Department of Energy
Office of Science Has Kept Majority of Projects within Budget and on Schedule, but Funding and Other Challenges May Grow Gao ID: GAO-08-641 May 30, 2008The Department of Energy (DOE) has long suffered from contract and management oversight weaknesses. Since 1990 DOE contract management has been on GAO's list of programs at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2003 DOE's Office of Science (Science) unveiled its 20-year plan to acquire and upgrade potentially costly research facilities. In light of DOE's history and the potential cost of this ambitious plan, GAO was asked to examine Science's project management performance. GAO determined (1) the extent to which Science has managed its projects within cost and schedule targets, (2) the factors affecting project management performance, and (3) challenges that may affect Science's future performance. GAO reviewed DOE and Science's project management guidance and 42 selected Science projects and also interviewed DOE and laboratory officials.
Of the 42 projects GAO reviewed that were completed by Science or under way from fiscal years 2003 through 2007, more than two-thirds were completed or being carried out according to original cost and schedule targets. Of the 27 projects that were completed during this period, 24 were completed within the original committed cost. Science also largely succeeded in achieving its original committed schedules, with 21 of the 27 projects completed on or ahead of time. Two of Science's completed projects were both over cost and late. Fifteen of the 42 projects reviewed were still under way in February 2008. Nine of these 15 projects appeared to be on track to meet their cost and schedule targets; the rest were likely to be completed over cost, late, or both. Science's ability to generally achieve projects' original cost and schedule targets is due in part to factors often considered fundamental to effective project management: leadership commitment to meeting cost and schedule targets; appropriate management and technical expertise; and disciplined, rigorous implementation of project management policies. Science's frequent independent reviews, in particular, were cited by DOE officials as a key reason for Science's project management performance. To achieve cost or schedule targets, Science also trimmed selected components from some projects, a practice that has sometimes raised concerns. Specifically, DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management, which develops DOE's project management policy, and DOE's Inspector General have expressed the concern that changes in scope may not always preserve a project's technical goals. Construction Management officials told GAO that if a project's technical goals are not detailed enough, it can be difficult to determine the effects of changes in scope. They are therefore considering clarifying project management guidance regarding this issue, perhaps by 2009. Given forecasts of increasingly constrained discretionary spending, plus a workforce fast approaching retirement, Science is likely to face two primary challenges to maintaining future performance: budgetary and market uncertainties, and a shrinking pool of qualified project management and technical expertise. First, achieving targets could become more difficult for Science as future federal budget constraints interrupt anticipated flows of funding to projects already under way or labor and commodity prices rise unexpectedly. Several projects GAO reviewed exceeded or will exceed their cost targets because expected funding did not materialize or prices increased after cost and schedule targets had been established. Second, finding knowledgeable staff to lead and carry out projects may become harder, since an estimated 21 percent to 43 percent of Science's engineers, scientists, and contract specialists will become eligible for retirement within the next 5 years. Similar large-scale retirements are expected at Science's contractor laboratories. Science will need to remain diligent to ensure future success in the face of these potentially intensifying challenges.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-641, Department of Energy: Office of Science Has Kept Majority of Projects within Budget and on Schedule, but Funding and Other Challenges May Grow
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Report to the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee
on Science and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
Department of Energy:
Office of Science Has Kept Majority of Projects within Budget and on
Schedule, but Funding and Other Challenges May Grow:
GAO-08-641:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-641, a report to the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has long suffered from contract and
management oversight weaknesses. Since 1990 DOE contract management has
been on GAO‘s list of programs at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement. In 2003 DOE‘s Office of Science (Science) unveiled
its 20-year plan to acquire and upgrade potentially costly research
facilities. In light of DOE‘s history and the potential cost of this
ambitious plan, GAO was asked to examine Science‘s project management
performance. GAO determined (1) the extent to which Science has managed
its projects within cost and schedule targets, (2) the factors
affecting project management performance, and (3) challenges that may
affect Science‘s future performance. GAO reviewed DOE and Science‘s
project management guidance and 42 selected Science projects and also
interviewed DOE and laboratory officials.
What GAO Found:
Of the 42 projects GAO reviewed that were completed by Science or under
way from fiscal years 2003 through 2007, more than two-thirds were
completed or being carried out according to original cost and schedule
targets. Of the 27 projects that were completed during this period, 24
were completed within the original committed cost. Science also largely
succeeded in achieving its original committed schedules, with 21 of the
27 projects completed on or ahead of time. Two of Science‘s completed
projects were both over cost and late. Fifteen of the 42 projects
reviewed were still under way in February 2008. Nine of these 15
projects appeared to be on track to meet their cost and schedule
targets; the rest were likely to be completed over cost, late, or both.
Science‘s ability to generally achieve projects‘ original cost and
schedule targets is due in part to factors often considered fundamental
to effective project management: leadership commitment to meeting cost
and schedule targets; appropriate management and technical expertise;
and disciplined, rigorous implementation of project management
policies. Science‘s frequent independent reviews, in particular, were
cited by DOE officials as a key reason for Science‘s project management
performance. To achieve cost or schedule targets, Science also trimmed
selected components from some projects, a practice that has sometimes
raised concerns. Specifically, DOE‘s Office of Engineering and
Construction Management, which develops DOE‘s project management
policy, and DOE‘s Inspector General have expressed the concern that
changes in scope may not always preserve a project‘s technical goals.
Construction Management officials told GAO that if a project‘s
technical goals are not detailed enough, it can be difficult to
determine the effects of changes in scope. They are therefore
considering clarifying project management guidance regarding this
issue, perhaps by 2009.
Given forecasts of increasingly constrained discretionary spending,
plus a workforce fast approaching retirement, Science is likely to face
two primary challenges to maintaining future performance: budgetary and
market uncertainties, and a shrinking pool of qualified project
management and technical expertise. First, achieving targets could
become more difficult for Science as future federal budget constraints
interrupt anticipated flows of funding to projects already under way or
labor and commodity prices rise unexpectedly. Several projects GAO
reviewed exceeded or will exceed their cost targets because expected
funding did not materialize or prices increased after cost and schedule
targets had been established. Second, finding knowledgeable staff to
lead and carry out projects may become harder, since an estimated 21
percent to 43 percent of Science‘s engineers, scientists, and contract
specialists will become eligible for retirement within the next 5
years. Similar large-scale retirements are expected at Science‘s
contractor laboratories. Science will need to remain diligent to ensure
future success in the face of these potentially intensifying
challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) consider adopting, department-wide,
selected practices from Science‘s independent project reviews and (2)
review and strengthen, as appropriate, DOE‘s departmentwide project
management guidance to ensure that each project‘s technical goals are
clearly defined. DOE generally agreed with these recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-641]. For more information,
contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Office of Science Managed Majority of Projects within Committed Cost
and Schedule Targets:
Several Factors Contributed to Science's Cost and Schedule Performance:
Maintaining Successful Project Performance in the Future Will Require
Continued Attention to Challenges Affecting Funding and Human
Resources:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Office of Science Projects Reviewed:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Projects Under Way or Completed from Fiscal Year 2003 through
Fiscal Year 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: The Five Critical Decision Points in DOE's Project Management
Process:
Figure 2: Expected or Actual Performance of 42 Reviewed Office of
Science Projects, Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007:
Abbreviations:
CERN: European Organization for Nuclear Research:
DOE: Department of Energy:
GLAST: Gamma-Ray Large Area Space Telescope:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 30, 2008:
The Honorable Brad Miller:
Chairman:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science (Science) and its
predecessor agency[Footnote 1] have long served the nation in the quest
for scientific knowledge and innovation. From the construction of long
tunnels where subatomic particles collide with targets at nearly the
speed of light to the design and launch of a satellite telescope that
reveals stellar explosions in the deepest parts of space, projects
overseen by the Office of Science have broadened our understanding of
the cosmos and of the fundamental components of life on Earth. With a
$4 billion annual budget, Science has historically been the nation's
single largest funding source for basic research in the physical
sciences, energy sciences, advanced scientific computing, and other
fields, most of which is carried out at 10 national laboratories and 42
research and development facilities nationwide. Contractors to DOE--
primarily research consortia or nonprofit institutions--perform the day-
to-day operations at each of these laboratories and facilities. DOE
site offices, located at or near the laboratories and facilities, are
responsible for overseeing the laboratory and facility contractors,
including monitoring the progress of scientific projects and the
maintenance and upgrade of buildings.
In 2003, Science unveiled an ambitious 20-year plan to upgrade its
existing portfolio of research facilities and to pioneer the design and
construction of potentially costly new scientific instruments and
facilities. These projects include the Linac Coherent Light Source, an
advanced, laser-based X-ray light source that will illuminate the
structure of molecules never previously visible, and the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, a facility to test the feasibility
of fusion, a process in which nuclei are combined to generate energy
like that produced naturally by the sun. Science's contractor
laboratories and facilities will ultimately be charged with executing
Science's 20-year plan, which, if carried out in its entirety, could
cost many billions of dollars.
Since 1990, we have reported that the Department of Energy as a whole
has suffered from substantial and continual weaknesses in overseeing
contractors and managing large, expensive, and technically complex
projects effectively. Some projects, such as DOE's planned waste
treatment and immobilization plant at its Hanford site in Washington
State, have been fraught with problems that caused project expenses to
soar beyond estimated costs and project schedules to exceed completion
dates, sometimes by many years. DOE's environmental cleanup and
construction projects, in particular, have significantly and
consistently overrun both cost and schedule targets, occasionally
requiring cutbacks so severe that facilities do not function as
intended or, worse, delaying projects so long that, upon completion,
they no longer serve the intended purpose. Because of problems like
these, GAO in 1990 included DOE's contracting and project management on
the list of federal programs and functions at high risk of fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. While DOE has since implemented
various management improvements, including a 2000 policy directive
outlining the steps required for project planning and execution, some
of the department's projects continue to experience major cost overruns
and delays. As of May 30, 2008, DOE contracting and project management
remain on GAO's high-risk list.
Although our recent work has focused on DOE projects experiencing cost
and schedule difficulties at program offices other than the Office of
Science--particularly the Office of Environmental Management and the
National Nuclear Security Administration--in light of Science's plan to
invest billions of dollars in the coming years to acquire or upgrade
facilities and equipment at its sites, we are reporting on (1) the
extent to which Science manages its projects within cost and schedule
commitments, (2) the key factors affecting Science's project management
performance, and (3) the main challenges that could affect Science's
ability to maintain project management performance in the future.
In conducting our work, we reviewed DOE project management policies and
guidance and interviewed headquarters officials at DOE's Office of
Engineering and Construction Management, which provides project
management policy and oversight departmentwide, and at Science's Office
of Project Assessment, which provides guidance and oversight for
Science's projects. We also obtained performance information on the 42
Science projects at 10 national laboratories that, from fiscal year
2003 through fiscal year 2007, were either completed (27 projects) or
still under way at the time of our study and for which Science had
committed to cost and schedule targets (15 projects). Because we did
not consider as fully reliable DOE's Project Assessment Reporting
System, the database DOE uses to track project performance, we obtained
project cost and schedule data and other information directly from the
laboratories responsible for the projects.[Footnote 2] From these 42
Science projects, we selected for more detailed review a
nongeneralizable sample of 12 projects overseen by four laboratories
with diverse scientific missions: Argonne National Laboratory and Fermi
National Accelerator Laboratory in Illinois, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in Tennessee, and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in
California. We selected these 12 projects to ensure that our sample
included completed and ongoing projects, scientific projects and
infrastructure improvement projects, and a wide range of project costs.
Together, the 12 projects represent about $2.9 billion, or 75 percent,
of the total value of the 42 projects. To understand how these projects
were managed and the reasons that projects did or did not meet their
cost and schedule commitments, we visited the four laboratories,
reviewed project data and documentation for the selected projects, and
interviewed the contract laboratories' project managers and Science's
on-site federal project directors.[Footnote 3] For each of the 30
projects we did not review in depth, we obtained and analyzed project
performance documentation from the responsible laboratories. In
assessing whether projects had achieved their cost and schedule
targets, we followed Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE
performance goals, which regard projects completed at less than 10
percent above their original cost targets as achieving satisfactory
performance. Because Office of Management and Budget guidance includes
performance standards for project schedule, we considered projects to
be on time if they were or are expected to be completed at less than 10
percent past their original target completion date. DOE's performance
goals, developed in coordination with the Office of Management and
Budget, do not address project schedule. To determine Science's main
future challenges, we interviewed officials at the four laboratories,
DOE regional site offices, and DOE headquarters. We reviewed relevant
studies on human capital planning by GAO, DOE's Inspector General, and
the National Science Foundation. We also reviewed recent GAO studies on
federal budgetary constraints. Appendix I describes our scope and
methodology in more detail, and appendix II summarizes the 42 projects
we reviewed. We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through
May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Of the 42 projects we reviewed that were completed by Science or under
way from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, more than two-
thirds were completed or being carried out in accordance with original
cost and schedule targets. Of the 27 projects that were completed
during this period, 24 (89 percent) were completed within the original
committed cost. For purposes of this analysis, given DOE's performance
goals and Office of Management and Budget guidance, we considered any
Science project completed at less than 10 percent beyond its original
cost or schedule baseline as completed within the committed cost and
schedule targets. These completed projects represented a wide range of
efforts--from conventional construction projects costing a few million
dollars, such as improvements to heating and air-conditioning systems,
to the design and construction of sophisticated scientific equipment
costing more than a billion dollars. Science also largely succeeded in
achieving its original committed schedules, with 21 (78 percent) of the
27 projects completed on or ahead of time. Two (7 percent) of Science's
completed projects, however, were both over budget and late. These
projects included one to construct a device to measure the activity of
subatomic particles called neutrinos and another to upgrade the
performance of an existing particle accelerator. Fifteen of the 42
projects we reviewed were still under way as of the end of February
2008. Nine of these 15 projects appear to be on track to meet both
their cost and schedule commitments, whereas 4 of them are expected to
finish late, and 2 are expected to miss both their cost and schedule
commitments.
Science's ability to manage a majority of projects within original cost
and schedule commitments is due in part to factors generally considered
fundamental to effective project management: leadership commitment to
meeting cost and schedule targets; appropriate management and technical
expertise; and disciplined, rigorous implementation of project
management policies through processes that focus on results. Science's
practice of trimming selected technical or other components from
projects also sometimes played a role in achieving cost and schedule
commitments, although this practice has raised some concerns.
* Strong leadership commitment to meeting cost and schedule targets:
Science's leadership is strongly committed to holding projects to their
original cost and schedule baselines and has made it clear to the rank
and file at its laboratories that they are accountable for staying
within these limits. Officials we spoke with said that requesting
additional funding was normally not an option if problems arose.
* Appropriate project management and technical expertise: Science and
laboratory officials said that finding experienced staff to manage and
carry out projects can be challenging, but they have generally
succeeded by implementing recruitment and retention incentives,
collaborating with other Science laboratories to secure the expertise
and management skills lacking on the project team, and training skilled
scientists in effective project management techniques. For example, Oak
Ridge Laboratory officials said they initially had problems attracting
people with the right skill mix to work on the Spallation Neutron
Source, including finding a capable management team. As a result, the
laboratory developed a "human resources tool kit," which provided
recruiting and retention incentives that allowed the lab to efficiently
hire needed personnel. Furthermore, both the Oak Ridge and Fermi
laboratories have obtained additional scientific expertise by
partnering with other Science laboratories and arranging for
knowledgeable staff to work from their home laboratories rather than
relocate.
* Disciplined, more-rigorous application of DOE policies: Science has
developed more-rigorous project oversight policies and processes than
required under a DOE project management directive issued in
2000.[Footnote 4] This rigor enhanced Science's ability to identify
potential problems and to take timely corrective actions to help keep
projects on track. DOE's directive requires independent internal
reviews at key decision points--all told, one or two reviews during a
project's life span. Science, however, conducts reviews much more
often, with some projects receiving as many as 17 reviews each,
depending on the project's nature and complexity. Science's independent
review panels consist of as many as 30 technical and management experts
from other Science field sites, including contractor laboratories
external to the project. The review panels rigorously assess
management, cost, schedule, technical, and safety issues. Lessons that
panel members have learned from experience on prior projects often lead
to specific actions to address emerging problems, such as potentially
difficult procurements and technical design issues or overly optimistic
initial cost estimates.
In addition, Science's practice of occasionally trimming away selected
components from a project's scope (the sum total of a project's
requirements and features) when facing budgetary constraints also
helped to achieve cost or schedule targets. Such reductions to scope
are permitted, with the proper DOE or laboratory approval, as long as
the changes do not adversely affect Science's key technical goals for a
project. But concerns have been raised by DOE's Office of Engineering
and Construction Management and its Inspector General that changes in
scope may not always preserve a project's technical goals. For example,
the Spallation Neutron Source project team cut a number of items from
the project's scope--including 5 scientific instruments--to achieve its
cost baseline. The Inspector General and the Office of Science
disagreed over the effect these changes had on the project's technical
goals, in part because those technical goals were so broadly defined
that it was unclear how acquiring the 5 instruments, rather than the 10
described in the project baseline, may have affected the facility's
performance, if at all. Although we did not find other projects where
concerns about scope reductions appeared, we did find differences in
the level of detail spelled out in projects' technical goals, even
among similar projects. Office of Engineering and Construction
Management officials we spoke with are concerned enough about this
vulnerability departmentwide that they are considering clarifying
project management guidance on defining projects' technical goals,
perhaps by 2009.
Given continued budgetary pressures, which have been forecast to
increasingly constrain the nation's discretionary spending, plus an
aging workforce nearing retirement, Science is likely to face two
primary challenges to its project performance in the future: heightened
funding and market uncertainties and a shrinking pool of qualified
people to manage projects.
* Uncertainties in funding and market forces: Achieving cost and
schedule targets could become more difficult for Science in the future
if growing federal budgetary constraints further interrupt anticipated
flows of funding to projects already under way. Some projects we
reviewed experienced interruptions in funding for two primary reasons:
tightened federal budgets reduced discretionary funding available to
support the projects, or an international partner failed to provide
support as planned. Given that federal budgets are likely to remain
tight, Science can expect to face continued funding difficulties.
Science's fiscal year 2008 appropriations, for example, totaled less
than the amount required to support the year's anticipated expenditures
for ongoing projects. A number of Science's projects already under way
could be delayed as a result, possibly raising total costs. Since a
sudden increase in prices can render well-considered cost estimates
obsolete, uncertainties in prices for labor and manufactured goods,
which have sometimes fluctuated widely, may make it still more
difficult to achieve cost and schedule targets. A project to implement
seismic and utility upgrades at the Stanford Linear Accelerator, for
example, has faced unanticipated labor price increases in the San
Francisco Bay Area, which, according to federal officials, has
threatened the project's ability to achieve its original cost and
schedule targets.
* Shrinking pool of experienced and knowledgeable staff: Although
Science and laboratory officials said that to date they have generally
been able to find experienced and knowledgeable staff to lead and carry
out projects, doing so may become increasingly difficult in the future,
as an estimated 21 percent to 43 percent of Science's workforce becomes
eligible for retirement by 2011. Similar large-scale retirements are
expected at Science's contractor laboratories. Of the 12 projects we
reviewed in depth, Science officials reported that for 2 of them,
contractors initially had trouble securing adequately experienced
project managers, although only 1 breached its cost and schedule
baseline as a result. Experienced management personnel were unavailable
for this project--to create and study the behavior of subatomic
particles called neutrinos--because they had been assigned to other,
higher-priority projects. This issue is of substantial concern to DOE's
Inspector General, who in 2007 identified human capital as a
"significant management challenge" requiring priority long-term
attention.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Energy consider whether other
program offices would benefit from adopting selected practices from
Science's independent project reviews, such as the frequency and focus
of reviews for technically complex projects. We are also recommending
that DOE review and strengthen, as appropriate, its project management
guidance to help better ensure each project's technical goals,
including the project's expected scientific performance and
functionality of its facilities and infrastructure.
We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment.
DOE generally agreed with our findings and stated that it would
consider incorporating recommendations as part of its Root Cause
Analysis: Corrective Action Plan to improve contract and project
management. DOE also provided a number of general and project-specific
comments that we incorporated throughout this report as appropriate.
Background:
Created in 1977 from diverse agencies, DOE manages the nation's nuclear
weapons production complex, cleans up the environmental legacy of
nuclear weapons development, and conducts research in both energy and
basic sciences. DOE carries out its work at numerous sites and
facilities around the country, primarily through private entities that
manage the facilities and implement program and project activities
under contract to DOE. About 90 percent of DOE's annual budget of $24
billion goes into contracts. The department has established an
extensive network of site offices to directly oversee the work of these
contractors.
DOE's Office of Science is one of several program offices within the
department. It is the third largest in annual funding, after the Office
of Environmental Management, which leads the national effort to clean
up toxic and nuclear waste sites left by nuclear weapons manufacture,
and the National Nuclear Security Administration, which conducts
nuclear weapons research and manages the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile. Science's $4 billion in annual funding is used primarily to
support scientific research conducted under contract with private
entities, many of which are educational or other nonprofit
institutions. For example, UT-Battelle--a limited-liability partnership
formed by the University of Tennessee and Battelle Memorial Institute--
manages and operates the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. In
addition to managing research, contractors are responsible for carrying
out major repairs or upgrades to existing facilities, equipment, and
site infrastructure; fabricating or procuring needed technological
components; and designing and constructing additions to the facilities.
The vast majority of the scientists, engineers, and others who manage
research funded by the Office of Science work directly for the facility
contractors.
DOE has a consistent record of poorly estimating costs and managing
projects. We reported in 1997 that over a 16-year period, 80 DOE
projects costing over $100 million were started, but only 15 were
completed, with most of these experiencing cost overruns and delays.
Thirty-one of the 80 projects were terminated before completion. For
example, we reported that the Office of Environmental Management's
efforts to clean up a disposal area for hazardous waste at the Idaho
National Laboratory were running 2 years behind schedule and that
estimated costs had nearly doubled to $400 million. Problems were so
severe that DOE eventually terminated all work on this project. The
cleanup effort has recently been renewed--more than 10 years after we
first reported problems--as the state of Idaho enforces DOE agreements
to mitigate hazardous wastes buried at the site. DOE's Office of
Engineering and Construction Management was established in 1999 mainly
to implement project management reforms that would address such
problems. The Construction Management office is responsible for
providing consistent guidance on project management policy and
processes and for facilitating oversight of the department's project
management efforts. As part of these responsibilities, the office in
2000 issued DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets, which was updated in 2006. All DOE
program offices must comply with the updated order if their projects
involve acquisitions totaling $20 million or more, although the
principles set forth in the order apply to projects costing $5 million
or more. This directive defines DOE's project management and oversight
principles, including requirements for both external project reviews
led by the Construction Management office and internal project reviews
led by DOE program offices; these internal and external reviews assess
each project's costs, schedule, and technical issues. The order also
prescribes a series of DOE management reviews and approvals, called
critical decision points, required to move a project forward (see fig.
1). In general, DOE management reviews and approvals at these decision
points are to ensure that the project requirements are met.
Figure 1: The Five Critical Decision Points in DOE's Project Management
Process:
This figure is a flowchart showing the five critical decision points in
DOE's project management process.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and DOE.
[End of figure]
Before a project may begin construction, the sponsoring DOE program
office must develop and obtain departmental approval for the project's
"performance baseline." This baseline represents the organization's
commitment to completing a project at a certain cost and by a specific
date. Also included as part of the performance baseline are the
project's technical goals, which define the scope of work and the
project's expected performance at completion. The scope and performance
standards define in general terms what facilities and equipment will be
purchased or upgraded within the agreed cost and schedule targets, as
well as the project's minimum capability to perform the desired
function at completion, such as a research facility's ability to
accommodate people and equipment or a particle accelerator's minimum
energy level.
Sometimes problems arise during a project's implementation that prevent
the project from achieving its original cost, schedule, or technical
baselines. If so, the project generally must be "rebaselined" to
reflect needed changes. In essence, a revised baseline allows a project
that is running over budget or late, or requires a change in scope, to
establish new performance targets. The performance baseline may be
changed only with Science or DOE management review and approval. In
rare instances, DOE may decide to terminate the project rather than
approve a change, particularly if the project's technical goals cannot
be achieved without spending substantially more money.
Office of Science Managed Majority of Projects within Committed Cost
and Schedule Targets:
Of the 42 projects we reviewed that were completed by Science or under
way from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, around 70 percent
adhered to their original cost and schedule targets (see fig. 2).
Twenty-seven of the projects we reviewed were completed during this
period, and 15 were still under way. Our analysis found that 24 (89
percent) of these 27 projects met their original cost targets and 21
(78 percent) were completed on or ahead of schedule. Similarly, as of
the end of February 2008, 9 (60 percent) of the 15 projects that were
still under way were on track to meet their original cost and schedule
targets. For purposes of this analysis, in accordance with Office of
Management and Budget guidance and DOE performance goals, we considered
as within budget any Science project that exceeded or will exceed its
original cost baseline by less than 10 percent. Although DOE
performance goals do not address project schedule, the Office of
Management and Budget's guidance addresses both cost and schedule; we
therefore also evaluated Science's performance in meeting its schedule
baseline, considering as on time the projects that exceeded or will
exceed the original completion date by less than 10 percent.
Figure 2: Expected or Actual Performance of 42 Reviewed Office of
Science Projects, Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007:
This figure is a flowchart showing expected or actual performance of 42
reviewed office of science projects, fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2007. The bars represent met cost target and completed on time,
met cost or schedule target but not both, and exceeded cost target and
completed late.
Ongoing projects;
Met cost target and completed on time: 9;
Met cost or schedule target but not both: 4;
Exceeded cost target and completed late: 15;
Total: 15.
Completed projects;
Met cost target and completed on time: 20;
Met cost or schedule target but not both: 5;
Exceeded cost target and completed late: 2.
Total: 27.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Office of Science data.
[End of figure]
Among the completed projects, the 20 that successfully met their
original cost targets and were on time ranged in nature from
construction jobs costing a few million dollars to cutting-edge
scientific facilities and equipment costing more than a billion
dollars. While a few of these projects finished well below their
original cost and schedule targets, most were at or near the targets,
including the following:
* Run IIb CDF Detector, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory,
Illinois: In July 2006, scientists and engineers successfully completed
a 3.5-year effort[Footnote 5] to upgrade a highly complex device used
for detecting the presence of subatomic particles at the laboratory's
main particle accelerator. The project was completed for around $10.9
million--64 percent less than the $30.4 million cost target--and 4
months ahead of schedule. The upgraded device was capable of supplying
critical evidence of certain particles thought to exist but
undetectable by current particle detectors; confirmation of these
particles could help resolve fundamental questions about the nature of
energy and matter. A concurrent project to upgrade a similar detector
at the Fermi Laboratory's main accelerator, the Run IIb D-Zero
Detector, was also completed well below (39 percent) its original $29
million target; it was also completed on schedule.
* Nanoscale Science Research Centers at Argonne National Laboratory,
Illinois; Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York; Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory, California; Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Tennessee; and Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories, New Mexico:
All five of the nanoscale science research center construction projects
included in our review came in at or below their original cost and
schedule targets or are on track to do so.[Footnote 6] The Center for
Nanoscale Materials at the Argonne National Laboratory, finished in
September 2007, for example, took 47 months to complete. The project
was completed on schedule and within its original committed cost target
of $72 million.[Footnote 7] The 88,000-square-foot facility, used for
researching and developing materials at the molecular or atomic level
(such as those found within computer microchips), houses wet and dry
laboratories and sterile "clean rooms" outfitted with $36 million of
specialized research instruments and equipment, as well as a computing
center, offices, meeting rooms, and other supporting infrastructure.
* Laboratory facilities HVAC upgrades, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Tennessee: A project to upgrade heating, ventilation, and air-
conditioning systems was finished in November 2003 (4 months ahead of
schedule) for about $150,000 less than the project's original target
cost of $7.2 million. The project, which took 23 months to complete,
involved upgrading and replacing deteriorated equipment and piping
serving 13 buildings in the central research complex.
In addition, 5 of the 27 completed projects (19 percent) met either
their cost or schedule target but not both. Those that missed their
schedule targets finished 3 to 15 months late. The projects in this
group included lower-cost infrastructure improvement projects and
higher-cost projects to acquire advanced research equipment. The
following projects met their cost targets but missed their schedule
targets:
* Electrical systems upgrade, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee:
This $5.9 million project was completed in April 2003 slightly under
budget but took about 26 months to complete, 3 months longer than
scheduled. The project included replacing damaged electrical poles and
about 3 miles of feeder lines around the laboratory complex, installing
a computer-based electrical metering system, and replacing or
installing additional breakers and substations throughout the
laboratory complex.
* Central supply facility, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois: This
$5.9 million project met its original cost target when it was completed
in October 2002. Design began around June 1999,[Footnote 8] and
construction was completed in 40 months, about 15 months later than
originally scheduled. The focus of this project was to expand a storage
facility and make other improvements to site infrastructure.
Finally, only 2 of the 27 completed projects (7 percent) were both over
cost and late. These 2 projects finished 18 percent and 23 percent over
cost and over 1 year late. With costs ranging from $58 million to $168
million, they were among the more costly of the projects we reviewed
and generally had longer lead times, taking up to 6 years to complete
after their original cost and schedule estimates were established. Both
projects aimed to expand Science's research capabilities, rather than
to improve site infrastructure. The projects that were both over cost
and late follow:
* Neutrinos at the Main Injector, Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory, Illinois: The neutrinos project included designing and
constructing two particle detectors--one sited at Fermi Laboratory in
Batavia, Illinois, and the other in Soudan, Minnesota--and a tunnel in
which a proton beam instrument could be aimed through solid earth at
the Soudan detector, more than 450 miles away. This $168 million
project took 72 months and was completed 17 months late at more than 23
percent over its committed cost.
* Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3 Upgrade),
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California: This project, to
upgrade the scientific capability of the SPEAR 3 device, was completed
in 2003 for $58 million--14 months late and nearly 18 percent over its
original cost target of $49 million. The upgrade project, which lasted
over 5 years, increased the device's ability to produce x-rays useful
for research in a variety of disciplines, including biology and
medicine. Science partnered with the National Institutes of Health,
which provided half of the project's funding.
For Science's 15 projects still under way as of the end of February
2008, Science or laboratory officials reported that they expected to
complete 9 (60 percent) within their cost and schedule targets. In
contrast, managers of 4 of the 15 projects (27 percent) told us that as
of the end of February 2008, they expected to meet their cost targets
but not their target completion dates. And 2 (13 percent) of these
projects--specifically, the National Compact Stellarator Experiment at
the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, New Jersey, and the Linac
Coherent Light Source project at the Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center--are expected to miss both their cost and schedule targets.
Several Factors Contributed to Science's Cost and Schedule Performance:
That Science has been able to deliver most projects within their
committed cost and scheduled targets is due in part to practicing sound
management principles: leadership commitment to achieving these
targets, ensuring that each project has the necessary management and
technical expertise, and approaching project management with discipline
and rigor so that processes focus on results. Science's practice of
trimming selected technical or other components from some projects
helped in achieving cost and schedule commitments, although this
practice has sometimes raised concerns.
Leadership Commitment to Achieving Cost and Schedule Targets Played a
Key Role:
In our prior work reviewing practices that promote effective project
management, we identified committed leadership as an important
contributing factor.[Footnote 9] An organization's leaders play a
pivotal role because they serve as the primary proponents of the
organization's values and culture, including commitment to consistently
achieving project cost and schedule targets. When the top tier of an
organization embraces a particular performance goal, the rest of the
organization is more likely to follow suit. Shortly after assuming
office in 2002, the Under Secretary of Science issued a memorandum to
Science staff articulating his commitment to achieving project cost and
schedule targets, stating that "the Office of Science expectation is
that all projects be completed on schedule and within budget" and that
senior-level managers and project staff would be held accountable for
doing so. Most recently, in a March 2007 testimony before Congress, the
Under Secretary emphasized Science's continued commitment to "a careful
process" of preparing project cost and schedule targets to ensure that
they are realistic.[Footnote 10] Science leadership's consistent
emphasis on achieving cost and schedule goals appears to have been
adopted by Science and contractor laboratory management and staff, many
of whom told us they believed that requesting more money or more time
to complete a project was typically not an option, as the following
examples illustrate:
* National Compact Stellarator Experiment, Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory, New Jersey: This experiment to develop an alternative
method for harnessing fusion energy is facing design problems that are
likely to increase the cost by 91 percent and delay completion by 4.5
years. In an August 2007 letter to the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory
Committee, which advises the Office of Science on fusion energy
research, the Under Secretary requested that the committee evaluate the
feasibility of continuing the project. "These overruns are large enough
to add new burdens on the limited resources of the U.S. fusion energy
sciences program, as well as undermine confidence of the Administration
and Congress in the ability of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences and
the Office of Science to manage large and technically challenging
construction projects. Given the magnitude of the increases projected
for the NCSX (National Compact Stellarator Experiment), all options,
including termination of the project, must be considered," the Under
Secretary wrote. As of November 2007, the project team had requested to
increase the cost target and extend the completion schedule, but the
Under Secretary had not approved the request.
* Center for Nanoscale Materials, Argonne National Laboratory,
Illinois: The Argonne National Laboratory project staff managing the
construction of this $72 million office and laboratory facility said
that the Director of Basic Energy Sciences, who was responsible for
project oversight, repeatedly made it clear that the team could not
exceed its cost target. According to the laboratory project manager for
construction, basic energy sciences officials were "breathing down our
necks" to ensure that the project would be completed on time and within
cost; it was.
* Neutrinos at the Main Injector, Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory, Illinois: The federal project director said that the
project team felt pressured to maintain a fixed budget target even
before a firm baseline was established. The project included designing
and constructing two particle detectors and a tunnel. He pointed out
that an early Fermi Laboratory plan to construct three modules for the
Neutrinos at the Main Injector project was trimmed back to two modules
to save on costs, even though the project had not yet committed to a
cost target. According to the federal project director, suggesting that
the project's budget expand for the modules was not an option.
Management and Technical Expertise Was Generally Available to Lead and
Carry Out Projects:
Another factor important to effective project management is having
people in the right numbers with the right skills to accomplish an
agency's goals. Science and laboratory officials said that finding
experienced staff to manage and carry out projects can be challenging,
but they have generally succeeded by supporting and implementing
recruitment and retention incentives, collaborating with other Science
laboratories to secure expertise and management skills lacking on the
project team, and training skilled scientists in effective project
management techniques. For example:
* Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee:
Oak Ridge Laboratory officials said problems assigning people with the
right skills to support construction of the Spallation Neutron Source,
the world's most powerful neutron-scattering device, were significant.
Not only did the project face problems hiring a project manager, but it
also faced problems securing other needed staff. When initial work on
the spallation project did not progress adequately, threatening cost
and schedule targets, the project manager was replaced. The laboratory,
which had developed a "human resources tool kit" to assist in
recruiting and retaining staff, was eventually able to secure needed
personnel. According to officials, they offered key personnel pay
incentives, including recruiting bonuses and employment service credit
for employees transferring from other DOE laboratories.
* U.S. components of the Large Hadron Collider, Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory, Illinois: Science officials said that many
laboratories have been able to secure scientific expertise they lacked
by partnering with other Science laboratories, so that experienced
staff could lend their knowledge and expertise to a project without
having to relocate themselves and their families. The hadron collider
project is a collaboration among the member states of the European
Organization for Nuclear Research,[Footnote 11] the United States, and
others to construct a new high-energy physics facility outside Geneva,
Switzerland. The United States is contributing components to an
accelerator and two very large general-purpose detectors. Because the
project's complexity and size required a wide range of technical
expertise not readily available at the Fermi site alone, the laboratory
collaborated with two additional laboratories, Lawrence Berkeley and
Brookhaven national laboratories. Fermi Laboratory, with experience
constructing and operating particle detectors, was given responsibility
for overseeing U.S. contributions to one of the two detectors and the
accelerator; Brookhaven took responsibility for the other detector.
* Center for Nanoscale Materials, Argonne National Laboratory,
Illinois: Science officials said that laboratories generally assign a
project leader with science background and a project manager with
project management background to manage projects jointly. In one
instance, they assigned a scientist as project manager. For the
nanoscience research facility at Argonne Laboratory, the project
manager was a trained physicist. He said that although his interest and
expertise lay in scientific research, the laboratory assigned him to
spearhead construction of the nanoscience facility. To successfully do
so, he said, he received sufficient training in project management
skills to be certified by the Project Management Institute, a national
organization that sets professional project management standards.
Similarly, according to Oak Ridge officials, 12 federal and laboratory
staff completed project management training and were professionally
certified by the Project Management Institute during construction of
the Spallation Neutron Source.
Rigorous Project Oversight Policies and Processes Helped Identify
Potential Problems:
Another factor fundamental to effective project management is the
quality of project monitoring and oversight. Office of Science project
monitoring and oversight practices are more frequent, focused, and
rigorous than those required under DOE project management
guidance.[Footnote 12]
DOE requires that, at selected stages, projects receive independent
peer reviews, called independent project reviews, directed by each
responsible program office.[Footnote 13] Generally, DOE guidance states
that independent peer reviews are to be done by individuals with no
vested interest in a project's outcome. Depending on the total project
scope, cost and schedule estimates, and other factors, such internal
reviews may be required to validate the mission need for the project
(at critical decision point 0), the project's costs and schedule
estimates (at critical decision point 2), and the project's readiness
to be executed or begin construction (at critical decision point 3).
For projects involving high-risk or high-hazard nuclear facilities, a
technical review at critical decision point 1 may also be required to
validate the safety of the project's design. Guidance regarding
independent peer review suggests only when and why reviews should
occur; it does not provide specific requirements for how the reviews
should be conducted or how each project should be evaluated.
Science not only follows this overall guidance but has developed more
explicit guidelines, laid out in its Independent Review Handbook. For
each Science project, a review panel is convened, consisting of up to
30 technical and management experts from Science field sites and
contractor laboratories other than the project site; more-complex
projects have larger review panels, and less-complex projects have
smaller panels. The handbook lays out the documentation each project
team should provide reviewers, expected areas of reviewer expertise and
their respective responsibilities, and follow-up procedures for
addressing any problems identified during review. For example, the
handbook calls for assessing, among other things:
* how a project conforms to Science's mission needs;
* cost estimates, including the estimates' basis and level of detail,
associated risks, and contingency planning in the event of unexpected
events, such as changes to labor market rates;
* planned schedules and how schedules could affect cost estimates;
* the proposed strategy for procuring goods and services to support the
project;
* the project's business management, including organization, project
controls, staffing, risk mitigation, quality issues, and environmental
and safety compliance issues; and:
* how problems or recommendations identified in previous reviews were
or are being addressed.
For most of the Science projects we reviewed, DOE guidance required
only one or two independent peer reviews. Nevertheless, Science
reviewed many of these projects more than the requisite once or twice
and issued review reports that appeared to be comprehensive. Many
officials we spoke with, including DOE Construction Management
officials, federal project directors, and laboratory officials, said
that Science's peer reviews are thorough; often improve cost and
schedule estimates; and lead to corrective measures that address
procurement, design, and other problems. In fact, a number of these
officials pointed to these reviews as key to Science's strong
performance relative to that of other DOE offices.
DOE and laboratory officials told us that the technical expertise
provided by Science's internal review panels was key to providing
effective review and oversight, particularly since the Office of
Engineering and Construction Management, which develops guidance on
project management policy and processes, depends on internal reviews to
evaluate technical issues that lie beyond its own capabilities. DOE
Construction Management and other officials explained that Science's
internal reviews are valuable because the panel members' experience and
expertise help to identify and resolve potential difficulties before
they become problems affecting cost, schedule, or technical goals. The
following examples illustrate the effectiveness of internal reviews:
* The Center for Nanophase Materials Sciences, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Tennessee: Under DOE guidance, this $65 million project to
construct a four-story office and laboratory complex to study materials
on the nanoscale should have received two independent internal reviews,
one at the stage in which cost and schedule targets and work scope were
validated and another when the project was nearly ready to begin
construction. Science, however, conducted four reviews--on average, one
each year. Among the concerns identified during these internal reviews
were questions about whether a planned "clean room" would adequately
limit the number and size of airborne environmental pollutants, such as
dust, microbes, and vapors, and whether the costs of achieving industry
standards for a sterile laboratory environment had been accurately
projected. The review panel for this project suggested hiring a private
consultant to evaluate the laboratory's construction plans, and
numerous changes were ultimately implemented. In addition, the review
panel validated cost estimates that had been revised on the basis of an
earlier review. Ultimately, this project averted cost overruns and was
completed 1 month early.
* U.S. contributions to the Large Hadron Collider, Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory, Illinois: Under DOE guidance, the three
projects (components of two particle detectors and an
accelerator)[Footnote 14] comprising the $531 million U.S. contribution
to the international Large Hadron Collider would have required only one
internal review each to validate readiness for construction at critical
decision point 3. Instead, Science conducted 17 reviews of each
component. According to project managers for the detector components,
the first internal independent review found that the estimated cost
allowance to cover unexpected occurrences was deficient, given the
project's complexity. The review panel directed the project teams to
develop a higher cost estimate to better account for unexpected
problems. Ultimately, each of these projects was or will be completed
within 2 percent of its committed cost (the two detector projects are
still under way), although our analysis suggests that all three were or
will be completed late, in part because of installation delays
resulting from problems with tunnel construction, which was a
responsibility of the European consortium.
Science Modified Project Scope to Meet Cost and Schedule Targets, but
This Practice Sometimes Raised Concerns:
Some of the projects we reviewed were able to achieve original cost or
schedule targets, in part because they trimmed away selected components
from the project's scope. DOE's project management order 413.3 and
associated guidance allow revisions in project scope to control costs
and stay on schedule, as long as the project will still meet its
technical goals and the proper laboratory or DOE officials approve the
changes. DOE guidance defines technical goals to include the minimum
level of performance that a project must attain--the essential
capabilities, design features, functions, and other characteristics
present at the project's completion--to fulfill the mission need
motivating DOE to pursue the project.[Footnote 15]
The scope of several projects we reviewed was revised to help meet cost
or schedule targets, without apparent adverse effect on technical
goals, including:[Footnote 16]
* Argonne National Laboratory trimmed scope from a project to expand
its central supply facility when it decided not to remove aboveground
pipes from the laboratory grounds. The funds saved by this decision
offset the unexpected additional costs resulting from higher-than-
expected construction bids. Removing the pipes was considered the
project's lowest priority.
* Similarly, Oak Ridge National Laboratory eliminated a planned upgrade
of the electrical connections between two laboratory buildings, in part
because electricity use had declined and the upgrade was no longer
essential. Eliminating this work helped offset increased costs
associated with other components of the project.[Footnote 17]
* At the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, a plan to construct an
administrative office building was deleted from the Linac Coherent
Light Source project and replaced by a plan to renovate existing space
to help offset costs associated with high construction bids resulting
from labor market pressures in the San Francisco Bay Area.
DOE policies and guidance, as well as other organizations' guidance
related to effective project management, emphasize the importance of
clearly defining a project's performance or technical goals.
Specifically, DOE guidance requires that minimum performance goals
clearly define what new facilities or functions a project will consist
of. These goals are then used as a measure for evaluating project
performance. Our own cost assessment guide and studies of DOE's project
management by the National Research Council also discuss the importance
of defining a project's technical goals appropriately to enable
adequate oversight.[Footnote 18] The underlying rationale is that if
technical goals are too broad or vaguely stated, it can be difficult to
assess whether or to what extent trimming certain aspects of project
scope undermines the project's ability to accomplish its mission.
In fact, concerns have been raised within DOE that projects' goals may
not always be adequately defined. An April 2008 DOE report--which cited
the findings of a recent workshop to identify systemic challenges in
planning and managing DOE projects--found that DOE often fails to plan
thoroughly before committing to project costs, schedules, scope, and
technical goals. This shortcoming was identified as the primary root
cause for long-standing project management problems.[Footnote 19]
Project management oversight officials at DOE's Office of Engineering
and Construction Management said that projects, including Science's,
sometimes include overly broad technical goals, making it difficult to
determine the effects of a change in project scope. According to DOE,
descriptions of project scope do not always articulate technical goals
in terms of required facilities, whose costs generally make up a
significant share of overall expenditures. Facility requirements, as
well as technical goals, must be well defined in project scope to
establish reliable cost and schedule targets. Officials added that they
believe that DOE guidance could be clarified to help ensure that
project technical goals are sufficiently detailed to permit effective
oversight.
DOE's Inspector General has also raised concerns about project scope.
Specifically, changes in the scope of the Spallation Neutron Source
project led the Inspector General to conclude that Science had
compromised the project's scientific mission and technical goals to
achieve cost and schedule commitments and avoid requesting more funding
from Congress. In its November 2001 report, the Inspector General found
that, among other scope reductions, Science had trimmed both the range
of capabilities and the number of planned scientific instruments it had
committed to in the original baseline.[Footnote 20] Science countered
that it had never committed to procuring the 10 instruments described
in the project's performance goals and was clear in its intention to
delay selecting instruments until later in the project. Science
officials explained that the 5 instruments ultimately selected were
chosen on scientific, rather than budgetary, grounds and were
technically superior to the 10 "proxy" instruments in the original
performance goals. Science and the Inspector General disagreed over the
effect these changes may have had on the project's technical goals, in
part because those goals were so broadly defined that it was unclear
how acquiring the 5 instruments, rather than the original 10, may have
affected the facility's performance.
We did not find such concerns in the other projects we reviewed,
although we did find differences in the level of detail spelled out in
technical goals, such as the goals listed for five similar nanoscience
research centers in five states. For example, the center in Illinois
defined "completion" as a completed laboratory building approved for
occupancy, with all scientific instruments delivered, installed,
verified, and tested. The technical goals for the centers in California
and New York went so far as to specify the number of users their
facilities would accommodate. All of these facilities were or are on
track to successful completion, but if any of them found it necessary
to reduce scope to stay on track, it might be difficult to discern the
effect of any reductions on the overarching technical goals unless
those goals were explicitly detailed. The effect of a midproject
reduction in how many researchers and staff a facility could
accommodate, for example, might only be apparent for the centers whose
technical goals spelled out how many users were originally envisioned
for the facility. An Office of Engineering and Construction Management
official explained that a scope description clearly laying out a
building's expected functionality, not just its square footage, can
make it easier for interested parties to understand key project goals
and the effects of any modifications in scope. Engineering and
Construction Management officials we spoke with are concerned enough
about this vulnerability departmentwide that they are considering
developing and issuing additional guidance on defining projects'
technical goals, perhaps by 2009.
Maintaining Successful Project Performance in the Future Will Require
Continued Attention to Challenges Affecting Funding and Human
Resources:
Science is likely to face two primary challenges to maintaining its
project performance in the future: heightened funding and market
uncertainties, and a shrinking pool of qualified people to manage
projects. Interruptions in expected funding that in the past have
increased project costs or caused schedule delays will doubtless
continue, given the ongoing decline in federal funding available for
discretionary projects, including Science's programs. Meanwhile, as the
nation's population ages and both federal and laboratory staff retire
in increasing numbers, the pool of experienced scientists and project
managers available to carry out Science's program of work is likely to
shrink, and difficulties replacing them are likely to continue.
Heightened Funding and Market Uncertainties Could Make Cost and
Schedule Targets More Difficult to Achieve in the Future:
Achieving cost and schedule targets could become more difficult for
Science in the future, as growing federal budgetary constraints
potentially exacerbate interruptions in anticipated flows of funding to
projects already under way and volatile market conditions in some areas
of the country unexpectedly drive up the costs of the labor and
commodities needed to complete those projects. When projects do not
receive funding as anticipated, officials said, projects take longer to
complete. Labor expenses accumulate over the longer period, and prices
for commodities may increase, driving total project costs upward. The
experiences of the following projects at the Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center in California help illustrate how these forces have
affected Science's ability to meet cost and schedule targets:
* Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3 Upgrade): This
project experienced a slowdown in the expected stream of funding during
the years when a large share of the project's costs were to be
allocated for major aspects of the work, such as fabricating
components. As a result, Science had to extend its schedule and revise
its cost estimates to ensure sufficient funding and staff to carry out
the remaining work. Total project costs increased 9 percent--from $53
million to $58 million--and instead of 4 years, the project took over 5
years to complete. This followed an earlier but unrelated cost increase
from the project's original $49 million target cost, resulting from a
decision by Science and the National Institutes of Health, which funded
half of the project's costs, to further boost the scientific capability
of the upgraded device beyond the level planned in the baseline.
* Large Area Telescope: This telescope is the primary scientific
instrument to be flown on the Gamma-Ray Large Area Space Telescope
(GLAST), which is due to launch in May 2008. The telescope, DOE's
contribution to GLAST and a joint effort of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and a host of other U.S. and foreign
institutions, was completed in March 2006.[Footnote 21] Once in orbit,
the telescope will be used to explore the dynamics of extreme
environments in space and could lead to major discoveries about the
universe. When the cost and schedule targets were first established,
this project included an in-kind contribution by the French space
agency to design and fabricate the telescope's calorimeter--a device
for measuring the energy picked up by the telescope's sensors. When the
French government withdrew its participation, the project managers at
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center had to procure the component
elsewhere and pay for it out of the project's budget. That procurement
contributed to the overall increase in costs from $121 million to $188
million, and DOE's direct financial contribution to the project
increased from $37 million to $45 million.
* Safety and operational reliability improvements: This $15.7 million
project will upgrade utilities and improve the aging Stanford
laboratory's ability to withstand earthquakes. When construction prices
in the San Francisco Bay Area rose dramatically and unexpectedly
between approval of the project's cost baseline and DOE's authorization
to begin construction, Stanford postponed some planned improvements
until other, higher-priority work was completed. If sufficient funding
is unavailable to complete those improvements, they will be cut from
the project. Officials told us they do not plan to request additional
funding. If, near the end of construction, residual project funding is
available, Stanford will then contract for the postponed work, adding
at least 3 months to this 3.5-year project.
Although the future cannot be predicted with certainty, it seems that
current federal fiscal constraints on discretionary funding will likely
make Science's ability to meet its future cost and schedule targets
increasingly more challenging. Lower-than-expected appropriations for
fiscal year 2008 are already forcing Science to end or slow progress on
several projects and curtail operation or use of a number of scientific
facilities and items of equipment obtained earlier. According to
Science's assessment, for example, shortfalls in funding for one of the
ongoing projects in our review--a $33 million effort to construct
additional space at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
California, to accommodate the growing number of researchers using the
Advanced Light Source facility--could delay this 3.5-year project by
more than 1 year beyond the original committed schedule. For the U.S.
contribution to the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor--an
internationally led fusion energy demonstration project currently in
planning and design and the subject of our prior work[Footnote 22]--
$10.7 million in funding for fiscal year 2008 was provided, rather than
the $160 million requested.
Over the long term, fiscal constraints on discretionary funding are
also likely to affect Science's 20-year plan to acquire new research
equipment and facilities. In our work assessing the nation's long-term
fiscal outlook, we have reported that continued budget deficits--
exacerbated by the aging of the American population and rising related
Social Security and health care costs--could soon lead to a protracted
decline in the availability of federal funding for discretionary
programs, including scientific research.[Footnote 23] The Director of
Science's Office of Project Assessment said that interruptions in
project funding arising from federal fiscal constraints represent the
primary challenge Science faces in meeting cost and schedule targets in
the future. In a February 2008 presentation to the High Energy Physics
Advisory Panel, the Under Secretary for Science echoed this concern. He
said he expected that recent flat and declining budgets for the agency
would continue unless Science and its advocates successfully convinced
Congress of the need for long-term high-energy physics research.
Finally, recent sustained increases in the prices for crude oil, steel,
and other commodities and a weakening dollar could have inflationary
effects on the nation, leading to higher prices for many things--from
manufactured goods to facility construction.[Footnote 24] Unexpected
increases in prices add continued uncertainty to the cost of Science's
planned long-term research and facility construction programs, raising
questions about Science's ability to meet cost and schedule targets in
the future.
Forthcoming Retirements Could Deplete Scientific, Technical, and
Management Expertise Available for Future Projects:
Large-scale retirements as the nation's workforce ages are likely to
continue challenging Science's ability to staff future projects
effectively and, ultimately, achieve cost and schedule goals. Two of
the 12 projects we reviewed in depth have faced difficulties securing
adequately experienced project managers, although only 1 breached its
cost and schedule baseline as a result. This 72-month project,
Neutrinos at the Main Injector, was completed 17 months late and 23
percent over its committed cost, in large part because expertise in two
areas was not available in a timely manner. First, the management team
overseeing the project had little experience in tunneling, which was
needed to house an underground proton-beam device. Staff qualified to
oversee tunneling work were not brought on board the project until
after the contractor encountered technical and safety problems. Second,
the project's cost target had been established before engineering was
completed, and the design did not fully account for the underground
environment. Other factors, including higher-than-expected construction
prices, also contributed to the cost increase and delay.
Such problems securing adequate management and technical expertise will
doubtless continue, given expected retirements within Science and its
contractor laboratories and growing competition for scientific
expertise, as these examples demonstrate:
* Office of Science: According to the most recent analysis from the
Office of Science, about 21 percent of the agency's workforce was
eligible for retirement in 2005, and that number is expected to
increase to 43 percent by 2011. Technical occupations are expected to
be most seriously affected, although Science also is facing the
imminent departure of much of its senior executive staff. Science has
reported that almost all of its nuclear, chemical, and mechanical
engineers will be eligible for retirement by 2011, as well as one-third
or more of its technical specialists, such as physical scientists,
health physicists, and chemists. In addition, more than half of
Science's senior management staff is already eligible to retire. These
people include senior project management officials, as well as
Science's most senior leadership in basic energy sciences, fusion
energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. Looming
retirements are of substantial concern to DOE's Inspector General,
which has identified human capital as a "significant management
challenge" requiring priority long-term attention.[Footnote 25] The
Inspector General reported in 2007 that recent reductions in overall
staffing at the department--staffing levels at Science have declined by
almost 15 percent since 1999--combined with an aging workforce
approaching retirement will create difficulties ensuring that the
department has sufficient skills and knowledge in place to carry out
its future responsibilities.
* Contractor laboratories: Officials at three of the four laboratories
we visited--Fermi, Oak Ridge, and Argonne--said that, like the federal
government, they also anticipate large-scale retirements in the near
future, although budget reductions have already caused layoffs of many
staff with management and technical expertise.[Footnote 26] The vast
majority of staff working on Science projects (about 23,000 people) are
employed by DOE's 10 contractor laboratories and facilities across the
country. In anticipation of future retirements, workforce-planning
officials at the laboratories we visited said they had recently begun
succession planning. None, however, had yet estimated the resulting
shortfall in project management and scientific expertise because they
have not completed comprehensive analyses comparing their expected
capabilities with their future workforce needs.
Nevertheless, laboratory officials said that replacing retiring staff
will present a challenge because the labor market demand for expertise
in key science and engineering fields currently exceeds the supply.
Colleges and universities are not generating enough graduates to
replace staff who are retiring. An Argonne National Laboratory
preliminary analysis of its workforce needs, for example, recently
identified a shortage of expertise in the computational sciences,
superconducting technology, nanoscience, nuclear engineering, and
health physics. Argonne's experience underscores the findings of a 2008
National Science Foundation report, which revealed that science and
engineering occupations grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 percent
between 1990 and 2000--more than triple the growth rate of other
occupations.[Footnote 27] According to the foundation, growth in the
science and engineering labor force in the past has been supported by
an influx of foreign-born graduates. But global competition for such
expertise is rising, and fewer immigrants can be expected to fill those
skill gaps in the future. The director of Fermi Laboratory's human
resources organization said that the laboratory has already faced
problems retaining its foreign-born scientists, many of whom have
returned to their home countries for higher pay and better professional
opportunities. In addition, laboratory officials said they often face
stiff competition for new graduates with for-profit private sector
firms, where salaries can be substantially higher and hiring
incentives, such as relocation packages, are often better. The combined
effects of retirements and a labor market in which demand for
experienced and knowledgeable scientists and technicians far outstrips
the supply will be a formidable challenge for Science in the future as
it seeks not only to implement its future plan of work, but also to do
so within budget and on time.
Conclusions:
The ability of DOE's Office of Science to deliver a majority of its
projects since 2003 within their original committed cost targets and on
time stands in clear contrast to the struggle of other DOE program
offices, in particular, the Office of Environmental Management. Science
has encountered challenges common to many large federal projects,
including unexpected interruptions in funding and difficulties in
securing appropriately qualified staff. Yet the office has addressed
such challenges, in large part by instilling a strong organizational
commitment to meeting cost and schedule targets, implementing a
rigorous approach to project oversight, and appropriately addressing
staffing problems it has encountered. Some of Science's practices--in
particular, the frequency and focus of its independent reviews--may
offer practical lessons for DOE's Office of Engineering and
Construction Management, which this office could consider implementing
in other DOE program offices. The wide range of expertise that internal
review panels are able to supply--from pointing out design flaws and
potential procurement obstacles to professional skepticism of overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates--appears to be especially
effective in helping projects stay on track to meet their performance
targets. Still, Science will need to remain diligent to ensure future
success despite continuing, and potentially intensifying, challenges in
funding and the impending retirement of large numbers of experienced
technical and project management staff. These growing pressures might
lead Science to more often consider trimming selected components from a
project's planned scope of work to achieve cost and schedule targets--
a practice that has the potential, without due diligence, of eventually
weakening some of a project's technical goals. In our view, concerns
about scope reduction expressed by DOE's Inspector General, differences
we found in the level of detail describing technical goals for similar
projects, and DOE's own concerns about inadequate project definition
could, when taken together, indicate potential vulnerabilities
associated with trimming project scope. To help ensure that
vulnerabilities do not materialize as problems, Science and other DOE
offices could benefit from DOE project management guidance to ensure
that a project's scientific mission and technical goals are clearly
defined, so that before reducing scope, organizations have fully
weighed the scientific and technical effects of the reductions and have
ensured that scope-altering trade-offs are clear to key interested
parties, including Congress.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help improve the potential for projects throughout DOE to achieve
their cost and schedule targets, we recommend that the Secretary of
Energy direct the Director of the Office of Engineering and
Construction Management, which develops DOE's project management policy
and facilitates project management oversight, to consider whether other
DOE program offices would benefit from adopting selected practices from
Science's independent project reviews, such as the frequency and focus
of reviews for technically complex projects.
In addition, to lessen the possibility that changes in work scope could
undermine some projects' ability to meet their mission need, we
recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Office of Engineering
and Construction Management to review DOE's project management guidance
and consider whether it could be strengthened to help ensure that each
project's technical goals, including the project's expected scientific
performance and corresponding facility requirements, are clearly and
sufficiently defined.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided copies of our draft report to DOE for comment. The
department generally concurred with our findings and stated that it
would consider incorporating our recommendations into its Root Cause
Analysis: Corrective Action Plan. DOE also wished to clarify the
utility of trimming project scope, stating that our report appeared to
imply that trimming project scope was an inappropriate practice. On the
contrary, we believe that trimming scope can be a useful tool to help
keep projects on schedule and within cost targets when internal or
external events affect a project's cost or progress. We described
several projects in the report where scope was trimmed without apparent
adverse effect on the projects' overall technical goals. Officials
within DOE, however, have raised concerns that projects' goals may not
always be adequately defined, which can make it more difficult to
assess the effects of a change in project scope. In addition, officials
within the Office of Engineering and Construction Management said they
believed that DOE guidance could be clarified to help ensure that
project technical goals are sufficiently detailed to facilitate
effective oversight. We agree, and we believe that if and when
difficult choices must be made, the effect of those choices should be
clear to all interested parties, including Congress. The department
also provided numerous technical clarifications, which we incorporated
as appropriate. Appendix III contains DOE's comment letter.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents
of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy,
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Science (Science) manages its projects within cost and
schedule commitments, we obtained performance information on the 42
Science projects at 10 national laboratories that, from fiscal year
2003 through fiscal year 2007, were either completed (27 projects) or
still under way at the time of our study and for which Science had
committed to cost and schedule targets (15 projects). The 42 projects
excluded information technology acquisitions and projects that met our
selection criteria but were suspended at the time we selected projects
for review in October 2007. Because we did not consider DOE's Project
Assessment Reporting System a fully reliable source for performance
information on individual projects, we obtained project cost and
schedule data and other information directly from the responsible
laboratories.[Footnote 28]
For the 42 Science projects, we reviewed selected documents providing
information about the projects' scope and purpose, estimated and actual
costs, and proposed and actual time frames. We compared the cost or
schedule commitments in the original project baselines with the actual
performance of the 27 completed projects and the expected performance-
-as of February 29, 2008--for the 15 projects still under way. For most
of the 27 completed projects, we compared the cost targets in the
documents establishing the project baseline (at critical decision point
2, or CD-2) with the actual costs, as provided in the documents
certifying project completion (at critical decision point 4, or CD-4).
We then compared the proposed time frames in the CD-2 documents with
the CD-4 document approval dates.[Footnote 29] In a few cases, these
documents were not available, and alternative documents were used
instead. For the 15 projects still under way, we compared the cost and
schedule targets in the CD-2 documents with project performance reports
as of February 29, 2008, provided by the responsible laboratories. In
recognition of Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE's
recent project performance goals, we characterized projects that met or
exceeded (or are expected to meet or exceed) their original cost or
schedule goals by less than 10 percent as completed within budget or on
time, whereas we considered projects that exceeded (or will exceed)
their goals by 10 percent or more to be over cost or late.[Footnote 30]
The Office of Management and Budget requires that federal agencies
monitor the performance of capital acquisitions and that agency heads
review major acquisitions that exceed their cost, schedule, and
performance goals by 10 percent or more.[Footnote 31] In coordination
with the Office of Management and Budget, DOE in 2008 adopted a goal of
completing individual projects within 10 percent of the original cost
baseline, with certain exceptions that were beyond the scope of this
report.[Footnote 32] DOE did not adopt a performance goal for projects'
schedule baselines.
To evaluate the key factors affecting Science's project management
performance, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 out of the 42
projects overseen by four laboratories with diverse scientific
missions--Argonne National Laboratory and Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory in Illinois, Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, and
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California--for more detailed
review. The projects were the Center for Nanoscale Materials; Neutrinos
at the Main Injector; U.S. ATLAS; U.S. Compact Muon Solenoid; U.S.
Large Hadron Collider Accelerator; Center for Nanophase Material
Sciences; SNS Instruments: Next Generation; Spallation Neutron Source;
Large Area Telescope; Linac Coherent Light Source; safety and
operational reliability improvements at the Stanford Linear
Accelerator; and Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3)
upgrade. Results from nongeneralizable samples, including our sample of
12 projects, cannot be used to make inferences about Science's overall
project performance. Our interest was in gathering information on the
selected Science projects to identify material factors that may not
exist across all projects but could help us understand Science's
organizational strengths and potential future challenges. We selected
these 12 projects to ensure that our sample included completed and
ongoing projects, scientific projects and infrastructure improvement
projects, and a wide range of project costs. Together, the 12 projects
represented about $2.9 billion, or 75 percent, of the total value of
the 42 projects.
For these 12 projects, we visited the responsible laboratory and
reviewed selected documents providing information about the project's
scope and purpose, estimated and actual costs, and proposed and actual
time frames. We also examined reviews of the 12 projects conducted by
Science's Office of Project Assessment, which provides guidance and
oversight for Science's projects.[Footnote 33] We interviewed federal
project directors, laboratory project managers, and other knowledgeable
staff to gather their perspectives on their projects' performance and
reasons for it. We also discussed key factors affecting Science's
project management performance with headquarters officials at DOE's
Office of Engineering and Construction Management, which provides
project management policy and oversight departmentwide; at Science's
Office of Project Assessment; and Science's principal subprogram
offices. In addition, to evaluate projects' technical goals, we
reviewed the project execution plans for projects within and outside
our nongeneralizable sample.
To determine the main challenges that could affect Science's ability to
maintain project management performance in the future, we interviewed
federal and laboratory officials at the four laboratories we visited,
as well as officials at DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction
Management and Science's Office of Project Assessment. We interviewed
workforce-planning officials at the four laboratories, Science's
headquarters, and regional administrative offices in Illinois and
Tennessee. We also reviewed relevant studies by GAO, DOE's Inspector
General, and the National Science Foundation about fiscal challenges
facing the United States and challenges to maintaining a skilled
federal workforce and to securing technical expertise across a variety
of scientific fields.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through May 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Office of Science Projects Reviewed:
We obtained and reviewed performance information on 42 Science projects
at 10 national laboratories, summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Projects Under Way or Completed from Fiscal Year 2003 through
Fiscal Year 2007:
Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Center for Nanoscale
Materials[D];
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory:
9/1/2007;
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 9/1/2007;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 0%;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National
Laboratory: $72.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory:
$72.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
0%.
Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Central supply facility;
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory:
7/1/2001;
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory:
10/1/2002;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 60.00;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 5.90;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory:
5.90;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Fire safety
improvements;
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory:
6/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 11/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 16.13;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 8.43;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 8.38;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
(0.59).
Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Mechanical and control
systems upgrade;
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory:
6/1/2005;
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 6/1/2005;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National
Laboratory: 9.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory:
8.96;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
(0.44).
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Center for Functional
Nanomaterials;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
4/1/2008;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 3/1/2008;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: (2.08);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 81.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
81.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Electrical system
modifications: phase II;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
9/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 11/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 7.41;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 6.77;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
6.73;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
(0.59).
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Electron Beam Ion
Source;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
3/1/2010;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
9/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 14.29;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 14.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
14.80;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Ground and surface
water protection upgrade;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
12/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
11/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: (3.33);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 6.05;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
6.03;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
(0.33).
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Research support
building;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
3/1/2007;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
2/1/2007;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: (2.94);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 18.27;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
18.27;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: STAR Electromagnetic
Calorimeter;
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
9/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 9/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National
Laboratory: 8.60;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
8.60;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: MINERvA;
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 4/1/2010;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
9/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 13.51;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 16.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 16.80;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Neutrinos at
the Main Injector[D];
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 9/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
2/1/2005;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 30.91;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 136.10;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 167.97;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 23.42.
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Run IIb CDF
Detector;
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 11/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
7/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: (8.89);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 30.40;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 10.90;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: (64.14).
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Run IIb D-Zero
Detector;
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 11/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
11/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 28.60;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 17.40;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: (39.16).
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. ATLAS[D];
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 9/1/ 2005;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
9/1/ 2008[E];
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 40.45;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 163.75;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 163.75;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. Compact
Muon Solenoid[D];
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 9/1/2005;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
9/1/2008[E];
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 40.91;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 167.25;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 167.25;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. Large
Hadron Collider Accelerator[D];
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 9/1/2005;
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory:
7/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 12.05;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory: 200.00[F];
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 200.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advanced Light
Source molecular environmental science facility;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 10/1/2002;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
12/1/2002;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 5.26;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 6.75;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 6;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: (11.11).
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advanced Light
Source user support building;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 5/1/2010;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
5/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 32.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 32.80;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Building 77
rehabilitation: phase II;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Argonne National Laboratory:
Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 11/1/2009;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
11/1/2009;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 13.61;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 13.61;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Gamma-Ray
Energy-Tracking Array;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 3/1/2011;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
3/1/2011;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 18.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 18.80;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: The Molecular
Foundry;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 12/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
12/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 85.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 84.90;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: (0.12).
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Transmission
Electron Aberration-Corrected Microscope;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 9/1/2009;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
9/1/2009;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 27.09;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 27.09;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Sitewide water
distribution upgrade: phase I;
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 12/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:
12/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory: 8.26;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory: 8.26;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Center for Nanophase
Materials Sciences[D];
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 8/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: (2.08);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 65.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
64.74;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(0.40).
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Electrical system
upgrade;
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
1/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 4/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 13.04;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 5.99;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
5.90;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(1.50).
Site and project: Facilities heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
upgrade;
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
3/1/2004;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 11/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: (14.81);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 7.20;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
7.05;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(2.08).
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Fire protection system
upgrade;
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9/1/2004;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 5/1/2004[G];
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: (12.50);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 6.02;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
5.89;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(2.16).
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Fundamental neutron
physics beamline;
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
6/1/2010;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 4/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: (2.56);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 9.20;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9.20;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Laboratory for
Comparative and Functional Genomics;
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 10/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 4;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 13.90;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
13.86;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(0.29).
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Research support
center;
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
8/1/2004;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 10/1/2004;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 9.52;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 16.26;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
16.04;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
(1.35).
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: SNS instruments: next
generation (SING I)[D];
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9/1/2011;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 8/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: (15.66);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 68.50;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
68.50;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Spallation Neturon
Source[D];
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
9/1/2005;
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 5/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 8.60;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory: 1332.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
1405.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
5.92.
Site and project: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Physical
sciences facility;
Project type: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Infrastructure;
Status: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory: 2/1/2011;
Actual completion date[B]: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:
2/1/2011;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory: 224.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory: 224.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory: 0.
Site and project: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Alcator C-Mod
lower drive upgrade;
Project type: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 3/1/2003;
Actual completion date[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory:
4/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 5.26;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 5.20;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 5.14;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: (1.15).
Site and project: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: National Compact
Stellarator Experiment;
Project type: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Scientific;
Status: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 5/1/2008;
Actual completion date[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory:
12/1/2012;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 107.84;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 86.30;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 165.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory: 91.19.
Site and project: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Center
for Integrated Nanotechnologies;
Project type: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Scientific;
Status: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Sandia And Los Alamos National
Laboratories: 5/1/2007;
Actual completion date[B]: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories:
5/1/2007;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Sandia And Los Alamos
National Laboratories: 0;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Sandia And Los Alamos
National Laboratories: 75.80;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Sandia And Los Alamos National
Laboratories: 75.75;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Sandia And Los Alamos National
Laboratories: (0.07).
Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Large Area
Telescope[D];
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific;
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
3/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
2/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: (2.5);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center: 121.20;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 188.06[H];
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 55.17.
Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Linac Coherent
Light Source[D];
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific;
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
3/1/2009;
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
7/1/2010;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 34.04;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center: 379.00;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 420.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 10.82.
Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Safety and
operational reliability improvements[D];
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Infrastructure;
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Under way;
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
9/1/2009;
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
12/1/2009;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 7.32;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center: 15.72;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 15.72;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory:
0.
Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: SPEAR 3
upgrade[D];
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific;
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
9/1/2002;
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center:
11/1/2003;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 29.17;
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center: 49.20;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 58.00;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center: 9.23.
Site and project: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory:
CEBAF center addition: phase I;
Project type: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory:
Scientific;
Status: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed;
Original target completion date[A]: Thomas Jefferson National
Accelerator Laboratory: 6/1/2006;
Actual completion date[B]: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator
Laboratory: 4/1/2006;
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Thomas Jefferson National
Accelerator Laboratory: (6.25);
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Thomas Jefferson
National Accelerator Laboratory: 10.94;
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Thomas Jefferson National
Accelerator Laboratory: 10.94;
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Thomas Jefferson National
Accelerator Laboratory: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of Office of Science data.
Note: DOE data typically expressed target completion dates as month and
year; for consistency, we recorded and calculated target and actual
completion dates from the first of the month.
[A] Original completion date and cost targets were committed to at
critical decision point 2, when cost and schedule targets are set. For
projects baselined before DOE's project management order 413.3 was
fully implemented, we used an equivalent project milestone or, if such
a milestone was not available, we instead used estimates at conceptual
design. Estimates made at conceptual design lack the precision possible
when design has progressed further.
[B] For projects under way, the actual completion date and final cost
reflect Science's projections as of February 29, 2008.
[C] To determine the extent to which each project finished before or
exceeded its original target completion date, we computed percentage
change from the planned project length (the period between DOE's
approval of critical decision point 2, which is not shown in the table,
and the original target completion date) to the actual project length
(the period between critical decision point 2 approval and critical
decision point 4, when DOE certifies that a project is complete). To
determine the extent to which each project finished under or exceeded
its original target cost, we computed the percentage change from the
original target cost to the final cost.
[D] Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 12 projects selected for in-
depth review.
[E] DOE completed 97 percent of this project on time. The remaining 3
percent will not be completed until September 2008 because of tunneling
problems at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) site
in Switzerland.
[F] DOE funding included $90 million paid to CERN to purchase parts
made in the United States.
[G] Date corresponds to date of project's critical decision point 4
memorandum, our criterion for project completion. Documentation for
this project, however, indicates that the upgrades were completed in
March 2004, 2 months earlier.
[H] DOE's direct financial contribution to this project amounted to $45
million.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
May 21, 2008:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street. NW:
Washington. DC 20584:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report. entitled Office of Science Has Kept
Majority of Projects on Schedule and within Budget, but Funding and
Other Challenges May Grow (GAO-08- 641). Generally, the Department of
Energy agrees with your findings and recommendations. The
recommendations will be considered as part of the agency's Root Cause
Analysis Corrective Action Plan to improve contract and project
management.
The Office of Science (SC) has a culture of effective project
management that stems from a shared belief in delivering the maximum
science capability in each of its projects. SC appreciates that GAO has
recognized elements of its culture (leadership, expertise, and rigorous
oversight) contributing to successful project outcomes. This is helpful
in communicating SC's commitment to scientific excellence throughout
the science communities, DOE laboratory complex, and other stakeholders
” especially SC oversight organizations.
SC understands that its large projects use precious, limited public
resources and must always be appropriately prioritized, well defined,
and effectively managed from concept formulation to operations. This is
a legacy that has been built by SC and its predecessors over many
decades. Today. SC managers and staff take pride in passing this legacy
on by promoting effective project management as a signature SC
experience that gives meaning to daily project work.
SC also agrees with GAO's description of challenges (availability of
funding and talent) confronting the organization that may impact future
project outcomes.
Finally, we would like to clarify the utility of "trimming" of project
scope as a means of meeting project cost and schedule targets. Although
GAO accurately reports that DOE's project management directives allow
reductions in scope, the implication appears to be that this approach
is inappropriate. DOE considers this practice to be in keeping with the
principles of responsible project management. We are often required to
make difficult choices in the face of internal and external events that
affect project costs. These choices can result in reductions to scope
in order to ensure meeting the primary technical goals within cost and
schedule constraints. Further, when a change of this type is proposed a
rigorous review is done to ensure that the change is appropriately
defined, justified, and approved.
Please find two attachments to this letter which provide additional
general and project- specific comments on the draft report. Many of
these comments were provided to GAO in response to their initial
Statement of Facts, but were not reflected in the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Daniel R. Lehman:
Director:
Office of Project Assessment Office of Science:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Janet Frisch, Assistant
Director; Ellen W. Chu; Elizabeth Deyo; Kevin Jackson; Omari Norman;
Jeff Rueckhaus; and Ginny Vanderlinde made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The predecessor agency to the Office of Science was the Office of
Energy Research within DOE.
[2] GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen
Project Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 18, 2005).
[3] Results from nongeneralizable samples, including the sample of 12
projects we selected for in-depth review, cannot be used to make
inferences about Science's project performance overall. Our interest
was in gathering information on the selected Science projects to
identify material factors that may not exist across all projects but
can help expand our understanding of Science's organizational strengths
and potential future challenges.
[4] DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition
of Capital Assets (Oct. 13, 2000), and the update, Order 413.3A (July
28, 2006), establish a framework for managing projects costing over $5
million.
[5] Unless otherwise noted, for ease of discussion in this report,
project length has been measured from DOE's critical decision point 2,
when the cost and schedule baselines are established for a project, to
critical decision point 4, when DOE certifies that the project is
complete.
[6] Construction of the nanoscience research facility with components
at the Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories, New Mexico, was
carried out as a single project. Additionally, the project to construct
the facility at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York, was the
only project of the five that was still under way as of the end of
February 2008.
[7] The state of Illinois provided half of this project's funding.
[8] Argonne National Laboratory could not document the date of critical
decision point 2 because this project's cost and schedule targets were
set before DOE's project management order 413.3 was issued.
[9] GAO, Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements
Needed to Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May
11, 2007), and GAO, Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at
Federal Agencies, GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2005).
[10] House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget for the
Department of Energy's Office of Science, March 14, 2007.
[11] The organization is known by its acronym, CERN.
[12] DOE Order 413.3 and Order 413.3A.
[13] Other reviews are also required, including those conducted by
organizations within and outside of Science, such as external
independent reviews by DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction
Management, peer reviews of project designs, "earned-value management
systems" reviews, and quarterly project reviews. These reviews were
outside the scope of our report.
[14] U.S. funding for the Large Hadron Collider project was provided by
both the National Science Foundation and DOE. U.S. funding supported
three primary components: two particle detectors and an accelerator.
Funding for the accelerator included $90 million paid to CERN to
purchase U.S. manufactured parts for that instrument. The total
combined DOE and National Science Foundation commitment to the project
was $531 million. DOE regards the U.S. contributions to the collider as
one project. For purposes of analysis, we have characterized these
contributions in this report as three separate projects because they
had separate budgets and schedules and were tracked separately under
DOE's Project Assessment Reporting System.
[15] Although technical goals may exist for a project's various
components and subcomponents, we are referring here to the technical
goals of a project as a whole, as defined in the project baseline.
[16] Each of the changes in scope we report here was approved by the
appropriate DOE or laboratory officials.
[17] Although this project met its original committed cost target, it
was completed 3 months late for reasons unrelated to the described
change in scope.
[18] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and
Managing Program Costs, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2007),
and National Research Council, Progress in Improving Project Management
in the Department of Energy: 2003 Assessment (Washington, D.C.:
National Academies Press, 2004).
[19] Department of Energy, Root-Cause Analysis: Contract and Project
Management (Washington, D.C., April 2008).
[20] Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Progress of
the Spallation Neutron Source Project, DOE-IG/0532 (Washington, D.C.,
November 2001).
[21] Although Science managed the large-area telescope project, DOE's
direct financial contribution totaled $45 million of the $188 million
project cost.
[22] GAO, Fusion Energy: Definitive Cost Estimates for U.S.
Contributions to an International Experimental Reactor and Better
Coordinated DOE Research Are Needed, GAO-08-30 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
26, 2007).
[23] GAO, A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st-Century Challenges, GAO-08-
93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007), and GAO, The Nation's Long-Term
Fiscal Outlook: January 2008 Update, GAO-08-591R (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 21, 2008).
[24] Congressional Research Service, Weak Dollar, Strong Dollar: Causes
and Consequences (Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 2007).
[25] Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Special Report:
Management Challenges at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0782
(Washington, D.C., December 2007).
[26] The Stanford Linear Accelerator Center is undergoing a change in
mission that has caused it to encourage early retirements and voluntary
separations. The center's director of human resources said he
anticipates that retirements will not present a near-term challenge.
[27] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators
2008 (Arlington, Va., January 2008).
[28] GAO, Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements
Needed to Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May
11, 2007), and GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions are Needed to
Strengthen Project Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 2005).
[29] For some projects baselined before the implementation of DOE's
project management directive, DOE Order 413.3, approved in October
2000, the committed cost and schedule targets were established early in
project development, typically, at conceptual design.
[30] In a prior GAO report, Department of Energy: Major Construction
Projects Need a Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness
to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays, GAO-07-336 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 27, 2007), the Spallation Neutron Source was characterized as
exceeding its original baseline. At the time of our 2007 report, the
project was 2 percent over its original cost target.
[31] Office of Management and Budget, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition,
and Management of Capital Assets, circular A-11, part 7 (Washington,
D.C., July 2007).
[32] Department of Energy, Root-Cause Analysis: Contract and Project
Management (Washington, D.C., April 2008).
[33] Although many different types of reviews of Science's projects
were conducted by organizations within or outside of DOE, we limited
our assessment to Science's independent project reviews and, to a
lesser extent, external independent reviews conducted by DOE's Office
of Engineering and Construction Management.
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