Nuclear Waste Management
Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives Gao ID: GAO-10-48 November 4, 2009High-level nuclear waste--one of the nation's most hazardous substances--is accumulating at 80 sites in 35 states. The United States has generated 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste and is expected to generate 153,000 metric tons by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of the waste in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. However, the repository is more than a decade behind schedule, and the nuclear waste generally remains at the commercial nuclear reactor sites and DOE sites where it was generated. This report examines the key attributes, challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository and the two principal alternatives to a repository that nuclear waste management experts identified: storing the nuclear waste at two centralized locations and continuing to store the waste on site where it was generated. GAO developed models of total cost ranges for each alternative using component cost estimates provided by the nuclear waste management experts. However, GAO did not compare these alternatives because of significant differences in their inherent characteristics that could not be quantified.
The Yucca Mountain repository is designed to provide a permanent solution for managing nuclear waste, minimize the uncertainty of future waste safety, and enable DOE to begin fulfilling its legal obligation under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to take custody of commercial waste, which began in 1998. However, project delays have led to utility lawsuits that DOE estimates are costing taxpayers about $12.3 billion in damages through 2020 and could cost $500 million per year after 2020, though the outcome of pending litigation may affect the government's total liability. Also, the administration has announced plans to terminate Yucca Mountain and seek alternatives. Even if DOE continues the program, it must obtain a Nuclear Regulatory Commission construction and operations license, a process likely to be delayed by budget shortfalls. GAO's analysis of DOE's cost projections found that a repository to dispose of 153,000 metric tons would cost from $41 billion to $67 billion (in 2009 present value) over a 143-year period until the repository is closed. Nuclear power rate payers would pay about 80 percent of these costs, and taxpayers would pay about 20 percent. Centralized storage at two locations provides an alternative that could be implemented within 10 to 30 years, allowing more time to consider final disposal options, nuclear waste to be removed from decommissioned reactor sites, and the government to take custody of commercial nuclear waste, saving billions of dollars in liabilities. However, DOE's statutory authority to provide centralized storage is uncertain, and finding a state willing to host a facility could be extremely challenging. In addition, centralized storage does not provide for final waste disposal, so much of the waste would be transported twice to reach its final destination. Using cost data from experts, GAO estimated the 2009 present value cost of centralized storage of 153,000 metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from $15 billion to $29 billion but increasing to between $23 billion and $81 billion with final geologic disposal. On-site storage would provide an alternative requiring little change from the status quo, but would face increasing challenges over time. It would also allow time for consideration of final disposal options. The additional time in on-site storage would make the waste safer to handle, reducing risks when waste is transported for final disposal. However, the government is unlikely to take custody of the waste, especially at operating nuclear reactor sites, which could result in significant financial liabilities that would increase over time. Not taking custody could also intensify public opposition to spent fuel storage site renewals and reactor license extensions, particularly with no plan in place for final waste disposition. In addition, extended on-site storage could introduce possible risks to the safety and security of the waste as the storage systems degrade and the waste decays, potentially requiring new maintenance and security measures. Using cost data from experts, GAO estimated the 2009 present value cost of on-site storage of 153,000 metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from $13 billion to $34 billion but increasing to between $20 billion to $97 billion with final geologic disposal.
GAO-10-48, Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2009:
Nuclear Waste Management:
Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository
and Two Potential Alternatives:
GAO-10-48:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-48, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
High-level nuclear waste”one of the nation‘s most hazardous substances”
is accumulating at 80 sites in 35 states. The United States has
generated 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste and is expected to
generate 153,000 metric tons by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, as amended, requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of
the waste in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, about 100 miles
northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. However, the repository is more than a
decade behind schedule, and the nuclear waste generally remains at the
commercial nuclear reactor sites and DOE sites where it was generated.
This report examines the key attributes, challenges, and costs of the
Yucca Mountain repository and the two principal alternatives to a
repository that nuclear waste management experts identified: storing
the nuclear waste at two centralized locations and continuing to store
the waste on site where it was generated. GAO developed models of total
cost ranges for each alternative using component cost estimates
provided by the nuclear waste management experts. However, GAO did not
compare these alternatives because of significant differences in their
inherent characteristics that could not be quantified.
What GAO Found:
The Yucca Mountain repository is designed to provide a permanent
solution for managing nuclear waste, minimize the uncertainty of future
waste safety, and enable DOE to begin fulfilling its legal obligation
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to take custody of commercial waste,
which began in 1998. However, project delays have led to utility
lawsuits that DOE estimates are costing taxpayers about $12.3 billion
in damages through 2020 and could cost $500 million per year after
2020, though the outcome of pending litigation may affect the
government‘s total liability. Also, the administration has announced
plans to terminate Yucca Mountain and seek alternatives. Even if DOE
continues the program, it must obtain a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
construction and operations license, a process likely to be delayed by
budget shortfalls. GAO‘s analysis of DOE‘s cost projections found that
a repository to dispose of 153,000 metric tons would cost from $41
billion to $67 billion (in 2009 present value) over a 143-year period
until the repository is closed. Nuclear power rate payers would pay
about 80 percent of these costs, and taxpayers would pay about 20
percent.
Centralized storage at two locations provides an alternative that could
be implemented within 10 to 30 years, allowing more time to consider
final disposal options, nuclear waste to be removed from decommissioned
reactor sites, and the government to take custody of commercial nuclear
waste, saving billions of dollars in liabilities. However, DOE‘s
statutory authority to provide centralized storage is uncertain, and
finding a state willing to host a facility could be extremely
challenging. In addition, centralized storage does not provide for
final waste disposal, so much of the waste would be transported twice
to reach its final destination. Using cost data from experts, GAO
estimated the 2009 present value cost of centralized storage of 153,000
metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from $15 billion to $29
billion but increasing to between $23 billion and $81 billion with
final geologic disposal.
On-site storage would provide an alternative requiring little change
from the status quo, but would face increasing challenges over time. It
would also allow time for consideration of final disposal options. The
additional time in on-site storage would make the waste safer to
handle, reducing risks when waste is transported for final disposal.
However, the government is unlikely to take custody of the waste,
especially at operating nuclear reactor sites, which could result in
significant financial liabilities that would increase over time. Not
taking custody could also intensify public opposition to spent fuel
storage site renewals and reactor license extensions, particularly with
no plan in place for final waste disposition. In addition, extended on-
site storage could introduce possible risks to the safety and security
of the waste as the storage systems degrade and the waste decays,
potentially requiring new maintenance and security measures. Using cost
data from experts, GAO estimated the 2009 present value cost of on-site
storage of 153,000 metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from
$13 billion to $34 billion but increasing to between $20 billion to $97
billion with final geologic disposal.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. In written comments,
DOE and NRC generally agreed with the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at 202-512-3841
or gaffiganm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Yucca Mountain Repository Would Provide a Permanent Solution for
Nuclear Waste, but Its Implementation Faces Challenges and Significant
Upfront Costs:
We Identified Two Nuclear Waste Management Alternatives and Developed
Cost Models by Consulting with Experts:
Centralized Storage Would Provide a Near-Term Alternative, Allowing
Other Options to Be Studied, but Faces Implementation Challenges:
On-Site Storage Would Provide an Intermediate Option with Minimal
Effort but Poses Challenges that Could Increase Over Time:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Our Methodology for Obtaining Comments from Nuclear Waste
Management Experts:
Appendix III: Nuclear Waste Management Experts We Interviewed:
Appendix IV: Modeling Methodology, Assumptions, and Results:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Estimated Cost of the Yucca Mountain Scenarios:
Table 2: Key Assumptions Used to Define Alternatives:
Table 3: Models and Scenarios Used for Cost Ranges:
Table 4: Estimated Cost Range for Each Centralized Storage Scenario:
Table 5: Estimated Cost Range for Each On-site Storage Scenario:
Table 6: Our Data Collection Instrument for Nuclear Waste Management
Experts:
Table 7: Initial Assumptions and Component Cost Estimates for Our
Centralized Storage and On-site Storage Alternatives and Modifications
Made Based on Experts' Responses to Our Data Collection Instrument:
Table 8: Model Results for All Scenarios:
Figures:
Figure 1: Current Storage Sites and Proposed Repository for High-Level
Nuclear Waste:
Figure 2: Aerial View and Cut-Out of the Yucca Mountain Repository:
Figure 3: Dry Cask Storage System for Spent Nuclear Fuel:
Figure 4: Cost Profile for the Yucca Mountain Repository, Assuming
70,000 Metric Tons:
Figure 5: Process Assumptions and Cost Components for Hypothetical
Nuclear Waste Management Alternatives:
Figure 6: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the Centralized 153,000
Metric Ton Models:
Figure 7: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the Centralized 70,000
Metric Ton Model:
Figure 8: Scenarios and Cost Time Frames for the On-Site 153,000 Metric
Ton Models:
Figure 9: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the On-Site 70,000 Metric
Ton Model:
Figure 10: Total Cost Ranges for Centralized Storage for 100 Years with
Final Disposition:
Figure 11: Total Cost Ranges for On-site Storage for 100 years with
Final Disposition:
Figure 12: Total Cost Ranges of On-Site Storage over 2,000 Years:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NWPA: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 4, 2009:
The Honorable Barbara Boxer:
Chairman:
Committee on Environment and Public Works:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Harry Reid:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John Ensign:
United States Senate:
High-level nuclear waste consists mostly of spent nuclear fuel removed
from commercial power reactors and is considered one of the most
hazardous substances on earth. The U.S. national inventory of 70,000
metric tons of nuclear waste--enough to fill a football field more than
15 feet deep--has been accumulating at 80 sites in 35 states since the
mid-1940s and is expected to more than double to 153,000 metric tons by
2055. The current national policy of constructing a federal repository
to dispose of this waste at Yucca Mountain--which is about 100 miles
northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada--has already been delayed more than a
decade. As a result, nuclear waste generally remains at the sites where
it was generated. Experts and regulators believe the nuclear waste, if
properly stored and monitored, can be kept safe and secure on-site for
decades; but communities across the country have raised concerns about
the waste's lethal nature and the possibility of natural disasters or
terrorism, particularly at sites near urban centers or sources of
drinking water. Industry has also raised concerns that local
communities will not support the expansion of the nuclear energy
industry without a final waste disposition pathway. Many experts and
communities view nuclear energy as a potential means of meeting future
energy demands while reducing reliance on fossil fuels and cutting
carbon emissions, a key contributor to climate change.
In addition to the spent nuclear fuel generated by commercial power
reactors, the Department of Energy (DOE) owns and manages about 19
percent of the nuclear waste--referred to as DOE-managed spent nuclear
fuel and high-level waste--which consists of spent nuclear fuel from
power, research, and navy shipboard reactors, and high-level nuclear
waste from the nation's nuclear weapons program. (See figure 1 for the
locations where nuclear waste is stored.)
Figure 1: Current Storage Sites and Proposed Repository for High-Level
Nuclear Waste:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
Commercial Sites:
Arkansas Nuclear One;
Beaver Valley;
Big Rock Point;
Braidwood;
Browns Ferry;
Brunswick;
Byron;
Calloway;
Calvert Cliffs;
Catawba;
Clinton;
Columbia Generating Station;
Comanche Peak;
Cooper Station;
Crystal River;
Davis-Besse;
D.C. Cook;
Diablo Canyon;
Dresden & Morris;
Duane Arnold;
Edwin I. Hatch;
Fermi;
Fort Calhoun;
Ginna;
Grand Gulf;
Haddem Neck;
H.B. Robinson;
Humbolt Bay;
Indian Point;
Joseph M. Farley;
Kewaunee;
La Crosse;
La Salle;
Limerick;
Maine Yankee;
McGuire;
Millstone;
Monticello;
Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick; North Anna;
Oconee;
Oyster Creek;
Palisades;
Palo Verde;
Peach Bottom;
Perry;
Pilgrim;
Point Beach;
Prairie Island;
Quad Cities;
Rancho Seco;
River Bend;
St. Lucie;
Salem & Hope Creek;
San Onofre;
Seabrook;
Sequoyah;
Shearon Harris;
South Texas Project;
Summer;
Surry;
Susquehanna;
Three Mile Island;
Trojan;
Turkey Point;
Vermont Yankee;
Vogtle;
Waterford;
Watts Bar;
Wolf Creek;
Yankee Rowe;
Zion.
DOE Sites:
Fort St. Vrain;
Hanford Site;
Idaho National Laboratory;
Savannah River Site;
West Valley Demonstration Project,
Proposed repository:
Yucca Mountain.
Source: DOE.
Note: Locations are approximate. DOE has reported that it is
responsible for managing nuclear waste at 121 sites in 39 states, but
DOE officials told us that several sites have only research reactors
that generate small amounts of waste that will be consolidated at the
Idaho National Laboratory for packaging prior to disposal.
[End of figure]
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, DOE was
to evaluate one or more national geologic repositories that would be
designated to permanently store commercial spent nuclear fuel and DOE-
managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. NWPA was amended in
1987 to direct DOE to evaluate only the Yucca Mountain site. In 2002,
the president recommended and the Congress approved the Yucca Mountain
site as the nation's geologic repository. The repository is intended to
isolate nuclear waste from humans and the environment for thousands of
years, long enough for its radioactivity to decay to near natural
background levels. NWPA set January 31, 1998, as the date for DOE to
start accepting nuclear waste for disposal. To meet this goal, DOE has
spent more than $14 billion for design, engineering, and testing
activities.[Footnote 1] In June 2008, DOE submitted a license
application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for approval to
construct the repository. In July 2008, DOE reported that its best
achievable date for opening the repository, if it receives NRC
approval, is in 2020. Delays in the Yucca Mountain repository have
resulted in a need for continued storage of the waste onsite, leaving
industry uncertain regarding the licensing of new nuclear power
reactors and the nation uncertain regarding a final disposition of the
waste.
In March 2009, the Secretary of Energy testified that the
administration planned to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository.
Since then, the administration has announced plans to study
alternatives to geologic disposal at Yucca Mountain before making a
decision on a future nuclear waste management strategy, which the
administration said could include reprocessing or other complementary
strategies.
In this context, you asked us to identify key aspects of DOE's nuclear
waste management program and other possible management approaches.
Specifically, you asked us to examine (1) the key attributes,
challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository; (2) and
identify alternative nuclear waste management approaches; (3) the key
attributes, challenges, and costs of storing the nuclear waste at two
centralized sites; and (4) the key attributes, challenges, and costs of
continuing to store the nuclear waste at its current locations. The
centralized storage and onsite storage options--both with disposal
scenarios--were the two most likely alternative approaches identified
by the experts we interviewed. We are also providing information on
what is known about sources of funding--primarily taxpayers and nuclear
power rate payers--for the Yucca Mountain repository and the two
alternative approaches.
To examine the key attributes, challenges, and costs of the Yucca
Mountain repository, we obtained reports and supporting documentation
from DOE, NRC, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board. Specifically, we used DOE's report on the Yucca
Mountain repository's total lifecycle cost to analyze the cost for
disposing of either (1) 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste, which is
the statutory cap on the amount of waste that can be disposed of at
Yucca Mountain, or (2) 153,000 metric tons, which is the estimated
total amount of nuclear waste that has already been generated and will
be generated if all currently operating commercial reactors operate for
a 60-year lifespan.[Footnote 2] We then discounted these costs to 2009
present value.
To identify alternative nuclear waste management approaches, we
interviewed DOE officials, experts at the National Academy of Sciences
and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and executives at the
Nuclear Energy Institute, among others. Based on their comments, we
identified two generic alternative approaches for managing this waste
for at least a 100-year period before it is disposed in a repository:
storing the nuclear waste at two centralized facilities--referred to as
centralized storage--and continuing to store the nuclear waste on site
at their current facilities--referred to as on-site storage. To examine
the key attributes, challenges, and costs of each alternative, we asked
nuclear waste management experts from federal agencies, industry,
academic institutions, and concerned groups to comment on the
attributes and challenges of each alternative, provide relevant cost
data, and comment on the assumptions and cost components that we used
to develop cost models for the alternatives. We then used the models to
produce the total cost ranges for each alternative with and without
final disposal in a geologic repository at the end of a 100-year
specific time period. In addition, we analyzed onsite storage for
longer periods than 100 years. We analyzed costs associated with
storing 70,000 metric tons and 153,000 metric tons and discounted the
costs to 2009 present value.
We did not compare the Yucca Mountain cost range to the ranges of other
alternatives because of significant differences in inherent
characteristics of these alternatives that our modeling work could not
quantify. For example, the safety, health, and environmental risks for
each are very different, which needs to be considered in the policy
debate on nuclear waste management decisions. (See appendix I for
additional information about our scope and methodology, appendix II for
our methodology for soliciting comments from nuclear waste management
experts, and appendix III for a list of these experts.)
