Nuclear Material
DOE Needs to Take Action to Reduce Risks Before Processing Additional Nuclear Material at the Savannah River Site's H-Canyon Gao ID: GAO-08-840 July 25, 2008During the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) produced nuclear materials for nuclear weapons at its Savannah River Site (SRS) by dissolving highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from reactors in a facility known as H-Canyon. DOE planned to end H-Canyon operations in 2007 but now plans to continue H-Canyon operations until 2019 to process additional nuclear material. GAO was asked to (1) identify the types of nuclear materials DOE will process using H-Canyon and its associated costs of operation, (2) determine whether SRS's radioactive waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste facilities are capable of handling the additional waste generated by H-Canyon, and (3) describe H-Canyon's compliance with safety and environmental requirements. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed DOE's plans to process nuclear material using H-Canyon and visited SRS to observe the canyon and associated radioactive waste treatment facilities.
DOE plans to process 23 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)and plutonium using H-Canyon; however, its cost estimate of $4.3 billion to $4.6 billion to process these materials through 2019 does not include all associated costs. First, DOE may identify additional HEU and plutonium as suitable for processing using H-Canyon, which could delay H-Canyon's planned 2019 shutdown and increase operational costs. Second, the estimate does not include the cost of storing and treating the waste generated by H-Canyon operations--approximately $253 million according to DOE. SRS's waste tanks are nearing capacity, and SRS cannot manage the projected waste from planned H-Canyon operations without critical enhancements. DOE is developing new technologies and building new facilities to meet these challenges. The most critical of these facilities--the Salt Waste Processing Facility--was originally scheduled to begin operating in 2009 but has been delayed twice and is now not projected to begin operations until as late as November 2013. If the facility is not completed on schedule, SRS will continue to face waste storage capacity challenges, which could affect the H-Canyon operating schedule. In addition, several potential events could significantly impede waste processing at SRS. For example, storage capacity could be reduced if critical equipment that reduces the amount of water volume in waste tanks malfunctions or if tank leaks develop. DOE has determined that H-Canyon is operating safely, and with minimal environmental impact, and DOE expects it will continue to do so in the future. However, DOE must complete further safety and environmental analyses prior to processing additional nuclear material using H-Canyon. Some of these analyses have been delayed by as much as 2 years because SRS lacks sufficient technical staff to conduct them. If these delays persist, the processing of nuclear material using H-Canyon could be delayed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-840, Nuclear Material: DOE Needs to Take Action to Reduce Risks Before Processing Additional Nuclear Material at the Savannah River Site's H-Canyon
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Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Nuclear Material:
DOE Needs to Take Action to Reduce Risks Before Processing Additional
Nuclear Material at the Savannah River Site's H-Canyon:
GAO-08-840:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-840, a report to the Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
During the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) produced nuclear
materials for nuclear weapons at its Savannah River Site (SRS) by
dissolving highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from reactors in a
facility known as H-Canyon. DOE planned to end H-Canyon operations in
2007 but now plans to continue H-Canyon operations until 2019 to
process additional nuclear material. GAO was asked to (1) identify the
types of nuclear materials DOE will process using H-Canyon and its
associated costs of operation, (2) determine whether SRS's radioactive
waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste facilities are capable
of handling the additional waste generated by H-Canyon, and (3)
describe H-Canyon‘s compliance with safety and environmental
requirements. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed DOE‘s plans to process
nuclear material using H-Canyon and visited SRS to observe the canyon
and associated radioactive waste treatment facilities.
What GAO Found:
DOE plans to process 23 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium using H-Canyon; however, its cost estimate of $4.3
billion to $4.6 billion to process these materials through 2019 does
not include all associated costs. First, DOE may identify additional
HEU and plutonium as suitable for processing using H-Canyon, which
could delay H-Canyon‘s planned 2019 shutdown and increase operational
costs. Second, the estimate does not include the cost of storing and
treating the waste generated by H-Canyon operations”approximately $253
million according to DOE.
SRS‘s waste tanks are nearing capacity, and SRS cannot manage the
projected waste from planned H-Canyon operations without critical
enhancements. DOE is developing new technologies and building new
facilities to meet these challenges. The most critical of these
facilities”the Salt Waste Processing Facility”was originally scheduled
to begin operating in 2009 but has been delayed twice and is now not
projected to begin operations until as late as November 2013. If the
facility is not completed on schedule, SRS will continue to face waste
storage capacity challenges, which could affect the H-Canyon operating
schedule. In addition, several potential events could significantly
impede waste processing at SRS. For example, storage capacity could be
reduced if critical equipment that reduces the amount of water volume
in waste tanks malfunctions or if tank leaks develop.
DOE has determined that H-Canyon is operating safely, and with minimal
environmental impact, and DOE expects it will continue to do so in the
future. However, DOE must complete further safety and environmental
analyses prior to processing additional nuclear material using H-
Canyon. Some of these analyses have been delayed by as much as 2 years
because SRS lacks sufficient technical staff to conduct them. If these
delays persist, the processing of nuclear material using H-Canyon could
be delayed.
Photograph: H-Canyon at DOE‘s Savannah River Site:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) ensure that all of the HEU and plutonium
that DOE identifies as suitable for processing using H-Canyon is
included in the department‘s plans, (2) develop a comprehensive cost
estimate that includes all associated costs to operate the canyon, and
(3) develop a plan to ensure sufficient staff are available to complete
safety analyses in a timely manner. In its comments, DOE cited the
actions that it is taking to address these recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-840]. For more
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE Has Not Determined the Complete Cost of Processing 23 Metric Tons
of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium in H-Canyon:
More Radioactive Waste at SRS Will Be Generated as a Result of
Continued H-Canyon Operations, Requiring Critical Technological
Enhancements to the Site's Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment System:
DOE Has Taken Steps to Ensure the Continued Safe Operation of H-Canyon
but Faces Challenges to Completing Safety and Environmental Analyses on
Time:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Tank Farm Waste Sources:
Figures:
Figure 1: H-Canyon at DOE's Savannah River Site:
Figure 2: Waste Components in SRS Storage Tanks as of March 2008:
Figure 3: Breakdown of SRS Waste Tank Storage as of March 2008:
Figure 4: Liquid Radioactive Waste Processing at SRS:
Abbreviations:
ARP/MCU: Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic-Side Solvent
Extraction Unit:
DDA: Deliquification, Dissolution, and Adjustment:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DWPF: Defense Waste Processing Facility:
HEU: highly enriched uranium:
LEU: low enriched uranium:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
SRS: Savannah River Site:
SWPF: Salt Waste Processing Facility:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 25, 2008:
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky:
Chairman:
The Honorable David L. Hobson:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
As demand for new nuclear weapons diminished following the end of the
Cold War, the United States was faced with the need to dispose of
nuclear materials left over from nuclear weapons production. When
weapons were manufactured during the Cold War, the Department of
Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina recovered
nuclear materials, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
plutonium for the U.S. nuclear weapons programs. It did so by
dissolving highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from the site's
nuclear reactors in large, heavily shielded chemical separation
facilities known as "canyons." These canyons used acids and other
chemicals to extract HEU, plutonium, and other nuclear material from
the fuel. Following the end of the Cold War, DOE began to use the two
canyon facilities at SRS--F-Canyon and H-Canyon--to treat nuclear
materials that were unstable and posed potential environmental, public
safety, and health risks if left untreated. F-Canyon completed its
mission in 2002 and has since shut down. As recently as 2004, DOE
planned to end H-Canyon operations in 2007 following the completion of
its mission. In 2006, however, DOE proposed continuing to operate H-
Canyon until 2019 to process spent nuclear fuel from research reactors
and enriched uranium and other materials from across DOE's nuclear
weapons complex. DOE expects that processing these materials will cost
several billion dollars.
