, even without Building 235-F,
Building 105-K has adequate storage capacity for all of its excess
plutonium, including the Hanford fuel rods. However, it is important to
note that DOE was proceeding with its plans to store plutonium in
Building 235-F until changes to the DBT forced DOE to reevaluate its
plans. Our draft report recognized that SRS officials believe Building
105-K has sufficient space to store all of DOE's plutonium storage
containers from its sites across the United States. Nevertheless, DOE's
estimates of the total number of containers have varied over time and
may continue to change because plutonium stabilization and packaging is
still ongoing at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
Laboratories. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, additional safety
analyses and documentation are necessary before Building 105-K would be
able to store the Hanford fuel rods.
Regarding DOE's ability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE stated in its
technical comments that it has the capability in Building 235-F to
monitor the condition of stored plutonium and that the building will
not be shut down until a monitoring capability is established in
Building 105-K. However, as our draft report noted, monitoring at
Building 235-F is currently limited to removing storage containers from
their outer packaging and performing nondestructive examinations of the
containers. Building 235-F also has equipment that can puncture storage
containers to relieve pressure if needed. However, Building 235-F does
not have the capability to perform destructive examinations of the
storage containers, which, according to SRS's plutonium surveillance
and monitoring plan, must be conducted beginning in fiscal year 2007.
In addition, SRS lacks the capability to restabilize and repackage
plutonium if necessary. Until nondestructive examination, destructive
examination, stabilization, and repackaging equipment is installed in
Building 105-K, we believe that DOE's capability to monitor the
condition of stored plutonium at SRS is incomplete. We modified our
draft report to further clarify DOE's current monitoring capabilities.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, NNSA; the Chairman of
the Safety Board; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. We
also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House
of Representatives, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of
Energy (DOE) can consolidate its nonpit plutonium at the Savannah River
Site (SRS) and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage
containers. A forthcoming classified report discusses SRS's plans for
upgrading security to meet the 2004 design basis threat (DBT).
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed independent studies of
storage conditions at SRS performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Safety Board), an independent federal agency established
by the Congress in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons
complex. Specifically, we reviewed the Safety Board's December 2003
report entitled Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's
Savannah River Site: Report to Congress and its June 2004 report
entitled Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's Savannah River
Site: First Annual Report to Congress. In addition, we interviewed
subject matter experts with the Safety Board. We also obtained and
reviewed several SRS studies of plutonium storage options: 1999
Savannah River Plutonium Storage Study, 2000 Evaluation of Savannah
River Plutonium Storage and Stabilization Options, and 2004 Savannah
River Site Storage of Surplus Plutonium Study: 2004 Update. A GAO
analyst with subject matter expertise and a GAO senior methodologist
with training and experience in evaluation research and methodology
reviewed all of these studies to evaluate their methodological
soundness and determine the reliability of their conclusions. These
reviews entailed an evaluation of each study's research methodology,
including its data quality, research design, and key assumptions, as
well as a summary of its major findings and conclusions. We also
assessed the extent to which each study's data and methods support its
findings and conclusions. We determined that these studies were
methodologically sound enough for the purposes of this report.
In cooperation with a GAO economist, we attempted to determine the cost
of plutonium storage at SRS by developing a model that evaluated costs
under various storage scenarios, such as constructing a new
consolidated storage facility or upgrading an existing facility to
store plutonium. This model also attempted to determine the cost of
continued storage of plutonium at Hanford for comparative purposes.
However, we were unable to complete our model because we were unable to
obtain complete cost data from DOE. Security costs are a major
component of the total cost of storing plutonium, but security cost
data were not available at the time of our review because neither SRS
nor Hanford had yet determined how they will enhance security to meet
the 2004 DBT.
To determine the extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at
SRS, we reviewed DOE's Records of Decision published in the Federal
Register for plutonium storage and disposition activities at SRS, such
as plans to construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and
subsequent postponement and then cancellation of those plans, and
relevant DOE orders, policies, and standards, such as DOE-STD-3013-
2003, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing
Materials. We visited SRS and inspected plutonium storage areas in
Building 105-K and facilities in Building 235-F originally intended for
plutonium storage and monitoring. We interviewed and received briefings
from DOE's operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River
Company); DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.);
SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS's
Nuclear Materials Programs Division. We also spoke with officials
responsible for the management of Building 105-K and Building 235-F.
We also visited the Hanford Site and toured the Plutonium Finishing
Plant, where we observed plutonium storage containers that are
currently stored inside the plant and nuclear fuel rods that are stored
inside and outside the facility. We spoke with officials from DOE's
Richland Operations Office, DOE's operating contractor for Hanford
(Fluor Hanford), and Fluor's security subcontractor for the Hanford
Site (Protection Technology Hanford). From these officials, we received
briefings on Hanford's plans for plutonium storage and shipment. We
also discussed the deactivation of the Plutonium Finishing Plant.
