Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Gao ID: GAO-07-282 January 31, 2007Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community. Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple national laboratories. The national laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress' request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in other countries.
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's inception in 2002. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage facilities and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long term. From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced limited results. DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts efficiently. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-282, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to
Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological
Sources:
GAO-07-282:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-282, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological
sources, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, were vulnerable to theft
and could be used to make a dirty bomb. In response, DOE established
the International Radiological Threat Reduction program to secure high-
risk sources in other countries. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE‘s
progress in helping other countries secure their high-risk sources, (2)
identify DOE‘s current and planned program costs, and (3) describe
coordination between DOE and U.S. and international agencies to secure
sources in other countries.
What GAO Found:
Since 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded the security of
hundreds of sites in other countries that contain radiological sources
and has achieved noteworthy accomplishments, including removing
radioactive material in Chechnya. However, DOE has made limited
progress securing many of the most dangerous sources located in waste
storage facilities and hundreds of sources across Russia contained in
radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). When DOE expanded the
program from the former Soviet Union to a global effort, it also
expanded the types of sites that required upgrades. As a result, as of
September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical
facilities, which generally contain one radiological source.
Furthermore, DOE has not developed a long-term plan to ensure that
security upgrades will be adequately sustained once installed.
From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
approximately $108 million to improve the security of sources in other
countries. However, funding for the program has steadily declined in
recent years, and future funding is uncertain because the agency places
a higher priority on securing special nuclear material such as
plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure sources in other
countries. DOE, however, has not always integrated its efforts
efficiently. For example, DOE did not transfer $5 million from its
fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for strengthening international
regulatory controls over radiological sources, despite a Senate
Appropriations Committee report directing DOE to do so. In addition,
gaps in information sharing between DOE and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) have impeded DOE‘s ability to target the most
vulnerable sites in IAEA member states for security improvements.
Figure: Recovered RTG Containing Large Amounts of Strontium-90:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: DOE.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to DOE to better prioritize sites
to be selected for security upgrades and strengthen program management
practices, including developing a long-term sustainability plan to
protect DOE‘s investment in security upgrades. In addition, GAO is
asking Congress to consider providing NRC with authority and a direct
appropriation to conduct regulatory development activities to help
improve other countries‘ security over sources. DOE said that our
recommendations were helpful and would further strengthen its program.
NRC said it would work closely with relevant executive branch agencies
and IAEA if Congress acts upon our matter for consideration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[end of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has
Not Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many
Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured:
DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an
Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials:
Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces
Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as
of August 31, 2006:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Tables:
Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
September 30, 2006:
Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia:
Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August
31, 2006:
Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades:
Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia:
Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE:
Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological
Sources:
Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with
Holes in the Roof:
Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic:
Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations:
Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
Unsecured Spent Fuel:
Abbreviations:
ANSTO: Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EC: European Commission:
EU: European Union:
EWGPP: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program:
FSU: Former Soviet Union:
GSSP: Global Search and Secure Program:
GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative:
HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
IRSRA: Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority:
IRTR: International Radiological Threat Reduction Program:
NDF: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:
RTG: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator:
SNRCU: State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 31, 2007:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological
sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security
threat to the United States and the international community.
Radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90,
is encapsulated or sealed in metal--such as stainless steel, titanium,
or platinum--to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed
radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for
many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural
applications. These applications include radiation treatment for cancer
patients, food and blood irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the
total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many
countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that
thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned--
commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these
sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a
simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a
radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb.
The amount of radiation emitted by these sources varies based on the
size and type of the source. For example, teletherapy machines, which
are used to treat cancer patients and are found in hospitals and
oncology clinics, contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about
1,000 to 10,000 curies.[Footnote 1] DOE officials have estimated that
there are approximately 2,000 teletherapy sources located primarily in
developing nations around the world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources
contained in large devices known as radioisotope thermoelectric
generators (RTG), designed to provide electric power to navigational
facilities such as lighthouses and weather stations, contain between
25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and Russian officials have estimated
that there were more than 1,050 RTGs produced and distributed
throughout the former Soviet Union. These devices present a
particularly high security risk because of their high levels of
radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of Energy (DOE)
has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest unsecured
quantity of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities also
pose a considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these
facilities can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of
material.
In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its
fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed
by dirty bombs.[Footnote 2] In response to the congressional
requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA)[Footnote 3] established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task
Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk
radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal
year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials
determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources.
In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the
scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately
establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR)
Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national
security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades
at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating,
recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive
sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure
necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory
controls, including the development of regional partnerships to
leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a
program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the
United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction
program.[Footnote 4] Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.-
origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to
other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.[Footnote 5]
The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple
national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los
Alamos National Laboratory.[Footnote 6] The national laboratories'
responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security
requirements of countries participating in the program, (2)
recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source
security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly
installed.
IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying,
securing, and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-
risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment
around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and
the international community.[Footnote 7] In September 2006, DOE
reorganized GTRI to consolidate its nuclear and radiological threat
reduction programs. As a result, the IRTR program was integrated into a
newly combined nuclear and radiological threat reduction effort that
focuses on three major geographic areas--North and South America,
Europe and Africa, and Asia and countries of the former Soviet
Union.[Footnote 8] As part of this restructuring, DOE issued new
program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of sites and
radiological sources that will be secured in the future.
The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other
countries, though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides
overall policy direction for U.S. government international radiological
source security efforts and has broadened international support for the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as
guidance on the import and export of radiological sources.[Footnote 9]
State also provides IAEA with funds to, among other things, conduct
training, workshops, and advisory missions to improve member states'
security practices and procedures. NRC has advised and provided
guidance on the development of programs in Armenia, Georgia, and
Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls over radiological
sources, including establishing radiological source inventories and
promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations governing
controls over this material.
In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides
assistance to countries--primarily those that are candidates or
potential candidates for joining the European Union (EU)--to improve
the security of sites containing radiological sources.[Footnote 10] EC
activities in this area are a component of its efforts to combat
nuclear terrorism.
In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and
international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources.[Footnote
11] We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy
take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls
over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the
progress DOE has made in implementing its program to help other
countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies
DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's
coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations
to secure radiological sources in other countries. To address these
objectives, we analyzed documentation on the IRTR program from DOE and
its national laboratories and conducted interviews with key program
officials. We also visited four countries that are major recipients of
DOE assistance to improve radiological source security--Georgia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Russia--to observe how equipment and training
were being utilized and to discuss the implementation of the program
with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary
information, conducted a data reliability assessment of the data we
received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
reliability of the data. We determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details
about the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We
conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
inception in 2002. These achievements include the removal of cesium and
cobalt sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya and providing
security upgrades to vulnerable sites in Greece prior to the 2004
Olympics. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources
still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. Specifically, 16 of 20
waste storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while
more than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are
vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to
broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also
expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a
result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured
were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological
source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we
spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of
medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage
facilities and RTGs--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program
does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one
location to another, a security measure that DOE and international
officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the
radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and
challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources
worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and
access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk
countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades
at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries
receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long
term. This is particularly problematic, given the number of problems we
identified during our site visits with the maintenance of security
equipment and storage facilities funded by DOE. For example in Georgia
we found that a facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which
has thousands of curies of cesium-137--had several large openings in
the roof. In Lithuania, we visited an oncology clinic and observed that
the security cable, which is used to secure a teletherapy machine's
cobalt-60 source, had been broken for almost a month. A DOE physical
security specialist told us that the cable was the most important
security feature installed by DOE because it triggered an alarm that
was connected to the source.
From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure
radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68
million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of
sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security
upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion
sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and
regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In
addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to
strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states.
The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities
such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private
consultants, and conducting studies. Russia received almost one-third
of total DOE funding, which focused primarily on orphan source
recovery, RTG removal and disposal, and physical security upgrades at
waste storage facilities. DOE officials told us that securing
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than
securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. As a result, recent budget allotments for
radiological security activities were reduced, and future funding for
the program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE
may be unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments in the
countries where it has installed more than $40 million in security
upgrades. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to
obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to
date have produced limited results.
DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat
reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing
with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led
interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory
Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq.
However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory
development efforts efficiently. For example, DOE and NRC disagreed
about whether, as directed by the Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE
should have transferred $5 million from its fiscal year 2004
appropriation to NRC for the purpose of strengthening international
regulatory controls over radiological sources. Ultimately, the funds
were not transferred, causing friction between the agencies. In
addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple
programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and
nuclear materials in other countries. For example, in Poland we found
that radiological sources were secured at a storage facility by DOE's
radiological program while spent nuclear fuel--located next to the
sources in the same storage facility--had not been secured by DOE's
nuclear security upgrades program. Polish officials told us they could
not understand why the separate DOE programs had not coordinated their
efforts to ensure that all of the material was secured at the same
time. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to
improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in
information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded
DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security
improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.
To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest
priority radiological sources, we are recommending that the Secretary
of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1)
limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological
sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed the highest
risk; (2) accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as
practicable; and (3) develop a long-term sustainability plan for
security upgrades that includes, among other things, future resources
required to implement such a plan.
Furthermore, if the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure
development is the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological
source security efforts, it should consider providing NRC with
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct these activities. The
appropriation would be provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds
to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC for their activities.
Background:
The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological
sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft.
According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in
radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004,
about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of
which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the
development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a
dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could,
however, have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type,
amount, and form, the dispersed radiological material could cause
radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic,
psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and
subsequent cleanup of the contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs
have been detonated, in the mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a
canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park. While the device was
not detonated and no radiological material was dispersed, the incident
demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to use
radiological sources as weapons of terror.
A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic
impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is
likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001,
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another
study, the economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs
at U.S. ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in
losses to the U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb
attack could also produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the
Federation of American Scientists concluded that an americium
radiological source combined with one pound of explosives would result
in medical supervision and monitoring required for the entire
population of an area 10 times larger than the initial blast.
The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological
sources are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources
can provide a measure of understanding of what could happen in case of
a dirty bomb attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy
machine containing about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally
in the form of a powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed
four people in Brazil and injured many more. The accident and its
aftermath caused about $36 million in damages to the region (Goiania)
where the accident occurred, according to an official from Brazil's
Nuclear Energy Commission. In addition to the deaths and economic
impact, the accident created environmental and medical problems. For
example, 85 houses were significantly contaminated and 41 of these had
to be evacuated. The decontamination process required the demolition of
homes and other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of
radioactive waste. Over 8,000 persons requested monitoring for
contamination in order to obtain certificates stating they were not
contaminated.
Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has
Not Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many
Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured:
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as
removing dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya,
many of the high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured,
particularly in Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has
barely "scratched the surface" in terms of securing the most dangerous
sources in the former Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous
sources from 16 of 20 waste storage facilities across Russia and
Ukraine remain unsecured while more than 700 RTGs remain operational or
abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In
2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former
Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required
security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent
of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain
one radiological source. In addition, DOE's program does not address
the transportation of radiological sources from one location to
another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have
identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply
chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges
implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide,
including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally,
DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries
receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once
installed.
DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Priority
Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured:
Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure
radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some
noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1)
facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137
sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya,
the location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2)
constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and
Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen
their long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in
Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held
radiation detection devices for first responders.[Footnote 12] DOE
secured, among other things, facilities with blood irradiators
containing cesium chloride and a large industrial sterilization
facility.
According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to
comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable
radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted
the support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help
other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous
sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where high-
risk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training to
conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the
support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure
facility. For example, DOE established a regional partnership with
Lithuania to facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in
Lithuania and in neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation
detection equipment and trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate
orphan source recovery efforts. Lithuania was able to identify 41
former Soviet military and industrial sites that potentially held high-
risk radiological sources. Subsequently, Lithuania assisted DOE in
initiating search and secure efforts in Estonia and Latvia, which
resulted in the discovery and disposition of orphan sources.
Despite these achievements, DOE's program has not adequately addressed
many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed
NNSA to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide,
which increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE
assistance and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program
into many countries outside of the former Soviet Union--the initial
focus and attention of DOE's program--resulted in the addition of many
medical facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now
being targeted for physical security upgrades.
