Securing U.S. Nuclear Material
DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material Gao ID: GAO-08-72 October 4, 2007The Department of Energy (DOE) recognizes that a terrorist attack on a DOE site containing material that can be used in a nuclear weapon could have devastating consequences. DOE currently stores special nuclear material at 10 sites in 8 states. To reduce security costs, DOE plans to consolidate the material at fewer sites and dispose of material that it no longer needs. In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Material Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (the committee) to plan for consolidation and disposition of DOE's special nuclear material. GAO was asked to (1) examine DOE's progress in consolidating and disposing of special nuclear material and (2) determine if DOE's plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material can be implemented on schedule and within cost. To do this, GAO reviewed the committee's plans and discussed consolidation and disposition with DOE officials.
Although the committee has spent nearly 2 years planning to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material, it has drafted only two of the eight implementation plans it intends to develop; and complexwide consolidation and disposition activities have not yet begun. The committee has drafted plans for consolidating and disposing of plutonium-239 and for disposing of uranium-233. Under the committee's plutonium-239 plan, surplus plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory will be consolidated at the Savannah River Site. Much of the plutonium-239 would then be prepared for permanent disposition through vitrification--a process that mixes nuclear material with molten glass, which is then poured into metal canisters where it hardens. The vitrified plutonium-239 would be stored on site inside large canisters filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste and, if DOE's plans are realized, later be permanently disposed of at a geologic repository to be built at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Under the committee's draft uranium-233 plan, most of DOE's uranium-233 will be disposed of by mixing it with other uranium isotopes to convert it into a more stable form that requires less security and that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as radioactive waste. DOE has begun activities to modify an existing facility that can perform this process at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, where most of DOE's uranium-233 is currently stored. Other sites that store uranium-233 would either ship it to Oak Ridge for processing or send it to DOE radioactive waste disposal facilities in New Mexico or Nevada. The remaining six plans are still in early stages of development. Factors that have contributed to DOE's limited progress in finalizing plans include leadership changes on the committee and uncertainty over who in the department has final approval authority for the committee's plans. Because of such factors, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of completing all eight implementation plans by December 2008. DOE cannot ensure that its plans are carried out on schedule and within cost because the plans drafted to date have only limited descriptions of organizational roles and responsibilities and lack performance measures to monitor the department's progress toward meeting its consolidation and disposition goals. DOE officials stated that the plans do not need to include such information because a forthcoming revision of a DOE order on nuclear material management will define organizational roles and responsibilities and the department already uses performance measures. However, the revision to the DOE order is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007, and the performance measures that DOE uses are not specifically intended to monitor activities required to implement consolidation and disposition plans.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-72, Securing U.S. Nuclear Material: DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
October 2007:
Securing U.S. Nuclear Material:
DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and Disposing of Special
Nuclear Material:
GAO-08-72:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-72, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy (DOE) recognizes that a terrorist attack on a
DOE site containing material that can be used in a nuclear weapon could
have devastating consequences. DOE currently stores special nuclear
material at 10 sites in 8 states. To reduce security costs, DOE plans
to consolidate the material at fewer sites and dispose of material that
it no longer needs. In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Material
Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (the committee) to
plan for consolidation and disposition of DOE‘s special nuclear
material. GAO was asked to (1) examine DOE‘s progress in consolidating
and disposing of special nuclear material and (2) determine if DOE‘s
plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material can be
implemented on schedule and within cost. To do this, GAO reviewed the
committee‘s plans and discussed consolidation and disposition with DOE
officials.
What GAO Found:
Although the committee has spent nearly 2 years planning to consolidate
and dispose of special nuclear material, it has drafted only two of the
eight implementation plans it intends to develop; and complexwide
consolidation and disposition activities have not yet begun. The
committee has drafted plans for consolidating and disposing of
plutonium-239 and for disposing of uranium-233:
* Plutonium-239: Under the committee‘s plutonium-239 plan, surplus
plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory will be
consolidated at the Savannah River Site. Much of the plutonium-239
would then be prepared for permanent disposition through
vitrification”a process that mixes nuclear material with molten glass,
which is then poured into metal canisters where it hardens. The
vitrified plutonium-239 would be stored on site inside large canisters
filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste and, if DOE‘s plans
are realized, later be permanently disposed of at a geologic repository
to be built at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
* Uranium-233: Under the committee‘s draft uranium-233 plan, most of
DOE‘s uranium-233 will be disposed of by mixing it with other uranium
isotopes to convert it into a more stable form that requires less
security and that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as
radioactive waste. DOE has begun activities to modify an existing
facility that can perform this process at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, where most of DOE‘s uranium-233 is currently stored. Other
sites that store uranium-233 would either ship it to Oak Ridge for
processing or send it to DOE radioactive waste disposal facilities in
New Mexico or Nevada.
The remaining six plans are still in early stages of development.
Factors that have contributed to DOE‘s limited progress in finalizing
plans include leadership changes on the committee and uncertainty over
who in the department has final approval authority for the committee‘s
plans. Because of such factors, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of
completing all eight implementation plans by December 2008. DOE cannot
ensure that its plans are carried out on schedule and within cost
because the plans drafted to date have only limited descriptions of
organizational roles and responsibilities and lack performance measures
to monitor the department‘s progress toward meeting its consolidation
and disposition goals. DOE officials stated that the plans do not need
to include such information because a forthcoming revision of a DOE
order on nuclear material management will define organizational roles
and responsibilities and the department already uses performance
measures. However, the revision to the DOE order is not scheduled to be
completed until late 2007, and the performance measures that DOE uses
are not specifically intended to monitor activities required to
implement consolidation and disposition plans.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) specify who in the department is
responsible for final approval of the committee‘s plans and (2) require
that the plans include descriptions of organizational roles and
responsibilities and performance measures. In commenting on a draft of
the report, DOE agreed with the recommendations but believed that the
report did not sufficiently recognize DOE‘s progress.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-72]. For more information, contact Gene
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE's Plans to Consolidate and Dispose of Special Nuclear Material Are
Not Yet Complete:
DOE's Plans Lack Information Necessary to Help Ensure Their
Implementation Is on Schedule and within Cost:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOE Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear
Material:
Figure 2: Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear
Material:
Abbreviations:
DBT: Design Basis Threat:
DOE: Department of Energy:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 4, 2007:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ed Whitfield:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful
terrorist attack on a site containing special nuclear material--
material that can be used in nuclear weapons such as plutonium-239,
uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium (uranium that is enriched to
over 20 percent concentration of uranium-235)--could have devastating
consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. The National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency
within DOE, and other DOE program offices, such as the Office of
Environmental Management and the Office of Nuclear Energy, are
responsible for the storage, transportation, and management of hundreds
of tons of special nuclear material. These organizations currently
store special nuclear material at 10 sites in 8 states, including the
Hanford Site in Washington, the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina, Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, Y-12 National Security Complex
in Tennessee, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, Sandia National Laboratory in
New Mexico, and the Nevada Test Site in Nevada.
