Yucca Mountain
DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear Gao ID: GAO-07-1010 August 2, 2007Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To permanently store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been working to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain about 100 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Although the project has been beset with delays, in part because of persistent problems with its quality assurance program, DOE stated in July 2006 that it will submit a license application with NRC by June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-quality application needs to be complete, technically adequate, transparent by clearly justifying underlying assumptions, and traceable back to original source materials. GAO examined (1) DOE's development of its schedule for submitting a license application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2) NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to submit a high-quality application, and (3) DOE's progress in addressing quality assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. GAO reviewed DOE's management plan for creating the license application, reviewed correspondence and attended prelicensing meetings between DOE and NRC, and interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site representatives for the Yucca Mountain project. In commenting on a draft of the report, both DOE and NRC agreed with the report.
The director of DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management set the June 30, 2008, date for filing the license application with NRC in consultation with the DOE and contractor managers for the Yucca Mountain project. DOE officials told us that external stakeholders were not consulted because there was neither a legal requirement nor a compelling management reason to do so. According to the director, the June 2008 schedule is achievable because DOE has already completed a large amount of work, including the completion of a draft license application in 2005 that DOE decided not to submit to NRC. NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license application by June 30, 2008, but until NRC receives the application, officials will not speculate about whether it will be high quality. NRC has not seen a draft of the license application, and NRC's long-standing practice is to maintain an objective and neutral position toward a future application until it is filed. To help ensure that DOE understands its expectations, NRC has, among other things, held periodic prelicensing management and technical meetings with DOE. DOE has made progress in resolving the quality assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. For example, DOE has replaced the one-page summary of performance indicators that GAO had determined was ineffective with more frequent and rigorous project management meetings. DOE has addressed the management challenges GAO identified to varying degrees. For example, regarding management continuity, DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel in key management positions, such as the director of quality assurance. However, for various reasons--including the long history of recurring problems and likely project leadership changes in January 2009 when the current administration leaves office--it is unclear whether DOE's actions will prevent these problems from recurring.
GAO-07-1010, Yucca Mountain: DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear
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Report to the Honorable Jon C. Porter, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2007:
Yucca Mountain:
DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its
Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear:
GAO-07-1010:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1010, a report to the Honorable Jon C. Porter,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To
permanently store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been
working to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain about
100 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Although the project has been beset
with delays, in part because of persistent problems with its quality
assurance program, DOE stated in July 2006 that it will submit a
license application with NRC by June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-
quality application needs to be complete, technically adequate,
transparent by clearly justifying underlying assumptions, and traceable
back to original source materials.
GAO examined (1) DOE‘s development of its schedule for submitting a
license application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2)
NRC‘s assessment of DOE‘s readiness to submit a high-quality
application, and (3) DOE‘s progress in addressing quality assurance
recommendations and challenges identified in GAO‘s March 2006 report.
GAO reviewed DOE‘s management plan for creating the license
application, reviewed correspondence and attended prelicensing meetings
between DOE and NRC, and interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site
representatives for the Yucca Mountain project. In commenting on a
draft of the report, both DOE and NRC agreed with the report.
What GAO Found:
The director of DOE‘s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
set the June 30, 2008, date for filing the license application with NRC
in consultation with the DOE and contractor managers for the Yucca
Mountain project. DOE officials told us that external stakeholders were
not consulted because there was neither a legal requirement nor a
compelling management reason to do so. According to the director, the
June 2008 schedule is achievable because DOE has already completed a
large amount of work, including the completion of a draft license
application in 2005 that DOE decided not to submit to NRC.
NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license
application by June 30, 2008, but until NRC receives the application,
officials will not speculate about whether it will be high quality. NRC
has not seen a draft of the license application, and NRC‘s long-
standing practice is to maintain an objective and neutral position
toward a future application until it is filed. To help ensure that DOE
understands its expectations, NRC has, among other things, held
periodic prelicensing management and technical meetings with DOE.
DOE has made progress in resolving the quality assurance
recommendations and challenges identified in GAO‘s March 2006 report.
For example, DOE has replaced the one-page summary of performance
indicators that GAO had determined was ineffective with more frequent
and rigorous project management meetings. DOE has addressed the
management challenges GAO identified to varying degrees. For example,
regarding management continuity, DOE has worked to fill and retain
personnel in key management positions, such as the director of quality
assurance. However, for various reasons”including the long history of
recurring problems and likely project leadership changes in January
2009 when the current administration leaves office”it is unclear
whether DOE‘s actions will prevent these problems from recurring.
Figure: Major Milestones in the Yucca Mountain Project:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: DOE and NRC.
[End of figure]
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1010].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan, (202) 512-
3841, gaffiganm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE's Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by June 30, 2008,
Was Developed in Consultation with Yucca Mountain Project Managers:
NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High-Quality
License Application That Will Facilitate Completion of a Timely Review:
DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance
Recommendations and Resolving Challenges We Identified:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Tables:
Table 1: Major Milestones in DOE's Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository
Schedule:
Table 2: Key Technical Issues Identified by NRC and DOE:
Figure:
Figure 1: NRC's License Application Review Process:
Abbreviations:
BSC: Bechtel/SAIC Company, LLC:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
OCRWM: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management:
USGS: U.S. Geological Survey:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 2, 2007:
The Honorable Jon C. Porter:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Porter:
Nuclear power reactors generate nearly 20 percent of the nation's
electricity, but they create waste that can remain highly radioactive
for hundreds of thousands of years and requires proper disposal to
protect public health and the environment. More than 50,000 metric tons
of this radioactive waste is stored temporarily at 72 sites around the
country--primarily at commercial nuclear power plants. The Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 established the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management (OCRWM) within the Department of Energy (DOE) and
directed OCRWM to construct an underground geological repository to
permanently dispose of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste.
The act also set 1998 as the target date for DOE to start accepting
this waste and required the owners of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive wastes to enter into contracts with DOE for the disposal of
these materials and to pay for the repository's construction and
operations. In 2002, the Congress approved the President's
recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for the repository.
However, construction has not yet begun. DOE currently estimates that
2017 is the earliest date that the repository could open. Since DOE was
unable to begin the acceptance of waste in 1998 as required by the
statute and contracts, the government has incurred a liability that DOE
now estimates to be approximately $7 billion. Each year of delay in the
operation of the repository beyond 2017 could increase the government's
liability by up to $500 million.
Before construction of the repository can begin, DOE must submit a
license application to obtain a construction authorization from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).[Footnote 1] The act directs NRC to
issue or deny construction authorization within 3 years after receiving
DOE's license application, unless NRC extends this period by not more
than 1 year and reports the reasons for doing so to the Secretary of
Energy and the Congress. To ensure that its license application review
is completed within the allotted 3-to 4-year time frame, NRC expects
the application to be high quality--that is, to contain the information
necessary and sufficient to support the technical positions it
presents. Specifically, NRC has stated that a high-quality license
application would be complete, technically adequate, transparent--
clearly justifying and explaining any underlying assumptions and
conclusions--and traceable back to original source materials.
As part of the licensing process, DOE must demonstrate that its
repository will meet NRC's regulations, which implement the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) standard for protecting public
health and the environment from harmful exposure to the radioactive
waste. In preparation to file a license application, DOE has been
conducting numerous scientific and technical studies at the Yucca
Mountain site that will serve as supporting documentation to
demonstrate that it can meet these standards. DOE has also developed
computer models to measure the probability that various combinations of
natural and engineered features of the repository could safely contain
waste for the long term, taking into account possible water
infiltration, waste package corrosion, earthquakes, volcanic action, or
other scenarios.
NRC requires a license applicant to support its technical analysis by
implementing a quality assurance program that ensures that the
scientific, engineering, procurement, recordkeeping, and other work at
the project is performed under controlled conditions and can be
verified by others. DOE project teams are responsible for carrying out
various functions or aspects of the work and creating their own
policies and procedures to implement the quality assurance
requirements. DOE has established a quality assurance program that, for
example, contains general requirements for calibrating equipment before
conducting scientific tests, such as stipulating when and how the
equipment should be calibrated and how to document the results.
In March 2006, we reported that DOE had experienced persistent problems
with its quality assurance program for the Yucca Mountain
project.[Footnote 2] We concluded that the project's management tools
were ineffective for monitoring performance and detecting new quality
assurance problems. We recommended that DOE take action to strengthen
the project's management tools to better identify problems and track
progress in addressing them. Our report also identified three
substantial management challenges facing the project. First, in March
2005, DOE announced the discovery of e-mail messages implying that some
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) employees responsible for analyzing water
infiltration in Yucca Mountain may have falsified scientific data and
had shown disdain for quality assurance program requirements.
Subsequently, in January 2007, we reported that DOE had spent about
$20.5 million to survey e-mail messages to determine the extent and
nature of the problem, rework the USGS analysis, and conduct quality
assurance and e-mail training.[Footnote 3] Second, DOE needs to ensure
that specific engineering designs reflected high-level plans and
regulatory requirements. For example, design changes to a spent fuel
handling building led to the description of different design
requirements regarding the need for a water-based, fire-suppression
system. The activation of such a system could facilitate a nuclear
reaction, if there were also an inadvertent release of spent nuclear
fuel inside the building. The requirement for the system, therefore,
was eliminated, but not all building design documents reflected the
change. Third, DOE has experienced substantial turnover in key project
management positions. NRC has stressed the importance of a continuity
of qualified managers rather than a series of acting managers, but 9 of
17 key management positions at DOE turned over between 2001 and 2006.
Quality assurance problems are not new at the project and over time
have contributed to delays in filing a license application. In 2001,
DOE determined that, in part because of ongoing efforts to resolve
quality assurance problems, it would be unable to submit a license
application to NRC by December 2002, the target date scheduled when the
Congress approved the Yucca Mountain site. DOE was also unable to meet
a December 2004 goal for submitting a license application. Past
initiatives to address these problems and prepare for the submission of
a license application have included changes to improve the project's
organizational culture and ability to quickly detect and resolve
problems. Subsequently, in October 2005, DOE implemented its "New Path
Forward" by making major changes to the project's design, organization,
and management. For example, to improve accountability at the project,
it reorganized project staff to create a single manager in charge of
the project's major tasks in science, engineering, and licensing. DOE
also designated Sandia National Laboratories as the project's lead
laboratory to integrate the scientific work that Bechtel/SAIC Company,
LLC (BSC), the project's lead contractor, had previously overseen.
Shortly after his Senate confirmation in May 2006, OCRWM's director
announced a new schedule to submit DOE's license application for the
repository to NRC by June 30, 2008. The director has also fundamentally
changed DOE's management of the Yucca Mountain project--DOE now
directly manages the project, rather than limiting its role to
overseeing BSC's implementation of its management and operating
contract. OCRWM's director and deputy director now hold monthly program
review meetings with DOE and contractor project managers and routinely
participate in quality assurance management meetings with a focus on
identifying and correcting problems. OCRWM's director has also
identified specific performance measures for each project employee to
improve the organizational culture.
In light of persistent quality assurance problems and other delays that
the Yucca Mountain project has experienced, we examined (1) DOE's
development of its schedule for filing a license application by June
30, 2008, and the stakeholders with whom it consulted; (2) NRC's
assessment of DOE's readiness to file a license application that is
high quality and enables NRC to complete its evaluation within 3 to 4
years; and (3) DOE's progress in implementing the recommendations and
resolving the additional challenges identified in our March 2006 report
and the extent to which these challenges were considered in setting the
license application schedule.
To examine DOE's development of its license application schedule, we
reviewed Yucca Mountain project documents, including DOE's license
application management plan and progress reports, and interviewed
senior OCRWM managers. To obtain NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to
file a high-quality license application, we attended prelicensing
meetings and other interactions between NRC and DOE and reviewed NRC
correspondence and statements regarding DOE's planned license
application submission. We also interviewed NRC officials regarding
these interactions and their views of the planned license application.
Finally, to determine DOE's progress in implementing the
recommendations in our March 2006 report and resolving the additional
challenges we identified, we reviewed prior GAO reports, corrective
action reports, and related Yucca Mountain project documents;
interviewed senior OCRWM managers in DOE headquarters and the Yucca
Mountain project office in Las Vegas, Nevada; and interviewed NRC
officials. We conducted our work from February 2007 through July 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The decision to submit a license application to NRC by June 30, 2008,
was made by OCRWM's director in consultation with DOE and contractor
project managers; the director did not consult with nonfederal
stakeholders, including the state of Nevada and the nuclear power
industry. DOE officials told us they did not consult with external
stakeholders because there was no legal requirement or compelling
management reason for them to do so. They noted that the NRC review
process includes public hearings on the application, which will provide
stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on the substance of the
application. OCRWM's director told us that he announced the decision to
expedite the license application process shortly after taking office to
jump-start what he viewed as a stalled project. The director believes
the June 30, 2008, schedule is achievable because DOE has already
completed a substantial amount of work, including the completion of a
draft license application in 2005 that DOE ultimately determined was
not ready to submit to NRC. To develop the internal schedule to meet
the June 2008 date, project managers created a management plan to (1)
assess the statutory and regulatory requirements for the license
application; (2) identify any gaps and inadequacies in previous efforts
to draft a license application; (3) rework the problem areas; and (4)
create a management process to review, revise, and then seek DOE
management's approval for filing the license application.
NRC officials expect that DOE will file a license application by June
30, 2008, but the officials would not speculate on its quality or
whether it will enable NRC to complete its evaluation within the 3-to 4-
year time frame cited by the act because of NRC's long-standing
practice to maintain an objective and neutral position toward proposed
license applications until they are filed with NRC. NRC has expressed
concern about the lack of a rigorous quality assurance program and the
reliability of USGS's scientific work, which DOE had certified before
it discovered the USGS e-mails indicating quality assurance problems.
However, NRC recognizes that DOE has taken steps to address these
problems. To better ensure that DOE understands its expectations, NRC
has held periodic prelicensing management and technical meetings with
DOE officials that are open to external stakeholders. NRC officials
stated that DOE will need to file a high-quality application to enable
NRC to complete its review within the 3-to 4-year time frame.
DOE has made progress in implementing the quality assurance
recommendations in our March 2006 report and resolving the challenges
we identified, but it is unclear whether its actions will prevent
similar problems from recurring. Specifically, DOE has eliminated the
one-page summary of performance indicators--the primary management tool
DOE program managers had used to monitor project performance--that we
determined was ineffective. In its place, OCRWM's director has
instituted more frequent and rigorous project management meetings and
is introducing a new trending report that synthesizes information from
the project's corrective action program. In addition, in response to
the USGS e-mail issue, Sandia National Laboratories developed a new
water infiltration model to replace USGS's technical analysis to ensure
that the license application's scientific analysis is accurate and
supportable, and DOE reviewed e-mail and other documents to determine
the root cause and extent of the problem. Regarding the rigor of the
engineering design process, DOE has implemented new systems to ensure
that specific engineering designs reflect high-level plans and
regulatory requirements. Regarding management continuity, DOE has
worked to fill and retain personnel in key management positions, such
as the director of quality assurance. However, DOE continues to lose
key project managers, most recently with the departure of OCRWM's
deputy director. In addition, OCRWM's director is a political appointee
whose term is expected to end in January 2009 when a new administration
takes office, and the management style and priorities of future
directors may be different. Furthermore, DOE project officials
anticipate that changing the project's culture and history of recurring
quality assurance problems will take a long time.
Background:
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, establishes a
comprehensive policy and program for the safe, permanent disposal of
commercial spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive wastes in
one or more geologic repositories. The act charges DOE with (1)
establishing criteria for recommending sites for repositories; (2)
"characterizing" (investigating) the Yucca Mountain site to determine
its suitability for a repository;[Footnote 4] (3) if the site is found
suitable, recommending it to the President, who would submit a
recommendation to the Congress if he agreed that the site was
qualified; and (4) seeking permission from NRC to construct and operate
a repository at the approved site. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
users of nuclear-power-generated electricity pay $0.001 per kilowatt-
hour into a Nuclear Waste Fund, which may be used only to pay for the
siting, licensing, and construction of a nuclear waste repository. In
fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that the fund had $19.4
billion.[Footnote 5] DOE also reported that it had spent about $11.7
billion (in fiscal year 2006 dollars) from project inception in fiscal
years 1983 through 2005 and estimated that an additional $10.9 billion
(in fiscal year 2006 dollars) would be incurred from fiscal years 2006
to 2017 to build the repository.
Since the early 1980s, DOE has studied the Yucca Mountain site to
determine whether it is suitable for a high-level radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel repository. For example, DOE completed numerous
scientific studies of water flow and the potential for rock movement
near the mountain, including the likelihood that volcanoes and
earthquakes will adversely affect the repository's performance. To
allow scientists and engineers greater access to the rock being
studied, DOE excavated two tunnels for studying the deep underground
environment: (1) a 5-mile main tunnel that loops through the mountain,
with several research areas or alcoves connected to it, and (2) a 1.7-
mile tunnel that crosses the mountain, allowing scientists to study
properties of the rock and the behavior of water near the potential
repository area. Since July 2002, when the Congress approved the
President's recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site for the
development of a repository, DOE has focused on preparing its license
application.
In October 2005, DOE announced a series of changes in the management of
the project and in the design of the repository to simplify the project
and improve its safety and operation. Previously, DOE's design required
radioactive waste to be handled at least four separate times by
transporting the waste to the Yucca Mountain site, removing the waste
from its shipping container, sealing it in a special disposal
container, and moving it into the underground repository. The new
repository design relies on uniform canisters that would be filled and
sealed before being shipped, reducing the need for direct handling of
most of the waste prior to being placed in the repository. As a result,
DOE will not have to construct several extremely large buildings
costing millions of dollars for handling radioactive waste. In light of
these changes, DOE has been working on revising the designs for the
repository's surface facilities, developing the technical
specifications for the canisters that will hold the waste, and revising
its draft license application.
In accordance with NRC regulations, before filing its license
application, DOE must first make all documentary material that is
potentially relevant to the licensing process electronically available
via NRC's Internet-based document management system. This system, known
as the Licensing Support Network, provides electronic access to
millions of documents related to the repository project. DOE is
required to initially certify to NRC that it has made its documentary
material available no later than 6 months in advance of submitting the
license application. NRC, Nevada, and other parties in the licensing
process must also certify their documentary material was made available
following DOE's initial certification. This information will then be
available to the public and all the parties participating in the
licensing process. OCRWM currently expects to certify its material in
the Licensing Support Network by December 21, 2007. In addition, OCRWM
expects to complete the necessary designs and have the draft license
application ready for DOE management's review by February 29, 2008.
NRC is charged with regulating the construction, operation, and
decommissioning phases of the project and is responsible for ensuring
that DOE satisfies public health, safety, and environmental regulatory
requirements. Once DOE files the license application, NRC will begin a
four-stage process to process the application and decide whether to (1)
authorize construction of the repository, (2) authorize construction
with conditions, or (3) deny the application. As shown in figure 1,
this process includes the following steps:
* Acceptance review. NRC plans to take up to 180 days to examine the
application for completeness to determine whether the license
application has all of the information and components NRC requires. If
NRC determines that any part of the application is incomplete, it may
either reject the application or require that DOE furnish the necessary
documentation. NRC will docket the application once it deems the
application complete, indicating its readiness for a detailed technical
review.
* Technical review. The detailed technical review, scheduled for 18 to
24 months, will evaluate the soundness of the scientific data, computer
modeling, analyses, and preliminary facility design. The review will
focus on evaluating DOE's conclusions about the ability of the
repository designs to limit exposure to radioactivity, both during the
construction and operation phase of the repository (known as
preclosure) and during the phase after the repository has been filled,
closed, and sealed (known as postclosure.) If NRC discovers problems
with the technical information used to support the application, it may
conduct activities to determine the extent and effect of the problem.
As part of this review, NRC staff will prepare a safety evaluation
report that details staff findings and conclusions on the license
application.
* Public hearings. NRC will also convene an independent panel of
judges--called the Atomic Safety Licensing Board--to conduct a series
of public hearings to address contested issues raised by affected
parties and review in detail the related information and evidence
regarding the license application. Upon completion, the board will make
a formal ruling (called the initial decision) resolving matters put
into controversy. This initial decision can then be appealed to the NRC
commissioners for further review.
* NRC commission review. In the likely event of an appeal, the NRC
commissioners will review the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's initial
decision. In addition, outside of the adjudicatory proceeding, they
will complete a supervisory examination of those issues contested in
the proceeding to consider whether any significant basis exists for
doubting that the facility will be constructed or operated with
adequate protection of the public health and safety. The commissioners
will also review any issues about which NRC staff must make appropriate
findings prior to the authorization of construction, even if they were
not contested in the proceeding.
Figure 1: NRC's License Application Review Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NRC.
[End of figure]
However, until DOE submits a license application, NRC's role has
involved providing regulatory guidance; observing and gathering
information on DOE activities related to repository design, performance
assessment, and environmental studies; and verifying site
characterization activities. These prelicensing activities are intended
to identify and resolve potential licensing issues early to help ensure
that years of scientific work are not found to be inadequate for
licensing purposes. DOE and NRC have interacted since 1983 on the
repository. In 1998, they entered into a prelicensing interaction
agreement that provides for technical and management meetings, data and
document reviews, and the prompt exchange of information between NRC's
on-site representatives and DOE project personnel. Consistent with this
prelicensing interaction agreement and NRC's regulations, NRC staff
observe and review activities at the site and other scientific work as
they are performed to allow early identification of potential licensing
issues for timely resolution at the staff level.
EPA also has a role in the licensing process--setting radiation
exposure standards for the public outside the Yucca Mountain site. In
2001, EPA set standards for protecting the public from inadvertent
releases of radioactive materials from wastes stored at Yucca Mountain,
which are required by law to be consistent with recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences. In July 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that EPA's standards were
not consistent with the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendations.[Footnote 6] In response, EPA proposed a revised rule
in August 2005.[Footnote 7] The director of EPA's Office of Air and
Radiation Safety told us that EPA plans to finalize its rule this year.
In addition, NRC must develop exposure limits that are compatible with
EPA's rule. NRC published a proposed rule which it states is compatible
with EPA's rule,[Footnote 8] received public comments in 2005, but has
not yet finalized the rule. If EPA's rule does not change significantly
in response to public comments, NRC's rule would not require major
revisions either and could be finalized within months. However, if
EPA's final rule has major changes, it could require major changes to
NRC's rule, which could take more than a year to redraft, seek and
incorporate public comments, and finalize, according to NRC officials.
DOE's Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by June 30, 2008,
Was Developed in Consultation with Yucca Mountain Project Managers:
In July 2006, DOE announced its intent to file a license application to
NRC no later than June 30, 2008. OCRWM's director set the June 30,
2008, goal to jump-start what he viewed as a stalled project. OCRWM's
director told us that he consulted with DOE and contractor project
managers to get a reasonable estimate of an achievable date for
submitting the license application and asked OCRWM managers to develop
a plan and schedule for meeting the June 30, 2008, goal. OCRWM's
director believes this schedule is achievable, noting that DOE had
already performed a significant amount of work toward developing a
license application. Specifically, DOE completed a draft license
application in September 2005, but opted not to file it with NRC to
allow more time to address the USGS e-mail issue, revise the
repository's design to simplify the project and improve its safety and
operation, and consider revising its technical documents in response to
the possibility that EPA would revise the radiation standards for the
proposed repository. Table 1 shows the project's major milestones.
Table 1: Major Milestones in DOE's Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository
Schedule:
Milestone: Complete repository designs for use in the license
application;
Date: November 30, 2007.
Milestone: Certify the License Support Network;
Date: December 21, 2007.
Milestone: Submit draft application to OCRWM's director for DOE
management review;
Date: February 29, 2008.
Milestone: Issue supplement to the environmental impact statement;
Date: May 30, 2008.
Milestone: File the license application with NRC;
Date: June 30, 2008.
Milestone: License application docketed by NRC[A];
Date: September 30, 2008.
Milestone: Start Nevada rail construction;
Date: October 5, 2009.
Milestone: Receive construction authorization from NRC;
Date: September 30, 2011.
Milestone: Update the license application to receive a license from NRC
to receive and possess nuclear waste[B];
Date: March 29, 2013.
Milestone: Complete construction for initial operations;
Date: March 30, 2016.
Milestone: Complete start-up testing;
Date: December 31, 2016.
Milestone: Begin receipt of radioactive waste canisters;
Date: March 31, 2017.
Source: DOE.
[A] Assumes a 90-day docketing review by NRC.
[B] DOE would need to receive a license to receive and possess before
it can begin to receive waste.
[End of table]
DOE did not consult with external stakeholders in developing this
schedule because there was no legal or regulatory requirement or
compelling management reason to do so, according to senior OCRWM
officials. However, these officials noted that the NRC review process
includes extensive public hearings on the application, which will
provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on and challenge
the substance of the application. In addition, regarding other aspects
of the program, senior OCRWM officials noted that they have often
consulted with external stakeholders, including city and county
governments near the proposed repository site, NRC, USGS, and nuclear
power companies. OCRWM has also consulted with Nevada, the U.S.
Department of the Navy, and other DOE offices. For example, in
developing its standards for the canisters that will be used to store,
transport, and place the waste in the repository, DOE consulted with
the Navy and the nuclear power plant operators that generate the
nuclear waste and will use the proposed canisters. In addition, DOE has
worked with the local city and county governments near the repository
to develop the plans for transporting the waste to the proposed
repository.
OCRWM's director has made the submission of the license application by
June 30, 2008, the project's top strategic objective and management
priority. Accordingly, each OCWRM office has created business plans
detailing how its work will support this objective. Furthermore, DOE
has developed a license application management plan that incorporates
the lessons learned from previous license application preparation
efforts and works to ensure that the license application meets all DOE
and NRC statutory, regulatory, and quality requirements. The plan
establishes a process whereby teams assess the statutory and regulatory
requirements for the license application, identify any gaps and
inadequacies in the existing drafts of the license application, and
draft or revise these sections. Since the license application is
expected to be thousands of pages long, the plan divides the license
application into 71 subsections, each with a team assigned specific
roles and responsibilities, such as for drafting a particular
subsection or approving a particular stage of the draft. Finally, the
plan also creates new project management controls to provide oversight
of this process and manage risks. For example, the plan details how
issues that may pose risks to the schedule or quality of the license
application should be noted, analyzed, and resolved, and how the
remaining issues should be elevated to successively higher levels of
management.
NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High-Quality
License Application That Will Facilitate Completion of a Timely Review:
NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license
application by June 30, 2008, but will not speculate about its quality
due to a long-standing practice to maintain an objective and neutral
position toward proposed license applications until they are filed with
NRC. According to NRC officials, NRC's ability to review an application
in a timely manner is contingent on the application being high quality,
which NRC officials define as being complete and accurate, including
traceable and transparent data that adequately support the technical
positions presented in the license application. NRC has expressed
concern about the lack of a rigorous quality assurance program and the
reliability of USGS scientific work that DOE had certified before the
USGS e-mails were discovered.[Footnote 9] Based on its prelicensing
review, NRC recognizes that DOE is addressing problems with its quality
assurance program and, by developing a new water infiltration model, is
restoring confidence in the reliability of its scientific work.
When the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 gave NRC responsibility for
licensing the nuclear waste repository, NRC staff began engaging in
prelicensing activities aimed at gathering information from DOE and
providing guidance so that DOE would be prepared to meet NRC's
statutory and regulatory requirements and NRC would be prepared to
review the license application. NRC issued high-level waste disposal
regulations containing criteria for approving the application and
publicly available internal guidance detailing the steps and activities
NRC will perform to review the application. NRC also established a site
office at OCRWM's Las Vegas, Nevada, offices to act as NRC's point of
contact and to facilitate prompt information exchanges. NRC officials
noted that they have also been working for several years to communicate
NRC's expectations for a high-quality license application.
Although NRC has no formal oversight role in the Yucca Mountain project
until DOE files a license application, NRC staff observe DOE audits of
its quality assurance activities to identify potential issues and
problems that may affect licensing. The NRC staff then report their
findings in quarterly reports that summarize their work and detail any
problems or issues they identify. For example, after observing a DOE
quality assurance audit at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
in August 2005, NRC staff expressed concern that humidity gauges used
in scientific experiments at the project were not properly calibrated-
-an apparent violation of quality assurance requirements. Due in part
to concerns that quality assurance requirements had not been followed,
BSC issued a February 7, 2006, stop-work order affecting this
scientific work. In June 2007, OCRWM project managers told us that
because quality assurance rules were not followed, DOE could not use
this scientific work to support the license application.
To facilitate prelicensing interactions, NRC and DOE developed a formal
process in 1998 for identifying and documenting technical issues and
information needs. As shown in table 2, issues were grouped into nine
key technical issues focused mainly on postclosure performance of the
geologic repository. Within this framework, NRC and DOE defined 293
agreements in a series of technical exchange meetings. An agreement is
considered closed when NRC staff determines that DOE has provided the
requested information. Agreements are formally closed in public
correspondence or at public technical exchanges. As of June 2007, DOE
has responded to all 293 of the agreements. NRC considers 260 of these
to be closed. NRC considers 8 of the remaining 33 agreements to be
potentially affected by the USGS e-mail issue that emerged in 2005.
Their resolution will be addressed after NRC examines the new water
infiltration analysis. NRC considers that the remaining 25 have been
addressed but still need additional information. DOE has indicated that
it does not plan any further responses on these agreements, and that
the information will be provided in the June 2008 license application.
Table 2: Key Technical Issues Identified by NRC and DOE:
Key technical issue: Container Life and Source Term;
Short description: Prediction of the waste package container lifetime,
including estimates of the amount of radioactivity that may escape from
deteriorated waste packages.
Key technical issue: Evolution of the Near-Field Geochemical
Environment;
Short description: Changes in the waste package environment over long
periods.
Key technical issue: Igneous Activity;
Short description: The likelihood and consequences of volcanic
activity.
Key technical issue: Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects;
Short description: Evaluation of how heat from the waste may affect the
mechanical properties of the geologic repository design.
Key technical issue: Radionuclide Transport;
Short description: Identification of key geochemical processes that may
control radionuclide transport at Yucca Mountain.
Key technical issue: Structural Deformation and Seismicity;
Short description: Evaluation of earthquake and fault activity.
Key technical issue: Thermal Effects on Flow;
Short description: Understanding of the effects of heat generated by
the waste on moisture flow around the repository.
Key technical issue: Total System Performance Assessment and
Integration;
Short description: Development of the capability to conduct and review
total system performance assessments.
Key technical issue: Unsaturated and Saturated Flow under Isothermal
Conditions;
Short description: Characterization of groundwater flow near the
repository.
Source: NRC.
[End of table]
NRC determined that adding agreements to the original 293 was not an
efficient means to continue issue resolution during prelicensing, given
DOE's stated intent to submit its license application, first in 2004,
and now in 2008. NRC is now using public correspondence, as well as
public technical exchanges and management meetings, to communicate
outstanding and emerging technical issues. For example, NRC's September
2006 correspondence provided input on DOE's proposed approach for
estimating seismic events during the postclosure period and requested
further interactions on the topic. Also, since May 2006, NRC and DOE
have conducted a series of technical exchanges to discuss such topics
as DOE's total system performance assessment model, the seismic design
of buildings, and other DOE design changes. Other interactions are
planned to ensure that NRC has sufficient information to conduct its
prelicensing responsibilities.
DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance
Recommendations and Resolving Challenges We Identified:
DOE is implementing the recommendations and addressing the challenges
identified in our March 2006 report, but it is unclear whether the
department's actions will prevent similar problems from recurring.
Specifically, in response to our recommendations that DOE improve its
management tools, DOE has eliminated the one-page summary (or panel) of
performance indicators and has revised its trend evaluation reports.
DOE is supplementing these changes with more rigorous senior management
meetings that track program performance to better ensure that new
problems are identified and resolved. DOE has also begun addressing
additional management challenges by independently reworking USGS's
water infiltration analysis, fixing problems with a design and
engineering process known as requirements management, and reducing the
high-turnover rate and large number of acting managers in key project
management positions.
DOE Has Replaced or Improved Two Previously Ineffective Management
Tools:
Our March 2006 report found that two of the project's management tools-
-the panel of performance indicators and the trend evaluation reports-
-were ineffective in helping DOE management to monitor progress toward
meeting performance goals, detecting new quality assurance problems,
and directing management attention where needed. In response, DOE has
stopped using its panel of performance indicators and replaced them
with monthly program review meetings--chaired by OCRWM's director and
attended by top-level OCRWM, BSC, Sandia, and USGS managers--that
review the progress of four main OCRWM projects: (1) the drafting of
the license application; (2) the effort to select and load documents
and records into NRC's Licensing Support Network; (3) work
supplementing DOE's environmental impact statement to reflect the
October 2005 changes in repository design, which shift from direct
handling of waste to the use of canisters; and (4) the development of a
system to transport waste from where it is generated, mainly nuclear
power plants, to the repository. In addition, DOE has developed the
following four new, high-level performance indicators that it evaluates
and discusses at its monthly program review meetings:
* safety, including injuries and lost workdays due to accidents at the
project;
* quality, including efforts to improve OCRWM's corrective action
program, which works to detect and resolve problems at the project and
the performance of the quality assurance program;
* cost, including actual versus budgeted costs, staffing levels, and
efforts to recruit new employees; and:
* culture, including the project's safety conscious work environment
program, which works to ensure that employees are encouraged to raise
safety concerns to their managers or to NRC without fear of retaliation
and that employees' concerns are resolved in a timely and appropriate
manner according to their importance.
Although DOE plans to develop additional performance indicators, these
four simplified indicators have replaced about 250 performance
indicators on the previous performance indicator panel. According to a
cognizant DOE official, the previous performance indicator panel was
ineffective, in part, because it focused on what could be measured, as
opposed to what should be measured, resulting in DOE focusing its
efforts on developing the performance indicator panel instead of
determining how to use this information as a management tool. The
monthly program review and the new performance indicators are designed
to be more useful to OCRWM management by being simpler and more focused
on the key mission activities.
DOE has also revised its trend evaluation reports to create new
organizational structures and procedures that detail the processes and
steps for detecting and analyzing trends and preparing trend evaluation
reports for senior management review. DOE has appointed a trend program
manager and implemented a work group to oversee these processes.
Furthermore, as we recommended, the new trend program has an increased
focus on the significance of the monitored condition by synthesizing
trends projectwide instead of separating OCRWM's and BSC's trend
evaluation reports.
To improve the utility of trend evaluation reports as a management
tool, the procedures now identify the following three types of trends
and criteria for evaluating them:
* Adverse trends are (1) repeated problems that involve similar tasks
or have similar causes and are determined by management to be
significant or critical to the success of the project; (2) repeated
problems that are less significant but collectively indicate a failure
of the quality assurance program, may be precursors to a more
significant problem, or pose a safety problem; and (3) patterns of
problems that management determines warrant further analysis and
actions to prevent their recurrence.
* Emerging trends are problems that do not meet the criteria for an
adverse trend, but require actions to ensure that they do not evolve
into an adverse trend.
* Monitored trends are fluctuations in the conditions being monitored
that OCRWM management determines do not warrant action, but each
fluctuation needs close monitoring to ensure that it does not evolve
into an emerging or adverse trend.
DOE has also implemented changes to its corrective action program--the
program that provides the data that are analyzed in the trend
evaluation program. The corrective action program is the broader system
for recognizing problems and tracking their resolution. It is one of
the key elements of the project's quality assurance framework and has
been an area of interest to NRC in its prelicensing activities. The
corrective action program consists of a computer system that project
employees can use to enter information about a problem they have
identified and create a record, known as a condition report, and a set
of procedures for evaluating the condition reports and ensuring these
problems are resolved.
Regarding our broader conclusions that the OCRWM quality assurance
program needed more management attention, in spring 2006, DOE requested
a team of external quality assurance experts to review the performance
of the quality assurance program. The experts concluded that 8 of the
10 topics they studied--including the corrective action program--had
not been effectively implemented. Specifically, the team found that the
corrective action program did not ensure that problems were either
quickly or effectively resolved. Furthermore, a follow-up internal DOE
study, called a root cause analysis report, concluded that the
corrective action program was ineffective primarily because senior
management had failed to recognize the significance of repeated
internal and external reviews and did not aggressively act to correct
identified problems and ensure program effectiveness.
In response, DOE has revised the corrective action program in an effort
to change organizational behaviors and provide increased management
attention. For example, DOE has restructured the condition screening
team, which previously had poor internal communication and adversarial
relationships among its members, according to a senior project manager.
Similarly, a December 2006 external review of the quality assurance
program found that OCRWM staff had focused its efforts on trying to
downgrade the significance of condition reports to deflect individual
and departmental responsibility, rather than ensuring that the
underlying causes and problems were addressed. In response, DOE (1)
reorganized the condition screening team to reduce the size of the team
but include more senior managers; (2) identified roles,
responsibilities, and management expectations for the team, including
expectations for collaborating and communicating; and (3) formalized
processes and criteria for screening and reviewing condition reports.
The condition screening team now assigns one of four significance
levels to each new condition report and assigns a manager who is
responsible for investigating the problem.
In addition, DOE has restructured the management review committee,
which oversees the corrective action program and the condition
screening team. The management review committee is charged with, among
other things, reviewing the actions of the condition screening team,
particularly regarding the condition reports identified as having the
highest two levels of significance. The management review committee
also reviews draft root cause analysis reports, and any condition
reports that could affect the license application. Whereas these
functions were previously performed by BSC, the management review
committee is now sponsored by OCRWM's deputy director and includes
senior DOE, BSC, and Sandia managers. DOE has also created written
policies to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of
the management review committee. The goal of these changes is to
refocus management attention--with OCRWM's deputy director serving as a
champion for the corrective action program--and ensure that problems
are resolved in a timely and efficient manner.
DOE Has Addressed Other Management Challenges:
DOE has addressed to varying degrees three other management challenges
identified in our March 2006 report: (1) restoring confidence in USGS's
scientific documents; (2) problems with a design and engineering
process known as requirements management; and (3) managing a changing
and complex program, particularly given the high turnover in key
management positions. Specifically:
* USGS e-mail issue. DOE has taken three actions to address concerns
about the reliability of USGS's scientific work after a series of e-
mails implied that some USGS employees had falsified scientific and
quality assurance documents and disdained DOE's quality assurance
processes. Specifically, DOE (1) evaluated USGS's scientific work; (2)
directed Sandia to independently develop a new water infiltration model
to compare with USGS's model and reconstruct USGS's technical
documents; and (3) completed a root cause analysis, including a
physical review of more than 50,000 e-mails and keyword searches of
nearly 1 million other e-mails sampled from more than 14 million e-
mails. DOE's evaluation of USGS's scientific work concluded that there
was no evidence that the USGS employees falsified or modified
information. DOE's root cause analysis team concluded that there was no
apparent widespread or pervasive pattern across OCRWM of a negative
attitude toward quality assurance or willful noncompliance with quality
assurance requirements. However, the analysis found that OCRWM's senior
management had failed to hold USGS personnel accountable for the
quality of the scientific work, fully implement quality assurance
requirements, and effectively implement the corrective action program.
These internal studies and reports and Sandia's independent development
of a new water infiltration model are intended to restore public
confidence in the water infiltration modeling work in the license
application.
* Problems with design control and the requirements management process.
DOE has revised its design control and requirements management
processes to address the problems that our March 2006 report
identified. In addition, to gauge the effectiveness of these changes,
DOE conducted an internal study called a readiness review, in which it
determined that the changes in the processes were sufficient and that
BSC was prepared to resume design and engineering work. Subsequently,
in January 2007, DOE's independent assessment of BSC and the
requirements management process concluded that the processes and
controls were adequate and provided a general basic direction for the
design control process. DOE has also contracted with Longenecker and
Associates to review the project's engineering processes with the final
report due in the summer of 2007.
* Management turnover. DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel in
key management positions that had been vacant for extended periods of
time, most notably the director of quality assurance and the OCRWM
project director. In addition, as part of an effort to change the
organizational culture, OCRWM's director has created a team to evaluate
how to improve succession planning and identify gaps in the skills or
staffing levels in OCRWM. However, DOE continues to lose key project
managers, most recently with the departure of OCRWM's deputy director.
Furthermore, additional turnover is possible after the 2008
presidential election, when the incoming administration is likely to
replace OCRWM's director. Historically, new directors have tended to
have different management priorities and have implemented changes to
the organizational structure and policies. To address this concern,
OCRWM's director suggested legislatively changing the director position
by making it a long-term appointment to reflect the long-term nature of
the Yucca Mountain project.
Concluding Observations:
The OCRWM director's schedule for filing a repository license
application with NRC by June 30, 2008, will require a concerted effort
by project personnel. However, given the waste repository's history
since its inception in 1983, including two prior failed efforts to file
a license application, it is unclear whether DOE's license application
will be of sufficient quality to enable NRC to conduct a timely review
of the supporting models and data that meet the statutory time frames.
DOE has taken several important actions to change the organizational
culture of the Yucca Mountain project since the issuance of our March
2006 report. These actions appear to be invigorating, for example, the
quality assurance program by focusing management attention on improving
quality by resolving problems. However, for a variety of reasons, it
has yet to be seen whether DOE's actions will prevent the kinds of
problems our March 2006 report identified from recurring or other
challenges from developing. First, some of DOE's efforts, such as its
efforts to reduce staff turnover, are in preliminary or planning stages
and have not been fully implemented. Therefore, their effectiveness
cannot yet be determined. Second, improving the quality assurance
program will also require changes in the organizational behaviors of
OCRWM's staff and contractors. OCRWM's director told us that these
types of cultural changes can be particularly difficult and take a long
time to implement. Consequently, it may be years before OCRWM fully
realizes the benefits of these efforts. Finally, as we have previously
reported, DOE has a long history of quality assurance problems and has
experienced repeated difficulties in resolving these problems.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their review
and comment. In their written responses, both DOE and NRC agreed with
our report. (See apps. I and II.) In addition, both DOE and NRC
provided comments to improve the draft report's technical accuracy,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To examine the development of DOE's license application schedule, we
reviewed DOE documents related to the announcement and creation of the
license application. We also reviewed the DOE management plan for
creating the license application and other internal reports on the
progress in drafting the application. We interviewed OCRWM's director
and other OCRWM senior management officials in DOE headquarters and its
Las Vegas project office about the process for creating the schedule,
including consultations with stakeholders. In addition, we observed
meetings covering topics related to the license application schedule
between DOE and NRC, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and
Materials, and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. These meetings
were held in Rockville, Maryland; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Arlington,
Virginia.
To obtain NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to file a high-quality
license application, we obtained NRC documents--such as the status of
key technical issues and briefing slides on NRC's technical exchanges
with DOE. We also attended NRC staff briefings for the Commission's
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials, including a briefing
on NRC's prelicensing activities; reviewed meeting transcripts; and
observed a NRC-DOE quarterly meeting and recorded NRC's comments. In
addition, we interviewed NRC's project manager who is responsible for
reviewing the postclosure portion of a license application, NRC's on-
site representative at the Las Vegas office, and other NRC regional
officials. Furthermore, we interviewed the director of EPA's Office of
Air and Radiation Safety regarding the status of EPA's rulemaking to
set radiation exposure standards for the public outside the Yucca
Mountain site.
To determine DOE's progress in implementing the recommendations and
resolving the additional challenges identified in our March 2006
report, we reviewed prior GAO reports that assessed DOE's quality
assurance process and relevant DOE corrective action reports, root
cause analyses, and other internal reviews that analyzed DOE's efforts
to improve its management tools and its corrective action program in
general. We also reviewed related NRC documents, such as some
observation audit reports. We observed NRC and DOE management meetings
and technical exchanges in Rockville, Maryland, and Las Vegas, Nevada,
that covered related issues. We also interviewed OCRWM's director in
DOE headquarters and senior managers at the Yucca Mountain project
office in Las Vegas about their efforts to address our recommendations.
Regarding the quality assurance challenges noted in our prior report,
we reviewed a January 2007 GAO report discussing the USGS issue and
reviewed DOE documents detailing their actions to restore confidence in
the scientific documents. We reviewed internal DOE documents regarding
requirements management and interviewed the program's chief engineer in
charge of resolving this issue. Finally, regarding staff turnover in
key management positions, we reviewed OCRWM's strategic objectives,
business plan, and project documents and interviewed OCRWM's director
and other senior project managers about their efforts to improve
succession planning.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of
Energy, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the director
of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were
Richard Cheston, Casey Brown, Omari Norman, Alison O'Neill, and Daniel
Semick.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Mark E. Gaffigan:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
July 26, 2007:
Mr. Mark Gaffigan:
Acting Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gaffigan:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on the
draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled Yucca
Mountain DOE /lets Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, But Whether
Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear. We
appreciate GAO's recognition of the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management's (OCRWM) increased management focus on quality
assurance improvements and the progress we have made in addressing
issues identified in your March 2006 report.
OCRWM has taken numerous actions to ensure a high-quality license
application that can be docketed will be Submitted to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) no later than June 30, 2008. We have
established a cadre of personnel with substantial licensing,
regulatory, and NRC experience. We have also fundamentally revised our
approach to the license application by establishing a rigorous process
approach to ensure the license application is a high-quality document
based on sound science.
Personnel and Organization Changes:
In July 2006, I announced four strategic objectives for the Program.
One of these objectives is to design. staff, and train the OCRWM
organization such that it has the skills and culture needed to design,
license, and manage the construction and operation of the Yucca
Mountain Project with safety, quality, and cost effectiveness. A Senior
Executive Service-level individual, reporting directly to me, has been
assigned as the project manager to plan and implement the
organization's development. In part, this effort is intended to ensure
that organizational culture changes will extend beyond my tenure.
In the meantime, OCRWM has substantially changed the offices and
personnel responsible for developing the license application. We
completed a transition of' responsibility for the post-closure safety
assessment from Bechtel SAIL Company, LLC (BSC'), OCRWM's management
and operating contractor, to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), our
designated lead laboratory. Sandia is managing all national laboratory
post-closure analysis and science work on the Yucca Mountain Project,
BSC now focuses on its core competency of engineering design and pre-
closure safety analysis. The top three license application individuals
in OCRWM, BSC, and SNL are new hires since 2005' and each has
significant utility and nuclear facility licensing experience.
OCRWM also has contracted with 12 nationally and internationally
recognized nuclear safety experts who support MUM, BSC, and SNL.
Finally, OCRWM established a license strategy team which includes
participants, academia, private sector firms, Program and former NRC
executives.
Changes to Processes and Procedures:
In early 2D06, OCRWM projectized the license application by
establishing a scope, cost, and schedule for license application
development with clear quality criteria. An OCRWM project manager with
nuclear engineering and nuclear safety expertise arid proven nuclear
project successes was selected to lead tile project.
A license application development and review organization has been
established with individuals experienced in engineering, science, and
licensing. This organization is divided. into design, subsurface
design, pre-closure safety analysis, into surface design, subsurface
design, pre-closure safety analysis, post-closure safety analysis, and
programmatic. Each of these areas is further divided into 71 specific
sections that are directly traceable to the NRC's NUREG 1804, }\/cc/
Mountain Review Plan.
Nearly all the processes and procedures related to developing the
license application have been revised over the past two years. OCRWM
and its contractors have established a rigorous approach to developing
the license application that was not employed with previous license
application development efforts. The final license application i s
expected to contain nearly 10,000 pages of technical information.
The license application development process consists of four successive
phases: a an internal draft, a final draft, and a final license
application section. Each phase is approved by tile appropriate
science, engineering, licensing, Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, and
Office of General Counsel staff prior to proceeding to the next phase.
A total of 284 line management reviews by teams averaging 10 people
each will he conducted. When a section proceeds to the final license
application phase and is validated, it is ready for transmittal to the
NRC, and My the OCRWM Me= can authorize changes.
In summary, OCRWM has substantially modified the organizations
established rigorous license application expectations, and procedures
that are maintained through configuration control; and hired national
and international experts to assess the processes. We are confident
that all these change-, will result in a high-quality license
application that is complete, docketable, and, ultimately, licenseable.
If you have any questions, please contact me or Victor Trebules of my
staff. Mr. Trebules can be reached on 202-586-8793.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Edward F. Sproat, III, Director:
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, DC 20555-0001:
July 30, 2007:
Mr. Mark Gaffigan, Acting Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gaffigan:
Thank you for providing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
the opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report GAO-07-1010, "Yucca Mountain
- DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, but Whether Its
Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is Unclear," The NRC
staff has reviewed the draft report and generally agrees with GAO's
findings and conclusions. Although we did not identify any significant
issues regarding accuracy, completeness, and sensitivity of
information, we have separately transmitted editorial comments to your
staff. In addition, we have a comment on page 15 of the draft report,
the first sentence of the second paragraph which states ".,the
commission staff began engaging in pre-licensing activities.." This
statement should be clarified to indicate that it is the NRC staff, and
not the personal staff of the Commission, who began engaging in pre-
licensing activities.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact
Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director of the Division of High-Level Waste
Repository Safety. Mr. Kokajko can be reached by telephone at (301) 492-
3165.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Luis A. Reyes:
Executive Director for Operations:
cc: Casey Brown, GAO:
Richard Cheston, GAO:
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Under 10 C.F.R. Part 63.121, NRC also requires, among other things,
that (1) the geologic repository operations be located in and on lands
that are either owned by DOE or are permanently withdrawn and reserved
for its use and (2) DOE obtain necessary water rights for the project.
[2] GAO, Yucca Mountain: Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear
Waste Repository Needs Increased Management Attention, GAO-06-313
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).
[3] GAO, Yucca Mountain Project: Information on Estimated Costs to
Respond to Employee E-mails That Raised Questions about Quality
Assurance, GAO-07-297R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
[4] The 1987 amendments to the act directed that DOE investigate only
the Yucca Mountain site.
[5] The Nuclear Waste Fund provided $8.3 billion and funding for
defense waste provided $3 billion. Both commercial spent nuclear fuel
and high-level defense waste are planned for disposal at Yucca
Mountain.
[6] Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir 2004).
Prior to establishing the original standards, EPA requested
recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences that resulted in
the National Research Council's report, Technical Bases for Yucca
Mountain Standards (Washington, D.C.: 1995).
[7] 70 Fed. Reg. 49014 (Aug. 22, 2005).
[8] 70 Fed. Reg. 53313 (Sept. 8, 2005).
[9] NRC expressed concerns in 1984 that some project staff viewed
quality assurance requirements as unnecessary and burdensome, and, in
1986, DOE issued a stop-work order based on its determination that USGS
staff did not appreciate the importance of quality assurance and that
USGS work would not meet NRC's expectations.
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