Combating Nuclear Terrorism
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened Gao ID: GAO-08-285T November 15, 2007The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These capabilities took on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the country to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological attack. This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities and (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance. It is based on GAO's report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could be Strengthened [Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. One of these unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and DHS disagree about which department is responsible for informing cities about the surveys, and funding and conducting surveys if cities request them. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have not informed cities about the surveys and have not conducted any additional surveys. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes than can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
GAO-08-285T, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-285T
entitled 'Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response
Facilities Could be Strengthened' which was released on November 16,
2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, November 15, 2007:
Combating Nuclear Terrorism:
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-08-285T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-285T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response
capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and
radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities are
primarily found at DOE‘s two key emergency response facilities”the
Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These capabilities took on increased
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of
heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or
radiological device in a major U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal
agency responsible for addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the
country to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological
attack.
This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE‘s aerial
background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities
and (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE‘s two key
emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE
guidance. It is based on GAO‘s report on DOE‘s nuclear and radiological
emergency response capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating
Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and
Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities
Could be Strengthened [Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).
What GAO Found:
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. One of these
unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background
radiation surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in
radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities
more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological
attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite
the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor
DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and
DHS disagree about which department is responsible for informing cities
about the surveys, and funding and conducting surveys if cities request
them. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have
not informed cities about the surveys and have not conducted any
additional surveys.
DOE‘s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and
radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are
not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of
critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE‘s ability to
quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only
helicopters and planes than can readily help locate nuclear or
radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not
been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be
sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
Figure: DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation
Survey:
This figure is a picture of a DOE helicopter flying over the US
Capitol.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-285T]. For more information, contact Gene
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's
(DOE) use of aerial background radiation surveys, and physical security
measures at DOE's two key emergency response facilities. DOE has long
maintained an emergency response capability to quickly respond to
potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This
capability took on increased significance after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may
try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States
and detonate a nuclear or a radiological dispersal device, otherwise
known as a dirty bomb, in a major U.S. city. Detonating either type of
device would have serious consequences for our national and economic
interests, including potentially causing numerous deaths and
undermining citizens' confidence in the government's ability to protect
the homeland.
To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise
to search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in
U.S. cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a
radiological incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of
contamination. One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to
conduct aerial background radiation surveys. Helicopters or planes
equipped with radiation detectors fly over an area and collect
information on existing background radiation sources, such as granite
statues in a city or medical isotopes located at hospitals. This
exercise can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels against which
future radiation levels can be compared in order to more easily detect
new radiation sources that may pose a security or public health threat.
After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response
capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical
capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two key
facilities, known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air
Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two
facilities house, among other things, specialized search teams that
locate and identify nuclear and radiological devices; planes and
helicopters used to measure contamination; and research and development
laboratories that design specialized equipment. DOE requires that these
facilities be adequately protected with security measures to defend
against potential terrorist attacks.[Footnote 1]
DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear
and radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to
detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials
at U.S. points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is
also responsible for helping state and local governments improve their
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological
materials. DHS also provides grants to state and local governments to
help them better prepare and respond to a potential terrorist attack.
DHS has provided $11.6 billion in grants to state and local governments
in the last 6 fiscal years--from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. If DHS
cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials into
the United States, it relies on DOE's emergency response capabilities
to search for and locate the materials.
For this testimony, you asked us to discuss (1) the benefits of using
DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are
consistent with DOE guidance and (2) the physical security measures in
place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they
are consistent with DOE guidance. My remarks will focus on our
September 2006 report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency
response efforts.[Footnote 2] To update this information, we also
collected documentation and interviewed officials from DOE's Office of
Emergency Response, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DOE's
Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base, and the Counter
Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department. We conducted
our work in November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary:
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey
of a major U.S. city because neither DOE nor DHS has mission
responsibility for conducting the surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, if a city had a completed survey, DOE could then conduct a new
survey and compare baseline radiation data from the previous survey to
identify locations with new sources of radiation. Focusing their
attention on these new locations, law enforcement officials may be able
to locate a nuclear or radiological device more quickly. In addition,
using baseline information from a prior survey, DOE could assess
contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist cleanup
efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from the surveys
could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts
could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other areas up to
pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing all traces
of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys, law
enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating pre-existing
sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time and cost
of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE officials
explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it is
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed
may also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices.
Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of
the survey--about $800,000--was funded through DHS grants. NYPD
officials indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because
it identified more than 80 locations with radiological sources that
required further investigation to determine their risk. In addition to
identifying potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us a
secondary benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public
health. While investigating the 80 locations, they found an old
industrial site contaminated with radium--a radiological material
linked to diseases such as bone cancer--and used this information to
close the area and protect the public. Despite these benefits, neither
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and
conducting surveys or notifying city officials that such a capability
exists. DOE officials told us they are reluctant to conduct additional
surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters, and these
are needed for emergency response functions, and because it is DHS's
mission to protect cities from potential terrorist attacks. DHS
officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the expertise or
capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a program to help
state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and radiological
materials, and in fiscal year 2007, made available approximately $1.7
billion in grant funding to state and local governments for terrorism
preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and
DHS have not conducted additional surveys, in part, because DOE and DHS
are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys.
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories, which house a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets, are protected at the lowest
level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according
to DOE, emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under
DOE policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in
November 2005, DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of
physical security if their capabilities and assets exist at other
locations and can be easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we
found that there are a number of critical capabilities and assets that
are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and their loss
would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent or respond
to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities and assets
include the most highly trained teams to help manage and minimize the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or
radiological devices and measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets have not been
fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be
sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors
but no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence,
vehicle barriers, or any other protective measures around the building,
but DOE has determined that it meets physical security requirements.
Furthermore, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with
federal government identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff
gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of
their identification. Security officials told us that the laboratories
are not designed to withstand certain types of terrorist attacks.
However, officials have not taken any steps to strengthen security
because of DOE's assumption that their capabilities and assets are
fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has not developed contingency plans
that would identify capabilities and assets that would be used in the
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked.
Background:
DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies
in 1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device
in Boston unless he received $200,000.[Footnote 3] Even though the
threat turned out to be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the
capability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. To
address this deficiency, AEC established the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team (NEST) to provide technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State, which is the lead
federal agency for terrorism response outside the United States. Under
the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for investigating illegal
activities involving the use of nuclear materials within the United
States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program was designed to
assist the FBI in searching for, identifying, and deactivating nuclear
and radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams were
large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to
threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device.
With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11,
2001, DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to
nuclear and radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent
terrorists from detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the
core mission, DOE's emergency response activities have expanded to
include actions to minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological incident. For example, DOE maintains an aerial capability
to detect, measure, and track radioactive material to determine
contamination levels at the site of an emergency. DOE has used this
capability to conduct background radiation surveys of most nuclear
power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident at a
nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to help
determine the location and amount of contamination.
Currently, about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from the
national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories are dedicated
to preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In
fiscal year 2006, DOE had a budget of about $100 million for emergency
response activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's efforts to
prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern
that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials
into the United States. These materials could be used to produce either
an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known
as a dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb
made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation
experts estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have
yields in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to
20,000 tons of TNT). A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the
yield of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart
of a medium-size U.S. city and result in thousands of casualties and
radiation contamination over a wider area.
A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
radioactive material,[Footnote 4] using explosive force to disperse the
radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks.
The extent of contamination would depend on a number of factors,
including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive
material used, and weather conditions. While much less destructive than
an improvised nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could
cause radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic
costs and psychological and social disruption associated with the
evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no
terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists
placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-
1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no radioactive
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have
the capability and willingness to use radiological materials as weapons
of terrorism.
Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them:
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can
later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect
radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce
the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major U.S.
city has been surveyed. Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission
responsibility for funding and conducting surveys, they have not
conducted additional surveys nor informed cities about their benefits.
Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect
Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the
Event of a Radiological Attack:
DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the
location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing
radiation levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from
a variety of sources, such as rock quarries, granite found in
buildings, statues, or cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals;
and areas treated with high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf
courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted with external radiation detectors
and equipped with a global position system to fly over an area and
gather data in a systematic grid pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a
helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting information on
radiation sources in a city.
Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
Radiation Survey:
This figure is an illustration of a helicopter conducting an aerial
background radiation survey.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians
and scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses
helicopters rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and
lower speed permit a more precise reading. While conducting the
baseline survey, DOE ground teams and law enforcement officials can
investigate these hot spots to determine whether the source of
radiation is used for industrial, medical or other routine purposes.
