Nuclear Weapons
Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex Gao ID: GAO-06-606T April 26, 2006Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. At the direction of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board's (SEAB) Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force issued a report in October 2005 that provided a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons complex for the next 25 years and offered its vision for an agile and responsive weapons complex. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the current actions NNSA is taking to address the SEAB task force's recommendations and (2) the critical steps that will be needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful, cost-effective transformation of the weapons complex.
The SEAB task force report contained the following five recommendations: (1) immediately begin to modernize the cold war nuclear stockpile by designing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW); (2) create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains a modern set of production facilities in one location; (3) consolidate all weapons-grade material and weapons components at the CNPC; (4) aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile; and (5) create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of the nuclear weapons complex. NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the nuclear weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a design competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an increase of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons in fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal year 2007 budget proposal to create an Office of Transformation, among other things. However, NNSA does not support the SEAB task force's recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of consolidating weapons-grade material at the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations as too costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated center for processing plutonium, removing weapons-grade material from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing the remaining production capabilities at their existing locations. Regardless of the approach chosen, any attempt to change an extremely complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. GAO has identified the following four actions that, in its view, are critical to successfully transforming the weapons complex: (1) the Department of Defense will need to establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile by determining the types and quantities of nuclear weapons needed to provide for our nation's nuclear deterrent; (2) after the Department of Defense determines the size and composition of the future stockpile, NNSA will need to develop accurate cost estimates of the proposals for transforming the weapons complex because current estimates of the costs of transforming the weapons complex contain considerable uncertainty; (3) after NNSA selects a proposal based on accurate cost estimates, it will need to develop a clear transformation plan containing measurable milestones so that it can evaluate progress and the Congress can hold it accountable; and (4) the proposed Office of Transformation must have authority to make and enforce its decisions on transformation and must be held accountable by the Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective results.
GAO-06-606T, Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 26, 2006:
Nuclear Weapons:
Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-06-606T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-606T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to
comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear
deterrent and what the nation‘s approach should be for transforming its
aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the
Department of Energy, is responsible for overseeing this weapons
complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories,
four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site.
At the direction of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board‘s (SEAB) Nuclear Weapons Complex
Infrastructure Task Force issued a report in October 2005 that provided
a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons complex for the
next 25 years and offered its vision for an agile and responsive
weapons complex. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the current actions NNSA
is taking to address the SEAB task force‘s recommendations and (2) the
critical steps that will be needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful,
cost-effective transformation of the weapons complex.
What GAO Found:
The SEAB task force report contained the following five recommendations:
* Immediately begin to modernize the cold war nuclear stockpile by
designing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).
* Create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains
a modern set of production facilities in one location.
* Consolidate all weapons-grade material and weapons components at the
CNPC.
* Aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile.
* Create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of
the nuclear weapons complex.
NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the nuclear weapons
complex that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the
SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1)
will decide on a design competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2)
have requested an increase of over $15 million in funding for
dismantling legacy weapons in fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested
$15 million in their fiscal year 2007 budget proposal to create an
Office of Transformation, among other things. However, NNSA does not
support the SEAB task force‘s recommendation for a CNPC and the
accompanying recommendation of consolidating weapons-grade material at
the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations as too
costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated center for
processing plutonium, removing weapons-grade material from the three
weapons laboratories, and modernizing the remaining production
capabilities at their existing locations.
Regardless of the approach chosen, any attempt to change an extremely
complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning,
and effective leadership. GAO has identified the following four actions
that, in its view, are critical to successfully transforming the
weapons complex:
* The Department of Defense will need to establish clear, long-term
requirements for the nuclear stockpile by determining the types and
quantities of nuclear weapons needed to provide for our nation‘s
nuclear deterrent.
* After the Department of Defense determines the size and composition
of the future stockpile, NNSA will need to develop accurate cost
estimates of the proposals for transforming the weapons complex.
Current estimates of the costs of transforming the weapons complex
contain considerable uncertainty.
* After NNSA selects a proposal based on accurate cost estimates, it
will need to develop a clear transformation plan containing measurable
milestones so that it can evaluate progress and the Congress can hold
it accountable.