DOE's processing of this material in H-Canyon results in several
potential benefits. First, it makes the material less usable in nuclear
weapons and, therefore, may reduce associated security costs. For
example, HEU recovered as a result of H-Canyon processing can be
converted into low enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used in
nuclear weapons but can be used as fuel in commercial nuclear power
plants.[Footnote 1] Second, using H-Canyon allows DOE to further
consolidate excess nuclear materials from multiple sites across the
nuclear weapons complex and support the department's efforts to
transform the complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more cost-
effective complex for the future. Third, using H-Canyon provides DOE
with an opportunity to dispose of certain types of nuclear material
that have no other currently defined means for permanent disposal.
Specifically, certain nuclear materials at different DOE sites are in
forms that cannot readily be disposed of at existing disposal
locations. When these materials are processed in H-Canyon, the HEU is
recovered, and the nuclear materials are converted into a form that can
be permanently disposed of in the same way and in the same facilities
as other radioactive waste at SRS.
Although the Congress requires DOE to keep H-Canyon operating,
continued operations present several potential challenges to the
department.[Footnote 2] First, H-Canyon costs approximately $220
million annually to operate in fiscal year 2006 dollars. Second,
concerns have been raised about whether SRS's liquid radioactive waste
storage tanks and treatment facilities have enough capacity for the
additional waste generated by extended H-Canyon operations. Third,
because H-Canyon processes highly radioactive materials, a catastrophic
accident at H-Canyon could result in serious environmental, safety, and
health consequences. H-Canyon is more than 50 years old and, therefore,
has a higher risk of major equipment or other failures that could
impair its operations.
In this context, you asked that we (1) identify the types of nuclear
materials DOE will process at H-Canyon and the associated costs of
continuing H-Canyon operations through 2019, (2) determine whether
SRS's radioactive waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste
facilities are capable of handling the additional waste generated from
continued H-Canyon operations, and (3) describe H-Canyon compliance
with current safety and environmental requirements.
To identify the types of nuclear materials that DOE will process using
H-Canyon and the potential costs, we reviewed DOE's nuclear material
disposition plans for HEU and plutonium. We also reviewed DOE's project
management guidance, which describes how DOE estimates costs,
determines milestones, and monitors project performance. We also
interviewed officials with DOE's Office of Environmental Management. In
addition, we spoke with officials from the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE that is
in charge of the day-to-day management of many of the nuclear materials
the department plans to process in H-Canyon. We also interviewed two
independent peer reviewers the department used to review its plans and
officials with DOE's Office of Inspector General. To determine whether
SRS's radioactive waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste
facilities are capable of handing additional waste, we reviewed SRS's
waste management plans and risk management analyses, as well as
business plans and integrated project management documents that outline
the approach SRS officials use to meet canyon processing and waste
management goals. We also visited SRS to observe H-Canyon and its
supporting infrastructure, as well as the site's radioactive waste
management facilities. To describe whether H-Canyon complies with
safety and environmental requirements, we reviewed DOE regulations,
orders, and guidance outlining the department's safety standards. We
also examined safety analyses and implementation plans for safety
improvements prepared by SRS officials. In addition, we reviewed
reports prepared by, and interviewed officials with, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board), an independent federal
agency established by the Congress in 1988 to provide advice and
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and
safety issues at DOE's defense nuclear facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOE plans to process 23 metric tons of HEU and plutonium at H-Canyon,
but its cost estimate for processing this material does not include all
associated costs. Nuclear materials included in DOE's plans consist of:
* approximately 19,500 spent nuclear fuel assemblies containing about
13.5 metric tons of HEU from domestic and foreign research and test
reactors,
* approximately 7.5 metric tons of various HEU materials currently
stored at five DOE facilities across the nuclear weapons complex, and:
* approximately 2 metric tons of plutonium.
DOE estimates it will cost approximately $4.3 billion to $4.6 billion
to process these materials through 2019. However, this estimate does
not include several costs DOE expects will be associated with canyon
operations. According to DOE and NNSA officials, more HEU and plutonium
may be identified as suitable for processing using H-Canyon, which
could delay its shutdown and increase its operational costs. In
addition, the estimate does not include the cost of storing and
treating the waste generated by H-Canyon operations through 2019--
approximately $253 million according to DOE.
SRS's waste tank farms are nearing capacity, and SRS cannot manage the
projected waste from planned H-Canyon operations through 2019 without
critical enhancements. DOE is developing new technologies and building
new facilities to meet these challenges. The most critical of these
facilities--the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF)--will provide the
additional tank space needed to ensure continued SRS waste processing
operations. The SWPF, originally scheduled to begin operating in 2009,
has been delayed because of design concerns and is now projected to
begin operation between September 2012 and November 2013. If the
facility is not completed on schedule, SRS will continue to face waste
storage capacity challenges, which could affect the H-Canyon operating
schedule. Before the SWPF begins operating, SRS is working to optimize
H-Canyon operations to minimize the canyon's impact on the waste
storage tanks. For example, since 2007, SRS has reduced the amount of
waste flowing into SRS's storage tanks from H-Canyon by approximately
450,000 gallons. Despite these measures, several potential events or
waste management risks could significantly impede waste processing at
SRS. For example, storage capacity could be reduced if critical
equipment that reduces the amount of water in the waste tanks
malfunctions or if tank leaks develop.