DOE officials told us that this baseline information would be
beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials could
immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or
radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an
emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts.
For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in
Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law
enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.
Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with
new sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a
nuclear or radiological device would focus their attention on these new
locations and might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources
and potential threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device
more quickly. Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training
opportunity for DOE personnel. DOE officials told us that regular
deployments helped to keep job performance standards high for pilots,
field detection specialists, and the technicians who analyze the data.
DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004,
DOD funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern
Virginia in order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or
radiological attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup
costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that
cleaning up after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological
device may cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE
officials estimated that information from background radiation surveys
could save several million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup
efforts could be focused on decontaminating buildings and other areas
to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a baseline radiation
survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to which they would
have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely clean areas with
levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings or
hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.
DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have
limitations and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or
radiological devices. Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain
nuclear or well-shielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and
the type of building being surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness
of detection systems. Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good
intelligence to find a device. Law enforcement officials would need
intelligence information to narrow the search to a specific part of a
city. Lastly, according to DOE officials, baseline background radiation
surveys may need to be conducted periodically because radiation sources
may change over time, especially in urban areas. For example, new
construction using granite, the installation of medical equipment, or
the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a city's radiation
background. Despite these limitations, without baseline survey
information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre-
existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time
consuming.
DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City:
In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to survey
the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that DOE had
the capability to measure background radiation and locate hot spots by
helicopter because DOE had used this capability at the World Trade
Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided the
city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a regional
radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend
part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs.
DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005,
requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about
$800,000.
According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey,
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological
sources. Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and
technicians investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether
they posed a danger to the public. While most of these hot spots were
medical isotopes located at medical facilities and hospitals, according
to NYPD officials, awareness of these locations will allow them to
distinguish false alarms from real radiological threats and locate a
radiological device more quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained
in investigating hot spots and they have real-life experience in
locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now have a
baseline radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts
in the event of a radiological release.
In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of
the over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park
that was once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD
officials, the survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by
large quantities of radium.[Footnote 5] Brush fires in the area posed
an imminent threat to public health because traditional fire mitigation
tactics of pushing flammable debris into the middle of the park could
release radiological contamination into the air. Investigating
locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by the
aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this
threat, and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material.
Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hopes to
get a better understanding of how and to what extent background
radiation changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue
identifying radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant
training to their officers.
Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility
for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both
Agencies from Developing a Strategy to Inform Cities about the Surveys:
Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and
conducting surveys. While DOE and DHS have taken some steps toward
making greater use of aerial surveys, they still have not developed a
strategy to notify city officials that such a capability exists,
explained the benefits and limitations of aerial surveys, and
determined how to pay for the surveys. According to DOE and DHS
officials, New York City is the only city where a background radiation
survey has been completed.
As we reported in September 2006, we found that neither DOE nor DHS was
notifying city officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or
of the availability of such a capability. In addition, neither
department had evaluated the costs, benefits, or limitations of the
aerial surveys to help cities decide whether to request a survey. As a
result, we recommended that DOE and DHS conduct such an evaluation.
After completing this evaluation, we then recommended that DOE and DHS
develop a strategy to notify state and local government officials about
the benefits and limitations of the surveys so government officials
could decide whether they would benefit from the surveys. According to
DOE officials, in April 2007, DOE began meeting with DHS to conduct the
evaluation and the departments are drafting a document that would
describe the benefits and limitations. They plan to distribute this
document to state and local governments to inform them about the
surveys. However, the departments have no specific timeframe for
completing this document. In addition, DOE and DHS notified one city--
Chicago--about the benefits of the surveys since we issued our report.
DOE and DHS are working with the Chicago Police Department to install
radiation detection equipment on planes or helicopters owned by the
Chicago Police Department to conduct aerial background radiation
surveys. DOE officials told us that this approach may be less costly
and state and local governments may be able respond more quickly to an
emergency by using their own aircraft. If this approach is successful,
DOE officials told us they would recommend that other cities also
purchase and install radiation detection equipment on their own
aircraft. However, DOE officials did not provide a timeframe for
completing this project.