All of the sites listed above have facilities that contain Category I
special nuclear material (see fig. 1). Category I material includes
specified quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched
uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test
devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of
plutonium, uranium-233, or highly enriched uranium, such as major
nuclear components and recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials,
such as carbides, oxides, and nitrates. The risks associated with
Category I special nuclear material vary but include (1) the nuclear
detonation of a weapon or test device at or near design yield; (2) the
creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear
yield; (3) theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon; and (4) the
potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal, or "dirty
bomb." Quantities of special nuclear material less than Category I
quantities are referred to as Category II, III, and IV quantities.
Although Category II, III, IV quantities are not, by themselves,
capable of producing a nuclear yield, they must still be secured to
prevent theft and use for radioactive dispersal or accumulation for use
in a nuclear weapon.
Figure 1: DOE Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear
Material:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the United States, depicting the following DOE
Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear Material:
* Savannah River Site, South Carolina;
* Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
* Y-12, Tennessee;
* Pantex, Texas;
* Los Alamos, New Mexico;
* Sandia, New Mexico;
* Nevada Test Site, Nevada;
* Idaho, Idaho;
* Hanford, Washington;
* Lawrence Livermore, California.
Source: DOE Draft Strategic Plan.
[End of figure]
Because special nuclear material, especially Category I special nuclear
material, poses such risks, the costs to secure it can be high. For
example, DOE predicts that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will
spend $464 million to secure and store Category I and II special
nuclear material from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2014. In
addition, DOE estimates that continued storage of Category I quantities
of plutonium-239 at the Hanford Site will cost over $800 million
through 2018. Many of these costs could be reduced or avoided, if
special nuclear material were consolidated at fewer sites. DOE could
also reduce storage costs by permanently disposing of about 50 metric
tons of plutonium-239 and about 375 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium that the department has determined it no longer needs for
nuclear weapons. Unless it disposes of this material, DOE must store it
indefinitely--with the department incurring costs for continued storage
and security.
In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Materials Disposition and
Consolidation Coordination Committee (the committee) to study and plan
for the consolidation of DOE's inventory of special nuclear material at
fewer sites (see fig. 2.), and the permanent disposition of material it
no longer needs.
Figure 2: Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear
Material:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the United States, depicting the following
Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear Material:
* Savannah River Site, South Carolina;
* Y-12, Tennessee;
* Pantex, Texas;
* Nevada Test Site, Nevada;
* Idaho, Idaho.
Source: DOE Draft Strategic Plan.
[End of figure]
The committee consists of members from NNSA and the other DOE program
offices that manage special nuclear material. Since its creation, the
committee has adopted a two-pronged approach to its consolidation
planning efforts. First, the committee has been developing a strategic
plan that will assist the department in, among other things,
identifying opportunities to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear
material. When completed, the strategic plan will serve as a high level
out-year planning document for the department's program offices to
follow in their budgeting and project planning. Second, the committee
is developing eight separate implementation plans, which are intended
to analyze viable alternatives and cost estimates for each of the eight
consolidation and disposition tasks DOE has identified. Specifically,
the committee is developing implementation plans to:
* Remove plutonium pits from Zone 4 at Pantex. DOE currently stores
plutonium "pits"--the central core of a nuclear weapon, consisting
largely of plutonium-239--in a secure area at the Pantex Plant known as
Zone 4 West. DOE plans to eventually transport pits that are no longer
required for nuclear weapons to the Savannah River Site, disassemble
them, convert the plutonium-239 into oxide, and blend it with uranium
oxide to produce mixed-oxide fuel for commercial nuclear power
plants.[Footnote 1]
* Consolidate and dispose of plutonium-239 in nonpit forms. In addition
to plutonium pits at Pantex, DOE also stores plutonium-239 that is no
longer needed for nuclear weapons in nonpit forms, such as contaminated
metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear
weapons production process. Because nonpit plutonium is in forms that
can be easily dispersed and plutonium can be dangerous to human health,
even in small quantities, it must be stabilized and packaged
appropriately to minimize the risk of accidental release. DOE stores
most of its nonpit plutonium-239 at Hanford, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Savannah
River Site.[Footnote 2]
* Consolidate plutonium-238. In addition to plutonium-239, DOE also
stores plutonium-238, a special nuclear material that is used to
produce heat sources for space probes. Most of DOE's plutonium-238 is
currently stored at Los Alamos and Idaho National Laboratories, with
smaller amounts stored at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Hanford, Pantex, and the Savannah River
Site. DOE plans to consolidate storage of plutonium-238 and evaluate
disposition options for some of its inventory that is not still being
used.
* Dispose of uranium-233. DOE has already consolidated the majority of
its uranium-233 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory; however, smaller
inventories are stored at other laboratories including Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory.
* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Sandia
National Laboratory. Sandia currently stores Category I quantities of
highly enriched uranium that are used in the Sandia Pulse Reactor--a
fast-burst reactor that is used to simulate nuclear weapons effects.
* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Los Alamos
National Laboratory. Los Alamos currently stores Category I quantities
of plutonium-239, plutonium-238, and smaller amounts of highly enriched
uranium that it uses for nuclear weapons certification and design
activities and to fabricate new plutonium pits.
* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Lawrence Livermore currently stores
Category I quantities of plutonium-239 and smaller amounts of highly
enriched uranium that it uses for nuclear weapons certification and
design activities.