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to October 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Nuclear waste is long-lived and very hazardous--without protective
shielding, the intense radioactivity of the waste can kill a person
within minutes or cause cancer months or even decades after exposure.
[Footnote 3] Thus, careful management is required to isolate it from
humans and the environment. To accomplish this, the National Academy of
Sciences first endorsed the concept of nuclear waste disposal in deep
geologic formations in a 1957 report to the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, which has since been articulated by experts as the safest
and most secure method of permanent disposal.[Footnote 4] However,
progress toward developing a geologic repository was slow until NWPA
was enacted in 1983. Citing the potential risks of the accumulating
amounts of nuclear waste, NWPA required the federal government to take
responsibility for the disposition of nuclear waste and required DOE to
develop a permanent geologic repository to protect public health and
safety and the environment for current and future generations.
Specifically, the act required DOE to study several locations around
the country for possible repository sites and develop a contractual
relationship with industry for disposal of the nuclear waste. The
Congress amended NWPA in 1987 to restrict scientific study and
characterization of a possible repository to only Yucca Mountain.
(Figure 2 shows the north crest of Yucca Mountain and a cut-out of the
proposed mined repository.)
Figure 2: Aerial View and Cut-Out of the Yucca Mountain Repository:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Aerial photo of Yucca Mountain:
Cut-out:
Surface;
Ventilation shafts;
North portal;
South portal;
Surface to Emplacement: 1,000 ft. (about 300 meters); Emplacement to
Water table: 1,000 ft. (about 300 meters); Access portals;
Emplacement tunnels.
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
After the Congress approved Yucca Mountain as a suitable site for the
development of a permanent nuclear waste repository in 2002, DOE began
preparing a license application for submittal to NRC, which has
regulatory authority over commercial nuclear waste management
facilities. DOE submitted its license application to NRC in June 2008,
and NRC accepted the license application for review in September 2008.
NWPA requires NRC to complete its review of DOE's license application
for the Yucca Mountain repository in 3 years, although a fourth year is
allowed if NRC deems it necessary and complies with certain reporting
requirements.
To pay the nuclear power industry's share of the cost for the Yucca
Mountain repository, NWPA established the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is
funded by a fee of one mill (one-tenth of a cent) per kilowatt-hour of
nuclear-generated electricity that the federal government collects from
electric power companies. DOE reported that, at the end of fiscal year
2008, the Nuclear Waste Fund contained $22 billion, with an additional
$1.9 billion projected to be added in 2009. DOE receives money from the
Nuclear Waste Fund through congressional appropriations. Additional
funding for the repository comes from an appropriation which provides
for the disposal cost of DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste.
NWPA caps nuclear waste that can be disposed of at the Yucca Mountain
repository at 70,000 metric tons until a second repository is
available. However, the nation has already accumulated about 70,000
metric tons of nuclear waste at current reactor sites and DOE
facilities. Without a change in the law to raise the cap or to allow
the construction of a second repository, DOE can dispose of only the
current nuclear waste inventory. The nation will have to develop a
strategy for an additional 83,000 metric tons of waste expected to be
generated if NRC issues 20-year license extensions to all of the
currently operating nuclear reactors.[Footnote 5] This amount does not
include any nuclear waste generated by new reactors or future defense
activities, or greater than class C nuclear waste.[Footnote 6]
According to DOE and industry studies, three to four times the 70,000
metric tons--and possibly more--could potentially be disposed safely in
Yucca Mountain, which could address current and some future waste
inventories, potentially delaying the need for a second repository for
several generations.
Nuclear waste has continued to accumulate at the nation's commercial
and DOE nuclear facilities over the past 60 years. Facility managers
must actively manage the nuclear waste by continually isolating,
confining, and monitoring it to keep humans and the environment safe.
Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites, immersed in pools
of water designed to cool and isolate it from the environment. With
nowhere to dispose of the spent nuclear fuel, the racks holding spent
fuel in the pools have been rearranged to allow for more dense storage
of assemblies. Even with this re-racking, spent nuclear fuel pools are
reaching their capacities. Some critics have expressed concern about
the remote possibility of an overcrowded spent nuclear fuel pool
releasing large amounts of radiation if an accident or other event
caused the pool to lose water, potentially leading to a fire that could
disperse radioactive material. As reactor operators have run out of
space in their spent nuclear fuel pools, they have turned in increasing
number to dry cask storage systems that generally consist of stainless
steel canisters placed inside larger stainless steel or concrete casks.
(See figure 3.) NRC requires protective shielding, routine inspections
and monitoring, and security systems to isolate the nuclear waste to
protect humans and the environment.
Figure 3: Dry Cask Storage System for Spent Nuclear Fuel:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrations and accompanying data]
At some nuclear reactors across the country, spent fuel is kept on
site, above ground, in systems basically similar to the one shown here.
1. Once the spent fuel has cooled, it is loaded into special canisters,
each of which is designed to hold about two dozen assemblies. Water and
air are removed. The canister is filled with inert gas, welded shut,
and rigorously tested for leaks. It may then be placed in a "cask" for
storage or transportation.
Illustration:
Storage cask;
Canister;
Bundle of used fuel assemblies.
2. The canisters can also be stored in above ground concrete bunkers,
each of which is about the size of a one-car garage. Eventually they
may be transported elsewhere for storage.
Illustration: Concrete storage bunker.
Source: NRC.
[End of figure]
NRC has determined that these dry cask storage systems can safely store
nuclear waste, but NRC considers them to be interim measures. In 1990,
NRC issued a revised waste confidence rule, stating that it had
confidence that the waste generated by a reactor can be safely stored
in either wet or dry storage for 30 years beyond a reactor's life,
including license extensions. NRC further determined that it had
reasonable assurance that safe geologic disposal was feasible and that
a geologic repository would be operational by about 2025. More
recently, NRC has published a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise
that rule, proposing that waste generated by a reactor can be safely
stored for 60 years beyond the life of a reactor and that geologic
disposal would be available in 50 to 60 years beyond a reactor's life.
[Footnote 7] NRC is currently considering whether to republish its
proposed rule to seek additional public input on certain issues. Forty-
five reactor sites or former reactor sites in 30 states have dry
storage facilities for their spent nuclear fuel as of June 2009, and
the number of reactor sites storing spent nuclear fuel is likely to
continue to grow until an alternative is implemented.
Implementing a permanent, safe, and secure disposal solution for the
nuclear waste is of concern to the nation, particularly state
governments and local communities, because many of the 80 sites where
nuclear waste is currently stored are near large populations or major
water sources or consist of shutdown reactor sites that tie up land
that could be used for other purposes. In addition, states that have
DOE facilities with nuclear waste storage are concerned because of
possible contamination to aquifers, rivers, and other natural
resources. DOE's Hanford Reservation, located near Richland,
Washington, was a major component of the nation's nuclear weapons
defense program from 1943 until 1989, when operations ceased. In the
settlement of a lawsuit filed by the state of Washington in 2003, DOE
agreed not to ship certain nuclear waste to Hanford until environmental
reviews were complete. In August 2009, the U.S. government stated that
the preferred alternative in DOE's environmental review would include
limitations on certain nuclear waste shipments to Hanford until the
process of immobilizing tank waste in glass begins, expected in 2019.
[Footnote 8] Moreover, some commercial and DOE sites where the nuclear
waste is stored may not be able to accommodate much additional waste
safely because of limited storage space or community objections. These
sites will require a more immediate solution.
The nation has considered proposals to build centralized storage
facilities where waste from reactor sites could be consolidated. The
1987 amendment to NWPA established the Office of the Nuclear Waste
Negotiator to try to broker an agreement for a community to host a
repository or interim storage facility. Two negotiators worked with
local communities and Native American tribes for several years, but
neither was able to conclude a proposed agreement with a willing
community by January 1995, when the office's authority expired.
Subsequently, in 2006 after a 9-year licensing process, a consortium of
electric power companies called Private Fuel Storage obtained a NRC
license for a private centralized storage facility on the reservation
of the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Indians in Utah. NRC's 20-year
license--with an option for an additional 20 years--allows storage of
up to 40,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel. However,
construction of the Private Fuel Storage facility has been delayed by
Department of the Interior decisions not to approve the lease of tribal
lands to Private Fuel Storage and declining to issue the necessary
rights-of-way to transport nuclear waste to the facility through Bureau
of Land Management land. Private Fuel Storage and the Skull Valley Band
of Goshutes filed a federal lawsuit in 2007 to overturn Interior's
decisions.
Reprocessing nuclear waste could potentially reduce, but not eliminate,
the amount of waste for disposal. In reprocessing, usable uranium and
plutonium are recovered from spent nuclear fuel and are used to make
new fuel rods. However, current reprocessing technologies separate
weapons usable plutonium and other fissionable materials from the spent
nuclear fuel, raising concerns about nuclear proliferation by
terrorists or enemy states. Although the United States pioneered the
reprocessing technologies used by other countries, such as France and
Russia, presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter ended government
support for commercial reprocessing in the United States in 1976 and
1977, respectively, primarily due to proliferation concerns. Although
President Ronald Reagan lifted the ban on government support in 1981,
the nation has not embarked on any reprocessing program due to
proliferation and cost concerns--the Congressional Budget Office
recently reported that current reprocessing technologies are more
expensive than direct disposal of the waste in a geologic repository.
[Footnote 9] DOE's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program is
currently performing research in reprocessing technologies that would
not separate out weapons usable plutonium, but it is not certain
whether these technologies will become cost-effective.[Footnote 10]
The general consensus of the international scientific community is that
geologic disposal is the preferred long-term nuclear waste management
alternative. Finland, Sweden, Canada, France, and Switzerland have
decided to construct geologic disposal facilities, but none have yet
completed any such facility, although DOE reports that Finland and
Sweden have announced plans to begin emplacement operations in 2020 and
2023, respectively. Moreover, some countries employ a mix of
complementary storage alternatives in their national waste management
strategies, including on-site storage, consolidated interim storage,
reprocessing, and geologic disposal. For example, Sweden plans to rely
on on-site storage until the waste cools enough to move it to a
centralized storage facility, where the waste will continue to cool and
decay for an additional 30 years. This waste will then be placed in a
geologic repository for disposal. France reprocesses the spent nuclear
fuel, recycling usable portions as new fuel and storing the remainder
for eventual disposal.
The Yucca Mountain Repository Would Provide a Permanent Solution for
Nuclear Waste, but Its Implementation Faces Challenges and Significant
Upfront Costs:
The Yucca Mountain repository--mandated by NWPA, as amended--would
provide a permanent nuclear waste management solution for the nation's
current inventory of about 70,000 metric tons of waste. According to
DOE and industry studies, the repository potentially could be a
disposal site for three to four times that amount of waste. However,
the repository lacks the support of the administration and the state of
Nevada, and faces regulatory and other challenges. Our analysis of
DOE's cost projections found that the Yucca Mountain repository would
cost from $41 billion to $67 billion (in 2009 present value) for
disposing of 153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste.[Footnote 11] Most of
these costs are up-front capital costs. However, once the Yucca
Mountain repository is closed--in 2151 for our 153,000-metric-ton
model--it is not expected to incur any significant additional costs,
according to DOE.
As Designed, the Yucca Mountain Repository Would Be a Permanent
Solution and Would Reduce the Uncertainty Associated with Future
Nuclear Waste Safety:
The Yucca Mountain repository is designed to isolate nuclear waste in a
safe and secure environment long enough for the waste to degrade into a
form that is less harmful to humans and the environment. As nuclear
waste ages, it cools and decays, becoming less radiologically
dangerous. In October 2008, after years of legal challenges, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards that
require DOE to ensure that radioactive releases from the nuclear waste
disposed of at Yucca Mountain do not harm the public for 1 million
years.[Footnote 12] This is because some waste components, such as
plutonium 239, take hundreds of thousands of years to decay into less
harmful materials. To meet EPA's standards and keep the waste safely
isolated, DOE's license application proposes the use of both natural
and engineered barriers. Key natural barriers of Yucca Mountain include
its dry climate, the depth and isolation of the Death Valley aquifer in
which the mountain resides, its natural physical shape, and the layers
of thick rock above and below the repository that lie 1,000 feet below
the surface of the mountain and 1,000 feet above the water table. Key
engineered barriers include the solid nature of the nuclear waste; the
double-shelled transportation, aging, and disposal canisters that
encapsulate the waste and prevent radiation leakage; and drip shields
that are composed of corrosion-resistant titanium to ward off any
dripping water inside the repository for many thousands of years.
The construction of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would
provide a permanent solution for nuclear waste that could allow the
government to begin taking possession of the nuclear waste in the near
term--about 10 to 30 years. The nuclear power industry sees this as an
important consideration in obtaining the public support necessary to
build new nuclear power reactors. The industry is interested in
constructing new nuclear power reactors because, among other reasons,
of the growing demand for electricity and pressure from federal and
state governments to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and curtail carbon
emissions. Some electric power companies see nuclear energy as an
important option for noncarbon emitting power generation. According to
NRC, 18 electric power companies have filed license applications to
construct 29 new nuclear reactors.[Footnote 13] Nuclear industry
representatives, however, have expressed concerns that investors and
the public will not support the construction of new nuclear power
reactors without a final safe and secure disposition pathway for the
nuclear waste, particularly if that waste is generated and stored near
major waterways or urban centers. Moreover, having a permanent disposal
option may allow reactor operators to thin-out spent nuclear fuel
assemblies from densely packed spent fuel pools, potentially reducing
the risk of harm to humans or the environment in the event of an
accident, natural disaster, or terrorist event.
In addition, disposal is the only alternative for some DOE and
commercial nuclear waste--even if the United States decided to
reprocess the waste--because it contains nuclear waste residues that
cannot be used as nuclear reactor fuel. This nuclear waste has no safe,
long-term alternative other than disposal, and the Yucca Mountain
repository would provide a near-term, permanent disposal pathway for
it. Moreover, DOE has agreed to remove spent nuclear fuel from at least
two states by certain dates or face penalties. Specifically, DOE has an
agreement with Colorado stating that if the spent nuclear fuel at Fort
St. Vrain is not removed by January 1, 2035, the government will,
subject to certain conditions, pay the state $15,000 per day until the
waste is removed. In addition, the state of Idaho sued DOE to remove
inventories of spent nuclear fuel stored at DOE's Idaho National
Laboratory. Under the resulting settlement DOE agreed to (1) remove the
spent nuclear fuel by January 1, 2035, or incur penalties of $60,000
per day and (2) curtail or suspend future shipments of spent nuclear
fuel to Idaho.[Footnote 14] Some of the spent nuclear fuel stored at
the Idaho National Laboratory comes from refueling the U.S. Navy's
submarines and aircraft carriers, all of which are nuclear powered.
Special facilities are maintained at the Idaho National Laboratory to
examine naval spent nuclear fuel to obtain information for improving
future fuel performance and to package the spent nuclear fuel following
examination to make it ready for rail shipment to its ultimate
destination. According to Navy officials, refueling these warships,
which necessitates shipment of naval spent nuclear fuel from the
shipyards conducting the refuelings to the Idaho National Laboratory,
is part of the Navy's national security mission. Consequently,
curtailing or suspending shipments of spent nuclear fuel to Idaho
raises national security concerns for the Navy.
The Yucca Mountain repository would help the government fulfill its
obligation under NWPA to electric power companies and ratepayers to
take custody of the commercial spent nuclear fuel and provide a
permanent repository using the Nuclear Waste Fund. When DOE missed its
1998 deadline to begin taking custody of the waste, owners of spent
fuel with contracts for disposal services filed lawsuits asking the
courts to require DOE to fulfill its statutory and contractual
obligations by taking custody of the waste. Though a court decided that
it would not order DOE to begin taking custody of the waste, the courts
have, in subsequent cases, ordered the government to compensate the
utilities for the cost of storing the waste. DOE projected that, based
on a 2020 date for beginning operations at Yucca Mountain, the
government's liabilities from the 71 lawsuits filed by electric power
companies could sum to about $12.3 billion, though the outcome of
pending and future litigation could substantially affect the ultimate
total liability.[Footnote 15] DOE estimates that the federal
government's future liabilities will average up to $500 million per
year. Furthermore, continued delays in DOE's ability to take custody of
the waste could result in additional liabilities. Some experts noted
that without immediate plans for a permanent repository, reactor
operators and ratepayers may demand that the Nuclear Waste Fund be
refunded.[Footnote 16]
Finally, disposing of the nuclear waste now in a repository facility
would reduce the uncertainty about the willingness or the ability of
future generations to monitor and maintain multiple surface waste
storage facilities and would eliminate the need for any future handling
of the waste. As a 2001 report of the National Academies noted,
continued storage of nuclear waste is technically feasible only if
those responsible for it are willing and able to devote adequate
resources and attention to maintaining and expanding the storage
facilities, as required to keep the waste safe and secure.[Footnote 17]
DOE officials noted that the waste packages at Yucca Mountain are
designed to be retrievable for more than 100 years after emplacement,
at which time DOE would begin to close the repository, allowing future
generations to consider retrieving spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing
or other uses. However, the risks and costs of retrieving the nuclear
waste from Yucca Mountain are uncertain because planning efforts for
retrieval are preliminary. Once closed, Yucca Mountain will require
minimal monitoring and little or no maintenance, and all future
controls will be passive.[Footnote 18] Some experts stated that the
current generation has a moral obligation to not pass on to future
generations the extensive technical and financial responsibilities for
managing nuclear waste in surface storage.