* The proposed Office of Transformation must have authority to make and
enforce its decisions on transformation and must be held accountable by
the Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective results.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to provide our observations on the
October 2005 report, Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of
the Future, prepared by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board's (SEAB)
Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force.[Footnote 1] After
the end of the cold war, the United States, in 1992, began a unilateral
moratorium on underground nuclear testing. Subsequently, in 1993, the
Department of Energy (DOE), at the direction of the President and the
Congress, established the Stockpile Stewardship Program to ensure the
United States' core intellectual and technical competencies in nuclear
weapons without testing.[Footnote 2] The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, is now
responsible for carrying out the Stockpile Stewardship Program through
a nuclear weapons complex (weapons complex) that comprises three
nuclear weapons design laboratories (weapons laboratories), four
production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. With the creation of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, the mission of the weapons complex
changed from "designing, building, and testing" successive generations
of weapons to extending the life of the existing nuclear weapons
stockpile through "scientific study, computer simulation, and
refurbishment."
Several events over the past few years have made it clear that it is
time for the United States to comprehensively reevaluate how it
maintains its nuclear deterrent and to develop and implement a strategy
for transforming its weapons complex. For example, the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review found that the nuclear weapons infrastructure had
atrophied and needed to be repaired; it also called for the development
of a "responsive infrastructure" that would support a smaller nuclear
deterrent. Subsequently, the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United
States and Russia set a goal of reducing the number of deployed U.S.
nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. More recently,
NNSA, as directed by the conference report accompanying DOE's fiscal
year 2005 appropriations act, created the Reliable Replacement Warhead
(RRW) program to study a new approach to maintaining nuclear warheads
over the long term by making weapons easier to manufacture, maintain,
dismantle, and certify without nuclear testing.[Footnote 3]
In this context, this Subcommittee requested, and the SEAB task force
has provided, a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons
complex over the next 25 years. The SEAB task force report contains
five major recommendations that, combined with numerous supporting
recommendations, offer the task force's vision for an agile and
responsive weapons complex. These recommendations are as follows:
* Immediately begin to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile by
designing a RRW.
* Create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains
a modern set of production facilities in one location.
* Consolidate all Category I and Category II quantities of Special
Nuclear Material and weapon primary and secondary components at the
CNPC.
* Aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile.
* Create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of
the weapons complex.
Our testimony discusses (1) the current actions NNSA is taking to
address the SEAB task force's recommendations and (2) the critical
actions needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful, cost-effective
transformation of the weapons complex.
To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the final SEAB task force
report and the comments provided by various parties on the initial
draft. We interviewed the SEAB task force members individually to
obtain their views on the final report and NNSA's response to it. We
met with various NNSA officials, including the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs and the head of NNSA's Responsive Infrastructure
Steering Committee, and with the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Nuclear Matters). We also reviewed the methods the SEAB task
force used to develop cost estimates for options presented in its
report. Finally, we reviewed a variety of documents, including the
Nuclear Posture Review, and the recent Defense Science Board report,
entitled Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear
Capabilities.[Footnote 4] We performed our work between February 2006
and April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
In summary:
NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the weapons complex that
it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force
report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a
design competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an
increase of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons
in fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal
year 2007 budget proposal to create an Office of Transformation and to
begin studying ways to transform the business practices of the weapons
complex. However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force's
recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of
consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear
Material at the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations
as too costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated
center for processing plutonium, removing Category I and II Special
Nuclear Material from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing
the remaining production capabilities at their existing locations.
Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex, any
attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be based on
solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We have
identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to successfully
transforming the weapons complex. As the Congress oversees NNSA's
future actions, it should expect to see each of these actions carefully
and fully implemented:
* The Department of Defense (DOD) will need to establish clear, long-
term requirements for the stockpile. Our current stockpile comprises
nine weapon systems, all of which were designed during the cold war.
Several of these systems--the B61, W76, and W80--are currently having
their useful lives extended for up to 30 years through NNSA's Stockpile
Life Extension Program. However, these life extensions are very
expensive, and some have already experienced cost and schedule
slippages. NNSA is now evaluating a new warhead--the RRW--which may be
able to take the place of some existing warheads. Before any plans for
a new weapons complex can be made final, however, in our view, DOD will
need to determine the systems, their capabilities, their quantities,
and the schedule it needs to provide for our nation's nuclear
deterrent.