* Consolidate or remove special nuclear material at the Y-12 National
Security Complex. Y-12 currently stores Category I quantities of highly
enriched uranium that it uses to fabricate nuclear weapons components.
DOE plans to consolidate highly enriched uranium into fewer locations
at the site and to remove some material that is no longer needed for
nuclear weapons from the site entirely, by blending it with other
uranium isotopes to produce fuel for commercial nuclear power plants.
In October 2005, DOE's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Environmental Management, who now chairs the committee, testified that
the committee was 1 to 2 years away from completing a strategic plan to
consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material. According to the
committee's draft strategic plan, it intends to complete its
implementation plans by December 31, 2008. In this context, you asked
us to (1) examine the progress DOE has made consolidating and disposing
of special nuclear material and (2) determine whether DOE can ensure
that these plans will be implemented on schedule and within cost.
To achieve these objectives, we reviewed DOE's draft strategic plan for
nuclear materials management and the two implementation plans for the
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear materials that the
committee has developed to date. We reviewed relevant DOE orders and
policies, and we examined environmental assessments and other DOE
documents prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy
Act. We also interviewed members of the committee and their staff,
including officials from NNSA and DOE's Office of Environmental
Management. Additional information on our objectives, scope, and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work between
August 2006 and October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Although DOE has spent nearly 2 years planning for the consolidation
and disposition of special nuclear material, its plans are incomplete;
and complexwide consolidation and disposition activities for special
nuclear material have not begun. DOE has completed only two of the
eight implementation plans for consolidating and disposing of special
nuclear material--one for plutonium-239 in nonpit forms and one for
uranium-233:
* The plutonium-239 implementation plan recommends relocating the
surplus nonpit plutonium-239 currently stored at Hanford, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory and
consolidating it at the Savannah River Site, pending disposition. Much
of the plutonium-239 would then be prepared for permanent disposition
through vitrification--a process that mixes nuclear material with
molten glass, which is then poured into metal canisters, where it
hardens. The vitrified plutonium-239 would be stored on site inside
large canisters filled with vitrified high level radioactive waste and,
if DOE's plans are realized, later be permanently disposed of at a
geologic repository to be built at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Although
this is essentially the same plutonium consolidation and disposition
strategy the department has proposed since 2005, and despite the fact
that the implementation plan states that consolidation could be
completed by October 2009 if shipments began in the spring of 2007,
shipments of plutonium to the Savannah River Site are not scheduled to
begin until October 2007.
* The draft uranium-233 implementation plan calls for disposing of the
majority of DOE's uranium-233 by mixing it with other uranium isotopes
to convert it into a more stable form that requires less security and
that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as radioactive
waste. DOE currently estimates that modification of an existing
facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to process the uranium-233
will be completed in 2011 at a cost of approximately $433.3 million,
which includes the cost of securing the material. The facility is
planned to operate through 2015. Other sites storing smaller quantities
of uranium-233, such as Los Alamos and Idaho National Laboratories,
among others, would dispose of uranium-233 either by shipping it to Oak
Ridge National Laboratory for processing or transporting it to DOE
radioactive waste disposal facilities in New Mexico or Nevada.
The remaining six implementation plans are still in early stages of
development and have not yet been reviewed by the committee. Several
factors have contributed to DOE's limited progress in finalizing plans,
including leadership changes on the committee, insufficient data
initially on the quantities of special nuclear material stored by each
DOE site, and uncertainty over who in the department has final approval
authority for implementation plans developed by the committee. Because
of such factors, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of completing all
eight implementation plans by December 2008.
DOE cannot ensure that its implementation plans are carried out on
schedule and within cost because the two plans completed to date have
only limited descriptions of organizational roles and responsibilities
and lack performance measures that could be used to monitor the
department's progress toward meeting its consolidation and disposition
goals. Neither DOE's plutonium-239 plan nor its uranium-233 plan
specifies which DOE organization will ultimately be responsible for
ensuring that consolidation and disposition occur. In addition, both
plans lack any milestones or other performance measures to track
whether plutonium-239 and uranium-233 shipments for consolidation and/
or disposition occur on schedule. According to DOE officials, the plans
do not need to include such information because, among other things, a
forthcoming revision of a DOE order on nuclear material management will
define the program offices' and sites' roles and responsibilities, and
the department already uses performance measures to monitor nuclear
material management activities. However, the revision to the DOE order
is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007 and, until the
revision is complete, program offices and sites will lack updated
guidance on their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and
disposition. In addition, the performance measures that DOE uses--such
as the number of containers of enriched uranium packaged for long-term
storage and the volume of waste disposed--are not specifically intended
to monitor the activities required to implement DOE's consolidation and
disposition plans.
We are recommending that DOE clarify who in the department is
responsible for approving implementation plans developed by the
committee. We are also recommending that DOE ensure that the
implementation plans have clear definitions of organizational roles and
responsibilities and performance measures so that the department and
outside entities such as the Congress can ensure accountability for
successfully implementing these plans and monitor the progress the
department is making consolidating and disposing of special nuclear
material.
In its comments on a draft version of the report, DOE agreed with our
recommendations, but the department stated that we did not give
sufficient credit for the progress it has made consolidating and
disposing of special nuclear material or for the improvements the
committee has made to communication and cooperation within the
department. DOE specifically noted that the completion of the plutonium-
239 implementation plan will allow the department to begin shipping
plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los
Alamos National Laboratory to the Savannah River Site in early October
2007. We recognized throughout our report the progress DOE has made and
the important contributions the committee has made to the department's
consolidation and disposition efforts by improving communication and
cooperation among the various DOE program offices and sites that
currently store special nuclear material. DOE also provided detailed
technical comments that we have incorporated into this report when
appropriate.
Background:
Since the beginning of the Manhattan Project in the 1940s, a primary
mission of DOE and its predecessor organizations has been to design,
build, and test the nation's nuclear weapons. To accomplish this
mission, DOE constructed a vast nuclear weapons complex throughout the
United States. Much of this complex was devoted to the production and
fabrication of nuclear weapons components. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, DOE temporarily suspended some operations throughout the weapons
complex because of safety and environmental concerns. Many of these
shutdowns became permanent with the end of the Cold War. Because these
shutdowns were initially considered to be temporary, the department did
not make long-term plans for the storage or the permanent disposition
of special nuclear material before suspending operations. As a result,
large quantities of special nuclear material were left without a clear
plan for their long-term storage or permanent disposition.
