Nuclear Nonproliferation
Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain Gao ID: GAO-07-404 February 28, 2007Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites.
Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175 buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access. DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003 report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative to EVM. DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-404, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
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Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain' which was released on April 2,
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
February 2007:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain:
GAO-07-404:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-404, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make
nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United
States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD)
have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear
material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE
established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE
has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and
other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving
security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD
have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded
security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO
analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program
officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites
What GAO Found:
Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to
provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and
other countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and
warheads. With regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have
’secured“ 175 buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional
buildings by the end of 2008. However, DOE‘s reported total of
buildings ’secured“ does not recognize that additional upgrades remain
to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building
’secured“ after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when
additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Further, DOE and Russia
have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 sites and details
the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. However, the plan does
not include two sites containing many buildings with vast amounts of
nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access.
DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead
sites and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008.
The departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our
2003 report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent
policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead
sites. Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage
large security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned
value management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and
schedule shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts,
but, during the course of GAO‘s review, augmented its contract
oversight to increase reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider
a comparable alternative to EVM.
DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure
that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded
security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S.
assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint
sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system
to track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a
sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD‘s abilities to ensure the
sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by
access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE
and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security
upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with
Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a
result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security
upgrades are being properly sustained.
Table:
Category: Nuclear material (DOE);
Progress: DOE has helped improve security at 175 of 210 buildings with
nuclear material in Russia and other countries; Spending: $1.3 billion.
Category: Nuclear warheads (DOE and DOD); Progress: DOE and DOD have
completed work at 62 of 97 planned sites and provided assistance to
improve warhead transportation security; Spending: $920 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) revise the metrics it uses to track
progress in securing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material and
(2) develop a management information system to track DOE‘s progress in
providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.
DOE agreed with GAO‘s findings and recommendations. DOD did not provide
written comments.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide
Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other
Countries, but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May
Be Misleading:
DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia Secure 62
Nuclear Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead Transportation Security:
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE and DOD
Sustainability Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts
to Secure Nuclear Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries:
Appendix III: Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites
with Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia:
Belarus:
China:
Georgia:
India:
Latvia:
Lithuania:
Kazakhstan:
Ukraine:
Uzbekistan:
Appendix IV: Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure
and Related Programs:
Material Consolidation and Conversion:
Secure Transportation:
Training and Technical Support Infrastructure:
Russian Federation Inspection Implementation:
Protective Forces Assistance:
Federal Information System:
Regulatory Development:
MPC&A Education:
Material Control and Accounting Measurements:
MPC&A Security Culture:
Taxation and Customs:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with Weapons-
Usable Nuclear Material through the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear Warhead
Sites:
Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE's Guidelines:
Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts through
the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE's Office of International
Material Protection and Cooperation:
Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and Other
Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia through
the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End of Fiscal
Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of Russia:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EVM: earned value management:
FIS: Federal Information System:
HEU: highly enriched uranium:
MIMS: Metrics Information Management System:
MOD: Ministry of Defense (Russia):
MOM: MPC&A Operations Monitoring:
MPC&A: Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
Rosatom: Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation:
February 28, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Chairman:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
Safeguarding nuclear warheads and nuclear materials that can be used to
make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the
United States and Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia
with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world with
unclassified U.S. estimates of the number of Russia's nuclear warheads
at the end of the cold war ranging from 18,000 to 25,000. Russia also
inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium--materials that could be used to build nuclear
weapons.[Footnote 1] Terrorists or countries seeking nuclear weapons
could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8
kilograms of plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon. During the Soviet
era, security systems at Soviet nuclear sites emphasized heavy
surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who
violated security procedures. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and
subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia and other
former Soviet republics exposed gaps in the physical security and
material accounting at sites containing nuclear material and revealed
weaknesses in these countries' abilities to secure nuclear sites
against internal and external threats of theft.
Since the early 1990s, there has been concern that unsecured nuclear or
radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists and be
smuggled into the United States for use in a nuclear weapon or a device
that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a
"dirty bomb"). For example, in January 2007, international media
reported that authorities in Georgia had seized about 100 grams of
highly enriched uranium from a Russian citizen who was attempting to
sell the material on the black market.[Footnote 2] Key to the United
States' efforts to combat this threat is securing nuclear materials and
warheads at vulnerable civilian and military sites in the former Soviet
Union and other countries. In 1991, the Congress authorized the
Department of Defense (DOD) to establish the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons.[Footnote 3] Members
of the Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might
be lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians
might be persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists
seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2006,
the Congress authorized about $9 billion for a variety of nuclear
nonproliferation programs implemented by DOD and the Department of
Energy (DOE), including efforts to help Russia and other countries
secure sites where nuclear material and warheads are located. In 1993,
DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure sites
housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE established
the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program,
which is now administered by the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).[Footnote 4] Through its MPC&A program,[Footnote
5] DOE has provided nuclear facilities in Russia and other countries
with modern nuclear security systems that include the following, among
other things:
* physical protection systems, such as fences around buildings
containing nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where
nuclear materials are stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor
storage rooms;
* material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material
containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the
containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into
areas containing nuclear material; and:
* material accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement equipment
and computerized databases to inventory the amount and type of nuclear
material contained in specific buildings and to track their location.
In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide a systematic approach for
DOE program managers to develop and implement MPC&A systems that meet
DOE's objective of helping Russia and other countries secure buildings
with weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warhead storage
sites.[Footnote 6] DOE seeks to improve security at nuclear sites in
Russia and other countries by providing security upgrades that protect
against threats of theft from both internal adversaries, such as
disgruntled nuclear workers (called the "insider" threat), and external
adversaries, such as terrorist groups. DOE conducts these site security
upgrades in two phases known as "rapid" upgrades and "comprehensive"
upgrades.
* Rapid upgrades include such improvements as bricking up windows in
buildings where nuclear material is stored; installing strengthened
doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled
access areas around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that
require the presence of two people when nuclear material is handled
(called the "two-person rule"). Rapid upgrades are primarily designed
to be simple, easy to implement and maintain, and result in immediate,
though limited, improvements to nuclear material security. Rapid
upgrades include upgrades designed to detect and delay external
adversaries and sometimes include basic material control and accounting
equipment and procedures that can be implemented during a 6-to-12 month
period.
* Comprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors,
and closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central
alarm stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and
computerized nuclear material accounting systems. Comprehensive
upgrades are designed to secure against both internal and external
threats and are usually put in place over the 18-to-24 months after the
rapid upgrades have been installed but can be installed concurrently in
some cases.
Buildings that contain nuclear material, which DOE considers to be of a
high proliferation threat receive both rapid and comprehensive
upgrades, and buildings with nuclear material of less concern may
receive only rapid upgrades. In addition to providing security
upgrades, DOE provides a variety of training to foreign officials and
nuclear site personnel on how to operate MPC&A systems.
In February 2006, DOE changed the metrics it uses to track progress in
its MPC&A program from measuring the percentage of nuclear material
secured (out of the estimated 600 metric tons of loose nuclear material
in the former Soviet Union) to measuring the number of buildings in
Russia and other countries with weapons-usable nuclear material that
have been secured.[Footnote 7] DOE currently plans to secure 210
buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and
other countries by the end of 2008.
The United States has also assisted Russia in improving security at
nuclear warhead storage sites, both temporary sites, such as rail
transfer points, and permanent sites containing storage bunkers. In
1995, DOD began assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) with
enhancing transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at
nuclear warhead sites. Also, in 1998, at Russia's request, DOE expanded
the scope of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval
reactor fuel to helping secure nuclear warheads. In February 2005,
President Bush and Russian President Putin issued a joint statement on
nuclear security cooperation, including enhanced cooperation on nuclear
terrorism prevention efforts.[Footnote 8] In 2006, Presidents Bush and
Putin reaffirmed their commitment to completing security upgrades at
nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia by the end of
2008.[Footnote 9] DOE and DOD plan to help Russia secure a total of 97
nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008.
After completing the installation of site security upgrades, DOE and
DOD provide ongoing technical and financial support to help ensure that
U.S.-funded security upgrades continue to reduce the risk of theft at
foreign nuclear sites. These efforts are known as sustainability
activities. Sustainability support is necessary to ensure that U.S.-
funded security upgrades are properly maintained and continue to
support risk reduction goals as intended. However, security of nuclear
material and warheads in Russia and other countries ultimately depends
on these countries' ability to sustain the continued operation of U.S.-
funded security upgrades after U.S. funding ends. In 2002, the Congress
directed DOE to work with Russia to develop a sustainable MPC&A system
to be solely supported by Russia no later than January 1,
2013.[Footnote 10]
As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to
secure nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries by
assessing: (1) the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other
countries secure weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) the progress DOE
and DOD have made in helping Russia secure its nuclear warhead sites,
and (3) the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the
sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades at
sites that house nuclear materials and warheads in Russia and other
countries.
To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from DOE and its
contractors at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Sandia National Laboratories;
DOD; and DOD contractors. We conducted interviews with key program
officials at each of these agencies and at the Department of State. We
also discussed the implementation of DOE and DOD's programs with
Russian officials. However, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the
Russian Federation (Rosatom), which is responsible for the production
of all nuclear materials in Russia and the development, testing, and
production of Russian nuclear weapons, denied our request for access to
facilities under its control. We were able to complete our audit
objectives by visiting four Russian nuclear facilities--civilian,
educational, and research institutes not under Rosatom's control--where
DOE installed MPC&A upgrades. We discussed security issues and the
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades with officials at these sites. In
addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary information from DOE and DOD
on U.S. efforts to help Russia and other countries secure nuclear
materials and warheads. We interviewed knowledgeable DOE and DOD
officials on the reliability of these data, including issues such as
data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the accuracy and
completeness of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from
April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3
billion to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to
sites with buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear material in
Russia and other countries, and the agency reports to have "secured"
175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material. However, the number of secured buildings does not
fully present the extent and nature of upgrades made and work remaining
to be completed because DOE considers a building to be "secure" after
it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when
additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed.
Specifically, 51 of the 175 buildings DOE reported to have "secured" by
the end of fiscal year 2006 do not have completed MPC&A upgrades. While
DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a measure of risk
reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid upgrades do
not meet all of DOE's risk reduction goals for most buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material. Further, in response to terrorist
actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is examining the impact
of an increased design basis threat for its MPC&A program and providing
additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear sites.
Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that
includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details
the remaining scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not
include two key sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear
warheads that contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material. Because of the sensitive nature of the
work conducted at these sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's proposals for
upgrading the sites, including proposals with less intrusive access
requirements, and informed DOE that it is not interested in pursuing
MPC&A cooperation at these sites.
