Nuclear Waste
DOE Should Reassess Whether the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration Project at Its Hanford Site Is Still Needed to Treat Radioactive Waste Gao ID: GAO-07-762 June 12, 2007The Department of Energy (DOE) is demonstrating a technology called bulk vitrification, in parallel with the Hanford waste treatment plant, to treat a portion of the radioactive waste stored in 177 tanks at its Hanford site in southeastern Washington state. DOE faces technical and management problems that have affected the original objectives to justify demonstrating the bulk vitrification technology. This report discusses the extent to which DOE (1) has managed the bulk vitrification demonstration project consistent with DOE management guidance and (2) continues to need a supplemental technology, such as bulk vitrification, to treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste. To assess DOE's management of the project, GAO reviewed reports by DOE and others and discussed the project with DOE and contractor officials.
DOE did not follow its management requirements during the first 2 years of the demonstration project in an effort to accelerate tank waste cleanup. This decision contributed to a nearly fourfold increase in estimated costs from $62 million to $230 million and a 6-year delay on the project. DOE did not conduct key internal and external reviews and did not fully develop or update key project planning documents as required. Without these management tools, DOE initially overlooked a number of technical and safety problems facing the project, such as uncertainties about the quality of the glass formed using the bulk vitrification technology and inadequate systems to shield radioactive material from workers and the environment. In late 2005, largely because of these problems, DOE began taking steps to implement its management requirements on the project. DOE's need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste at Hanford is no longer clear, but DOE does not plan to reassess the need for the project before completing the demonstration. Originally, DOE justified the bulk vitrification project as a relatively low-cost, rapidly deployable supplemental technology to assist the department to complete tank waste treatment at Hanford by 2028. However, none of the key components to this justification remains today. First, the price of a full-scale bulk vitrification facility has risen to $3 billion or more, about the same cost as adding a second low-activity waste treatment facility to the waste treatment plant. Second, the technology is no longer rapidly deployable because, as discussed above, the project faces at least a 6-year delay. Finally, it is now apparent that completing tank waste treatment at Hanford by 2028 is not possible under any reasonable scenario and that the waste treatment plant must operate for longer than DOE previously planned. This is significant since longer operating periods may reduce the need for a supplemental technology. Given the plant's estimated treatment capacity, more of the low-activity waste could be treated in the waste treatment plant facilities. Although DOE's management guidance specifies that when conditions have significantly changed DOE should reassess the mission need of a project, DOE does not intend to conduct this reassessment because DOE officials said they want more information about the technology. Proceeding with the demonstration project before reaffirming the need for the project increases the risk that DOE will spend an additional $137 million or more to develop a technology that may not be needed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-762, Nuclear Waste: DOE Should Reassess Whether the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration Project at Its Hanford Site Is Still Needed to Treat Radioactive Waste
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Vitrification Demonstration Project at Its Hanford Site Is Still Needed
to Treat Radioactive Waste' which was released on June 12, 2007.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2007:
Nuclear Waste:
DOE Should Reassess Whether the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration
Project at Its Hanford Site Is Still Needed to Treat Radioactive Waste:
GAO-07-762:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-762, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy (DOE) is demonstrating a technology called
bulk vitrification, in parallel with the Hanford waste treatment plant,
to treat a portion of the radioactive waste stored in 177 tanks at its
Hanford site in southeastern Washington state. DOE faces technical and
management problems that have affected the original objectives to
justify demonstrating the bulk vitrification technology. This report
discusses the extent to which DOE (1) has managed the bulk
vitrification demonstration project consistent with DOE management
guidance and (2) continues to need a supplemental technology, such as
bulk vitrification, to treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste.
To assess DOE‘s management of the project, GAO reviewed reports by DOE
and others and discussed the project with DOE and contractor officials.
What GAO Found:
DOE did not follow its management requirements during the first 2 years
of the demonstration project in an effort to accelerate tank waste
cleanup. This decision contributed to a nearly fourfold increase in
estimated costs from $62 million to $230 million and a 6-year delay on
the project. DOE did not conduct key internal and external reviews and
did not fully develop or update key project planning documents as
required. Without these management tools, DOE initially overlooked a
number of technical and safety problems facing the project, such as
uncertainties about the quality of the glass formed using the bulk
vitrification technology and inadequate systems to shield radioactive
material from workers and the environment. In late 2005, largely
because of these problems, DOE began taking steps to implement its
management requirements on the project. DOE‘s need for a supplemental
technology to treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste at Hanford
is no longer clear, but DOE does not plan to reassess the need for the
project before completing the demonstration. Originally, DOE justified
the bulk vitrification project as a relatively low-cost, rapidly
deployable supplemental technology to assist the department to complete
tank waste treatment at Hanford by 2028. However, none of the key
components to this justification remains today (see table). First, the
price of a full-scale bulk vitrification facility has risen to $3
billion or more, about the same cost as adding a second low-activity
waste treatment facility to the waste treatment plant. Second, the
technology is no longer rapidly deployable because, as discussed above,
the project faces at least a 6-year delay. Finally, it is now apparent
that completing tank waste treatment at Hanford by 2028 is not possible
under any reasonable scenario and that the waste treatment plant must
operate for longer than DOE previously planned. This is significant
since longer operating periods may reduce the need for a supplemental
technology. Given the plant‘s estimated treatment capacity, more of the
low-activity waste could be treated in the waste treatment plant
facilities. Although DOE‘s management guidance specifies that when
conditions have significantly changed DOE should reassess the mission
need of a project, DOE does not intend to conduct this reassessment
because DOE officials said they want more information about the
technology. Proceeding with the demonstration project before
reaffirming the need for the project increases the risk that DOE will
spend an additional $137 million or more to develop a technology that
may not be needed.
Table: original Objectives and Current Conditions of DOE's
Demonstration Project:
Original Objective: Rapid demonstration of the technology by 2006;
Current Condition: Not achievable; current estimated completion by 2012
or later.
Original Objective: Rapid deployment of full-scale facility by 2011;
Current Condition: Not achievable; current estimated deployment by
2019.
Original Objective: Full-scale facility costing about $1.3 billion
Current Condition: Not achievable; current estimated life-cycle cost is
$3 billion or more.