While in storage, DOE must secure special nuclear material from
potential terrorists interested in acquiring it for use in a nuclear
weapon, improvised nuclear device, or "dirty bomb." To manage potential
security risks, DOE has developed the Design Basis Threat (DBT), a
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
of terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites
to provide sufficient security personnel and equipment to defend
against the threats identified in the DBT. Since September 11, 2001,
the DBT has been revised several times. The increasing security threats
outlined in the DBT have greatly increased the cost of protecting
special nuclear material. Although specific measures vary from site to
site, all protective systems at the department's most sensitive sites
include the following:
* integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders;
* physical barriers, such as fences;
* hardened facilities and/or vaults; and:
* a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with items
such as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and
chemical protective gear.
To help meet the requirements of the current DBT and reduce overall
security costs, DOE plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear
material that it no longer needs. In 2004, we recommended that DOE
develop a departmentwide plan to meet the May 2003 DBT and that this
plan should include activities related to consolidation, such as the
transportation of special nuclear materials.[Footnote 3] Similarly, in
2005, we recommended that the department develop a detailed plan for
the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials as
part of a departmentwide plan to meet the requirements of the October
2004 DBT.[Footnote 4] We also recommended in 2005 that DOE develop a
comprehensive strategy for consolidating, storing, and disposing of
plutonium.[Footnote 5]
DOE's Plans to Consolidate and Dispose of Special Nuclear Material Are
Not Yet Complete:
DOE has spent nearly 2 years developing plans for the consolidation and
disposition of special nuclear material, but its plans are incomplete;
and complexwide consolidation and disposition activities have not
begun. Of the eight implementation plans the department has committed
to complete by 2008, DOE has developed only two draft implementation
plans: one for consolidating and disposing of plutonium-239, and one
for disposing of uranium-233. However, the remaining six implementation
plans are still in early stages of development and have not yet been
considered by the committee. Several factors have contributed to DOE's
limited progress in finalizing plans. These factors include several
committee leadership changes and the need for accurate data on the
department's nuclear material inventory.
DOE Has Developed Consolidation and Disposition Plans for Plutonium-239
and Uranium-233:
DOE has developed implementation plans for plutonium-239 in nonpit
forms and uranium-233. Both plans identify the location, form, and
quantity of material to be consolidated and/or disposed of and the
relevant factors that must be considered before the plans are
implemented.
Plutonium-239 Implementation Plan:
The plutonium-239 implementation plan recommends relocating the
surplus, nonpit plutonium-239 stored at Hanford, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory and
consolidating it with plutonium-239 already stored at the Savannah
River Site. Removing plutonium-239 from the Hanford site presents the
greatest near-term potential cost savings to DOE. By removing plutonium-
239 from the site, Hanford would eliminate its only remaining Category
I special nuclear material storage facility; and the department would
avoid spending several hundred million dollars for security upgrades
that would be required for this facility to meet DOE's security
requirements. The department estimates the cost of security upgrades
and continued storage of plutonium-239 at Hanford through 2018 at $831
million. Once the plutonium-239 is relocated to the Savannah River
Site, most of it would then be prepared for permanent disposition
through vitrification--a process that would stabilize the plutonium-239
by mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into small metal
canisters, where it hardens. The smaller canisters containing vitrified
plutonium-239 would than be placed into larger canisters, which would
then be filled with high-level radioactive waste. These large canisters
would be stored on-site and, if DOE's plans are realized, eventually
shipped to a geologic repository that DOE intends to construct at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. Construction of a new facility at the Savannah River
Site to vitrify the plutonium-239 is estimated to be completed in 2012
and to operate through 2019 at a cost of between $300 million and $500
million with estimated annual operating costs of $75 million. DOE is
also planning on disposing of smaller quantities of plutonium-239 by
processing the plutonium-239 with other high-level radioactive waste in
the Savannah River Site's H Canyon facility.
The plutonium-239 implementation plan is essentially the same plutonium
consolidation and disposition strategy the department has proposed
since 2005; however, shipments of plutonium-239 to the Savannah River
Site are not scheduled to begin until October 2007. There are several
reasons for DOE's failure to make progress consolidating plutonium-239.
First, as discussed in our July 2005 report,[Footnote 6] DOE is
prohibited from shipping plutonium to the Savannah River Site by
law[Footnote 7] until a disposition plan is developed and submitted to
the Congress. It was not until September 2007, while our draft report
was at DOE for review and comment, that DOE submitted the disposition
plan required by law. In addition, although the plutonium-239
implementation plan has been approved by the committee and by the
committee's Executive Steering Committee--which is comprised of the
chairman of the full committee and the Under Secretaries for Energy,
Science, and Nuclear Security--DOE officials told us that the plan
could not be implemented until the Secretary of Energy approved actions
contained in the plan that required secretarial approval.
Uranium-233 Implementation Plan:
Most of DOE's uranium-233 is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee, in a Category I special nuclear material storage facility
known as the Building 3019A complex. DOE is planning to equip these
buildings to dispose of uranium-233 by mixing it with other uranium
isotopes to convert it into a more stable form that requires less
security and that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as
radioactive waste--a process known as downblending. The downblended
uranium-233 will then be placed in storage at another location at Oak
Ridge, and the Building 3019A complex will be closed. Uranium-233,
which is a special nuclear material, must be secured to prevent theft,
among other things. However, after the material has been downblended,
it will not be Category I material, and DOE will no longer have to
provide it with a high level of security. According to DOE,
construction of a facility at Building 3019A to downblend uranium-233
will be completed in 2011. The department estimates that carrying out
its plan for the Building 3019A complex will cost about $433.3 million,
including security and construction expenses. DOE, which has already
begun construction activities at Building 3019A, plans to operate the
facility through 2015.