A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and Oncology Clinics:
As of September 30, 2006, DOE's program had completed the installation
of physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries.
However, a majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk
or the most vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256--or
about 70 percent--were hospitals and oncology clinics operating
teletherapy machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer
patients. These machines generally contain a single cobalt-60
radiological source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of
the 41 countries--or 93 percent--DOE had upgraded at least one hospital
or oncology clinic. According to DOE, many of the countries that are
included in its global program have medical facilities with
radiological sources. As a result, these facilities were targeted for
upgrades. In addition to the medical facilities, DOE has completed
security upgrades at 47 research institutes, 35 commercial and
industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities. Figure 1 depicts the
countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1 provides a breakdown
of the total number and types of facilities upgraded by DOE, as of
September 30, 2006.
Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
September 30, 2006:
Site type: Medical;
Number of sites completed by DOE: 256;
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 70%;
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 38.
Site type: Research institutes;
Number of sites completed by DOE: 47;
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 13;
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 19.
Site type: Commercial/Industrial;
Number of sites completed by DOE: 35;
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 10;
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 17.
Site type: Waste storage facilities(Radons)[B];
Number of sites completed by DOE: 30;
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 8;
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 22.
Site type: Total;
Number of sites completed by DOE: 368;
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 100%[C];
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 41.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.
Note: According to DOE, there are about 2,249 sites worldwide that
would be likely candidates for physical security upgrades. As of
September 2006, DOE had completed upgrades at about 16 percent of these
sites.
[A] Many of the countries received physical security upgrades for more
than one type of facility.
[B] Waste storage facilities are specifically identified as Radons in
the FSU.
[C] Percentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
[End of table]
Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible
for implementing the program told us that although progress had been
made in securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much
attention on securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-
priority sites, such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their
view, DOE installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities
primarily because the upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost.
For example, a typical suite of security upgrades at a medical facility
costs between $10,000 to $20,000, depending on the size of the site,
whereas the average cost to remove and replace an RTG in the Far East
region of Russia is about $72,000 based on 2006 dollars.
Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also
raised concerns about DOE's focus on securing radiological sources at
so many medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for
operating the teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland
told us that the cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine
did not pose a significant security risk. In their view, it was highly
unlikely that the sources could be easily removed from these machines
and that it would take more than one highly skilled and determined
intruder to remove the source and transport it out of the facility
without being detected or dangerously exposed to radiation.[Footnote
13] In fact, while emphasizing the importance of securing medical
facilities, DOE officials stated that getting medical and security
staff to buy into the need for improved security has been a consistent
challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told us that
radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to
RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any
security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are
focused on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources.
According to five national laboratory officials and security
specialists, completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to
demonstrate rapid program progress because the upgrades are completed
relatively quickly. DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on
the number of sites that have been upgraded, or "sites secured." While
sites completed is the primary metric used by DOE, the program does
compile and track several additional activities, including the amount
of curies secured, countries that receive regulatory assistance, and
orphan sources recovered.
In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the
number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been
completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions
with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they
consistently identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that
the program had been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by
radiological sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National
Laboratory officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not
demonstrate how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national
security interests. In their view, this measurement is one-dimensional
and does not adequately distinguish lower-priority sites from higher-
priority sites.
Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia:
DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing high-
priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the largest
unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices were
designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote locations
to power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and meteorological
stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to 250,000
curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of strontium- 90 released
from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of September
30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all RTGs
located in Russia's inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049
RTGs were in Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed
over the past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials.
DOE funded about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway,
France, and Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185.[Footnote
14] However, an estimated 732 RTGs, representing several million curies
of radioactivity, remain unsecured.
A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major regions-
-the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the majority
of its efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However, more
than 90 RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control of
the Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE
officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost
exclusively in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to
remove RTGs from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the
remaining RTGs in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE's efforts, along
with other countries, to remove RTGs in Russia.
Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia:
[See PDF for Image]
Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia:
Region: Total estimated RTG inventory in Russia;
Baltic: 96;
Far East: 233;
Arctic: 720;
Total[A]: 1049[B].
Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2004;
Baltic: 0;
Far East: 0;
Arctic: 63;
Total[A]: 63.
Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2005;
Baltic: 3;
Far East: 25;
Arctic: 24;
Total[A]: 52.
Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2006;
Baltic: 0;
Far East: 0;
Arctic: 17;
Total[A]: 17.
Region: Total DOE removals to date;
Baltic: 3;
Far East: 25;
Arctic: 104;
Total[A]: 132[C].
Region: Estimated DOE-partner countries removal;
Baltic: [D];
Far East: [D];
Arctic: 185[D];
Total[A]: 185[D].
Region: Estimated remaining RTGs in Russia;
Baltic: 93;
Far East: 208;
Arctic: 431;
Total[A]: 732[D].
Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.
Note: For the purpose of our analysis, we are combining the Northern
Sea route and White Sea route and labeling them the Arctic region.
[A] Because Russia has not comprehensively tracked the existing number
of RTGs, DOE and Russian figures for the total number of RTGs differ,
as do the number of RTGs recovered. Russian officials have cited
varying figures regarding the total number of RTGs that exist in
Russia. Russia has documented that at least 670 RTGs exist throughout
the Russian Federation territory. However, other Russian sources
estimated that the number of RTGs in Russia ranges from 605 to 700.
[B] The total does not include the 16 RTGs removed in other former
Soviet Union countries (13 in the Ukraine and 3 in Georgia).
[C] DOE is now engaged in the removal of an additional 27 RTGs in the
Far East.
[D] An additional 185 RTGs were removed by DOE partner countries,
including Russia, Norway, and France. However, the exact breakdown by
region for these RTG removals was not known by DOE. DOE assumed that
these 185 RTGs were removed from the Arctic region.
[End of table]
DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for
RTG removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have
specifically requested DOE's assistance for the Far East and provided
DOE with a prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other
countries have expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in
the Baltic region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005
Denmark announced that it had reached an agreement with Russia to
replace and remove all RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European
nations, including Germany, have also offered assistance. However,
Russian officials told us that assistance from Germany has not
materialized and that Denmark had rescinded its offer to provide
assistance. Moreover, these officials expressed concern regarding DOE's
decision to fund the removal of RTGs exclusively from the Far East
region. In their view, the RTGs in the Baltic are more vulnerable and
should be removed as soon as possible because of their accessibility
and proximity to large population centers. According to DOE officials,
if international funding for removal of these vulnerable RTGs does not
materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the Baltic effort.
According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and
future efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive
inventory of RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these
devices is unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but
the company dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all
the records were lost. The Russian organization that originally
designed them is currently developing a database of known RTGs in
Russia--with U.S. funding and support--to reconstruct records and
develop a reliable accounting of the total number of devices produced.
However, this effort has been ongoing for years and remains incomplete.
Officials from the Russian organization told us that they lack
confidence that the precise number and location of RTGs, both in Russia
and other countries of the former Soviet Union, will ever be known.
RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their
removal requires specialized containers for their transport and
adequate storage capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian
officials reported that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of
both. To address the need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted
Canada's support to provide funds to Russia for constructing an
additional 17 containers for transporting RTGs, bringing the total to
36. However, this effort is not scheduled to be completed until early
to mid-2007.[Footnote 15] DOE is also supporting the construction of
storage facilities at two locations in the Russian Far East,
Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the Vladivostok facility is
expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a smaller storage building
is under construction at Kamchatka, which will store RTGs until they
can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent storage. According to DOE,
the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that were recovered from the
Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok is scheduled to house
33 additional recovered RTGs.
Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will
depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power
supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a
project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and solar-
powered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these
replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational
lighthouses located in northern Russia experience severe weather and
limited daylight 4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power
during the winter months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have
stated that the navigational devices are critical and that they will
not approve removal of any additional RTGs without a viable energy
source to replace them. Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a
solar-powered replacement energy source funded by DOE that we observed
during our fieldwork.
Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by
challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example,
costs of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result
of increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian
government to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced
long delays while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to
approve the release of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate
funding to support RTG removal has extended the deadline for completion
from 2014 to 2021.
As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have
not yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with
alarm systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a
pilot project. Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor,
among other things, vibrations of the device and the source's movement.
Because the source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and
its source emit regular, electronic signals to a regional base station.
If the signals are interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of
September 2006, DOE had funded the installation of these security
systems for 24 RTGs in the Baltic region and 20 RTGs in the Far East
region. According to DOE, the cost of the alarm system is about $5,000,
and about $8,000 to establish the regional base station. DOE officials
said they will continue to install security upgrades to RTGs as an
interim measure, as long as the costs remain at those levels.
Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and Ukraine:
In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing
radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and
Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and
Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant
risk, due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently
housed at each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can
store up to 3 million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at
a majority of these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union,
particularly in Russia and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date,
upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons in Russia have been completed since DOE
began work in 2002. According to DOE, upgrades are under way at seven
additional Radons. However, work has been delayed at several of these
facilities. According to DOE, delays in upgrades to Radons were due in
large part to delays in the Russian certification process of physical
equipment for upgrades at these types of facilities. In addition,
reorganization and managerial changes at the primary Russian agency
with oversight authority over construction at Radon facilities
presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain access to Radons
for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE officials noted
that progress has been slowed because several Radon managers were
unwilling to participate in the program until they received assurances
from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding comparable
to larger Radons.
DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine's five Radon sites,
one of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to
DOE officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic
because Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as "sensitive"
and thus denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have
been delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to
provide DOE access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at
those facilities are under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining
three Radons by 2010 but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to
these additional sites.
In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities
worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in
several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking
upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites
in the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia,
and South Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE
officials, when, if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these
countries.
Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE's Program:
Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk
radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and
radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is
generally outside the scope of the program. Some DOE officials have
expressed concern about the lack of security during the transport of
radiological sources and questioned whether transportation should be a
component of DOE's program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis
concluded that DOE was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc
basis, and the existing method of providing transportation security had
serious limitations. The analysis also noted that DOE's current
approach is resource limited and lacked a commitment to integrate
transport security into all countries participating in the program.
According to DOE's 2003 program guidelines, DOE will fund
transportation security upgrades only in Russia and Uzbekistan because
the United States had international agreements with these countries to
provide liability coverage when transporting radiological sources. As a
result, DOE security specialists were not pursuing transportation
security-related projects with the majority of countries participating
in the program. However, DOE noted that its national laboratories were
working with the U.S. Department of Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA
donor states to strengthen transportation security regulations and
procedures to reduce the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear and
other radioactive materials in transit.
In every country we visited, host country officials identified the
transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority
for security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that
transportation security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE
has, in fact, provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow
Radon, including guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for
transporting both liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told
us that they also needed a reliable communication system to ensure the
security of sources in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a
satellite-linked cell phone to facilitate communication and to monitor
vehicles that transport radiological sources. However, at another Radon
site we visited in Russia, a similar communications system did not
exist. Moreover, officials from this site told us that their fleet of
transportation vehicles was about 30 years old and needed to be
replaced. These officials stated that they requested funds from DOE for
the vehicle replacement but were told that no funds were available.
Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing
small, easily transportable sources--typically weighing less than 25
pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE
estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several
different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and
beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration
purposes. According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base
camp to another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft
and potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources
were during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a
truck used to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration
site. Host country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove
the sources from the truck as they were being secured with a simple
lock. In addition, country officials told us that although some trucks
are equipped with mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes
are remote, and the phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an
unsecured truck used to transport radiological sources.
Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological
Sources:
[see PDF for Image]
Source GAO.
Truck compartment that holds sealed sources during transport.
[End of figure]
DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials
said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the
responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated
efforts with U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure
sources that have industrial applications and are frequently in
transit. In February 2006, DOE attended a forum with NRC and the
Society for Petroleum Engineers to discuss security issues and develop
best practices within the industry to better control radiological
sources used overseas for industrial purposes.[Footnote 16]
DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increased the Level
of Upgrades Required to Secure Certain Sites and Sources:
In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global
Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting
sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance,
DOE has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts
to develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy
prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the
attractiveness of the different types of radiological and nuclear
material and (1) their proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as
military bases overseas or commercial ports; (2) external threat
environment within the country; and (3) internal site vulnerability,
which measures existing physical protection on site. This new criteria
also increased the level of the design basis threat required to secure
each type of material. For example, sources having a curie level
exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority for security upgrades as
certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. As a result,
RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE's view, some medical
radiological sources could also be considered a high priority. However,
when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the relative
priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were
upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority
under the new criteria.