Yucca Mountain Faces Many Challenges, Including a Lack of Key Support
and License Approval:
There are many challenges to licensing and constructing the Yucca
Mountain repository, some of which could delay or potentially terminate
the program. First, in March 2009, the Secretary of Energy stated that
the administration planned to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository
and to form a panel of experts to review alternatives. During the
testimony, the Secretary stated that Yucca Mountain would not be
considered as one of the alternatives. The administration's fiscal year
2010 budget request for Yucca Mountain was $197 million, which is $296
million less than what DOE stated it needs to stay on its schedule and
open Yucca Mountain by 2020.
In July 2009 letters to DOE, the Nuclear Energy Institute and the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners raised
concerns that, despite the announced termination of Yucca Mountain, DOE
still intended on collecting fees for the Nuclear Waste Fund.[Footnote
19] The letters requested that DOE suspend collection of payments to
the Nuclear Waste Fund. Some states have raised similar concerns and
legislators have introduced legislation that could hold payments to the
Nuclear Waste Fund until DOE begins operating a federal repository.
[Footnote 20]
Nevertheless, NWPA still requires DOE to pursue geologic disposal at
Yucca Mountain. If the administration continues the licensing process
for Yucca Mountain, DOE would face a variety of other challenges in
licensing and constructing the repository. Many of these challenges--
though unique to Yucca Mountain--might also apply in similar form to
other future repositories, should they be considered.
One of the most significant challenges facing DOE is to satisfy NRC
that Yucca Mountain meets licensing requirements, including ensuring
the repository meets EPA's radiation standards over the required 1
million year time frame, as implemented by NRC regulation. For example,
NRC's regulations require that DOE model its natural and engineered
barriers in a performance assessment, including how the barriers will
interact with each other over time and how the repository will meet the
standards even if one or more barriers do not perform as expected. NRC
has stated that there are uncertainties inherent in the understanding
of the performance of the natural and engineered barriers and that
demonstrating a reasonable expectation of compliance requires the use
of complex predictive models supported by field data, laboratory tests,
site-specific monitoring, and natural analog studies. The Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board has also stated that the performance assessment
may be "the most complex and ambitious probabilistic risk assessment
ever undertaken" and the Board, as well as other groups or individuals,
have raised technical concerns about key aspects of the engineered or
natural barriers in the repository design.
DOE and NRC officials also stated that budget constraints raise
additional challenges. DOE officials told us that past budget
shortfalls and projected future low budgets for the Yucca Mountain
repository create significant challenges in DOE's ability to meet
milestones for licensing and for responding to NRC's requests for
additional information related to the license application. In addition,
NRC officials told us budget shortfalls have constrained their
resources. Staff members they originally hired to review DOE's license
application have moved to other divisions within NRC or have left NRC
entirely. NRC officials stated that the pace of the license review is
commensurate with funding levels. Some experts have questioned whether
NRC can meet the maximum 4-year time requirement stipulated in NWPA for
license review and have pointed out that the longer the delays in
licensing Yucca Mountain, the more costly and politically vulnerable
the effort becomes.
In addition, the state of Nevada and other groups that oppose the Yucca
Mountain repository have raised technical points, site-specific
concerns, and equity issues and have taken steps to delay or terminate
the repository. For example, Nevada's Agency for Nuclear Projects
questioned DOE's reliance on engineered barriers in its performance
assessment, indicating that too many uncertainties exist for DOE to
claim human-made systems will perform as expected over the time frames
required. In addition, the agency reported that Yucca Mountain's
location near seismic and volcanic zones creates additional uncertainty
about DOE's ability to predict a recurrence of seismic or volcanic
events and to assess the performance of its waste isolation barriers
should those events occur some time during the 1-million-year time
frame. The agency also has questioned whether Yucca Mountain is the
best site compared with other locations and has raised issues of
equity, since Nevada is being asked to accept nuclear waste generated
in other states. In addition to the Agency for Nuclear Projects'
issues, Nevada has taken other steps to delay or terminate the project.
For example, Nevada has denied the water rights DOE needs for
construction of a rail spur and facility structures at Yucca Mountain.
DOE officials told us that constructing the rail line or the facilities
at Yucca Mountain without those water rights will be difficult.
Based on DOE's Cost Estimates, Yucca Mountain Will Likely Cost from $41
Billion to $67 Billion for 153,000 Metric Tons of Nuclear Waste, but
Costs Could Increase:
Our analysis of DOE's cost estimates found that (1) a 70,000 metric ton
repository is projected to cost from $27 to $39 billion in 2009 present
value over 108 years and (2) a 153,000 metric ton repository is
projected to cost from $41 to $67 billion and take 35 more years to
complete. These estimated costs include the licensing, construction,
operation, and closure of Yucca Mountain for a period commensurate with
the amount of waste. Table 1 shows each scenario with its estimated
cost range over time.
Table 1: Estimated Cost of the Yucca Mountain Scenarios (Dollars in
billions):
Amount of nuclear waste disposed: 70,000 metric tons;
Time period covered[A]: 2009 to 2116; (108 years);
Present value estimate range[A]: $27 to $39.
Amount of nuclear waste disposed: 153,000 metric tons;
Time period covered[A]: 2009 to 2151; (143 years);
Present value estimate range[A]: $41 to $67.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.
[A] These costs are in 2009 present value and thus different than the
values presented by DOE which are in constant 2007 dollars. Also, these
costs do not include more than $14 billion, in constant fiscal year
2009 dollars, that DOE spent from 1983 through 2008 for the Yucca
Mountain repository. In addition, we did not include potential schedule
delays and costs associated with licensing. DOE reported that each year
of delay could cost DOE about $373 million in constant 2009 dollars.
[End of table]
As shown in figure 4, the Yucca Mountain repository costs are expected
to be high during construction, followed by reduced, but consistent
costs during operations, substantially reduced costs for monitoring,
then a period of increased costs for installation of the drip shields,
and finally costs tapering off for closure. Once the drip shields are
installed, by design, the waste packages will no longer be retrievable.
After closure, Yucca Mountain is not expected to incur any significant
additional costs.
Figure 4: Cost Profile for the Yucca Mountain Repository, Assuming
70,000 Metric Tons:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Profile indicates Cost, from lowest to highest, during the time period
of 2009 through 2116.
Construction:
2009-2020;
Cost highest.
Operations:
2020-2056;
Cost: Mid-range.
Monitoring:
2056-2095;
Cost: lowest.
Drip Shield installation:
2095-2106;
Cost: Lower mid-range.
Closure:
2016-2116;
Cost: low.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.
[End of figure]
Costs for the construction of a repository, regardless of location,
could increase based on a number of different scenarios, including
delays in license application, funding shortfalls, and legal or
technical issues that cause delays or changes in plans. For example, we
asked DOE to assess the cost of a year's delay in license application
approval from the current 3 years to 4 years, the maximum allowed by
NWPA. DOE officials told us that each year of delay would cost DOE
about $373 million in constant 2009 dollars. Although the experts with
whom we consulted did not agree on how long the licensing process for
Yucca Mountain might take, several experts told us that the 9 years it
took Private Fuel Storage to obtain its license was not unreasonable.
This licensing time frame may not directly apply to the Yucca Mountain
repository because the repository has a significantly different
licensing process and regulatory scheme, including extensive pre-
licensing interactions, a federal funding stream, and an extended
compliance period and, because of the uncertainties, could take shorter
or longer than the Private Fuel Storage experience. A nine-year
licensing process for construction authorization would add an estimated
$2.2 billion to the cost of the repository, mostly in costs to maintain
current systems, such as project support, safeguards and security, and
its licensing support network. In addition to consideration of the
issuance of a construction authorization, NRC's repository licensing
process involves two additional licensing actions necessary to operate
and close a repository, each of which allows for public input and could
potentially adversely affect the schedule and cost of the repository.
The second action is the consideration of an updated DOE application
for a license to receive and possess high-level radioactive waste. The
third action is the consideration of a DOE application for a license
amendment to permanently close the repository. Costs could also
increase if unforeseen technical issues developed. For example, some
experts told us that the robotic emplacement of waste packages could be
difficult because of the heat and radiation output from the nuclear
waste, which could impact the electronics on the machinery. DOE
officials acknowledged the challenges and told us the machines would
have to be shielded for protection. They noted, however, that industry
has experience with remote handling of shielded robotic machinery and
DOE should be able to use that experience in developing its own
machinery.
The responsibility for Yucca Mountain's costs would come from the
Nuclear Waste Fund and taxpayers through annual appropriations. NWPA
created the Nuclear Waste Fund as a mechanism for the nuclear power
industry to pay for its share of the cost for building and operating a
permanent repository to dispose of nuclear waste. NWPA also required
the federal taxpayers to pay for the portion of permanent repository
costs for DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. DOE has
responsibility for determining on an annual basis whether fees charged
to industry to finance the Nuclear Waste Fund are sufficient to meet
industry's share of costs. As part of that process, DOE developed a
methodology in 1989 that uses the total system life cycle cost estimate
as input for determining the shares of industry and the federal
government by matching projected costs against projected assets. The
most recent published assessment, published in July 2008, showed that
80.4 percent of the disposal costs would come from the Nuclear Waste
Fund and 19.6 percent would come from appropriations for the DOE-
managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste.
In addition, the Department of the Treasury's judgment fund will pay
the government's liabilities for not taking custody of the nuclear
waste in 1998, as required by DOE's contract with industry. Based on
existing judgments and settlements, DOE has estimated these costs at
$12.3 billion through 2020 and up to $500 million per year after that,
though the outcome of pending litigation could substantially affect the
government's ultimate liability. The Department of Justice has also
spent about $150 million to defend DOE in the litigation.
We Identified Two Nuclear Waste Management Alternatives and Developed
Cost Models by Consulting with Experts:
We used input from experts to identify two nuclear waste management
alternatives that could be implemented if the nation does not pursue
disposal at Yucca Mountain--centralized storage and continued on-site
storage, both of which could be implemented with final disposal,
according to experts. To understand the implications and likely
assumptions of each alternative, as well as the associated costs for
the component parts, we systematically solicited facts, advice, and
opinions from experts in nuclear waste management. Finally, we used the
data and assumptions that the experts provided to develop large-scale
cost models that estimate ranges of likely total costs for each
alternative.
We Consulted with Experts to Identify and Develop Assumptions for Two
Generic Alternatives to Analysis:
To identify waste management alternatives that could be implemented if
the waste is not disposed of at Yucca Mountain, we solicited facts,
advice, and opinions from nuclear waste management experts.
Specifically, we interviewed dozens of experts from DOE, NRC, the
Nuclear Energy Institute, the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, the National Conference of State Legislatures,
and the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. We also reviewed
documents they provided or referred us to.
Based on this information, we chose to analyze (1) centralized interim
dry storage and (2) on-site dry storage (both interim and long-term).
Centralized storage has been attempted to varying degrees in the United
States, and on-site storage has become the country's status quo.
Consequently, the experts believe these two alternatives are currently
among the most likely for this country in the near-term, in conjunction
with final disposal in the long-term. The experts also told us that
current nuclear waste reprocessing technologies raise proliferation
concerns and are not considered commercially feasible, but they noted
that reprocessing has future potential as a part of the nation's
nuclear waste management strategy. Because nuclear waste is not
reprocessed in this country, we found a lack of sufficient and reliable
data to provide meaningful analysis for this alternative. Experts have
largely dismissed other alternatives that have been identified, such as
disposal of waste in deep boreholes, because of cost or technical
constraints.
We developed a set of key assumptions to establish the scope of our
alternatives by initially consulting with a small group of nuclear
waste management experts. For example, we asked the experts about how
many storage sites should be used and whether waste would have to be
repackaged. These discussions occurred in an iterative manner--we
followed up with experts with specific expertise to refine our
assumptions as we learned more. Based on this input, we formulated
several key assumptions and defined the alternatives in a generic
manner by taking into account some, but not all, of the complexities
involved with nuclear waste management (see table 2). We made this
choice because experts advised us that trying to consider all of the
variability among reactor sites would result in unmanageable models
since each location where nuclear waste is currently stored has a
unique set of environmental, management, and regulatory considerations
that affect the logistics and costs of waste management. For example,
reactor sites use different dry cask storage systems with varying costs
that require different operating logistics to load the casks.
Table 2: Key Assumptions Used to Define Alternatives:
Centralized storage:
Type of storage:
Conventional dry cask storage (for commercial spent nuclear fuel).
Number of sites:
Two centralized interim storage sites, located in different geographic
regions of the country.
Reactor operations:
All currently operating reactors receive a 20-year license extension
and continue operating until the extensions expire. Reactors will be
decommissioned when operations cease, and only spent nuclear fuel dry
storage will remain on site.
Transportation:
Transportation to the centralized site will be via rail using dedicated
trains.
Repackaging:
Waste will not be repackaged at the centralized facilities.
Final disposition[A]:
After 100 years, the waste will be disposed of in a geologic
repository.
On-site storage:
Type of storage:
Conventional dry cask storage (for commercial spent nuclear fuel).
Number of sites:
Commercial spent nuclear fuel will be stored on independent spent fuel
storage installations at 75 reactor sites, which includes operating
reactor sites, decommissioned reactor sites, and the Morris
facility.[B] DOE high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel will remain at
five current sites.[C] DOE spent nuclear fuel will be moved to dry
storage. DOE high-level waste will be vitrified and stored in
facilities like the Glass Waste Storage Building at the Savannah River
Site.
Reactor operations:
All currently operating reactors receive a 20-year license extension
and continue operating until the extensions expire. Reactors will be
decommissioned when operations cease, and only spent nuclear fuel dry
storage will remain on site.
Transportation:
Waste will not be transported between reactor sites.
Repackaging:
Dry cask storage systems will need to be replaced after 100 years,
requiring repackaging into new inner canisters and outer casks. Only
our 500-year on-site storage model assumes repackaging.
Final disposition or long-term management[C]: We analyzed two final
disposition scenarios: The waste will be disposed of in a geologic
repository after 100 years or the waste will remain on site for 500
years and be repackaged every 100 years.
Source: GAO analysis based on expert-provided data.
[A] We analyzed some scenarios associated with these alternatives that
did not include final disposition of the waste.
[B] The Morris facility is an independent spent nuclear fuel storage
installation located in Illinois that is operated by General Electric
Corporation, which originally intended to operate a fuel reprocessing
plant at the site. The Morris facility is the only spent nuclear fuel
pool licensed by NRC that is not at a reactor site.
[C] Hanford Reservation, Washington; Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho;
Fort St. Vrain, Colorado; West Valley, New York; and Savannah River
Site, South Carolina.
[End of table]
In addition, there were some instances in which we made assumptions
that, while not entirely realistic, were necessary to keep our
alternatives generic and distinct from one another. For example, some
electric power companies would likely consolidate nuclear waste from
different locations by transporting it between reactor sites, but to
keep the on-site storage alternative generic and distinct from the
centralized storage alternative, we assumed that there would be no
consolidation of waste. These simplifying assumptions make our
alternatives hypothetical and not entirely representative of their real-
world implementation.
We also consulted with experts to formulate more specific assumptions
about processes that reflect the sequence of activities that would
occur within each alternative (see figure 5). In addition, we
identified the components of these processes that have associated
costs. For example, one of the processes associated with both
alternatives is packaging the nuclear waste in dry storage canisters
from the pools of water where they are stored. The component costs
associated with this process include the dry storage canisters and
operations to load the spent nuclear fuel into the canisters.
Figure 5: Process Assumptions and Cost Components for Hypothetical
Nuclear Waste Management Alternatives:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Centralized Storage:
Pool storage:
Packaged in dry storage systems:
Cost components:
* Cask storage systems;
* Loading operations.
