National Nuclear Security Administration
Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act Gao ID: GAO-07-428T January 31, 2007During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.
While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved communication through a reorganization and has made progress in establishing critical management systems, especially in the development of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, important weaknesses remain with respect to security; the Administration's relationship with DOE; and project, program and financial management. Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. Four factors have contributed to these problems: (1) lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for security; (2) security personnel staffing shortages at NNSA site offices; (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office security staff; and (4) incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's security program. While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with agreeing on how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as a separate agency, GAO does not believe that such drastic change is necessary to provide effective oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define their working relationships and determine how conflicts will be resolved. Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not (1) implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; (2) identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level of competency; and (3) established an independent analysis unit to review program budget proposals and analyze budget alternatives. In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight program; (2) clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program management, and the Administration's planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. NNSA generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. NNSA considered the agency a success but acknowledged there was considerable work yet to be accomplished.
GAO-07-428T, National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, January 31, 2007:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the
NNSA Act:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-07-428T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-428T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced
difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and
responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation‘s
nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major
projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under
Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000”the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience
security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer
systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the
National Ignition Facility.
GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1)
improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its
management practices and revise its organizational structure. In
January 2007, GAO issued a report”National Nuclear Security
Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the
Nation‘s Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)”that addressed these matters.
To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans
and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and
interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.
What GAO Found:
While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved
communication through a reorganization and has made progress in
establishing critical management systems, especially in the development
of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process,
important weaknesses remain with respect to security; the
Administration‘s relationship with DOE; and project, program and
financial management.
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security
organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security
program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO
identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites,
including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and
the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security
throughout NNSA. Four factors have contributed to these problems: (1)
lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for
security; (2) security personnel staffing shortages at NNSA site
offices; (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for
site office security staff; and (4) incomplete security data to gauge
the effectiveness of NNSA‘s security program.
While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its
internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with
agreeing on how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency
within the department. This lack of agreement has resulted in
organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations.
While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and
establishing it as a separate agency, GAO does not believe that such
drastic change is necessary to provide effective oversight of the
nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define
their working relationships and determine how conflicts will be
resolved.
Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where
additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the
nuclear weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not
(1) implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts;
(2) identified all of its program managers and trained them to a
certified level of competency; and (3) established an independent
analysis unit to review program budget proposals and analyze budget
alternatives.
In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA‘s security
oversight program; (2) clearly define NNSA‘s status as a separately
organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program
management, and the Administration‘s planning, programming, budgeting,
and evaluation process. NNSA generally agreed with the report and its
recommendations. NNSA considered the agency a success but acknowledged
there was considerable work yet to be accomplished.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-428T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized
agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)--has taken to improve the
security and management of the nation's nuclear programs. Specifically,
my remarks are based on the report we are issuing today--National
Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, which was prepared at the
request of this Subcommittee.[Footnote 1]
During the late 1990s, DOE experienced management difficulties with its
nuclear weapons programs that contributed to security problems at the
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and significant cost overruns on
major projects. According to a June 1999 report by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (the Board), DOE's management of
the nuclear weapons laboratories, while representing "science at its
best," also embodied "security at its worst" because of "organizational
disarray, managerial neglect, and —a culture of arrogance." The Board
urged the Congress to create a new organization that, whether
established as an independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within
DOE, would have a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and
drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability.
Responding to the Board's recommendations, the Congress created the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under Title 32 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA
Act.[Footnote 2]
The NNSA Act established NNSA as a "separately organized agency" within
DOE and made NNSA responsible for the management and security of the
nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor
programs. The NNSA Act established the position of DOE Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the Administrator of
NNSA. The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy were
allowed to establish policy for NNSA and to give direction to NNSA
through the Administrator; however, other DOE employees were prohibited
from directing the activities of individual NNSA employees. Finally,
the NNSA Act required that, among other things, NNSA develop a
planning, programming, and budgeting process in order to ensure that
the administration operated under sound financial management
principles.