* NNSA will need to provide accurate estimates of the costs of
transformation. Once a decision is made about the size and composition
of the stockpile, NNSA can develop accurate estimates of the costs of
proposals for transforming the weapons complex. As we have noted in
numerous reports over the last several years on key projects such as
the National Ignition Facility and the Stockpile Life Extension
Program, NNSA has had difficulty estimating costs and schedules and
adhering to them.[Footnote 5] Some cost estimates to transform the
weapons complex were developed as part of the SEAB task force report
and, according to NNSA officials, NNSA is currently using the same cost
models for its effort. However, these estimates need considerable
refinement. As a result, NNSA will need to develop credible, defensible
cost estimates for transforming the weapons complex.
* NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear milestones
for measuring progress. Developing workable plans, with realistic,
measurable milestones has been a continuing problem for NNSA. For
example, as we noted in our February 2006 report on NNSA's effort to
develop and implement a new method for assessing and certifying the
stockpile, NNSA does not have an integrated plan for carrying out this
important activity or clear milestones for measuring progress.[Footnote
6] Without question, transforming the weapons complex will be a much
more daunting enterprise. However, without a clear transformation plan
that contains measurable milestones, NNSA will have no way to evaluate
its progress, and the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA
accountable.
* Change will require a strong Office of Transformation. As we noted in
a 2003 report, one of the key practices for successfully transforming
an organization is to ensure that top leadership sets the direction,
pace, and tone for the transformation.[Footnote 7] Through its recent
reorganizations, NNSA has shown that it can move from what was often
called a "dysfunctional bureaucracy" to an organization with clearer
lines of authority and responsibility. NNSA officials have embraced the
SEAB task force's proposal for an Office of Transformation. However, in
order for such an office to be effective, it must (1) report directly
to the Administrator, NNSA; (2) have real authority to make and enforce
its decisions; and (3) be held accountable by the Congress for
achieving results in a cost-effective and timely manner.
Background:
NNSA conducts nuclear weapon and nonproliferation-related national
security activities in research and development laboratories,
production plants, and other facilities.[Footnote 8] Specifically, NNSA
operates three weapons laboratories--Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), California; Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
New Mexico; and the Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico and
California; and four nuclear weapons production sites--the Pantex
Plant, Texas; the Y-12 Plant, Tennessee; the Kansas City Plant,
Missouri; and the Savannah River Site, South Carolina. NNSA also
operates the Nevada Test Site. To implement its nuclear weapons
programs, NNSA received about $6.4 billion for fiscal year 2006 and has
requested more than $6.4 billion for fiscal year 2007. Between fiscal
years 2008 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to spend almost $27 billion for
these programs.
Over the past decade, NNSA has invested a substantial amount of money
in sustaining the cold war stockpile and upgrading the three weapons
laboratories with new, state-of-the-art experimental and computing
facilities. However, as described in studies over the past decade, the
production infrastructure of the weapons complex is aging and
increasingly outdated. For example, a 2000 DOE Office of Inspector
General report concluded that the postponement of repairs to aging and
deteriorating facilities had resulted in delays in weapons
modification, remanufacture, and dismantlement, among other
things.[Footnote 9] In addition, a 2001 report by the Foster Panel
found the state of the production facilities to be troubling and
recommended that NNSA restore missing production capabilities and
refurbish the production infrastructure.[Footnote 10] In its fiscal
year 2007 budget request, NNSA estimated that it will cost $2.4 billion
to reduce the backlog of deferred maintenance at these facilities to an
appropriate level consistent with industry best practices.
Events over the past several years have served to intensify concern
about how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what
the nation's strategy should be for transforming the weapons complex.
Specifically:
* The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review stated, among other things, that cold
war practices related to nuclear weapons planning were obsolete, and
few changes had been made to the size or composition of the nation's
nuclear forces. Furthermore, there had been underinvestment in the
weapons complex, particularly the production sites. The Nuclear Posture
Review called for, among other things, the development of a "responsive
infrastructure" that would be sized to meet the needs of a smaller
nuclear deterrent while having the capability to respond to future
strategic challenges.