Dry storage:
Cost components:
* Storage installation construction;
* Operations, maintenance, and security.
Transportation to geologic repository: Cost components:
* Transportation casks;
* Loading for transportation;
* Transportation infrastructure;
* Transportation operations.
Centralized storage:
Cost components:
* Centralized facility construction;
* Operations, maintenance, and security.
Transportation to geologic repository: Cost components:
* Transportation casks;
* Transportation infrastructure;
* Operations, maintenance, and security.
Geologic repository disposal:
Cost components:
* Repository construction, operation, monitoring, and closure.
On-Site Storage:
Pool storage:
Packaged in dry storage systems:
Cost components:
* Cask storage systems;
* Loading operations.
Dry storage:
Cost components:
* Storage installation construction;
* Operations, maintenance, and security.
100 years: Waste repackaged:
Cost components:
* Repackaging facility construction;
* Repackaging operations;
* Storage pad replacement.
Or:
Transportation to geologic repository: Cost components:
* Transportation casks;
* Transportation infrastructure;
* Operations, maintenance, and security.
Geologic repository disposal:
Cost components:
* Repository construction, operation, monitoring, and closure.
Source: GAO analysis based on expert-provided data.
[End of figure]
We then began to gather data on specific processes and component costs,
such as the kind of cask systems we would use in our model and their
cost. We gathered initial data from a core group of experts with
specialized knowledge in different aspects of nuclear waste management,
such as cask systems, waste loading operations, and transportation. We
then solicited comments on the initial data from a broader group of
experts using a data collection instrument that asked specific
questions about how reasonable the data were. We received almost 70
sets of comments and used them to refine or modify our assumptions and
component costs and develop the input data that we would use to
estimate the overall costs of the alternatives. (See appendix I for
additional information about our scope and methodology, appendix II for
our methodology for soliciting comments from nuclear waste management
experts, and appendix III for these experts.)
We Developed Cost Ranges for Each Alternative Using Large-scale Cost
Models that Addressed Uncertainties and Discounted Future Costs:
To generate cost ranges for the centralized storage and on-site storage
alternatives, we developed four large-scale cost models that analyzed
the costs for each alternative of storing 70,000 metric tons and
153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste and created scenarios within these
models to analyze different storage durations and final dispositions.
(See table 3.) We generated cost ranges for each alternative for
storing 153,000 metric tons of waste for 100 years followed by disposal
in a geologic repository. We also generated cost ranges for each
alternative of storing 70,000 metric tons and 153,000 metric tons of
nuclear waste for 100 years, and for storing 153,000 metric tons of
waste on site for 500 years without including the cost of subsequent
disposal in a geologic repository. For each of the models, which rely
upon data and assumptions provided by nuclear waste management experts,
the cost range was based on the annual volume of commercial spent
nuclear fuel that became ready to be packaged and stored in each year.
In general, each model started in 2009 by annually tracking costs of
initial packaging and related costs for the first 100 years and for
every 100 years thereafter if the waste was to remain on site and be
repackaged. Since our models analyzed only the costs associated with
storing commercial nuclear waste management, we augmented them with
DOE's cost data for (1) managing its spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste and (2) constructing and operating a permanent repository.
Specifically, we used DOE's estimated costs for the Yucca Mountain
repository to represent cost for a hypothetical permanent repository.
[Footnote 22]
Table 3: Models and Scenarios Used for Cost Ranges:
Model: Nuclear waste management alternative: On-site storage;
Waste volume (metric tons): 153,000;
Scenario: Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: None.
Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: Permanent repository.
Storage duration (years):500;
Final disposition or long-term management: Waste repackaged every 100
years.
Model: Nuclear waste management alternative: On-site storage;
Waste volume (metric tons): 70,000;
Scenario: Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: None.
Model: Nuclear waste management alternative: Centralized storage;
Waste volume (metric tons): 153,000;
Scenario: Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: None.
Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: Permanent repository.
Model: Nuclear waste management alternative: Centralized storage;
Waste volume (metric tons): 70,000;
Scenario: Storage duration (years): 100;
Final disposition or long-term management: None.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
One of the inherent difficulties of analyzing the cost of any nuclear
waste management alternative is the large number of uncertainties that
need to be addressed. In addition to general uncertainty about the
future, there is uncertainty because of the lack of knowledge about the
waste management technologies required, the type of waste and waste
management systems that individual reactors will eventually employ, and
cost components that are key inputs to the models and could occur over
hundreds or thousands of years. Given these numerous uncertainties, it
is not possible to precisely determine the total costs of each
alternative. However, much of the uncertainty that we could not easily
capture within our models can be addressed through the use of several
alternative models and scenarios. As shown in table 3, we developed two
models for each alternative to address the uncertainty regarding the
total volume of waste for disposal. We then developed different
scenarios within each model to address different time frames and
disposal paths. Furthermore, we used a risk analysis modeling technique
that recognized and addressed uncertainties in our data and
assumptions. Given the different possible scenarios and uncertainties,
we generated ranges, rather than point estimates, for analyzing the
cost of each alternative.
One of the most important uncertainties in our analysis was uncertainty
over component costs. To address this, we used a commercially available
risk analysis software program that enabled us to model specific
uncertainties associated with a large number of cost inputs and
assumptions. Using a Monte Carlo simulation process,[Footnote 23] the
program explores a wide range of values, instead of one single value,
for each cost input and estimates the total cost. By repeating the
calculations thousands of times with a different set of randomly chosen
input values, the process produces a range of total costs for each
alternative and scenario. The process also specifies the likelihood
associated with values in the estimated range.
Another inherent difficulty in estimating the cost of nuclear waste
management alternatives is the fact that the costs are spread over
hundreds or thousands of years. The economic concept of discounting is
central to such long-term analysis because it allows us to convert
costs that occur in the distant future to present value--equivalent
values in today's dollars. Although the concept of discounting is an
accepted and standard methodology in economics, the concept of
discounting values over a very distant future--known as
"intergenerational discounting"--is still subject to considerable
debate. Furthermore, no consensus exists among economists regarding the
exact value of the discount rate that should be used to discount values
that are spread over many hundreds or thousands of years.
To develop an appropriate discounting methodology and to choose the
discount rates for our analysis, we reviewed a number of economic
studies published in peer-reviewed journals that addressed
intergenerational discounting. Based on our review, we designed a
discounting methodology for use in our models. Because our review did
not find a consensus on discount rates, we used a range of values for
discount rates that we developed based on the economic studies we
reviewed, rather than using one single rate. Consequently, because we
used ranges for the discount rate along with the Monte Carlo simulation
process, the present value of estimated costs does not depend on one
single discount rate, but rather reflect a range of discount rate
values taken from peer-reviewed studies. (See appendix IV for details
of our modeling and discounting methodologies, assumptions, and
results.)
Centralized Storage Would Provide a Near-Term Alternative, Allowing
Other Options to Be Studied, but Faces Implementation Challenges:
Centralized storage would provide a near-term alternative for managing
nuclear waste, allowing the government to begin taking possession of
the waste within approximately the next 30 years, and giving additional
time for the nation to consider long-term waste management options.
However, centralized storage does not preclude the need for final
disposal of the waste. In addition, centralized storage faces several
implementation challenges including that DOE (1) lacks statutory
authority to provide centralized storage under NWPA, (2) is expected to
have difficulty finding a location willing to host a centralized
storage facility, and (3) faces potential transportation risks. The
estimated cost of implementing centralized storage for 100 years ranges
from $15 billion to $29 billion for 153,000 metric tons of nuclear
waste, and the total cost ranges from $23 billion to $81 billion if the
nuclear waste is centrally stored and then disposed in a geologic
repository.
Centralized Storage Would Provide a Near-Term Alternative to Managing
Nuclear Waste but Does Not Eliminate the Need for Final Disposal:
As the administration re-examines the Yucca Mountain repository and
national nuclear waste policy, centralized dry cask storage could
provide a near-term alternative for managing the waste that has
accumulated and will continue to accumulate. This would provide
additional time--NRC has stated that spent nuclear fuel storage is safe
and environmentally acceptable for a period on the order of 100 years--
to consider other long-term options that may involve alternative
policies and new technologies and allow some flexibility for their
implementation. For example, centralized storage would maintain nuclear
waste in interim dry storage configurations so that it could be easily
accessible for reprocessing in case the nation decided to pursue
reprocessing as a waste management option and developed technologies
that address current proliferation and cost concerns. In fact,
reprocessing facilities could be built near or adjacent to centralized
facilities to maximize efficiencies. However, even with reprocessing,
some of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in current
inventories would require final disposal.
Centralized storage would consolidate the nation's nuclear waste after
reactors are decommissioned, thereby decreasing the complexity of
securing and overseeing the waste and increasing the efficiency of
waste storage operations. This alternative would remove nuclear waste
from all DOE sites and nine shutdown reactor sites that have no
operations other than nuclear waste storage, allowing these sites to be
closed. Some of these storage sites occupy land that potentially could
be used for other purposes, imposing an opportunity cost on states and
communities that no longer receive the benefits of electricity
generation from the reactors. To compensate for this loss, industry
officials noted that at least two states where decommissioned sites are
located have tried to raise property taxes on the sites, and at one
site, the state collects a per cask fee for storage. In addition, the
continued storage of nuclear waste at decommissioned sites can cost the
power companies between about $4 million and $8 million per year,
according to several experts.
Centralized storage could allow reactor operators to thin-out spent
nuclear fuel assemblies from densely packed spent fuel pools and may
also prevent operating reactors from having to build the additional dry
storage capacity they would need if the nuclear waste remained on site.
According to an industry official, 28 reactor sites could have to add
dry storage facilities over the next 10 years in order to maintain a
desired capacity in their storage pools. These dry storage facilities
could cost about $30 million each, but this cost would vary widely by
site. In addition, some current reactor sites use older waste storage
systems and are near large cities or large bodies of fresh water used
for drinking or irrigation. Although NRC's licensing and inspection
process is designed to ensure that these existing facilities
appropriately protect public health and safety, new centralized
facilities could use state-of-the-art design technology and be located
in remote areas with fewer environmental hazards, in order to protect
public health and enhance safety.
Finally, if DOE uses centralized facilities to store commercial spent
nuclear fuel, this alternative could allow DOE to fulfill its
obligation to take custody of the commercial spent nuclear fuel until a
long-term strategy is implemented. As a result, DOE could curtail its
liabilities to the electric power companies, potentially saving the
government up to $500 million per year after 2020, as estimated by DOE.
The actual impact of centralized storage on the amount of the
liabilities would depend on several factors, including when centralized
storage is available, whether reactor sites had already built on-site
dry storage facilities for which the government may be liable for a
portion of the costs, how soon waste could be transported to a
centralized site, and the outcome of pending litigation that may affect
the government's total liability. DOE estimates that if various complex
statutory, regulatory, siting, construction, and financial issues were
expeditiously resolved, a centralized facility to accept nuclear waste
could begin operations as early as 6 years after its development began.
However, a centralized storage expert estimated that the process from
site selection until a centralized facility opens could take between 17
and 33 years.
Although centralized storage has a number of positive attributes, it
provides only an interim alternative and does not eliminate the need
for final disposal of the nuclear waste. To keep the waste safe and
secure, a centralized storage facility relies on active institutional
controls, such as monitoring, maintenance, and security. Over time, the
storage systems may degrade and institutional controls may be
disrupted, which could result in increased risk of radioactive exposure
to humans or the environment. For example, according to several experts
on dry cask systems, the vents on the casks--which allow for passive
cooling--must be periodically inspected to ensure no debris clogs them,
particularly during the first several decades when the spent nuclear
fuel is thermally hot. If the vents become clogged, the temperature in
the canister could rise, which could impact the life of the dry cask
storage system. Over a longer time frame, concrete on the exterior
casks could degrade, requiring more active maintenance. Although some
experts stated that the risk of radiation being released into the
environment may be low, such risks can be avoided by permanently
isolating the waste in a manner that does not require indefinite,
active institutional controls, such as disposal in a geologic
repository.
Legal and Community Challenges Contribute to the Complexity of
Implementing Centralized Storage:
A key challenge confronting the centralized storage alternative is the
lack of authority under NWPA for DOE to provide such storage.
Provisions in NWPA that allow DOE to arrange for centralized storage
have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones
in repository development that have not been met. For example, NWPA
authorized DOE to provide temporary storage for a limited amount of
spent nuclear fuel until a repository was available, but this authority
expired in 1990. Some industry representatives have stated that DOE
still has the authority to accept and store spent nuclear fuel under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, but DOE asserts that NWPA
limits its authority under the Atomic Energy Act.[Footnote 24] In
addition, NWPA provided authority for DOE to site, construct, and
operate a centralized storage facility, but such a facility could not
be constructed until NRC authorized construction of the Yucca Mountain
repository, and the facility could only store up to 10,000 metric tons
of nuclear waste until the repository started accepting spent nuclear
fuel. Therefore, unless provisions in NWPA were amended, centralized
storage would have to be funded, owned, and operated privately. A
privately operated centralized storage facility alternative, such as
the proposed Private Fuel Storage Facility in Utah, would not likely
resolve DOE's liabilities with the nuclear power companies.[Footnote
25]
A second, equally important, challenge to centralized storage is the
likelihood of opposition during site selection for a facility. Experts
noted that affected states and communities would raise concerns about
safety, security, and the likelihood that an interim centralized
storage facility could become a de facto permanent storage site if
progress is not being made on a permanent repository. Even if a local
community supports a centralized storage facility, the state may not.
For example, the Private Fuel Storage facility was generally supported
by the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Indians, on whose reservation
the facility was to be located, but the state of Utah and some tribal
members opposed its licensing and construction. Other states have
indicated their opposition to involuntarily hosting a centralized
facility through means such as the Western Governors' Association,
which issued a resolution stating that "no such facility, whether
publicly or privately owned, shall be located within the geographic
boundaries of a Western state without the written consent of the
governor."[Footnote 26] Some experts noted that a state or community
may be willing to serve as a host if substantial economic incentives
were offered and if the party building the site undertook a time-
consuming and expensive process of site characterization and safety
assessment. However, DOE officials stated that in their previous
experience--such as with the Nuclear Waste Negotiator about 15 to 20
years ago--they have found no incentive package that has successfully
encouraged a state to voluntarily host a site.
A third challenge to centralized storage is that nuclear waste would
likely have to be transported twice--once to the centralized site and
once to a permanent repository--if a centralized site were not
colocated with a repository.[Footnote 27] Therefore, the total distance
over which nuclear waste is transported is likely to be greater than
with other alternatives, an important factor because, according to one
expert, transportation risk is directly tied to this distance. However,
according to DOE, nuclear waste has been safely transported in the
United States since the 1960s and National Academy of Sciences, NRC,
and DOE-sponsored reports have found that the associated risks are well
understood and generally low. Yet, there are also perceived risks
associated with nuclear waste transportation that can result in lower
property values along transportation routes, reductions in tourism, and
increased anxiety that create community opposition to nuclear waste
transportation. According to experts, transportation risks could be
mitigated through such means as shipping the least radioactive fuel
first, using trains that only transport nuclear waste, and identifying
routes that minimize possible impacts on highly populated areas. In
addition, the hazards associated with transportation from a centralized
facility to a repository would decline as the waste decayed and became
less radioactive at the centralized facility.
Cost Ranges for Centralized Storage Will Vary Depending on Waste Volume
and Final Disposition:
As shown in table 4, our models generated cost ranges from $23 billion
to $81 billion for the centralized storage of 153,000 metric tons of
spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste for 100 years followed by
geologic disposal. For centralized storage without disposal, costs
would range from $12 billion to $20 billion for 70,000 metric tons of
waste and from $15 billion to $29 billion for 153,000 metric tons of
waste. These centralized model scenarios include the cost of on-site
operations required to package and prepare the waste for
transportation, such as storing the waste in dry-cask storage until it
is transported off site, developing and operating a system to transport
the waste to centralized storage, and constructing and operating two
centralized storage facilities. (See appendix IV for information about
our modeling methodology, assumptions, and results.)
Table 4: Estimated Cost Range for Each Centralized Storage Scenario
(Dollars in billions):
Storage of 70,000 metric tons;
Time period covered[A]: 2009 to 2108 (100 years);
2009 present value estimate range: $12 to $20.
Storage of 153,000 metric tons;
Time period covered[A]: 2009 to 2108 (100 years);
2009 present value estimate range: $15 to $29.
Storage of 153,000 metric tons, with disposal in a permanent repository
after 100 years;
Time period covered[A]: 2009 to 2240 (232 years[B]);
2009 present value estimate range: $23 to $81.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by nuclear waste management
experts and DOE.