Since its inception, however, NNSA has continued to experience both
security and management problems. For example, with respect to
security, in 2003 we found that NNSA had not fully defined the roles
and responsibilities of officials in its security program and that NNSA
had shortfalls in security staff at the site offices that oversee its
contractors. In addition, two NNSA studies commissioned in July 2003
found ongoing problems with NNSA's security program, including
weaknesses in its security culture, organization, and staffing and
training. Finally, DOE's Office of Inspector General found security
problems with NNSA's contractors, including improprieties in the
testing of the officers who protect NNSA's sites and weaknesses in
NNSA's cyber security program. With respect to the management of major
projects, the National Ignition Facility and the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test Facility--two major facilities needed to support
NNSA's nuclear weapons programs--experienced major delays and cost
overruns because of problems with project management and are still not
complete.
In this context, you asked us to evaluate the extent to which NNSA has
taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and
(2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational
structure. To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the NNSA Act; and
NNSA and DOE policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and
former NNSA and DOE officials. We also used reports on NNSA's security
efforts prepared by GAO, the DOE Inspector General, and outside groups,
such as a 2005 report on security commissioned by NNSA. Finally, we
collected and analyzed security performance ratings developed by DOE's
Office of Health, Safety and Security and NNSA site offices, from
fiscal years 1996 through 2005. We used these performance ratings
because there was wide agreement among NNSA and DOE security officials
that these ratings represented the best available information on the
overall performance of NNSA's safeguards and security program. We
conducted the work for our report from March 2005 through January 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards,
which included an assessment of data reliability and internal controls.
In summary:
Producing a well-organized and effective agency out of what was widely
considered a dysfunctional enterprise has been a considerable
challenge. In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. Most
notably, through its internal reorganization efforts, NNSA has
addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority
and improving communication and has made important progress in
establishing critical management systems, especially in the development
of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process.
However, important problems remain with respect to security, the
Administration's relationship with DOE, and project, program and
financial management.
Regarding security, NNSA still cannot demonstrate that all of its
security program objectives are being met at all of its sites.
Specifically, we found weaknesses with physical security at several
NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, Sandia National
Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex, and weaknesses
throughout NNSA in the cyber security area. Four factors have
contributed to problems with NNSA's security program. Specifically, we
found:
* a lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for
security;
* security personnel staffing shortages at the NNSA site offices that
oversee NNSA's contractors;
* inadequate training resources and opportunities for site office
security staff; and:
* incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's
security program.
With respect to NNSA's relationship to DOE, we found that almost 7
years after its creation, NNSA and DOE still have not fully agreed on
how NNSA should function within the department as a separately
organized agency. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational
conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. In our view, DOE
and NNSA need to take a more active approach to clearly defining DOE
and NNSA's working relationships and determining how conflicts will be
resolved. While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from
DOE and establishing it as a separate agency, we do not believe that
such drastic change is necessary to produce an organization that can
provide effective oversight of the nation's nuclear weapons complex.
Finally, while NNSA has taken several actions to improve its management
practices, including developing a PPBE process, we also identified
several areas where management weaknesses remain. Specifically, NNSA
has not developed a project management policy, implemented a plan for
improving its project management efforts, and fully shared project
management lessons learned between its sites. In addition, NNSA has not
identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified
level of competency. Finally, NNSA has not established an independent
analysis unit to (1) review program budget proposals, (2) confirm cost
estimates, and (3) analyze budget alternatives.
In order to improve the management of NNSA and its ability to oversee
the nuclear weapons complex , in our report to you, we made a series of
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA
to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight program; (2) clearly define
NNSA's status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3)
improve project and program management, and the agency's planning,
programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. In its comments on our
report, NNSA generally agreed with the report and its corresponding
recommendations. NNSA noted that it considers the agency to be a
success but acknowledged that there was considerable work yet to be
accomplished.