Original Objective: Complete waste treatment by 2028; Current
Condition: Not achievable; current estimated completion date unclear
but ranges from 2039-2074.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) reassess the need for a supplemental
technology and the costs and benefits of bulk vitrification compared
with other viable technologies and (2) report to Congress the results
of the reassessment. In addition, Congress should consider withholding
additional funding for the project until DOE does so. DOE disagreed
with several of the report‘s findings but did not comment on GAO‘s
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-762].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Management Weaknesses during the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration
Project Contributed to Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule
Delays:
The Extent to Which the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration Is Still
Needed Is Unclear; However, DOE Does Not Plan to Reassess Its Need
Before Continuing with the Demonstration:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Original Objectives for Demonstrating and Deploying Bulk
Vitrification Technology Compared with Current Conditions:
Abbreviations:
AMEC: AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc.
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 12, 2007:
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan:
Chairman:
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky:
Chairman:
The Honorable David L. Hobson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for one of the world's
largest environmental cleanup programs--the treatment and disposal of
nuclear waste created as a by-product of producing nuclear weapons.
Decades of nuclear weapons production have left a legacy of chemical,
hazardous, and radioactive wastes to be cleaned up at DOE sites across
the country. One of the most contaminated nuclear waste sites in North
America is DOE's Hanford site located along the Columbia River in
southeastern Washington state. This site occupies 586 square miles
upriver from the cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick, with a
combined regional population of over 200,000. Since 1989, DOE has spent
more than $10 billion to manage about 56 million gallons of high-level
radioactive and hazardous waste at the site and explore ways to treat
and dispose of it. However, to date, none of the tank waste at Hanford
has been treated for final disposal. Over the years, including
testimony before this subcommittee in April 2006, we have criticized
DOE's management of Hanford's tank waste and its efforts to design and
build facilities that are capable of treating the waste.[Footnote 1]
DOE currently manages this waste in 177 large, aging, underground
storage tanks. The waste contains high-level radioactive constituents
(less than 10 percent by volume) to be stabilized on the Hanford site
and then sent to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. DOE
plans to stabilize the low-activity radioactive constituents (more than
90 percent by volume) and dispose of it on-site in near-surface burial
facilities. DOE is required to complete treatment of all of the Hanford
tank waste by 2028, as part of the Tri-Party Agreement between DOE, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State
Department of Ecology.[Footnote 2] DOE manages its projects under a
project management order and implementing guidance[Footnote 3] that
require a formal set of internal and external reviews and approvals
during the planning and execution of a project to help ensure work is
completed on schedule, within budget, and according to mission needs.
To address the tank waste, DOE is constructing the Hanford Waste
Treatment and Immobilization Plant (waste treatment plant), a large
complex of treatment and support facilities.[Footnote 4] DOE's initial
plan for the waste treatment plant was a phased approach to first
demonstrate treatment technologies and then add capacity by
constructing additional treatment facilities within the plant. DOE
initially expected that treating all of the tank waste would take until
about 2046, but during the design and early construction years of the
plant the department began to explore ways to accelerate the cleanup
and treat all of the waste by 2028, as required by the Tri-Party
Agreement. DOE's contractor subsequently modified the plant design to
expand the capacity or "throughput" of the facilities under
construction by, for example, requiring larger waste treatment
equipment. Based on those changes, DOE expected that the waste
treatment plant would be able to treat all of the high-level waste and
about half of the low-activity waste by 2028.
To treat the other half of the low-activity waste without adding to the
cost of the waste treatment plant that was already under construction,
DOE began exploring options to develop a supplemental technology that
would be low cost, capable of being rapidly developed, and could help
complete all waste treatment by 2028. In 2003, after examining a
variety of alternatives, DOE decided to develop a separate supplemental
technology called bulk vitrification to see if it had the potential to
treat the remaining low-activity tank waste.[Footnote 5] Bulk
vitrification involves drying and placing low-activity waste in large
steel containers, mixing the waste with other feed material--such as
soil and other glass-forming materials--heating it with electrical
currents inside the containers until the mixed materials melt, and then
letting them cool into a solid, glass material. The waste is then
permanently stored on-site in those containers.[Footnote 6] DOE
selected the bulk vitrification technology because the department
believed it would add flexibility to DOE's tank waste treatment effort
and be less costly, relatively rapid and straightforward to develop,
and likely to meet a more aggressive schedule compared with other
options. In addition, the bulk vitrification technology was acceptable
to federal and state environmental agencies because it would stabilize
the waste in glass that would meet or exceed the disposal standards
agreed to in the Tri-Party Agreement. A contract was awarded in June
2004 to design and build a pilot plant that would both test and
demonstrate the viability of the technology and treat about 200,000
gallons of tank waste within 2 years.
By 2006, DOE planned to compare bulk vitrification with other viable
alternatives, and, if selected, design, build, and then beginning in
2011, operate a full-scale bulk vitrification facility in parallel with
the waste treatment plant. DOE initially estimated the Demonstration
Bulk Vitrification System (demonstration project) would cost $62
million. However, since awarding the contract in 2004, the project's
estimated cost has increased from $62 million to $230 million, and its
scheduled completion date has been extended from 2006 to 2012.[Footnote
7] In mid-2005, DOE suspended construction activities and decided not
to request continued project funding from Congress in fiscal years 2007
and 2008 until it had a better understanding of the project's scope and
technical uncertainties. To date, DOE has spent about $93 million on
the demonstration project. If bulk vitrification is selected as the
supplemental technology for treating a portion of Hanford's tank waste,
DOE's plans include eventually building and operating two full-scale
bulk vitrification facilities located near the underground storage
tanks in the east and west areas of the Hanford site.
Because of the significant technical and management problems DOE is
facing on the waste treatment plant project and the important role DOE
assigned to the bulk vitrification demonstration in achieving the
overall objectives for stabilizing the tank waste at Hanford, you asked
us to review the status of the demonstration project. On October 12,
2006, we briefed your staff on the preliminary results of our review.
To respond to your remaining concerns, this report addresses the extent
to which DOE (1) has managed the bulk vitrification demonstration
project consistent with departmental management guidance and (2)
continues to need a supplemental technology, such as bulk
vitrification, to treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste.
To determine how the bulk vitrification demonstration has been managed,
we compared project management practices with project management
guidance and documented any differences. We also documented the steps
the department has taken to improve management of the demonstration. To
determine the extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental
technology, we reviewed external technical studies and cost reviews on
the project and discussed with DOE and contractor officials the steps
they have taken to resolve problems experienced to date. In addition,
since the purpose of the bulk vitrification technology is to supplement
the capacity of the Hanford waste treatment plant, we spoke with DOE's
Office of River Protection and contractor officials to determine the
extent to which the waste treatment plant's cost, schedule, and
technical changes may affect the bulk vitrification demonstration
project. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is
provided in appendix I. We performed our work between June 2006 and May
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
DOE did not follow departmental project management requirements during
the first 2 years of the demonstration in an effort to accelerate the
tank waste cleanup, which contributed to a nearly fourfold increase in
estimated project costs from $62 million to $230 million, and a 6-year
delay on the project. Specifically, early in the demonstration, DOE did
not conduct key internal and external reviews that would have evaluated
the project's design, procurement, and construction management approach
and that were designed to identify potential problems and address them
before starting construction. In addition, DOE did not fully develop or
update key project planning documents, such as a project execution
plan, an acquisition plan, and a validated project cost baseline.
Without these management tools, DOE initially overlooked a number of
technical and safety problems facing the demonstration project, such as
uncertainties about the quality of the glass formed using the bulk
vitrification technology and inadequate systems to shield and confine
radioactive material from workers and the environment. These problems
contributed to an increase in the project's estimated cost and a delay
in the estimated completion date. In late 2005, largely because of
these problems, DOE determined that the project should be managed in
accordance with departmental guidance, including focusing on completing
the facility design before continuing construction activities, updating
project execution and acquisition plans, and commissioning two
independent reviews to assess the viability of the project's approach,
as well as its cost and schedule estimates.
DOE's need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of the low-
activity tank waste at Hanford is no longer clear, but DOE does not
plan to reassess the need for the bulk vitrification project before
continuing with the demonstration. In the 4 years since DOE selected
the bulk vitrification technology for further development, conditions
have changed. Originally, DOE justified bulk vitrification as a
relatively low-cost, supplemental technology that could be rapidly
deployed to complement the waste treatment plant and treat all of the
remaining tank waste at Hanford by 2028. However, none of the key
components to this justification remains today. First, technical and
safety problems during the project have not only led to higher project
costs, but have also led DOE to make changes to the facility design.
These problems have also resulted in increases to the estimated life-
cycle cost of future full-scale bulk vitrification facilities from
about $1.3 billion to $3 billion. This is about the same cost as
another alternative DOE previously considered--adding a second low-
activity waste treatment facility to the waste treatment plant. Second,
the technology is no longer rapidly deployable because, as discussed
above, the project faces at least a 6-year delay. DOE now estimates
that the bulk vitrification demonstration project would not be
completed until 2012 and that the full-scale bulk vitrification
facilities would not be fully available until late 2019. Finally, it is
now apparent that completing waste treatment at Hanford by 2028 is not
possible under any reasonable scenario and that the waste treatment
plant must operate for longer than DOE previously planned. This is
significant since longer operating periods may reduce the need for a
supplemental technology. Given the plant's estimated treatment
capacity, more of the low-activity waste could be treated in the waste
treatment plant facilities.
DOE's project management guidance specifies that when conditions have
significantly changed, the department should reassess the mission need,
as well as the benefits and appropriateness of continuing with a
project. Despite this fact, DOE plans to renew requests for project
funding in fiscal year 2009 but does not intend to reassess the overall
need for the project until much later. DOE project officials
acknowledged that the need for bulk vitrification may be less
compelling than when initially selected, but they said that developing
more information about bulk vitrification would provide additional
treatment flexibility that may have value in the future. As part of the
effort to develop more information, DOE is in the process of comparing
various combinations of treatment options for completing tank waste
treatment at Hanford. The purpose of this comparison is to support near-
term tank waste funding decisions rather than assess bulk vitrification
or the need for a supplemental technology. However, proceeding with the
demonstration project before reaffirming the need for a supplemental
technology, or reassessing the need for the bulk vitrification project,
increases the risk that DOE will spend an additional $137 million or
more to develop a technology that may not be needed or is no longer the
best option for treating Hanford's low- activity tank waste.
We are recommending that, before continuing with the bulk vitrification
demonstration project, the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant
Secretary for Environmental Management to (1) reassess the continuing
need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of Hanford's low-
activity tank waste; (2) if a reassessment shows that a supplemental
technology is still needed, reassess the relative costs and benefits of
demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification compared with other
available technologies; and (3) report to Congress on the results of
the reassessment before requesting additional funding for the bulk
vitrification demonstration. If DOE does not reassess the bulk
vitrification project before requesting additional funding for the
project, we are recommending that Congress consider withholding the
additional funding until DOE implements these recommendations.
DOE commented on a draft of the report and disagreed with the report's
assertions that the bulk vitrification project did not follow the
department's project management requirements. In addition, DOE
commented that the project has been subject to multiple, formal
independent project management, technical, and safety reviews.
Furthermore, DOE stated that it is already performing an assessment of
options to complete the cleanup of Hanford's waste tanks and that bulk
vitrification is one of several supplemental treatment technologies
being evaluated. We disagree with DOE's comment that the bulk
vitrification project followed DOE's project management requirements.
Documents that DOE provided during our review indicate it was not until
September 2005--after the project had experienced numerous problems and
significant cost and schedule increases--that DOE decided the
demonstration project would be subject to the department's project
management order. Regarding DOE's assessment of options to complete
tank waste cleanup, we do not believe it constitutes the reassessment
of the need for a supplemental technology or the relative costs and
benefits of demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification compared
with other viable technologies that our report recommends. Although DOE
did not comment on our recommendations, we believe that implementing
them will enhance the available data on the bulk vitrification project
and improve the basis for future DOE decisions.
Background:
DOE carries out its waste cleanup program at Hanford under the
direction of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and
in consultation with a variety of stakeholders. EPA and the Washington
State Department of Ecology provide regulatory oversight of cleanup
activities at the site. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Safety Board) also oversees DOE's operations.[Footnote 8] Other
stakeholders involved in the Hanford cleanup project include county and
local governmental agencies, Native American tribes, advisory groups,
and citizen groups. These stakeholders advocate their views through
various processes, including site-specific advisory boards. DOE manages
the tank waste at Hanford through its Office of River Protection, which
Congress directed DOE to establish in 1998. The office has a staff of
about 110 DOE employees and a fiscal year 2007 budget of about $1
billion. It manages Hanford's tank waste through two main contracts: a
tank farm operations contract with CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc., to
maintain safe storage of the waste in underground tanks and to prepare
it for retrieval, and a construction contract with Bechtel National,
Inc., to design, construct, and commission the waste treatment plant.
DOE's tank farm contractor, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., awarded a
subcontract to AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. (AMEC), to begin
testing the bulk vitrification technology.
Management Weaknesses during the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration
Project Contributed to Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule
Delays:
As part of the effort to accelerate the tank waste cleanup at the
Hanford site, DOE site officials decided not to follow a number of
project management requirements on the bulk vitrification demonstration
project. Without the management tools that these requirements provide,
DOE initially overlooked a number of technical and safety problems
facing the demonstration, which contributed to an increase in the
project's estimated cost and a delay in the estimated completion date.
In late 2005, largely because of the technical and safety problems, DOE
determined that the project should be managed in accordance with
departmental requirements and is currently in the process of
implementing these requirements.
DOE Did Not Follow Project Management Requirements during the First 2
Years of the Demonstration:
DOE's project management requirements outlined in the DOE order specify
that a number of steps be taken throughout the development of a
project. These requirements apply to all capital projects having a
total cost of at least $20 million and are intended to ensure that
projects are effectively delivered on schedule and within budget and
that both DOE and its contractors are held accountable. According to
the Secretary of Energy, the purpose of the requirements is to provide
for a documented decision-making process that fosters a disciplined
project planning approach and a method for measuring progress toward
defined goals. As such, the order includes a requirement to follow a
strict set of decision points outlining specific actions that DOE must
take before beginning the construction and operations of a new
facility. Some of these specific actions include conducting various
internal and external reviews, developing key project documents, such
as an acquisition strategy and a project execution plan, and developing
and validating a cost and schedule estimate.[Footnote 9] These
requirements are applicable to both DOE and its contractors on the
project.
However, during the first 2 years of the bulk vitrification project,
DOE did not follow its management requirements. In an effort to
expedite cleanup activities in 2003, as part of DOE's accelerated
cleanup initiative, DOE officials at the Hanford site determined that
activities connected to Hanford's tank waste cleanup effort would not
be subject to the project definition requirements of the DOE order.
Specifically, DOE made two key determinations to justify its decision
to accelerate the project. First, DOE reasoned that since the tank farm
cleanup effort, as a whole, did not technically meet the definition of
a project--work that has a defined start and end point and that creates
a "product, facility, or system"--related activities would not be
subject to DOE's strict project management requirements. Based on that
decision, in 2004, DOE officials at Hanford determined that the bulk
vitrification demonstration project, which was managed as part of DOE's
tank farm activities, would also not be subject to DOE's project
management requirements. However, this determination was not consistent
with DOE's requirements since the demonstration project is expected to
have a start and end point and result in a facility. Second, DOE
officials further justified the decision to not apply the project
management requirements by asserting that the demonstration project was
a minor research and development effort. However, specific language in
the DOE order states that "technology development activities," such as
the bulk vitrification project, should be subject to the requirements
in the order.
As a result of DOE's decision not to apply some of the requirements of
its order during the early stages of the demonstration project, DOE and
its contractor did not take a number of key project management steps
called for in the order. For example, DOE is required to conduct
internal and external reviews to evaluate a project's mission need and
cost estimate in the development of a project. However, DOE did not
conduct these reviews that could have helped identify potential
problems during the first 2 years of the bulk vitrification
demonstration. Similarly, DOE's guidance requires project managers and
DOE contractors to develop and update key project planning documents,
such as a project execution plan and an acquisition strategy. While
both of these documents were created in early 2004, neither was updated
when the contractor was awarded the contract for the demonstration
several months later. Instead, the contract called for a fast-track,
design-build approach where design, construction, and technology
development occur simultaneously. This approach increases the risk of
encountering problems that can adversely affect a project's cost and
schedule.[Footnote 10] Finally, the project management order requires
DOE to develop, validate, and maintain an updated cost and schedule
baseline for its projects and to notify the proper DOE headquarters
officials when significant changes to these estimates occur. However,
DOE did not develop, and still does not have, a validated cost and
schedule baseline for the project about 3 years after awarding the
contract. DOE now plans to follow the management order by developing
and validating a cost and schedule estimate for the demonstration
project in early fiscal year 2008.
The Demonstration Project Faced a Number of Technical and Safety
Problems Resulting in Cost Increases and Schedule Delays:
The bulk vitrification technology posed a number of technical and
safety problems very early on in the development of the project. Even
before the contract was awarded in 2004, DOE's contractor was aware of
potential problems that could affect the demonstration. For example,
during initial testing of the technology in 2003, which involved
melting simulated waste, not all of the simulated waste--intended to
mimic the properties of hazardous materials, such as technetium 99--was
retained in the glass. In subsequent large-scale tests, some of the
simulated waste collected near the surface of the container and began
leaking out through the joints in the container. Similarly, testing in
2003 indicated that the contractor was aware of potentially dangerous
emissions during operations of the facility that could have safety
implications to demonstration workers. In August 2005, the Safety Board
reported that the facility, as designed, would not adequately contain
radioactive and hazardous emissions during and after melting
operations. The Safety Board pointed out that the facility design did
not comply with DOE's own facility safety requirements and requested
that DOE resolve these weaknesses.
These technical and safety problems contributed to an increase in the
demonstration's estimated cost and a delay in the projected completion
date. One month after awarding the $62 million contract for the
demonstration, the contractor informed DOE that to address these
issues, the cost estimate had nearly doubled to an estimated $102
million. The cost estimate has since risen to about $230 million--
nearly a fourfold increase from the initial contract price--as DOE and
its contractors have taken steps to address these problems. These steps
included upgrading facility designs, such as changes to accommodate
more robust safety systems than had originally been anticipated;
additional testing; and other scope changes, such as adding the cost to
accept waste retrieved from one of Hanford's tanks for testing. In
addition, these changes caused the initial estimated completion date
for the demonstration to slip from 2006 to the current estimate of
2012.
DOE's decision not to follow its project management requirements likely
contributed to these problems. Without the management tools called for
in DOE's requirements, such as updated timely reviews, project
documents, and a validated cost and schedule baseline, these problems
were not brought to the attention of DOE headquarters. For example,
even though the costs increased significantly during the first few
months of the project, without a validated baseline for the project,
DOE's contractor did not file an official baseline change request that
would have alerted DOE management of the cost increases. Similarly,
because DOE and its contractor did not follow the strict set of
approvals required by DOE's order at key decision points, there was no
way for DOE to formally reassess the risks and mission needs as the
project became more expensive and complex. According to a review of the
project conducted in September 2005, having these key management tools
in place when the project began would have provided DOE with an
opportunity to identify and address these problems.[Footnote 11]
Without these tools, however, DOE was not fully informed, and the
contractor was allowed to continue at an accelerated pace. Despite the
problems facing the project, construction began on the demonstration
facility in January 2005, with detailed facility design only about 30
percent complete.
DOE Began Following Management Requirements in the Third Year of the
Demonstration:
In 2005, facing numerous problems, DOE halted construction on the
project and determined that it should be managed in accordance with
departmental project management requirements. In May 2005, 4 months
after construction had begun, DOE's contractor began slowing down its
activities related to the demonstration in order to assess the reasons
behind the cost increases and schedule delays. In addition, in August
2005, the Secretary of Energy instructed all program offices to follow
DOE's order "scrupulously, without exception." As a result, in
September 2005, DOE officials at Hanford instructed the contractor to
more rigorously follow project management requirements, including
focusing on completing facility design before continuing construction
activities, updating project execution and acquisition plans, and
commissioning two independent reviews to assess the demonstration's
technical approach and cost and schedule estimates. DOE decided not to
request funding for the project in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 while the
problems are being resolved.
DOE is currently in the process of implementing a number of its project
management requirements to address the problems facing the project and
to better control costs. Because the project was at an advanced stage
of design development when DOE chose to begin following its management
order, DOE has had to implement some of the requirements retroactively.
For example, DOE updated the project initiation documents, such as the
project execution plan and the mission needs statement, and obtained
internal approvals for those documents even though the project was past
the initiation stage. DOE also commissioned external independent
reviews called for in its order, including two external technical
reviews of the demonstration,[Footnote 12] as well as a management
review of the project. Finally, DOE is currently in the process of
developing and validating a cost and schedule baseline for the
demonstration and plans to submit the entire project package for
another review by the department's Office of Engineering and
Construction Management in early fiscal year 2008, as required by DOE's
order.
The Extent to Which the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration Is Still
Needed Is Unclear; However, DOE Does Not Plan to Reassess Its Need
Before Continuing with the Demonstration:
The extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental technology to
treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste at Hanford is unclear.
In the years since DOE selected bulk vitrification as the preferred
technology, significant changes to the objectives that originally
existed have raised questions about whether bulk vitrification is the
most viable option for treating a portion of Hanford's low-activity
tank waste. Despite these questions, DOE does not plan to reassess the
project before continuing with the demonstration and has not developed
an acquisition strategy that clearly shows how the bulk vitrification
and waste treatment plant projects will be integrated to control costs
and meet tank waste cleanup requirements.
The Original Objectives That Justified Developing the Bulk
Vitrification Technology Are No Longer Achievable:
The original objectives DOE used to justify demonstrating and deploying
the bulk vitrification technology are no longer achievable. Table 1
compares DOE's original objectives for demonstrating and deploying the
bulk vitrification technology with the current conditions.
Table 1: Original Objectives for Demonstrating and Deploying Bulk
Vitrification Technology Compared with Current Conditions:
Original objectives: Rapid demonstration of the technology by 2006;
Current conditions: Not achievable; current estimated completion by
2012 or later.
Original objectives: Rapid deployment of full-scale facility by 2011;
Current conditions: Not achievable; current estimated deployment by
2019.
Original objectives: Full-scale facility costing about $1.3 billion[A];
Current conditions: Not achievable; current estimated life-cycle cost
is $3 billion or more[A].
Original objectives: Complete waste treatment by 2028;
Current conditions: Not achievable; current estimated completion date
unclear but ranges from 2039-2074.
Source: DOE.
[A] These figures are in constant 2006 dollars.
[End of table]
DOE's goals of rapidly demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification
as a supplemental technology in conjunction with waste treatment plant
operations are no longer achievable. DOE initially planned to use a
fast-track, design-build approach to demonstrate bulk vitrification as
the preferred supplemental technology by 2006 and have a facility fully
operational by 2011 when the waste treatment plant was scheduled to
begin operations. Although DOE has not been able to demonstrate and
deploy the bulk vitrification technology at this aggressive pace, the
urgency to do so no longer exists because of delays with the waste
treatment plant schedule, of at least 8 years, to late 2019. DOE has
not yet finalized the design of the bulk vitrification demonstration,
resumed construction of the demonstration facilities, or validated the
project's estimated cost and schedule. Instead of demonstrating the
technology by 2006, as originally planned, DOE estimated that the bulk
vitrification demonstration project may be completed in 2012, or about
6 years behind schedule. Recently updated demonstration project
schedules show that the demonstration may be delayed even further until
early 2013. Similarly, instead of having a full-scale treatment
facility operational by 2011, DOE now estimates that supplemental
treatment facilities may not be fully operational until 2019, or about
8 years later than originally planned.[Footnote 13]
Further, DOE expected that a supplemental technology would be less
expensive than expanding the waste treatment plant, but DOE is no
longer able to develop and deploy a supplemental technology at low
cost. As discussed earlier, during the years that the bulk
vitrification demonstration has been under way, costs increased
primarily because of the technical and safety problems that have
plagued the project. Such problems required DOE to make changes to the
demonstration project's design and resulted in increased costs to
demonstrate the bulk vitrification technology. These problems have also
increased the expected cost of a full-scale operating bulk
vitrification facility. DOE's life-cycle cost estimate of a full-scale
bulk vitrification facility has increased from about $1.3 billion to
about $3 billion. This is about the same cost as another alternative
DOE previously evaluated in 2003--adding a second low-activity waste
treatment facility to the waste treatment plant--and which DOE
considered to be too expensive.[Footnote 14] In addition, the latest
bulk vitrification life-cycle cost estimate is expected to increase
further because it is based on assumptions that are no longer
current[Footnote 15] and, according to project officials, is a
conceptual estimate that is subject to change as DOE proceeds with the
demonstration.
DOE also based its need for a supplemental technology, in part, on the
expectation that it could accelerate the overall cleanup effort by
treating about half of Hanford's low-activity waste by 2028, the legal
milestone for completing tank waste treatment. However, given the
recent schedule delays for both the bulk vitrification and waste
treatment plant projects, this goal is no longer achievable, and it is
no longer clear when, or if, a supplemental technology will be needed.
DOE now estimates that the waste treatment plant may begin treating
waste in late 2019, or about 8 years later than originally scheduled. A
variety of factors affecting the operation of the waste treatment plant
remain unresolved, including the actual capacity of the waste treatment
plant facilities and the operational reliability of those facilities.
Given these uncertainties, DOE has not yet defined how long waste
treatment plant operations will extend. However, the length of plant
operations may range from 20 to 55 years.[Footnote 16] This wide range
reflects DOE's uncertainty about the amount of waste that the waste
treatment plant can treat each year and the outcome of future
negotiations DOE will have with federal and state environmental
agencies to set a new time frame for completing tank waste treatment
operations. This is significant as longer operating periods may reduce
the need for a supplemental technology because, given the plant's
estimated treatment capacity, more of the low-activity waste could be
treated in waste treatment plant facilities. For example, based on the
plant's maximum estimated treatment capacity, for tank waste treatment
to be completed in 20 years, a supplemental technology would need to
treat about half of the low-activity waste. If treatment operations
extend for more than 40 years, supplemental technology may not be
needed because the waste treatment plant would be able to treat all of
the tank waste.
DOE Does Not Plan to Reassess the Need for Continuing the Demonstration
and Risks Additional Spending on a Technology That May Not Be Needed or
Is Not a Viable Option for Treating Hanford's Radioactive Waste:
Even though the conditions justifying the bulk vitrification
demonstration have changed significantly, DOE does not plan to reassess
the need for the project and plans to continue the demonstration. This
decision runs contrary to DOE's project management requirements that
specify that when conditions have significantly changed, the department
should reassess the mission need and reexamine available alternatives
as well as the benefits and appropriateness of continuing with a
project. Furthermore, DOE plans to renew requests for project funding
in fiscal year 2009 but does not intend to reassess the overall need
for the project before proceeding. Instead, DOE decided to continue
with the demonstration to obtain more information on the performance of
bulk vitrification technology and compare the technology with other
available alternatives by 2012 or later.
DOE project officials acknowledged that the need for bulk vitrification
may be less compelling than when initially selected but said that
developing more information on this technology would provide additional
treatment flexibility that may have value in the future. As part of
this effort to develop more information, DOE initiated an internal
study in late April 2007 to compare advantages, disadvantages, and
risks for various combinations of treatment options, including bulk
vitrification, for successfully completing tank waste treatment at
Hanford. Although this study, which is to be completed by June 30,
2007, is not a decision-making document or a comprehensive reassessment
of individual technologies or the overall need for a supplemental
technology, it will be used to support near-term funding decisions for
the tank waste cleanup program. After completing the demonstration
project in 2012 or later, DOE plans to compare the bulk vitrification
technology with other viable technical alternatives, such as building a
second low-activity waste facility, as required by the Tri-Party
Agreement.[Footnote 17] However, DOE's decision to proceed with the
demonstration before reassessing the need for the project increases the
risk that it may spend an additional $137 million or more[Footnote 18]
to develop a technology that may not be needed or is no longer the most
viable option for treating Hanford's low-activity tank waste.
Conclusions:
Nearly 4 years after selecting bulk vitrification as the preferred
technology for treating about half of Hanford's low-activity tank
waste, DOE is faced with a host of technical, safety, and management
uncertainties on the demonstration project, as well as more fundamental
questions as to whether a supplemental waste treatment technology is
still needed. Although bulk vitrification was initially viewed as a
relatively low-cost technology that could be rapidly developed,
demonstrated, and deployed to supplement the operations of the waste
treatment plant, technical problems, rising costs, and schedule delays
with the bulk vitrification demonstration project raise questions about
DOE's overall strategy for addressing the waste. In light of these
questions, it is unclear if pursuing the demonstration of this
particular technology, instead of other technologies, is the best
approach. Furthermore, because DOE now expects the waste treatment
plant to operate for much longer than originally planned, the plant may
be capable of treating most or all of the low-activity waste a
supplemental technology was originally intended to treat. However,
despite this significant uncertainty about how much waste, if any, a
supplemental technology would actually need to treat, DOE is not
planning to reexamine the need for bulk vitrification before proceeding
with the demonstration project. In taking this approach, DOE is not
following its guidelines that specify that when conditions have
significantly changed, the department should reassess the benefits and
appropriateness of continuing with a project. Without this
reassessment, DOE risks spending an additional $137 million or more to
demonstrate a technology that may not be needed or is no longer the
best available option for treating Hanford's low-activity tank waste.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In light of major changes that have occurred on both the bulk
vitrification demonstration and the waste treatment plant, which may
affect the demonstration's costs, schedule, and mission justification,
we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant
Secretary for Environmental Management to take the following three
actions:
* Reassess the need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of
Hanford's low-activity tank waste. The reassessment should clearly
identify how a supplemental technology would complement and be
integrated with waste treatment plant operations.
* If a reassessment shows that a supplemental technology is still
needed, reassess the relative costs and benefits of demonstrating and
deploying bulk vitrification compared with other viable technologies,
such as constructing a second low-activity waste vitrification
facility.
* Report to Congress on the results of the reassessment before
requesting additional funding for the bulk vitrification project.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Congress should consider withholding future funding for the
demonstration until the department conducts and reports on a
reassessment that clearly confirms the need for a supplemental
technology at Hanford and bulk vitrification as a viable alternative
for treating Hanford's low-activity waste.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment.
In written comments, DOE's Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management expressed areas of disagreement with the report's findings
but did not comment on our recommendations. DOE's written comments on
our draft report are included in appendix II. DOE also provided
technical comments that we have incorporated where appropriate.
In its written comments, DOE disagreed with the draft report's finding
that the bulk vitrification project did not follow the department's
project management requirements. In addition, DOE commented that the
project has been subject to multiple, formal independent project
management, technical, and safety reviews. Furthermore, DOE stated that
it is already performing an assessment of options to complete the
cleanup of Hanford's waste tanks and that bulk vitrification is one of
several supplemental treatment technologies being evaluated.