[A] See appendix IV for an explanation of the periods covered by the
scenarios.
[B] This period was chosen to capture costs of the hypothetical
geologic repository through closure.
[End of table]
Actual centralized storage costs may be more or less than these cost
ranges if a different centralized storage scenario is implemented. For
example, our models assume that there would be two centralized
facilities, but licensing, construction, and operations and maintenance
costs would be greater if there were more than two facilities and lower
if there was only one facility. Some experts told us that centralized
storage would likely be implemented with only one facility because it
would be too difficult to site two. But other experts noted that having
more sites could reduce the number of miles traveled by the waste and
provide a greater degree of geographic equity. The length of time the
nuclear waste is stored could also impact the cost ranges, particularly
if the nuclear waste were stored for less than or more than the time
period assumed in our model. For periods longer than 100 years, experts
told us that the dry storage cask systems may be subject to degradation
and require repackaging, substantially raising the costs, as well as
the level of uncertainty in those costs. Transportation is another area
where costs could vary if, for example, transportation was not by rail
or if the transportation system differed significantly from what is
assumed in our models.
Furthermore, costs could be outside our ranges if the final disposition
of the waste is different. Our scenario that includes geologic disposal
is based on the current cost projections for Yucca Mountain, but these
costs could be significantly different for another repository site or
if much of the nuclear waste is reprocessed. A different geologic
repository would have unique site characterization costs, may use an
entirely different design than Yucca Mountain, and may be more or less
difficult to build. Also, reprocessing could contribute significantly
to the cost of an alternative. For example, we previously reported that
construction of a reprocessing plant with an annual production
throughput of 3,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel could cost about
$44 billion.[Footnote 28] Studies analyzed by the Congressional Budget
Office estimate that once a reprocessing plant is constructed, spent
nuclear fuel could be reprocessed at between $610,000 and $1.4 million
per-metric-ton, when adjusted to 2009 constant dollars.[Footnote 29]
This would result in an annual cost of about $2 billion to $4 billion,
assuming a throughput of 3,000 metric tons per year.
Finally, the actual cost of implementing one of our centralized storage
scenarios would likely be higher than our estimated ranges indicate
because our models omit several location-specific costs. These costs
could not be quantified in our generic models because we did not make
an assumption about the specific location of the centralized
facilities. For example, a few experts noted that incentives may be
given a state or locality as a basis for allowing a centralized
facility to be built, but the incentive amount may vary from location
to location based on what agreement is reached. Also, several experts
said that rail construction may be required for some locations, which
could add significant cost depending on the distance of new rail line
required at a specific location. Experts could not provide data for
these location-dependent costs to any degree of certainty, so we did
not use them in our models. Also, the funding source for government-run
centralized storage is unclear. The Nuclear Waste Fund, which electric
power companies pay into, was established by NWPA to fund a permanent
repository and cannot be used to pay for centralized storage without
amending the act. Without such a change, the cost for the federal
government to implement this alternative would likely have to be borne
by the taxpayers.
On-Site Storage Would Provide an Intermediate Option with Minimal
Effort but Poses Challenges that Could Increase Over Time:
On-site storage of nuclear waste provides an intermediate option to
manage the waste until the government can take possession of it,
requiring minimal effort to change from what the nation is currently
doing to manage its waste. In the meantime, other longer term policies
and strategies could be considered. Such strategies would eventually be
required because the on-site storage alternative would not eliminate
the need for final disposal of the waste. Some experts believe that
legal, community, and technical challenges associated with on-site
storage will intensify as the waste remains on site without plans for
final disposition because, for example, communities are more likely to
oppose recertification of on-site storage. The estimated cost to
continue storing 153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste on site for 100
years range from $13 billion to $34 billion, and total costs would
range from $20 billion to $97 billion if the nuclear waste is stored on
site for 100 years and then disposed in a geologic repository.
On-Site Storage Would Require Minimal Near-Term Logistics and Provide
Time to Decide on Long-Term Waste Management Strategies:
Because of delays in the Yucca Mountain repository, on-site storage has
continued as the nation's strategy for managing nuclear waste, thus its
continuation would require minimal near-term effort and allow time for
the nation to consider alternative long-term nuclear waste management
options. This alternative maintains the waste in a configuration where
it is readily retrievable for reprocessing or other disposition,
according to an expert. However, like centralized storage, on-site
storage is an interim strategy that relies on active institutional
controls, such as monitoring, maintenance, and security. To permanently
isolate the waste from humans and the environment without the need for
active institutional controls some form of final disposal would be
required, even if some of the waste were reprocessed.
The additional time in on-site storage may also make the waste safer to
handle because older spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste has had a
chance to cool and become less radioactive. As a result, on-site
storage could reduce transportation risks, particularly in the near-
term, since the nuclear waste would be cooler and less radioactive when
it is finally transported to a repository. In addition, some experts
state that older, cooler waste may provide more predictability in
repository performance and be some degree safer than younger, hotter
waste. However, NRC cautioned that the ability to handle the waste more
safely in the future also depends on other factors, including how the
waste or waste packages might degrade over time. In particular, NRC
stated that there are many uncertainties with the behavior of spent
nuclear fuel as it ages, such as potential fracturing of the structural
assemblies, possibly increasing the risks of release. If the waste has
to be repackaged, for example, the process may require additional
safety measures. Some experts noted that continuing to store nuclear
waste on site would be more equitable than consolidating it in one or a
few areas. As a result, the waste, along with its associated risks,
would be kept in the location where the electrical power was generated,
leaving the responsibility and risks of the waste in the communities
that benefited from its generation.
On-Site Storage Poses Legal, Community, and Technical Challenges that
Are Likely to Intensify over Time:
With on-site storage of DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste, DOE would have difficulty meeting enforceable agreements with
states, which could result in significant costs being incurred the
longer spent nuclear fuel remains on site. In addition to Idaho's
agreement to impose a penalty of $60,000 per day if spent nuclear fuel
is not removed from the state by 2035, DOE has an agreement with
Colorado stating that if the spent fuel at Fort St. Vrain is not
removed by January 1, 2035, the government will, subject to certain
conditions, pay the state $15,000 per day until it is removed. Other
states where DOE spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste are currently
stored may seek similar penalties if the spent fuel and waste remain on-
site with no progress toward a permanent repository or centralized
storage facility.
A second challenge is the cost due to the government's possible legal
liabilities to commercial reactor operators. Leaving waste on site
under the responsibility of the electric power companies does not
relieve the government of its obligation to take custody of the waste,
thus the liability debt could continue to mount. For every year after
2020 that DOE fails to take custody of the waste in accordance with its
contracts with the reactor operators, DOE estimates that the government
will continue to accumulate up to $500 million per year beyond the
estimated $12 billion in liabilities that will have accrued up to that
point; however, the outcome of pending litigation could substantially
affect the government's total liability.[Footnote 30] The government
will no longer incur these costs if DOE takes custody of the waste.
Some representatives from industry have stated that it is not practical
for DOE to take custody of the waste at commercial reactor sites.
Moreover, some electric power company executives have stated that their
ratepayers are paying for DOE to provide a geologic repository through
their contributions to the Nuclear Waste Fund, and the executives
believe that simply taking custody of the waste is not sufficient. A
DOE official stated that if DOE were to take custody of the waste on
site, it would be a complex undertaking due to considerations such as
liability for accidents.
Third, continued use of on-site storage would likely also face
community opposition. Some experts noted that without progress on a
centralized storage facility or repository site to which waste will be
moved, some state and local opposition to reactor storage site
recertification will increase, and so will challenges to nuclear power
companies' applications for reactor license extensions and combined
licenses to construct and operate new reactors. Also, experts noted
that many commercial reactor sites are not suitable for long-term
storage, and none has had an environmental review to assess the impacts
of storing nuclear waste at the site beyond the period for which it is
currently licensed. One expert noted that if on-site storage were to
become a waste management policy, the long-term health, safety, and
environmental risks at each site would have to be evaluated. Because
waste storage would extend beyond the life of nuclear power reactors,
decommissioned reactor sites would not be available for other purposes,
and the former reactor operators may have to stay in business for the
sole purpose of storing nuclear waste.
Finally, although dry cask storage is considered reliable in the short
term, the longer-term costs, maintenance requirements, and security
requirements are not well understood. Many experts said waste packages
will likely retain their integrity for at least 100 years, but
eventually dry storage systems may begin to degrade and the waste in
those systems would have to be repackaged. However, commercial dry
storage systems have only been in existence since 1986, so nuclear
utilities have little experience with long-term system degradation and
requirements for repackaging. Some experts suggested that only the
outer protective cask would require replacement, but the inner canister
would not have to be replaced. Yet, other experts said that, over time,
the inner canister would also be exposed to environmental conditions by
vents in the outer cask, which could cause corrosion and require a
total system replacement. In addition, experts disagreed on the
relative safety risks and costs associated with using spent fuel pools
to transfer the waste during repackaging compared to using a dry
transfer system, which industry representatives said had not been used
on a commercial scale. Finally, future security requirements for
extended storage are uncertain because as spent nuclear waste ages and
becomes cooler and less radioactive, it becomes less lethal to anyone
attempting to handle it without protective shielding. For example, a
spent nuclear fuel assembly can lose nearly 80 percent of its heat 5
years after it has been removed from a reactor, thereby reducing one of
the inherent deterrents to thieves and terrorists attempting to steal
or sabotage the spent nuclear fuel and potentially creating a need for
costly new security measures.
Cost Ranges for On-Site Storage Will Vary Depending on Waste Volume,
Final Disposition, and Duration of Storage:
As shown in table 5, our models generated cost ranges from $20 billion
to $97 billion for the on-site storage of 153,000 metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste for 100 years followed by geologic
disposal. For only on-site storage for 100 years without disposal,
costs would range from $10 billion to $26 billion for 70,000 metric
tons of waste and from $13 billion to $34 billion for 153,000 metric
tons of waste. On-site storage costs would increase significantly if
the waste were stored for longer periods--storing 153,000 metric tons
on site for 500 years would cost from $34 billion to $225 billion--
because it would have to be repackaged every 100 years for safety. The
on-site storage model scenarios include the costs of on-site operations
required to package the waste into dry canister storage, build
additional dry storage at the reactor sites, prepare the waste for
transportation, and operate and maintain the on-site storage
facilities. Most of the costs for the first 100 years would result from
the initial loading of materials into dry storage systems. (See
appendix IV for information on our modeling methodology, assumptions,
and results.)
Table 5: Estimated Cost Range for Each On-site Storage Scenario
(Dollars in billions):
Storage of 70,000 metric tons;
Period covered[A]: 2009 to 2108 (100 years);
2009 present value estimate range: $10 to $26.
Storage of 153,000 metric tons;
Period covered[A]: 2009 to 2108 (100 years);
2009 present value estimate range: $13 to $34.
Storage of 153,000 metric tons, with disposal in a permanent repository
after 100 years;
Period covered[A]: 2009 to 2240 (232 years[B]);
2009 present value estimate range: $20 to $97.
Storage of 153,000 metric tons with repackaging every 100 years;
Period covered[A]: 2009 to 2508 (500 years);
2009 present value estimate range: $34 to $225.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by nuclear waste management
experts and DOE.
[A] See appendix IV for an explanation of the periods covered by the
scenarios.
[B] This period was chosen to capture costs of the hypothetical
geologic repository through closure.
[End of table]
Actual on-site storage costs may be more or less than these cost ranges
if a different on-site storage scenario is implemented. For example, to
keep it distinct from the centralized storage models, our on-site
storage models assume that there would be no transportation or
consolidation of waste between the reactor sites. However, several
experts noted that in an actual on-site storage scenario, reactor
operators would likely consolidate their waste to make operations more
efficient and reduce costs. Also, as with the centralized storage
alternative, costs for the on-site storage scenario that includes
geologic disposal could differ for a repository site other than Yucca
Mountain or for additional waste management technologies.
Finally, our models did not include certain costs that were either
location-specific or could not be predicted sufficiently to be
quantified for our purposes, which would make the actual costs of on-
site storage higher than our cost ranges. For example, the taxes and
fees associated with on-site storage could vary significantly by state
and over time. Also, repackaging operations in our 500-year on-site
storage scenario would generate low-level waste that would require
disposal. However, the amount of waste generated and the associated
disposal costs could vary depending on the techniques used for
repackaging. Finally, the total amount of the government's liability
for failure to begin taking spent nuclear fuel for disposal in 1998
will depend on the outcome of pending and future litigation.
Like the centralized storage alternative, the funding source for the on-
site storage alternative is uncertain. Currently, the reactor operators
have been paying for the cost to store the waste, but have filed
lawsuits to be compensated for storage costs of waste that the federal
government was required to take title to under standard contracts.
Payments resulting from these lawsuits have come from the Department of
the Treasury's judgment fund, which is funded by the taxpayer, because
a court determined that the Nuclear Waste Fund could not be used to
compensate electric power companies for their storage costs. Without
legislative or contractual changes--such as allowing the Nuclear Waste
Fund to be used for on-site storage--taxpayers would likely bear the
ultimate costs for on-site storage.
Concluding Observations:
Developing a long-term national strategy for safely and securely
managing the nation's high-level nuclear waste is a complex undertaking
that must balance health, social, environmental, security, and
financial factors. In addition, virtually any strategy considered will
face many political, legal, and regulatory challenges in its
implementation. Any strategy selected will need to have geologic
disposal as a final disposition pathway. In the case of the Yucca
Mountain repository, these challenges have left the nation with nearly
three decades of experience. In moving forward, whether the nation
commits to the same or a different waste management strategy, federal
agencies, industry, and policy makers at all levels of government can
benefit from the lessons of Yucca Mountain. In particular, stakeholders
can better understand the need for a sustainable national focus and
community commitment. Federal agencies, industry, and policymakers may
also want to consider a strategy of complementary and parallel interim
and long-term disposal options--similar to those being pursued by some
other nations--which might provide the federal government with maximum
flexibility, since it would allow time to work with local communities
and to pursue research and development efforts in key areas, such as
reprocessing.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their review
and comment. In their written comments, DOE and NRC generally agreed
with the report. (See apps. V and VI.) In addition, both DOE and NRC
provided comments to improve the draft report's technical accuracy,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We also discussed the draft report with representatives of the Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the
State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. These representatives
provided comments to clarify information in the draft report, which we
have incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to other appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy,
the Chairman of NRC, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and other interested parties. The report also will be available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Mark E. Gaffigan:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
For this report we examined (1) the key attributes, challenges, and
costs of the Yucca Mountain repository; (2) alternative nuclear waste
management approaches; (3) the key attributes, challenges, and costs of
storing the nuclear waste at two centralized sites; and (4) the key
attributes, challenges, and costs of continuing to store the nuclear
waste at its current locations.
Developing Information on Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs of
Yucca Mountain:
To provide information on the key attributes and challenges of the
Yucca Mountain repository, we reviewed documents and interviewed
officials from the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management and Office of Environmental Management;
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Division of Spent Fuel
Storage and Transportation and Division of High Level Waste Repository
Safety, both within the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards; and the Department of Justice's Civil Division. We also
reviewed documents and interviewed representatives from the National
Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and
other concerned groups. Once we developed our preliminary analysis of
Yucca Mountain's key attributes and challenges, we solicited input from
nuclear waste management experts. (See appendix II for our methodology
for soliciting comments from nuclear waste management experts and
appendix III for a list of these experts.)
To analyze the costs for the Yucca Mountain repository through to
closure, we started with the cost information in DOE's Yucca Mountain
Total System Lifecycle Cost report, which used 122,100 metric tons of
nuclear waste in its analysis.[Footnote 31] We asked DOE officials to
provide a breakdown of the component costs on a per-metric-ton basis
that DOE used in the Total System Lifecycle Cost report. We used this
information to calculate the costs of a repository at Yucca Mountain
for 70,000 metric tons and 153,000 metric tons, changing certain
component costs based on the ratio between 70,000 and 122,100 or
153,000 and 122,100. For example, we modified the cost of constructing
the tunnels for emplacing the waste for the 70,000-metric-ton scenario
by 0.57, the ratio of 70,000 metric tons to 122,100 metric tons. We
applied this approach to component costs that would be impacted by the
ratio difference, particularly for transporting and emplacing the waste
and installing drip shields. We also incorporated DOE's cost estimates
for potential delays to licensing the Yucca Mountain repository into
our analysis and made modifications to the analysis based on comments
by cognizant DOE officials. Finally, we discounted DOE's costs, which
were in 2008 constant dollars, to 2009 present value using the
methodology described in appendix IV.