* The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led DOE to increase the
size of its Design Basis Threat, a classified document that identifies
the size and capabilities of terrorist forces. This increase in the
size of the Design Basis Threat has greatly increased NNSA's cost for
protecting its weapons-grade nuclear material.
* The 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia set a
goal of reducing the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads to
between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. However, a significant number of
existing warheads would be kept in reserve to address potential
technical contingencies with the existing stockpile.
* NNSA, at the Congress' direction, created the RRW program to study a
new approach to maintaining nuclear warheads over the long term. The
RRW program would redesign weapon components to be easier to
manufacture, maintain, dismantle, and certify without nuclear testing,
potentially allowing NNSA to transition to a smaller, more efficient
weapons complex. A design competition between LANL and LLNL is
scheduled to end in November 2006.
* Finally, in recent congressional testimony, the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of NNSA emphasized to the Congress that while
they believe stockpile stewardship is working, the current cold war
legacy stockpile is the wrong stockpile for the long term, and the
current nuclear weapons infrastructure is not responsive to
unanticipated events or emerging threats.
Current NNSA plans call for substantial funding to operate the existing
weapons complex. For example, according to NNSA's fiscal year 2007
budget request, over the next 5 years, NNSA plans to spend about $7.4
billion to operate and maintain the existing infrastructure of the
weapons complex. In addition, NNSA plans to spend $1.8 billion on new
construction projects. These construction projects include:
* the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at the Y-12 Plant,
which is estimated to cost $335 million and be completed in fiscal year
2007;[Footnote 11]
* the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at LANL,
which is estimated to cost $838 million and be completed in fiscal year
2013; and:
* the proposed Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant, which is
projected to cost between $600 million to $1 billion.
During testimony before this Subcommittee in March 2004, the Secretary
of Energy agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of the weapons
complex. Subsequently, in January 2005, the Secretary of Energy
requested the SEAB to form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure
Task Force to assess the implications of presidential decisions on the
size and composition of the stockpile; the cost and operational impacts
of the new Design Basis Threat; and the personnel, facilities, and
budgetary resources required to support a smaller stockpile. The review
was also to evaluate opportunities for consolidating Special Nuclear
Material, facilities, and operations across the weapons complex in
order to minimize security requirements and the environmental impacts
of continuing operations. The SEAB task force formally transmitted the
final report to the Secretary of Energy in October 2005.
According to the report, the SEAB task force assessed the impact of its
recommendations on near-term funding requirements, as well as total
costs, for the weapons complex over the next 25 years. The report
stated that implementing all of the recommendations will increase near-
term costs substantially but would result in a substantial reduction in
future operating costs after the CNPC is in full operation. The SEAB
task force estimated that the long-term cost savings would be
approximately twice the near-term cost increases.
NNSA Actions to Implement the SEAB Task Force Recommendations:
Initially, NNSA officials did not provide us with any detailed
information concerning their plans for transforming the infrastructure
of the weapons complex and for addressing the recommendations in the
SEAB task force report. Instead, NNSA officials described to us the
following process they were using to establish a detailed vision for
the future weapons complex and to identify a "path forward" for
achieving that vision:
* In March 2005, NNSA established a Responsive Infrastructure Steering
Committee and created a position within the Office of Defense Programs
to lead this effort.
* In October 2005, NNSA received the final SEAB task force report. NNSA
officials said that they have reviewed the recommendations from this
report, along with recommendations from other advisory bodies, such as
the Defense Science Board.
* In November 2005 and January 2006, NNSA held two meetings for senior-
level officials within the weapons complex to establish a broad range
of planning options, which NNSA refers to as its "preferred
infrastructure planning scenario."
* In January 2006, NNSA held a 3-week session for about 50 key midlevel
managers within the weapons complex to evaluate the proposed planning
options.
As a result of this process, NNSA recently offered a proposal for
transforming the weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the
recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA
officials stated that:
* NNSA will decide on the RRW design competition in November 2006 and,
assuming that the RRW is technically feasible, will seek authorization
to proceed to engineering development and production;
* NNSA is requesting an additional $15.6 million in its fiscal year
2007 budget request to dismantle legacy weapons material at the Pantex
Plant; and:
* NNSA is requesting about $15 million for fiscal year 2007, as well as
over $30 million annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2011, to
support the implementation of its responsive infrastructure strategy,
including the creation of an Office of Transformation within the Office
of Defense Programs.