DOE's previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a
minimum threshold level--measured in curies--of radiological sources
present at a particular location.[Footnote 17] In addition, the
guidance factored in other conditions such as the location of the site,
the security conditions of the site, and evidence of illicit
trafficking in the country. According to DOE, in a presentation made to
us in September 2006, this guidance gave equal treatment to all sites
within countries receiving security upgrades. This guidance did not
clearly discriminate between the different types of sites secured and
whether they were considered to be the highest priority. For example,
securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to three
million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology
clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures
recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of
one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while
working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance
significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense
scenario, including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10
kilograms of explosives working with one complicit insider. As a
result, DOE officials said that future upgrades to secure radiological
sources will have to be strengthened to meet the new protection levels.
Additional enhancements at some sites are now being considered to
address a more robust design-basis scenario.
Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Secure High-
Priority Radiological Sources at High-Risk Radiological Sites:
DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program
implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources.
As a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE
was unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in
its ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because
IRTR is a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as
Nigeria and Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security
upgrades. In addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had
identified several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to
decline physical security assistance, Mexican officials have since
agreed to accept regulatory infrastructure development assistance.
In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a
prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low
risk.[Footnote 18] To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the
countries identified as priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed
that DOE attempted to initiate efforts to secure radiological sources
in 31 high-priority, 17 medium-priority and one low-priority country.
Consequently, about 40 percent of countries receiving assistance do not
represent the highest-priority countries. According to DOE officials,
medium and low-priority countries---more than one-third of the total in
DOE's program--were selected because these countries had expressed a
willingness to receive assistance.
We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE's
ability to implement its program in several of the countries targeted
for assistance. These included, among other things, problems with
foreign contractor performance and lack of adequate physical
infrastructure to support security upgrades. DOE officials said that
various combinations of these and other impediments resulted in delays
implementing security upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries
participating in the program. DOE also stated that many of these
problems were identified and corrected during quality assurance visits
by DOE inspection teams.
Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials
told us that contractor performance and selection of reputable,
reliable in-country contractors was critical to successful project
implementation. DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in
selecting foreign contractors because most of the countries do not
follow normal Western business practices. In DOE's view, problems
arising from contractor performance resulted from "security culture"
and language barriers, which caused miscommunication. Some problems we
found with reliable in-country contractors included the following:
* In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors--which
protected radiological sources--with the hinges on the outside of the
door. As a result, a potential transgressor could have unhinged the
door and accessed the sources;
* In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and procedures
for newly installed equipment in English instead of the native
language. As a result, DOE officials found that the hospital staff had
not changed the security codes and were not well versed in proper
security procedures; and:
* In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not train
them on operating the alarm systems.
DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in Poland,
Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project implementation.
DOE project managers for these countries told us that contractors
conducted adequate training and followed up with security upgrades
maintenance.
Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades also
presented challenges due to inadequate physical infrastructure. In
these countries, the types of challenges included lack of reliable
electricity, a backup power source, and telecommunications at sites
containing radiological sources. For example, in both Nicaragua and
Tanzania, DOE officials said that frequent power outages diminished the
detection capability of security alarms installed and that neither
country had a backup source of power to operate the security alarms and
security lighting provided by DOE.
DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustainability of
Physical Security Upgrades:
DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better
ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed, and
the security training that has been provided, will be effectively
sustained over the long term. DOE's current guidance states that DOE
will sustain upgrades by providing countries with a 3-year warranty on
newly installed security equipment and preventative maintenance
contracts, as well as providing training on newly installed equipment
for operational staff at the sites. However, DOE has not formulated a
long-term sustainability plan that identifies expected completion dates
for each country, including an exit strategy, and approaches for
sustaining upgrades, including how host countries will financially
continue maintenance of upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. In
fact, a senior DOE official told us that responsibility for drafting
and implementing long-term sustainability should be that of the host
country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately addressed the lack of
regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of source security in a
majority of countries to receive DOE assistance.
DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that they
were uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by
countries once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact, our
analysis showed that these officials had confidence that the security
upgrades would be sustained in only 25 percent of the countries.
Specifically, officials pointed out that countries, such as Bangladesh
or Tajikistan, would be unlikely to sustain upgrades because they do
not have the resources to maintain the equipment and have not
identified or allocated funding to maintain them beyond the 3-year
warranty period. In addition, several host-country officials with whom
we met expressed similar concerns. For example, hospital administrators
in three countries told us that hospital budgets were already strained
and that they could not be certain that funding would be available once
the warranties expired. Moreover, hospital administrators told us it
was difficult to estimate the level of resources needed to sustain the
upgrades because DOE had not provided them with future maintenance
costs.
Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced
maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a storage
facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has thousands of
curies of a cesium-137 source--had several large openings in the roof.
When we asked host government officials about the cause of the
openings, they stated that a recent storm had shifted the metal sheets
covering the storage facility's roof. The officials did not state when
the roof would be fixed or how funds would be allocated for the repair.
In addition, we found that surveillance monitors were not being used at
a medical facility. In fact, according to the hospital staff, the
monitors, which were not broken, had been turned off for several days.
In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the
security cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60
source, had been broken for almost a month. According to a DOE physical
protection specialist, the cable was the most important security
feature because it triggered an alarm directly connected to the
teletherapy machine's "head," which contains the radiological source.
According to DOE, this was subsequently corrected as part of program
assurance procedures. In addition, in Poland, we visited a research
facility containing a 22,000 curie irradiator. We observed that the
motion detection device in the room housing the irradiator was not
working because of the high level of radioactivity present. According
to the in-country contractor, the device had been disabled at least
three times since the equipment was installed about a year earlier.
Figure 5 shows the temporary storage facility with large openings in
the roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the oncology clinic.
Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with
Holes in the Roof:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of
adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised questions
about the long-term success of the program. According to the hospital
staff at a facility in Georgia, they had not received adequate training
from the in-country contractor on how to operate the installed alarm
systems. We found similar problems in other countries we visited. For
example, at some of the hospitals, security codes allowing entry into
rooms where sources were located had not been changed on a regular
basis. Also, at one medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the
security code for a room storing a radiological source of about 1,250
curies. A DOE physical security specialist reported that the security
code had not been changed from the default settings in at least three
FSU countries. Furthermore, this specialist noted that staff in charge
of protecting the equipment had copied security access codes onto
checklists that were readily accessible to unauthorized staff in about
15 countries.
According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of sources
is having an organized, competent guard force. In general, the guard
force serves as a critical communications link between the facility
staff and the response force. We found that several of the 49 countries
did not possess adequate guard or response forces, and in several
cases, the guard forces in these countries were untrained and unarmed.
Specifically, at one site that DOE upgraded, the guard with whom we
spoke was unarmed and had no viable form of communication in the case
of an emergency. At the same site, the guard told us that he shared
responsibility for site security with an individual who served as a
guard on a part-time basis in exchange for being able to live at the
site. Moreover, we found that the absence of a reliable source of
electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the sustainability
of alarms and motion detection devices in some of the countries
receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El Salvador have
limited telephone line access. As a result, according to DOE, the local
guard forces could not be contacted immediately after an alarm was
triggered at a site containing radiological sources. Consequently,
security alarms installed in lesser developed countries may have
marginal long-term impact.
At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well
trained guard force equipped with flashlights, radios, walkie-talkies,
or cell phones. However, we also found that even at locations where
improved security systems were in place, only a single guard was
present and had no reliable method of contacting a response force. In
these types of situations, according to DOE, the site is very
vulnerable to theft. At one facility in Lithuania, we were told that
the police were located about 30 minutes from the site. At that
facility, we observed that the guards were not equipped with guns, and
officials were not sure they were always present. However, DOE did fund
remote monitoring equipment, which allowed the local police force to
view the site 24 hours per day from the police station.
According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior level
officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory authority that
is able to provide effective radiological source oversight is critical
to program sustainability. A key function of a nuclear regulatory body
is to establish procedures for the control of radiological sources,
including the development of a basic registry of sources. The absence
of reliable registries in many countries impeded DOE's ability to
identify a comprehensive list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of
such a list complicates DOE's ability to determine when it has
completed its program in a particular country. More specifically, DOE
physical security specialists told us that sources that had been
identified and inventoried at various hospitals were subsequently moved
to another location within the facility or are no longer being used.
Consequently, some of the upgrades that DOE installed had limited
security impact, or DOE has had to fund additional upgrades for the
same source.
We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security
program too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking into
account respective countries' long-term needs to develop better nuclear
regulatory infrastructures.[Footnote 19] DOE recognized the critical
role of regulatory infrastructure development midway through the
program and subsequently added a small regulatory infrastructure
development component that is designed to support the creation and
strengthening of effective and sustainable national regulatory
infrastructures. DOE officials told us that the department's regulatory
infrastructure development efforts are meant to complement the more
comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In 1994, IAEA established a "model
project" program to enhance countries' regulatory capacity, and the
program was available to any member state upon request. IAEA continues
to provide a variety of regulatory infrastructure support services and
training to both member and nonmember states to support radiological
source security and safety.
The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of
DOE's program would likely have been enhanced had there been a stronger
regulatory infrastructure in place to support the recommended security
upgrades efforts in many of the countries. However, many countries
participating in the IRTR program--specifically lesser developed
countries--lack an independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as
110 countries worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to
adequately protect or control sealed sources as of 2003.
DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an
Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials:
As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to
implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other
things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites
containing radiological sources and to install physical security
upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion
sensors and surveillance cameras. Russia received almost one-third of
total DOE funding--about $33 million--which focused primarily on orphan
source recovery, RTG removal and disposal and physical security
upgrades at waste storage facilities. However, one-fourth of total
expenditures--about $26.5 million--paid for program planning activities
such as development of program guidance documents, hiring private
consultants, and conducting studies. The program has also carried over
large balances of unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its
inception in 2002, because of, among other things, large supplemental
appropriations at the onset of the program and systemic delays in
project implementation. DOE officials told us that securing
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than
securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding for radiological
security activities and future funding for the program is uncertain.
DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be unable to meet
outstanding contractual commitments to maintain the more than $40
million in upgrades already installed.
DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security Upgrades
and Recovering Lost or Abandoned Sources; However, About $26.5 Million
Has Been Spent on Program Planning Activities:
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to implement
the IRTR program. A majority of this money--$68 million--was spent to
(1) physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2)
locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help
countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and
accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA
to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources
in IAEA member states. However, one-fourth of the total budget--about
$26.5 million--was spent on program planning activities not directly
attributed to a specific country, such as hiring private consultants,
and building a database for international law enforcement officials.
Table 3 provides a breakdown of DOE program expenditures.
Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August
31, 2006:
Dollars in thousands.
Physical security upgrades;
FY 2002: $0;
FY 2003: $4,348;
FY 2004: $10,497;
FY 2005: $15,210;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): $12,840;
Total (and percentage of total): $42,895 (40%).
Orphan source recovery[A];
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 878;
FY 2004: 8,069;
FY 2005: 9,633;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 4,342;
Total (and percentage of total): 22,922 (21).
Regulatory infrastructure support;
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 375;
FY 2005: 757;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 913;
Total (and percentage of total): 2,045 (2).
IAEA;
FY 2002: 3,000;
FY 2003: 684;
FY 2004: 4,170;
FY 2005: 5,098;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 460;
Total (and percentage of total): 13,412 (13).
Strategic development;
FY 2002: 3,821;
FY 2003: 3,524;
FY 2004: 5,436;
FY 2005: 5,466;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 3,702;
Total (and percentage of total): 21,949 (20).
All other program activities[B];
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 2,582;
FY 2005: 1,327;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 596;
Total (and percentage of total): 4,505 (4).
Total;
FY 2002: $6,821;
FY 2003: $9,434;
FY 2004: $31,129;
FY 2005: $37,491;
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): $22,853;
Total (and percentage of total): $107,728.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
[A] Includes Russia Orphan Source Recovery and Global Search and Secure
programs (GSSP).