Examining and Identifying Nuclear Waste Management Alternatives:
To examine and identify alternatives, we started with a series of
interviews among federal and state officials and industry
representatives. We also gathered and reviewed numerous studies and
reports on managing nuclear waste--along with interviewing the authors
of many of these studies--from federal agencies, the National Academy
of Sciences, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the American Physical Society,
Harvard University, the Boston Consulting Group, and the Electric Power
Research Institute. To better understand how commercial spent nuclear
fuel is stored, we visited the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant in Illinois
and the Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey, which both store
spent nuclear fuel in pools and in dry cask storage. We also visited
DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and Fort St. Vrain site in
Colorado to observe how DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste are processed and stored.
As we began to identify potential alternatives to analyze, we shared
our initial approach and methodology with nuclear waste management
experts--including members of the National Academy of Sciences and the
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board to obtain their feedback--and
revised our approach accordingly. Many of these experts advised us to
develop generic, hypothetical alternatives with clearly defined
assumptions about technology and environmental conditions. Industry
representatives and other experts advised us that trying to account for
the thousands of variables relating to geography, the environment,
regional regulatory differences, or differences in business models
would result in infeasible and unmanageable models. They also advised
us against trying to predict changes in the future for technologies or
environmental conditions because they would purely conjectural and fall
beyond the scope of this analysis.
Based on this information, we identified two generic, hypothetical
alternatives to use as the basis of our analysis: centralized storage
and on-site storage. Within each of these alternatives, we identified
different scenarios that examined the costs associated with the
management of 70,000 metric tons and 153,000 metric tons of nuclear
waste and whether or not the waste is shipped to a repository for
disposal after 100 years.
Once we identified the alternatives, we again consulted with experts to
establish assumptions regarding commercial spent nuclear fuel
management and its associated components to define the scope and
specific processes that would be included in each alternative. To
identify a more complete, qualified list of nuclear waste management
experts with relevant experience who could provide and critique this
information, we used a technique known as snowballing. We started with
experts in the field who were known to us, primarily from DOE, NRC,
National Council of State Legislators, the State of Nevada Agency for
Nuclear Projects, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and asked them to refer
us to other experts, focusing on U.S.-based experts. We then contacted
these individuals and asked for additional referrals. We continued this
iterative process until additional interviews did not lead us to any
new names or we determined that the qualified experts in a given
technical area had been exhausted.
We conducted an initial interview with each of these experts by asking
them questions about the nature and extent of their expertise and their
views on the Yucca Mountain repository. Specifically, we asked each
expert:
* What is the nature of your expertise? How many years have you been
doing work in this area? Does your expertise allow you to comment on
planning assumptions and costs of waste management related to storage,
disposal, or transport?
* If you were to classify yourself in relation to the Yucca Mountain
repository, would you classify yourself as a proponent, an opponent, an
independent, an undecided or uncommitted, or some combination of these?
We then narrowed our list down to those individuals who identified
themselves or whom others identified as having current, nationally
recognized expertise in areas of nuclear waste management that were
relevant to our analysis. For balance, we ensured that we included
experts who reflected (1) key technical areas of waste management; (2)
a range of industry, government, academia, and concerned groups; and
(3) a variety of viewpoints on the Yucca Mountain repository. (See
appendix III for 147 experts we contacted.)
Once we developed our list of experts, we classified them into three
groups:
* Those whose expertise would allow them to provide us with specific
information and advice on the processes that should be included in each
alternative and the best estimates of expected cost ranges for the
components of each alternative, such as a typical or reasonable price
for a dry cask storage.
* Those who could weigh in on these estimates, as well as give us
insight and comments on assumptions that we planned to use to define
our alternatives.
* Those whose expertise was not in areas of component costs, but who
could nonetheless give us valuable information on other assumptions,
such as transportation logistics.
To define our alternatives and develop the assumptions and cost
components we needed for our analysis, we started with the experts from
the first group who had the most direct and reliable knowledge of the
processes and costs associated with the alternatives we identified.
This group consisted of seven experts and included federal government
officials and representatives from industry. We worked closely with
these experts to identify the key assumptions that would establish the
scope of our alternatives, the more specific assumptions to identify
the processes associated with each alternative, the components of these
processes that we could quantify in terms of cost, and the level of
uncertainty associated with each component cost. For example, two of
the experts in this first group told us that for the on-site
alternative, commercial reactor sites that did not already have
independent spent nuclear fuel storage installations would have to
build them during the next 10 years and that the cost for licensing,
design, and construction of each installation would range from $24
million to $36 million. Once we had gathered our initial assumptions
and cost components, we used a data collection instrument to solicit
comments on them from all of our experts. We then used the experts'
comments to refine our assumptions and component costs. (See appendix
II for our methodology for consulting with this larger group of nuclear
waste management experts.)
DOE officials provided assumptions and cost data for managing DOE spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste, which we incorporated into our
analysis of the centralized storage and on-site storage alternatives.
These assumptions and cost information covered management of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste at DOE's Idaho National Laboratory,
Hanford Reservation, Savannah River Site, and West Valley site.
Developing Information on Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs of the
Centralized Storage and On-Site Storage Alternatives:
To gather information on the key attributes and challenges of our
alternatives, we interviewed agency officials and nuclear waste
management experts from industry, academic institutions, and concerned
groups. We also reviewed the reports and studies and visited the
locations that were mentioned in the previous section. To ensure that
the attributes and challenges we developed were accurate,
comprehensive, and balanced, we asked our snowballed list of experts to
provide their comments on our work, using the data collection
instrument that is described in appendix II. We used the comments that
we received to expand the attributes or challenges on our list or,
where necessary, to modify our characterization of individual
attributes or challenges.
To generate cost ranges for the centralized storage and on-site storage
alternatives, we developed four large-scale cost models that analyzed
the costs for each alternative of storing 70,000 metric tons and
153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste for 100 years followed by disposal
in a geologic repository. (See appendix IV.) We also generated cost
ranges for each alternative of storing the waste for 100 years without
including the cost of subsequent disposal in a geologic repository for
storing 153,000 metric tons of waste on site for 500 years. For each
model, which rely upon data and assumptions provided by nuclear waste
management experts, the cost range was based on the annual volume of
commercial spent nuclear fuel that became ready to be packaged and
stored in each year. In general, each model started in 2009 by annually
tracking costs of initial packaging and related costs for the first 100
years and for every 100 years thereafter if the waste was to remain on
site and be repackaged. Since our models analyzed only the costs
associated with storing commercial nuclear waste management, we
augmented them with DOE's cost data for (1) managing its spent nuclear
fuel and high-level waste and (2) constructing and operating a
permanent repository. Specifically, we used DOE's estimated costs for
the Yucca Mountain repository to represent cost for a hypothetical
permanent repository.[Footnote 32]
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to October 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Our Methodology for Obtaining Comments from Nuclear Waste
Management Experts:
As discussed in appendix I, we gathered the assumptions and associated
component costs used to define our nuclear waste management
alternatives by consulting with experts in an iterative process of
identifying initial assumptions and component costs and revising them
based on expert comments. This appendix (1) describes the data
collection instrument we used to obtain comments on the initial
assumptions and component costs, (2) describes how we analyzed the
comments and revised our assumptions, and (3) provides a list of the
assumptions and cost data that we derived through this process and used
in our cost models.
To obtain comments from a broad group of nuclear waste management
experts, we compiled the initial assumptions and component costs that
we gathered from a small group of experts into a data collection
instrument that included:
* a description of the Yucca Mountain repository and our proposed
nuclear waste management alternatives--on-site storage and centralized
storage--and attributes and challenges associated with them;
* our initial assumptions that would identify and define the processes,
time frames, and major components used to bound our hypothetical
centralized and on-site storage alternatives;
* the major component costs of each alternative, including definitions
and initial cost data; and:
* components associated with each alternative with a high degree of
uncertainty that we did not attempt to quantify in terms of costs.
The data collection instrument asked the experts to answer specific
questions about each piece of information that we provided (see table
6).
Table 6: Our Data Collection Instrument for Nuclear Waste Management
Experts:
Section of the data collection instrument: Description of each
alternative and its attributes and challenges;
Questions asked of the experts: What additional issues do you suggest
we consider, or is there one listed that you would modify?.
Section of the data collection instrument: List of initial assumptions
for each alternative;
Questions asked of the experts: To what extent to you think this
assumption is reasonable or unreasonable?[A];
If this assumption does not seem reasonable, please describe[A];
Are there additional assumptions defining our scenario not mentioned
above that you would recommend GAO consider? Please describe.
Section of the data collection instrument: List of component costs and
initial cost data;
Questions asked of the experts: Is this estimate reasonable or
unreasonable?[A];
If this estimate is not reasonable, please describe why (estimate too
high, estimate too low, range too broad, range too narrow) and, if
possible, provide specific alternative cost estimates[A];
Please tell us anything about this cost item that might make it
difficult (or not difficult) to estimate accurately?[A]
Are there additional cost categories not mentioned above that you would
recommend GAO consider? Please provide a generic cost estimate or
potential source of such an estimate, if possible.
Section of the data collection instrument: List of uncertain
components;
Questions asked of the experts: In your opinion, do you think any of
these items can be quantified? If so, please provide suggestions for
how to quantify them, along with supporting data, if available.
Source: GAO.
[A] This question was asked after each assumption or component.
[End of table]
We pretested our instrument with several individual experts to ensure
that our questions were clear and would provide us with the information
that we needed, and then refined the instrument accordingly. Next, we
sent the instrument to 114 experts who were identified through our
snowballing methodology (see apps. I and III). Each expert received the
sections of our data collection instrument that included the attributes
and challenges of the alternatives and the initial assumptions, but
only those experts with the type and level of expertise to comment on
costs received the cost component sections.
We received 67 sets of comments from independent experts and experts
representing industry, federal government, state governments, and other
concerned groups.[Footnote 33] These experts also represented a range
of viewpoints on the Yucca Mountain repository. Each of their responses
was compiled into a database organized by each individual assumption or
cost element for the on-site storage and centralized interim storage
alternatives.
To arrive at the final assumptions and cost component data for our
models, we qualitatively analyzed the experts' comments. The comments
we received on the assumptions differed in nature from those we
received on the component costs, so our analysis and disposition of
comments differed slightly. For the assumptions, we took the comments
on each assumption that were made when an expert did not believe it was
entirely reasonable and grouped comments that were similar. We
determined the relevance of a comment to our assumption based on
whether the comment provided a basis upon which we could modify the
assumption or was within the scope or capability of our models. For
example, we received several comments about how an assumption may be
affected by nuclear waste from new reactors, including potential
liabilities if the Department of Energy (DOE) does not take custody of
that waste, but in the key assumptions defining our alternatives, we
explicitly excluded new reactors because we could not predict how many
new reactors would be built, when they would operate, and the amount of
waste that they would generate. For those comments that were relevant,
we weighed the expertise of those making the comments and determined
whether the balance of the comments warranted a modification to our
preliminary assumption. In some instances, we conducted followup
interviews with selected experts to clarify issues that the broad group
of experts raised.
For the component costs, we organized the comments on a particular
component based on whether an expert thought the cost and uncertainty
range was reasonable, too high, too low, the range was too broad, or
the range was too narrow. We developed a ranking system to identify
which experts had the greatest degree of direct experience or knowledge
with the cost and weighed their comments accordingly to determine
whether our preliminary cost should be modified. Also, we took into
account the incidence of expert agreement or disagreement when deciding
how much uncertainty to apply to a particular cost.
Through this analysis, we determined that the preponderance of our
preliminary assumptions and cost data were reasonable for use in our
models either because the experts generally agreed it was reasonable,
or the experts who thought it was reasonable had a greater degree of
relevant expertise or knowledge than those who commented otherwise.
However, some of the experts' responses indicated that a modification
to our model was needed. Table 7 presents a summary of the
modifications we made to our model assumptions and cost data based on
the expert comments received.
Table 7: Initial Assumptions and Component Cost Estimates for Our
Centralized Storage and On-site Storage Alternatives and Modifications
Made Based on Experts' Responses to Our Data Collection Instrument:
Centralized storage:
Key aspect of the alternative: Number of sites;
Initial key assumptions: Two sites located in different geographic
regions of the country;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor operations;
Initial key assumptions: Current reactors will receive, if they have
not already, a 20-year license extension and will operate until the end
of their licensed life;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation;
Initial key assumptions: When reactors cease operations, they will be
decommissioned and only spent nuclear fuel dry storage will remain on
site;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation;
Initial key assumptions: Transportation will be the similar to what is
assumed for the Yucca Mountain repository--via rail, using dedicated
trains;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Repackaging;
Initial key assumptions: Waste will not be repackaged at the
centralized facilities[A];
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Final disposition;
Initial key assumptions: Waste will be stored at the centralized sites
until 100 years from now and then be disposed of in a geologic
repository[B];
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Process:
Key aspect of the alternative: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial key assumptions: Reactor operators will only move the amount of
waste from pools into dry storage that is necessary to preserve full-
core offload capability--the capacity in their spent nuclear fuel pools
to store all of the fuel in the reactor core;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial key assumptions: The overall amount of fuel moved from the
pools to dry storage will be equal to estimated annual rates at which
fuel is discharged from the reactors;
Centralized storage: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial key assumptions: Dual-purpose canister systems will be used
until Transportation, Aging and Disposal systems become widely
available;
Modifications based on expert comments: Only dual-purpose systems will
be used.
Key aspect of the alternative: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial key assumptions: Transportation, Aging and Disposal systems
will have a capacity of 8.5 metric tons plus or minus 5 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: None (although this assumption
became obsolete when we no longer assumed transportation, aging, and
disposal systems would be used).
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor site dry storage;
Initial key assumptions: All reactor sites without dry storage
facilities will construct them at the time they lose full-core offload
capability--the capacity in their spent nuclear fuel pools to store all
of the fuel in the reactor core;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor site dry storage;
Initial key assumptions: Dry storage operations and maintenance costs
vary by nature of the site, such as operating versus decommissioned;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor site dry storage;
Initial key assumptions: On average, 1.5 decommissioned reactor sites
will be cleared of their waste each year;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation to centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions: Once running at full capacity, transportation
rates will be approximately 3,000 metric tons per year (what is assumed
for Yucca Mountain);
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation to centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions: Waste from decommissioned sites and GE Morris
will be transported before waste from operating sites. This waste would
not be converted to dry storage prior to transportation;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation to centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions: 133 transportation casks will be required
(what is assumed for Yucca Mountain) and will be acquired over a 7-year
period;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation to centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions: No new rail construction will be required;
Centralized storage: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation to centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions: Transportation system infrastructure, system
support, and operations will be analogous to what DOE assumes for Yucca
Mountain;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Centralized storage;
Initial key assumptions:The two centralized facilities will begin
accepting waste in 2028;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Geologic disposal;
Initial key assumptions:The sites will be built at existing federal
facilities and be owned and operated by DOE;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Geologic disposal;
Initial key assumptions: Waste will not be repackaged before being
disposed of in a permanent repository;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Geologic disposal;
Initial key assumptions: Any spent nuclear fuel not originally packaged
into a Transportation, Aging and Disposal canister will be repackaged
at the geologic repository;
Modifications based on expert comments: This assumption became obsolete
when we no longer assumed transportation, aging, and disposal canisters
would be used.
Process component:
Key aspect of the alternative: Dry cask storage systems:
* transportation, aging, and disposal;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $1.1 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* Obsolete.
Key aspect of the alternative: Dry cask storage systems:
* dual-purpose;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $900,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $900,000 plus or minus 25 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Loading operations:
* cost per cask to load fuel into dry storage canisters;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $150,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $275,000 plus or minus 45 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Loading operations:
* loading campaign consisting, on average, of five casks (including set-
up, clean up, training, and labor);
Initial component cost estimate:
* $750,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Design, licensing, and construction of
dry storage installations at reactor sites;
Initial component cost estimate: $30 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: $30 million plus or minus 40
percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Annual operations and maintenance:
* operating reactor site dry storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $100,000 plus or minus 20 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $100,000 plus or minus 50 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Annual operations and maintenance:
* decommissioned reactor site dry storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $3 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $4.5 million plus or minus 40 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Annual operations and maintenance:
* decommissioned reactor site wet storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $10 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation casks;
Initial component cost estimate: $4.5 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Loading for transportation cost per
canister;
Initial component cost estimate: $250,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: $150,000 plus or minus 40
percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation infrastructure:
* rolling stock and facilities;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $400 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation infrastructure:
* transportation system support;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $2.5 billion plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation operations per-metric-
ton;
Initial component cost estimate: $26,000 plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Centralized facility licensing and
construction:
* 70,000 metric ton facility;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $168 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $218 million plus or minus 20 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Centralized facility licensing and
construction:
* 153,000 metric ton facility;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $232 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments:
* $302 million plus or minus 20 percent.