However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force's
recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of
consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear
Material at the CNPC. NNSA believes that these recommendations are not
affordable or feasible. For example, in recent congressional testimony,
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs said that the SEAB task
force report's recommendation on the timing for a CNPC--i.e., that a
CNPC could be designed, built, and operational by 2015--is not
plausible and underestimates the challenges of transitioning a unique
and highly skilled workforce to a new location. He also stated that the
recommendation does not recognize the challenge of meeting near-term
requirements of the current stockpile and transforming the weapons
complex infrastructure at the same time. In addition, he stated that it
may be decades before all existing legacy weapons are fully removed
from the stockpile and dismantled.
Instead, NNSA has proposed the following plan for the 2030 weapons
complex, which it states will achieve many of the benefits of the SEAB
task force's approach in a way that is technically feasible and
affordable over both the near and longer term:
* Consolidated plutonium center. All research and development (except
certain experiments at the Nevada Test Site), surveillance, and
production activities involving Category I and II quantities of
plutonium would be transferred to a consolidated plutonium center. The
center would have a baseline production capacity of 125 pits per year
by 2022 and would be situated at an existing Category I and II Special
Nuclear Material site. In the interim, NNSA would upgrade the plutonium
facility at Tech Area 55 at LANL to produce 30-50 pits per year and
operate the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at
LANL as a Category I and II Special Nuclear Material facility.
* Consolidation of Category I and II Special Nuclear Material. This
material would be consolidated to fewer sites, and to fewer locations
within sites. Specifically, NNSA would remove all Category I and II
Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratory by 2008 and
from LLNL by 2014, and would cease all activities involving this
material at LANL by 2022. The remaining NNSA sites with Category I and
II Special Nuclear Material would include the consolidated plutonium
center, the Nevada Test Site, the Pantex Plant, the Y-12 Plant, and the
Savannah River Site.
* Modernizing the remaining production sites. The planned Uranium
Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant would consolidate existing highly
enriched uranium contained in legacy weapons, dismantle legacy warhead
secondaries, support associated research and development, and provide a
long-term capacity for new secondary production. Tritium production and
stockpile support services would remain at the Savannah River Site. All
weapons assembly and disassembly would be carried out at a Pantex Plant
modernized for increased throughput for the long term. In addition,
NNSA would build a new, nonnuclear component production facility by
2012 at an unspecified location. Finally, the Nevada Test Site would
become the only site for large-scale hydrodynamic testing, which
measure how stockpile materials behave when exposed to explosively
driven shocks.
Four Actions Will Be Critical to Successfully Transforming the Complex:
Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex, any
attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be based on
solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We have
identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to the
successful transformation of the weapons complex. As the Congress
oversees NNSA's future actions, it should expect to see each of these
actions carefully and fully implemented.
DOD Will Need to Establish Clear, Long-Term Requirements for the
Stockpile:
The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of nine weapon types. (See
table 1.) The lifetimes of the weapons currently in the stockpile have
been extended well beyond the minimum life for which they were
originally designed--generally about 20 years--increasing the average
age of the stockpile and, for the first time, leaving NNSA with large
numbers of weapons that are close to 30 years old.
Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in the Enduring Stockpile:
Warhead or bomb type: B61 3/4/10;
Description: Tactical bomb;
Date of entry into stockpile: 1979/1979/1990;
Laboratory: LANL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: B61 7/11;
Description: Strategic bomb;
Date of entry into stockpile: 1985/1996;
Laboratory: LANL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: W62;
Description: ICBM warhead[A];
Date of entry into stockpile: 1970;
Laboratory: LLNL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: W76;
Description: SLBM warhead[B];
Date of entry into stockpile: 1978;
Laboratory: LANL, SNL;
Military service: Navy.
Warhead or bomb type: W78;
Description: ICBM warhead[A];
Date of entry into stockpile: 1979;
Laboratory: LANL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: W80 0/1;
Description: Cruise missile warhead;
Date of entry into stockpile: 1984/1982;
Laboratory: LLNL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force / Navy.