DOE officials told us that the department is reluctant to conduct large
numbers of additional surveys if cities request them because they have
a limited number of helicopters, and these are needed to prevent and
respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Furthermore, they
assert that DOE does not have sufficient funding to conduct aerial
background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the emergency
response budget for aerial radiation detection was approximately $11
million for costs such as aircraft maintenance, personnel, fuel, and
detection equipment. DOE relies on federal agencies and cities to
reimburse them for the costs of surveys. However, even if DHS funded
cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New York's case, DOE officials
stated that payment would need to include costs associated with the
wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the extra costs could
not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to the city
because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate money from
year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, DOE
officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland
security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist
attacks, not as part of DOE's emergency response mission. However, DOE
officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise,
they would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the
full cost of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE's
equipment.
DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability.
According to DNDO, it does not have the expertise or capability to
conduct surveys, which are DOE's responsibility. However, DNDO is
responsible for assisting state and local governments' efforts to
detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological materials, develop
mobile detection systems, and advise cities about different radiation
detection technology to help state and local officials decide which
technologies would be most beneficial. DNDO does not plan to conduct
background surveys as part of this effort, but it plans to work with
DOE to advise cities and states on the potential benefits of background
surveys.
DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic
events, including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year
2007, about $1.7 billion was available in grant funding for state and
local governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could
be used for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However,
according to DHS officials, the agency has not received any requests
for funding other than the 2005 request by New York City. While it is
DHS's responsibility to inform state and local governments about
radiation detection technology, it has neither an outreach effort nor
does it maintain a central database for informing cities and states
about background radiation surveys. Instead, DHS maintains a lessons-
learned information-sharing database, which is a national online
network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan and prepare
for a terrorist attack. State and local governments can enter
information into this database, and DHS officials told us they were not
aware if New York City officials had done so.
More than a year after we issued our report, the status on background
radiation surveys remains largely unchanged. In short, in the absence
of clear mission responsibility, neither DOE nor DHS has any plans to
conduct additional surveys. In addition, no other city has requested
one, in part, because DOE and DHS have informed only one city--Chicago-
-about the benefits of these surveys.
DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities:
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories.
However, we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities
and assets are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and
whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond
to a nuclear or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and
assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security
measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a
terrorist attack.
DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest
Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under Its Guidance Because
Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed:
DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest
level of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE's November 2005
policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities required a
review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security
to determine whether they were "mission critical." Mission-critical
facilities have capabilities and assets that are not available at any
other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under
DOE guidance, facilities designated as mission critical must be
protected at a higher level of physical security. For example, DOE
headquarters was designated as mission critical because the loss of
decision makers during an emergency would impair the deployment and
coordination of DOE resources. As a result, DOE strengthened the
physical security measures around DOE headquarters by, among other
things, adding vehicle barriers around the facility.
In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the
capabilities and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and
determined that they were not mission critical because if either one or
both laboratories were attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to
easily reconstitute their capabilities and assets to meet mission
requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has dispersed some of the
assets and capabilities once found exclusively at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search mission to
include Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams that are located at
eight sites across the country. These teams receive training and
equipment similar to the search teams at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories, such as radiation detectors mounted in backpacks and
vehicles. They have also participated in a number of search missions,
including addressing potential threats at sporting events and national
political conventions, or assisting customs officials with
investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings.
DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at The Two
Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to
Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats:
Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories'
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would
significantly undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or
radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist
only at the laboratories include (1) teams that help minimize the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) planes and
helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search
teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a
sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location
of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP
teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or
radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams.
The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have
specialized equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount,
and extent of contamination. These teams are responsible for
establishing an operations center near the site of contamination to
coordinate all of DOE's radiological monitoring and assessment
activities and to analyze information coming from the field, including
aerial survey data provided by helicopters, planes, and ground teams
monitoring radiation levels.
At these two laboratories, the teams also have specialized equipment--
emergency response planes and helicopters--that are designed to detect,
measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or
radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a
limited number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at
the Remote Sensing Laboratories. The planes and helicopters use a
sophisticated radiation detection system to gather radiological
information and produce maps of radiation exposure and concentrations.
It is anticipated that the planes would arrive at an emergency scene
first and be used to determine the location and extent of ground
contamination. The helicopters would then be used to perform more
detailed surveys of any contamination. According to DOE officials, the
planes and helicopters can gather information on a wide area, in a
shorter amount of time, without placing ground teams at risk. Without
this capability, DOE could not quickly obtain comprehensive information
about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be used by
search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities.