Key aspect of the alternative: Centralized facility annual operations
and maintenance;
Initial component cost estimate: $8.8 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modifications based on expert comments: None.
On-site storage:
Key aspect of the alternative: Number of commercial sites;
Initial key assumption: Commercial spent nuclear fuel spent nuclear
fuel will be stored at 75 reactor sites;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Number of DOE sites;
Initial key assumption: DOE high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel
will remain at five current sites;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor operations;
Initial key assumption: Current reactors will receive, if they have not
already, a 20-year license extension and will operate until the end of
their licensed life;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Reactor operations;
Initial key assumption: When reactors cease operations, they will be
decommissioned and only spent nuclear fuel dry storage will remain on
site;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Transportation;
Initial key assumption: There will be no transportation of waste
between sites;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Key aspect of the alternative: Repackaging;
Initial key assumption: Dry cask storage systems would require
repackaging every 100 years;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial process assumption: Reactor operators will use generic dual-
purpose canisters for dry storage with a capacity of 13 metric tons
plus or minus 5 percent;
Modification based on expert comments: Range increased to plus or minus
15 percent.
Process: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial process assumption: Reactor operators will only move the amount
of waste from pools into dry storage that is necessary to preserve full-
core offload capability;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process: Waste packaged into dry storage casks;
Initial process assumption: The overall amount of fuel moved from the
pools to dry storage will be equal to estimated annual rates at which
fuel is discharged from the reactors;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process: Reactor site dry storage;
Initial process assumption: All reactor sites without dry storage
facilities will construct them at the time they lose full-core offload
capability;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process: Reactor site dry storage;
Initial process assumption: Dry storage operations and maintenance
costs vary by nature of the site, such as operating versus
decommissioned;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process: Repackaging;
Initial process assumption: Wet transfer facilities will need to be
built at each site for every packaging interval (i.e. every 100 years);
Modification based on expert comments: We will assume a generic
transfer system that could be either wet or dry.
Process: Repackaging;
Initial process assumption: All sites will need to replace their dry
storage pad and infrastructure every 100 years when they repackage;
Modification based on expert comments: None.
Process component: Dry cask storage system;
Initial component cost estimate: $900,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modification based on expert comments: $900,000 plus or minus 25
percent.
Process component: Loading operations:
* cost per cask to load fuel into dry storage canisters;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $150,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* $275,000 plus or minus 45 percent.
Process component: Loading operations:
* loading campaign consisting, on average, of five casks (including set-
up, clean up, training, and labor);
Initial component cost estimate:
* $750,000 plus or minus 5 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* None.
Process component: Design, licensing, and construction of dry storage
installations at reactor sites;
Initial component cost estimate: $30 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modification based on expert comments: $30 million plus or minus 40
percent.
Process component: Annual operations and maintenance:
* operating reactor site dry storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $100,000 plus or minus 20 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* $200,000 plus or minus 50 percent.
Process component: Annual operations and maintenance:
* decommissioned reactor site dry storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $3 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* $4.5 million plus or minus 40 percent.
Process component: Annual operations and maintenance:
* decommissioned reactor site wet storage;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $10 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* None.
Process component: Construction of a transfer facility for repackaging;
Initial component cost estimate: $300 million plus or minus 50 percent
(for a wet transfer facility);
Modification based on expert comments: $300 million plus or minus 50
percent (for either a wet or a dry transfer facility).
Process component: Repackaging operations:
* repackaging costs per cask;
Initial component cost estimate:
* $1.2 million plus or minus 10 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* $1.6 million plus or minus 10 percent.
Process component: Repackaging operations:
* repackaging campaign consisting, on average, of 5 casks (including
set-up, clean up, training, and labor);
Initial component cost estimate:
* $750,000 plus or minus 10 percent;
Modification based on expert comments:
* None.
Process component: Storage pad replacement;
Initial component cost estimate: $30 million plus or minus 20 percent;
Modification based on expert comments: $30 million plus or minus 40
percent.
Source: GAO analysis based on expert-provided data.
Note: Unless specifically noted, all assumptions and costs apply
specifically to commercial nuclear power sites. We used information
provided by DOE for the assumptions and costs related to DOE-managed
spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste.
[A] We did not explicitly solicit comment on this assumption in the
data collection instrument for the centralized storage alternative
because we solicited comments on the repackaging requirements in the on-
site alternative.
[B] This assumption applies only to the version of our centralized
storage alternative that includes final disposal.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Nuclear Waste Management Experts We Interviewed:
Name: Mark D. Abkowitz;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: John Ahearne;
Affiliation: Sigma Xi.
Name: Joonhong Ahn;
Affiliation: National Academy of Sciences/Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board.
Name: David Applegate;
Affiliation: U.S. Geological Survey.
Name: Wm. Howard Arnold;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Tom Baillieul;
Affiliation: The Chamberlain Group.
Name: James David Ballard;
Affiliation: California State University, Northridge.
Name: William D. Barnard;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (retired)
(staff).
Name: Lake Barrett;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
(retired).
Name: Barbara Beller;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: David W. Bland;
Affiliation: TriVis Incorporated.
Name: Ted Borst;
Affiliation: CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC.
Name: David C. Boyd;
Affiliation: Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
Name: Michele Boyd;
Affiliation: Physicians for Social Responsibility.
Name: William Boyle;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: E. William Brach;
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)/Division of Spent Fuel
Storage and Transportation.
Name: Bruce Breslow;
Affiliation: State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects.
Name: Philip Brochman;
Affiliation: NRC/Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
Name: Tom Brookmire;
Affiliation: Dominion Resources, Inc..
Name: Robert J. Budnitz;
Affiliation: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
Name: Susan Burke;
Affiliation: Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.
Name: Barbara Byron;
Affiliation: Western Interstate Energy Board.
Name: Robert Capstick;
Affiliation: The Yankee Nuclear Power Companies.
Name: Thure E. Cerling;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Margaret Chu;
Affiliation: M.S. Chu & Associates.
Name: Tom Clements;
Affiliation: Friends of the Earth.
Name: Jean Cline;
Affiliation: University of Nevada Las Vegas.
Name: Thomas Cochran;
Affiliation: Natural Resources Defense Council.
Name: Marshall Cohen;
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute.
Name: Kevin Crowley;
Affiliation: Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Research
Council of the National Academies.
Name: Jeanne Davidson;
Affiliation: U.S. Department of Justice/Civil Division.
Name: Bradley Davis;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Nuclear Energy.
Name: Jack Davis;
Affiliation: NRC/Division of High Level Waste Repository Safety.
Name: Jay C. Davis;
Affiliation: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired);
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Research Council of the
National Academies.
Name: Scott DeClue;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Edgardo DeLeon;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Fred Dilger;
Affiliation: Black Mountain Research.
Name: David J. Duquette;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Doug Easterling;
Affiliation: Wake Forest University.
Name: Steven Edwards;
Affiliation: Progress Energy.
Name: Randy Elwood;
Affiliation: CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC.
Name: Rod Ewing;
Affiliation: University of Michigan.
Name: Steve Fetter;
Affiliation: University of Maryland.
Name: James Flynn;
Affiliation: Pacific World History Institute.
Name: Charles Forsberg;
Affiliation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Name: Derrick Freeman;
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute.
Name: Steve Frishman;
Affiliation: State of Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office.
Name: Robert Fronczak;
Affiliation: Association of American Railroads.
Name: B. John Garrick;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (chairman).
Name: Ron Gecan;
Affiliation: U.S. Congressional Budget Office.
Name: Lynn Gelhar;
Affiliation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Name: Christine Gelles;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Robert Gisch;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Aubrey Godwin;
Affiliation: Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency.
Name: Charles R. Goergen;
Affiliation: Washington Savannah River Company[A].
Name: Stephen Goldberg;
Affiliation: Argonne National Laboratory.
Name: Steven Grant;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: Paul Gunter;
Affiliation: Beyond Nuclear.
Name: Brian Gustems;
Affiliation: PSEG Nuclear, LLC.
Name: Brian Gutherman;
Affiliation: ACI Nuclear Energy Solutions.
Name: Roger L. Hagengruber;
Affiliation: University of New Mexico Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board, National Research Council of the National Academies.
Name: R. Scott Hajner;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: Robert Halstead;
Affiliation: Transportation Advisor, State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects.
Name: Paul Harrington;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Ronald Helms;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: Damon Hindle;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: James Hollrith;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Greg Holden;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Mark Holt;
Affiliation: U.S. Congressional Research Service.
Name: George M. Hornberger;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: William Hurt;
Affiliation: Idaho National Laboratory.
Name: Thomas H. Isaacs;
Affiliation: Stanford University Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Research Council of the
National Academies.
Name: Lisa R. Janairo;
Affiliation: Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office.
Name: Andrew C. Kadak;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Kevin Kamps;
Affiliation: Beyond Nuclear.
Name: Anthony Kluk;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Lawrence Kokajko;
Affiliation: NRC/Division of High Level Waste Repository Safety.
Name: Leonard Konikow;
Affiliation: U.S. Geological Survey.
Name: Christopher Kouts;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Steven Kraft;
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute.
Name: Darrell Lacy;
Affiliation: Nye County, State of Nevada.
Name: Gary Lanthrum;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Doug Larson;
Affiliation: Western Interstate Energy Board.
Name: Ned Larson;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Ronald M. Latanision;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Thomas Leschine;
Affiliation: University of Washington.
Name: Adam H. Levin;
Affiliation: Exelon Corporation.
Name: David Little;
Affiliation: Washington Savannah River Company[C].
Name: David Lochbaum;
Affiliation: Union of Concerned Scientists.
Name: Bob Loux;
Affiliation: Consultant.
Name: Edwin Lyman;
Affiliation: Union of Concerned Scientists.
Name: Allison Macfarlane;
Affiliation: George Mason University.
Name: Arjun Makhijani;
Affiliation: Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
Name: Zita Martin;
Affiliation: Tennessee Valley Authority.
Name: Rodney McCullum;
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute.
Name: John McKenzie;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Richard A. Meserve;
Affiliation: Carnegie Institution for Science Nuclear and Radiation
Studies Board, National Research Council of the National Academies.
Name: Barry Miles;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Thomas Minvielle;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Bob Mitchell;
Affiliation: Yankee Rowe.
Name: Ali Mosleh;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: William M. Murphy;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Connie Nakahara;
Affiliation: Utah Department of Environmental Quality.
Name: Irene Navis;
Affiliation: Clark County, Nevada.
Name: Tara Neider;
Affiliation: Transnuclear, Inc..
Name: Brian O'Connell;
Affiliation: National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
Name: Mary Olson;
Affiliation: Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
Name: Pierre Oneid;
Affiliation: Holtec International.
Name: Ronald S. Osteen;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Jean Ridley;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: John Parkyn;
Affiliation: Private Fuel Storage.
Name: Stan Pedersen;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: Charles W. Pennington;
Affiliation: NAC International.
Name: Mark Peters;
Affiliation: Argonne National Laboratory.
Name: Per Peterson;
Affiliation: University of California at Berkeley.
Name: Henry Petroski;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (member).
Name: Max Power;
Affiliation: Oregon Hanford Cleanup Board.
Name: Kenneth Powers;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Jay Ray;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Environmental Management.
Name: Jeffrey Ray;
Affiliation: Washington Savannah River Company[C].
Name: Everett Redmond II;
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute.
Name: James Robert;
Affiliation: Tennessee Valley Authority.
Name: Gene Rowe;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (staff).
Name: Karyn Severson;
Affiliation: U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (staff).
Name: David Shoesmith;
Affiliation: University of Western Ontario.
Name: Linda Sikkema;
Affiliation: National Conference of State Legislators.
Name: Kris Singh;
Affiliation: Holtec International.
Name: Brian M. Smith;
Affiliation: Department of Defense/Department of the Navy.
Name: Susan Smith;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Joseph D. Sukaskas;
Affiliation: Maine Public Utilities Commission.
Name: Jane Summerson;
Affiliation: DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Name: Eileen Supko;
Affiliation: Energy Resources International, Inc..
Name: Bill Swift;
Affiliation: Washington Savannah River Company[C].
Name: Peter Swift;
Affiliation: Sandia National Laboratories.
Name: Raymond Termini;
Affiliation: Exelon Corporation.
Name: Mike Thorne;
Affiliation: Mike Thorne and Associates Limited.
Name: John Till;
Affiliation: Risk Assessment Corporation.
Name: Richard Tosetti;
Affiliation: Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC[B].
Name: Brian Wakeman;
Affiliation: Dominion Resources, Inc..
Name: John Weiss, Jr.;
Affiliation: Entergy Corporation.
Name: Christopher U. Wells;
Affiliation: Southern States Energy Board.
Name: Chris Whipple;
Affiliation: ENVIRON International Corporation.
Name: James Williams;
Affiliation: Western Interstate Energy Board.
Name: Wayne Worthington;
Affiliation: Progress Energy.
Name: David Zabransky;
Affiliation: DOE/Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Board.
Name: Paul L. Ziemer;
Affiliation: Purdue University (retired) Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board, National Research Council of the National Academies.
Name: Louis Zeller;
Affiliation: Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League.
Source: GAO.
[A] On August 1, 2008, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC replaced
Washington Savannah River Company as the primary contractor for DOE's
Savannah River site. Expert affiliation was with Washington Savannah
River Company at the time of our interviews.
[B] On April 1, 2009, USA Repository Services, LLC, replaced Bechtel
SAIC Company, LLC, as the primary contractor for the Yucca Mountain
repository. Expert affiliation was with Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC at
the time of our interviews.
[C] On July 1, 2009, Savannah River Remediation, LLC replaced
Washington Savannah River Company as the liquid waste program
contractor. Expert affiliation was with Washington Savannah River
Company at the time of our interviews.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Modeling Methodology, Assumptions, and Results:
The methodology and results of the models we developed to analyze the
total costs of two alternatives for managing nuclear waste are based on
cost data and assumptions we gathered from experts. Specifically, this
appendix contains information on the following:
* The modeling methodology we developed to generate a range of total
costs for the two nuclear waste management alternatives with two
different volumes of waste.
* The Monte Carlo simulation process we used to address uncertainties
in input data.
* The discounting methodology we developed to derive the present value
of total costs in 2009 dollars.
* The individual models and scenarios within each model.
* The results of our cost estimations for each scenario.
* Caveats to our modeling work.
Appendixes I and II describe our methodology for collecting cost data
and assumptions and how we ensured their reliability.
Modeling Methodology:
The general framework for our models was an Excel spreadsheet that
annually tracked all costs associated with packaging, transportation,
construction, operation, and maintenance of nuclear waste facilities as
well as repackaging of nuclear waste every 100 years when applicable.
The starting time period for all models was the year 2009, but the end
dates vary depending on the specifics of the scenario. The cost inputs
were collected in constant 2008 dollars, but the range of total costs
for each scenario was converted to and reported in 2009 present value
dollars. Our analysis began with an estimate of existing and future
annual volume of nuclear waste ready to be packaged and stored. We
chose to model two amounts of waste: 70,000 metric tons and 153,000
metric tons.[Footnote 34] For ease of calculation, we converted all
input costs to cost per-metric-ton of waste, when applicable.
The total cost range for each scenario was developed in four steps.
First, we developed the total costs for commercial spent nuclear fuel
volumes of about 63,000 metric tons and 140,000 metric tons,
respectively. Second, we added DOE cost data for its managed
waste.[Footnote 35] Third, we discounted all annual costs to 2009
present value by a discounting methodology discussed later in this
appendix. Finally, for scenarios where we assumed that the waste would
be moved to a permanent repository after 100 years, we added DOE's cost
estimate for the Yucca Mountain repository to represent cost for a
permanent repository.[Footnote 36] To ensure compatibility of cost data
that DOE provided with cost ranges generated by our models, we
converted DOE cost data to 2009 present value.
Monte Carlo Simulation Process:
To address the uncertainties inherent in our analysis, we used a
commercially available risk analysis software program called Crystal
Ball to incorporate uncertainties associated with the data. This
program allowed us to explore a wide range of possible values for all
the input costs and assumptions we used to build our models. The
Crystal Ball program uses a Monte Carlo simulation process, which
repeatedly and randomly selects values for each input to the model from
a distribution specified by the user. Using the selected values for
cells in the spreadsheet, Crystal Ball then calculates the total cost
of the scenario. By repeating the process in thousands of trials,
Crystal Ball produces a range of estimated total costs for each
scenario as well as the likelihood associated with any specific value
in the range.