[B] Includes DOE-funded consultant reports and development of program
protocol, guidelines, and standards.
[End of table]
Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological
sources accounted for the largest program expenditure--almost $43
million. The majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and
oncology clinics. DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities
that utilize or store radiological sources and materials, including
waste storage facilities, commercial and industrial facilities, and
other research institutes. While DOE estimates that costs for each
facility type range from $15,000 to secure a medical facility to
$50,000 to secure a waste storage facility, actual expenditures for
securing sites varied based on factors such as regional labor rates,
conditions of existing infrastructure, and remoteness of location.
DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included
vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and
warranty contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE
physical security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to
identify security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the
local guard force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In
some instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors
responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments
with direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and
photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended upgrades.
Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings and
host country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages
consisted mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and
alarms; access control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card
entry; security cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also
provided guard forces with enhanced communication equipment, including
radios and mobile panic buttons that send emergency signals to local
police or security companies. Installation costs also included training
for on-site personnel that would be responsible for operating the
equipment.
Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty
contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote
monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are
negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and
require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of
sustaining the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades
have been installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE
estimated that, on average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year
to maintain equipment.[Footnote 20] This estimate includes sending one
DOE team per country, per year to conduct assurance visits, any
equipment contractors have to replace, and costs of remote monitoring
systems.
DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation
detection equipment and training to locate and recover lost or
abandoned radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent
storage facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source
recovery efforts--the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is
focused solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program,
which includes search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving
DOE assistance. More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery
expenditures were spent in Russia--about $19 million. To support GSSP,
DOE spent $4 million in 11 countries--Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania,
Tajikistan, and Tanzania. These funds were spent primarily to provide
countries with (1) standard packages of equipment such as hand-held
radiation detection monitors and characterization instruments to
properly identify recovered sources; (2) training workshops on the
appropriate use of the equipment; and (3) physical security upgrades at
some facilities storing recovered or disposed sources.
In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria,
Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and
regulations for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A
majority of these funds were spent in the United States--$1.8 million-
-to develop a set of security-based regulations to be utilized by
countries with limited resources and inadequate radiological source
inventories. Once countries drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE
experts reviewed drafts and provided feedback and proposals for
improvement. DOE also provided training workshops and seminars on
appropriate regulatory inspection practices for radiological source
controls and accounting. In particular, DOE has been working with
regional partners, such as the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement many of its regulatory
development activities.[Footnote 21] For example, DOE and ANSTO have
conducted regulatory development training workshops for countries
located in East Asia and the Pacific region.
DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund
to support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member
states, including technical training on fundamental principles and
objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund,
which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries,
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[Footnote 22] The
fund is designed to improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by
helping countries to protect their nuclear and radiological materials
and facilities. Specifically, DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out
safety and security assessments at sites identified by member states
containing vulnerable radiological sources. Additionally, DOE
contributions to IAEA supported training conferences and other advisory
services. DOE funds also enabled IAEA to transport several high-risk
sources to secure storage facilities and provide conditioning equipment
to prepare recovered sources for disposal.
Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures--about
$26.5 million--on activities not directly attributed to a specific
country. Specifically, these costs included, among other things,
program planning activities such as the development of program guidance
documents. For example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a
review of the radiological source security program and to help DOE
develop a plan to guide future efforts. The contractor spent several
months interviewing agency officials and program staff to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the program and the level of DOE
coordination with State, NRC, and IAEA. The final report provided
recommendations to improve coordination with other U.S. agencies and
within DOE. In addition, DOE spent $1.5 million of these funds to
facilitate an information exchange with Interpol, an international
agency that coordinates the law enforcement activities of the national
police bureaus in each of its member states, in order to obtain
information about international arrests involving theft or smuggling of
radiological materials. DOE's intent was to provide Interpol the
capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE's database, which
contains country-specific information regarding, among other things,
criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers and
software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol
headquarters in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for
two years. A DOE program manager expressed concern about whether
providing funds to Interpol would provide tangible results or increase
the effectiveness of the radiological sources program. This program
manager questioned whether the Interpol project contributed to the
program's core objectives of securing the highest risk, highest
priority sources in other countries.
A senior DOE official told us that these funds--identified by DOE as
strategic development and program integration funds--were established
at the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities
not directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade
projects and initiatives. This official added that in the early stages
of the program, expenditures of this type focused primarily on
strategic planning, developing program technical documents and
processes, conducting studies, and developing a database of regional
country information to support program objectives.
While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the
largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program
expenditures. DOE's cost manager for the IRTR program reported that
expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1)
orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and
disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million);
and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository
sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of
about $11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving
about $3.5 million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures
in FSU countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment,
and materials that were used to improve physical security.
By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and
expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and
disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE's national
laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.[Footnote
23] For example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17
million, or just 28 percent of total country-specific
expenditures.[Footnote 24] Two-thirds of funds spent for non-FSU
countries were spent in the United States. Furthermore, five countries
in Africa received no in-country expenditures. Although many countries
in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE, countries in this
region received a total of about $1.3 million, about two-thirds the
amount spent in one European country--Poland. While expenditures in
South America were more evenly divided between in-country costs and
funds spent in the United States, the region received only about $3.5
million spread among 12 countries.[Footnote 25] Figure 7 provides a
regional breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II
for more details about regional and individual country expenditures for
fiscal years 2002 through 2006.
Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOE cost data.
[End of figure]
DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent and
Unobligated Funds:
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in
unspent or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years.
Moreover, the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted
balance each fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For
example, for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the program carried over
uncosted funds totaling $27.4 million, $34.1 million, and $22.4
million, respectively. According to the program's director, a majority
of carryover balances were due to, among other things, large
supplemental appropriations at the onset of the program and delays in
implementing security upgrade projects. As we reported in 2004, large
carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE nuclear nonproliferation
programs--especially in Russia--because of, among other things,
difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and the multiyear
nature of programs.[Footnote 26] Table 4 shows DOE total budget and
uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.[Footnote 27]
Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006:
Dollars in thousands.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Appropriated funds: $20,555;
Funds obligated: $11,799;
Funds unobligated: $11,756;
Total expenditures: $6,821;
Uncosted obligations: $4,978;
Uncosted balance forward[A]: $16,733.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Appropriated funds: 38,000;
Funds obligated: 15,463;
Funds unobligated: 21,359;
Total expenditures: 9,433;
Uncosted obligations: 6,030;
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 27,389.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Appropriated funds: 36,000;
Funds obligated: 48,020;
Funds unobligated: 17,235;
Total expenditures: 31,128;
Uncosted obligations: 16,892;
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 34,127.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Appropriated funds: 24,800;
Funds obligated: 49,681;
Funds unobligated: 10,219;
Total expenditures: 37,492;
Uncosted obligations: 12,189;
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 22,407.
Fiscal year: 2006 (through Aug. 31, 2006);
Appropriated funds: 24,078;
Funds obligated: 33,977;
Funds unobligated: 11,832;
Total expenditures: 22,853;
Uncosted obligations: 11,125;
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 22,957.
Total;
Appropriated funds: $143,433;
Funds obligated: [Empty];
Funds unobligated: [Empty];
Total expenditures: $107,727;
Uncosted obligations: [Empty];
Uncosted balance forward[A]: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
[A] Uncosted balance forward is equal to funds unobligated plus
uncosted obligations.
[End of table]
DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduced, and
Future Program Funding Is Uncertain:
DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and
DOE officials expect further reductions over the next several years.
Specifically, DOE's internal budget allotments for the IRTR program
have gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million
in fiscal year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities
within GTRI, which funds DOE's nuclear and radiological threat
reduction efforts, have shifted, and future funding will be redirected
to, among other things, securing special nuclear material, such as
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has
assigned the highest budget priority to three specific GTRI elements
that address the threats posed by an attack using an improvised nuclear
device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
program, (2) Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return program, and (3)
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel program. The goal of the
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is to get
research reactors around the world to convert from HEU to low enriched
uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian research reactors to be
completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return and Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs are designed specifically
for returning HEU to the United States or Russia and are expected to be
completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.[Footnote 28]
In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not
have presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are
lower priorities for funding. DOE's Principal Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE
initially placed a high priority on securing radiological material and
the Secretary of Energy made a personal commitment to this activity.
More recently, because of budget reductions affecting the entire
agency, DOE has had to review and evaluate program priorities. This
official noted that while the likelihood of a dirty bomb attack is much
greater than a nuclear attack, the consequences in terms of loss of
life and the overall catastrophic impact of the latter would be much
greater. He also noted that, if given a choice, he would place more
emphasis on securing radiological sources in the United States than in
other countries. In his view, there is still a significant amount of
work to be done to secure radiological sources in the United States.
Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have
significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured
in other countries. DOE's initial target for program completion was to
secure 1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal
assumed that the program would receive $25 million per year over the
life of the program. DOE officials told us that currently projected
budget reductions may jeopardize the program's ability to fund even the
existing warranty contracts applied to physical security upgrades
already installed. Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which
the program will fund warranties for future upgrade projects meaning
countries will need to assume greater financial responsibility for
sustaining upgrades. However, DOE officials who are responsible for
project implementation told us they lacked confidence that a majority
of countries would be able to maintain upgrades without further DOE
assistance, mostly because many recipients do not have adequate
resources. For example, DOE officials responsible for project
implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where DOE has
spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for
radiological source security once DOE warranties expire.
In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the
increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis
threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI's reorganization.
Although DOE's new program guidance says that the radiological security
upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable, low-
cost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario
significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must
withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need
to be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE
officials have raised concerns regarding DOE's ability to sustain low-
cost upgrades already installed. In light of the program's ongoing
budget reductions, the new guidance raises further concern regarding
DOE's ability to sustain the increased cost of enhanced upgrades for
future projects.
To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek
international contributions to secure radiological sources in other
countries. DOE officials said that several countries, including,
Canada, Japan and Norway, have inquired about contributing funds
directly to GTRI but that, until recently, DOE had no authority to
accept direct financial support from international partners for GTRI
activities or to use funds received outside of the normal
appropriations process. In October 2006, Congress authorized DOE to
enter into agreements, with the concurrence of State, to receive
contributions from foreign countries and international organizations
for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those contributed funds
without fiscal year limitation.[Footnote 29] Additionally, Russian
officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program,
they are interested in providing increased financial commitments to
secure radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the
Russian Radon waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal
Agency for Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization
would be willing to make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE
officials stated that international source security is not the sole
responsibility of the United States government and that increased
foreign cooperation will be necessary to complete program objectives.
Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces
Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide:
DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat
reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing
with the agencies.[Footnote 30] However, DOE has not always integrated
its efforts efficiently and coordinated efforts among the agencies have
been inconsistent. Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the
activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for
securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries and, at
times, this has resulted in conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has
improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other
countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and
multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their
regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA has supported, among
other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and security of sites
containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored training programs
and regional workshops focusing on radiological source security.
However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA,
and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE's ability to target
the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid
possible duplication of efforts.
DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activities, but
Governmentwide Coordination Is Inconsistent:
In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and
has taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to
secure radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved
U.S. coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological
source regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support
of DOE and NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq
Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a
radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided
IRSRA with equipment, training, technical assistance, and funding to
help the new agency assume increased responsibility for establishing
radiological source regulations and procedures consistent with
international standards.[Footnote 31] Specifically, with funding and
logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several meetings in
Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel training by
IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new Iraqi
laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and export
of radiological sources, including physical security requirements. DOE
experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance
to the security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for
developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State
also funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that
Iraqi regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for
orphaned radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, included radiological handling,
measurement, and protective equipment, such as radiation meters,
respirators, and protective clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment
from DOE has also been transferred to Iraqi agencies for border
monitoring. DOE experts also trained IRSRA officials and personnel on
how to conduct vulnerability assessments.
Finally, to financially support IRSRA's efforts, State provided a
portion of $1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF),[Footnote 32] to IAEA for training and other
assistance to IRSRA, including an IAEA review of Iraq's draft laws and
regulations.[Footnote 33] State also used a portion of this funding to
purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can be driven through
neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources. DOE and State
officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique
circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination
to strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a
model for future efforts.
Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts
have been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide
approach to securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003
that DOE's efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been
well coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE
had not fully coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program
resources, maximize available expertise, avoid potential duplication of
efforts, and help ensure the program's long-term success. We also
recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive
governmentwide plan to strengthen controls over sources in other
countries. In response to our report, DOE hired a consultant to
determine, among other things, whether gaps exist in agency program
activities with respect to securing radiological sources worldwide and
what role and responsibilities DOE should assume in coordinating U.S.
government efforts.
In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had
addressed many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective
coordination was needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack
of effective coordination among these agencies posed the greatest
potential for conflict, as a result of differing mandates and
conflicting philosophical approaches to radiological source security.
Specifically, effective and systematic coordination between U.S.
agencies has been impeded at times because individual agency missions
differ and, as a result, agency efforts have been, at times, at odds
with one another. For example, the consultant reported that NRC had
expressed concern that DOE's regulatory infrastructure development
activities infringed on a decades-long NRC function. Furthermore, DOE
is primarily concerned with security of sources while NRC has
traditionally focused more on safety issues related to the use of
sources. The report also concluded that the debate between DOE and NRC
over the importance of the safety versus the security of radiological
sources had negatively impacted effective coordination between the two
agencies.
DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and
implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in
other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC's Office of
International Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to
assist its regulatory counterparts in the FSU and countries of central
and eastern Europe to enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations
governing use of radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track
radiological sources, such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to-
day regulatory oversight of sources. NRC stated in its request that
DOE's physical security enhancements would not likely be sustained in
the medium to long-term absent clear, enforceable regulatory
requirements. Moreover, NRC sought to assist DOE by providing
assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU, where a majority of
DOE's efforts were focused at the time.
NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been
identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support
international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government
agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies--Departments of State,
Energy and Defense--to support its international programs and is
required by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget
authority through licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S.
nuclear industry. Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised
concerns about using NRC funds to support international assistance.
Despite these funding limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting
regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of central and
eastern Europe and the FSU. These efforts have included training other
countries' regulators in all aspects of licensing and inspection
procedures and developing a control and accounting system for nuclear
materials.
In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5
million out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available
to NRC for bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory
controls over radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of
being used in a dirty bomb attack.[Footnote 34] In September 2003,
according to the Director of the NRC Office of International Programs,
NRC and the Director of DOE's International Materials Protection,
Control and Cooperation program reached an initial agreement in
principle, whereby DOE would provide NRC with $1 million per year for 5
years to conduct regulatory activities in countries outside of Russia.
According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because
the Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during
conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable
language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision
directing the transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference
report and was not included in the appropriation legislation.
Furthermore, these officials added that DOE was directed by guidance
received from House Energy and Water Development Subcommittee staff to
not transfer the funds. According to a senior NRC official in the
Office of International Programs, the conference report included a
joint explanatory statement, which directed that allocations set forth
in the House and Senate reports "should be complied with unless
specifically addressed to the contrary in the conference report and
statement of the managers."[Footnote 35] NRC asserts that this
reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without
language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have
received the funding as originally directed by the Senate
Appropriations Committee. The conference report does not specifically
address this funding issue.[Footnote 36]
In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support
radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in
Ukraine. Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of
radiological sources and strengthen Ukraine's overall radiological
source-related laws, rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because
of its relatively large inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the
stability of its existing nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC's
long-standing history of assisting Ukraine's nuclear regulatory
authority, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU).
NRC requested funding for the Ukraine project from State's
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. The total cost of the project
was estimated at $2.2 million.
The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project's
aim was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long-
term security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing
NRC's overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel.
Furthermore, the proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors
had been involved in an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2
years the effort in Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences,
utilizing much of that background data and materials. However, managers
for NDF projects ultimately decided that State would not use NRC
resources and would undertake and manage the project itself, even
though the agency had no prior experience in directly supporting
regulatory infrastructure development in Ukraine. According to a State
official, the agency made this decision because, among other things,
NRC planned to hire a contractor--the Ukrainian State Scientific and
Technical Center--to manage the project, which would have increased the
project's overall cost by about 20 percent.[Footnote 37]
State officials said that their approach departed from that which was
originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects.
However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its
projects as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State
chose to work directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the
State Scientific and Technical Center because, among other things, the
approach streamlined oversight and accountability for project
performance and reduced overhead expenses. According to the NDF manager
of the Ukraine project through October 2005, the Ukraine project
experienced significant delays. However, State officials told us the
project is currently on track. Following a November 30, 2006 meeting
with State officials to discuss our draft report, State provided us a
letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU dated December 4, 2006.
The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine project as one of the
most successful and efficient international assistance projects between
the United States and Ukraine and that the project was implemented in
the shortest possible time period.
Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a
set of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological
sources. Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal
IAEA review process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA-
sponsored training workshops to assist member states to strengthen
regulatory controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials
expressed significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute
unofficial guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S.
regulations. In a December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director
General of Nuclear Safety and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that
publishing interim guidance that had not been reviewed in advance, and
as a result may need to be substantially modified, was neither
efficient nor effective. State officials told us that their chief
concern was the manner in which any such guidance would be construed
abroad. These officials added that many of the specific problems
associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie with internal
issues regarding the process for reviewing security documents at IAEA.
In addition, they said that concerns over the development of IAEA
guidance on security of radioactive sources, which preceded development
of the draft regulations, are long standing and that State has worked
consistently with IAEA to develop and implement a consistent process
for preparation and review of security guidance similar to the
established process used by IAEA to develop safety guidance.
Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with
the agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with
established domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has
since proposed a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and
the DOE draft regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series
document entitled "Security of Radioactive Sources," which was
coordinated with State and NRC.
Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for
helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological
sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a
comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition,
DOE's consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S.
government agency with the resources to focus solely on international
source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report
recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency, site-
specific approach to international radiological source security,
including development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources
and leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has
not implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a
governmentwide plan for the security of radiological sources in other
countries because it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S.
agencies on how to conduct their efforts, and other agencies' programs
are not within DOE's control. However, DOE is currently taking steps,
as part of the GTRI reorganization, to address several coordination
issues within the department, including establishing regional points of
contact to interface with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency
efforts.
DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and
Program Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies:
The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately
coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are
responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other
countries. As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes.
For example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear
facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland's
nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us
that DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the
facilities, one of which stored several high-risk radiological sources
as well as spent fuel from the research reactor. Although the material
was collocated in the same storage facility, we observed that the
sources had been secured in a locked cage by the IRTR program, but the
spent fuel had no security and was being stored unprotected in
underground canisters. Figure 8 shows secured radiological sources
collocated with unsecured spent fuel contained in underground storage.
Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
Unsecured Spent Fuel:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security
upgrades at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately
coordinated by DOE. Furthermore, security officials that had installed
the physical security upgrades told us that the overall security in the
facility was inadequate, given the types of nuclear and radioactive
material being housed there. The director of the site said that he
expressed concern to DOE about the lack of security of the spent
nuclear fuel and requested similar upgrade improvements. However, he
said that it was his understanding that DOE's radiological program was
only authorized to fund radiological source security upgrades and not
the security of spent nuclear fuel, which was the responsibility of
DOE's nuclear security upgrades program.
The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear
to them why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological
material stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by
different DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong
signal to host country officials when DOE programs have such different
security approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades.
Subsequent to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government
officials in March 2006 offering to return to Poland and provide
further DOE technical and financial support to protect the nuclear
material stored at the facility.
Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led
primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the
laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing
radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program
manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists
and in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability
assessments and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site
visits, we observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of
the types of upgrades installed and that security measures were not
standardized. For example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and
found that, although they housed the same equipment and radiological
sources, they had received different upgrades as a result of
assessments conducted by different laboratory security specialists.
Specifically, teletherapy units in certain countries had fiber optic
cables attached to the sources that sent alarm signals if the device
was tampered with. Security specialists traveling with us at those
sites told us that the cable was the key security feature for this type
of device. However, during a meeting with a senior security specialist
from a different laboratory, we were told that his teams do not install
fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades to the same devices
because the cables can break.
We also found that DOE's IRTR program components are not well-
coordinated. For example, more than one program manager told us that
DOE had not consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts
or regulatory infrastructure development assistance with physical
security upgrades. According to officials responsible for managing the
majority of the program's physical security upgrade projects, IRTR
program managers did not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple
visits to the same country. In their view, this caused confusion within
the recipient countries because country officials had difficulty
understanding why some parts of the same DOE program were being
addressed separately. Officials from Sandia National Laboratories, the
lead for GSSP, told us that projects were often implemented
independently from physical security upgrade projects and that Sandia
did not routinely coordinate its efforts with those of PNNL prior to
initiating search and secure activities. PNNL officials, who brought
this matter to our attention, concurred and stated that GSSP officials
did not routinely consult with their physical security specialists
prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already established
relationships.
Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE's regulatory
infrastructure development team had visited several countries without
coordinating with the physical security upgrade teams. According to a
DOE program manager, host country officials were frequently uncertain
whether these two components were part of the same program. According
to PNNL, this fragmented approach created confusion and required them
to explain to country officials that the program components were meant
to complement one another. The lead official for regulatory
infrastructure development activities told us that future visits would
be better planned to ensure that an integrated approach to source
security was undertaken.
Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible
for domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-
origin radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological
Threat Reduction program officials said there have been limited
opportunities to share information or to assess the potential to
coordinate international source recovery activities so as to leverage
DOE resources. For example, the domestic program recently discovered a
large quantity of unsecured radiological sources in South America. The
sources were no longer in use and were inadequately secured. Officials
managing DOE's domestic program informed IRTR mangers of the finding
and the location of the sources. However, IRTR officials declined to
immediately secure the sources because the country where they were
discovered, which is considered high risk, is not scheduled for IRTR
upgrades until 2011. As a result, the sources will remain unsecured
until the international program completes upgrades in this country.
In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within
the department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and
consistent approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and
radiological programs should be established. They acknowledged that it
was inefficient for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part
of different programs to address multiple threat reduction activities.
To that end, DOE's recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create
a more streamlined structure that is organized geographically to
address all threat reduction activities more effectively. Specifically,
DOE plans to increase efficiency and improve coordination by (1)
integrating multiple GTRI programs working in the same country or at
the same sites; (2) redistributing workloads across the radiological
and nuclear programs; and (3) improving relationships with host country
officials by tailoring comprehensive strategies and incentives to more
effectively meet unique country-specific conditions.
Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between
DOE and IAEA Have Impeded DOE's Efforts to Target the Highest Priority
Sites for Security Upgrades:
DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with
countries around the world to support and share the agency's
international efforts. IRTR's director told us that these partnerships
have helped to foster increased awareness of the security of sources
through country-specific training and regional workshops. For example,
with the assistance of IAEA, DOE has established a partnership with the
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization through which
DOE has increased opportunities to conduct physical security
assessments and strengthen regulatory inventories of radiological
sources in Southeast Asia. Specifically, ANSTO has identified and
facilitated communication with several high-risk countries, which has
helped DOE gain access to countries that DOE had difficulty initiating
contact with, like Vietnam. DOE has also provided funding to support,
among other things, IAEA-sponsored training programs and regional
workshops focusing on radiological source security.
DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite
Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install
upgrades at 102 sites in 13 FSU countries--Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the
Tripartite Initiative was to improve the security of dangerous
radioactive sources in the FSU. We noted in our 2003 report that, in
its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative was not well planned, that
initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more systematic approach to program
activities was needed.[Footnote 38] However, an IAEA official recently
told us that coordination with DOE has improved significantly as the
program evolved.
Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information
gaps exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE's ability to target the
most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First,
according to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that
IAEA considers the most in need of security assistance. Second,
although DOE funds IAEA appraisal missions--known as Radiation Safety
and Security Infrastructure Appraisals--to assess the weaknesses in
radioactive source security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not
provide DOE with the findings of these missions because member state
information is considered country-sensitive and confidential. The
objective of these missions is to evaluate, among other things, the
quality of regulatory controls countries exercise over their
radiological sources. Results of the appraisals are formalized into
action plans that provide the framework for subsequent IAEA assistance
to improve the security of sources. Because IAEA does not provide DOE
with the results of the missions, DOE is unable to effectively
prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be most
vulnerable. DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific
information has been an ongoing problem that limits DOE's ability to
effectively leverage its resources to maximize program impact and
effectiveness.