In addition to Oak Ridge National Laboratory, DOE stores smaller
quantities of uranium-233 at other sites, including the Los Alamos,
Idaho, Argonne, and Brookhaven National Laboratories, among others. The
draft uranium-233 implementation plan recommends shipping some of Los
Alamos National Laboratory's uranium-233 to Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. In addition, the plan notes that some sites--such as Idaho,
Argonne, and Brookhaven laboratories, among others--possess smaller
amounts of uranium-233 that can be disposed of without processing.
Although the plan's recommendations vary by site, in general, the plan
calls for these sites to send material to DOE waste disposal
facilities, such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and
the Nevada Test Site. According to DOE's estimates, shipping and
disposing of uranium-233 at these facilities will cost more than $10
million.
Although DOE's uranium-233 plan calls for processing most of the
material at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and directly disposing of the
remainder, the plan also notes that some material may be retained for
programmatic use. For instance, DOE's Brookhaven and New Brunswick
laboratories have requested to receive small quantities of uranium-233
currently stored at Building 3019A. In addition, NNSA plans to retain
small quantities of material, which will be used to maintain the
technologies and infrastructure that would be needed if the United
States were to resume nuclear testing. Furthermore, the uranium-233
plan states that NNSA has proposed retaining an additional
approximately 45 kilograms of uranium-233 currently stored at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory for future use. According to the plan, if this
material is retained, it will not be stored at Oak Ridge; instead, it
will be relocated to an unspecified NNSA facility. However, because 45
kilograms constitutes a Category I quantity of uranium-233, any site
that receives this material will be required to meet costly security
requirements.
Several Factors Have Contributed to the Limited Progress DOE Has Made
In Finalizing Consolidation and Disposition Plans:
Although DOE and NNSA officials have begun drafting the remaining six
implementation plans, the plans have not yet been reviewed by the
committee. The committee has not been able to meet its own established
timelines for completing these plans. For example, the committee
planned to complete implementation plans for removing special nuclear
material from Sandia National Laboratory by January 2007 and for
consolidating special nuclear material into fewer facilities and
removing material no longer needed for nuclear weapons from the Y-12
National Security Complex by March 2007. However, according to a DOE
official, the Sandia plan was scheduled to be complete by August 2007,
and work on the Y-12 plan did not begin until July 2007. In the
interim, Sandia National Laboratory has been working to consolidate
and/or remove its special nuclear material under a separate plan that
was developed by Sandia in 2004.
Several factors have limited the committee's progress in finalizing
consolidation and disposition plans. First, the committee experienced
several leadership changes between January 2005 and November 2005. For
example, the first chairman of the committee, appointed on January 31,
2005, only held the position until March 2005. The second chair held
the position for about 6 months, and the Deputy Secretary of Energy
appointed the third and current chair to the position in November 2005.
According to DOE officials, these frequent leadership changes hindered
the committee's initial planning efforts. In addition, DOE and NNSA
program offices that manage special nuclear material had little
involvement with early committee efforts. For example, the second
chairperson began developing special nuclear material consolidation and
disposition plans independent of program offices with nuclear materials
management, disposition, and security responsibilities.
Furthermore, prior to the committee's development of consolidation and
disposition plans, the committee needed to first determine the exact
amounts of special nuclear material stored at each site. DOE maintains
a nuclear material inventory assessment database that is designed to
identify fiscal year-end nuclear material inventories. However,
according to DOE officials, the data in this database are typically
between 6 and 18 months old, limiting their usefulness. In April 2006,
the committee began requesting nuclear material inventory data directly
from program managers at each site in an effort to identify all nuclear
material intended for consolidation and/or permanent disposition. This
request resulted in the identification of some special nuclear
material, specifically, uranium-233 at one DOE site for which a method
for permanent disposition had not yet been determined. This discovery
delayed the development of the uranium-233 implementation plan while
disposition alternatives were developed.
Another factor that has contributed to the department's limited
progress is uncertainty about who is responsible for approving the
committee's implementation plans. According to the committee's charter,
the committee's Executive Steering Committee is authorized to approve
the committee's strategic plan and to direct departmental resources
required to implement the approved strategic plan. Although the charter
is silent on who approves individual implementation plans, the
committee has been preparing implementation plans under the assumption
that they would be approved by the Executive Steering Committee and
subsequently carried out under its authority. As previously noted, the
plutonium-239 implementation plan has been approved by the Executive
Steering Committee; however, the uranium-233 implementation plan, to
date, has not. Notwithstanding the Executive Steering Committee's
approval of the plutonium-239 implementation plan in early 2007, this
plan has only recently begun to be carried out. This is because DOE's
Office of General Counsel has taken the position that, despite the
authority provided in the committee's charter for the Executive
Steering Committee to approve and implement the committee's strategic
plan, the department must comply with all statutory and regulatory
requirements associated with actions contained in the committee's
implementation plans prior to the plans being carried out. DOE's Office
of General Counsel considers the implementation plans to be only
recommendations until the Secretary approves such actions. The
plutonium-239 implementation plan listed among actions "proposed to be
taken" the Secretary's submittal of a disposition plan to the Congress.
The Secretary did not submit the disposition plan until September 2007.
DOE's Plans Lack Information Necessary to Help Ensure Their
Implementation Is on Schedule and within Cost:
DOE cannot ensure that its implementation plans for consolidating and
disposing of special nuclear material will be carried out on schedule
and within cost because the two plans completed to date include only
limited information on organizational roles and responsibilities--such
as who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that consolidation and
disposition occur--and they lack performance measures, such as
milestones and outcome-related measures. DOE officials told us it is
addressing organizational roles and responsibilities and performance
measures through, among other things, a forthcoming revision to a DOE
order on nuclear materials management and existing performance measures
used to monitor nuclear material management. However, the revision to
the DOE order is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007; and
until it is complete, program offices and sites will lack updated
guidance on their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and
disposition. Furthermore, DOE's existing performance measures are not
specifically intended to monitor the department's progress in
implementing its consolidation and disposition plans. For instance, the
Savannah River Site uses various performance measures, such as the
number of containers of enriched uranium packaged for disposition.
According to a DOE official, however, these measures--known
collectively as the "gold chart"--are not detailed enough to be used to
monitor the execution of individual implementation plans.