In Washington, D.C., we met with DOE's acting Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management to discuss DOE's planned consolidation of
plutonium at SRS and how SRS will store the material. We also discussed
issues related to storage, monitoring, and security with officials from
DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, and DOE's National Nuclear
Security Administration.
To evaluate DOE's ability to monitor plutonium storage containers, we
first examined the reliability of SRS's database for tracking inventory
and for SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring project. We
obtained responses to a series of data reliability questions covering
issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the
accuracy and completeness of the data. We asked follow-up questions
whenever necessary. We also obtained and reviewed related documents,
including Users Manual for the DOE Complex Integrated Surveillance
Program Working Database and other manuals and data dictionaries. We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this report.
To evaluate the safety of conducting monitoring activities in Building
105-K and Building 235-F, we reviewed the Safety Board's 2003 and 2004
reports described earlier, and discussed the safety conditions of the
facilities with subject matter experts on the Safety Board. We observed
the facilities where SRS plans to conduct monitoring activities and
reviewed documents pertaining to SRS's monitoring plans. We received
briefings from Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel
responsible for plutonium monitoring and discussed the planned
monitoring activities with officials responsible for managing Building
105-K and Building 235-F. We also discussed monitoring with officials
from the Safety Board; Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Wackenhut
Services, Inc; SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency
Services; and SRS's Nuclear Materials Programs Division. At the Hanford
Site, we observed facilities and equipment for surveillance and
monitoring of its plutonium and received a briefing on Hanford's use of
that facility.
We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
JUL 1 2005:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for your June 14, 2005, letter to the Secretary of Energy
providing the draft report, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs
to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium, and requesting written
comments from the Department of Energy (DOE). Your draft report
contains two recommendations for executive action: (1) the Secretary
develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and
disposition of DOE's excess plutonium, and (2) DOE's cleanup plans be
reviewed to ensure they are consistent with the comprehensive strategy.
With respect to your first recommendation, earlier this year former
Secretary Abraham established the Nuclear Materials Disposition and
Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC). Secretary Bodman
subsequently approved the charter for this Committee. The principal
mission of the NMDCCC is to provide a forum to perform cross-cutting
nuclear materials disposition and consolidation planning with the
objectives of providing the necessary security for DOE's nuclear
material, identifying paths for disposition, as appropriate, and
reducing out-year security and program costs. One of the
responsibilities of this Committee, of which I am a member, is to
develop and ensure implementation of a Strategic Plan for disposition
and consolidation of special nuclear material. This Strategic Plan will
encompass the comprehensive strategy called for in your first
recommendation.
Regarding your second recommendation, following completion of the
NMDCCC's Strategic Plan, I will ensure that site cleanup plans are
revised accordingly. My staff will review those revised plans to make
certain they are consistent with the Strategic Plan and its associated
implementation schedule.
At a recent meeting with you and your staff, we provided comments to
you on the bulk of the draft report. Although some revisions were made
to the report as a result of those comments, we believe that the draft
report still contains inaccuracies and statements that can be
misinterpreted. Enclosed are detailed comments that we respectfully
request be considered as you finalize your report.
If you have any further questions, please contact me at (202) 586-7709
or Mr. Mark A. Gilbertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Cleanup and Acceleration, at (202) 586-0755.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Charles E. Anderson:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robin
Eddington, Doreen S. Feldman, Jonathan M. Gill, Sherry L. McDonald,
Mehrzad Nadji, James D. Noel, Judy K. Pagano, Keith A. Rhodes, Paul
Rhodes, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this
report.
(360467):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The exact amounts of plutonium that are in pit and nonpit forms is
considered classified information.
[2] A dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device, uses
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. While a dirty
bomb would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals,
it could potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those
contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated
areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic
costs.
[3] See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004).
[4] U.S. Department of Energy, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013-2003 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2003).
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001).
[6] The two proposed plutonium disposition facilities are the plutonium
immobilization plant and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility for
surplus plutonium pits and nonpit plutonium.
[7] This facility--FB Line--was constructed in the early 1960s at SRS
to convert plutonium solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear
weapons components. In recent years, its primary mission has been the
stabilization of scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and
packaging the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. It ceased
operations and transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in
March 2005.
[8] Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete
enclosures and filled with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As
air flows upward through the bed, the rock, gravel, and sand filter out
plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then flow
into the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S.
nuclear facilities since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand
filters can remove a large amount of radioactive material, are
relatively low maintenance, and are fire resistant.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