We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the
European Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in
assistance and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides
financial support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure
radioactive sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership.
EC officials told us that no formal communication exists with the
United States on matters related to radioactive source security
assistance, and as a result, each is largely unaware of the specific
sites and locations the other is securing, or whether recipient
countries are receiving too little or too much assistance. DOE
officials told us that coordination with the EC has been conducted
primarily at IAEA donor meetings.
The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member
states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the
EC works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the
security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear
purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing
physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable
radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked
with IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the
Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean
countries.
Conclusions:
DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security
of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries.
We recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other
countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of
these sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided
to expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it
diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from
securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources.
Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority
threats, such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding
resources to securing medical facilities that, in our view--as well as
several DOE officials associated with the program--pose considerably
less threat to U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot
be removed until alternate energy sources are developed to replace
them, removing as many RTGs as possible, or securing them until they
can be removed, should be a critical component of DOE's radiological
threat reduction efforts.
We believe that DOE's current reorganization of its nuclear and
radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction
toward improving the management of the program. However, there are
still many significant management issues that need to be addressed and
resolved. DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term
sustainability of the equipment, which could jeopardize the significant
investment made to improve the security of radiological sources in many
countries. The security equipment and upgraded storage facilities
funded by DOE will require a long-term commitment by the countries to
help ensure their continued use and operation, and it is not clear to
us that a sustained stream of funding will be made available by DOE or
by recipient countries to maintain and/or replace aging or defective
equipment. Moreover, there are continuing concerns that many of the
countries do not have adequate nuclear regulatory infrastructures in
place to promote sustainability. Without a comprehensive sustainability
plan that adequately addresses a country's ability to reliably install
and maintain upgrades and provide adequate oversight for source
security, DOE risks losing a significant portion of its investment to
improve the security of radiological sources in many countries.
Furthermore, DOE's decision to increase physical security requirements
for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised threat protection
criteria, may have significant cost implications for a program that is
already facing severe budget reductions. This raises concerns because
DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs associated with
its elevated threat protection criteria.
This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program,
particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example,
how certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol
database, directly contribute to the program's core mission of securing
radiological sources in other countries. There are other management
issues that require DOE's attention. First, DOE has not developed
meaningful performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to which
the radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its
efforts, including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing
between the types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of
reliable contractors to implement security projects and provide
adequate training may be limited in some countries. However, many
project delays could be avoided in the future if DOE developed specific
selection criteria or a set minimum standard for foreign contractor
qualifications.
Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility.
DOE's investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to
addressing the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority
of the costs on behalf of the international community. Specifically,
certain EU accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently
Russia, should be willing to contribute more resources to improve the
security of dangerous and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In
addition, DOE now has the authority to accept foreign contributions for
GTRI programs from other interested countries, such as Canada, Japan,
and Norway. However, gaps in communication between DOE and
international partners, such as IAEA and the EC, significantly impede
effective global radiological threat reduction.
Finally, developing foreign countries' nuclear regulatory organizations
is a well recognized and critical component in strengthening
radiological source security worldwide. NRC has a long- standing
history of promoting regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our
view, play a more prominent role in this regard. DOE's refusal to
transfer $5 million from its appropriations to NRC to conduct
regulatory development activities, despite the direction of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, underscores NRC's limited ability to provide
international assistance, while reliant on funding from other agencies.
Most of the coordination problems we identified between NRC and other
agencies could have been avoided if NRC had its own stream of
predictable and reliable funding for international regulatory
development, rather than having to rely on DOE or State for funds.
However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will continue to depend on
other agencies for funds, thus increasing the likelihood that similar
problems will occur in the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest
priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration take the following two actions:
* Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological
sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the
highest-risk, and:
* To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in
Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those
remaining until they can be removed from service.
Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the
following seven actions to improve program management:
* Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that
includes, among other things, future resources required to implement
such a plan;
* Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not
directly contribute to securing the highest priority radiological
sources in other countries;
* Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with
increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat
protection criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased
security upgrades until such an analysis has been completed;
* Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real
risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number
countries and sites that have received physical security upgrades;
* Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to
help reduce potential project delays in the future;
* Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to
maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United
States; and:
* Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient
countries, including Russia and EU accession countries.
Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, should work with IAEA and European
Commission officials to consider ways to systematically improve
information sharing to maximize and leverage resources and
institutional expertise.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure development is
the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological source security
efforts, it should consider providing NRC with authority and a direct
appropriation to conduct these activities. The appropriation would be
provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another agency
to reimburse NRC for its activities. Should the Congress decide to do
so, NRC's efforts need to be fully coordinated with those of State,
DOE, and IAEA.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their
review and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are presented
as appendix III. NRC's written comments are presented as appendix IV.
NRC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the
report. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our matter for
congressional consideration, which would provide NRC with the legal
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct international
regulatory activities for radiological source security. However, NRC
stated that if Congress acts upon our matter for consideration, NRC
would work closely with State, relevant executive branch agencies, and
IAEA to implement the program.
In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the
department faced a considerable challenge in securing other countries'
most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these sources
and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore, DOE stated that
enormous amounts of dangerous material have not been secured, although
the IRTR program has achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a
short period of time. DOE stated that the recommendations were very
helpful and would further strengthen its program.
DOE also noted that it had measures in place--as a result of its
reorganization of GTRI--to address program challenges and concerns that
we raised, such as site prioritization; quality assurance/
sustainability; coordination; and transportation. We recognized in the
report that the reorganization of the program was a step in the right
direction toward improving program management. However, as we noted in
our report, many significant management issues still need to be
addressed and resolved despite the reorganization. That is why we
believe it was important to offer recommendations to improve program
management and source prioritization efforts.
In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number of
factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects to
upgrade in addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in
radiological sources. These other factors include (1) known terrorist
threat in the country/region; (2) current level of security at the
site; and (3) the proximity of the site in relationship to potential
strategic targets of U.S. interest. In our report, we stated that site
selection was based on a number of factors, including those
specifically noted by DOE in its written comments. We also pointed out
in our report that DOE's guidance on site selection has not clearly
discriminated between the different sites secured and which sites were
to be considered the highest priority. We are encouraged that DOE is
explicitly linking its prioritization guidelines to a site's proximity
to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it remains to
be seen how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site
selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated that
it will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also address
high priority medical and other sources. In our view, this action by
DOE would be consistent with the key conclusions and recommendations in
our report. Our recommendations specifically state that DOE should, to
the extent possible, remove as many RTGs in Russia and limit the number
of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive
security upgrades to only those deemed to be the highest risk.
With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability issues, DOE
stated that it employs a standard process that ensures quality
assurance for the security equipment that it installs. This process
includes, among other things, conducting post-installation visits by
technical experts for the purpose of assuring that all equipment and
systems are installed as agreed upon. DOE also noted that despite these
measures, it would further investigate its process to identify and
implement additional improvements. We think DOE should take these steps
because, as discussed in our report, we identified several problems
with malfunctioning equipment and other maintenance problems at sites
containing radiological sources. DOE also noted that it has a short-
term sustainability program for every site that it upgrades that
includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative maintenance
contracts and training for operational staff. DOE believes that we
should revise the report to indicate the existence of the 3-year
warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE's program guidance calls for
preventative maintenance contracts and training. We also noted that DOE
provides a 3-year warranty, and we gave DOE credit for providing this
coverage. Our main point remains--which DOE explicitly agreed with--
that DOE has not developed a long-term sustainability plan for the
equipment it has installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report
language, as appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term
sustainability plan but has not developed a long-term plan to maintain
the security upgrades completed.
Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written
comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies,
other DOE elements, and international partners on matters pertaining to
international radiological source security. We believe the report
fairly characterized DOE's coordination efforts in each of these areas.
Specifically, we noted that DOE had improved coordination with State
and NRC since we reported on this matter in 2003 and has increased
information-sharing with the agencies. In addition, we believe our
characterization of coordination problems within the department is
correct. Our evaluation was based on information provided by an
independent consultant's report as well as our own analysis of
conditions we found within the department pertaining to inconsistent
and, at times, inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE
programs responsible for threat reduction activities in the same
country. As we noted in the report, DOE officials recognized that
coordination within the agency needs to be improved and that a
comprehensive and consistent approach to threat reduction efforts
between nuclear and radiological threat reduction activities should be
established. We also noted in the report that DOE's September 2006
reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to create a more
streamlined structure that is organized along three geographic regions,
which could improve program coordination.
On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an
opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our
report about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE's ability
to target the most vulnerable sites and countries for security
improvements. Since this information was provided to us by DOE
officials, it is unclear to us what benefit would have been achieved by
providing a draft of this report to IAEA for review and comment of
DOE's views. Our report notes that DOE has, despite some information-
sharing problems with IAEA, improved coordination with the agency in
recent years to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological
sources.
Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented that,
among other things, it had been working with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries to strengthen
transport security regulations. We added this information to our report
based on DOE's comments. DOE also stated that it was working with
Russia to enhance the security of radioactive materials, including
providing cargo trucks and escort vehicles for the Moscow waste storage
facility. We had already recognized this fact in the report. More
broadly, however, we believe that the report accurately and fairly
depicts the limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation
security. A primary source of information for our observation came
directly from a DOE analysis--cited in the report--which concluded that
the department was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc
basis and that the existing method of providing transportation security
had serious limitations and lacked a commitment to integrate transport
security into all countries participating in the IRTR program.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of State; the Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include
Erika D. Carter, Glen Levis, Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO's
Chief Technologist), and Jim Shafer.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE),
since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of
radiological sources worldwide and provides significant funds for that
purpose. We also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., which also
provide assistance to help other countries secure their sealed
radiological sources. In addition, we reviewed program-related
activities and interviewed program officials from Argonne National
Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois; the Los Alamos National Laboratory in
Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in
Richland, Washington; Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New
Mexico; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna,
Austria; and the European Commission (EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also
met with nongovernmental organizations, including, the Council on
Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
In November 2005, we attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held in
the United Kingdom, which discussed international approaches to
securing radiological sources against terrorism.
We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its
program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these
countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent the
most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries represented about
$37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall program expenditures. We
selected Lithuania and Poland since, among other reasons, DOE officials
told us that these were model countries in securing radiological
sources and implementing effective physical security upgrades. Also, we
selected Russia and Georgia because they received significant program
funds, totaling about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition,
thousands of radiological sources are located in these two countries.
In the case of Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and
operates 44 percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union.
During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all types
of sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities, and RTGs.
For instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial sites
throughout Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania, we visited
the Radiation Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology Institute Clinic,
Klaipeda City Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology Clinic, and Saiuliu
Oncology Hospital, as well as the Lithuanian Institute of Physics and
the Maisiagala Repository. In Poland, we visited the Regionaine
Centreem Kriwodawstwa I Krwiolecznictwa (Children's Hospital) as well
as the Glowny Urzad Miar (Main Measurement Office), Polytechnic
Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow,
Radioisotope Waste Management Plant in Swierk, Technical University
Institute of Applied Radiation Chemistry, and the Technical Institute
of Applied Physics. At each location, we interviewed facility staff who
were responsible for implementing radiological source security
procedures and using the monitoring equipment funded by DOE. Facility
staff included--but was not limited to--doctors, clinical technicians,
and other medical support staff. At each site, we met with local guards
to determine how well they were trained and equipped. We also
interviewed host country contractors who were responsible for
installing and maintaining physical security upgrades.
We also met with host government officials in both countries. In
Lithuania we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA
(Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation
Protection Center (nuclear regulatory organization); and the Ministry
of Environment. In Poland, we interviewed officials from the National
Atomic Energy Agency (Poland's nuclear regulator), the Department of
Environmental Hygiene, and the Ministry of Health.