DOE has determined that H-Canyon is operating safely and with minimal
environmental impact, and DOE expects it will continue to do so in the
future. H-Canyon must comply with a variety of nuclear safety
requirements to protect workers, the public, and the environment from
any consequences associated with an accident at the facility. H-Canyon
is routinely reviewed and inspected for compliance with these
requirements. DOE has determined through safety and environmental
reviews and inspections that H-Canyon can continue to operate without
endangering the health and safety of the public, the workers, or the
environment. According to DOE officials, H-Canyon continues to pass all
required inspections. Furthermore, DOE officials point to the
facility's history of operating for nearly 50 years with no serious
radiation-related accidents. The department has also taken several
steps to ensure the continued safe operations of the canyon, including
installing new safety equipment and updating H-Canyon's standard
operating procedures to comply with revised DOE regulations and safety
standards. However, DOE must complete further safety and environmental
analyses prior to processing additional nuclear material using H-
Canyon. Some of these analyses have been delayed by as much as 2 years
because SRS lacks sufficient technical staff to conduct them. If these
delays persist, the processing of nuclear material using H-Canyon could
be delayed.
We are making a series of recommendations to DOE to develop a more
complete, accurate estimate of all associated costs for processing the
materials it expects H-Canyon to handle and to complete safety analyses
in a timely manner to prevent delays in H-Canyon operations. We also
provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment. In
its written comments, DOE cited the actions that are underway or that
it plans to take to address the report's recommendations.
Background:
H-Canyon is one of two chemical separation facilities constructed at
SRS during the early 1950s to recover HEU, plutonium, and other nuclear
material from nuclear fuel irradiated in SRS reactors for the U.S.
nuclear weapons program. (See fig. 1.) With the end of the Cold War,
nuclear material processing at the canyons was phased out, but some
nuclear materials that had been introduced into the processing line at
the canyons were left in place when DOE decided to cease canyon
operations in 1992. In response to studies conducted by the department
and by the Safety Board showing the potentially significant health,
safety, and environmental risks posed by these unstable materials, DOE
returned F and H-Canyons to service, in 1995 and 1997, respectively, to
address these risks.
Figure 1: H-Canyon at DOE's Savannah River Site:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of H-Canyon at DOE's Savannah River Site.
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
The end of nuclear weapons production also left a significant amount of
nuclear materials at SRS and other DOE sites without a means of
permanent disposal. Among these materials are spent nuclear fuel rods
from domestic and foreign research and test reactors. DOE and its
predecessor agencies provided nuclear fuel to these reactors. In some
cases, this fuel contained HEU. Since 1996, DOE has had a program to
return U.S.-origin HEU in foreign research reactor fuel to the United
States. These spent fuel rods are currently stored at SRS in water-
filled pools. The water both cools the fuel rods and provides shielding
from the radiation that they emit. Since the 1990s, DOE has had three
different strategies for disposing of this material. DOE initially
planned to develop a new technology--known as "melt-and-dilute"--to
convert the material into a form that would render it unusable in
nuclear weapons. Because of budget shortfalls and risks associated with
DOE research and development for this approach, DOE abandoned this
effort in 2002. Next, DOE considered removing the rods from the pools,
drying them, packaging them in storage containers, and storing the
containers at SRS until they could be disposed of at DOE's planned
permanent geological repository at Yucca Mountain. Now DOE plans to
process this spent fuel in H-Canyon, which is consistent with legal
requirements to keep the canyon operating.
In addition, DOE has identified other nuclear materials that lack
options for disposal but that could also be processed using H-Canyon.
For example, DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that the
United States no longer needs for nuclear weapons. The majority is in
the form of pits (the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal,
and oxides while the remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated
metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear
weapons production process.[Footnote 3] DOE plans to dispose of the
surplus plutonium that is in pit, clean metal, and oxide forms by
fabricating it into mixed uranium and plutonium oxide fuel that can be
used in commercial nuclear power plants. This process will take place
in a new Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility that is currently under
construction at SRS. Some of DOE's nonpit plutonium, however, is not
suitable to be converted into mixed-oxide fuel. Although final
decisions have not been made, DOE's current plans call for some of this
nonpit plutonium to be fabricated into mixed-oxide fuel and some to be
prepared for permanent disposition through vitrification--a process
that would stabilize the plutonium by mixing it with molten glass and
then pouring it into small metal canisters where it hardens. The
smaller canisters containing vitrified plutonium would then be placed
into larger canisters, which would then be filled with radioactive
waste. Plutonium vitrification would take place at another facility DOE
plans to construct at SRS. A smaller amount of plutonium, however, is
unsuitable to be processed using either of these methods because it
does not meet the technical requirements of these facilities. DOE plans
to process this plutonium using H-Canyon.
The canyon operations produce radioactive waste that is stored in a
series of underground tanks at SRS known as the F and H Area Tank
Farms. In total, there are 51 tanks on these farms that contain
approximately 36.5 million gallons of radioactive waste. Waste has been
removed from 2 of these tanks, and the tanks have been operationally
closed, leaving 49 tanks still in service. Radioactive waste generally
comes in a variety of physical forms and layers inside the underground
tanks, depending upon the physical and chemical properties of the waste
components. As figure 2 shows, the waste in the tanks takes the
following three main forms:
* Sludge: The denser, water insoluble components of the waste generally
settle to the bottom of the tank to form a thick layer known as sludge,
which has the consistency of peanut butter. Although sludge is only 8
percent of the total volume of the tank waste at SRS, it has about 46
percent of the tanks' total radioactivity.
* Saltcake: Above the sludge may be water-soluble components such as
sodium salts that crystallize or solidify out of the waste solution to
form a moist sandlike material called saltcake.
* Salt supernate: Above or between the denser layers may be liquids
comprising water and dissolved salts that is called supernate. This
represents about 50 percent of both the total volume and total
radioactivity in the tanks.
Figure 2: Waste Components in SRS Storage Tanks as of March 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains two pie-charts depicting the following data:
Percentage of total volume by waste type:
Salt supernate: 49%;
Saltcake: 43%;
Sludge: 8%;
Total: 36.5 million gallons.
Percentage of total radioactivity by waste type:
Salt supernate: 51%;
Sludge: 46%;
Saltcake: 3%;
Total: 397 million curies.
Source: DOE.
Note: Radioactivity is measured in curies--the unit of measurement most
commonly used in the United States. The corresponding international
standard unit, the Bequerel (Bq) is the activity equal to one
radioactive disintegration per second. One Bq=2.7 X 10-11 curies.