Warhead or bomb type: B83 0/1;
Description: Strategic bomb;
Date of entry into stockpile: 1983/1993;
Laboratory: LLNL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: W87;
Description: ICBM warhead[A];
Date of entry into stockpile: 1986;
Laboratory: LLNL, SNL;
Military service: Air Force.
Warhead or bomb type: W88;
Description: SLBM warhead[B];
Date of entry into stockpile: 1989;
Laboratory: LANL, SNL;
Military service: Navy.
Source: NNSA.
Note: The dates of entry into the enduring nuclear stockpile are based
on when the weapon reached phase 6 of the weapons development and
production cycle. As of 2005, responsibility for the W80 0/1 was
transferred from LANL to LLNL.
[A] ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile.
[B] SLBM = submarine launched ballistic missile.
[End of table]
NNSA is currently rebuilding several of these weapon types through the
Stockpile Life Extension Program. Already, the W87 has been
refurbished. In addition, the B61, W76, and W80 are well into their
respective refurbishments. The first production unit for the B61 is
scheduled for September 2006, while the first production unit for the
W76 is scheduled for September 2007 and for the W80 for January 2009.
These are costly and difficult undertakings. According to NNSA's fiscal
year 2007 budget request, over the next 5 years, the agency will need
$118.4 million for the B61 life extension, $669.9 million for the W76,
and $581.5 million for the W80. These efforts place considerable
demands on the computational and experimental facilities of the weapons
laboratories, as well as the production facilities. Finally, some of
the life extensions have experienced significant cost and schedule
overruns.[Footnote 12] For example, the total cost of the W80 life
extension has increased by almost $600 million, while the first
production unit date has slipped from February 2006 to the current date
of January 2009.
In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD described the need to
substantially reduce operationally deployed strategic warheads through
2012. These reductions were subsequently reflected in the Moscow Treaty
between the United States and Russia, which was signed in May 2002. As
part of this strategy, DOD has stated its support for the development
of an RRW, which could enable reductions in the number of older,
nondeployed warheads maintained as a hedge against reliability problems
in deployed systems and assist in the evolution to a smaller and more
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Currently, LANL and LLNL are
developing competing designs for an RRW deployed on a submarine-
launched ballistic missile, with the first production unit planned for
fiscal year 2012. However, since the RRW design competition will not be
completed until November 2006, more information on the viability of the
RRW program will be necessary before any firm plans can be drawn up,
budgeted, and implemented. In particular, it is not clear at this point
whether the RRW can achieve the military characteristics, such as
yield, provided by the current stockpile. Some NNSA officials have
indicated that the military characteristics may need to be relaxed in
order to design a warhead that is safer, easier to build, and easier to
maintain.
Producing an RRW warhead, while at the same time refurbishing a
significant portion of the stockpile and continuing to dismantle
retired weapons, will be a difficult and costly undertaking. Given
NNSA's performance to date with the life extension programs and the
current unresolved questions about the RRW, in our view, DOD will need
to establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile
before NNSA can make any final decisions about transforming the weapons
complex. Specifically, DOD, working with NNSA through the Nuclear
Weapons Council, needs to determine the types and quantities of nuclear
weapons that will provide for our nation's nuclear deterrent over the
long term. To facilitate this process, and to provide a foundation for
transforming the weapons complex, the Congress may wish to consider
setting firm deadlines for DOD, NNSA, and the Nuclear Weapons Council
to determine the future composition of the nuclear stockpile.
NNSA Will Need to Provide Accurate Estimates of the Costs of
Transformation:
Once a decision about the size and composition of the stockpile is
made, NNSA will need accurate estimates of the costs of proposals for
transforming the weapons complex. However, historically, NNSA has had
difficulty developing realistic, defensible cost estimates, especially
for large complex projects. For example, in our August 2000 report on
the National Ignition Facility,[Footnote 13] we found that NNSA and
LLNL managers greatly underestimated the costs of creating such a
technically complex facility and failed to include adequate contingency
funding, which virtually assured that the National Ignition Facility
would be over budget and behind schedule. Similarly, as noted in a
March 2005 NNSA report, inadequate appreciation of the technical
complexities and inadequate contingency funding directly contributed to
the cost overruns and schedule slippage experienced by the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility.[Footnote 14] As noted earlier,
NNSA has experienced similar cost and schedule problems with some of
its life extension efforts.
Some cost estimates to transform the weapons complex were included in
the SEAB task force report. Specifically, using the results of computer
models developed at LANL and LLNL, the SEAB task force estimated that
NNSA would need about $175 billion between now and 2030 to support its
current baseline program and modernize the current weapons complex in
place, while NNSA would need only $155 billion to carry out the task
force's recommendations. According to NNSA officials, NNSA is currently
using the same cost models to evaluate its proposal.
However, according to SEAB task force and NNSA and laboratory
officials, while the LANL and LLNL models are useful for analyzing
overall cost trends and evaluating the cost implications of alternative
strategies, they are not currently designed to provide overall life-
cycle cost estimates. In addition, we found, among other things, that
the cost data used in the models have a high degree of uncertainty
associated with them and that the models do not currently have the
ability to provide any confidence intervals around their estimates.
Several of the SEAB task force members told us that they recognize the
limitations associated with their cost estimates. Since they did not
have the time to fully analyze the costs and implementation issues
associated with their recommendations, they expected that the proposed
Office of Transformation would perform the necessary, detailed cost-
benefit analyses of their recommendations in order to make the most
informed decisions.
As previously mentioned, NNSA officials have stated that they do not
support building a CNPC because they believe that it is neither
affordable nor feasible. However, until NNSA develops a credible,
defensible method for estimating life-cycle costs and performs detailed
cost analyses of the recommendations contained in the SEAB task force
report, as well as its own proposal, it will not be possible to
objectively evaluate the budgetary impact of any path forward.
NNSA Will Need to Develop a Transformation Plan with Clear Milestones
for Measuring Progress:
According to one count, NNSA has established over 70 plans with
associated performance measures to manage the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. Nevertheless, over the last 6 years, we have repeatedly
documented problems with NNSA's process for planning and managing its
activities. For example, in a December 2000 report prepared for this
Subcommittee, we found NNSA needed to improve its planning process so
that there were linkages between individual plans across the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and that the milestones contained in NNSA's plans
were reflected in contractors' performance criteria and
evaluations.[Footnote 15] However, in February 2006, we reported
similar problems with how NNSA is managing the implementation of its
new approach for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of
the nuclear stockpile.[Footnote 16] Specifically, we found that NNSA
planning documents did not contain clear, consistent milestones or a
comprehensive, integrated list of the scientific research being
conducted across the weapons complex in support of the Primary and
Secondary Assessment Technologies programs. These programs are
responsible for setting the requirements for the computer models and
experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and
reliability of nuclear warheads. We also found that NNSA had not
established adequate performance measures to determine the progress of
the weapons laboratories in developing and implementing this new
methodology.
However, the need for effective planning applies to more than the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. One of the major recommendations of the
SEAB task force is to consolidate Category I and II Special Nuclear
Material at the CNPC. In our July 2005 report, we noted that the
successful consolidation of Special Nuclear Material into fewer
locations is a crucial component of several DOE sites' Design Basis
Threat implementation plans.[Footnote 17] Such consolidation requires
the cooperation of a variety of entities, including NNSA's Office of
Secure Transportation, which moves weapons-grade material from site to
site. In our report, we recommended that DOE develop a departmentwide
Design Basis Threat implementation plan that includes the consolidation
of Special Nuclear Material. However, while DOE has established a
Nuclear Material Disposition Consolidation and Coordination Committee,
it has yet to develop such a comprehensive plan.
The process of transforming the weapons complex will take a long time
to complete--as long as two decades, according to some estimates. As a
result, NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear
milestones that all involved can work toward and that the Congress can
use to hold NNSA accountable. For example, as we stated in a 2003
report, one key practice in successful transformations is to set
implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show
progress from day 1.[Footnote 18] In addition, given the demand for
transparency and accountability in the public sector, these goals and
time lines should be made public. We would note that NNSA should be
able to establish milestones for some activities quickly, while others
will take more time. For example, NNSA's Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs has indicated a willingness to establish an Office of
Transformation and to implement other SEAB task force recommendations,
such as developing a consistent set of business practices across the
weapons complex. In these situations, the Congress should expect NNSA
to move quickly to establish specific milestones needed to create the
Office of Transformation, select key staff to fill this office, and
implement key initiatives.
We recognize that NNSA will not be able to establish specific
milestones in some areas until after the Office of Transformation has
performed a detailed, cost-benefit analysis of both the recommendations
in the SEAB task force report and of NNSA's own preferred approach.
However, once this analysis is complete, the Congress should expect to
see specific, detailed plans and accompanying milestones for the RRW
program, the establishment of a pit production capability, and the
other adopted recommendations from the SEAB task force report.
Change Will Require a Strong Office of Transformation:
Many of the recommendations in the SEAB report are not new. A number of
studies over the past 15 years have stressed the need to transform the
weapons complex. However, for a variety of reasons, DOE and NNSA have
never fully implemented these ideas. One of the key problems that NNSA
has experienced during this time has been its inability to build an
organization with clear lines of authority and responsibility. As we
noted in our June 2004 report, NNSA, through its December 2002
reorganization, made important strides in providing clearer lines of
authority and responsibility.[Footnote 19] However, we also noted
problems in certain oversight functions, such as safety. We are
currently evaluating NNSA's management effectiveness for the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Committee on Armed
Services.
The Congress, and Chairman Hobson in particular, have offered
leadership in supporting the creation of the SEAB task force and in
funding the RRW program. However, as we stated in a 2003 report,
organizational transformation entails fundamental and often radical
change.[Footnote 20] As a result, top leadership must set the
direction, pace, and tone for the transformation, while simultaneously
helping the organization remain focused on the continued delivery of
services. One key strategy is to dedicate a strong and stable
implementation team that will be responsible for the transformation's
day-to-day management. Accordingly, this team must be vested with the
necessary authority and resources to set priorities, make timely
decisions, and move quickly to implement decisions. Therefore, in our
view, it is imperative that the proposed Office of Transformation (1)
report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be given sufficient
authority to conduct its studies and implement its recommendations; and
(3) be held accountable for creating real change within the weapons
complex.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. James Noel, Assistant Director; Jason Holliday;
and Peter Ruedel made key contributions to this testimony.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,
Report of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force:
Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future
(Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005).
[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-160, § 3138 (1993).
[3] The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, stated that the
appropriations committee was providing $9 million "for the Reliable
Replacement Warhead program to improve the reliability, longevity, and
certifiability of existing weapons and their components." H.R. Rep. No.
108-792, Div. C, at 951 (2004).
[4] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: January 2006).
[5] See GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Exist to Improve the
Budgeting, Cost Accounting and Management Associated with the Stockpile
Life Extension Program, GAO-03-583 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2003)
and GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures
Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays, GAO/RCED-00-271
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).
[6] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Refine and More Effectively
Manage Its New Approach for Assessing and Certifying Nuclear Weapons,
GAO-06-261 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2006).
[7] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[8] The Office of Naval Reactors is managed as a separate entity within
NNSA.
[9] DOE Office of Inspector General, Management of the Nuclear Weapons
Production Infrastructure, September 2000, DOE/IG-0484.
[10] John S. Foster, Fr., et. al, FY 2000 Report to Congress of the
Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, Feb. 1, 2001.
[11] NNSA's fiscal year 2007 budget request states that detailed
design, cost, and schedule assessments for incorporating facility
improvements to meet the new Design Basis Threat and facility start-up
activities are still in progress. It is anticipated that when these
assessments are complete, the baseline "total estimated costs" of the
Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility will increase substantially,
and the completion date will slip.
[12] For information on cost and schedule overruns associated with the
W87 life extension program, see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved
Management Needed to Implement Stockpile Stewardship Program
Effectively, GAO-01-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.14, 2000).
[13] GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures
Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays, GAO/RCED-00-141
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).
[14] NNSA, DARHT Construction Project Lessons Learned Report, March
2005.
[15] See GAO-01-48.
[16] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Refine and More Effectively
Manage Its New Approach for Assessing and Certifying Nuclear Weapons,
GAO-06-261 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2006).
[17] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2005).
[18] See GAO-03-669.
[19] GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management
Structure and Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts
Downsizing, GAO-04-545 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).
[20] See GAO-03-669.
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