We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at waste
facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically, we visited
the Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about 90 kilometers
from Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site, located about 80
kilometers from St. Petersburg. While in Russia we also met with the
key federal agencies responsible for radiological source management and
oversight. Specifically, we met with several high-level officials from
Rostechnadzor, Russia's nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental,
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal
Agency for Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear
and Radiation Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally,
we interviewed directors of both the Moscow and St. Petersburg Radon
facilities; officials of the IBRAE Institute (Russian National Academy
of Sciences); and directors of VNIITFA (Russian National Technical
Physics and Automation Research Institute), the designer of RTGs.
Moreover, after meeting with officials from the Kurchatov Institute,
which is primarily responsible for the RTG removal, we visited three
sites where RTGs had been removed and replaced with alternative energy
sources.
In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at the
Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as Georgia's
temporary national storage facility that stores many high-risk
radiological sources, including six RTGs and a seed irradiator.
Regarding Georgia's medical sites, we also visited the National Cancer
Center of Georgia and the Kutaisi Oncological Center and interviewed
staff and guards who were responsible for source security. We met with
officials from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry
of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (Georgia's nuclear
regulator), the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department, the Institute
of Radiobiology, and the Chamber of Control.
To assess the progress of DOE's efforts to help other countries secure
their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed
documentation on DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction
Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and
program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal briefings.
For example, we reviewed DOE's Action Plan to Secure and Control
Foreign-Origin Source Materials for Radiological Dispersal Devices
(April 2003), and Programmatic Guidelines for Site Prioritization and
Protection Implementation (September 2006). We supplemented the
documentation with interviews with senior level DOE officials
responsible for implementing the IRTR program.
To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49 countries
receiving DOE's assistance, we reviewed DOE's Project Management
Information System database to construct a summary table that included
factors, among other things, the number of sites completed; host
country agencies and international organizations involved in
radiological source security; and program accomplishments and
challenges. To identify challenges DOE faces in securing sources in
other countries and to assess sustainability efforts, we collected and
analyzed (1) IRTR program trip reports for all countries participating
in the program, and (2) testimonial evidence obtained from project
managers, security specialists, and contracting officers to identify
all programmatic and management challenges. Furthermore, we performed a
comprehensive review and analysis of trip reports from fiscal year 2004
through fiscal year 2006.
To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that
provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries,
we reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program
expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006. We
obtained responses from key agency database officials to a number of
questions focused on data reliability, covering issues such as data-
entry access and the accuracy and completeness of the data. For DOE
specifically, to determine how much DOE had budgeted and spent through
August 31, 2006, to secure radiological sources in other countries, we
reviewed element of cost reports detailing program expenditures by
country, national laboratory, and program objective per fiscal year to
determine the amount spent in-country and the overall carryover of
unspent and unobligated funds. Furthermore, to determine planned
program costs for DOE, we reviewed DOE's congressional budget request
for fiscal year 2007 and met with senior DOE officials to learn about
DOE's plans for addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions
were added whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were
noted in the documentation, where necessary. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based
on work we performed to ensure the data's reliability.
To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE as
well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed documents
from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological threat reduction
and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed several senior
officials at NRC, including the Senior Advisor for Nuclear Security, a
senior foreign policy advisor for the Office of International Programs,
and a Senior Engineer. At State, we interviewed several high-level
officials, including the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed
State, NRC, and DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight
interagency coordination. To address the level of coordination with
international organizations, we met with senior officials at the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission,
including the Director of Nuclear Safety, and a senior official from
the External Relations Directorate, respectively. Finally, we met with
the Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Centre from the
Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority to learn about NRC's role in
providing regulatory assistance to Armenia.
We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations, from
November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as
of August 31, 2006:
[End of section]
Dollars in thousands.
Former Soviet Union.
Recipient Country: Russia;
U.S. Costs: $10,451;
In-country costs: $22,721;
Total spent: $33,172.
Recipient Country: Ukraine;
U.S. Costs: 1,490;
In-country costs: 2,000;
Total spent: 3,490.
Recipient Country: Lithuania;
U.S. Costs: 736;
In-country costs: 588;
Total spent: 1,324.
Recipient Country: Georgia Republic;
U.S. Costs: 359;
In-country costs: 662;
Total spent: 1,022.
Recipient Country: Kazakhstan;
U.S. Costs: 327;
In-country costs: 519;
Total spent: 846.
Recipient Country: Uzbekistan;
U.S. Costs: 282;
In-country costs: 490;
Total spent: 772.
Recipient Country: Moldova;
U.S. Costs: 344;
In- country costs: 441;
Total spent: 785.
Recipient Country: Azerbaijan;
U.S. Costs: 214;
In-country costs: 557;
Total spent: 771.
Recipient Country: Kyrgyzstan;
U.S. Costs: 329;
In-country costs: 282;
Total spent: 611.
Recipient Country: Tajikistan;
U.S. Costs: 321;
In-country costs: 204;
Total spent: 525.
Recipient Country: Latvia;
U.S. Costs: 223;
In- country costs: 28;
Total spent: 251.
Recipient Country: Armenia;
U.S. Costs: 172;
In- country costs: 26;
Total spent: 198.
Recipient Country: Estonia;
U.S. Costs: 114;
In- country costs: 44;
Total spent: 158.
Recipient Country: Belarus;
U.S. Costs: 247;
In- country costs: 223;
Total spent: 470.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $15,609;
In-country costs: $28,785;
Total spent: $44,395.
Africa.
Recipient Country: Ethiopia;
U.S. Costs: $91;
In- country costs: $0;
Total spent: $91.
Recipient Country: South Africa;
U.S. Costs: 69;
In-country costs: 0;
Total spent: 69.
Recipient Country: Kenya;
U.S. Costs: 15;
In- country costs: 0;
Total spent: 15.
Recipient Country: Nigeria;
U.S. Costs: 104;
In- country costs: 0;
Total spent: 104.
Recipient Country: Morocco;
U.S. Costs: 306;
In- country costs: 322;
Total spent: 628.
Recipient Country: Tanzania;
U.S. Costs: 237;
In- country costs: 131;
Total spent: 368.
Recipient Country: Libya;
U.S. Costs: 2;
In- country costs: 0;
Total spent: 2.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $824;
In-country costs: $453;
Total spent: $1,277.
Europe.
Recipient Country: Poland;
U.S. Costs: $538;
In- country costs: $1,387;
Total spent: $1,925.
Recipient Country: Bulgaria;
U.S. Costs: 442;
In- country costs: 419;
Total spent: 861.
Recipient Country: Greece;
U.S. Costs: 397;
In- country costs: 259;
Total spent: 656.
Recipient Country: Serbia;
U.S. Costs: 138;
In- country costs: 177;
Total spent: 315.
Recipient Country: Albania;
U.S. Costs: 332;
In- country costs: 6;
Total spent: 338.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $1,847;
In-country costs: $2,248;
Total spent: $4,095.
Latin America.
Recipient Country: Colombia;
U.S. Costs: $401;
In-country costs: $913;
Total spent: $1,314.
Recipient Country: Panama;
U.S. Costs: 114;
In- country costs: 100;
Total spent: 214.
Recipient Country: Peru;
U.S. Costs: 210;
In- country costs: 176;
Total spent: 386.
Recipient Country: Nicaragua;
U.S. Costs: 72;
In- country costs: 45;
Total spent: 117.
Recipient Country: El Salvador;
U.S. Costs: 82;
In-country costs: 67;
Total spent: 149.
Recipient Country: Chile;
U.S. Costs: 201;
In- country costs: 110;
Total spent: 311.
Recipient Country: Ecuador;
U.S. Costs: 158;
In- country costs: 152;
Total spent: 310.
Recipient Country: Argentina;
U.S. Costs: 124;
In-country costs: 9;
Total spent: 133.
Recipient Country: Brazil;
U.S. Costs: 90;
In- country costs: 15;
Total spent: 105.
Recipient Country: Honduras;
U.S. Costs: 122;
In- country costs: 20;
Total spent: 142.
Recipient Country: Guatemala;
U.S. Costs: 104;
In-country costs: 42;
Total spent: 146.
Recipient Country: Bolivia;
U.S. Costs: 101;
In- country costs: 66;
Total spent: 167.
Recipient Country: Mexico;
U.S. Costs: 0;
In- country costs: 0;
Total spent: 0.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $1,779;
In-country costs: $1,715;
Total spent: $3,494.
Asia-Pacific.
Recipient Country: Indonesia;
U.S. Costs: $244;
In-country costs: $359;
Total spent: $603.
Recipient Country: Philippines;
U.S. Costs: 235;
In-country costs: 196;
Total spent: 431.
Recipient Country: Vietnam;
U.S. Costs: 112;
In- country costs: 2;
Total spent: 114.
Recipient Country: Bangladesh;
U.S. Costs: 161;
In-country costs: 43;
Total spent: 204.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $752;
In-country costs: $600;
Total spent: $1,352.
Middle East.
Recipient Country: Iraq;
U.S. Costs: $4,250;
In- country costs: $206;
Total spent: $4,456.
Recipient Country: Afghanistan;
U.S. Costs: 607;
In-country costs: 0;
Total spent: 607.
Recipient Country: Yemen;
U.S. Costs: 68;
In- country costs: 48;
Total spent: 116.
Recipient Country: Jordan;
U.S. Costs: 188;
In- country costs: 56;
Total spent: 244.
Recipient Country: Egypt;
U.S. Costs: 955;
In- country costs: 526;
Total spent: 1,481.
Recipient Country: Turkey;
U.S. Costs: 146;
In- country costs: 1;
Total spent: 147.
Recipient Country: Subtotal;
U.S. Costs: $6,214;
In-country costs: $837;
Total spent: $7,051.
Recipient Country: Total;
U.S. Costs: $27,025;
In-country costs: $34,638;
Total spent: $61,664.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy:
NNSA:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
January 17, 2007:
Mr. Gene Aloise Director:
National Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20584:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International
Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on
Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources." We understand that
this work was done at the request of the Senate's Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.
We appreciate the fact that GAO has incorporated changes that add
clarity to the original draft report. Equally, we appreciate the fact
that GAO recognizes that we have achieved noteworthy accomplishments in
improving the security of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in
more than 40 countries. As is acknowledged, we have:
* secured or recovered radioactive sources at over 430 facilities in 43
countries under this program since 2002;
* removed radiological sources from war-torn Chechnya;
* improved security in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics;
* created secure storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
and Georgia;
* removed or secured, in cooperation with our international partners,
more than 30% of the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
located in Russia;
* agreement to obtain international funding (e.g. Government of Canada)
to accelerate RTG security efforts in Russia;
* improved coordination with the Department of State and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide
(the most prominent example was the cooperation and radiological
sources in Iraq); and
* improved coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and developed several successful bilateral and multilateral
partnerships to enhance physical protection of vulnerable radioactive
material at various sites around the world.
As you note, radioactive sources provide substantial medical,
industrial, and agriculture benefits and are, therefore, in widespread
commercial use throughout the world. We agree with the assessment that
we face a considerable challenge in securing other countries' most
dangerous radiological sources given the number of these sources and
how widely dispersed they are. We further recognize that we have
achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a short period of time but
that there remains an enormous amount of dangerous material left to
secure or eliminate.
Nonetheless, GAO has identified areas that it believes need to be
further addressed, such as prioritization, quality assurance/
sustainability, coordination, and transportation. It is important to
note that we already have in place substantial measures to address each
of these areas. For example, during the past several months the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) undertook a major program assessment
aimed at establishing new prioritization guidelines for securing and
recovering vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the
world. GTRI has further improved coordination by organizing the program
regionally by country.
Regarding GAO's belief that we need to further address prioritization,
we note that:
* NNSA and its international partners have made substantial progress by
securing 742 sites. All of these sites are of the highest priority and
contain vulnerable radiological sources. Specifically NNSA or its
partners have completed security upgrades affecting:
- 374 of 1,062 (35%) of the RTGs:
- 30 of 69 (43%) of the waste repositories:
- 82 of 229 (36%) of the research institutes and commercial/industrial
sites:
- 256 of 1,951 (13%) of the medical facilities:
* Total curies of radioactivity are just one of several critical
factors that the program uses to determine priority. The others are (1)
known terrorist threat in the country/region, (2) current level of
security at the site, and (3) the proximity of the site to potential
strategic targets of U.S. interest. The majority of large scale
terrorist attacks to date have been at U.S. assets (embassies, military
bases/ships, etc.) or western hotels and transportation systems in
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Europe using locally purchased/stolen
materials to minimize the risk of detection prior to the attack.
* Because of this, specific types of medical sources are highly
attractive to would-be terrorists. GAO's report highlights a 1,400
curie medical source in Brazil that killed 4 people, caused widespread
panic, and resulted in $36 million in decontamination costs.
* Recent research conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, as you
know, documents the ease with which a medical teletherapy source could
be stolen within minutes and helps to validate the significance of this
risk.
* As GAO states, it is the small size, portability and potential value
of sealed radiological sources that make them vulnerable to misuse. At
the same time, as GAO recommends, NNSA will continue to accelerate RTG
recoveries but the program must also address these high priority
medical and other radioactive sources.
Regarding your belief that we need to further address quality
assurance/sustainability, we note that:
* Our standard protection upgrade implementation practice ensures
quality assurance. This is accomplished by (1) having the contract for
the development of a protection upgrade design reviewed and approved by
NNSA physical protection experts prior to payment for the design
document; (2) insisting the approved design document is a precondition
to proceeding with procurement of protection equipment and
installation; (3) conducting post-installation visits by our technical
experts for the purpose of assuring all equipment and systems are
installed as agreed upon in the design document (if installations are
performed incorrectly, payments are withheld until corrections are
made). We will further investigate this process to identify and
implement additional improvements.
* GTRI already has a short-term sustainability program for every site
that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative maintenance
contracts and training on newly installed equipment for operational
staff at the sites. In order to ensure effective long-term security
upgrades at facilities around the world, we agree with the
recommendation to expand this into a long-term sustainability plan of
the security measures. However, the draft report should be revised to
accurately reflect the existence of a 3-year warranty plan for each
site, but note that additional work needs to be done to develop a long-
term sustainability plan. This phrase should be added in the Executive
Summary and on pages 1, 8, 10, 11 and in the title on page 29. We are
currently re-examining our sustainability policies and procedures to
assure ourselves that security upgrades can and will function
effectively over the long term, especially in those countries that lack
reliable communications and electric power systems.
Regarding your belief that we need to further address coordination, we
note that NNSA is closely cooperating with elements of the Department
of Energy (DOE), other Government Agencies, and international partners.
For example, we:
* worked closely with the NRC and the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health's (MDPH) Radiation Control Program in removing
radioactive materials from Massachusetts in December 2006;
* teamed with other elements of our organization to secure and recover
large quantities of orphaned nuclear materials and radioactive
materials in Iraq under Project Maximus in 2004;
* continue to work closely with the Department of State and NRC to
develop and implement physical protection programs internationally;
* are closely cooperating and coordinating with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Specific programs include: successful
Tripartite Initiative with the IAEA and the Government of the Russian
Federation to identify, locate and secure disused and orphaned sources
in the Former Soviet Republics, including the recovery of a large
quantity of vulnerable radioactive sources from Chechnya this past
year; and teaming with the Department of State to assist the IAEA in
development and implementation of a major upgrade to its Radiological
Authority Information System (RAIS);
* provide technical experts to support the IAEA's Office of Nuclear
Security's programs to assist countries in the areas of regulatory
infrastructure support, physical protection training and inspections;
providing technical experts to assist the IAEA in the recovery of
vulnerable at risk radioactive sources;
* are teaming with the IAEA and the Government of South Africa to
recover and disposition sixty-eight (68) disused or orphaned sources
from other African countries to mitigate security concerns; assisting
the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) in
development of a mobile Spent High Activity Radioactive Source (SHARS)
conditioning facility to aid in the recovery of vulnerable, high-risk
orphaned and disused sources around the world. This system is scheduled
to be used to recover several high activity sources in Africa during
the first quarter of 2007;
* are teaming with the Government of Australia and the IAEA in securing
and recovering vulnerable high risk radioactive sources in Southeast
Asia.
As an indication of the importance and effectiveness of our RTG
security and recovery program, the Government of Canada is preparing to
provide NNSA approximately $2 million to augment the work currently
being done by GTRI to secure and recover RTG's in Russia.
Regarding your belief that we need to further address transportation,
we note that:
* Our national laboratories have been working with the U.S. Department
of Transportation, the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security, and key IAEA
Donor States to strengthen transport security regulations and
procedures to mitigate the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear and
other radioactive materials in transit.
* We have also been working bilaterally with the Government of the
Russian Federation to enhance the security of radioactive materials
during their transport from the end-user's site to a location of final
material disposition. Because the vast majority of all waste shipments
within the Russian RADON system are handled by the RADONs located at
Sevgayeo Posad and Leningrad, most of the funds we provided to upgrade
transport security within Russia, including cargo trucks and escort
vehicles, were expended in support of shipments to and from these two
sites.
NNSA acknowledges the efforts made by the GAO report to reinforce the
importance of NNSA's nuclear and radiological security programs in
support of U.S. national security. GAO's independent validation of our
successes and recommendations for further strengthening of our efforts
is very helpful. We believe, however, that the IAEA should have had the
opportunity to review and address some of the allegations made by this
report concerning the close cooperation and coordination of programs we
have maintained with the IAEA over the past several years.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management at
202-586-5009.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
cc: William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
January 10, 2007:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am
responding to your e-mail dated December 20, 2006, requesting NRC
review and comment on your draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation:
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to
Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological
Sources" (GAO-07-282). I appreciate your providing the NRC the
opportunity to review this draft report, the time and effort that you
and your staff have invested in reviewing this important topic, and the
care that you have taken to ensure that your report is accurate and
constructive. Although the report is not focused principally on NRC
activities, it does recognize NBC's contribution to this important
effort.
With regard to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
recommendation that the United States Congress consider providing the
NRC the authority and direct appropriation to conduct international
regulatory infrastructure development in support of the long-term
sustainability of radiological source security efforts, the NRC notes
that this recommendation would expand its current program of
international assistance in regulatory controls over sources. NRC
already has a modest program to strengthen the regulation of sources in
countries such as Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. This program seeks
to ensure that the national regulator has a sustainable nuclear
regulatory infrastructure that includes a legislative mandate to
control sources, resources and skilled personnel, and the means to
implement the guidance in the International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological
Sources. If Congress implements GAO's recommendation, NRC would work
closely with the Department of State, relevant Executive Branch
agencies, and IAEA to expand the NBC's present program. In addition,
the NRC believes that the direct funding must be sufficient on an
annual basis to expand and sustain the short and long-term efforts of
the program. Because NRC is required by law to recover most of its
budget through fees to licensees and applicants, funding for these
activities should be exempt from NBC's fee recovery requirements.
In addition to NBC's comment on GAO's recommendation, I have enclosed
additional comments related to enhancing the clarity and accuracy of
statements in the body of the report. Should you have any questions
about these comments, please contact Ms. Melinda Malloy, at (301) 415-
1785, of my staff.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Luis A. Reyes:
Executive Director for Operations:
Enclosure:
As stated:
[End of section]
(36042)
FOOTNOTES
[1] A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern
nuclear physics, it is defined as the amount of substance in which 37
billion atoms per second undergo radiological disintegration. In the
international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of
radioactivity. One curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels.
[2] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001).
[3] NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
[4] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its
Expanded Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources, GAO-05-967
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005).
[5] The Atoms for Peace Program was established in the 1950s for the
purpose of promoting peaceful domestic and international exploration,
development, and advancement of nuclear energy. Under the auspices of
the program, DOE and its predecessor agencies provided many countries
with sealed radiological sources.
[6] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world.
The mission of DOE's 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to
design and build atomic weapons, these laboratories have since expanded
to conduct research in many disciplines--from high-energy physics to
advanced computing.
[7] In addition to the IRTR program, GTRI consists of the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and
Test Reactors, the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return, the U.S.
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance, Emerging
Threats and Gap Materials, Global Research Reactor Security, and BN-350
programs.
[8] The countries of the former Soviet Union include Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.
[9] The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources serves as a guide in developing policies, laws, and regulations
on maintaining the safety and security of radiological sources. It is
not, however, legally binding. The code, which was revised in 2003,
includes, among other things, enhanced requirements for the security of
sources. As of December 2006, 88 countries, including the United
States, had committed to implement the code. Further, in September
2004, IAEA's Board of Governors approved new guidance on the import and
export of sources, which is designed to help countries ensure that high-
risk sources are supplied only to authorized end-users. As of December
2006, 37 countries, including the United States, had committed to
implement the import/export guidance.
[10] The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member
states.
[11] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance
Efforts to Control Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-
03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
[12] The hand-held radiation detection equipment was provided under
DOE's Cooperative Radiological Instrument Threat Reduction program.
This program is designed to help DOE's international radiological
threat reduction program to ensure that other countries' law
enforcement officials are provided with the necessary equipment and
training to detect and mitigate radiological security threats.
[13] Sandia National Labatories determined that a source could be
easily removed from a teletherapy machine using basic tools and
drawings.
[14] Norway has committed to securing an additional 77 RTGs along the
Arctic coast, including the Kola Peninsula. Specifically, Norway agreed
to remove 30 RTGs in 2006, 30 in 2007 and 17 in 2008.
[15] According to DOE, this is part of a larger funding commitment by
Canada for $2 million to support radiological source security in
Russia.
[16] DOE identified the Society for Petroleum Engineers, which is an
organization that represents petroleum companies' engineers and petro-
physicists. Its membership includes both service operators, like
Chevron and British Petroleum, and service providers, like Halliburton.
[17] DOE identified 10 radioisotopes of concern: americium-241,
californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, curium-234, iridium-192,
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, radium-226, and strontium-90.
[18] In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE first assessed
the vulnerability of radiological sources in 191 countries. Based on
this assessment, DOE determined that 100 of these countries were a high
priority and were targeted for assistance. Within the 100 countries,
DOE further refined the priority list and ranked countries as either
high, medium, or low priority.
[19] GAO-03-638.
[20] Number of sites and types of upgrades installed vary per country,
and warranty costs may vary accordingly.
[21] ANSTO operates Australia's nuclear facilities and conducts nuclear
research for the Australian government.
[22] For more information on IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, see Nuclear
Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear
Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).
[23] DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE
assistance had comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that
of several non-FSU countries and, in some cases, higher labor rates;
and therefore, project implementation costs in the FSU countries were
proportionally higher.
[24] Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million
could be traced to specific country-related expenditures.
[25] DOE also has funds budgeted to be spent in Mexico, but to date, no
funds have been expended.
[26] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's
Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is
Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).
[27] In December 2006, DOE provided GAO with cost data updated as of
the end of fiscal year 2006 reflecting total program expenditures as
$113.8 million and total carryover as $17.7 million.
[28] For more information on these programs, see GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004), and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation:
DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-
Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia,
GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).
[29] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, § 3113 (2006) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 2569). Contributions from foreign countries to DOE's
nuclear nonproliferation programs are not without precedent. Section
3135 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 authorized the Secretary of Energy to accept
international contributions for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade
Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP). Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat.
2170 (2004). Since fiscal year 2005, the EWGPP has received $25.5
million from the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, and the Republic
of Korea to support the closure of Russian plutonium production
reactors by building or refurbishing replacement fossil fuel plants.
[30] GAO-03-638.
[31] For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological
sources in Iraq, see Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate
Its Source Recovery Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future
Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
[32] According to senior State officials, NDF is designed to permit
rapid response to unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority
requirements such as efforts to (1) halt the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related
technologies, and other weapons; (2) destroy or neutralize existing
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional
weapons; and (3) prevent the diversion of weapons-related scientific
and technical expertise of the former Soviet Union.
[33] In 2005, State also provided DOE $1.24 million from NDF to support
DOE's search and secure program. These funds paid for the deployment of
radiological detection and characterization equipment to several
countries to search, locate, and consolidate high-risk radiological
sources.
[34] See S. Rep. No. 108-105, at 117 (July 17, 2003), accompanying S.
1424, the Senate version of the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
[35] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-357, at 45 (Nov. 7, 2003).
[36] Although a committee report is not legally binding, it is viewed
as expressing the will and intent of the relevant congressional
committees.
[37] NRC officials told us that for projects in Ukraine, NRC typically
provides the regulatory expertise and contracts directly with the State
Scientific and Technical Center to manage the completion of project
tasks.
[38] GAO-03-638.
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