[End of figure]
SRS uses different methods to stabilize the waste and prepare it for
permanent disposal. In the case of sludge, SRS stabilizes the material
through vitrification at SRS's Defense Waste Processing Facility
(DWPF). Canisters of vitrified radioactive waste produced at DWPF are
stored at SRS for future disposition at DOE's planned permanent
geological repository at Yucca Mountain, in Nevada. Sludge processing
also produces significant amounts of low-radioactivity waste, called
"DWPF recycle," that is returned to the SRS tank farms for storage. In
fact, DWPF recycle makes up the largest portion of liquid waste added
to the tank farms annually.
Because of the large volumes of lower-radioactivity saltcake and salt
supernate (known collectively as "salt waste") stored at SRS, glass
vitrification of all of this waste without reducing its volume would
produce too many canisters to be disposed of at the Yucca Mountain
facility and would inappropriately use the facility to dispose of low-
level waste. Therefore, SRS is constructing facilities to separate
higher radioactivity waste from the remainder of the lower activity
waste. One facility, the SWPF, will separate the higher radioactivity
waste in the salt waste from the low radioactivity waste. In the
interim, before the SWPF is constructed, DOE is using three interim
processes to separate the lower-radioactivity waste. The higher-
radioactivity waste will then be mixed with sludge for vitrification at
the DWPF. The remaining low-radioactivity waste will be stabilized by
combining it with cement at another SRS facility called the Saltstone
Facility. This mixture, called grout, will then be permanently disposed
of at SRS in a series of on-site vaults at the Saltstone Facility.
DOE Has Not Determined the Complete Cost of Processing 23 Metric Tons
of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium in H-Canyon:
DOE currently plans to process 23 metric tons of HEU and plutonium
using H-Canyon, but, according to DOE and NNSA officials, it is likely
that more HEU and plutonium will be identified as suitable for
processing using the canyon. DOE has estimated that processing the 23
metric tons of nuclear material in its current plans will cost
approximately $4.3 billion to $4.6 billion through 2019. However, this
cost estimate is incomplete. For example, the estimate does not include
the costs of storing and treating the waste generated by H-Canyon
operations. According to DOE officials, it will cost approximately $253
million to process the liquid radioactive waste expected to be produced
as a result of H-Canyon operations.
DOE Is Likely to Identify Other Nuclear Material Needing Processing in
H-Canyon, Making the Project More Costly and Possibly Delaying H-
Canyon's Shutdown:
DOE plans to process 23 metric tons of HEU and plutonium at H-Canyon.
The following three categories of weapons-usable HEU and plutonium
material are included in DOE's plans:
* Approximately 19,500 spent nuclear fuel assemblies containing 13.5
metric tons of weapons-usable HEU from domestic and foreign research
and test reactors. This spent fuel consists of irradiated aluminum-clad
HEU and LEU fuel, most of which is currently stored at either SRS or
Idaho National Laboratory.
* Approximately 7.5 metric tons of various weapons-usable HEU materials
DOE had used for research and development that are currently stored at
NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee, Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California, Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico, and Idaho
National Laboratory.
* Approximately 2 metric tons of nonpit plutonium currently stored at
SRS, some of which cannot be disposed of using either the Mixed-Oxide
Fuel Fabrication Facility or the proposed plutonium vitrification
facility.
HEU recovered from H-Canyon will be blended with natural uranium to
produce LEU that can be used as fuel in the Tennessee Valley
Authority's commercial nuclear power plants. According to a 2007 DOE
estimate, sale of this uranium to the Tennessee Valley Authority will
provide $481 million in revenues to the U.S. Treasury. However, this
estimate is subject to great variation because of volatility in the
price of uranium. Plutonium processed in H-Canyon will not be
recovered. Instead, it will be introduced into SRS's liquid radioactive
waste management system. Processing this HEU and plutonium reduces the
risks associated with storage of such materials at multiple sites,
helps reduce storage and security costs, and furthers nuclear non-
proliferation objectives.
Beyond the 23 metric tons of HEU and plutonium DOE has identified for
processing using H-Canyon, depending on future decisions, DOE and NNSA
officials told us they may identify additional plutonium that is
suitable to be processed using H-Canyon. Specifically, these additional
materials are likely to include an extra 3 metric tons of plutonium
that was going to be processed for final disposal at SRS's proposed
plutonium vitrification facility, according to DOE and SRS officials.
Although the addition of this plutonium to the H-Canyon processing plan
is unlikely to delay the canyon's planned shutdown, it will increase
the canyon's operational costs. According to DOE officials, if this
plutonium is added, one of H-Canyon's processing lines --the HB-Line--
will have to continue operating beyond its currently planned shutdown
date. DOE originally estimated to have completed HB-Line operations in
2014. However, the HB-Line will need to continue operating until at
least 2019 at a cost of approximately $60 million per year if H-Canyon
were to be used to process additional plutonium beyond that already
planned. DOE officials noted that the costs of operating HB-Line
between 2014 and 2019 was included in their original $4.3 to $4.6
billion cost estimate. However, they also acknowledged that between
$240 and $300 million in H-Canyon costs could be saved by not
processing this additional 3 metric tons of plutonium using H-Canyon.
Other nuclear materials may be identified for processing using H-
Canyon, further extending the canyon's operations. In October 2007, DOE
authorized NNSA to review whether additional quantities of nuclear
material from foreign countries could be recovered for disposition at
DOE sites. For example, DOE and NNSA officials told us that more spent
nuclear fuel, HEU materials, and plutonium still stored at foreign
research and test reactors may be suitable for processing using H-
Canyon. Specifically, NNSA has identified approximately 1,000 kilograms
of HEU and approximately 50 kilograms of plutonium that potentially
could be returned to the United States. If these materials are brought
to the United States, DOE is considering adding them to the scope of
materials included in the H-Canyon processing plan, which may delay the
canyon's planned shutdown. In addition, according to DOE officials,
other materials currently stored at DOE facilities might be added to
DOE's plan. For example, DOE might add HEU and/or plutonium currently
stored at DOE research facilities that are no longer in use.
DOE's Estimate for Processing Nuclear Material Using H-Canyon Is
Incomplete:
DOE estimates that it will cost between approximately $4.3 billion and
$4.6 billion to process 23 metric tons of HEU and plutonium using H-
Canyon. However, DOE's cost estimate for processing nuclear material at
H-Canyon does not include all of the costs associated with continued H-
Canyon operations. Most notably, the cost of storing and treating the
waste generated by H-Canyon operations is not included in DOE's
estimate.
H-Canyon produces up to approximately 300,000 gallons of liquid
radioactive waste annually, which is added to SRS's tank farms for
storage and must eventually be treated using SRS's liquid waste
processing facilities. Processing this waste will increase the amount
of time that the radioactive liquid waste facilities are required to
operate, which increases the cost for SRS liquid waste system life
cycle cost. Because DOE's estimate did not include these costs, we
asked DOE to estimate the additional costs of storing and treating the
waste generated by the department's plans to process 23 metric tons of
HEU and plutonium using H-Canyon. In response, DOE estimated that it
will cost approximately $253 million to store and treat the additional
radioactive waste resulting from H-Canyon's operations through 2019.
DOE estimated some of these costs to include:
* approximately $40 million to store the additional radioactive waste
produced by H-Canyon in the SRS tank farms;
* approximately $25 million to operate the SWPF for the additional 6
months DOE estimates will be necessary to separate higher and low
radioactivity wastes in the additional salt waste that will be produced
by H-Canyon;
* approximately $140 million to treat the additional higher
radioactivity waste using the DWPF;[Footnote 4] and:
* approximately $30 million to treat and dispose of the additional low
radioactivity waste at the Saltstone Facility.[Footnote 5]
More Radioactive Waste at SRS Will Be Generated as a Result of
Continued H-Canyon Operations, Requiring Critical Technological
Enhancements to the Site's Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment System:
Although H-Canyon processing produces a relatively small portion of
SRS's liquid radioactive wastes, SRS storage tanks are nearing capacity
and do not currently have the space necessary to store all of the waste
H-Canyon will produce through 2019. DOE must modify current facilities
and develop new technologies to successfully store and treat all
radioactive waste at SRS. Certain elements of DOE's SRS waste
management plan, such as the construction of the SWPF, have faced
delays. Furthermore, despite DOE efforts to monitor and mitigate risks,
a number of events could potentially disrupt planned waste management
activities at SRS.
Continued H-Canyon Operations Will Add Waste to the SRS Tank Farms,
Which Are Already Nearing Capacity:
More than 140 million gallons of radioactive waste have been produced
at SRS since canyon operations began in the 1950s. Fifty-one storage
tanks were constructed at SRS to hold these waste products; 49 of these
tanks remain in service, providing approximately 41 million gallons of
storage capacity. Currently, approximately 36.5 million gallons of
radioactive waste are stored in these tanks. Another 1.3 million
gallons of space is kept open as contingency space for use during an
emergency, and 1.9 million gallons remains available as space used to
prepare waste for processing. As a result, only 1.3 million gallons of
space remain as usable space for additional waste storage. Figure 3
shows how tank space is used at SRS.
Figure 3: Breakdown of SRS Waste Tank Storage as of March 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-cart depicting the following data:
Breakdown of SRS Waste Tank Storage as of March 2008 (millions of
gallons):
Salt supernate: 16.9 million;
Saltcake: 16.6 million;
Sludge: 3 million;
Processing space: 1.9 million;
Contingency space: 1.3 million;
Usable space: 1.3 million.
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Waste disposition activities must be meticulously planned and scheduled
to maximize use of the small amount of available tank space. H-Canyon
operations contribute up to 300,000 gallons of liquid radioactive waste
annually to the tanks. In addition, approximately 1.5 million gallons
of radioactive waste is added per year as a result of SRS waste
processing activities to close waste storage tanks. Specifically,
closing tanks requires the removal of radioactive waste stored in the
tanks by adding water to redissolve saltcake or to prepare insoluble
sludge for transfer to another tank or waste processing facility.
Adding this water, however, reduces the amount of space available for
additional liquid radioactive waste. Other salt removal operations
result in another 1.5 million gallons of waste flowing into the tanks
annually. Furthermore, the vitrification process used at DWPF produces
the most significant annual inflows of waste to the tank farms;
approximately 2 million gallons of DWPF recycle annually. Table 1
details the annual liquid inflows to SRS's tank farms.
Table 1: Tank Farm Waste Sources:
Source: H-Canyon;
Approximate annual volume: 0.3 million gallons.
Source: Sludge washing;
Approximate annual volume: 1 million gallons.
Source: Salt removal activities;
Approximate annual volume: 1.5 million gallons.
Source: Tank closure activities;
Approximate annual volume: 1.5 million gallons.
Source: DWPF recycle;
Approximate annual volume: 2 million gallons.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
More liquid radioactive waste is generated annually than SRS's tanks
can store. However, because water makes up a portion of the liquid
radioactive waste, SRS uses evaporators--heated tanks that evaporate
water from waste material--to conserve tank space. Three evaporator
systems are currently operating at SRS. One evaporator--the 2H
evaporator--is used solely to reduce the quantity of DWPF recycle
entering the tanks while two other evaporators--the 2F and 3H
evaporators--are used for H-Canyon waste and other waste processing
activities. Operation of these evaporators allows SRS to successfully
manage the inflows of liquid radioactive waste in the limited space
available in the tanks.
DOE Must Modify Its Waste Management System to Deploy New Technologies
in Order to Successfully Treat SRS's Liquid Radioactive Waste:
DOE is taking a number of steps to ensure the availability of storage
tank space for continued waste processing and H-Canyon operations.
Critical among these initiatives is development of salt waste
processing technologies that will significantly reduce the amount of
salt waste stored in SRS tank farms. The most important of these is the
SWPF. H-Canyon and waste management staff are also working to minimize
the amount of liquid radioactive waste transferred to the tank farms by
changing operating procedures and redirecting this waste. Nevertheless,
DOE must continue to manage several potential risks to ensure
uninterrupted H-Canyon and SRS waste management operations.
DOE Has Developed Plans for Processing Salt Waste:
DOE plans to process the majority of SRS's salt waste using the yet to
be constructed SWPF. Before SWPF begins operations, however, two other
facilities currently operate at SRS that provide interim salt waste
processing capability. These facilities are intended to provide the
necessary tank space to support H-Canyon operations, tank closure
activities, and DWPF operations. Specifically, these interim facilities
are the following:
* The Deliquification, Dissolution, and Adjustment (DDA) facility,
which began operation in March 2007 and had treated 1.35 million
gallons of salt waste through April 2008. This technology mixes
saltcake with low radioactivity waste and transfers it to the Saltstone
Facility for processing into grout. According to DOE officials, the DDA
facility will process another 800,000 gallons of waste before it
completes its mission in 2009.
* The Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction
Unit (ARP/MCU) is a small-scale version of the permanent SWPF,
according to DOE officials. In May 2008, DOE began operating the ARP/
MCU. The facility will process approximately 1.2 million gallons of
salt waste per year until SWPF becomes operational.
In the long term, DOE describes SWPF as an essential capability to
process salt waste at SRS and increase the amount of tank space
available for continued operations. Using the same technology as the
ARP/MCU facility, SWPF is expected to process 6 million gallons of salt
waste each year when fully operational and, in total, treat
approximately 90 percent of the salt waste at SRS. SWPF is expected to
operate through 2030; however, this date may change based on
adjustments in waste volumes. Figure 4 illustrates SRS's liquid
radioactive waste processing system.
Figure 4: Liquid Radioactive Waste Processing at SRS:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of liquid radioactive waste processing
at SRS, as follows:
H-Canyon Facility:
* H-Canyon waste goes to SRS tank farms;
* Sludge goes from SRS tank farms to DWPF;
* DWPF recycled material goes back to SRS tank farms;
* DWPF sends vitrified high-level waste to high-level waste repository
at Yucca Mountain (available no earlier than 2017);
* SRA tank farms send Salt waste (high-activity waste) to DDA (2007-
2009); ARP/MCU (2008-2013); SWPF (2013-2030);
* DDA, ARP/MCU, SWPF send low-activity waste to Saltstone facility;
* Saltstone facility sends low-activity waste to Saltstone vaults.
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Design of the SWPF facility began in January 2004, and the facility was
originally scheduled for completion in 2009. However, the project has
been delayed twice, substantially delaying its completion. In November
2005, the Safety Board reviewed the plans for the facility and
suggested that the SWPF be designed to meet more robust construction
specifications than originally planned. To meet these more stringent
specifications, the facility was redesigned, which resulted in
extending the facility's completion date to 2011. More recently, a
change in construction seismic standards forced another delay,
resulting in a revised estimated completion date of between September
2012 and November 2013. Additionally, DOE is in the process of
preparing a existing waste storage tank that will be used to store
materials being prepared for processing at SWPF. DOE is having
challenges finding a contractor that can perform this work within
budget. Failure to prepare this tank on schedule could negatively
impact SRS waste management activities by reducing the volume of salt
waste SWPF would be able to process when it begins operation.
DOE Is Undertaking Initiatives to Minimize H-Canyon Waste:
DOE is developing ways to reduce the amount of liquid radioactive waste
that H-Canyon contributes to SRS's tank farms annually. For example, to
neutralize the acidic waste from H-Canyon so that the waste will not
corrode tank linings, DOE adds a material called "caustic" before the
liquid waste is transferred to the tanks. Adding caustic, however,
increases the volume of waste H-Canyon generates. DOE has determined a
way to reduce the quantity of caustic added while still ensuring the
waste does not cause corrosion in the tanks. This, in turn, has reduced
the volume of waste H-Canyon contributes to the tank farms. In
addition, piping changes at the canyon will allow the separation of
high radioactivity and low radioactivity wastes, allowing the low
radioactivity waste to bypass the tank farms altogether. Low
radioactivity waste will be sent directly to SRS's Saltstone Production
Facility for disposal rather than to the tank farm as has been done in
the past. According to a DOE official, waste minimization efforts
implemented at SRS have reduced high radioactivity waste production by
450,000 gallons through April 2008. Finally, DOE plans to first process
approximately 7.5 metric tons of HEU from other nuclear complex
facilities and a portion of the approximately 2 metric tons of
plutonium before processing the approximately 13.5 metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel because the HEU materials and plutonium generate less
radioactive waste than processing spent nuclear fuel. In 2010, once
additional tank space is available through waste minimization
activities and/or salt waste processing, DOE plans to start processing
spent nuclear fuel at H-Canyon.
DOE Could Still Face Delays in Waste Management Operations:
Despite efforts to control the amount of liquid waste, DOE faces a
number of potential obstacles that could reduce the tank space and
potentially delay waste management operations. For example,
insufficient tank space continues to be a high risk that DOE must
monitor. As discussed, SRS uses evaporators to reduce the amount of
water in the tanks to conserve tank space. SRS's 2007 Life-cycle Liquid
Waste Disposition System Plan outlines how an unanticipated extended
outage of certain evaporator systems could delay DWPF operations, tank
closure activities, and H-Canyon operations.[Footnote 6] According to
the risk management plan for SRS's liquid radioactive waste management
system, the 2H evaporator system that reduces the amount of DWPF
recycle in the tanks may encounter problems that could negatively
affect tank space availability. The risk management plan indicates that
malfunctions in this evaporator could delay waste processing activities
for up to 1 year at a cost of $550 million. A similar risk has been
noted for the 2F and 3H evaporators that support, among other things, H-
Canyon operations, but this risk has been deemed less likely to occur
and to have less significant consequences for waste management
operations.
One of the highest risks that DOE must manage is the potential for tank
leaks. While DOE considers a leak that will require the use of tank
farm contingency space unlikely, 12 tanks without secondary containment
have a history of leakage.[Footnote 7] Sufficient liquid waste has been
removed from these tanks so that there are currently no active leak
sites. Although DOE considers the likelihood of a new tank leak of high
radioactivity waste to be low, the potentially severe impact of such a
leak requires DOE to monitor it as a high risk. A tank leak would
require DOE to use most of the available contingency space in the tank
farm system and would complicate transfers necessary for future waste
processing. If a leak occurred, waste management operations would cease
immediately until the leak and its implications are understood, and new
contingency space became available. Such a situation, though improbable
because DOE has removed sufficient liquid waste from tanks without
secondary containment, would likely result in a delay of approximately
5 years to the liquid waste stabilization and disposition activities
and cost approximately $2.25 billion, according to DOE's plans.
DOE Has Taken Steps to Ensure the Continued Safe Operation of H-Canyon
but Faces Challenges to Completing Safety and Environmental Analyses on
Time:
H-Canyon must comply with a variety of nuclear safety requirements to
protect workers, the public, and the environment from any consequences
associated with an accident at the facility. DOE has determined that H-
Canyon complies with current safety standards, and the department has
taken several steps to ensure the continued safe operations of the
canyon. However, DOE must take several additional steps prior to
processing additional nuclear material using H-Canyon, including
completing required safety and environmental analyses. DOE is currently
behind schedule in preparing some of these analyses and, if these
delays persist, the processing of nuclear material using H-Canyon could
be delayed.
According to DOE and SRS Officials, H-Canyon Operations Comply with
Current DOE Safety Standards:
H-Canyon operations must comply with rigorous nuclear safety
requirements established in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
and associated DOE directives. These requirements address programs such
as, among other things, protecting the public and workers from
radiation, emergency response procedures, and fire protection in
nuclear facilities. H-Canyon is routinely reviewed and inspected for
compliance with these requirements. DOE has determined through this
process that H-Canyon can continue to operate without endangering the
health and safety of the public, the workers, or the environment.
Furthermore, DOE officials point to the facility's history of operating
for nearly 50 years with no serious radiation-related accidents.
In addition, DOE continues to maintain and improve safety systems at H-
Canyon. During the last decade, DOE has made some significant safety
upgrades to the facility, including installing a new safety electrical
system with backup diesel generators. DOE has also upgraded H-Canyon's
ventilation system, which will better protect workers, the public, and
the environment in the event of a release of radioactive material.
Moreover, prior to processing any additional nuclear material using H-
Canyon, DOE needed to ensure that H-Canyon's standard operating
procedures were updated and complied with the relevant DOE regulations
and safety standards for nuclear facilities. These updates were
completed in 2007.
Late Completion of Safety and Environmental Analyses Could Delay H-
Canyon Operations:
Federal regulations require DOE to prepare documented safety analyses
that detail potential accident conditions that might lead to the
release of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These analyses
also identify safety systems and processes to protect workers, the
public, and the environment from any adverse consequences of a release
of this material. DOE developed a strategy in April 2007 for updating H-
Canyon's documented safety analyses to ensure that they comply with
applicable regulations and DOE standards.[Footnote 8] This strategy
established specific milestones for completing required analyses. While
some analyses have been completed as scheduled so that SRS can continue
processing some types of nuclear material using H-Canyon, DOE is behind
schedule completing other required documented safety analyses.
Specifically, an accident analysis that identifies the consequences of
accidents involving the nuclear material DOE plans to process using H-
Canyon, as well as another analysis--called a mitigated hazard
analysis--that identifies the specific safety systems to prevent such
accidents have been delayed. While these analyses were to be completed
in September and November 2007, respectively, DOE now estimates the
analyses will not be completed until fiscal year 2009. DOE officials
attribute this delay to the limited technical staff available to
conduct safety analyses at SRS.
Delays completing these analyses could negatively affect H-Canyon
operations. In particular, DOE has developed a stringent schedule for
processing different types of nuclear material using H-Canyon. For
example, completing the processing of spent nuclear fuel by 2019, as is
currently scheduled, requires SRS to begin processing the fuel in 2010.
If delays completing required safety analyses continue, SRS may have to
delay beginning the processing of spent nuclear fuel beyond 2010 and,
as a result, H-Canyon may have to operate beyond the planned 2019
shutdown date to make up for the disruption in the processing schedule.
In addition to completing required safety analyses, DOE must also
update environmental analyses required by the National Environmental
Policy Act. DOE previously issued environmental impact statements and
records of decision regarding the spent nuclear fuel, HEU, and
plutonium that the department now plans to process using H-Canyon. For
example, in an environmental impact statement and record of decision
that DOE issued in 2000, DOE decided to dispose of up to 33 metric tons
of surplus plutonium as mixed-oxide fuel and approximately 17 metric
tons of plutonium using an immobilization process.[Footnote 9] A
subsequent 2002 decision cancelled DOE's plans to build an
immobilization facility and left the department without a means for
processing some of this plutonium into a form suitable for permanent
disposition. In March 2007, DOE announced that it was preparing a
supplemental environmental impact statement that would examine
alternative plutonium disposition methods, including the disposal of
some of the surplus plutonium using H-Canyon. Although DOE's March 2007
announcement stated that a draft supplemental environmental impact
statement was planned to be issued in January 2008, and the final
supplemental environmental impact statement and associated record of
decision would be issued in the summer of 2008, neither the draft nor
the final supplemental environmental impact statement has been issued.
DOE officials stated that the department will issue the draft
supplemental environmental impact statement in September 2008 and the
final supplemental environmental impact statement in 2009.
DOE is engaged in a similar effort to update the environmental analyses
prepared for permanently disposing of the department's surplus HEU and
for the treatment, long-term storage, and eventual disposition of DOE's
spent nuclear fuel. A supplemental analysis for processing and
disposing of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel and other HEU materials
using H-Canyon was completed in January 2008 and is undergoing review
and concurrence. DOE expects to complete the reminder of its
environmental analyses by the end of fiscal year 2008.
Conclusions:
DOE's plan to continue processing nuclear material using H-Canyon has
several potential benefits, such as decreasing the amount of spent
nuclear fuel to be disposed of at Yucca Mountain in the event that the
repository eventually opens. To achieve these benefits, DOE will have
to carefully manage the significant risks associated with the canyon's
operation; namely, the generation of large quantities of additional
radioactive waste that will further stress SRS's already strained waste
processing capabilities. It is not currently possible to determine if
DOE's plan to use H-Canyon to process nuclear material through 2019 is
the most advantageous plan because DOE's cost estimate for operating H-
Canyon is incomplete. Specifically, the estimate does not account for
all the nuclear material that DOE now believes it may process using H-
Canyon, and the estimate does not include costs such as those
associated with storing and treating the waste generated as a result of
H-Canyon operations. Without a comprehensive understanding of the
inventory of materials suitable for H-Canyon processing, it is unclear
whether DOE can complete nuclear material processing and successfully
shut down H-Canyon by 2019 as the department currently plans.
Furthermore, DOE has not developed a reliable estimate of the canyon's
total life cycle costs, including the costs associated with treating
the additional radioactive waste.
H-Canyon has an established record of operating safely for five
decades. However, continued operations of the canyon could be delayed
if required safety analyses are not completed in a timely manner. While
SRS has pledged to complete analyses in time to have operations proceed
on schedule and has met some deadlines for the completion of these
analyses, it has missed others by as much as 2 years. Other projects at
SRS continue to compete for the necessary engineering expertise to
complete these analyses. Further delays could cause the canyon's
operations to be extended beyond its planned 2019 closure and result in
increased costs. An unforeseen accident could also lead to significant,
potentially catastrophic, consequences. It is therefore critical that
DOE and SRS ensure that adequate resources are devoted to completing
these required analyses before additional nuclear material is processed
using H-Canyon.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that DOE is effectively able to use H-Canyon's capabilities
to process and dispose of nuclear material, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy take the following three actions:
* Ensure that the efforts of NNSA and other offices within DOE to
identify additional HEU, plutonium, and other nuclear materials that
may be suitable for processing using H-Canyon are coordinated in order
to make sure that these materials are included in SRS's processing
plans and that any additional material added does not unduly delay H-
Canyon's planned 2019 shutdown.
* Develop a comprehensive cost estimate for continuing to operate H-
Canyon that includes all waste treatment costs and contingency costs
for any additional nuclear materials that will be included in the
processing plans.
* Direct SRS to develop a plan to ensure that sufficient technical
staff are available to complete the required safety analyses in a
timely manner so that H-Canyon operations can proceed on schedule.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment.
In their written comments, DOE outlined the actions that are underway
or that it plans to take to address the draft report's recommendations.
The complete text of DOE's comments are presented in appendix I. DOE
also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the
report as appropriate.
To address the report's recommendations, DOE stated it will work
closely with NNSA's recently established Office of Nuclear Material
Integration to ensure that future decisions to process additional
materials at H-Canyon are coordinated to minimize the impact to the
canyon's planned shutdown. In addition, DOE stated that it would
formally document the H-Canyon cost estimate that includes the
resultant impact of planned H-Canyon operations to the SRS liquid waste
system. Moreover, DOE stated that it has directed the contractor
operating SRS to complete the required safety analyses to support
scheduled H-Canyon operations and that the department will monitor the
contractor's progress.
In its comments, DOE stated that the draft report's title implied that
certain actions are not being taken expeditiously to reduce nuclear
risks. Contrary to DOE's assertion, we do not imply that the canyon is
currently being operated unsafely. Our draft report detailed the
actions DOE is taking to reduce the risks associated with continued H-
Canyon operations. DOE also noted that the use of the term "nuclear
waste" in the draft report's title was inaccurate because H-Canyon does
not process nuclear waste. We used the term nuclear waste to refer to
surplus spent nuclear fuel, HEU materials, and plutonium for
simplicity. This is because--with the exception of uranium recovered
from the spent nuclear fuel and HEU materials--all of the nuclear
materials processed using H-Canyon will ultimately be permanently
disposed of as nuclear waste. However, we acknowledge DOE's concern and
have clarified the report's title accordingly.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Energy; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We also will make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
July 11, 2008:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for your June 27, 2008, letter to the Secretary of Energy
providing the draft report, "DOE Needs to Take Action to Reduce Risks
Before Processing Additional Nuclear Waste at Savannah River Site's H-
Canyon," and requesting written comments from the Department of Energy
(DOE). Your draft report contains three recommendations for executive
action: 1) ensure that efforts by the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and other offices to identify additional
materials for processing in H-Canyon are coordinated and do not unduly
delay H-Canyon shutdown; 2) develop a comprehensive cost estimate for
operating H-Canyon that includes all waste treatment costs and
contingency costs for any additional materials that will be included in
processing plans; and 3) direct the Savannah River Site (SRS) to
develop a plan to ensure technical staff are available to complete
required safety analyses to support scheduled H-Canyon operations.
With respect to your first recommendation, DOE established the Nuclear
Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC)
to provide a forum to perform cross-cutting nuclear materials
disposition and consolidation planning. The committee, which includes
members from my office and NNSA, has been working to coordinate DOE
activities associated with nuclear material consolidation and
disposition, such as the ongoing surplus plutonium consolidation
effort. The committee is expected to complete its agenda by the end of
this year and its coordinating function will be transferred to the
recently established Office of Nuclear Material Integration (ONMI)
within NNSA. My staff will work with NNSA to ensure that the
responsibilities of the newly established ONMI include continuing the
coordination role that the NMDCCC has been performing. Close
coordination within DOE, together with DOE Order 413.3 and its
associated manual, will ensure future decisions to process additional
materials, beyond the Enriched Uranium (EU) Disposition Project scope,
will be coordinated to minimize impacts to H-Canyon disposition
activities completion.
In regard to your second recommendation, I have directed my staff to
formally document the H-Canyon cost estimate provided to your audit
team and congressional staff that implements the scope of the EU
Disposition Project and the resultant impacts to the SRS liquid waste
system.
For your third recommendation, the Savannah River Operations Office
(SR) Manager Jeffrey Allison, by letter dated July 2, 2008, directed
the SRS contractor to upgrade the H-Canyon safety analyses to be
consistent with the DOE-STD-3009 format and content supporting the
schedule to maintain the facility's planned operations. Mr. Dae Chung,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety Management and Operations, and
his staff will continue to follow the progress made by both the
contractor and federal staff in the preparation and review of safety
documentation to ensure completion of the required documentation to
support approval and initiation of spent nuclear fuel processing. Spent
nuclear fuel processing is scheduled to begin in 2010.
At the recent Exit Conference with your staff, we provided comments on
the bulk of the draft report, and although your draft report includes
several revisions in response to those comments, we believe it contains
some inaccuracies and misleading statements. For example, the title of
the draft report, "DOE Needs to Take Action to Reduce Risks Before
Processing Additional Nuclear Waste at Savannah River Site's H-Canyon,
" implies certain actions are not being taken expeditiously to reduce
nuclear risks. As you are aware, that is not a true statement and there
has never been any dispute regarding the fact that H-Canyon is
currently being safely operated and in compliance with all existing
safety requirements. Additionally, and contrary to that statement, H-
Canyon does not process nuclear waste, and it is not permitted to do
so. Enclosed is a mark-up of your draft report that contains our
comments. We respectfully request they be considered as you finalize
your report.
If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 586-5216 or Mr.
Gary DeLeon, Director, Office of Nuclear Materials Disposition, at
(301) 903-7668.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Deane P. Cochran, for:
Ines R. Triay:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant
Director; Naba Barkakati; Don Cowan; Mehrzad Nadji; Omari Norman; Peter
Ruedel; Rebecca Shea; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Tom Twambly made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] HEU, which is used in some nuclear weapons, is uranium enriched in
the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. In contrast, LEU,
which is used in commercial nuclear power reactors, contains less than
20 percent uranium-235.
[2] Under section 3137 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-398) and
section 3115 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136), DOE must continue operations and maintain a
high state of readiness at H-Canyon as well as provide necessary
technical staff to operate the facility.
[3] The exact amount of plutonium in either pit or nonpit forms is
considered classified information.
[4] DOE estimates that operating H-Canyon through 2019 will add 297
canisters to the approximately 6,300 vitrified high radioactivity waste
canisters required to dispose of SRS's high radioactivity waste.
[5] DOE estimates that operating H-Canyon through 2019 will add an
additional two Saltstone Facility vaults to the 36 planned vaults
required to dispose of SRS's low radioactivity waste.
[6] DOE-SRS, SRS Liquid Waste Planning Process: Life-cycle Liquid Waste
Disposition System Plan, Rev. 14. October 18, 2007.
[7] Tanks that meet Environmental Protection Agency standards have a
metal liner on the outer tank wall that is referred to as a secondary
containment. Of the 49 tanks currently in service at SRS, 25 tanks have
full secondary containment while the remaining 24 have only partial or
no secondary containment.
[8] Specifically, documented safety analyses must comply with
requirements in Part 830 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
and DOE Standard 3009-94 "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses."
[9] Immobilization involves mixing the plutonium with ceramics, placing
the mixture in large canisters, and filling the canisters with
vitrified high-level radioactive waste.
[End of section]
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