Background:
NNSA operates three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons-
-Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Los Alamos
National Laboratory, New Mexico; and the Sandia National Laboratories,
New Mexico and California; and four nuclear weapons production sites--
the Pantex Plant, Texas; the Y-12 National Security Complex, Tennessee;
the Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and parts of the Savannah River Site,
South Carolina; as well as the Nevada Test Site.
To implement its programs, NNSA received about $9.1 billion for fiscal
year 2006, including almost $6.4 billion for its nuclear weapons
activities, about $1.6 billion for its defense nuclear nonproliferation
programs, and about $782 million for the Naval Reactors program. NNSA's
appropriation also included about $766 million to provide security at
its sites. NNSA requested over $9.3 billion for fiscal year 2007,
including $6.4 billion for its nuclear weapons activities, $1.7 billion
for its defense nuclear nonproliferation programs, and $795 million for
the Naval Reactors program. According to NNSA's Future Years Nuclear
Security Program plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is
proposing to spend almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear
nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
As noted earlier, for several years before NNSA was established,
external studies found problems with the organization and operation of
what is now NNSA's principal organization--DOE's Office of Defense
Programs. These studies cited continuing problems in the areas of
overall management, organization, priority setting, and maintenance of
a viable infrastructure and workforce. Most influential in the creation
of NNSA was the study conducted by a Special Investigative Panel of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Prepared in response
to a series of security problems, including public access to classified
documents at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Board found that
DOE was a dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable of reforming itself and
that reorganization was clearly warranted to resolve security and
counterintelligence problems. As noted earlier, the Board urged the
Congress to create a new organization that, whether established as an
independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within DOE, should have
a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified
lines of authority and accountability. To correct the problems
identified by the Board and others, in 1999, the Congress created the
NNSA.
For the last several years, we have monitored NNSA's actions to
implement the NNSA Act for this Subcommittee and the Special Oversight
Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, House Armed Services
Committee. For example, in April 2001, we testified that NNSA's efforts
to establish a new organization looked promising. However, we
highlighted the need for NNSA to clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of headquarters and field staff and to establish clear
lines of authority between NNSA and its contractors, among other
things. In May 2001, NNSA announced plans to reorganize its
headquarters operations. In December 2001, however, we found that
NNSA's plans for the headquarters reorganization did not contain a
clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the headquarters
organizational units.
In addition to reorganizing its headquarters, in February 2002, NNSA
proposed reorganizing its entire operation to solve important, long-
standing issues. In February 2002, we testified that, with the proposed
new organizational structure, resolution of NNSA's long-standing
organizational issues appeared to be within its grasp. However, we
noted that NNSA's lack of a long-term strategic approach to ensuring a
well-managed workforce precluded it from identifying its current and
future human capital needs, including the size of the workforce; its
deployment across the organization; and the knowledge, skills, and
capabilities needed to fulfill its mission. In December 2002, the
Administrator of NNSA implemented the proposed reorganization.
Our May 2003 report on the management of NNSA's security program
identified similar concerns about NNSA's security organization and
management. Specifically, we found that NNSA (1) had not fully defined
clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site security
operations and (2) had shortfalls at its site offices in the total
number of staff and in expertise, which could make it more difficult
for the site offices to effectively oversee security activities. We
therefore concluded that NNSA could not be assured that its contractors
were working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and
material from individuals seeking to inflict damage.
Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA's reorganization had
addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority
and improving communication. However, we also found that NNSA's
reorganization had not ensured that the agency had sufficient staff
with the right skills in the right places because it had downsized its
federal workforce by about 17 percent without first determining the
critical skills and capabilities needed to meet its mission and program
goals.
Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA's Security Program:
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security
organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security
program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we
found that the results of internal and independent security oversight
assessments have identified weaknesses in physical security at several
NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National
Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in
cyber security throughout NNSA. The following factors have contributed
to this situation:
* Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security
activities. For several years, the NNSA headquarters security
organization experienced turnover in the position of Chief of the
Office of Defense Nuclear Security. Specifically, four individuals have
occupied the position since NNSA's creation, often in an acting
capacity. In addition, these chiefs have reported to different levels
within the organization. The current Chief is a permanent appointee,
reporting directly to the NNSA administrator, and he has taken a number
of steps to develop an effective headquarters security organization.
* Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Having
sufficient staff to oversee the security programs of its contractors
continues to be a problem. For example, since NNSA became operational,
key site offices, such as the Los Alamos Site Office, have experienced
staffing shortfalls. As a result, sites are limited in their ability to
effectively oversee contractors' security activities.
* Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office
security staff. NNSA has not implemented a training program that
provides NNSA federal security officials with the skills needed to
effectively oversee contractor security programs. In addition, NNSA
site offices often do not have all the resources needed to meet
training needs. For example, according to site office officials, the
Los Alamos Site Office did not receive training funds for fiscal year
2006 and the Nevada Site Office received a minimal training budget for
its security staff.
* Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. NNSA does not have
complete data for tracking security deficiencies identified by security
oversight reviews and, as a result, does not have information regarding
the overall effectiveness of its safeguards and security program. NNSA
officials told us that while they believe security across the weapons
complex has improved, NNSA does not have sufficient data to support
this assertion. In addition, NNSA has not implemented a formal process
for sharing best practices or lessons learned to guide security
improvements. While best practices and lessons learned have been
communicated informally, a formal process could help ensure that
previously identified security deficiencies, such as the retrieval of
badges from terminated employees at one NNSA site, are reviewed and
corrected as necessary at other NNSA field locations.
DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate as a
Separately Organized Agency within DOE:
While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its
internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with
establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency
within the department. Several factors have contributed to this
situation. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow
for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. The Board's June
1999 report suggested several federal agencies, such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce,
which could be used as a model for NNSA. However, we found that none of
the officials from these agencies considered their agency to be
separately organized or believed that their agency's operational
methods were transferable to NNSA. Second, DOE's January 2000
implementation plan, which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define
how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE.
Instead reflecting the opposition of the then DOE senior leadership to
the creation of NNSA, the implementation plan "dual-hatted" virtually
every significant statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials,
including the Director of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Counterintelligence and General Counsel. As we testified in April 2001,
this practice caused considerable concern about NNSA's ability to
function with the independence envisioned in the NNSA Act. Dual-hatting
was subsequently forbidden by an amendment to the NNSA Act.[Footnote 3]
As a result, although some NNSA programs have set up procedures for
interacting with DOE, other programs have not, resulting in
organizational conflict. For example, DOE made a commitment to issuing
NNSA-specific acquisition procedures in its January 2000 implementation
plan for NNSA, but it has not done so. According to DOE Office of
General Counsel officials, the department subsequently determined that
NNSA-specific procedures were inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, the NNSA Act, and the January 2000 implementation plan.
According to both DOE and NNSA officials, since 2004 the department has
blocked NNSA's efforts to issue its own acquisition regulations. As a
result, according to NNSA officials, NNSA has had to issue a series of
deviations to the DOE acquisition regulations to carry out NNSA
acquisition policies in areas such as negotiating a more effective
contract fee arrangement and awarding additional years to a contract's
term.
Even where formal procedures have been developed, interpersonal
disagreements have hindered effective cooperation. Most notable in this
regard has been the longstanding conflict between NNSA and DOE
counterintelligence offices. Specifically, as our report documents,
NNSA and DOE counterintelligence officials have disagreed over (1) the
scope and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their
ability to jointly direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence
program offices, (3) the allocation of counterintelligence resources,
(4) counterintelligence policymaking and (5) their roles and
responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence matters--in
particular with regard to the department's handling of the well-
publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified NNSA computer system
and removal of the names and social security numbers of 1,502
individuals working for NNSA. Subsequently, the Congress amended the
NNSA Act to consolidate the counterintelligence programs of DOE and
NNSA under the Department of Energy.
In this environment, concerns about NNSA's organizational status have
persisted. Most notably, a January 2006 report by the Defense Science
Board called for the removal of NNSA from DOE and the creation of a
new, independent National Nuclear Weapons Agency. However, former
senior DOE and NNSA officials with whom we spoke generally did not
favor removing NNSA from DOE.
Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Become Fully
Effective:
In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA's relationship
to DOE, we identified the following four other management areas where
additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the
nuclear weapons complex if it took further action.
* Human capital. NNSA has made progress in developing a human capital
strategy. However, DOE and NNSA have not conducted a systematic,
detailed analysis of how many staff NNSA needs in relation to DOE. As a
result, we identified areas where potential staff imbalances have
affected NNSA's ability to operate separately from DOE. For example,
NNSA's Office of General Counsel has 35 attorneys, including the
General Counsel, to provide NNSA legal analysis, while the rest of DOE
has 277 attorneys. According to NNSA's General Counsel, his office
would need 15 to 20 additional attorneys to fully handle NNSA's legal
workload with minimal assistance from DOE. Currently, NNSA relies on
DOE's Office of General Counsel to perform a significant portion of its
legal work.
* Project management. While both DOE and NNSA have initiated efforts to
improve project management, NNSA reported in November 2006 that about
16 percent of NNSA projects were at risk of breaching their cost
baseline, schedule baseline or both. We identified seven areas for
improvement that would foster a stronger culture for effective project
management. For example, DOE's Project Assessment and Reporting System-
-a Web-based system for keeping DOE senior managers apprised of the
performance of projects costing more than $5 million--does not include
four major NNSA projects, estimated to cost over $100 million each.
Consequently, these projects do not receive the senior management
oversight that can be provided through that system.
* Program management. NNSA program managers are responsible for
completing a set of activities by employing a working knowledge of such
diverse areas as contracting, budgeting, and engineering. Recognizing
the important role of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions,
such as developing a program management policy. However, NNSA has yet
to identify all of its program managers or train them to a certified
level of competency. Indeed, DOE's most recent performance and
accountability report for fiscal year 2006 showed that NNSA fully met
only about 52 percent of its program goals while the rest of DOE
achieved about a 79-percent success rate.
* Financial management. NNSA has made significant progress in
implementing its PPBE process over the last 4 years, as mandated by the
NNSA Act. However, several areas of improvement still have not been
fully addressed. For example, NNSA has issued policy letters on PPBE,
but some of these letters are still in draft form because, in part,
NNSA is waiting to obtain DOE's views on certain matters. In addition,
NNSA's PPBE mechanism for centralized resource allocation relies on
collegial decision making among senior NNSA managers, with the
Administrator resolving disputes and deciding on the final resource
allocation. However, the Administrator does not have an independent
group to review program proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze
alternatives. According to a 2003 DOE Inspector General report, most
senior managers believe that such an analytical group would be of
value. While NNSA has taken some action in this direction, it is not
clear when such a group will be established.
As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for
removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we do not
believe that such drastic change is necessary to produce an
organization that can provide effective oversight of the nation's
nuclear weapons complex. Rather, we believe NNSA can provide
comprehensive oversight of the operation and security of the nation's
nuclear weapons programs by addressing a variety of lingering, often
unrelated, but important management issues. These issues include
providing sufficient, qualified staff to conduct program and
operational oversight, especially in the security area, and developing
and implementing improvements needed to support effective project,
program, and financial management.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. James Noel, Assistant Director; Robert Baney;
Preston Heard and Jonathan Ban made key contributions to this
testimony.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Department of Energy: Views on DOE's Plan to Establish the National
Nuclear Security Administration, GAO/T-RCED-00-113 (Washington, D.C.:
March 2, 2000).
Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear
Security Administration in Implementing Title 32, GAO-01-602T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2001).
NNSA Management: Progress in the Implementation of Title 32, GAO-02-93R
(Washington, D.C.: Dec.12, 2001).
Department of Energy: NNSA Restructuring and Progress in Implementing
Title 32, GAO-02-451T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2002).
GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and
Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003).
National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and
Workforce Planning Issues Remain As NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO-04-
545 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO-07-36.
[2] Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999).
[3] Pub. L. 106-398, § 3157, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-468 (2000) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2410).
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