The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time
than teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct
secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels
identified by the helicopters.
The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses
this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of
contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to
quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response
capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear
or radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help
find nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are
detonated.
DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that
are unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's
ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local
governments would not receive information--such as the location and
extent of contamination--that they need in a timely manner in order to
manage the consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public
health and property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and
assets, DOE has not developed contingency plans identifying
capabilities and assets at other locations that could be used in the
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked.
Specifically, DOE has not identified which RAP team would assume
responsibility for coordinating contamination monitoring and assessment
activities in the place of the consequence management teams from
Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly defined roles may
hamper emergency response efforts.
DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and
assets of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could
mobilize and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or
national laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories,
such as Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure
contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing
Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national
laboratories would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large-
scale contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do
not have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and
analyze data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In
April 2006, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible
for independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of
DOE's programs, reported that during performance tests, the RAP teams
could not quickly provide state and local governments with
recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public's
exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate contaminated
areas.[Footnote 6] In addition, DOE officials told us, based on
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous
nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to
manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence
management teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple,
simultaneous attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a
nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered.
DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked,
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless
the aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However,
DOE policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed
at Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top
government decision makers and other key government assets. During a
nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited
airborne capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if
there were multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable
delay in providing information to state and local governments about the
extent of contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a
time.
Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available
to provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it
with radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that
DOE would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not
designed for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE
has a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and
other federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes
for transport and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely
that DOD or any other agency would provide them with aircraft during an
emergency because those agencies' priority would be to carry out their
own missions, not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with
helicopters, it does not have spare radiation detectors like those
found on its own helicopters, and even if it did have spares, it would
not have time to mount radiation detectors on the exterior of the
aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation detectors, like those
found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an airplane or
helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.
Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that
all of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of
consequence management teams and the planes and helicopters from the
Remote Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it
would be able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities
and assets of the Remote Sensing Laboratories.
Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching
for nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have
the most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams
trained to conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate
potential nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at
a U.S. port. The search teams can also repair radiation equipment for
search missions in the field. Furthermore, these search teams are more
prepared than the RAP teams to enter environments where there is a
threat of hazards other than those associated with radiological
materials, such as explosives. If there is a threat of explosives in an
area where a search mission would be conducted, these teams have
specialized equipment to detect explosives and can more quickly request
FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to complete their search
mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent Oversight reported
that the RAP teams did not always complete their search missions when
there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team members
from explosives. The Office also reported that some RAP teams refused
to perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device
was removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety
criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams
had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team
members against their ability to complete the search mission because
there was a lack of guidance on how to respond.
Because of these concerns, we recommended in September 2006 that DOE
review the physical security measures at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories and determine whether additional measures should be taken
to protect the facilities against a loss of critical emergency response
capabilities or whether it was more cost-effective to fully disperse
its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the country. Since we
issued our report, DOE has not made any upgrades or other changes to
security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. In written comments
responding to our recommendations, DOE concluded that it was not cost-
effective to further disperse emergency response capabilities. In
addition, DOE noted that it would not be making any changes to the
security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories because the security
measures were reviewed separately by the Associate Administrator for
Emergency Response and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Security and they agreed that security measures were adequate. While
DOE may have reviewed the physical security measures at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories, it did not specifically address the security
issues we raised. We continue to believe that these measures may not be
sufficient to protect unique and critical emergency response
capabilities at these facilities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene
Aloise at (202) 512-3841. Leland Cogliani, Omari Norman, Carol
Herrnstadt Shulman, and Ned Woodward made key contributions to this
testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its
facilities. The levels of protection are specific to the type of
security interests and the significance of the targets. They are
provided in a graded fashion in accordance with potential risks.
[2] GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response
Capabilities Could be Strengthened, GAO-06-1015 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2006).
[3] DOE was established in 1977.
[4] Different types of radioactive material that could be used by
terrorists for a dirty bomb include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium-
238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.
[5] According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term
exposure to radium increases the risk of developing diseases such as
lymphoma, bone cancer, and leukemia.
[6] Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, Independent Oversight Inspection of the Radiological
Assistance Program (Washington, D.C., April 2006).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, DC 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, jarmong@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, DC 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548:
