Critical Infrastructure Protection
Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-07-1036 September 10, 2007Control systems--computer-based systems that monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions--perform vital functions in many of our nation's critical infrastructures, including electric power, oil and gas, water treatment, and chemical production. The disruption of control systems could have a significant impact on public health and safety, which makes securing them a national priority. GAO was asked to (1) determine cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems; (2) determine the challenges to securing these systems; (3) identify private sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems; and (4) assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. To address these objectives, we met with federal and private sector officials to identify risks, initiatives, and challenges. We also compared agency plans to best practices for securing critical infrastructures.
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Control systems are more vulnerable to cyber attacks than in the past for several reasons, including their increased connectivity to other systems and the Internet. Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. For example, in 2003, a computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast and in 2006, a foreign hacker was reported to have planted malicious software capable of affecting a water filtering plant's treatment operations. Critical infrastructure owners face both technical and organizational challenges to securing control systems. Technical challenges--including control systems' limited processing capabilities, real-time operations, and design constraints--hinder an infrastructure owner's ability to implement traditional information technology security processes, such as strong user authentication and patch management. Organizational challenges include difficulty in developing a compelling business case for investing in control systems security and differing priorities of information security personnel and control systems engineers. Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and standards setting organizations are working to help secure control systems. Their efforts include developing standards, providing guidance to members, and hosting workshops on control systems security. For example, the electricity industry has recently developed standards for cybersecurity of control systems and a gas trade association is developing guidance for members to use encryption to secure control systems. Federal agencies also have multiple initiatives under way to help secure critical infrastructure control systems, but more remains to be done to coordinate these efforts and to address specific shortfalls. Over the past few years, federal agencies--including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)--have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. However, there is as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Further, DHS lacks processes needed to address specific weaknesses in sharing information on control system vulnerabilities. Until public and private sector security efforts are coordinated by an overarching strategy and specific information sharing shortfalls are addressed, there is an increased risk that multiple organizations will conduct duplicative work and miss opportunities to fulfill their critical missions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2007:
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but
Challenges Remain:
GAO-07-1036:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1036, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Control systems”computer-based systems that monitor and control
sensitive processes and physical functions”perform vital functions in
many of our nation‘s critical infrastructures, including electric
power, oil and gas, water treatment, and chemical production. The
disruption of control systems could have a significant impact on public
health and safety, which makes securing them a national priority. GAO
was asked to (1) determine cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the
potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems;
(2) determine the challenges to securing these systems; (3) identify
private sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control
systems; and (4) assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to
strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. To address these
objectives, we met with federal and private sector officials to
identify risks, initiatives, and challenges. We also compared agency
plans to best practices for securing critical infrastructures.
What GAO Found:
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to
cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact
of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be
intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come
from a variety of sources. Control systems are more vulnerable to cyber
attacks than in the past for several reasons, including their increased
connectivity to other systems and the Internet. Further, as
demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving control systems,
the impact on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. For
example, in 2003, a computer virus was blamed for shutting down train
signaling systems throughout the East Coast and in 2006, a foreign
hacker was reported to have planted malicious software capable of
affecting a water filtering plant‘s treatment operations.
Critical infrastructure owners face both technical and organizational
challenges to securing control systems. Technical challenges”including
control systems‘ limited processing capabilities, real-time operations,
and design constraints”hinder an infrastructure owner‘s ability to
implement traditional information technology security processes, such
as strong user authentication and patch management. Organizational
challenges include difficulty in developing a compelling business case
for investing in control systems security and differing priorities of
information security personnel and control systems engineers.
Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and
standards setting organizations are working to help secure control
systems. Their efforts include developing standards, providing guidance
to members, and hosting workshops on control systems security. For
example, the electricity industry has recently developed standards for
cybersecurity of control systems and a gas trade association is
developing guidance for members to use encryption to secure control
systems.
Federal agencies also have multiple initiatives under way to help
secure critical infrastructure control systems, but more remains to be
done to coordinate these efforts and to address specific shortfalls.
Over the past few years, federal agencies”including the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)”have initiated efforts to improve the
security of critical infrastructure control systems. However, there is
as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various activities across
federal agencies and the private sector. Further, DHS lacks processes
needed to address specific weaknesses in sharing information on control
system vulnerabilities. Until public and private sector security
efforts are coordinated by an overarching strategy and specific
information sharing shortfalls are addressed, there is an increased
risk that multiple organizations will conduct duplicative work and miss
opportunities to fulfill their critical missions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to develop a strategy for coordinating control systems security
efforts and to enhance information sharing with relevant stakeholders.
DHS officials did not agree or disagree with GAO‘s recommendations, but
stated that they would take them under advisement.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1036].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Dave Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Face Increasing Risks Due to
Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and the Potentially Serious Impact of
an Attack:
Critical Infrastructure Owners Face Technical and Organizational
Challenges to Securing Control Systems:
The Private Sector Has Multiple Initiatives Under Way to Help Secure
Control Systems:
Federal Agencies Have Multiple Initiatives to Help Secure Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems, but More Remains to Be Done:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: The Department of Homeland Security's Control Systems
Security Initiatives:
Appendix III: The Department of Energy's Initiatives to Support Control
Systems Security within the Energy Sector:
Appendix IV: Other Agencies' Initiatives to Help Secure Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Designated Sector-Specific
Agencies:
Table 2: Sources of Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructures:
Table 3: Comparing IT Systems to Control Systems Illustrates Security
Challenges:
Table 4: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Electricity
Sector:
Table 5: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Oil and Gas
Sector:
Table 6: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Water Sector:
Table 7: Control System Security Initiatives that Affect Multiple
Sectors:
Table 8: Selected DHS Control Systems Security Initiatives:
Table 9: NIST Control Systems Security Efforts:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Critical Infrastructures (clockwise from upper
left: chemical plants, nuclear power plants, hydroelectric dams, and
railroads):
Figure 2: Control Room of an Electric Power Company:
Figure 3: Major Components of a SCADA System:
Figure 4: Components of a Control System in a Water Treatment and
Distribution Facility:
Figure 5: A Substation That Is Part of Idaho National Laboratory's
Facilities for Testing Control Systems:
Figure 6: The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's Electricity
Infrastructure Operations Center:
Abbreviations:
CIP: critical infrastructure protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOE: Department of Energy:
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:
IT: information technology:
NERC: North American Electric Reliability Corporation:
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology:
SCADA: supervisory control and data acquisition:
US-CERT: United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 10, 2007:
Congressional Requesters:
Control systems are computer-based systems that are used in many
industries to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical
functions. Control systems perform vital functions in many of our
nation's critical infrastructures, including electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution; oil and gas refining and pipelines;
water treatment and distribution; chemical production and processing;
railroads and mass transit; and manufacturing. Ten years ago, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
highlighted the risk of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures,
stating that "the widespread and increasing use of supervisory control
and data acquisition systems for control of energy systems provides
increasing ability to cause serious damage and disruption by cyber
means."
In 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace[Footnote 1] (often
called the cyberspace strategy) stated that the disruption of control
systems could have significant consequences for public health and
safety, and made securing these systems a national priority. The
cyberspace strategy further states that both the private and public
sectors have roles in securing control systems. The strategy directs
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the
Department of Energy (DOE) and other agencies, to work in partnership
with private industry in increasing awareness of the importance of
efforts to secure control systems, developing standards, and improving
policies with respect to control systems security.
Given the importance of this issue, you asked us to (1) determine cyber
threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on
critical infrastructure control systems; (2) determine the challenges
to securing critical infrastructure control systems; (3) identify
private sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control
systems; and (4) assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to
strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems.
To accomplish these objectives, we assessed documentation of control
system security incidents and analyzed research studies and reports, as
well as our prior reports and testimonies on control systems, critical
infrastructure protection (CIP), and national preparedness, among
others. We analyzed reports by, and met with, private sector and
federal officials who had expertise in control systems and their
security. Our work was performed from March 2007 to July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I contains further details on our objectives, scope, and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to
cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact
of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be
intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come
from a variety of sources including foreign governments, criminal
groups, and disgruntled organization insiders. Control systems are more
vulnerable to cyber attacks than in the past for several reasons,
including their increased connectivity to other systems and the
Internet. Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents
involving control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure
could be substantial. For example, in 2003, a computer virus was blamed
for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast; in
2006, a foreign hacker was reported to have planted malicious software
capable of affecting a water filtering plant's water treatment
operations; and, also in 2006, excessive traffic on a nuclear power
plant's control system network--possibly caused by the failure of
another control system device--caused two circulation pumps to fail,
forcing the unit to be shut down manually.
Critical infrastructure owners face both technical and organizational
challenges to securing control systems. Technical challenges--
including control systems' limited processing capabilities, real-time
operations, and design constraints--hinder an infrastructure owner's
ability to implement traditional information technology (IT) security
processes, such as strong user authentication and patch management.
Organizational challenges include difficulty in developing a compelling
business case for investing in control systems security and differing
priorities of information security personnel and control systems
engineers.
Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and
standards setting organizations are working to help secure control
systems. These organizations include those specific to the electric,
chemical, oil and gas, and water sectors. Their efforts include
developing standards, providing guidance to members, and hosting
workshops on control systems security. For example, the electricity
industry has recently developed standards for cybersecurity of control
systems, and a gas trade association is developing guidance for members
to use encryption to secure control systems.
Over the past few years, federal agencies--including DHS, DOE, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and others--have initiated efforts
to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems.
However, there is as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various
control systems activities across federal agencies and the private
sector. Further, DHS lacks processes needed to address specific
weaknesses in sharing information on control system vulnerabilities.
Until public and private sector security efforts are coordinated by an
overarching strategy, there is an increased risk that multiple
organizations will conduct duplicative work and miss opportunities to
learn from other organizations' activities. In addition, until
information-sharing weaknesses are addressed, DHS risks not being able
to effectively carry out its responsibility for sharing information on
vulnerabilities with the private and public sectors.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security to develop a strategy for coordinating control
systems security efforts and to enhance information sharing with
control systems stakeholders.
DHS officials, including the Deputy Director of the National Cyber
Security Division, provided comments via e-mail on a draft of this
report, but did not agree or disagree with our recommendations.
Instead, agency officials stated that the agency would take the
recommendations under advisement. DHS officials also discussed the
agency's plans to develop a comprehensive strategy for control systems
security and efforts to develop a process for sharing sensitive
information on control system vulnerabilities. In addition, DHS
officials and others who contributed information to this report
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in this report
as appropriate.
Background:
Critical infrastructures are physical or virtual systems and assets so
vital to the nation that their incapacitation or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on national and economic security, public health,
and safety. These systems and assets--such as the electric power grid,
chemical plants, and water treatment facilities--are essential to the
operations of the economy and the government. Recent terrorist attacks
and threats have underscored the need to protect our nation's critical
infrastructures. If vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are
exploited, our nation's critical infrastructures could be disrupted or
disabled, possibly causing loss of life, physical damage, and economic
losses.
Although the vast majority of our nation's critical infrastructures are
owned by the private sector, the federal government owns and operates
key facilities that use control systems, including oil, gas, water,
energy, and nuclear facilities (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Examples of Critical Infrastructures (clockwise from upper
left: chemical plants, nuclear power plants, hydroelectric dams, and
railroads) (photographs):
[See PDF for image]
Sources (clockwise from upper left): Corbis, PhotoDisc, Corbis, Digital
Vision.
[End of figure]
Control Systems Are Used in Many Critical Infrastructures:
Control systems are computer-based systems that are used within many
infrastructures and industries to monitor and control sensitive
processes and physical functions. Typically, control systems collect
sensor measurements and operational data from the field, process and
display this information, and relay control commands to local or remote
equipment. Control systems perform functions that range from simple to
complex. They can be used to simply monitor processes--for example, the
environmental conditions in a small office building--or to manage the
complex activities of a municipal water system or a nuclear power
plant.
In the electric power industry, control systems can be used to manage
and control the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric
power (see fig. 2). For example, control systems can open and close
circuit breakers and set thresholds for preventive shutdowns. The oil
and gas industry uses integrated control systems to manage refining
operations at plant sites, remotely monitor the pressure and flow of
gas pipelines, and control the flow and pathways of gas transmission.
Water utilities can remotely monitor well levels and control the wells'
pumps; monitor flows, tank levels, or pressure in storage tanks;
monitor water quality characteristics such as pH, turbidity, and
chlorine residual; and control the addition of chemicals to the water.
Control systems are also used in manufacturing and chemical processing.
Chemical reactors may use control systems to produce chemicals or
regulate temperatures within the production process.
Figure 2: Control Room of an Electric Power Company (photograph):
[See PDF for image]
Source: Major electric utility.
[End of figure]
Installing and maintaining control systems requires a substantial
financial investment. DOE cites research estimating the value of the
control systems used to monitor and control the electric grid and the
oil and natural gas infrastructure at $3 billion to $4
billion.[Footnote 2] The thousands of remote field devices represent an
additional investment of $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion. Each year, the
energy sector alone spends over $200 million for control systems,
networks, equipment, and related components and at least that amount in
personnel costs.
Control Systems: Types and Components:
There are two primary types of control systems: distributed control
systems and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Distributed control systems typically are used within a single
processing or generating plant or over a small geographic area, while
SCADA systems typically are used for large, geographically dispersed
operations. For example, a utility company may use a distributed
control system to manage power generation and a SCADA system to manage
its distribution.
A SCADA system is generally composed of six components: instruments,
operating equipment, local processors, short-range communication, host
computers, and long-range communications.
* Instruments sense conditions such as pH, temperature, pressure, power
level, and flow rate.
* Operating equipment includes pumps, valves, conveyors, and substation
breakers that can be controlled by energizing actuators or relays.
* Local processors communicate with the site's instruments and
operating equipment. Local processors go by several different names,
including programmable logic controller, remote terminal unit,
intelligent electronic device, and process automation controller. A
single local processor may be responsible for dozens of inputs from
instruments and outputs to operating equipment. Local processors can
collect instrument data; turn on and off operating equipment; translate
protocols so different controllers, instruments, and equipment can
communicate; and identify alarm conditions.
* Short-range communication consists of the relatively short cables or
wireless connections that carry analog and discrete signals between the
local processors and the instruments and operating equipment. The
communication uses electrical characteristics such as voltage and
current or other established industrial communications protocols.
* Host computers are the central point of monitoring and control. The
host computer is where a human operator can supervise the process,
receive alarms, review data, and exercise control. In some cases the
host computer has logic programmed into it to provide control over the
local processors. The host computer may be called the master terminal
unit, the SCADA server, or a personal computer.
* Long-range communication consists of the communication between the
local processors and host computers. This communication typically
covers miles using methods such as leased phone lines, satellite,
microwave, and cellular packet data.
Figure 3 illustrates the major components of a SCADA system and Figure
4 illustrates how these components would be distributed in a typical
water utility.
Figure 3: Major Components of a SCADA System:
This is an illustration of the major components of a SCADA system:
* Host computers;
* Long-range communication;
* Local processors;
* Short-range communication;
* Instruments;
* Operating equipment.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
These components can be adapted to perform specific functions in many
industrial sectors. For example, the following graphic shows the
application of these components in a water treatment and distribution
system.
Figure 4: Components of a Control System in a Water Treatment and
Distribution Facility:
[See PDF for image]
This is an illustration of the components of a control system in a
water treatment and distribution facility:
* Reservoir;
* Central control station;
- Host computers;
- Long-range communication;
- Internet;
* Water treatment plant;
-Short-range communication;
* Pumping station;
- Operating equipment;
- Instruments;
- Local processors;
* End use.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The Federal Government Plays a Critical Role in Helping Secure Critical
Infrastructures and Their Control Systems:
Federal law and policies call for critical infrastructure protection
activities to enhance the cyber and physical security of both public
and private infrastructures that are essential to national security,
national economic security, and national public health and
safety.[Footnote 3] Federal policy designates certain federal agencies
as lead points of contact for each key critical infrastructure sector
(see table 1). Further, it assigns agencies responsibility for
infrastructure protection activities in their assigned sectors and for
coordination with other relevant federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector. In addition, federal policy
establishes DHS as the focal point for the security of cyberspace--
including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability
reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for public and private
critical infrastructure information systems. To accomplish this
mission, DHS is to work with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector.
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Designated Sector-Specific
Agencies:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Agriculture, Department of Health
and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration[A].
Sector: Banking and finance;
Sector-specific agency: Department of the Treasury.
Sector: Chemical;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Dams;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Defense.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Sector-specific agency: Environmental Protection Agency.
Sector: Emergency services;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Energy;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Energy.
Sector: Government facilities;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Information technology;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Sector-specific agency: Department of the Interior.
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Public health and health care;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Health and Human Services.
Sector: Telecommunications;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Transportation systems;
Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Source: The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7, and the National Strategy for Homeland
Security.
[A] The Department of Agriculture is responsible for food (including
meat, poultry, and eggs) and agriculture; and the Department of Health
and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, is responsible for
food other than meat, poultry, and egg products.
[End of table]
Several key federal plans focus on securing critical infrastructure
control systems. The cyberspace strategy [Footnote 4] calls for DHS and
DOE to work in partnership with industry to develop best practices and
new technology to increase the security of critical infrastructure
control systems, to determine the most critical control systems-related
sites, and to develop a prioritized plan for short-term cybersecurity
improvements for those sites. In addition, DHS's National
Infrastructure Protection Plan[Footnote 5] specifically identifies
control systems as part of the cyber infrastructure, establishes an
objective of reducing vulnerabilities and minimizing severity of
attacks on these systems, and identifies programs directed at
protecting control systems. Further, in May 2007, the critical
infrastructure sectors issued sector-specific plans to supplement the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Twelve sectors, including the
chemical, energy, water, information technology, postal, emergency
services, and telecommunications sectors, identified control systems
within their respective sectors. Of these, most identified control
systems as critical to their sector and listed efforts under way to
help secure them.
Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Face Increasing Risks Due to
Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and the Potentially Serious Impact of
an Attack:
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to
cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the potentially serious
impact of an attack as demonstrated by reported incidents. Cyber
threats can be unintentional or intentional, targeted or nontargeted,
and can come from a foreign, domestic, or inside source. Control
systems can have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to cyber
attacks, including the increased connectivity of control systems to
other systems and the Internet. Further, based on past events, the
impact of a control systems incident on a critical infrastructure could
be substantial.
Critical Infrastructures Face Multiple Cyber Threats:
Cyber threats can be unintentional and intentional, targeted or
nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Unintentional
threats can be caused by software upgrades or maintenance procedures
that inadvertently disrupt systems. Intentional threats include both
targeted and nontargeted attacks. A targeted attack is when a group or
individual specifically attacks a critical infrastructure system. A
nontargeted attack occurs when the intended target of the attack is
uncertain, such as when a virus, worm, or malware[Footnote 6] is
released on the Internet with no specific target.
There is increasing concern among both government officials and
industry experts regarding the potential for a cyber attack on a
national critical infrastructure, including the infrastructure's
control systems. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified
multiple sources of threats to our nation's critical infrastructures,
including foreign nation states engaged in information warfare,
domestic criminals and hackers, and disgruntled employees working
within an organization. Table 2 summarizes those groups or individuals
that are considered to be key sources of threats to our nation's
infrastructures.
Table 2: Sources of Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructures:
Threat source: Criminal groups;
Description: There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by criminal
groups that attack systems for monetary gain.
Threat source: Foreign nation states;
Description: Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of
their information gathering and espionage activities. Also, several
nations are aggressively working to develop information warfare
doctrine, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single
entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the
supply, communications, and economic infrastructures that support
military power--impacts that, according to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, can affect the daily lives of Americans across the
country.[A].
Threat source: Hackers;
Description: Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of
the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community. While
remote cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer
knowledge, hackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from
the Internet and launch them against victim sites. Thus, attack tools
have become more sophisticated and easier to use.
Threat source: Hacktivists;
Description: Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on
publicly accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. These groups and
individuals overload e-mail servers and hack into Web sites to send a
political message.
Threat source: Disgruntled insiders;
Description: The disgruntled insider, working from within an
organization, is a principal source of computer crimes. Insiders may
not need a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions because
their knowledge of a victim system often allows them to gain
unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system
data. The insider threat also includes contractor personnel.
Threat source: Terrorists;
Description: Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit
critical infrastructures to threaten national security, cause mass
casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and
confidence. However, traditional terrorist adversaries of the United
States are less developed in their computer network capabilities than
other adversaries. Terrorists likely pose a limited cyber threat. The
Central Intelligence Agency believes terrorists will stay focused on
traditional attack methods, but it anticipates growing cyber threats as
a more technically competent generation enters the ranks.
Threat source: Virus writers;
Description: Virus writers are posing an increasingly serious threat.
Several destructive computer viruses and worms have harmed files and
hard drives, including the Melissa macro virus, the Explore.Zip worm,
the CIH (Chernobyl) virus, Nimda, and Code Red.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, unless otherwise indicated.
[A] Prepared statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
February 2, 2000.
[End of table]
Control Systems Are Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks:
Control systems are vulnerable to flaws or weaknesses in system
security procedures, design, implementation, and internal controls.
When these weaknesses are accidentally triggered or intentionally
exploited, they could result in a security breach. Vulnerabilities
could occur in control systems' policies, platform (including hardware,
operating systems, and control system applications), or networks.
Federal and industry experts believe that critical infrastructure
control systems are more vulnerable today than in the past. Reasons
include the increased standardization of technologies, the increased
connectivity of control systems to other computer networks and the
Internet, insecure connections, and the widespread availability of
technical information about control systems. Further, it is not
uncommon for control systems to be configured with remote access
through either a dial-up modem or over the Internet to allow remote
maintenance or around-the-clock monitoring. If control systems are not
properly secured, individuals and organizations may eavesdrop on or
interfere with these operations from remote locations.
Reported Control Systems Incidents Reveal the Potential for Substantial
Impact:
Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving critical
infrastructure control systems demonstrate that a serious attack could
be devastating. Although there is not a comprehensive source for
incident reporting, the following attacks, reported in government and
media sources,[Footnote 7] demonstrate the potential impact of an
attack.
* Worcester air traffic communications. In March 1997, a teenager in
Worcester, Massachusetts, disabled part of the telephone network using
a dial-up modem connected to the system. This disabled phone service to
the airport control tower, airport security, the airport fire
department, the weather service, and the carriers that use the airport.
Also, the tower's main radio transmitter and another transmitter that
activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer that
controllers use to monitor flight progress. The attack also disrupted
phone service to 600 homes in a nearby town.
* Maroochy Shire sewage spill. In the spring of 2000, a former employee
of an Australian organization that develops manufacturing software
applied for a job with the local government, but was rejected. Over a 2-
month period, this individual reportedly used a radio transmitter on as
many as 46 occasions to remotely break into the controls of a sewage
treatment system. He altered electronic data for particular sewerage
pumping stations and caused malfunctions in their operations,
ultimately releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby
rivers and parks.
* Los Angeles traffic lights. According to several published reports,
in August 2006, two Los Angeles city employees hacked into computers
controlling the city's traffic lights and disrupted signal lights at
four intersections, causing substantial backups and delays. The attacks
were launched prior to an anticipated labor protest by the employees.
In addition, the following incidents illustrate the consequences of
nontargeted attacks and unintentional incidents on critical
infrastructure control systems. According to experts, incidents such as
these could also be triggered by a targeted attack.
* CSX train signaling system. In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus
was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the
East Coast of the United States. The virus infected the computer system
at CSX Corporation's Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters, shutting down
signaling, dispatching, and other systems. According to an Amtrak
spokesman, 10 Amtrak trains were affected. Train service was either
shut down or delayed up to 6 hours.
* Davis-Besse power plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed
that in January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm known as Slammer
infected a private computer network at the idled Davis-Besse nuclear
power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring system
for nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant's process computer failed,
and it took about 6 hours for it to become available again.
* Northeast power blackout. In August 2003, failure of the alarm
processor in the control system of FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based electric
utility, prevented control room operators from having adequate
situational awareness of critical operational changes to the electrical
grid. This problem was compounded when the state estimating program at
the Midwest Independent System Operator failed due to incomplete
information on the electric grid. When several key transmission lines
in northern Ohio tripped due to contact with trees, they initiated a
cascading failure of 508 generating units at 265 power plants across
eight states and a Canadian province.
* Zotob worm. In August 2005, a round of Internet worm infections
knocked 13 of Daimler Chrysler's U.S. automobile manufacturing plants
offline for almost an hour, leaving workers idle as infected Microsoft
Windows systems were patched. Zotob and its variations also caused
computer outages at heavy-equipment maker Caterpillar Inc., aircraft
maker Boeing, and several large U.S. news organizations.
* Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam failure. In December 2005, the Taum Sauk
Water Storage Dam, approximately 100 miles south of St. Louis,
Missouri, suffered a catastrophic failure, releasing a billion gallons
of water. According to the dam's operator, the incident may have
occurred because the gauges at the dam read differently than the gauges
at the dam's remote monitoring station.
* Bellingham, Washington, gasoline pipeline failure. In June 1999,
237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16-inch pipeline and ignited
an hour and a half later, causing three deaths, eight injuries, and
extensive property damage. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by
poorly performing control systems that limited the ability of the
pipeline controllers to see and react to the situation.
* Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, water system. In October 2006, a foreign
hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant. The intruder
planted malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant's
water treatment operations. The infection occurred through the Internet
and did not seem to be an attack that directly targeted the control
system.
* Browns Ferry power plant. In August 2006, two circulation pumps at
Unit 3 of the Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear power plant failed,
forcing the unit to be shut down manually. The failure of the pumps was
traced to excessive traffic on the control system network, possibly
caused by the failure of another control system device.
As control systems become increasingly interconnected with other
networks and the Internet, and as the system capabilities continue to
increase, so do the threats, potential vulnerabilities, types of
attacks, and consequences of compromising these critical systems.
Critical Infrastructure Owners Face Technical and Organizational
Challenges to Securing Control Systems:
Critical infrastructure owners face both technical and organizational
challenges in securing their control systems. Technical challenges--
including control systems' limited processing capabilities and their
real-time operations--hinder infrastructure owners' ability to
implement traditional information security technologies and practices.
Organizational challenges include the lack of a compelling business
case to improve security and a reluctance to share information
regarding incidents.
Technical Challenges Hinder Use of Traditional Information Security
Measures for Control Systems:
According to industry experts, existing information security
technologies and practices--such as strong user authentication and
patch management--are generally not implemented in control systems due
to several technical issues, including limited computational processing
capabilities, the need for real-time operation, and the lack of
consideration of cybersecurity in the original design of the system.
These challenges are described here in more detail.
Limited computational capabilities. Existing security technologies--
such as authorization, authentication, encryption, intrusion detection,
and filtering of network traffic and communications--require more
bandwidth, processing power, and memory than control system components
typically have. Controller stations are generally designed to do
specific tasks, and they often use low-cost, resource-constrained
microprocessors. In addition, passwords and other data from control
systems are often transmitted in a plain, unencrypted format.
Encrypting this data could overload the processing abilities of the
control system.
Need for real-time operations. Complex passwords and other strong
password practices are not always used to prevent unauthorized access
to control systems, in part because they could hinder the operator's
ability to respond rapidly during an emergency. As a result, according
to security experts, weak passwords that are easy to guess, and shared
and infrequently changed, are common in control systems. Some even use
default passwords or no password at all.
Design limitations. Historically, control systems vendors did not
design their products with security in mind, although recently vendors
have begun including more security-related features in their products.
In addition, although modern control systems are based on standard
operating systems, they are typically customized to support control
system applications. Consequently, software patches may either be
incompatible with the customized version of the operating system or
difficult to implement without compromising service by shutting down
"always-on" systems or affecting interdependent operations.
Table 3 illustrates the technical challenges in securing control
systems by contrasting them with conventional information technology
(IT) systems.
Table 3: Comparing IT Systems to Control Systems Illustrates Security
Challenges:
System characteristic: Performance requirements;
Information technology system:
* Generally not real time;
* Response must be consistent;
* High throughput is demanded;
* Delay may be acceptable;
Control system:
* Real time;
* Response is time critical;
* Modest throughput is acceptable;
* Delay is a serious concern;
Security challenge for control systems: Real-time operations: The
security solution should not delay system response time.
System characteristic: Availability requirements;
Information technology system:
* Responses such as rebooting are acceptable;
* Availability deficiencies can often be tolerated, depending on the
system's operational requirements;
Control system:
* Responses such as rebooting may not be acceptable because of process
availability requirements;
* Outages must be planned and scheduled days/weeks in advance;
* High availability requires exhaustive predeployment testing;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitations: The
security solution should not require rebooting or cause unplanned
outages.
System characteristic: Risk management requirements;
Information technology system:
* Data confidentiality and integrity are paramount;
* Fault tolerance is less important-momentary downtime is not a major
risk;
* Major risk impact is delay of business operations;
Control system:
* Human safety is paramount, followed by protection of the process;
* Fault tolerance is essential: even momentary downtime is not
acceptable;
* Major risk impact is regulatory noncompliance or loss of life,
equipment, or production;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitations: The
security solution should not impose unacceptable risk by endangering
lives or affecting the process being controlled; the security solution
should not cause downtime.
System characteristic: Time-critical interaction;
Information technology system:
* Less critical emergency interaction;
* Tightly restricted access control can be implemented to the degree
necessary;
Control system:
* Response to human and other emergency interaction is critical;
* Access to control system should be strictly controlled, yet not
hamper human-machine interaction;
Security challenge for control systems: Real-time operations: Increased
security of stringent access controls must be balanced against the need
for fast response times in emergencies.
System characteristic: System operation;
Information technology system:
* Systems are designed for use with typical operating systems;
* Upgrades are straightforward with the availability of automated
deployment tools;
Control system:
* Differing and custom operating systems often do not have security
capabilities;
* Software changes must be carefully made, usually by software vendors,
because of the specialized control algorithms and perhaps modified
hardware and software involved;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitation: Additional
testing and modification of off-the-shelf products may be required;
additional time may be required for vendors to implement upgrades.
System characteristic: Resource constraints;
Information technology system:
* Systems are specified with enough resources to support the addition
of third party applications such as security solutions;
Control system:
* Systems are designed to support the intended industrial process, with
minimal memory and computing resources to support the addition of
security technology;
Security challenge for control systems: Processing capabilities: It is
more difficult to add additional security technology or processes to
control systems.
System characteristic: Communications;
Information technology system:
* Standard communications protocols;
* Primarily wired networks with some localized wireless capabilities;
* Typical IT networking practices;
Control system:
* Many proprietary and standard communication protocols;
* Several types of communications media used including dedicated wire
and wireless (radio and satellite);
* Networks are complex and sometimes require the expertise of control
engineers;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitation: Standard IT
solutions may not operate on control system networks.
System characteristic: Change management;
Information technology system:
* Software changes are applied in a timely fashion in the presence of
good security policies and procedures. The procedures are often
automated;
Control system:
* Software changes must be thoroughly tested and deployed incrementally
throughout a system to ensure that the integrity of the control system
is maintained;
* Control system outages often must be planned and scheduled days/weeks
in advance;
Security challenge for control systems: Real-time operations:
Additional planning, testing, and slower deployment are required when
implementing security solutions.
System characteristic: Managed support;
Information technology system:
* Allow for diversified support methods;
Control system:
* Service support is usually via a single vendor;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitations: Solutions
may be limited to those provided or supported by vendor.
System characteristic: Component lifetime;
Information technology system:
* Lifetime on the order of 3-5 years;
Control system:
* Lifetime on the order of 15-20 years;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitation: Security
solution should not become obsolete quickly.
System characteristic: Access to components;
Information technology system:
* Components are usually local and easy to access;
Control system:
* Components can be isolated, remote, and require extensive physical
effort to gain access to them;
Security challenge for control systems: Design limitation: Additional
time and effort required to access network components.
Source: GAO analysis of NIST, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security, Special
Publication 800-82 (Initial Public Draft).
[End of table]
Organizational Issues Pose Challenges to Securing Control Systems:
In addition to the technical challenges of securing control systems,
critical infrastructure owners face organizational challenges in
securing control systems, including difficulty in developing a
compelling business case for improving control systems security, a
reluctance to share information on control system incidents (which
could help build a business case), and the division of technical
responsibilities within an organization.
Experts and industry representatives reported that organizations may be
reluctant to devote resources to securing control systems. These
resources include money, personnel, training, and the early replacement
of equipment that may have been originally designed to last 20 years or
more. Until industry users of control systems have a business case to
justify why additional security is needed, there may be little market
incentive for the private sector to develop and implement more secure
control systems.
Another challenge is the reluctance to share information on control
systems incidents and the resulting lack of attention to this risk.
While incidents and attacks on critical infrastructure control systems
have occurred, to date there is no authoritative, centralized process
for collecting and analyzing information about control systems
incidents. Experts we interviewed stated that companies are reluctant
to share details of incidents due to factors such as legal liability
and impact on their reputation. Several experts stated that they
believed incidents were occurring, but are not being reported by
industry. One expert suggested that since there have been no reports of
significant disruptions caused by cyber attacks on U.S. control
systems, industry representatives may believe the threat of such an
attack is low. We have previously recommended that the government work
with the private sector to improve the quality and quantity of
information being shared among industries and government about attacks
on the nation's critical infrastructures.[Footnote 8]
Another challenge involves the way security responsibilities are
structured within organizations that use control systems. Several
experts and industry representatives stated that two separate groups
often have responsibility for securing control systems: (1) IT security
personnel and (2) control system engineers and operators. IT security
personnel focus on securing enterprise systems, while control system
engineers and operators focus on the reliable performance of their
control systems. Because each has a different focus, the two groups
face challenges in collaborating to implement secure control systems.
For example, IT security personnel may be unaware of the special
requirements of a control system and the control systems personnel may
be unaware of the full range of security technologies that may be
available.
Certain challenges are inherent to control systems. However, according
to experts, many of these challenges can be addressed by both the
private and public sectors through proper implementation of existing
technology, development of new technologies, and implementation of
organizational policies and procedures and training.
The Private Sector Has Multiple Initiatives Under Way to Help Secure
Control Systems:
Industry-specific organizations in various sectors, including the
electricity, chemical, oil and gas, and water sectors, have initiatives
under way to help improve control system security. These initiatives
include developing standards, publishing guidance, and hosting
workshops.
Electricity:
The electricity system of the United States and Canada has more than $1
trillion in asset value, more than 200,000 miles of transmission lines,
and more than 800,000 megawatts of generating capability serving over
300 million people. The effective functioning of this infrastructure is
highly dependent on control systems. As a result, private sector
organizations in the electricity sector have several activities under
way related to control systems security, including establishing
mandatory reliability standards, developing guidelines for compliance
with these standards, hosting workshops, and other activities. See
table 4 for a description of key control systems security initiatives
in the electricity sector.
Table 4: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Electricity
Sector:
Organization: North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC);
NERC's mission is to ensure that the major transmission components of
the electric system in North America are reliable, adequate, and
secure. It is a self-regulatory organization that sets standards for
the reliable operation and planning of the major transmission
components of the electric system and monitors, assesses, and enforces
compliance with those standards.
Initiative: NERC promotes the development of a new mandatory system of
reliability standards, authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. The standards are meant to apply to systems such as control
systems that, if compromised, could cause a threat to the large-scale
power distribution system. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a
process through which NERC is authorized to enforce compliance with
these reliability standards.[A] NERC began implementing cybersecurity
reliability standards that apply to control systems in June 2007.
Electric utilities must be fully compliant with the standards by 2010.
Organization: Electric Power Research Institute;
The institute is an independent nonprofit center for energy and
environmental research. It brings together members, participants, the
institute's scientists and engineers, and other experts to work on
solutions to the challenges of electric power. Its members represent
over 90 percent of the electricity generated in the United States.
Initiative: The institute has released guidelines on control systems
security, including a report in 2003 and another in 2005. A recent
institute report, Compliance Guidelines for Cyber Security Reliability
Standards-2006 Update, provides information, recommendations, and tools
to help the electric power industry comply with the mandatory NERC
cybersecurity reliability standards. The institute is currently
developing a tool to help asset managers create better business cases
for control system security technology. According to a manager of the
institute's CIP efforts, the institute also:
* has a forum that meets about three times per year during which its
members discuss cybersecurity incidents, including those related to
control systems;
* performs research on policies and procedures for securing control
systems, but has not been able to develop security technology for
control systems given current funding levels (the institute's security
research has included various reviews of SCADA systems, determining how
to secure certain products that are being used by the electric power
industry, reviewing how a facility could recognize and recover from a
control systems attack, and studying the use of wireless technology for
SCADA systems and the inherent security risks); and;
* has worked on control systems-related projects with the national
laboratories, and has collaborated with DOE. For example, in 2006, the
institute worked with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to
identify the risks and vulnerabilities associated with using broadband
communications for control systems and to develop mitigation
strategies. According to a laboratory official, the institute and the
laboratory are currently working on a project on electric power
utilities' use of wireless technologies. The project is to produce two
papers addressing best practices for wireless deployment in the
electric sector, and guidelines for securing wireless networks,
training personnel, and securely integrating wireless and wired
networks.
Organization: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers;
The institute is responsible for developing international standards for
telecommunications, IT, and power generation products and services.
Initiative: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers has
several working groups that address issues related to control systems
security in the electric power industry. Some of these work groups are
developing standards for defining, specifying, and analyzing control
systems. For example, the institute is developing P1689, a standard for
retrofitting cybersecurity to various communications links in a control
system, and P1711, a cryptographic standard for the same links. The
institute is also developing P1686, which will define the functions and
features to be provided in substation intelligent electronic devices to
accommodate critical infrastructure protection programs.
Organization: International Electrotechnical Commission;
The commission prepares and publishes international standards for all
electrical, electronic, and related technologies. World Trade
Organization agreements permit use of these standards in international
trade.
Initiative: The commission's Technical Committee 57 is working to
develop standards for control systems and control system components of
power transmission and distribution systems, including communications
and end devices called remote terminal units. It is also establishing
data and communications security and communications standards for
substations. The commission's Technical Committee 65 is chartered to
produce standards in the area of industrial process measurement and
control. Working Group 10 of the committee is developing commission
standard 62443, which is a three-part standard that will address
network and system cybersecurity of industrial process measurement and
control systems.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by North America Electric
Reliability Corporation, interviews with Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission officials, Electric Power Research Institute, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and the International
Electrotechnical Commission.
[A] Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1211 (Aug. 8, 2005), 16 U.S.C. § 824o
(2006).
[End of table]
Chemical:
Control systems are used to monitor and control processes within the
chemical industry. A $460 billion critical infrastructure sector, the
chemical industry contributes nearly 3 percent of the U.S. gross
domestic product and generates 6.2 million jobs. Chemical reactors may
use control systems to produce chemicals or regulate temperatures
within the production process.
The American Chemistry Council is a trade association that represents
major companies in the U.S. chemical manufacturing sector. The council
supports research and initiatives related to federal regulation on
health, safety, security, and the environment.
The council established a Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program in
2002 to facilitate implementation of the Chemical Sector Cyber Security
Strategy. Updated in 2006, the strategy, as well as the Guidance for
Addressing Cyber Security in the Chemical Industry, addresses
manufacturing and control system security efforts and guidance on how
to secure these systems. Further, within the cybersecurity program, the
Manufacturing and Control Systems Security Work Team was developed to
collect, identify, and facilitate the use of practices for securing
manufacturing and control systems and to establish a network of
manufacturing and control systems subject matter experts.
Oil and Gas:
The United States has more than 2 million miles of pipelines delivering
oil and natural gas. In 2005, the consumption of natural gas totaled
about 22,000 billion cubic feet, and in the United States, 20,802,000
barrels of petroleum were consumed per day. Both the gas and oil
industries use control systems for process management and monitoring
purposes. Employing integrated control systems, these industries can
control the refining operations at a plant site, remotely monitor the
pressure and flow of gas pipelines, and control the flow and pathways
of gas transmissions. The sector-specific plan for the energy sector
(which includes oil and gas) includes a discussion of selected control
systems security efforts within the sector. The oil and gas sector has
multiple control systems security activities under way, in particular,
standards relating to security of control systems. See table 6 for a
description of key control systems security efforts in the oil and gas
sector.
Table 5: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Oil and Gas
Sector:
Organization: American Gas Association;
A trade organization that advocates for local natural gas utility
companies and provides a broad range of programs and services for
member natural gas pipelines, marketers, international gas companies,
and industry associates.
Initiative: The American Gas Association's Automation and
Telecommunication and Gas Control committees supported the development
of a report that would recommend how to apply encryption to protect gas
utility control systems. A task group was organized to develop Standard
AGA Report No.12, Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications,
which consists of four parts. The first part, Background, Policies, and
Test Plan, published in March 2006, is intended to serve as a guideline
for voluntary implementation of a comprehensive cybersecurity posture.
This report sets up the risk assessment process and allows owners and
operators to determine if encryption is a good security practice for
their control systems. The second part, Retrofit Link Encryption for
Asynchronous Serial Communications, has not yet been finalized. This
part contains functional requirements and details technical
specifications for AGA-12 compliant retrofit devices used in control
systems. Both the third and fourth parts have not yet been developed.
The third part, Protection of Networked Systems, is to focus on high-
speed communication systems for control systems, including the
Internet. The final part, Protection Embedded in SCADA Components, is
to focus on protecting control systems by incorporating cryptography
into system components at the time of manufacture. The second, third,
and fourth parts of this report are expected to be developed under the
leadership and technical expertise of the Gas Technology Institute with
user input from the membership of the American Gas Association.
Organization: American Petroleum Institute;
A national trade association for America's oil and natural gas
industry. The institute's corporate members include various segments of
the oil industry, such as producers, refiners, suppliers, pipeline
operators and marine transporters, as well as service and supply
companies that support all segments of the industry;
Initiative: The institute published standard 1164, Pipeline SCADA
Security, in September 2004. This standard provides guidance to the
operators of oil and gas liquid pipeline systems for managing critical
infrastructure control systems integrity and security. This guideline
is specifically designed to provide the operators with a description of
industry practices in critical infrastructure control systems security
and to provide the framework needed to develop sound security practices
within the operator's individual companies. The institute published
standard 1165, Recommended Practice for Pipeline SCADA Displays, in
January 2007. This recommended practice focuses on the design and
implementation of displays used for displaying, monitoring, and
controlling information on pipeline control systems.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by American Gas
Association, Interview with Department of Energy officials, American
Petroleum Institute.
[End of table]
Water:
The water sector includes drinking water and water treatment systems.
The sector's infrastructures are diverse, complex, and distributed,
ranging from systems that serve a few customers to those that serve
millions. The sector includes about 150,000 water, wastewater, and
storm water organizations; federal water offices at the national,
regional, and state levels belonging to several agencies; some 100
state water agency organizations; and many other local government water
organizations. Members of the water sector have worked with the
Environmental Protection Agency on development of the Water Sector-
Specific Plan, which includes some efforts on control systems security.
Members of the water sector are also participating in the Process
Control Security Forum's activities. See table 7 for a list of key
control system security initiatives by various organizations in the
water sector.
Table 6: Key Control System Security Initiatives in the Water Sector:
Organization: Awwa Research Foundation;
An international nonprofit organization that sponsors research to
enable water utilities, public health agencies, and other professionals
to provide safe and affordable drinking water to consumers.
Initiative: The foundation is currently working on two research
projects. The first is the Cryptographic Protection of SCADA
Communications for Water Systems #2969, which will develop a standard
suite of equations and protocols to provide cybersecurity for water
utility SCADA systems. The second, which is in collaboration with DHS,
is the Control Systems Cyber Security Self Assessment Tool #3045, which
is to identify, organize, prioritize, and describe the most probable
electronic security threats; risks associated with vulnerabilities,
available prevention technology, best practices, and critical areas of
uncertainty. In 2002, the foundation developed a vulnerability
assessment methodology for large drinking water utilities to assist
them in meeting federally mandated vulnerability assessments. Now that
deadlines for vulnerability assessments have passed, utilities may
still use the methodology to develop emergency response plans. The
methodology has also been adapted for use at small and medium-sized
utilities.
Organization: Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies;
An organization of the largest publicly owned drinking water systems in
the United States. The association collects and exchanges management,
security, legislative, and technical information to support competitive
utility operations, effective utility leadership, safe and secure water
supplies, and effective public communication on drinking water quality.
Initiative: The association served as the U.S. EPA-designated liaison
between the water sector and the federal government on critical
infrastructure protection and currently operates the Water Information
Sharing and Analysis Center and the Water Security Channel. The Water
Information Sharing and Analysis Center offers a secure database,
expert analysis, information gathering, and the rapid distribution of
reports and government alerts about threats to America's drinking water
and wastewater utilities, including control systems. The center went
online in December 2002. The Water Security Channel is a free service
of the center designed to disseminate security information to the
broadest wastewater and drinking water community, including information
about control systems security issues. Members of the association have
held workshops, events, formed committees, and written papers that deal
with cyber and control systems security.
Source: American Water Works Association, Association of Metropolitan
Water Agencies.
[End of table]
Other Organizations:
Other organizations are working on efforts to improve control systems
security that are not sector-specific. The organization formerly known
as the Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society, and now called
ISA, is currently working on control systems security efforts, and
InfraGard, a nonprofit organization associated with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, has recently started a control systems-related
effort. See table 8 for a description of these initiatives.
Table 7: Control System Security Initiatives that Affect Multiple
Sectors:
Organization: ISA (formerly the Instrumentation, Systems, and
Automation Society);
The society develops standards, certifies industry professionals,
provides education and training, and publishes books and technical
articles.
Initiative: The society's industrial automation and control systems'
Security Standards Committee is composed of representatives from many
industries, including water/wastewater, fossil fuels, nuclear energy,
food and beverages, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petrochemicals, U.S.
government labs and organizations, and automotive and educational
institutions. The committee intends to establish standards, recommend
practices, and develop technical reports and related information that
will define procedures for implementing electronically secure
industrial automation and control systems and security practices and
assess electronic security performance. The committee has finished two
technical reports. One report documents the current state of
cybersecurity technologies as they are applied to the control systems
environment to clearly define what can reasonably be deployed today and
to define areas where more research is needed. A second report presents
an approach for developing, implementing, and operating a program that
addresses security for control systems. The committee is currently
working on a standard to establish and operate an industrial automation
and control systems security program and specific security requirements
for industrial automation and control systems. The first part deals
with terminology and has been approved by the society. The second part
deals with establishing a security program and is currently awaiting
approval by the committee. The third part deals with operating the
program and has not been started. The fourth part deals with technical
security requirements and was started in October 2006. The committee
has also recently started a related working group on patch management.
Organization: InfraGard/SCADAGard;
InfraGard is a nonprofit organization associated with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The program consists of 86 regional chapters
with representatives from the public and private sectors. The program
focuses on activities related to critical infrastructure protection and
cyber crime.
Initiative: InfraGard recently established a SCADAGard special interest
group. According to the head of the group, the group will be used to
share control systems security information with InfraGard members who
are control systems vendors, owners, and operators and have previously
been vetted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by ISA and InfraGard.
[End of table]
Federal Agencies Have Multiple Initiatives to Help Secure Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems, but More Remains to Be Done:
Over the past few years, federal agencies--including DHS, DOE, NIST,
FERC, and others--have initiated efforts to improve the security of
critical infrastructure control systems. However, DHS has not yet
established a strategy to coordinate the various control systems
activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Further,
more can be done to address specific weaknesses in DHS's ability to
share information on control systems vulnerabilities. Until DHS
develops an overarching strategy, there is an increased risk that the
federal government and private sector will invest in duplicative
initiatives and miss opportunities to learn from other organization's
activities. Further, until DHS addresses specific weaknesses in sharing
information, there is an increased risk that the agency will not be
able to effectively carry out its responsibility for sharing
information on vulnerabilities, and that there could be a disruption to
our nation's critical infrastructures.
Federal Agencies Have Many Initiatives Under Way, but DHS Lacks a
Comprehensive Strategy that Delineates Responsibilities and Coordinates
Activities:
There are many federal efforts under way to help improve the security
of critical infrastructure control systems. For example, DHS is
sponsoring multiple control systems security initiatives across
critical infrastructure sectors, including a program to improve control
systems cybersecurity that includes vulnerability reporting and
response, activities to promote security awareness within the control
systems community, and efforts to build relationships with control
systems vendors and infrastructure asset owners. See appendix II for a
detailed description of DHS's key initiatives and projects involving
control systems security.
Additionally, DOE sponsors control systems security efforts within the
electric, oil, and natural gas industries. These efforts include the
National SCADA Test Bed Program, which funds testing, assessments, and
training in control systems security and the development of a road map
for securing control systems in the energy sector. Also, several of
DOE's national laboratories play an important role in implementing many
DHS and DOE efforts and provide support directly to asset owners and
vendors. For example, the national laboratories perform site
assessments, test vendor equipment, and conduct outreach and awareness
activities for infrastructure asset owners and vendors. See appendix
III for more information on DOE's initiatives.
Other federal agencies, such as NIST and FERC, have also undertaken
efforts to help secure control systems. For example, NIST is working
with federal and industry stakeholders to develop standards,
guidelines, checklists, and test methods to help secure critical
control systems, while FERC is working to implement electricity
reliability standards that address control systems. See appendix IV for
more information on these and other initiatives.
Several industry experts we spoke with stated that many federal
programs in control systems security have been helpful. For example,
experts stated that developing the road map was a positive step for the
energy sector. An official who participated in the development of DOE's
road map stated that the process succeeded in identifying industry
needs and was a catalyst for bringing agencies and government
coordinating councils together and that it was a good idea for other
industries to develop plans similar to the road map. In addition,
experts we interviewed said the testing and site assessments conducted
by the national laboratories for DHS and DOE made individual products
more secure and helped improve overall attention to control systems
security.
However, the federal government does not yet have an overall strategy
for guiding and coordinating control systems security efforts across
the multiple agencies and sectors. To evaluate activities related to
critical infrastructure protection, we developed a risk management
framework for protecting critical infrastructures based on the
standards and practices of leading organizations.[Footnote 9] The first
phase of this framework is the development of a strategy that includes
the goals, objectives, constraints, specific activities, milestones,
and performance measures needed to achieve a particular end result. In
2004, we reported that federal agencies, standards organizations, and
the private sector were leading various initiatives on control systems
security, but lacked coordination and oversight to effectively improve
the cybersecurity of the nation's control systems.[Footnote 10] We
recommended that DHS develop and implement a strategy for coordinating
control systems security efforts among government agencies and the
private sector.
DHS agreed with our recommendation to develop a control systems
security strategy and, in 2004, issued a strategy that focuses
primarily on DHS's initiatives. However, the strategy does not include
ongoing work by DOE, FERC, NIST, and others. Further, it does not
include the various agencies' responsibilities, goals, milestones, or
performance measures. Agency officials stated they have convened a
federal working group that will develop a list of control systems
security activities across the government. Further, in commenting on a
draft of this report, DHS officials stated that this baseline list of
activities will serve as the foundation for a comprehensive strategy
across the public and private sectors. However, they did not provide a
date for when the baseline and the comprehensive strategy would be
completed. In addition, they did not state whether the list or the
strategy would include responsibilities, goals, milestones, or
performance measures.
Until DHS develops an overarching strategy that delineates various
public and private entities' roles and responsibilities and uses it to
guide and coordinate control systems security activities, the federal
government and private sector risk investing in duplicative activities
and missing opportunities to learn from other organization's
activities.
DHS Faces Challenges in Sharing Sensitive Information on Control
Systems Vulnerabilities:
DHS is responsible for sharing information with critical infrastructure
owners on control systems vulnerabilities, but faces challenges in
doing so. In 2006, DHS developed a formal process for managing control
systems vulnerabilities reported to the U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT).[Footnote 11] DHS gathers this information and
works with vendors and others to identify mitigation strategies. It
then releases this information to critical infrastructure owners and
operators, control systems vendors, and the public.
However, DHS's sharing of sensitive information on control systems to
date has been limited. As of June 2007, US-CERT has issued only nine
notices related to control systems security since the inception of the
control systems security program in 2003. DHS's information sharing is
limited in part because of reluctance by those in the private sector to
inform the agency of vulnerabilities they have identified and in part
because of weaknesses in DHS's ability to disseminate potentially
sensitive information to the private sector. We previously reported on
difficulties DHS has had in collecting information from, and sharing it
with, the private sector.[Footnote 12] Industry officials stated that
they are reluctant to share information about incidents because of
uncertainties about how the information will be used and the value of
reporting such incidents.
In addition, DHS lacks a rapid, efficient process for disseminating
sensitive information to private industry owners and operators of
critical infrastructures. An agency official noted that sharing
information with the private sector can be slowed by staff turnover and
vacancies at DHS, the need to brief agency and executive branch
officials and congressional staff before briefing the private sector,
and difficulties in determining the appropriate classification level
for the information. DHS's control systems security program manager
acknowledged the need to share information more quickly. In commenting
on a draft of this report, DHS officials stated that after the start of
our review, the agency began developing a process to formalize and
improve information sharing. However, this process was not evident
during our review. Further, DHS did not provide evidence of this
process or examples of how the process had actually been used to share
information.
Until DHS establishes an approach for rapidly assessing the sensitivity
of vulnerability information and disseminating it--and thereby
demonstrates the value it can provide to critical infrastructure
owners--the agency's ability to effectively serve as a focal point in
the collection and dissemination of sensitive vulnerability information
will continue to be limited. Without a trusted focal point for sharing
sensitive information on vulnerabilities, there is an increased risk
that attacks on control systems could cause a significant disruption to
our nation's critical infrastructures.
Conclusions:
Control systems are an essential component of our nation's critical
infrastructure. Past incidents involving control systems, system
vulnerabilities, and growing threats from a wide variety of sources
highlight the risk facing these systems. The public and private sectors
have begun numerous activities to improve the cybersecurity of these
systems. However, the federal government lacks an overall strategy for
coordinating public and private sector efforts. DHS also lacks an
efficient process for sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities
with private sector critical infrastructure owners. Until an
overarching strategy is in place, public and private sectors risk
undertaking duplicative efforts. Also, without a streamlined process
for advising private sector infrastructure owners of vulnerabilities,
DHS is unable to fulfill its responsibility as a focal point for
disseminating this information. If key vulnerability information is not
in the hands of those who can mitigate its potentially severe
consequences, there is an increased risk that attacks on control
systems could cause a significant disruption to our nation's critical
infrastructures.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve federal government efforts to secure control systems
governing critical infrastructure, we recommend that the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security implement the following two
actions:
* develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems,
including agencies' responsibilities, as well as overall goals,
milestones, and performance measures, and:
* establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control
system vulnerability information with critical infrastructure control
system stakeholders, including vendors, owners, and operators.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received comments via e-mail on a draft of this report from DHS
officials, including the Deputy Director of the National Cyber Security
Division. In the comments, agency officials neither agreed nor
disagreed with our recommendations. Instead, they stated that DHS would
take the recommendations under advisement. Additionally, officials
stated that the agency has recently begun working with its partners in
the Federal Control System Security Working Group to establish a
baseline of ongoing activities. This baseline is to serve as a
foundation for developing a comprehensive strategy that will encompass
the public and private sectors, set a vision to secure control systems,
describe roles and responsibilities, and identify future requirements
for resources and action. Moreover, officials stated that the agency
has recently developed a process to formalize the sharing of sensitive
information related to control systems vulnerabilities. The officials
reported that this process describes the information flow from
vulnerability discovery, to validation, public and private
coordination, and outreach and awareness. Further, it identifies the
deliverables and outcomes expected at each step in the process.
While DHS's intention to develop a comprehensive public/private
strategy is consistent with our recommendation, the agency did not
provide a date by which this strategy will be completed. Until DHS
completes the comprehensive strategy, the public and private sectors
risk undertaking duplicative efforts.
Additionally, while DHS officials stated that the agency had developed
a process for sharing sensitive information on control system
vulnerabilities, it did not have such a process in place during our
review. Further, the agency has not provided evidence of its process
for sharing control system vulnerability information or evidence that
this process has been used to share information. Until such a process
is formalized and implemented, key vulnerability information may not be
available to those who can mitigate its potentially severe
consequences, therefore increasing the risk that attacks on control
systems could cause a significant disruption to our nation's critical
infrastructures.
DHS officials and officials from other agencies who contributed to this
report provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please
contact Dave Powner at (202) 512-9286 or Keith Rhodes at (202) 512-
6412, or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov and rhodesk@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
Signed by:
Keith A. Rhodes:
Chief Technologist Director:
Center for Technology and Engineering:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Daniel L. Lungren:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) determine cyber threats, vulnerabilities,
and the potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control
systems; (2) determine the challenges to securing critical
infrastructure control systems; (3) identify private sector initiatives
to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems; and (4) assess the
adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity
of control systems.
To determine the cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential
impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems, we
reviewed prior GAO reports on control systems as well as reports
prepared by other government agencies and private organizations,
including documentation of prior control system security incidents. We
conducted interviews with individuals in the private sector, including
representatives of private companies that operate control systems.
These individuals were selected based on their knowledge of and
participation in both private and public sector control system security
activities. We also met with representatives from trade associations
and federal agencies. On the basis of the information and documentation
we received from these individuals, and information we collected during
site visits to three of the national laboratories, we were able to
compile information on the cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the
potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems.
To determine the challenges to securing critical infrastructure control
systems, we reviewed prior GAO reports and testimonies and materials
written by other public and private organizations on control systems
security, critical infrastructure protection, and national
preparedness. We conducted interviews with experts and industry
representatives, including managers of federal control systems programs
at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Energy
(DOE), experts from the national laboratories, vendors, owners and
operators, and standards and trade associations.
To identify the private sector initiatives to strengthen cybersecurity
of control systems, we researched current standards and accepted trade
practices and analyzed current efforts to better secure control
systems. We spoke to private sector owners and operators, vendors,
trade associations, industry experts, and standards associations. These
organizations included the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the American Gas Association, and ISA.
To assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the
cybersecurity of control systems, we researched relevant federal laws
and regulations and initiatives by federal agencies to better secure
control systems, and reviewed documentation and project plans on
federal control systems efforts. We also reviewed GAO's prior work
analyzing best practices from leading organizations and interviewed
private sector and other experts in control systems security for their
perspectives on federal efforts. We interviewed officials from federal
agencies including DHS, DOE, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
In addition, we visited three of the national laboratories that are
leading control systems security research and outreach efforts. These
labs were selected because of their extensive participation in DOE and
DHS control systems security programs. We then compared the activities
of federal agencies with best practices and the perspectives of
experts.
Our work was conducted from March 2007 to July 2007 at agencies'
headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at national laboratories in
Idaho, New Mexico, and Washington state in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: The Department of Homeland Security's Control Systems
Security Initiatives:
DHS supports multiple control systems security initiatives across
government and the private sector. Table 9 lists key initiatives and
projects conducted by DHS in control system security.
Table 8: Selected DHS Control Systems Security Initiatives:
Initiative: Coordination with US-CERT;
Description: DHS's control systems program is working to enhance
management of control system incidents and provide timely situational
awareness information to control systems owners and operators through
coordination with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT). According to agency officials, a person from the program
works in the US-CERT operations center and handles any incoming threats
or vulnerabilities related to control systems. The Idaho National
Laboratory provides backup technical support if needed. DHS also
provides outreach and awareness on the role of US-CERT in reporting and
mitigating control systems cyber vulnerabilities, and is developing the
capability to analyze software harmful to control systems.
Initiative: Control System Cyber Security Self Assessment Tool;
Description: DHS has developed the Control Systems Cyber Security Self
Assessment Tool to assist control systems owners and operators in
evaluating vulnerabilities and recommending mitigation strategies. This
software takes users through a series of questions to determine the
current status of their control systems network. It includes specific
control systems architectures recommended by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology as examples for end users and uses existing
standards and recommended practices to provide the user a set of
requirements for addressing specific security measures. The software
was piloted in 2006 in several critical infrastructure sectors, and was
deployed to the water sector in June 2007. According to agency
officials, the software has also been tested in the electric sector and
oil and gas sectors. According to DHS officials, in the future, the
department plans to turn over development and maintenance of the
software to a commercial vendor.
Initiative: Process Control System Forum;
Description: In February 2005, DHS launched the first Process Control
System Forum. The forum is primarily a means for the government to
reach out to academia, vendors, and owners and operators of critical
infrastructure. In March 2007, the forum was held in Atlanta, Georgia,
and included approximately 200 attendees.
Initiative: Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems;
Description: The Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control
Systems project is an initiative that DHS sponsored together with Idaho
National Laboratory, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis
Center, and private industry. The purpose of the project is to
summarize security principles that should be considered when designing
and procuring control systems products and provide examples of language
to incorporate into procurement specifications. According to an
industry expert, the language has been used by owners procuring new
control systems equipment. NIST officials stated that they are
considering integrating this project into the Control System Cyber
Security Self Assessment Tool (see previous section), by identifying
the procurement language that would be necessary to address an
identified vulnerability. In January 2007 the National Infrastructure
Advisory Council[A] issued a report recommending that the Office of
Management and Budget mandate that federal agencies apply the
procurement language when procuring control systems and services.
Initiative: Catalog of Control System Security Requirements;
Description: DHS is also in the process of developing a Catalog of
Control System Security Requirements. This initiative will provide a
catalog of recommended requirements to facilitate the development and
implementation of control systems cybersecurity standards to be applied
to critical infrastructure. DHS and NIST officials stated that this
will provide a common terminology that can be used for standards
development and can therefore promote collaboration or convergence of
industry standards. The catalog was used by NIST during the development
of control systems- related guidance and, according to agency
officials, was sent to ISA, a standards association, and the
International Electrotechnical Commission for consideration. The
catalog is currently in draft form.
Initiative: Monthly Vendor Phone Calls;
Description: DHS hosts monthly teleconference meetings with control
systems vendors to provide a forum for the vendors to share information
and common concerns, and to discuss control systems security needs for
legacy and next generation products. According to agency officials,
approximately 30 vendors representing most of the sectors using control
systems are participating in the calls. At the most recent Process
Control System Forum conference, the vendors held their first face-to-
face meeting. The DHS Control System Security Program Director stated
that approximately 90 percent of the control systems manufacturers in
the United States were represented at this meeting.
Initiative: Federal Control Systems Working Group;
Description: This group represents the federal control systems
community and it is currently working on development of a baseline of
federal control systems security efforts and enhancing information
sharing with relevant stakeholders.
Initiative: National Laboratory Assessments and Training;
Description: DHS funds initiatives at DOE laboratory facilities
including control systems site and vendor assessments and training. For
more information, see appendix III.
Initiative: Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection;
Description: In January 2002, the Institute for Information
Infrastructure Protection, a consortium made up of 27 entities managed
by Dartmouth College, began operation. In 2005, the institute launched
the Process Control Systems Security Research Project. This project
focuses on cybersecurity-related research in the oil and gas sector.
Initiatives completed include a source code checking tool, an intrusion
detection and event correlation tool for process control systems, and a
tool for building a business case for investing in security. According
to program officials, currently there are two main bodies of work: (1)
work that is drawing to a close from $8.5 million in funding from DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate and (2) a new body of work that
received $4.1 million in funding from DHS's National Cyber Security
Division. Institute officials stated that the new work is under way as
of April 2007, and will also focus on solutions for survivability and
recovery of process control systems in the oil, gas, and chemical
industries.
Initiative: Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cyber Security;
Description: The Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cyber
Security project was a cooperative initiative between DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate and companies in the oil and gas industry that
ran from July 2005 to June 2006. The program's purpose was to identify
new technologies for protecting process control systems. The program
included a 14-member consortium of private sector oil and gas
companies. DHS officials stated that the project was a precompetitive
research and development project, and therefore the agency was able to
provide support to begin the project and will likely play a role in the
technology transfer process. The consortium of companies selected six
vendor products to be included in the project. The consortium worked
with Sandia National Laboratories on integrating and testing the six
products, which resulted in a potentially viable security solution. The
integrated solution was demonstrated to the participating organizations
at a wrap-up meeting in Houston, Texas, on September 11, 2006.
Initiative: Small Business Innovation Research Awards;
Description: According to agency officials, from 2004 to 2005 DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate funded 13 research proposals related
to control systems security. The proposals received individual awards
of up to $100,000 and lasted no more than 6 months in duration. On the
basis of the results of these proposals, DHS awarded five small
business innovation research awards. These awards were up to $750,000
and typically were for no more than 2 years in duration. The last of
these awards was completed in February 2007. Agency officials stated
that oil and gas owners and operators have shown particular interest in
continuing work on intrusion detection, encryption, and authentication
of users.
Initiative: Chemical Facilities Security Standards;
Description: The 2007 DHS Appropriations Act required that DHS issue
interim final regulations establishing security standards for chemical
facilities. The regulations require vulnerability assessments and the
development and implementation of site security plans for these
facilities, and DHS must audit and inspect the facilities. DHS issued
the regulations in April 2007, explicitly extending their applicability
to control systems.
Initiative: Pipeline Control Systems Safety;
Description: The Transportation Security Administration's Pipeline
Security Division conducts a corporate security review process for
major pipeline operators that includes a high-level review of control
systems security. As of June 2007, the division has conducted
approximately 65 reviews. In addition, the administration is working on
a pilot project involving assessments of security policies and control
systems security for a particular pipeline operator.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DHS and the Institute
for Information Infrastructure Protection.
[A] The National Infrastructure Advisory Council was chartered on July
1, 2005 to provide the President, through the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, with advice on the security of the
critical infrastructure sectors and their information systems.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: The Department of Energy's Initiatives to Support Control
Systems Security within the Energy Sector:
Since 2003, the Department of Energy's Office of Electricity Delivery
and Energy Reliability has led control systems security efforts within
the electric, oil, and natural gas industries by establishing the
National SCADA Test Bed Program and developing a 10-year strategic
framework for securing control systems in the energy sector. DOE's
national laboratory facilities also play an important role in control
systems security research. In particular, the Idaho National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory lead key efforts in control systems security
research for DOE, DHS, and other public and private organizations.
The National SCADA Test Bed Program:
In 2004, DOE launched the National SCADA Test Bed Program, a
multilaboratory effort to identify control systems vulnerabilities,
conduct control systems research and development, and provide
cybersecurity training and outreach to industry. The test bed program
includes five DOE laboratories and has a budget of $10 million for
fiscal year 2007. To date, the test bed program has completed 12
control systems vulnerability assessments in cooperation with control
systems vendors and energy sector owners and operators. As a result of
these assessments, the test bed team has provided vendors with
recommendations to improve control systems security, and owners and
operators with strategies for mitigating existing system security
risks. The test bed program also has 10 ongoing control systems
research and development projects that are peer-reviewed biannually to
ensure they meet the needs of the government and the end users. In
addition to its testing and research efforts, the program has led
training workshops on control systems security for over 1,500 industry
personnel, and has established a working group to evaluate control
systems security standards in the energy sector.
Strategic Framework for Securing Control Systems in the Energy Sector:
In January 2006, DOE released the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in
the Energy Sector, a collaborative public-private strategy for securing
control systems infrastructures over the next 10 years. Developed
jointly by energy owners and operators, researchers, vendors, and the
government, the road map links near-, mid-, and long-term security
needs with four main goals: (1) measure and assess the current security
posture; (2) develop and integrate protective measures; (3) detect
intrusion and implement response strategies; and (4) sustain security
improvements.
The road map outlines the energy sector's top control systems security
concerns and existing mitigation efforts, and is serving as a model for
other sectors to develop similar plans. For example, in January 2007,
DHS's National Infrastructure Advisory Council recommended that DHS and
the sector-specific agencies develop plans using DOE's road map as a
model. DOE has used the road map to align its test bed projects with
strategic goals. In addition, DOE has created an online road map that
uses the strategic framework to track public and private sector control
systems security projects.
National Laboratories Are Leading Significant Portions of Control
Systems Security Work:
DOE owns 17 laboratories and research facilities around the country
that play an important role in control systems security research. In
particular, the Idaho National Laboratory, the Sandia National
Laboratories, and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory manage and
conduct key efforts in control systems security research for DOE, DHS,
and other public and private organizations. Using their research
facilities, the laboratories are able to conduct work for DHS, DOE, and
other organizations.
Research Facilities:
The laboratories are able to use a number of unique research facilities
to test control systems equipment. For example, Idaho National
Laboratory operates its own electrical power transmission facility,
which consists of 61 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, feeders,
transformers, and independent substations (see fig. 5). According to
laboratory officials, because portions of the transmission facility are
easy to separate from the overall power grid, control systems equipment
can be tested on the grid without fear of effects on the larger power
grid.
[End of section]
Figure 5: A Substation That Is Part of Idaho National Laboratory's
Facilities for Testing Control Systems (photograph):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has the Electricity
Infrastructure Operations Center, which is a replica of a typical
operations center used in the electric industry, with consoles,
displays, hardware, and software that can be used for control of
electricity transmission (see fig. 6). The center receives live
transmission data from actual utility control systems, and is used as a
platform for research, development, and demonstration.
[End of section]
Figure 6: The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's Electricity
Infrastructure Operations Center (photograph):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS Sponsors Laboratory Activities Involving Control Systems Security:
The national laboratories manage key efforts for DHS related to control
systems security. For example, the Idaho National Laboratory is the
lead laboratory to support and execute the DHS Control Systems Security
Program. According to laboratory officials, the laboratories coordinate
activities funded through DHS with those funded through the National
SCADA Test Bed of the Department of Energy. For example, Idaho National
Laboratory has conducted five vendor assessments and six site
assessments using DHS funds and eight vendor assessments and four site
assessments using DOE funds.
Additionally, the Idaho, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National
Laboratories developed training for asset owners and operators. The
Idaho National Laboratory has developed 4-and 8-hour classes on control
systems security that it has given to approximately 1,500 industry
personnel since 2005. In 2006, the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory developed online control systems security awareness training
that has been published on US-CERT's Web site. In 2007, Sandia National
Laboratories developed training to educate owners and operators on how
to effectively use red teaming to improve the security posture of their
control systems.[Footnote 13] Further, the Idaho National Laboratory
has worked with George Mason University and New York University to
develop a draft master's level course curriculum on critical
infrastructure and control systems security.
DOE's National SCADA Test Bed Sponsors Laboratory Activities:
Under DOE's National SCADA Test Bed Program, the national laboratories
have worked both independently and collaboratively on performing vendor
vulnerability assessments, conducting control systems research and
development, and leading industry training and outreach.[Footnote 14]
For example, between 2004 and 2007, the Idaho National Laboratory
conducted assessments of eight different control systems for the
electricity sector. According to laboratory officials, vendors provide
the lab with the hardware, software, and training necessary to run the
control system; this represents a $1 million to $1.5 million investment
by the vendor. Largely on the basis of the results of these
assessments, vendors have chosen to develop system patches, reconfigure
system architectures, and build enhanced systems, which have been
retested by the laboratory. Furthermore, according to an agency
official, the results of the vendor assessments have helped inform
other federal control systems efforts, such as the development of the
control system self assessment tool. In addition, the Idaho National
Laboratory has conducted four on-site control system assessments for
electricity sector owners and operators.
In addition to vendor assessments, the laboratories are engaged in 10
research projects that are to help industry stakeholders analyze
control systems operations and improve the security and reliability of
architectures for control systems. For example, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory has developed a technology to encapsulate control
systems communications between two devices with a unique identifier and
authenticator. This technology enables the devices to verify that the
communication has not been tampered with. Unlike comparable
technologies for standard information technology (IT) systems, the
authentication technology does not require substantial amounts of
bandwidth or processing power. Importantly, this technology has the
potential to be applied to both new systems and older control systems.
In addition, the Idaho, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National
Laboratories are working on identifying vulnerabilities in the current
communications protocol used between control centers, testing
mitigation techniques, and, ultimately, assisting industry in
implementing a secure version of the protocol.
Other Organizations Sponsor Laboratory Activities:
In addition to work for DHS and DOE, the laboratories have conducted
control systems security work for other public and private
organizations, including research, security assessments, and training.
For example, the laboratories have performed security assessments of
control systems for federal operators of critical infrastructure,
including the Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Bonneville Power Administration, and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve,
as well as private sector utility companies. Moreover, the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory worked with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Nuclear Energy Institute to develop a self-
assessment methodology for nuclear plants to determine compliance with
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Other Agencies' Initiatives to Help Secure Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems:
In addition to DHS and DOE, multiple other federal agencies and
entities are working to help secure critical infrastructure control
systems. Initiatives undertaken by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and others are described here.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:
Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) was authorized to (1) appoint an electricity
reliability organization to develop and enforce mandatory electricity
reliability standards, including cybersecurity, and (2) approve,
remand, or require modification to each proposed standard. The agency
may also direct the reliability organization to develop a new standard
or modify existing standards. Both the agency and the reliability
organization have the authority to enforce approved standards,
investigate incidents, and impose penalties (up to $1 million a day) on
noncompliant electricity asset users, owners, or operators.
FERC has conducted several activities to begin implementing the
requirements of the act. In July 2006, FERC certified the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the electric
reliability organization. In December 2006, FERC released a staff
assessment of NERC's eight Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
reliability standards, which include standards for control systems
security. FERC found that while the standards were a good start, there
were a number of items that required improvement, including ambiguous
language for standards requirements, measurability, and degrees of
compliance; insufficient technical requirements to ensure grid
reliability; and the use of "fill-in-the-blank standards," which are
not enforceable. NERC agreed that the standards represented a starting
point and has proposed a work plan to address the deficiencies. In July
2007, FERC issued a notice of public rulemaking in which it proposed to
approve eight CIP reliability standards while directing NERC to modify
the areas of these standards that require improvement. After
considering public comments on the notice of public rulemaking, which
are due in late September 2007, FERC plans to issue its final rule on
the CIP reliability standards.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology Is Developing
Standards and Guidance to Improve Control Systems Security:
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is working
with federal and industry stakeholders to develop standards,
guidelines, checklists, and test methods to help secure critical
control systems. For example, NIST is currently developing guidance for
federal agencies that own or operate control systems to comply with
federal information system security standards and guidelines.[Footnote
15] The guidance identifies issues and modifications to consider in
applying information security standards and guidelines to control
systems. Table 10 lists key NIST efforts.
Table 9: NIST Control Systems Security Efforts:
Initiative: Industrial Control Systems Security Project;
Description: The project intends to build on current federal security
standards and provide targeted extensions and/or interpretations of
those standards for industrial and process control systems where
needed.
Initiative: Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls
for Federal Information Systems, Revision 1 --Appendix I: Industrial
Control Systems: Interim Guidance on the Application of Security
Controls;
Description: NIST is currently working on applying Special Publication
(SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems, to control systems. NIST SP 800-53 was originally developed
for the traditional IT environment, and it treats control systems as
information systems. However, organizations have had difficulties in
using SP 800-53 to protect their control systems due to the unique
needs of control systems. Through the results of NIST workshops held in
April 2006 and March 2007, NIST developed and, in July 2007, released
an augmentation to SP 800-53 that addresses control systems. According
to agency officials, while most controls in SP 800-53 are applicable to
control systems as written, several controls do require supplemental
guidance and enhancements. NIST officials stated they plan to hold a
workshop in late summer 2007, to include representatives from national
and international control systems communities to share information,
obtain input, and determine their level of interest in voluntarily
adopting and using NIST's industrial control system interpretation of
SP 800-53.
Initiative: Special Publication 800-82, Guide to Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security;
Description: NIST is developing Special Publication 800-82, Guide to
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control
Systems Security. The publication is a guidance document on how to
secure control systems, including the security of legacy systems. An
initial public draft was released in September 2006, and the
publication is due for second public draft release in August 2007.
Initiative: NIST Special Publication 1058, Using Host-Based Antivirus
Software on Industrial Control Systems: Integration Guidance and a Test
Methodology for Assessing Performance Impacts;
Description: NIST and Sandia National Laboratories, under the guidance
and sponsorship of DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy
Reliability and its National SCADA Test Bed Program, investigated and
tested the impacts of commercial, off-the-shelf antivirus software on
control system performance. A guidance document was released in
September 2006.
Initiative: Process Controls Security Requirements Forum;
Description: NIST organized the Process Controls Security Requirements
Forum to establish security specifications that can be used in the
procurement, development, and retrofit of industrial control systems.
The forum's membership includes representatives from the water,
electric, chemical, and petrochemical industries; U.S. government
laboratories and organizations; and vendors of control systems. Its
immediate goal is to increase the security of control systems through
the definition and application of a common set of information security
requirements for these systems.
Initiative: Catalog of Control System Security Requirements;
Description: In collaboration with DHS, NIST is developing a catalogue
of requirements that provides a detailed list of security requirements
to facilitate the development and convergence of cybersecurity
standards applied to control systems across the industries, domestic
and foreign.
Initiative: NIST Industrial Control System Security Test Bed;
Description: NIST initiated the development of a test bed consisting of
several implementations of typical industrial control systems including
SCADA, networking equipment, and relevant sensors. The test bed is
being used at NIST to develop test methods for validation and
conformance testing of security implementations. The test bed is also
being used to help identify system vulnerabilities and to establish
best practices.
Source: NIST.
[End of table]
Other Federal Agencies Are Working with DHS, DOE, and NIST on Control
Systems Security Initiatives:
Environmental Protection Agency:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assisted DHS in developing a
control systems self-assessment tool, a software program that assists
owners and operators in identifying control systems vulnerabilities and
mitigation strategies for addressing these vulnerabilities. EPA began
work on a water security assessment tool in response to the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
which required the agency to conduct vulnerability assessments of
community water systems serving more than 3,300 individuals. EPA's
preliminary work in this area served as the foundation for DHS's
Control Systems Cyber Security Self Assessment Tool project. The agency
initially launched the tool within the water sector in July 2007.
In addition, EPA actively participates in control systems security
information sharing activities through the Water Information Sharing
and Analysis Center and DHS's Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
Analysis Center, and has been involved with control systems standards
development efforts.
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Crime division participates
in DHS's US-CERT program and coordinates with DHS's National Cyber
Security Division on general cybersecurity issues. According to an
agency official, the Cyber Crime division is in the process of
establishing a control systems work group within its Intelligence and
Information Sharing group.
In addition, since 1996, the bureau's cyber division has sponsored
InfraGard, a cooperative government and private sector program to
exchange information about infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities.
As previously mentioned, SCADAGard, a special interest group within
InfraGard, is to be used to share information with control systems
owners and operators who have been vetted by the bureau.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has conducted several activities
related to enhancing the cybersecurity of control systems. The
commission, which has regulatory authority over nuclear power plant
safety control systems, completed a cybersecurity self-assessment
project with technical assistance from the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory in October 2004 and documented the results in two technical
reports published in 2004 and 2005.[Footnote 16] According to agency
officials, on the basis of the information in these reports, a nuclear
industry task force developed NEI 04-04, Cyber Security Program for
Power Reactors, to provide nuclear power reactor licensees a means for
developing and maintaining effective cybersecurity programs at their
sites. In December 2005, the commission's staff accepted this document
as an acceptable method for establishing and maintaining cybersecurity
programs at nuclear power plants.
In January 2006, the commission issued a revision to Regulatory Guide
1.152, Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power
Plants, which provides cybersecurity-related guidance for the design of
nuclear power plant safety systems. In addition, the commission has
initiated a rulemaking process providing security requirements for
digital computer and communication networks, including systems that are
needed for safety, security, or emergency response. The public comment
period for this rulemaking closed in March 2007.
According to agency officials, in May 2007, all nuclear plants had
completed an inventory and assessment of their critical digital
systems. Agency officials stated that the commission staff is planning
to conduct oversight inspections after completion of ongoing security-
related rulemaking that will clearly establish the requirements for
nuclear power plant cybersecurity programs.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov:
Keith A. Rhodes, (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Scott Borre, Heather A. Collins, Neil
J. Doherty, Vijay D'Souza, Nancy Glover, Sairah Ijaz, Patrick Morton,
and Colleen M. Phillips (Assistant Director) made key contributions to
this report.
(310841):
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
[2] Newton-Evans Research Company, Inc., World Market Study of SCADA,
Energy Management Systems and Distribution Management Systems in
Electrical Utilities: 2005-2007, (Ellicott City, Maryland: June 2005)
as cited in U.S. Department of Energy, Roadmap to Secure Control
Systems in the Energy Sector (Washington, D.C.: January 2006).
[3] These laws and policies include, for example, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, sec. 214 (Nov. 25, 2002)); Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Pub.
L. No. 109-58, sec. 1211 (Aug. 8, 2005)); and The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace.
[4] The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
[5] Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[6] "Malware" (malicious software) is defined as programs that are
designed to carry out annoying or harmful actions. They often
masquerade as useful programs or are embedded into useful programs so
that users are induced into activating them.
[7] See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special
Publication 800-82 Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security: Recommendations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, (Gaithersburg,
Maryland. September 2006); Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office
(da.co.la.ca.us/mr/010507a.htm), Two City Engineers Charged with
Allegedly Hacking Into City's Traffic Computer (Los Angeles,
California: Jan. 5, 2007); and ISA (www.isa.org/content/contentgroups/
news/2006/november29/hackers_hit_pennsylvania_water_system.htm),
Hackers Hit Pennsylvania Water System, (Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina: November 2,, 2006).
[8] See GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage
More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical
Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, DC,: Apr. 17,
2006); Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information
Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July
9, 2004); and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for
Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors, GAO-03-233 (Washington, DC.:
Feb. 28, 2003).
[9] See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91, (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[10] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to
Secure Control Systems, GAO-04-354, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2004).
[11] US-CERT's mission is to protect the nation's Internet
infrastructure. US-CERT coordinates defense against and responses to
cyber attacks by analyzing and reducing cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, disseminating cyber threat warning information, and
coordinating incident response activities.
[12] See GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information
Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July
9, 2004), and GAO-06-383.
[13] Red teaming is assembling a team to attack a computer system for
the purpose of identifying and reporting its vulnerabilities.
[14] Five national laboratories currently participate in the National
SCADA Test Bed program: Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National
Laboratories, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory.
[15] See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special
Publication 800-82 Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security: Recommendations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, (Gaithersburg,
Maryland, September 2006).
[16] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6847: Cyber Security
Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, (Washington D.C.,
October, 2004) and NUREG/CR-6852: An Examination of Cyber Security at
Several U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, (Washington D.C.: May, 2005).
[End of section]
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