Since 1995, DOE and DOD have spent about $920 million to help Russia
improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites, and the agencies plan to
help Russia secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. Through the
end of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $374 million to help Russia
secure 50 nuclear warhead sites, while DOD spent about $546 million to
secure 12 nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve security for the
transportation of Russian warheads. DOE plans to provide security
upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD plans to provide upgrades at
12 additional sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and
DOD has improved since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had
inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian
nuclear warhead sites. For example, DOE and DOD have now jointly
developed common designs for security upgrades at similar Russian
warhead sites in order to ensure a level of consistency in the
assistance provided to these sites. We also found that DOE and DOD use
similar approaches to managing large contracts to provide security
upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has used an earned value
management (EVM) system to identify cost and schedule variances on
contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites
so they can be addressed in a timely manner. DOE does not require its
contractors to implement EVM systems on its fixed-price contracts for
installing security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. However, during
the course of our review, the department augmented its contract
oversight mechanisms, and DOE officials believe that their improved
oversight system constitutes a comparable alternative to an EVM system.
As DOE and DOD near the completion of their security upgrade programs,
the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in Russia
and other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring that
the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not
wasted. To this end, DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its
efforts to help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and
maintain) U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and
warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Rosatom to
develop a joint U.S.-Russian sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a
management information system to assist MPC&A management in tracking
the progress being made toward its goal of providing Russia a
sustainable MPC&A system by 2013, similar to the system DOE uses to
track the number of buildings and sites where it has installed security
upgrades. Further, access challenges and other issues could impact DOE
and DOD's ability to prepare Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security
upgrades on its own. In 2002, the Congress directed DOE to work with
Russia to provide a sustainable MPC&A system to be solely supported by
Russia no later than January 1, 2013. In response, DOE issued interim
guidelines in May 2004 to direct its efforts to create a sustainable
MPC&A system in Russia and finalized these guidelines in December 2006.
DOE's sustainability guidelines include seven key elements, such as a
site MPC&A operational plan and preventative maintenance program.
However, access difficulties, sites' financial ability to maintain
equipment, and other issues could impact DOE's ability to prepare
Russia to sustain security upgrades at nuclear material sites. For
example, at one facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE
officials were denied access from 1999 through 2002 and, upon returning
to the facility, found the security upgrades were in a severe state of
disrepair. As a result, DOE had to spend about $800,000 to correct
problems resulting from the site's inability to properly maintain the
security upgrades DOE had provided. Finally, DOE and DOD also plan to
provide Russia with assistance to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades
at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the
agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither DOE nor
DOD has reached an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense on
access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead
storage sites. Site access or alternative means of verification are
necessary to ensure that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia
maintain security upgrades at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach
an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense on access procedures
for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, the agencies will be
unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly
sustained and may not be able to spend funds appropriated for these
efforts.
To strengthen program management and the effectiveness of DOE's efforts
to improve security at nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia and
other countries, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy,
working with the Administrator of NNSA, (1) revise the metrics used to
measure MPC&A program progress to better reflect the level of security
upgrade completion at buildings reported as "secure" and (2) develop a
management information system to track DOE's progress in providing
Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.
We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DOD for comment. DOE
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no
written comments on our report. DOE provided additional information
about the metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its
reasons for not using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts
to work with Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE and DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
Background:
In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to
secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE
established the MPC&A program, which is now administered by NNSA. DOE's
Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, within
NNSA, consists of five offices whose collective efforts contribute to
enhancing the security of nuclear material and warheads in countries of
concern and to improving the ability to detect illicit smuggling of
those materials (see fig. 1). Four of these offices implement DOE's
MPC&A program, which, among other things, provides security upgrades at
nuclear sites in Russia and other countries, and the fifth office, the
Office of the Second Line of Defense, works to improve detection of
illegal nuclear trafficking activities at border crossings and
seaports.[Footnote 11]
Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE's Office of International
Material Protection and Cooperation:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: DOE.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection works with the Russian
Ministry of Defense, including the 12TH Main Directorate--the Russian
Defense Ministry's organization for nuclear munitions, the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and the Navy to install security upgrades at nuclear
warhead storage sites. The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection also
oversees DOE's security upgrades work at naval nuclear fuel sites. The
Office of Weapons Material Protection upgrades MPC&A systems at sites
within the Rosatom nuclear weapons complex and also oversees DOE
efforts to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear sites
within the former Soviet Union that are not in Russia, such as
facilities in Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The Office of Material
Consolidation and Civilian Sites works to install MPC&A upgrades at
nonmilitary nuclear facilities throughout Russia and oversees efforts
to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and to convert
excess weapons-usable nuclear material into less attractive forms. The
Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites also manages DOE's
efforts to provide nuclear security assistance to countries outside of
the former Soviet Union. The Office of National Infrastructure and
Sustainability manages a variety of crosscutting programs, including
transportation and protective forces assistance, and oversaw the
development of guidelines for DOE's efforts to help ensure that Russia
can sustain the operation of U.S.-funded security systems at its
nuclear sites after U.S. assistance ends.
DOD has also assisted Russia in securing nuclear warhead storage sites,
both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, and permanent sites
containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began assisting the Russian
Ministry of Defense with enhancing transportation security for nuclear
warheads and security at nuclear warhead sites. DOD's efforts to help
Russia secure its nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve the
security of warheads in transit are implemented by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. Oversight and policy guidance for this work is
provided by DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
Additional information on the history of U.S. efforts to help Russia
and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads can be found
in appendix II.
Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide
Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other
Countries, but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May
Be Misleading:
DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year
2006 to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to
facilities that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and
other countries and reports to have "secured" 175 buildings containing
about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and
the former Soviet Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as
secured, however, does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to
be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building to be
"secure" after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid
upgrades), even when additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be
completed. Further, in response to terrorist actions and rising threat
levels in Russia, DOE is examining the impact of an increased design
basis threat it uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades
provided to Russian nuclear facilities and providing additional
assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear sites. Finally, DOE
and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20
civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining
scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key
sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that
contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material where DOE has been denied access.
Through the End of Fiscal Year 2006, DOE Spent About $1.3 Billion for
Security Upgrades and Other Related Assistance at Nuclear Material
Sites in Russia and Other Countries:
From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion
to enhance security at buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear
materials in foreign countries. The majority of these buildings are
located in Russia and fall into three categories: Rosatom weapons
complex sites, civilian sites, and naval fuel sites. DOE has also
helped to secure buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in nine
other countries.[Footnote 12] Figure 2 shows a breakdown of DOE's
spending on MPC&A efforts.
Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and Other
Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.
Note: Figure does not include program management expenses, and amounts
have been rounded.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
As figure 2 shows, DOE spent about $684.7 million to provide security
upgrades to civilian, naval fuel, and Rosatom weapons complex sites
with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and an additional $131.5
million to provide security upgrades to sites located outside of
Russia. DOE also spent about $493.9 million on additional and related
MPC&A efforts in Russia, such as assistance for transportation
security, providing equipment for protective forces at nuclear
facilities, and efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer
buildings and sites. According to DOE officials, these efforts are
important to increasing the overall security of nuclear materials in
Russia and other countries, and they support DOE's goal of enhancing
the security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear
material. For example, because DOE believes that nuclear materials are
most vulnerable while they are in transit, the department has provided
Russia with specialized secure trucks, armored escort vehicles, and
secure containers--called overpacks--to improve the security of nuclear
material transported within and between nuclear sites in Russia.
Further, DOE's assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear
sites, which includes such items as bulletproof vests, helmets, and
response vehicles, helps ensure that guards at those sites are properly
equipped and trained so that they can quickly respond to alarms.
Additional information on other DOE efforts to improve security at
sites with weapons-usable nuclear materials can be found in appendix
IV.
DOE Considers Buildings "Secure" After Only Limited or "Rapid" Upgrades
Have Been Installed, Even When More Comprehensive Upgrades Are Planned:
At the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported to have "secured" 175
buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but 51 of the 175
buildings DOE reported to have "secured" as of the end of fiscal year
2006 do not have completed MPC&A upgrades. These 51 buildings are
located at sites in the Rosatom weapons complex. In its program
metrics, DOE defined a building to be "secure" after it has received
only limited MPC&A upgrades (called rapid upgrades), even when
additional comprehensive upgrades, which would further improve
security, have yet to be completed.[Footnote 13]
The buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE is working
to improve security fall into four categories: Rosatom weapons complex,
civilian, naval fuel, and sites outside of Russia. As table 1 shows,
all planned upgrades have been completed at naval fuel sites and sites
outside of Russia. The vast majority of remaining buildings that have
not yet received security upgrades are in the Rosatom weapons complex,
where DOE has historically had access difficulties, including being
denied access to key sites and buildings housing weapons-usable nuclear
material.
Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with Weapons-
Usable Nuclear Material through the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Site type: Rosatom weapons complex[A];
Number of buildings DOE reports as "secured" 92;
Number of buildings where DOE has not installed security upgrades: 32;
Total number of buildings where DOE plans to install security upgrades:
124.
Site type: Civilian;
Number of buildings DOE reports as "secured" 47;
Number of buildings where DOE has not installed security upgrades: 3;
Total number of buildings where DOE plans to install security upgrades:
50.
Site type: Naval fuel;
Number of buildings DOE reports as "secured" 21;
Number of buildings where DOE has not installed security upgrades: 0;
Total number of buildings where DOE plans to install security upgrades:
21.
Site type: Outside of Russia;
Number of buildings DOE reports as "secured" 15;
Number of buildings where DOE has not installed security upgrades: 0;
Total number of buildings where DOE plans to install security upgrades:
15.
Site type: Total;
Number of buildings DOE reports as "secured" 175;
Number of buildings where DOE has not installed security upgrades: 35;
Total number of buildings where DOE plans to install security upgrades:
210.
Source: DOE.
[A] At some sites in the Rosatom weapons complex, DOE counts individual
material storage or handling areas (material balance areas) within
large buildings separately in its program performance measurements in
an attempt to more accurately reflect the amount of work involved.
According to DOE, the work that would go into securing a material
balance area of this size would be commensurate to the work that goes
into securing a smaller building.
[End of table]
While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a limited measure
of risk reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid
upgrades fall short of meeting all of DOE's risk reduction goals for
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, rapid
upgrades generally include only limited measures designed to address
the insider threat of theft, such as establishing a two-person rule and
providing certain types of tamper indication devices that would set off
alarms at guard stations in the case of an unauthorized attempt to
access nuclear materials. According to NNSA, which implements the MPC&A
program at DOE, the greatest threat DOE faces in its effort to help
Russia secure nuclear materials is the threat of insider theft.
However, the majority of measures to address the insider threat at
Russian nuclear material sites, such as computerized nuclear material
inventory databases and barcoding of nuclear material containers, are
provided in the comprehensive upgrades phase.
DOE Is Examining the Impact of an Increased Design Basis Threat for Its
MPC&A Program:
In response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia,
DOE recently analyzed the implications of an increased design basis
threat it uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to
Russian nuclear facilities. The design basis threat is defined as the
attributes and characteristics of potential adversaries (a group or
groups of armed attackers) against which a facility's physical
protection systems are designed and evaluated. According to DOE, the
design basis threat is critical to determining an MPC&A system's
effectiveness. In 2005, DOE began examining the impact of increasing
the number of adversaries against which Russian sites with U.S.-funded
security upgrades should be able to defend themselves. DOE is currently
reassessing the effectiveness of the security upgrades it has provided
through the MPC&A program and has increased its emphasis on providing
assistance to the protective forces at Russian nuclear material sites.
Specifically, DOE is currently working with a number of sites to
relocate guard forces closer to the target nuclear material to improve
their response times to an incident. For example, at all four of the
nuclear material sites we visited in Russia, Russian officials told us
that they were working with DOE to relocate guard forces closer to
buildings that contain weapons-usable nuclear material at their sites.
However, DOE is limited in the scope of assistance it can provide to
protective forces at nuclear facilities in Russia and other countries.
For example, DOE is neither allowed to provide weapons or ammunition to
these forces, nor is it allowed to pay the salaries of protective
forces at these sites. According to DOE officials, the department has
provided assistance to the protective forces at all nuclear material
sites where the department has access and agreement to work, including
helmets, winter uniforms, radios, and other equipment intended to
improve their effectiveness in responding to alarms and their
survivability against potential adversaries.
DOE Plans to Complete All Security Upgrades Work by the End of 2008 but
Lacks Access or Agreement to Work at Two Key Sites That Contain Vast
Amounts of Nuclear Material:
Historically, DOE has had difficulty obtaining access to some sensitive
sites in Russia, especially within the Rosatom weapons complex. For
example, we reported in 2003 that DOE's lack of access to many
buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear material in the Rosatom
weapons complex was the greatest challenge to improving nuclear
material security in Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to
validate Russian security system designs and to confirm the
installation of equipment as intended. DOE signed an access agreement
with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (now called Rosatom) in
September 2001 that described administrative procedures to facilitate
access, such as specifying which DOE personnel are allowed to make site
visits and the number and duration of those visits. We reported in 2003
that this access agreement had done little to increase DOE's ability to
complete its work at many key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex.
Since that time, DOE has worked with Rosatom through a Joint
Acceleration Working Group and other mechanisms to develop alternative
access procedures, such as the use of remote video monitoring, that
have allowed work to progress at some sensitive buildings and sites
that had previously been inaccessible to DOE project teams. In June
2005, DOE and Rosatom signed a Joint Action Plan detailing the
remaining scope of work to be completed by the 2008 deadline. Rosatom
and DOE are using this plan to guide cooperative activities and to
develop a multiyear budget for DOE's MPC&A program. DOE officials told
us that they have been granted access to almost all of the sites and
buildings covered in the plan and that all security upgrades should be
completed, as scheduled, by the end of 2008. DOE plans to spend about
$98 million to complete its planned security upgrades at 210 buildings
containing weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other
countries by the end of calendar year 2008.
The DOE-Rosatom Joint Action Plan covers 20 Russian civilian and
nuclear weapons complex sites. However, the Joint Action Plan does not
include two key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex where Russian
nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled. Because of the nuclear
weapons manufacturing work conducted at these sites, DOE believes these
two sites contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material. According to DOE officials, the
department has offered numerous alternative access proposals to try to
obtain access to install security upgrades at these two sites. For
example, in November 2004, DOE provided senior Russian officials with
access to some of the most sensitive sites in the U.S. nuclear weapons
complex, including the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in Texas, which is
the only U.S. nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility.
However, Rosatom has refused to grant DOE officials reciprocal access
to analogous Russian sites. Because of the sensitive nature of the work
conducted at these sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's requests for access,
rejected DOE offers to provide assistance without access, and informed
DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these
sites. DOE officials expressed very little optimism that Rosatom would
allow DOE to help improve security at these facilities in the near
future.
DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia Secure 62
Nuclear Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead Transportation Security:
Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent about $920
million to help Russia improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites.
The agencies plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead
sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved
since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent
policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear
warhead sites. In addition, DOE and DOD are currently taking similar
approaches to managing large contracts to provide security upgrades at
Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has used EVM to identify cost and
schedule variances for its contracts to install security upgrades at
Russian warhead sites at early stages so they can be addressed in a
timely manner. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts to
install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites, but, during
the course of our review, the department augmented its contract
performance management system to include additional reporting
mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE
officials believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system.
DOE believes the benefits of EVM techniques do not justify the
additional costs to implement them on fixed-price contracts.
DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear Warhead
Storage Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve Security of Warheads
in Transit:
Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million
to improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to
install security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008.
Additionally, DOD spent approximately $546 million to help Russia
secure 12 warhead sites and to provide security for nuclear warheads in
transit.[Footnote 14] DOD plans to complete security upgrades at 12
additional sites by the end of 2008. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of U.S.
funding to improve security of Russian nuclear warheads through the end
of fiscal year 2006.
Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia through
the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis od DOE and DOD data.
Note: DOD spending for nuclear warhead site security efforts includes
spending on related DOD efforts, such as the development of an
Automated Inventory Control and Management System for Russia's nuclear
warhead stockpile, a personnel reliability program and training
equipment for guard forces at nuclear warhead sites, an emergency
response capability, and a variety of training for site personnel.
DOE's program also includes training for site personnel and the
development of a personnel reliability program for those Russian
nuclear commands not supported by DOD. Percentages do not total 100 due
to rounding.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
DOE plans to provide security upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD
plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008.
DOE and DOD gained authorization and access to work at 15 of these
sites as a result of an agreement reached at the summit between
President Bush and Russian President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in
February 2005. After this summit, Russia offered access to 15
additional nuclear warhead sites of which DOE has agreed to install
upgrades at 7 sites, and DOD will help secure the remaining 8 sites.
Table 2 provides an overview of DOE and DOD's progress in improving
security at Russian nuclear warhead sites.
Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear Warhead
Sites:
Site type: Permanent warhead sites;
DOE sites complete: 8;
DOD sites complete: 9;
Total sites completed: 17;
DOE sites remaining: 14;
DOD sites remaining: 10;
Total sites remaining: 24.
Site type: Temporary warhead sites;
DOE sites complete: 42;
DOD sites complete: 3;
Total sites completed: 45;
DOE sites remaining: 9;
DOD sites remaining: 2;
Total sites remaining: 11.
Site type: Total;
DOE sites complete: 50;
DOD sites complete: 12;
Total sites completed: 62;
DOE sites remaining: 23;
DOD sites remaining: 12;
Total sites remaining: 35.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD information.
[End of table]
Despite the agencies' optimism that all sites within this scope will be
secured by the end of 2008, they face challenges in meeting this goal.
For example, DOE and DOD officials stated that work in Russia involves
extensive bureaucracy, changing requirements to meet Russian demands
and, at times, difficult relationships and coordination with Russian
subcontractors. DOD officials told us that there have been performance
issues with a certain Russian subcontractor, but finding alternatives
is difficult because there are only a limited number of Russian
subcontractors qualified for this type of work and cleared by the
Russian MOD to work at nuclear weapons sites. Additionally, the harsh
environmental conditions at some remote sites have caused delays in the
installation of security upgrades. Specifically, DOD officials stated
that adverse weather conditions delayed the installation of security
upgrades at four Russian warhead sites by about 1 month.
In addition, DOD spent over $125 million through the end of fiscal year
2006 to improve the security of nuclear warheads during transportation
by rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites. According to DOD
officials, security experts consider nuclear warheads to be highly
vulnerable to theft during transport. DOD has attempted to address this
threat by providing the Russian MOD with security enhancements for
railcars, hardened shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect
against small arms fire and other threats, and payment of railway
tariffs associated with transporting nuclear warheads to consolidation
and dismantlement sites. Since 1995, DOD has supported maintenance on
200 specialized, secure railcars for transporting nuclear weapons and
provided 15 armored railcars for guard forces protecting shipments of
nuclear weapons. DOD is in the process of procuring up to 100
additional nuclear warhead transport railcars for use by the Russian
MOD.
Coordination between DOE and DOD's Nuclear Warhead Security Efforts in
Russia Has Improved:
DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding
duplication of effort. Coordination between the agencies has improved
since 2003, when we reported that the agencies did not have consistent
policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear
warhead sites. We recommended in 2003 that the departments work
together to develop a standardized approach to improving security at
Russian nuclear warhead sites. Since our 2003 report, DOD and DOE have
expanded their efforts to share information about their work at Russian
nuclear warhead sites.
Specifically, the departments coordinate their efforts through an
interagency working group, which reports to the National Security
Council.[Footnote 15] According to DOE and DOD officials, this group
was instrumental in coordinating the U.S. response to proposals for
security upgrades at additional Russian nuclear warhead sites stemming
from the summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava,
Slovakia, in 2005. In addition, DOE and DOD participate in joint
coordinating groups that include key representatives from DOE, DOD, and
the various branches of the Russian MOD. All of these groups meet
regularly to discuss ongoing work at Russian nuclear warhead sites and
resolve problems or issues that arise in this effort. Furthermore, DOE
and DOD have jointly developed common designs for security upgrades at
similar Russian warhead sites to ensure a level of consistency in the
assistance provided to these sites. DOD officials stated that having a
standardized design between the two agencies allows DOE and DOD
leverage with the Russian MOD, to deny requests if they are made for
items not in the site design plan of either agency. Further, DOE and
DOD seek to present a united image to Russian officials by writing
letters jointly on common issues and answering Russian site proposals
together.
DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large Contracts to Improve
Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites:
In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear
warhead sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing
large contracts. Generally, OMB requires federal agencies to use
EVM[Footnote 16] or an alternative performance management system on
major acquisition contracts to identify cost and schedule variances at
early stages so they can be addressed in a timely manner.[Footnote 17]
DOD has used EVM to evaluate its contracts to install security upgrades
at Russian warhead sites. DOE does not require its contractors to
implement EVM to evaluate its contracts to install security upgrades at
Russian warhead sites, but, during the course of our review, augmented
its contract performance management system to include additional
reporting mechanisms for identifying and addressing schedule variances,
which DOE officials believe represent a comparable alternative to an
EVM system.
DOD officials stated that EVM is one of many tools that provide
empirical data to validate testimonial information about the status of
security upgrades provided in its contractors' monthly and quarterly
reports. Additionally, EVM enhances program management capabilities by
providing an early warning system for deviations from plans and
quantifies technical and schedule problems in terms of cost. This
provides DOD with an objective basis for considering corrective action.
DOD officials told us that their use of EVM allowed them to identify
schedule variances due to poor contractor performance at one Russian
nuclear warhead site where the department is installing security
upgrades. DOD officials stated that this early detection allowed them
to reassign the work to a different Russian subcontractor and formulate
a plan to make up for the lost time and work in order to meet their
scheduled completion date and critical path milestones.
Similarly, DOE recently proposed requirements that its large contracts
for security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites be managed with a system
similar to EVM. In September 2006, DOE initiated security upgrades at
four large nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia.[Footnote 18] Until
January 2007, DOE managed these fixed-price contracts according to the
NNSA Programmatic Guidelines, which do not require the use of EVM or an
alternative system to assess contract performance for cost and schedule
variances. In part, as a result of our inquiry into its contracting
practices, DOE altered its oversight mechanisms for these contracts in
January 2007 and will now require monthly reports and other measures to
more accurately ascertain the progress of contracted items, including
the identification of schedule variances due to inclement weather and
other unforeseen events and, subsequently, the development of recovery
plans. According to DOE officials, these new reporting mechanisms
represent a comparable alternative to an EVM system and will give DOE
project managers additional opportunities to identify potential
schedule slippages and enable appropriate management intervention to
take place in a timely manner.[Footnote 19]
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE and DOD
Sustainability Efforts:
DOE has developed sustainability guidelines to help Russia prepare to
take financial responsibility for maintaining U.S.-funded security
upgrades at nuclear material and warhead sites without DOE assistance
by 2013 as the Congress mandated. DOE and Rosatom are developing a
joint sustainability plan that will provide an agreed-upon framework to
guide DOE's sustainability efforts at nuclear material sites in Russia.
However, DOE's ability to ensure that U.S.-funded security upgrades at
nuclear material sites are being sustained may be hampered by access
difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, access
difficulties at some Russian nuclear warhead sites may also prohibit
DOE and DOD from ensuring that U.S.-funded security upgrades are being
properly sustained.
DOE Issued Guidelines to Direct Its Efforts to Help Russia Prepare to
Maintain U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades without DOE Assistance:
In May 2004, DOE issued interim guidelines (referred to as
Sustainability Guidelines) to direct its efforts to assist Russia in
developing sustainable MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear material and
warhead sites by 2013 as the Congress mandated. In December 2006, DOE
issued a final version of its Sustainability Guidelines for the MPC&A
program. These guidelines require DOE program managers to develop
assessments of each site's existing capabilities to sustain MPC&A
systems and to identify requirements that should be met before a site
transitions from DOE support to full Russian responsibility. According
to DOE, these assessments will be used to develop site-specific
sustainability plans that detail the remaining cooperative activities
required to address each of the seven elements of sustainability. The
guidelines also require DOE project teams to develop site-specific
transition plans, which would detail how sustainability activities will
be funded as the sites move toward transition to full Russian
responsibility by 2013.
DOE's Sustainability Guidelines set forth seven key elements of a
sustainable MPC&A program at sites receiving MPC&A upgrades, such as
the development of site operating procedures, which form the foundation
for all of DOE's sustainability activities at nuclear material and
warhead sites in Russia and other countries where DOE has provided
security upgrades. DOE uses a variety of sustainability indicators for
each of the seven elements to determine the degree to which the
individual elements are being addressed at Russian sites. Table 2 shows
the seven elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability
Guidelines and some of the indicators DOE uses to assess the degree to
which each element of sustainability is being met at a given Russian
site.
Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE's Guidelines:
Element: Site MPC&A organization;
Definition: Site MPC&A operations plans establish management
structures, assign staff responsibilities that support MPC&A
operations, identify how site actions reduce risk, and identify how the
site will allocate human and financial resources to effectively operate
the MPC&A systems;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has an established and documented MPC&A organization with clear
roles and responsibilities;
* Site has conducted MPC&A sustainability planning;
* Site has a budget for MPC&A operations and personnel.
Element: Site operating procedures;
Definition: MPC&A systems require a set of procedures to direct site
personnel in the proper operation of equipment. Site operating
procedures help staff operate systems consistently and effectively in
conformance with Russian national regulations;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has written procedures covering all key MPC&A operations;
* Site procedures are consistent with regulations;
* Site has a mechanism for modifying procedures.
Element: Human resource management and site training;
Definition: A human resource management system is designed to provide
qualified and well-trained MPC&A professionals to perform assigned
MPC&A duties;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Training requirements for each MPC&A position have been identified;
* The site has a mechanism to track corrective actions from inspections
and offers retraining to staff.
Element: Operational cost analysis;
Definition: Operational cost analysis helps sites to plan and allocate
resources for MPC&A operations throughout the system's life cycle by
estimating the costs associated with long-and short-term maintenance of
MPC&A systems;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has identified life cycle costs, capital equipment replacement
costs, etc;
* Site has established a budget for MPC&A operation, which covers the
site's system requirements.
Element: Equipment maintenance, repair, and calibration;
Definition: Preventative maintenance, repair, and equipment calibration
should be governed by a formal maintenance and repair process to ensure
that malfunctioning equipment is promptly repaired, spare parts are
available, and equipment is properly calibrated;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has documented maintenance requirements, strategy, and schedule,
prioritized based on relative importance of the components;
* Site has adequate resources to maintain or repair MPC&A systems;
* Site has a documented calibration plan.
Element: Performance testing and operational monitoring;
Definition: Performance testing and operational monitoring allows site
MPC&A organizations to assess the effectiveness of MPC&A components and
systems and to take corrective actions when deficiencies are
identified;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has an internal or external review system to evaluate MPC&A
system performance;
* Site has evidence of identifying and correcting MPC&A deficiencies.
Element: MPC&A system configuration management;
Definition: MPC&A systems operate as part of the overall nuclear
operations at a site. Configuration management systems are designed to
ensure that changes in site operations do not compromise the
effectiveness of the site's MPC&A systems;
Select sustainability indicators:
* Site has a configuration control plan or similar document;
* Changes to configuration are reviewed by appropriate staff to verify
that system effectiveness is not degraded.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
According to DOE, the Sustainability Guidelines provide general
criteria for DOE project teams to follow when working with their
Russian counterparts in developing sustainability programs for sites
where DOE has installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials noted that some
sites may not require assistance to address issues in each of the seven
categories. For example, many sites that store naval nuclear fuel are
administered by the Russian Navy, which has its own human resource
management system and would not require DOE assistance to address the
human resource management and site training sustainability element.
In addition, DOE and Rosatom are currently developing a joint
sustainability plan that is intended to govern sustainability
activities at the sites under Rosatom's control where DOE has installed
MPC&A systems. DOE officials told us that this joint sustainability
plan may be completed in March 2007. DOE officials believe that this
plan will be an important step in gaining Rosatom's buy-in to the
concepts of sustainability and will lead to a specific path forward and
detailed plan for funding sustainability activities for DOE, while
transitioning to full Russian responsibility in 2013. According to DOE
officials, the plan will be based largely on DOE's Sustainability
Guidelines and will include the seven key elements of sustainability
outlined in those guidelines. DOE anticipates spending about $437.8
million to provide sustainability support to sites in Russia and other
countries between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013.
While DOE's Sustainability Guidelines provide a framework for the
department's approach to sustainability implementation, the guidelines
do not call for a tracking system to assist MPC&A management in
assessing the progress being made toward DOE's goal of providing Russia
a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. Currently, DOE's Metrics
Information Management System (MIMS) contains data detailing the
department's progress in implementing the MPC&A program by tracking the
number of buildings and sites where DOE has installed security
upgrades, among other things. DOE also uses MIMS to track some measures
of progress in their sustainability efforts, such as the development of
site-specific plans that document how MPC&A site management will plan,
budget, direct, monitor, and evaluate all MPC&A systems. DOE managers
use MIMS as a tool in their oversight of the MPC&A program. However,
DOE officials acknowledged that the current MIMS data do not provide an
accurate picture of the department's progress toward its goal of
preparing Russia to take full responsibility for funding the
maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013.
Expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements
could give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A
program's progress toward the goal of preparing Russia to take full
responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-
funded upgrades by 2013. Further, DOE officials told us that improved
tracking of sustainability implementation would be useful to allow the
department to provide more accurate information to the Congress on
DOE's progress in its sustainability efforts.
DOE's Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades at Nuclear
Material Sites Are Being Sustained May Be Hampered by Access
Difficulties, Funding Concerns, and Other Issues:
Several challenges could impact DOE's ability to prepare Russia to
sustain security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable
nuclear material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2)
the limited financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-
funded MPC&A equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-
funded MPC&A equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A
Operations Monitoring (MOM) system at Rosatom facilities.
* According to DOE officials, Russia has denied DOE access at some
sites after the completion of security upgrades, making it difficult
for the department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of
U.S.-funded upgrades are being properly spent. For example, at one
facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE officials were
denied access from 1999 through 2002. DOE officials told us that after
commissioning the MPC&A system at this facility, the department had not
developed specific plans for sustaining the U.S.-funded security
equipment. Upon returning to the facility in September 2002, DOE
officials found that the U.S.-funded security upgrades were in a severe
state of disrepair. As a result, DOE has had to spend about $800,000 to
correct problems resulting from the site's inability to properly
maintain the U.S.-funded security upgrades. According to DOE officials,
these security upgrade replacement efforts are scheduled to be
completed in fiscal year 2007.
* Despite improvements in the Russian economy, some sites may not be
financially able to maintain DOE-funded security upgrades. The Russian
economy has improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
the financial troubles of the late 1990s.[Footnote 20] In September
2006, the Deputy Head of Rosatom stated that Russia is no longer in
need of U.S. assistance and that it is easier and more convenient for
Russia to pay for its own domestic nuclear security projects. However,
during our visit to Russia, officials at three of the four civilian
nuclear research institutes we visited told us that they are concerned
about their sites' financial ability to maintain U.S.-funded security
upgrades after U.S. assistance ends. Some of these sites do not receive
regular funds from the Russian government to support the operation and
maintenance of their MPC&A systems. As a result, Russian site officials
told us that, after DOE financial support ends in 2013, they will
likely face difficult choices about how to pay for maintenance of the
security upgrades DOE has provided.
* Some U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment is not certified for use at Russian
facilities, which means that the Russian government may not pay for its
maintenance. Certification is a mandatory Russian regulatory
requirement designed to ensure the functionality, safety, and security
of specific equipment, products, and technology used in Russian nuclear
sites. Certification of U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment must be obtained
before it can be legally used at Russian nuclear sites. DOE has
historically maintained that certification is a Russian responsibility,
and current DOE policy generally precludes funding for certification of
equipment. Despite repeated attempts to persuade Russia to fund
equipment certification, DOE is paying for some equipment to be
certified on a case-by-case basis. According to DOE officials, some
sites have equipment or MPC&A systems that are not fully certified for
use. For example, at eight sites that house weapons-usable nuclear
material, DOE-funded equipment used to make accurate measurements of
the type and quantity of nuclear material stored at these sites has not
been certified for use. Unless this equipment receives certification in
the near future, DOE may be forced to pay for maintenance longer than
it intends. Rosatom and DOE also have established a Joint Certification
Working Group that is developing a joint plan to certify key equipment
items. DOE developed the Equipment Certification and Vendor Support
project in 1998 to provide DOE project managers with accurate
information on the Russian certification process. DOE spent $23.6
million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006.
* There have been delays installing the MOM system at some Rosatom
facilities. In February 2001, we recommended that DOE develop a system,
in cooperation with Russia, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the
security systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they
continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear
material.[Footnote 21] In response to this recommendation, DOE
developed the MOM system, consisting of off-the-shelf video cameras and
other equipment designed to allow Russian officials to ensure that
MPC&A systems are properly staffed, personnel are vigilant, and key
security procedures are enforced. DOE officials told us in 2002 they
anticipated that the MOM system would be an integral part of DOE's
sustainability assistance to Russian sites. However, through the end of
fiscal year 2006, only five sites with weapons-usable nuclear material
where DOE installed security upgrades had the MOM system.[Footnote 22]
While DOE also plans to install equipment at two additional sites in
fiscal year 2007, none of the seven sites where DOE has installed or
plans to install MOM systems is controlled by Rosatom. Rosatom has been
unwilling to allow DOE to install MOM systems at sites under its
control.[Footnote 23] Unfortunately, DOE was unable to anticipate
Rosatom's resistance to the MOM system and, in 2002, the department pre-
purchased MOM equipment for use at Rosatom facilities. As a result, DOE
has had to pay for storage and upkeep of 367 MOM cameras and other
equipment since 2002. DOE officials told us that if Rosatom decides not
to allow MOM equipment at its sites, the excess equipment may be used
by other DOE programs, such as the Second Line of Defense program,
which works with Russia to combat nuclear smuggling by installing
radiation detection equipment at key border crossings. Through fiscal
year 2006, DOE had spent a total of $20.5 million on the MOM project,
including about $270,000 to pay for storage and upkeep of unused MOM
equipment that has been in storage since 2002.
Access Difficulties at Some Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites May Prohibit
DOE and DOD from Ensuring That Security Upgrades Are Being Sustained:
DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security
upgrades at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent
the agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither
department has reached an agreement with the Russian MOD on access
procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage
sites where the agencies are installing security upgrades. Site access
is needed to ensure that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia
maintain security upgrades at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach
an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for
sustainability activities at these 44 sites, or develop acceptable
alternatives to physical access, the agencies will be unable to
determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained
and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts.
DOE and DOD have formed an informal working group to more effectively
coordinate their efforts on sustainability of security upgrades at
Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD have agreed in principle
that the seven elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's
Sustainability Guidelines will be applied to the agencies' efforts to
help the Russian MOD sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead
sites. DOE and DOD's joint plan to address sustainability at Russian
nuclear warhead sites uses a three-phased approach, (1) addressing
processes and procedural issues, (2) establishing regional training and
maintenance centers, and (3) providing site-level assistance, such as
warrantees and spare parts.
* First, DOE is assisting the Russian MOD with the development of
regulations, operating procedures, and an independent inspections
process to help ensure that security systems continue to operate as
intended. Similarly, DOD has supported the development of a personnel
reliability program for the 12TH Main Directorate of the MOD and DOE is
planning to support a similar program for the Russian Navy and
Strategic Rocket Forces.
* Second, DOE and DOD have funded the construction of regional training
and maintenance centers. For example, DOE recently completed
construction of the Kola Technical Center, near Murmansk, Russia, which
serves as the centralized training and maintenance facility for all
Russian MOD sites in the Murmansk region, both naval nuclear fuel sites
and nuclear warhead storage sites.[Footnote 24] The Kola Technical
Center was commissioned in fall 2005, and Russian MOD officials told us
that the facility will help them prepare to assume full financial
responsibility for maintenance and sustainability when U.S. assistance
ends.
* Finally, at the site level, once DOE and DOD come to agreement with
the Russian MOD on verification of sustainability assistance, they will
assist in sustaining the upgraded security systems with a focus on
training and developing the Russian MOD's capability to maintain the
modernized systems. Initially, DOE and DOD will rely on contractor
support for repair of failed security systems while the Russian MOD's
capability is being developed, gradually transitioning to full Russian
system support.
Although DOE and DOD are working closely to provide sustainability
assistance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites, differences exist
in the length of time DOE and DOD intend to fund sustainability
activities at these sites. Specifically, DOE intends to fund
sustainability until 2013, while DOD plans to halt funding in 2011.
This has the potential to cause difficulties for the Russian MOD when
it comes to funding sustainability earlier at sites where DOD installed
security upgrades. In addition, DOD plans no further support with
respect to sustainability for warhead transportation upgrades it has
provided to the Russian MOD, because, according to DOD officials, the
Russian MOD has not requested assistance for this activity.
Conclusions:
DOE and DOD have made significant progress in helping Russia and other
countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable
nuclear material and nuclear warheads. Since our 2003 report, DOE has
worked with Russia to resolve many of the access difficulties that we
reported, especially at sites within the Rosatom weapons complex.
However, in our view, DOE's current metric for reporting progress on
the number of buildings secured by its MPC&A program provides the
Congress with a potentially misleading assessment of the security at
these facilities. Specifically, DOE should not report to the Congress
that buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other
countries are "secure" until all DOE risk reduction goals have been
achieved, and all planned upgrades at those buildings are completed.
Currently, DOE considers buildings to be "secured" after only limited
MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades) are installed, even when additional
comprehensive upgrades are planned. Rapid upgrades do not include the
majority of measures DOE uses to address the threat of insider theft at
Russian nuclear sites, which DOE considers to be one of its most
pressing concerns. DOE provides most upgrades designed to address the
insider threat during the comprehensive upgrades phase. Further, DOE
officials told us that comprehensive upgrades are necessary to achieve
all risk reduction goals at buildings with nuclear material, calling
into question DOE's decision to report buildings without such upgrades
completed as "secure."
As DOE nears the completion of its security upgrade work in its MPC&A
program, the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in
Russia and other countries has become increasingly important for
ensuring that the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15
years is not wasted. DOE and Rosatom have been cooperating to develop a
joint sustainability plan for the majority of sites where DOE has
installed MPC&A upgrades. We believe this is a critical step in gaining
agreement on what remains to be done before DOE transfers full
responsibility for sustainability of MPC&A upgrades to Russia in 2013.
While DOE uses its Metrics Information Management System to track some
measures of progress in its sustainability efforts, DOE officials
acknowledged that the current MIMS data do not provide an accurate
picture of the department's progress toward its goal of preparing
Russia to take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and
sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Creating a new
management information system for sustainability or expanding MIMS to
include tracking for all sustainability elements could give DOE
managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program's progress
on sustainability and would aid the department in providing the
Congress with a more accurate assessment of the progress made toward
DOE's goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear
material and warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that
the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take
the following two actions:
* revise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to
better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at
buildings reported as "secure;" and:
* develop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics
Information Management System to more clearly track DOE's progress in
developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has
installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of
the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's
Sustainability Guidelines.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOE generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no
written comments on our report. DOE and DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
In its comments, DOE provided additional information about the metric
it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not
using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with
Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE agreed that the current metric it
uses to track progress in the MPC&A program may be confusing. DOE wrote
that it is changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies
the level of completion for upgrades. Similarly, DOE officials told us
in January 2007 that they were taking steps to modify the progress
metric. However, in February 2007, DOE issued its Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request, which did not include modifications to clarify the
confusions DOE agrees are present in its progress metric. As a result,
DOE's most recent budget justification continues to present the
Congress with an unclear picture of the progress made in improving
security at buildings with weapons-useable nuclear material in Russia
and other countries because DOE's progress metric does not recognize
that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings that
the department lists as being "secure."
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]
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report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in
appendix VI.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We performed our review of U.S. efforts to assist Russia and other
countries in securing nuclear materials and warheads at the Departments
of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD) and State (State); the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington, D.C; the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency in Fort Belvior, Virginia; Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory in
Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. We visited Russia to discuss the
implementation of U.S. nuclear material and warhead security assistance
programs with Russian officials. We also spoke with officials from the
U.S. embassy in Moscow, DOE's Moscow office, and the DOD's Defense
Threat Reduction Office in Moscow.
While in Russia we met with officials from the Federal Agency for
Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), Rostekhnadzor (the
Russian nuclear regulatory authority), and the Ministry of Defense
(MOD)--including representatives from the 12TH Main Directorate, Navy,
and Strategic Rocket Forces. We requested visits to the Institute of
Nuclear Materials, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering,
Interdepartmental Special Training Center, Russian Methodological
Training Center, and All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of
Technical Physics (also known as Chelyabinsk-70 and Snezhinsk), but
Rosatom denied us access to all facilities under its control, including
these. In fact, we were denied access to some Russian sites GAO
officials had visited during past reviews of U.S. nonproliferation
programs. Rosatom officials told us that because our names were not on
the list of 185 individuals provided by DOE for access under the terms
of a 2001 access arrangement, we would not be allowed to visit any
Rosatom facilities. Rosatom officials did not deny our request for
access until we had already arrived in Russia to begin our fieldwork
for this review. In addition, the Russian MOD denied our request to
visit a naval nuclear fuel facility, Site 49, and a naval nuclear
warhead facility near Murmansk, Russia, due to military exercises
scheduled near these sites during the time of our visit.
We were able meet our audit objectives by visiting four sites--
civilian, educational, and research institutes that are not under
Rosatom's control--where DOE had provided security upgrades through
NNSA's Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program:
Karpov Institute for Physical Chemistry, Kurchatov Institute, Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research, and Moscow State Engineering and
Physics Institute. During our visits to these sites, we discussed the
implementation of the MPC&A program, sustainability of U.S.-funded
MPC&A upgrades, and the future of DOE cooperation with Russian
officials. In addition, we visited a training facility near Murmansk,
Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to Russian MOD
personnel in the Murmansk region.
To assess the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other
countries secure nuclear material, we had discussions with officials
from NNSA's MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos,
and Sandia National Laboratories, and experts from nongovernmental
organizations that specialize in nuclear nonproliferation. We reviewed
various program documents, including the MPC&A Programmatic Guidelines,
MPC&A Program Management Document, project work plans, and the DOE-
Rosatom Joint Action Plan. We also analyzed financial information
detailing program expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates,
and contract data for expenditures of the MPC&A program through the end
of fiscal year 2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we
questioned key database officials about data entry access, internal
control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data,
following up with further questions, as necessary. Although any caveats
and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation of our
work, we determined that the data we received were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
To assess the progress DOE and DOD have made in assisting Russia with
securing nuclear warheads, we reviewed documents and had discussions
with officials from NNSA's MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak
Ridge and Sandia National Laboratories, DOD's Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency. We spoke with officials from the Russian MOD and visited a
training facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to
provide training to Russian MOD personnel. We analyzed financial
information detailing program expenditures, projected costs and
schedule estimates, and contract data from both DOE and DOD through the
end of fiscal year 2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we
questioned key database officials about on data entry access, internal
control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data,
following up with further questions, as necessary. Although any caveats
and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation of our
work, we determined that these data were also sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
In addition, we reviewed guidance on government contracting, including
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, DOD Earned
Value Management (EVM) Implementation Guide, and DOE Order
413.3A.[Footnote 25] After reviewing this guidance, we requested copies
of DOE and DOD's ongoing contracts valued over $20 million for work to
help Russia and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads.
To determine how DOE's large contracts were being managed, we reviewed
contract documents and identified a requirement for quarterly reporting
in the contracts. We contacted the Contracting Officers identified in
the contracts to request information on how the contracts are managed
in respect to applicable criteria required by OMB and DOE directives.
Additionally, we reviewed DOD's large contracts for installing security
upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites and reviewed documentation
from DOD's contractors, Bechtel National, Inc., and Raytheon Technical
Services. After analyzing these contracts and other related
documentation, we determined that both of DOD's contracts reflected an
EVM system. DOD provided us with certification documentation for
Bechtel and Raytheon's EVM systems, a requirement called for by federal
guidance for all EVM systems. Since the scope of work within the
Bechtel contract was at or near completion, we evaluated only the
contract performance management for Raytheon, in order to determine how
DOD was executing and managing its large contracts for security
upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOD provided Raytheon's cost
performance reports which GAO contracting experts assessed for cost and
schedule variances in contracted work. After review of Raytheon's cost
performance reports, we determined that shortfalls in scheduled work
were resulting in a schedule variance equivalent to around $13
million.[Footnote 26]
To assess the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the
sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades, we
had discussions with officials from NNSA's MPC&A program; DOE's
contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories;
DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We analyzed program documents,
including DOE's May 2004 interim Sustainability Guidelines, DOE's
December 2006 final Sustainability Guidelines, DOE-DOD Joint
Sustainability Task Force documents, DOE-Rosatom Joint Sustainability
Working Group documents, and project work plans. We interviewed program
officials responsible for the development of DOE's Sustainability
Guidelines and program managers responsible for implementing them. We
also discussed the sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades with Russian
officials at sites we visited.
We performed our review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts
to Secure Nuclear Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites
with Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia:
From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent a total of
$131.5 million on efforts to help countries outside of Russia secure
facilities with nuclear material (see fig. 4). Responsibility for
managing DOE's MPC&A efforts in countries outside of Russia has shifted
among a number of offices within DOE and NNSA.[Footnote 27]
Responsibility for sustainability of upgrades at sites in the former
Soviet Union now rests with the Office of Weapons Material Protection
within the Office of International Materials Protection and Cooperation
in NNSA. The Office of Materials Consolidation and Civilian Sites
within the Office of International Materials Protection and Cooperation
in NNSA is responsible for implementing MPC&A efforts outside of the
former Soviet Union, such as DOE's efforts in China and India.
Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End of Fiscal
Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of Russia:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and map Resources (map).
Note: In addition to the spending illustrated in the above figure, DOE
also spent $33.7 million on miscellaneous MPC&A efforts outside of
Russia through the end of fiscal year 2006. Also, all dollar amounts
are rounded, and dollars are in millions.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Belarus:
DOE provided security upgrades to two buildings at one facility--the
Sosny Scientific and Technical Center (now known as the Joint Institute
of Power and Nuclear Research-Sosny)--in Belarus. DOE began work at
this site in April 1994, and the initial phase of MPC&A upgrades was
completed in December 1997. After this, DOE was unable to conduct
additional work in the country due to sanctions the United States had
placed on Belarus.[Footnote 28] However, in May 2003, the Department of
State modified its position and allowed a team from DOE to visit Sosny
solely to review the status of the MPC&A systems provided with U.S.
funds. The DOE team visited the site in June 2003 and noted several
security deficiencies that required immediate improvement. Shortly
thereafter, DOE received approval from the Department of State to
return to Belarus to perform a comprehensive vulnerability assessment
at the Sosny site. According to DOE officials, the Department of
State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund allocated $250,000 for
design work and $1.6 million for further upgrades in 2003 and 2005,
respectively. Since there is currently no government-to-government
agreement between the United States and Belarus, the project is being
administered via the International Scientific and Technical Center's
Partners Program. However, no funding has been spent yet because the
Belarusian government suspended the project due to concerns over
sharing information with a foreign entity. In the fall of 2006, Belarus
indicated that it was again ready to move forward with the project. DOE
sent a team to Sosny in December 2006 and was able to re-establish
relations, as well as, develop a statement of work for the design of a
communications system for the site and a project work plan for material
control and accounting. Additional trips are planned for February and
April 2007. DOE hopes to complete a second phase of MPC&A upgrades at
the site in fiscal year 2008. In total, DOE spent about $3.6 million
through the end of fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to
Belarus.
China:
DOE has a cooperative engagement program with China on issues related
to nuclear material security. The purpose of the engagement is to
increase awareness of our respective approaches to nuclear security
issues, as well as MPC&A methodologies and applicable technologies, and
to work cooperatively to improve security in these areas when and where
appropriate. DOE is pursuing this objective through dialogue and
technical collaboration with the China Atomic Energy Authority in
China's civilian nuclear sector and is attempting initial engagements
with the China Academy of Engineering Physics in China's defense
nuclear sector.
DOE is pursuing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese civilian nuclear
sector under the Statement of Intent signed with the China Atomic
Energy Authority in January 2004 and the DOE-China Atomic Energy
Authority Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement. In February
2004, DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority agreed to conduct a
Joint Technology Demonstration on integrated nuclear material
management in Beijing. The purpose of this demonstration project was to
promote the adoption of modern security practices and technologies at
civilian nuclear facilities by demonstrating established physical
protection, nuclear material control and accounting, and international
safeguards technologies that provide a first line of defense against
nuclear material theft, diversion, and sabotage. The Joint Technology
Demonstration took place in Beijing in October 2005. Following the
completion of the technology demonstration project, DOE is currently
discussing ideas for future bilateral work with the China Atomic Energy
Authority and the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy. Through fiscal
year 2006, DOE had spent about $4.7 million on MPC&A cooperation with
China.
Georgia:
DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Georgia, the
Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tbilisi. Work began at
this site in January 1996 and was completed in May 1996, at a cost of
about $0.2 million. All fresh and spent nuclear fuel was transferred
from the facility to a secure nuclear site in Scotland in April 1998
under a multinational effort known as Operation Auburn Endeavor. DOE's
MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Georgia.
India:
DOE's cooperative security engagement program with India is in its
initial stages. DOE is investigating near-term opportunities to engage
India on issues related to nuclear material security with the intent of
initiating a cooperative program with India on nuclear security best
practices. Potential issues for discussion include the theoretical
framework for developing and implementing a design basis threat; the
methodology for designing effective physical protection systems; a
vulnerability assessment methodology; regulatory infrastructure for
material control and accounting, and physical protection; and general
nuclear security culture. DOE spent about $100,000 on MPC&A cooperation
with India through the end of fiscal year 2006.
Latvia:
DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Latvia, the Latvian
Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (also known as the Latvian
Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils). Work began at this site in
July 1994 and was completed in February 1996. Since fiscal year 1994,
DOE has spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades
at this facility. In May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh highly enriched
uranium (HEU) fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned
to Russia. According to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the
Russian Federation (Rosatom), the HEU fuel will be downblended into low-
enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants.
DOE's MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Latvia.
Lithuania:
DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Lithuania, the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. Work began at this site in October 1995
and was completed in August 1996. Since fiscal year 1996, DOE has spent
about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this
facility. DOE counted one building at this facility as secure in its
progress metric for the MPC&A program that tracks the number of
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material secured, even though the
facility never possessed such material.[Footnote 29] During the course
of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE management, and
they agreed to remove the facility from the progress report in DOE's
fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. DOE's MPC&A program
currently has no ongoing work in Lithuania.
Kazakhstan:
DOE provided security upgrades to four sites in Kazakhstan: the
Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, the Institute of Nuclear Physics
at Alatau, the BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, and the Ulba
Metallurgical Plant. In total, DOE spent about $45.3 million from
fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance
to Kazakhstan.
Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov:
The Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, formerly called Semipalatinsk-
21, is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center. Two nuclear
research reactors are located at the site. DOE began providing both
physical security and material control and accounting upgrades to the
site in October 1994, and the site was commissioned in September 1997.
The perimeter security system at the site was commissioned in July
1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Atomic Energy-
Kurchatov with spare parts, extended warranties, and training to
sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
Institute of Nuclear Physics:
The Institute of Nuclear Physics is a branch of the Kazakhstan National
Nuclear Center located in the town of Alatau. The site operates a 10-
megawatt research reactor used to manufacture radioisotopes as a
radiation source for industrial and medical use, among other
activities. DOE began work at the site in September 1995 and completed
upgrades in October 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute
of Nuclear Physics at Alatau with extended warranties and training to
sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
BN-350 Reactor at Aktau:
DOE provided upgrades to two buildings at the BN-350 reactor site at
Aktau. MPC&A upgrade work began in September 1994 and was completed in
December 1998. In May 2002, HEU fuel was transferred from the BN-350
breeder reactor in Aktau to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with the
assistance of a nongovernmental organization involved in
nonproliferation efforts--the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The HEU fuel
will be downblended into low-enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in
civilian nuclear reactors.
Ulba Metallurgical Plant:
The Ulba Metallurgical Plant contains a low-enriched uranium fuel
fabrication facility, among other resources. The fuel fabrication
facility produces nuclear fuel pellets with a capacity of 1,000 metric
tons per year. Security upgrades work began in September 1994 and was
completed in September 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Ulba
Metallurgical Plant with extended warranties and spare parts to sustain
its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
In addition, on November 21, 1994, 581 kilograms of HEU was transferred
from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the United States in a highly
secret project code-named "Sapphire." The project was carried out with
cooperation from the Kazakhstani government and DOE and DOD.[Footnote
30] The large stockpile of HEU, reportedly left over from the Soviet
Union's secret Alfa submarine program, had been stored at the Ulba
Metallurgical Plant in unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities without
electronic means of accounting. Experts estimate the nuclear material
was sufficient to make 20-25 nuclear bombs. The HEU was downblended
into low-enriched uranium for use in civilian nuclear power plants in
the late 1990s.
Ukraine:
DOE provided MPC&A assistance to four sites in Ukraine: Kharkiv
Institute of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear
Research, Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry,
and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. In total, DOE spent about $37.7
million from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A
assistance to Ukraine, including installation of security upgrades,
maintenance of installed MPC&A systems, and training for site
personnel.
Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology:
The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology conducts nuclear fuel
cycle research and has important experimental physics facilities
including a number of electron and ion accelerators. DOE provided
upgrades to one building at this site. Security upgrades work began in
May 1995 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to
assist the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology with extended
warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year
2007.
Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research:
The Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research was established in 1970 and is
operated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The institute's primary
function is to perform research in low-and medium-energy nuclear
physics. Security upgrades work began at one building at this site in
December 1993 and was completed in October 1997. DOE plans to continue
to assist the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research with extended
warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year
2007.
Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry:
The Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry's
mission is to support Ukraine's nuclear power industry by training
nuclear power plant personnel. The facility operates a 200-kilowatt,
light-water cooled, research reactor. Security upgrades work began at
one building at this facility in May 1996 and was completed in January
1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Sevastopol National Institute
of Nuclear Energy and Industry with extended warranties and training to
sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant:
In addition to these facilities, DOE provided MPC&A upgrades to a
fourth site that does not possess weapons-usable nuclear material, the
South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. DOE began security upgrades work at
this site in August 1994 and completed its upgrades work in January
1999. DOE counted this facility as secured in its progress metric for
the MPC&A program, even though the facility never possessed such
material. During the course of our review, we brought this to the
attention of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility
from their progress report in DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget
justification document. According to DOE officials, no further MPC&A
assistance is planned at this site.
Uzbekistan:
In Uzbekistan, DOE's project goal is to continue to enhance
capabilities and commitment to operating and maintaining security
improvements at two institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Tashkent and the Foton facility. In total, DOE spent about $4.4 million
from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A
assistance to Uzbekistan.
Institute of Nuclear Physics:
Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the
Institute of Nuclear Physics operates a 10-megawatt research reactor.
Often described as the largest facility of its kind in central Asia,
the site has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear
research and isotope production facility for the region. The facility
maintains fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to
support continued reactor operations. Security upgrades at the site
began in June 1995 and were provided by a joint team from the United
States, Australia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Australia and Sweden
agreed to provide assistance in the area of material control and
accounting, while the United States and United Kingdom agreed to
provide physical protection upgrades. Upgrades were provided in two
phases. Phase I upgrades were completed in August 1996. After the
attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE began to work with the facility to
develop a plan to further improve its security system. Additional
upgrades focused on the facility perimeter and included the
installation of new fencing and exterior intrusion detection sensors.
In addition, the Department of State provided about $0.6 million in
fiscal year 2002 through its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to
supply cameras and lighting for the facility's perimeter. All Phase II
upgrades were completed in September 2002. A commissioning ceremony was
held in October 2002. In 2006, DOE announced the removal of 63
kilograms of HEU in the form of spent nuclear fuel from the facility.
The HEU spent fuel was returned to Russia through DOE's Global Threat
Reduction Initiative. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of
Nuclear Physics with extended warranties and training to sustain its
MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
Foton Facility:
The Foton facility has a small research reactor containing less than 5
kilograms of HEU. MPC&A upgrades at the site began in January 2005 and
were completed in May 2005. Physical security upgrades at the Foton
facility focused on the research reactor building and included such
things as intrusion detection sensors, improved access controls, and a
central alarm station. DOE plans to continue to assist the Foton
facility with extended warranties to sustain its MPC&A systems in
fiscal year 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure
and Related Programs:
In addition to DOE's efforts to provide security upgrades at sites with
weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other
countries, the department implements other crosscutting efforts to
support the efforts of its MPC&A program, such as assistance for
transportation security, equipment for protective forces at nuclear
facilities, and efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer
buildings and sites. According to DOE officials, these efforts support
DOE's goal of improving security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-
usable nuclear material by contributing to the overall security systems
at nuclear materials sites in Russia and other countries. As table 4
shows, through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $493.9
million on these efforts.
Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts through
the End of Fiscal Year 2006:
Dollars in millions.
Material consolidation and conversion;
Spending: $128.8.
Secure transportation;
Spending: 88.1.
Training and technical support infrastructure;
Spending: 63.6.
Russian Federation inspection implementation;
Spending: 43.1.
Protective forces assistance;
Spending: 30.2.
Federal Information System;
Spending: 29.1.
Regulatory development;
Spending: 27.0.
Certification[A];
Spending: 23.6.
MPC&A operations monitoring[A];
Spending: 20.5.
MPC&A operations/sustainability[A];
Spending: 13.9.
MPC&A education;
Spending: 13.4.
Material control and accounting measurements;
Spending: 10.8.
MPC&A security culture;
Spending: 1.3.
Taxation and customs;
Spending: 0.5.
Total;
Spending: $493.9.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.
[A] The certification, MPC&A operations monitoring, and MPC&A
operations/sustainability projects are discussed in the body of this
report. Dollar amounts are rounded.
[End of table]
Material Consolidation and Conversion:
DOE's Material Consolidation and Conversion project supports the
transfer of HEU from Russian sites where it is no longer needed in
order to secure locations within Russia for eventual conversion to low-
enriched uranium. According to DOE, consolidation and conversion
efforts significantly reduce the requirements and costs of securing
material. For example, in 2006, DOE announced the completion of a 2-
year cooperative effort to remove HEU from the Krylov Shipbuilding
Research Institute, a Russian research facility located near St.
Petersburg. DOE teams worked with their Russian counterparts to
validate the inventory of nuclear material and confirm that it was
securely packaged for transport. DOE paid for the HEU to be shipped to
another facility in Russia where it will be converted (downblended) to
low-enriched uranium, which will eliminate it as a proliferation
concern. Through the Material Consolidation and Conversion project, DOE
has also supported the secure storage and conversion of Russian-origin
HEU that has been returned to Russia from countries such as Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. DOE reported in
July 2006 that more than 8,000 kilograms of HEU had been downblended
into low-enriched uranium under the project. Through the end of fiscal
year 2006, DOE had spent about $128.8 million on the project.
Secure Transportation:
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during
transit. By providing upgraded security for transport and guard
railcars, specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure
containers--called overpacks--DOE seeks to reduce the risks of theft
and sabotage of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear
facilities in Russia. The goal of the Secure Transportation project is
to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of material or warheads during
transportation operations in Russia by improving security for railcars
and trucks, Russian nuclear material and warhead transport
infrastructure, and communications interface with response forces.
Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $88.1 million to improve
the transportation security of nuclear material in Russia, by providing
76 cargo trucks, 86 escort vehicles, as well as 66 cargo railcars, 25
guard railcars, and 283 security overpacks. This included 54
refurbished cargo railcars, 25 new manufactured guard railcars, 12 new
manufactured cargo railcars, and approximately 78 cargo trucks and 89
escort trucks to support both on-site and off-site nuclear material
shipments.
Training and Technical Support Infrastructure:
DOE provides a variety of training and technical support to both the
Russian Navy and Rosatom to help these entities operate and maintain
U.S.-funded security upgrades and MPC&A systems. One of the primary
accomplishments of the project was the construction of the Kola
Technical Center near Murmansk. The facility was designed and
constructed by DOE to be a central training and maintenance center to
support naval nuclear fuel and warhead sites in the Murmansk region.
DOE completed construction of the Kola Technical Center in June 2005 at
a cost of $24 million.[Footnote 31] We visited the facility during our
trip to Russia. Russian officials told us that the Kola Technical
Center is critical to help the Russian MOD transition to full financial
responsibility for sustainability after U.S. funding ends.
In addition, DOE provides support to Rosatom's regional training
facilities through the Rosatom Training and Technical Support
Infrastructure project. These facilities, such as the Interdepartmental
Special Training Center and the Russian Methodological and Training
Center, seek to train specialists and guard forces to safeguard
materials at Russian nuclear sites. Additionally, these centers seek to
assist Rosatom by providing effective and sustainable training and
technical support infrastructures. To date, DOE has spent $42.5 million
on the establishment of these training and technological support
centers.
Russian Federation Inspection Implementation:
The Russian Federation Inspection Implementation project seeks to
enhance nuclear material inspections by establishing a sustainable
infrastructure with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations
through federal and industry oversight. Under this project, DOE
provides inspection support to Rostekhnadzor, Rosatom, and other
Russian ministries and agencies. The project enhances MPC&A nuclear
material inspections at the ministerial, agency, and site-level by
providing comprehensive training, inspection, and technical assistance,
as well as sufficient information technology to aid inspectors in
conducting systematic inspections. For example, DOE assists Russian
organizations in developing a systematic inspection approach that
assures the MPC&A objectives are met and assists organizations in
defining the inspection program by benchmarking proposed inspection
methodologies against U.S. and other inspection approaches. Through
fiscal year 2006, DOE has sponsored 83 inspections by Rosatom and
Rostekhnadzor, and 980 Russian personnel have attended inspection
courses. DOE's goal for the project is to maintain a cadre of about 125
trained inspectors. DOE had spent about $43.1 million on this project
through the end of fiscal year 2006.
Protective Forces Assistance:
The objective of the Protective Force Assistance project is to ensure
that a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained response
forces are present and able to protect against threats to highly-
desirable nuclear material at Russian and Ukrainian sites and during
transit. The project includes efforts in Russia and Ukraine, although
the bulk of the efforts and money are spent in Russia. As of fiscal
year 2006, DOE spent about $26.7 million to purchase a variety of
equipment, such as bulletproof vests, helmets, response vehicles, and
cold-weather uniforms for use by the forces that protect sites that
store weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. As of fiscal year
2006, DOE spent about $3.4 million to purchase the same type of
equipment for Ukrainian sites.
Federal Information System:
The Federal Information System (FIS) is a computerized management
information system designed to track the location and movement of
nuclear material between organizations throughout Russia. The FIS
provides information on the quantity of nuclear material located at
facilities that report to Rosatom. The system is centralized and
automated to ensure that information can be received, tracked, and
monitored by Rosatom. The development of the FIS is important to the
MPC&A program because, prior to its development, Russian nuclear
facilities generally used paper-based systems to track nuclear material
inventories. The FIS will allow the Russian government to maintain an
accurate and complete inventory of its weapons-usable nuclear material.
As of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that 21 organizations and
facilities throughout Russia report to the FIS. Through the end of
fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $29.1 million to develop the FIS.
Regulatory Development:
The purpose of the Regulatory Development project is to assist Russian
regulatory and operating agencies and services in developing a
sustainable MPC&A regulatory system for civilian nuclear materials site
security and to also provide assistance to regulatory agencies in
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The regulatory framework establishes legal
requirements for MPC&A activities for relevant ministries, agencies,
services, operating organizations, and facilities. DOE works with
Rosatom, Rostekhnadzor--Russia's civilian nuclear regulatory authority,
and other agencies to develop consistent MPC&A requirements across
ministries, operating organizations, and facilities. In doing so, DOE
aims to create incentives for effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions
for noncompliance with regulations in order to foster a strong MPC&A
culture and help sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades. Through the end
of fiscal year 2006, the project has achieved enactment of 67
regulations, which is 35 percent of the total planned. In addition, DOE
has worked with the Russian MOD to develop a comprehensive regulatory
base that ensures MPC&A practices are implemented consistently
throughout all branches and services of the Russian MOD. DOE spent
about $27 million through fiscal year 2006 on its regulatory
development projects.
MPC&A Education:
The MPC&A Education project supports efforts in Russia to train
existing and future MPC&A experts. The project consists of two
educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute
and one degree program at Tomsk Polytechnic University. The first
educational degree program is the MPC&A Graduate Program available only
at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. DOE worked with both the
Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University
to develop an undergraduate engineering program, focusing on more
technical, hands-on aspects of nuclear security. For each of these
degree programs, DOE works with the two universities to develop
curriculum; identify and acquire training aids; develop and publish
textbooks; and strengthen instructor skills. In addition, DOE works
with the Monterey Institute of International Studies[Footnote 32] to
support the instruction of nontechnical nonproliferation courses at
universities and high schools located outside of Moscow. Through the
end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $13.4 million on the
project.
Material Control and Accounting Measurements:
The Material Control and Accounting Measurements project provides
support to Russia for developing a national system of reference
materials (standards), nuclear material measurement methods,
instruments, and infrastructure to support the accurate measurement and
accounting of weapons-usable nuclear material at Russian facilities.
Reference materials, measurement methods, and instruments are needed to
accurately measure the quantity and isotopic composition of nuclear
material during inventories and transfers for input into accountability
databases. Accurate material control and accounting measurements are
key components to any MPC&A system. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had
spent about $10.8 million under this project and has purchased and
distributed transportable equipment that allows for the testing of
uranium and plutonium.
MPC&A Security Culture:
The MPC&A Security Culture project supports the overall MPC&A goal of
assisting Russia with enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its
commitment to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security by
fostering the development of training centers and developing an
outreach strategy to enhance partner countries' awareness and
understanding of MPC&A benefits, e.g., an MPC&A security "culture." The
main objective of this project is to establish an infrastructure that
emphasizes the importance of MPC&A and increase the commitment
throughout Russia to operate and maintain MPC&A systems with minimal
U.S. support by reinforcing the necessary attitudes and beliefs
required to instill a strong MPC&A culture. Accomplishments under this
project include training 1,800 staff in security culture and initiating
a pilot security culture coordinator project at nine sites. Through the
end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $1.3 million on the MPC&A
Security Culture project.
In addition to its efforts to improve the security culture at Russian
nuclear sites, DOE recently conducted a series of workshops for Russian
officials on MPC&A best practices at U.S. nuclear sites. The workshops
included presentations by U.S. MPC&A experts. In conducting this
workshop series, DOE intends to further enhance the security culture at
Russian sites by working to educate Russian site officials on the
methods used at U.S. facilities, so that these best practices can be
applied at Russian sites.
Taxation and Customs:
The MPC&A Taxation and Customs project began in 1999 to meet a
congressional mandate that U.S. nuclear safety and security programs
not pay taxes in Russia. The MPC&A program must obtain a certified tax
exemption when providing technical equipment and services. The Taxation
and Customs project assists DOE project teams' understanding of
taxation and customs issues and ensures compliance with Russian laws.
The project stays abreast of Russian taxation and customs legislation,
as well as guidance on bureaucracy and requirements for tax exemption,
by holding workshops for Russian sites; tracking the tax-exemption
process; and maintaining a taxation Web site for DOE project teams.
Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $0.5 million
on the project.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
NNSA:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
February 21, 2007:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security
at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-Term Sustainability of U.S.-
Funded Security Upgrades is Uncertain." We understand that this report
was done at the request of the Chairman, House Energy and Commerce
Committee, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate's
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
While we generally concur with the findings in the report, we have a
number of comments for clarification.
Regarding the metric reporting the number of buildings secured, we
agree that the metric as currently applied may be confusing, but we are
already changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies the
level of completion for upgrades. In addition, we would like to point
out that important risk reduction activities, including additional
delay at the target, two-person rule for access to material, and the
confirmation of rapid base-line inventories, occur during rapid
upgrades, which significantly reduce the risk of theft by both an
outside adversary and a facility insider. We would also like to point
out that during our upgrades process there is no sharp delineation
between the completion of rapid upgrades and the beginning of
comprehensive upgrades. In most situations comprehensive upgrades begin
before rapid upgrades are completed, and in the 51 buildings identified
in the GAO report, comprehensive upgrades are already underway, and are
in varying stages of implementation.
Regarding earned value management, we do not require our contractors to
implement earned value management (EVM) systems for firm fixed price
contracts such as the ones used by the Department to upgrade security
on Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. DOE Policy P 413.1 and DOE
Order O 413.3A instruct program managers to utilize EVM for the
acquisition of capital assets for Departmental use, but specifically
exclude projects conducted under cooperative agreements. The
Department's Office of Engineering and Construction Management has
confirmed that EVM is not required for projects at sensitive Russian
military facilities, where day-to-day management of events could not be
directly monitored by U.S. personnel. While EVM may be appropriate for
contracting methodologies used by DOD --which feature "cost-plus-award
fee" mechanisms and are executed through various task orders - our
Laboratories negotiate fixed-priced contracts directly with Russian
integrating contractors. Since we negotiate all costs upfront prior to
commencing the upgrades, and these costs include all equipment and
installation prices, there is zero-cost variance during the period of
performance, for which EVM would otherwise be appropriate. We
concentrate on managing possible schedule variances due to force
majeure or unforeseen technical challenges that may arise during the
period of performance, and have therefore implemented a system for
managing large contracts, which combines classical milestone/work
breakdown structure methodologies with those principles of EVM
appropriate for assistance work in Russia. This system includes
stringent periodic reporting requirements, institutionalized In-
Progress Review meetings with contractors, and detailed laboratory
analyses. This system helps us ensure that upgrades are installed in
accordance with the established milestones, the conceptual designs
agreed to between NNSA and the Russian MOD, and the site-specific
designs required by the contracts.
Regarding sustainability, as the report correctly points out, in the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization of 2003, the Congress directed
us to transfer a sustainable MPC&A system to sole Russian support no
later than January 1, 2013. To carry out this mandate, the Department
has been actively engaged with the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency
(Rosatom) to develop a program to transition full support to the
Russian Federation. Rosatom and NNSA established a Joint Sustainability
working group that has met on six occasions since January 2005 to
develop a joint Russian-U.S. sustainability plan which identifies
sustainability requirements that need to be met by each site before a
full transition to sole Russian support can take place. We expect that
a final plan will be presented to the Joint Coordinating Committee at
its next meeting in April 2007. We have developed and recently updated
our programmatic guidelines for sustainability that provide
standardized criteria for sustaining MPC&A upgrades, and a list of
sustainability indicators that we currently use to track progress at 15
sites. We will extend the use of these metrics to all sites as they
complete the MPC&A upgrades and incorporate the reporting into a
sustainability management system as called for in the report.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management, or
me.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]
loisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, R. Stockton Butler, Jeffery
Hartnett, Lisa Henson, and Jim Shafer made significant contributions to
this report. Other assistance was provided by John Delicath, Jennifer
Echard, Brandon Haller, Gregory Marchand, Keith Rhodes, and Karen
Richey.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some
DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. GAO-05-828. Washington,
D.C.: August 29, 2005.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and
Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-329. Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-
482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material
Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, D.C.:
February 28, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear
Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/
NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April
13, 1999.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
1993.
(360674):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Weapons-usable nuclear materials are uranium enriched to 20 percent
or greater in uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium
containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less
than 10 percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These
types of materials are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.
[2] We recently reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
For additional information see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S.
Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries,
GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006) and GAO, Preventing
Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing
Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-
05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[3] In 1991, the Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction
Act of 1991, popularly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Act, authorizing
U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, due to
concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Pub.
L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note). The
legislation authorized funding to assist the former Soviet Union with
its efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical and other weapons; (2)
transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with
their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the
proliferation of such weapons. As a result of this assistance, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned all Soviet nuclear weapons on their
territories to Russia in the early 1990s.
[4] NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
[5] We reported on U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and warheads
in Russia, including DOE's MPC&A program, most recently in 2003. See
GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed
to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-
03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
[6] DOE, Programmatic Guidelines for Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities (first published December
1998, revised September 2001 and December 2005).
[7] DOE, Department of Energy Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget
Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, vol. 1, 514,
February 2006.
[8] Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear
Security Cooperation, February 24, 2005.
[9] Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President V. V.
Putin, July 17, 2006.
[10] Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 3156(b)(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2343).
[11] The Office of the Second Line of Defense is composed of two
programs: the Second Line of Defense-Core program and the Megaports
Initiative. We recently reported on these efforts, which are not
discussed in this report. For additional information, see GAO-06-311
and GAO-05-375.
[12] Additional information on DOE's MPC&A efforts in countries outside
of Russia can be found in appendix III.
[13] DOE officials noted that comprehensive upgrades work is in
"varying stages of implementation" at these 51 buildings.
[14] DOE and DOD differ somewhat in their definition of what
constitutes a "site." For example, some temporary nuclear warhead
storage sites controlled by the Russian Navy, where DOE installed
upgrades, consist of one or more piers where submarines are berthed,
which are generally smaller than permanent warhead storage sites.
[15] We reported in 2003 that DOE and DOD did not have consistent plans
to balance nuclear warhead security improvements against the
possibility of enhancing the operational capability of Russia's nuclear
forces. In January 2003, the National Security Council issued
guidelines that generally prohibited assistance to operational sites
due to concerns that U.S. assistance might enhance Russia's military
capability. As a result of these guidelines and other internal policy
decisions, DOE plans no further assistance to 21 nuclear warhead sites
where the department had installed rapid upgrades and one additional
site where DOE had installed both rapid and comprehensive upgrades.
[16] An EVM system compares the value of the work accomplished during a
given period with the value of the work scheduled to be accomplished
during that period. Differences from the scheduled work plan are
measured in both cost and schedule variances. For example, program
activities that are completed ahead of schedule would be reported as
positive variances, while activities that are completed behind schedule
would be reported as negative variances. Similarly, the EVM system
tracks whether completed activities are costing more or less than
expected. A negative cost variance would indicate that activities are
costing more than expected, while a positive cost variance would mean
activities are costing less than expected.
[17] Office of Management and Budget, Office of Management and Budget
Circular No. A-11, Part 7, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and
Management of Capital Assets (June 30, 2006).
[18] Two of these fixed-price contracts are managed by Sandia National
Laboratories, and two are managed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
[19] Since DOE negotiates fixed-price contracts for its work to improve
security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, an EVM system would only
track schedule variances, rather than cost and schedule variances. As a
result, DOE has elected to monitor schedules with comparable, but less
expensive alternatives to EVM.
[20] For example, in 1999, Russia's foreign debt amounted to about 96
percent of its gross domestic product, but in 2006, it fell to about 9
percent. Russia's economy was expected to grow about 6 percent in 2006.
[21] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear
Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001).
[22] In addition, two other sites that do not contain nuclear material
had been provided with MOM systems--the Interdepartmental Special
Training Center, where Russian officials are trained on MPC&A systems,
and the Information Security Center, which performs certification
activities for MOM equipment.
[23] DOE and Rosatom have agreed to install a pilot MOM system in
Rosatom's Situation and Crisis Center in Moscow. Although this facility
does not have nuclear material, it functions as a technical center
authorized by Rosatom to evaluate the feasibility of using the MOM
system at Rosatom sites. DOE officials are hopeful that Rosatom will
allow the installation of MOM equipment at its facilities in the near
future.
[24] DOD's Security Assessment and Training Center, which was completed
in fiscal year 2003 at a cost of $25.9 million and is located near
Moscow, serves a similar purpose for sites located in the Moscow
region. DOD is also funding the construction of a third facility, the
Far East Training Center, to support sites in the Russian Far East,
including the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet. DOD expects the facility to
be completed in 2009 at a cost of $16.9 million.
[25] DOD and DOE's guidance in these directives requires the use of EVM
on contracts valued over $20 million.
[26] We followed up with DOD program managers who stated that they had
identified this same variance through use of their EVM system. DOD
officials stated that this schedule variance had been addressed with a
plan to recoup lost work and, in any case, the variance did not affect
the critical path forward. They remained confident that they would
complete upgrades within their scope by the 2008 deadline.
[27] From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE's MPC&A
projects in Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan were managed by four separate offices within NNSA and
one task force. Program activities in these countries included work on
physical protection, material control and accounting, International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards requirements, and other nuclear
security issues. Funding noted here reflects the total level of effort
in this region, though the majority of funds cited relate to the MPC&A
activities on which this report focuses.
[28] The Department of State's Selective Engagement Policy prohibits a
variety of U.S. assistance to Belarus and was applied to that country
beginning in 1997.
[29] We reported in 2000 that DOE improved the security at the Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant because the nuclear security systems would assist
the site in implementing the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards. Safeguards are systems designed to limit the risk of
proliferation through the diversion of nuclear materials and assist
efforts to reduce global nuclear weapons stockpiles. See GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material
Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-
82 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2000).
[30] The costs of this project are not readily available and, as a
result, are not included in our total of DOE spending on MPC&A
assistance in Kazakhstan.
[31] Prior to fiscal year 2003, funding for this project derived from
DOE's Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection. From fiscal year 2003
through fiscal year 2006, funding for the project came from the budget
of DOE's Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability, which
spent $21.2 million on its construction.
[32] Founded in 1955, the Monterey Institute of International Studies
is located in Monterey, California, with a mission of improving
international understanding through education in languages, cross-
cultural communications, and a detailed study of the complex relations
between nations and peoples.
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