DOE's Plans Have Limited Information on Organizational Roles and
Responsibilities:
DOE's two completed plans for consolidation and disposition include
limited information on organizational roles and responsibilities. GAO's
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, notes the
importance of clearly defining organizational roles and
responsibilities to establish accountability to help achieve desired
results. Federal law states that agencies must establish internal
administrative controls in accordance with the standards prescribed by
the Comptroller General.[Footnote 8] The Comptroller General published
such standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, which sets out internal control standards for all aspects
of an agency's operation. Internal control comprises the plans,
methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives,
and supports performance-based management.
In particular, GAO's internal control standards note that the manner in
which an agency delegates authority and responsibility throughout the
organization affects accountability within the agency. Our previous
work has found that national strategies--plans that may be national in
scope, cut across levels of government, and involve a large number of
organizations and entities both within and outside of government--
should include information on organizational roles and responsibilities
to foster accountability and coordination.[Footnote 9] DOE's plans
share the characteristics of a national strategy because the plans
involve different levels of government and multiple organizations, such
as program offices and sites.
DOE's two completed implementation plans differ in how much detail they
provide on organizational roles and responsibilities. As we have
previously noted, defining organizational roles and responsibilities
helps to answer the fundamental question about who is in
charge.[Footnote 10] For example, the plutonium-239 plan states that
the committee's Executive Steering Committee must approve the plan, but
does not include any information on which program offices, sites, or
other DOE organizations are responsible for carrying out the other
actions that the plan identifies as necessary next steps, such as
finalizing a schedule for plutonium-239 shipments from Hanford, Los
Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore. In contrast, the uranium-233
implementation plan includes program-and site-specific
responsibilities. For instance, in its discussion of the recommended
alternative for each site that has special nuclear material, the plan
states that Los Alamos, should work with the Building 3019A project and
DOE's Carlsbad field office, which manages the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant radioactive waste disposal facility, to determine the details of
packaging, transporting, and receiving uranium-233. In addition, the
plan states that DOE's Office of Science, which has expressed interest
in obtaining uranium-233 from Building 3019A for use by its Brookhaven
and New Brunswick laboratories, should obtain the necessary funding,
collaborate with NNSA's Office of Stockpile Technology, and retrieve
the requested material.
However, both plans have only limited information about which entities
are responsible for funding and coordinating consolidation and
disposition activities, and neither plan states which program office,
site, or other DOE organization is ultimately accountable for ensuring
that consolidation and disposition occur. The plutonium-239 plan
provides estimates for the overall cost of consolidation, but it does
not specifically identify which program offices and sites are
responsible for paying these costs. For example, the plan estimates
that consolidation at the Savannah River Site will incur about $116
million in secure transportation costs, but it does not state which
office or site is responsible for paying these expenses. The uranium-
233 plan also includes cost estimates by site for consolidation and
disposition activities but notes that its estimates are not complete.
For instance, the plan acknowledges that the estimate for removing
material from Los Alamos National Laboratory does not include the cost
of disposing the material. However, the uranium-233 plan includes some
information on which program office or site will pay for consolidation
and disposition activities. For instance, it notes that the Office of
the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Secure Transportation is
responsible for the cost of transporting uranium-233 from Los Alamos
National Laboratory to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for processing.
However, the plan does not assign responsibility for all of the costs
associated with activities at a site. For example, in its discussion of
alternatives for disposing of uranium-233 currently at Idaho National
Laboratory, the plan estimates that it will cost $4.1 million to
shuttle material from Idaho National Laboratory to the Nevada Test
Site; but it does not state who will pay for these shipments. Finally,
neither plan designates responsibility to a program office or site for
providing overall coordination of the multiple entities involved in
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear material.
We have reported in the past about DOE's problems achieving the
coordination necessary to accomplish its consolidation goals. For
example, we found that DOE's reliance on individual sites to create
consolidation plans resulted in inconsistent plans. Specifically, the
Hanford site planned to ship plutonium to the Savannah River Site in a
form that the Savannah River Site did not have plans for storing; and,
as a result, the Savannah River Site was unable to receive some of
Hanford's plutonium.[Footnote 11] In our April 2004 and two July 2005
reports, we recommended that DOE develop and implement a departmentwide
plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among program
offices and sites to consolidate special nuclear material.[Footnote 12]
DOE's Plans Lack Performance Measures to Monitor Progress Consolidating
and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material:
GAO's internal control standards also call for the establishment and
review of performance measures to help ensure that agency management's
orders are carried out. Our prior work has found that effective
national strategies incorporate outcome-related performance measures to
address steps needed to achieve desired results. Furthermore, we have
previously reported that measuring performance allows organizations to
track their progress toward their goals and gives managers crucial
information on which to base their organizational and management
decisions.[Footnote 13] We have also noted that milestones are an
important means for an agency to evaluate its progress and for the
Congress to hold an agency accountable.[Footnote 14]
Both of DOE's completed implementation plans lack performance measures,
such as outcome-related measures and milestones. First, neither plan
includes outcome-related measures that indicate how the program offices
and sites will track how much material has been consolidated or
disposed. For example, the plans do not include targets for the amount
of material being packaged or shipped for consolidation. Second,
neither plan includes milestones to help ensure that implementation
occurs on schedule. For example, the plutonium-239 plan states that
consolidation of this material can be completed by fiscal year-end
2009, if shipments begin in spring 2007; but it lacks any interim
milestones to track whether shipments occur on schedule. As noted
earlier, these shipments have not begun, to date. Similarly, the
uranium-233 plan states that the current schedule for the shutdown of
Building 3019A calls for all shipments to be completed by June 2012.
However, the plan does not include milestones to help determine whether
the site is on-schedule to meet this deadline. The plan includes only
one milestone, a cleanup milestone for Idaho National Laboratory that
was already in place when the plan was created.
DOE Officials Contend that Other Guidance and Current Practices Address
Organizational Roles and Responsibilities and Performance Measures:
DOE officials stated that they believe departmental guidance and
current practices address organizational roles and responsibilities and
performance measures. Specifically:
Organizational roles and responsibilities. Officials stated that
forthcoming guidance and current practices address organizational roles
and responsibilities for consolidation and disposition activities.
These include the following:
* Forthcoming revision to DOE Order 5660.1B (Management of Nuclear
Materials). Officials noted that the department's order on nuclear
materials management is currently being revised to include
organizational responsibilities for consolidation and disposition
activities. The order has not been updated since it was written in
1994, and it does not mention new DOE organizations, such as NNSA,
which was established in 2000. DOE officials told us that the revised
order will outline specific responsibilities for NNSA's Office of
Defense Programs, DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's
Office of Nuclear Energy, and DOE field organizations that oversee
contractors' management of nuclear materials. However, the revised
order is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007. Until it is
complete, the program offices and sites will lack updated guidance on
their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and disposition.
* Additional guidance for specific sites and/or program offices. DOE
officials asserted that the department's implementation plans to
consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material do not include
detailed information on how they will be implemented because they are
intended to be high-level plans. Officials noted that other guidance
will provide more detailed information. According to a DOE official,
the action memorandum that will accompany each plan will clarify
responsibilities if there is uncertainty among the program offices or
sites on this issue. A department official also told us that the
revised order, when completed, will require the development of site-
specific disposition plans, in addition to maintaining the current
order's requirement for nuclear material management plans by site.
Although we acknowledge that the committee does not intend for the
plans to provide detailed guidance, our prior work on national
strategies indicates that the more information a plan includes, the
easier it will be for the responsible parties to implement the plan and
achieve its goals.[Footnote 15]
* Current practices. DOE officials stated that it is not necessary for
the implementation plans to include organizational roles and
responsibilities because the relevant program offices already
understand their roles and responsibilities. According to a DOE
official, the committee includes representatives from all of the
program offices that manage special nuclear material; and, as such, the
program offices are aware of their duties for carrying out the plans.
However, the committee is scheduled to dissolve after it has completed
the last implementation plan for consolidation and disposition.
Therefore, if clarification about organizational roles and
responsibilities is necessary in the future, it may be difficult for
the program offices to resolve such issues after the committee has
disbanded.
Performance measures. DOE officials also noted that the department
currently uses performance measures to monitor its nuclear material
management activities. A DOE official noted that each DOE program
office uses its own performance measures. For instance, the
department's Office of Environmental Management's current performance
measures include the following:
* Quarterly project reviews. An official noted that DOE sites submit
quarterly project reviews that include performance measures for
activities related to managing special nuclear material, such as
monitoring containers used to store this material. The quarterly
project review for the Savannah River Site, for example, includes
numeric measures, such as the number of containers of enriched uranium
packaged for disposition. However, a DOE official acknowledged that
these measures, known collectively as the "gold chart," are not
detailed enough to be used to monitor the execution of individual
implementation plans. In addition, because the performance measures are
not specifically intended to address activities needed to implement
DOE's plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material, it
is unclear whether they will be helpful in monitoring the department's
progress in carrying out these plans.
* Milestone Report. DOE's 2006 Milestone Report[Footnote 16] includes
performance measures such as the number of certified containers of
plutonium metal or oxide packaged for long-term storage and the volume
of low-level waste disposed. However, like the performance measures in
the quarterly project reviews, these measures are not intended to
monitor the progress of consolidation and disposition activities. The
Milestone Report states that its performance measures are intended to
track the Office of Environmental Management's progress toward site
cleanup targets.
Conclusions:
The successful consolidation and disposition of special nuclear
material has the potential to significantly reduce the risks posed by
storing this material as well as the security costs that can reach
hundreds of millions of dollars at each DOE site that stores it. Until
DOE completes its plans and clarifies who has final approval authority,
the department will have difficulty ensuring that consolidation and
disposition activities begin in a timely manner. Further, without
incorporating descriptions of organizational roles and responsibilities
and performance measures in the plans, the department cannot ensure
that its plans can be implemented on schedule and within cost.
Moreover, until the plans include defined organizational roles and
responsibilities, the Congress may have difficulty in holding DOE
accountable for its responsibilities in consolidating and disposing of
special nuclear material. Similarly, the Congress may face challenges
in evaluating the progress of consolidation and disposition activities
because DOE's plans lack performance measures to provide such
information. Given the large cost savings that DOE could realize by
consolidating and disposing of special nuclear material that is no
longer needed for national security purposes, we believe that it is
vital that DOE develop plans for consolidation and disposition that
provide the department and the Congress with the necessary tools to
ensure their successful implementation.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that DOE begins implementing its plans to consolidate
and dispose of special nuclear material in a timely manner, we
recommend that the Secretary of Energy specify who in the department--
the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
Committee, the committee's Executive Steering Committee, or the
Secretary himself--is responsible for final approval of plans.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy require that
DOE's implementation plans for consolidating and disposing of special
nuclear material include the following:
* A description of the organizational roles and responsibilities for
consolidating and disposing of DOE's special nuclear material such as
information about which program offices or sites are responsible (1)
for ensuring that consolidation and disposition occurs, (2) for paying
for consolidation and disposition activities, and (3) for coordinating
the activities of the numerous DOE organizations involved in
consolidation and disposition; and:
* Performance measures that will allow DOE and the Congress to monitor
the department's progress in consolidating and disposing of special
nuclear material, including milestones for shipping special nuclear
material for consolidation and outcome-based measures, such as
quantities of special nuclear material that have been consolidated and
disposed.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE with a draft version of this report for its review and
comment. DOE agreed, in principle, with our recommendations to identify
consolidation and disposition plan approval authority, clarify
organizational roles and responsibilities, and establish performance
measures.
However, DOE believed that our report lacked balance and objectivity
because the report did not give the department sufficient credit for
the progress it has made consolidating and disposing of special nuclear
material or for the improvements the Nuclear Materials Disposition and
Consolidation Coordination Committee has made to communication and
cooperation within the department. For example, DOE stated that the
committee has made a substantial contribution by completing an
implementation plan that recommended consolidation of weapons-usable
plutonium at the Savannah River Site. As a result, DOE anticipates
shipments of plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Savannah River
Site will begin in early October 2007.
We recognize throughout our report the progress DOE has made and the
important contributions the committee has made to the department's
consolidation and disposition efforts by improving communication and
cooperation among the various DOE program offices and sites that
currently store special nuclear material. For example, our draft report
discussed the committee's plutonium-239 implementation plan in detail.
It is important to note, however, that the plutonium-239 implementation
plan is only one of eight implementation plans the committee is
developing and, to date, only one other--for disposition of uranium-
233--has been completed. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, the
plutonium-239 implementation plan is essentially the same plutonium
consolidation and disposition strategy the department has proposed
since 2005. It was not until September 2007, while our draft report was
at DOE for its review and comment, that the department submitted to the
Congress the disposition plan required by law that will allow DOE to
begin shipping plutonium to the Savannah River Site.
DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we have incorporated
into this report when appropriate. DOE's comments on our draft report
are included in appendix II.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this report. We will then send copies to the
Secretary of Energy, the Administrator, NNSA; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or
aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
At the request of the Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives, and the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House
of Representatives, we examined (1) the progress the Department of
Energy (DOE) has made in consolidating and disposing of special nuclear
material and (2) whether DOE can ensure that these plans will be
implemented on schedule and within cost.
To obtain information on DOE's progress in consolidating and disposing
of special nuclear material, we reviewed the activities of DOE's
Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee
(the committee). Specifically, we reviewed the committee's charter,
minutes from the committee's meetings, and congressional testimonies
prepared by the chairman of the committee to obtain information about
the committee's progress in developing plans to consolidate and/or
dispose of special nuclear material. We also reviewed a draft strategic
plan and two draft implementation plans for the consolidation and
disposition of special nuclear material that were prepared by the
committee. Specifically, we reviewed the draft Department of Energy
Strategic Plan for Nuclear Materials Management, the November 2006
draft Implementation Plan for Consolidation and Disposition of Surplus
Weapons-Usable Plutonium, and the June 2007 draft Implementation Plan
for Disposition of Surplus Uranium-233. We also reviewed relevant DOE
orders and policies, such as the DOE Order 5660.1B, Management of
Nuclear Materials. In addition, we examined environmental assessments
and other DOE documents prepared in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act such as DOE/EA-1574, Environmental Assessment
for U-233 Stabilization, and Building 3019 Complex Shutdown at the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, as well as its
accompanying Finding of No Significant Impact published in the Federal
Register. To obtain additional information on the status and content of
DOE's plans, we interviewed members of the committee) including
officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration and DOE's
Office of Environmental Management and staff of committee members.
To determine whether DOE will be able to ensure that its plans will be
implemented on schedule and within cost, we reviewed the two draft
implementation plans and the draft strategic plan prepared by the
committee. We assessed the two implementation plans using our Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the characteristics
of an effective national strategy developed in our prior work, which
reviewed several sources of information, including legislative and
executive branch guidance on national strategies, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature on strategic
planning and performance, and our past reports and
testimonies.[Footnote 17] In addition, we also interviewed members of
the committee to learn about DOE's efforts to ensure the effective
implementation of its nuclear material consolidation and disposition
plans.
We conducted our work from August 2006 to October 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
September 11, 2007:
Mr. James Noel:
Assistant Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW, Room 2J28:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Noel:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report, "Securing
Nuclear Material, DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and
Disposing of Special Nuclear Material" (GAO-07-1182). We agree, in
principle, with the draft report's recommendations to identify
consolidation and disposition plan approval authority(ies), clarify
organizational roles and responsibilities, and establish performance
measures.
However, the draft report contains a number of factual inaccuracies and
errors of omission resulting in a report lacking balance and
objectivity. As indicated in our detailed comments (enclosed), the
Department has made substantial progress over the past several years in
both the areas of special nuclear material (SNM) consolidation and
disposition. While much of this progress pre-dates the establishment of
the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
Committee (NMDCCC), the committee has improved the communication and
cooperation within the Department. The committee has helped the
Department to achieve its goals to enhance the security of excess and
surplus SNM and its ultimate disposition. For example, the NMDCCC has
already made a very substantial contribution to the Department's
nuclear material consolidation and disposition progress by completing
an implementation plan that recommended consolidation of weapons-usable
plutonium at the Savannah River Site (SRS), and by playing a key role
in completing all five actions identified in that plan for implementing
that recommendation. Those five actions were all subsequently completed
essentially on schedule, thus addressing the Department's most urgent
nuclear material consolidation issue: the removal of plutonium from the
Hanford Site. As a result of completing those actions, the Department
anticipates shipments of plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory to SRS will
begin in early October 2007, to further consolidate plutonium storage
pending disposition.
If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 586-7709 or Mr. Karl
Goodwin, Acting Director of Safeguards and Security/Emergency
Management, at (301) 903-5498.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Charles E. Anderson:
Chairperson:
Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee:
Enclosure
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant
Director; A. Don Cowan; James Noël; Omari Norman; Alison O'Neill; and
Susan W. Tieh made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For more information on the storage of plutonium pits at Pantex,
see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Storage of Plutonium Pits at the Pantex
Plant, GAO-07-539RSU (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2007).
[2] For more information on plutonium storage at the Savannah River
Site, see GAO, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take
Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium, GAO-05-665 (Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2005) and GAO, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning
Has Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts, GAO-06-164T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).
[3] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004); GAO, Nuclear Security: Several
Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science, and
Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-894T
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004).
[4] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2005).
[5] GAO-05-665 and GAO-06-164T.
[6] GAO-05-665.
[7] 50 U.S.C. § 2567 (Supp. IV 2004).
[8] 31 U.S.C. §§ 3512(b), (c) (2000).
[9] For more information on the characteristics of an effective
national strategy, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-
408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-
06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
[10] GAO-04-408T.
[11] GAO-05-665.
[12] GAO-04-623, GAO-05-611, and GAO-05-665.
[13] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[14] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear
Weapons Complex, GAO-06-606T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2006).
[15] GAO-04-408T.
[16] The conference report for the Fiscal Year 2006 Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act requests the department to submit
semiannual reports that include information on whether the department
is meeting its cleanup milestones, as well as annual budget estimates
and life-cycle costs for cleanup, for the years 2006, 2012, and 2035.
Reports are due on March 1 and September 1 of each year. H.R. Rep. No.
109-275, at 149 (2005).
[17] GAO-04-408T and GAO-06-788.
[End of section]
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