Based on our review of available documentation, we continue to believe
that the bulk vitrification project did not follow DOE's project
management requirements. Multiple documents provided by DOE during our
review demonstrate that the department determined in 2003 that
activities related to the Hanford tank farm cleanup effort, such as the
bulk vitrification project, would not be subject to all of DOE's
project management requirements. In fact, DOE even advised its
contractor that it would not be required to follow the formal decision
process outlined in DOE's project management order. Because of this
decision, DOE proceeded from the initiation phase of the project to the
construction phase without taking preliminary steps called for in the
order, such as developing a cost and schedule baseline. DOE commented
that, as early as November 2004, it recognized that additional project
management oversight would be warranted as the project matured.
However, documents provided to us by DOE indicate that it was not until
September 2005--after the project had experienced numerous problems and
significant cost and schedule increases--that DOE decided that the
demonstration would, from that time forward, be subject to the
requirements of its project management order.
We agree with DOE that the bulk vitrification project has been subject
to multiple, formal independent project management and technical and
safety reviews by organizations inside and outside of the department.
Our draft report discussed many of these reviews. Although these
reviews have addressed important management, technical, and safety
problems of the project, they are not reassessments of the need for a
supplemental technology. It is also important to note that the
assessment of options to complete the cleanup of Hanford's waste tanks
that DOE refers to in its comments is likewise not a reassessment of
the need for a supplemental technology or of bulk vitrification
technology. In fact, as stated in its charter, the assessment--which is
for information purposes only and is not intended as a decision-making
document--assumes the continued need for a supplemental technology and
development of the bulk vitrification technology. Furthermore, as our
draft report noted, it is only after the bulk vitrification
demonstration project is completed in 2012 or later that DOE plans to
compare bulk vitrification technology with other technical
alternatives. Given the scope and purpose of this assessment, we do not
believe it constitutes the reassessment of the need for a supplemental
technology or the relative costs and benefits of demonstrating and
deploying bulk vitrification compared with other viable technologies
that our draft report recommends.
While DOE agrees that the extent to which a supplemental technology
would be used is imprecise, it continues to assert that there is a very
high likelihood that the cleanup mission at Hanford would benefit from
added capacity to treat low-activity waste. Although DOE may be
correct, we are uncertain whether the department has adequately
demonstrated the basis for this assertion. As our draft report
discussed, the original cost and schedule conditions DOE used to
justify the need for supplemental technology have changed
significantly, and the original objectives that justified developing
the technology are no longer achievable. In light of these significant
changes, we continue to believe that the department should reassess the
mission need and benefits of continuing the project, rather than simply
assuming that the need still exists. Contrary to DOE's contention, we
are not recommending that the department cancel its evaluation of the
bulk vitrification approach before it has data on which to base a
decision. Indeed, we believe that our recommendation that DOE reassess
the need for supplemental technology and the costs and benefits of bulk
vitrification compared with other viable technologies would actually
enhance the available data on the project and improve the basis for
future DOE decisions.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees and to the Secretary of Energy. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or by e-mail at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the Department of Energy (DOE) has managed the bulk
vitrification demonstration project, we compared project management
practices with project management guidance and documented any
differences. We reviewed project planning and acquisition documents to
understand the original objectives and assumptions DOE used to justify
demonstrating bulk vitrification technology and for managing the
demonstration project. We documented the management problems the
contractor has experienced on the project from contract award to the
present. We also documented the steps the department has taken to
improve management of the demonstration. We discussed these steps with
department and contractor officials to determine their status and to
assess DOE's progress. We also discussed project oversight efforts with
officials of DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management in
Washington, D.C.
To determine the extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental
technology, we reviewed internal and external technical studies and
reviews on the project and discussed with DOE and contractor officials
the steps they have taken to resolve problems experienced to date. We
also discussed these issues with key representatives of federal and
state environmental agencies. We visited the bulk vitrification
demonstration site, interviewed DOE and contractor officials, and
reviewed key studies and project documents that describe how DOE and
the contractor plan to conduct the demonstration. To assist in
evaluating the technical aspects of the demonstration project, we
obtained assistance from a technical consultant, Dr. George Hinman, who
has a Doctor of Science degree in physics and is Professor Emeritus at
Washington State University. Dr. Hinman has extensive nuclear energy
experience in industry, government, and academia. Since the purpose of
the bulk vitrification technology is to supplement the capacity of
Hanford's waste treatment plant, we spoke with DOE's Office of River
Protection and contractor officials to determine the extent to which
the waste treatment plant's cost, schedule, and technical changes may
affect the bulk vitrification demonstration project. We also obtained
documentation and discussed with these officials the life-cycle cost of
a second low-activity waste facility as part of the waste treatment
plant. We compared this cost with the current life-cycle cost estimate
for a full-scale bulk vitrification facility.
We relied on dollar figures provided by DOE and its contractors but
took various steps, such as analyzing cost estimating documents and
reviewing cost estimating assumptions, reviewing budget documents, and
obtaining clarifications from the officials who prepared them, to
ensure that the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this
report. We performed our work between June 2006 and May 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
May 18 2007:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
We have reviewed your draft report entitled, "Nuclear Waste: DOE Should
Reassess Whether the Bulk Vitrification Project at Its Hanford Site is
Still Needed to Treat Radioactive Waste (GAO-07-762), dated May 2007, "
and I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concludes that the delay in
the anticipated start date for the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)
has brought the need for supplemental treatment technology into
question. While the extent to which supplemental treatment would be
used is imprecise, the Department of Energy (DOE) expects that there is
a very high likelihood that the cleanup mission would benefit from an
added capacity to treat low-activity waste. Based on technical and
management evaluations, there is potential benefit in alternative
treatment technologies such as bulk vitrification that could fill this
need.
We disagree with the assertions made in the report that decisions were
made, either formally or informally, to not follow DOE Order 413.3A,
Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets
(June 2006). Since the inception of the Demonstration Bulk
Vitrification System (DBVS) Project, it has been and remains subject to
the requirements of DOE Order 413.3A and predecessor project management
orders. The DBVS Project is an expense funded research and testing
project to determine the viability of a supplemental waste treatment
technology and is a subproject within the larger Radioactive Liquid
Tank Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project.
As such, the DBVS Project has been subject to multiple, formal
independent project management and technical and safety reviews and
validations by organizations both inside and outside the Department. As
early as November 2004, the Office of Environmental Management
recognized that as the project matured and moved from bench-scale to
larger, engineering-scale testing, project uncertainties and technical
risks would be better defined and the project would warrant additional
project management oversight. Thus, the provisions of the DOE project
management orders, including the critical decision process, were
implemented. This approach was reaffirmed on August 10, 2005, in
Secretary of Energy Bodman's memorandum on Improving Project Management
within the Department.
I want to be unequivocally clear that DOE has not committed to use bulk
vitrification for supplemental treatment because we are not yet at that
critical decision point in the project management process. However,
because of its potential as a treatment technology, DOE has had an
interest in the DBVS Project as a component of a research and
development program to collect information that would allow a
comparative decision. As you know, this project recently underwent an
external technical review. Related testing and analysis continues for
the purpose of validation of the technical baseline.
DOE is also currently performing an assessment of mission completion
options for cleanup of Hanford tanks, of which bulk vitrification is
one of several possible supplemental treatment technologies.
Furthermore, an independent team is being commissioned to validate the
cost and schedule baselines in June 2007. DOE periodically updates a
system plan which accounts for waste treatment pathways involving the
WTP and other disposition paths such as supplemental treatment. We
believe it would be an extreme disservice to abruptly cancel our
evaluation of this approach before we have data upon which to base a
decision.
We have enclosed more specific comments on the report regarding
technical aspects of DBVS testing history and interpretations
referenced in the report.
If you have any further questions, please contact me at (202) 586-7709
or Mr. Mark A. Gilbertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Engineering
and Technology, at (202) 586-5042.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James A. Rispon:
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, William R. Swick, Assistant
Director; Ryan T. Coles; John Delicath; Doreen Feldman; George Hinman;
Jeffrey Larson; and Thomas Perry made significant contributions to this
report. Others who made important contributions included Mark Braza,
Doreen Eng, and Mehrzad Nadji.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management
Problems Have Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety
Concerns, GAO-06-602T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
[2] The Tri-Party Agreement is a legally binding agreement that
incorporates the requirements of federal environmental laws and guides
the process under which DOE will address the wastes and environmental
contamination at the Hanford site.
[3] DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition
of Capital Assets, issued Oct. 13, 2000. DOE issued a revised order as
DOE Order 413.3A on July 28, 2006.
[4] The waste treatment plant includes three primary waste processing
facilities--the pretreatment facility, which will receive waste from
Hanford's underground tanks and separate it into its high-level and low-
activity waste components; the high-level waste facility that will
immobilize high-level waste for off-site disposal through a process
known as vitrification, which mixes nuclear waste with molten glass;
and the low-activity waste facility that will immobilize the low-
activity waste for on-site disposal. In addition, a large analytical
laboratory and more than 20 other buildings will support waste
treatment activities.
[5] To examine the alternatives, DOE conducted a review that included
an assessment of studies and a series of workshops with experts from
national laboratories, industry, and academia. The experts grouped the
technologies into potential treatment approaches involving various
methods of preparing, treating, and solidifying the waste for permanent
on-site storage. In all, DOE compared about 10 available technical
approaches for treating Hanford's low-activity waste.
[6] In contrast to a bulk vitrification facility, the low-activity
waste vitrification facility for the waste treatment plant would
consist of a vitrification technology that involves feeding the waste
and other feed material into a device, called a melter, where the waste
is heated to a molten state, then poured into stainless steel
canisters, where it is allowed to cool into a solid form and
permanently stored on-site.
[7] The initial contract price of $62 million included a smaller work
scope involving a modular, mobile waste treatment facility, while the
$230 million contract price involves a larger, stationary treatment
facility that includes the capacity to accept waste retrieved from an
underground storage tank.
[8] The Safety Board was created by Congress in 1988 to provide an
independent assessment of safety conditions and operations at defense
nuclear facilities, including DOE's Hanford site. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2286-
2286i.
[9] According to the DOE order, an "acquisition strategy" is a document
describing the high-level business and technical management approach
that includes a master schedule, along with details about planning,
organizing, and controlling a project; a "project execution plan" is
the core document for managing a project and includes policies and
procedures to be followed and how the project is to be accomplished.
[10] Since 1992, we have reported frequently on the problems and risks
of this approach to managing projects. See, for example, GAO-06-602T.
[11] Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Independent Review Report,
Longenecker and Associates, September 2005.
[12] One of these reviews of the project identified 19 technical issues
that could result in a failure of the bulk vitrification demonstration
to meet performance requirements unless addressed before operational
startup, and 26 areas of concern that could result in a change to
facility design or require additional testing to determine if the
design is adequate. See A Comprehensive Technical Review of the
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System, Technical Assessment Conducted
by an Independent and External Team of Experts, Volume 1, chartered by
CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc. (Richland, Wash.: Sept. 28, 2006).
[13] Based on the project schedule, a full-scale bulk vitrification
facility in the west area of the Hanford site may be operational
between 2014 and 2016. The planned facility in Hanford's east area is
not scheduled to be operational until late 2019.
[14] Although the estimated life-cycle costs of the two facilities are
about the same, their technologies are at different stages of
development. A low-activity waste treatment facility, like the one
currently under construction on the waste treatment plant project,
represents a more mature technology than bulk vitrification because it
has already been extensively demonstrated, its detailed design is more
than 90 percent complete, and construction of the facility will be
about 50 percent complete by the end of fiscal year 2007.
[15] One such assumption in the bulk vitrification life-cycle cost
estimate is that tank waste treatment would be completed by 2036. In
contrast, DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget request states that treatment
will not be completed until 2042, or at least 6 years later than
previously estimated. DOE contractor officials acknowledged that an
extension to the estimate's schedule would result in increased costs,
but they had not updated the estimate because the length of the
operating schedule is not yet known.
[16] Although the fiscal year 2008 budget request indicates an
operating schedule through 2042, DOE has not specifically defined the
length of the waste treatment plant's operating schedule. DOE's project
managers stated that the operating schedule may range from 22 to 35
years. However, an internal engineering study estimated operations may
range from 20 to 55 years. We include the latter range because it
reflects the full range of estimates.
[17] Tri-Party Agreement milestone M-62-08 required DOE to conduct a
final assessment of supplemental technologies and submit a Hanford tank
waste supplemental treatment technologies report by July 31, 2005. DOE
missed this milestone but has agreed to perform this assessment by
2012. However, a revised milestone has not yet been formally negotiated
with federal and state environmental agencies.
[18] To date, DOE has spent about $93 million of the estimated $230
million for the bulk vitrification demonstration project.
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