Discount Rates and Present Value Analysis:
One of the inherent difficulties in developing the cost for a nuclear
waste disposal option is that costs are spread over thousands of years.
The economic concept of discounting is central to such analyses as it
allows costs incurred in the distant future to be converted to present
equivalent worth. We selected discount rates primarily based on results
of studies published in peer reviewed journals. That is, rather than
subjectively selecting a single discount rate, we developed our
discounting approach based on a methodology and values for discount
rates that were recommended by a number of published studies.
We selected studies that addressed issues related to discounting
activities whose costs and effects spread across the distant future or
many generations, also known as "intergenerational discounting." In
general, we found that these studies were in near consensus on two
points: (1) discounting is an appropriate methodology when analyzing
projects and policies that span many generations and (2) rates for
discounting the distant future should be lower than near term discount
rates and/or should decline over time. However, we found no consensus
among the studies as to any specific discount rate that should be used.
Consequently, we developed a discounting methodology using the
following steps:
* We divided the entire time frame of our analysis into five different
discounting intervals: immediate, near future, medium future, far
future, and far-far future.
* We assumed that within each interval the discount rates were
distributed with a triangular distribution.
* Based on all published rates, we developed the maximum, minimum, and
mode values for each of the five specified intervals.
* We discounted all costs, using Crystal Ball to randomly and
repeatedly select a rate from the appropriate interval and discount
cost values using a different rate for each trial.
* Using these steps, we discounted all annual costs to 2009 present
value.
Our methodology builds on a wide range of published rates from a number
of different sources in concert with the Crystal Ball program. This
enabled us, to the extent possible, to address the general lack of
consensus on any specific discount rate and, at the same time, address
the uncertainties that were inherent in intergenerational discounting
and long-term analyses of nuclear waste management alternatives.
Individual Models:
We developed the following four models to estimate the cost of several
hypothetical nuclear waste disposal alternatives, and we incorporated a
number of scenarios within each model to address all uncertainties that
we could not easily capture with Crystal Ball:
* Model I: Centralized storage for 153,000 metric tons, which included
the following scenarios:
* Scenario 1: Centralized storage for 100 years.
* Scenario 2: Centralized storage for 100 years plus a permanent
repository after 100 years.
* Model II: Centralized storage for 70,000 metric tons, which included
one scenario:
* Scenario 1: Centralized storage for 100 years.
* Model III: On-site storage using total waste volume of 153,000 metric
tons which included the following scenarios:
* Scenario 1: On-site storage for 100 years.
* Scenario 2: On-site storage for 100 years plus a permanent repository
after 100 years.
* Scenario 3: On-site storage for 500 years.
* Model IV: On-site storage using total waste volume of 70,000 metric
tons, which included one scenario:
* Scenario 1: On-site storage for 100 years.
Model I: Centralized Storage (153,000 metric tons):
For this model we assumed that nuclear waste would remain on site until
interim facilities are constructed and ready to receive the waste. Two
centralized storage facilities would be constructed over 3 years--from
2025 through 2027--and then start accepting waste. The first scenario
for this model includes the costs to store waste at the centralized
facilities through 2108. In the second scenario, these facilities would
stay in operation through 2155, or 47 years after a permanent
repository for the waste would become available. The total analysis
period for the cost of this alternative plus permanent repository
continues until 2240, when a permanent repository would be expected to
close. In general, the costs include the following:
* Initial costs, which include costs of casks, costs for loading of
casks, cost of loading campaigns, and operating and maintenance costs
by three types of nuclear sites, i.e., operating sites with dry
storage, decommissioned sites with dry storage, and decommissioned
sites with wet storage. The uncertainty ranges for these costs were
from plus or minus 5 percent to plus or minus 50 percent, depending on
specific cost variable.
* Costs associated with centralized facilities, including construction
costs for centralized facilities, transportation cost for transfer of
nuclear waste to centralized facilities, capital and operation and
maintenance costs for transportation of waste to centralized facilities
and operation and maintenance of centralized facilities. The
uncertainty ranges for these costs are from plus or minus 10 percent to
plus or minus 40 percent, depending on the cost category.
Figure 6: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the Centralized 153,000
Metric Ton Models:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Centralized storage for 100 years:
Commercial waste (packaging and operations and maintenance [O&M]):
20009-2065;
Commercial waste (on-site O&M): 2065-2074;
Centralized facility and transportation: 2025-2074;
Centralized facility O&M: 2075-2108;
On-site DOE waste management: 2009-2100 (100 years).
Centralized storage for 100 years with a permanent repository:
Commercial waste (packaging and O&M): 2009-2065;
Commercial waste (on-site O&M): 2065-2074;
Centralized facility and transportation: 2025-2074;
Centralized facility O&M: 2075-2155;
On-site DOE waste management: 2009-2100;
Permanent repository: 2098-2240 (232 years).
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE-provided data.
[End of figure]
Model II: Centralized Storage (70,000 metric tons):
This model was developed under the assumption that total existing and
newly generated waste from the private sector and DOE will be 70,000
metric tons. The stream of new annual waste ready to be moved to dry
storage will continue through 2030. The cost categories and uncertainty
ranges assumed for this storage alternative are the same as those
assumed in the centralized storage model for 153,000 metric tons.
Figure 7: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the Centralized 70,000
Metric Ton Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Centralized storage for 100 years:
On-site commercial waste: 2009-2050;
Centralized facility: 2025-2108;
On-site DOE waste management: 2009-2100 (100 years).
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE-provided data.
[End of figure]
Model III: On-Site Storage (153,000 metric tons):
We developed this model under the assumption that total existing and
newly generated nuclear waste by the private sector and DOE would be
153,000 metric tons. The stream of new waste ready to be moved to dry
storage would continue through 2065. In general, the costs include the
following:
* Initial costs, which include costs of casks, costs for loading of
casks, cost of loading campaigns, and operating and maintenance costs
by three types of nuclear sites, i.e., operating sites with dry
storage, decommissioned sites with dry storage, and decommissioned
sites with wet storage. The uncertainty ranges for these costs were
from plus or minus 5 percent to plus or minus 50 percent, depending on
specific cost variable.
* Repackaging costs, which include the costs for casks; construction of
transfer facilities, site pools, and other needed infrastructure; and
repackaging campaigns. Because these costs are first incurred after 100
years and then every 100 years thereafter, they are included only in
the model scenarios covering more than 100 years. The uncertainty for
these costs range from plus or minus 10 percent to plus or minus 50
percent, depending on the specific cost variable.
* Dry storage pad costs, including initial costs when dry storage is
first established, as well as replacement costs. Because the
replacement costs are first incurred after 100 years and then every 100
years thereafter, they are included only in the model scenarios
covering more than 100 years. The cost of these pads, collectively
referred to as independent spent fuel storage installations, include
costs related to licensing, design, and construction of dry storage.
The independent spent nuclear fuel storage installation costs have an
uncertainty range of plus or minus 40 percent.
Figure 8: Scenarios and Cost Time Frames for the On-Site 153,000 Metric
Ton Models:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
On-Site Storage for 100 Years:
Commercial Waste (Packaging and operations and maintenance [O&M]): 2009-
2108;
DOE waste management: 2009-2108 (100 years).
On-Site Storage for 100 Years with a Permanent Repository:
Commercial waste (packaging and O&M): 2009-2065;
Commercial waste (O&M): 2066-2155;
DOE waste management: 2009-2108;
DOE waste (O&M): 2109-2155;
Permanent repository: 2098-224-(232 years).
On-Site Storage for 500 Years:
Commercial waste (packaging and O&M): 2009-2108;
Repackaging every 100 years: 2109-2508;
DOE waste management: 2009-2508 (500 years).
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE-provided data.
[End of figure]
Model IV: On-Site Storage (70,000 metric tons):
We developed this model under the assumption that total existing and
newly generated nuclear waste by the private sector and DOE will be
70,000 metric tons. The stream of new annual waste ready to be moved to
dry storage will continue through 2030. The cost categories and
uncertainty ranges assumed for this storage alternative are the same as
those for the on-site model for storing 153,000 metric tons for 100
years.
Figure 9: Scenario and Cost Time Frames for the On-Site 70,000 Metric
Ton Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
On-site storage for 100 years:
Commercial waste (packaging and operations and maintenance [O&M]): 2009-
2108;
DOE waste management: 2009-2108 (100 years).
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE-provided data.
[End of figure]
Costs for a Permanent Repository:
For two scenarios, we assumed that at the end of 100 years the nuclear
waste would be transferred to a permanent repository for disposal. To
estimate the cost for a repository, we used DOE's cost data for the
Yucca Mountain repository and made three adjustments to ensure
compatibility with costs generated by our models. First, we included
only DOE's future cost estimates for the Yucca Mountain repository.
Second, because DOE provided costs in 2008 constant dollars, we
converted all costs for the permanent repository to costs to 2009
present value using corresponding ranges of interest rates as
previously described in this appendix. Finally, we assumed that
repository construction and operating costs would be incurred from 2098
to 2240 when we added these cost ranges to our alternatives after 100
years.
Modeling Results:
Table 8 shows the results of our analysis for all scenarios.
Table 8: Model Results for All Scenarios (Dollars in billions):
Models and scenarios:
Permanent repository (153,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: Permanent repository[B];
Range of total costs[A]: $41 to $67;
Mean[A]: $53.
Permanent repository (70,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: Permanent repository[B];
Range of total costs[A]: $27 to $39;
Mean[A]: $32.
Model I: centralized storage (153,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: Centralized 100 years;
Range of total costs[A]: $15 to $29;
Mean[A]: $21.
Models and scenarios: Centralized 100 years plus permanent repository;
Range of total costs[A]: $23 to $81;
Mean[A]: $47.
Model II: centralized storage (70,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: Centralized 100 years;
Range of total costs[A]: $12 to $20;
Mean[A]: $15.
Model III: on-site storage (153,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: On-site 100 years;
Range of total costs[A]: $13 to $34;
Mean[A]: $22.
Models and scenarios: On-site 100 years plus permanent repository;
Range of total costs[A]: $20 to $97;
Mean[A]: $51.
Models and scenarios: On-site for 500 years;
Range of total costs[A]: $34 to $225;
Mean[A]: $89.
Model IV: on-site storage (70,000 metric tons):
Models and scenarios: On-site 100 years;
Range of total costs[A]: $10 to $26;
Mean[A]: $18.
Source: GAO.
Note: All costs are in 2009 present value and represent costs
regardless of who will pay or is legally responsible to pay for them
and as such do not address the issue of liabilities. Furthermore, these
costs do not include other potential costs, such as decommissioning and
environmental costs and the government's penalties for delays in moving
waste from the Idaho National Laboratory under the settlement agreement
with Idaho.
[A] The cost estimates do not present exact values rather order-of-
magnitude estimates as both the maximum and minimum as well as mean
values will be somewhat different each time the simulation is repeated.
This is because the Monte Carlo methodology will randomly select a
different set of input data from one simulation run to the next.
[B] While our cost ranges for a permanent repository are based on DOE's
estimate for the Yucca Mountain repository, our cost ranges differ from
DOE's of $96 billion estimate for the following reasons: First, our
cost ranges are in 2009 present value, while DOE uses 2007 constant
dollars, which are not discounted. Our present value analysis reflects
the time value of money--costs incurred in the future are worth less
today--so that streams of future costs become smaller. Second, our cost
ranges do not include about $14 billion in previously incurred costs.
Third, our cost ranges are for 153,000 metric tons and 70, 000 metric
tons of nuclear waste, while DOE's estimated cost is for 122,100 metric
tons. Finally, we use ranges while DOE provides a point estimate.
[End of table]
Figures 10 and 11 show ranges of total costs, as well as the
probabilities for two selected scenarios. In the figures, each bar
indicates a range of values for total cost and the height of the each
bar indicates the probability associated with those values.
Figure 10: Total Cost Ranges for Centralized Storage for 100 Years with
Final Disposition:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
This graph plots Probability from 0 to 0.02 against Billions of 2009
dollars from 0 to 80 billion. The Mean is indicated as $47 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE provided data.
Note: The values on the horizontal axis of the figure are to provide a
scale and do not correspond exactly to the ranges for total costs which
are provided in table 8.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Total Cost Ranges for On-site Storage for 100 years with
Final Disposition:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
This graph plots Probability from 0 to 0.02 against Billions of 2009
dollars from 0 to 80 billion. The Mean is indicated as $51 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE provided data.
Note: The values on the horizontal axis of the figure are to provide a
scale and do not correspond exactly to the ranges for total costs which
are provided in table 8.
[End of figure]
Figure 12 shows the present value of the total cost ranges of storing
the nuclear waste on site over 2,000 years. The shaded areas indicate
the probability that the values fall within the indicated ranges and
are the result of combinations of uncertainties from a large number of
input data. Specifically, we estimate that these costs could range from
$34 billion to $225 billion over 500 years, from $41 billion to $548
billion over 1,000 years, and from $41 billion to $954 billion over
2,000 years, indicating and substantial level of uncertainty in making
long-term cost projections.
Figure 12: Total Cost Ranges of On-Site Storage over 2,000 Years:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked line graph]
The graph plots Billions of 2009 dollars versus years from 100 years to
2,000 years.
Certainty banks indicate 50 percent certainty and 90 percent certainty.
Source: GAO analysis of expert and DOE provided data.
Note: The values on the vertical axis of the figure are to provide a
scale and do not correspond exactly to the total cost ranges presented
in table 8.
[End of figure]
Modeling Caveats:
Our models are based on ranges of average costs for each major cost
category that is applicable to the alternative under analysis. As a
result, the costs do not reflect storage costs for any specific site.
Since we did not attempt to capture specific characteristics of each
site, our values for any cost factor, if applied to any specific site,
are likely incorrect. Nevertheless, since we used ranges rather than
single values for a wide range of cost inputs to the models, we expect
that our cost range for each variable includes the true cost for any
specific site. Moreover, we expect the total cost point estimate for
any scenario is within the range of total costs we developed.
Our models are designed to develop total cost ranges for each scenario
within each alternative, regardless of who will pay or is legally
responsible for the costs. Issues related to assignment of the costs
and potentially responsible entities are discussed elsewhere in this
report but are not incorporated into our ranges. Also, our cost ranges
focus on actual expenditures that would be incurred over the period of
analysis and do not assume a particular funding source and do not
necessarily represent costs to the federal government. Finally, because
a number of cost categories are not included in our final estimated
ranges, we cannot predict their impact on our final costs ranges. For
example, we did not include (1) decontamination and decommissioning
costs for existing facilities or facilities yet to be built within each
scenario and (2) estimates for local and state taxes or fees, which
would be required to establish new sites or for continued operation of
on-site storage facilities after nuclear reactors are decommissioned.
Table 8 and figures 10 and 11 present the results of our analysis by
individual scenario. Because the purpose of our analysis was primarily
to provide cost ranges for various nuclear waste management
alternatives, we did not attempt to provide a comparison of results
across scenarios. For a number of reasons, we believe such a comparison
would have been misleading. The alternatives we have considered are
inherently different in a large number of characteristics that could
not be captured in our modeling work or they were not within the scope
of our analysis. For example, differences in safety, health, and
environmental effects, and ease of implementation characteristics of
these alternatives should have an integral role in the policy debate on
waste management decisions. However, because these effects cannot be
readily quantified, they were outside the scope of our modeling work
and are not reflected in the total cost ranges we generated.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
October 28, 2009:
Mr. Mark E. Gaffigan:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gaffigan:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and submit comments on the
draft report, "Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges and
Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives"
(GAO-10-48). The U.S. Department of Energy appreciates the amount of
time and effort that you and your staff have taken to review this
important topic.
Specific comments from Naval Reactors, the Office of General Counsel,
and the Office of Environmental Management on the draft report are
enclosed. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 202-
586-6850.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher A. Kouts:
Acting Director:
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
October 26, 2009:
Mr. Richard Cheston:
Assistant Director:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Cheston:
Thank you for providing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
the opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report GAO-10-48, "Nuclear Waste
Management ” Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca
Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives." The NRC staff has
reviewed the draft report. Although we did not identify any significant
issues regarding accuracy, completeness, or sensitivity of information,
we have separately transmitted several technical and editorial comments
to your staff.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact Mr.
Jesse Arildsen of my staff, at (301) 415-1785.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R.W. Borchardt:
Executive Director for Operations:
Enclosure: NRC Staff Comments on Draft Report GAO-10-48.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark Gaffigan, (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Richard Cheston, Assistant
Director; Robert Sánchez; Ryan Gottschall; Carol Henn; Anne Hobson;
Anne Rhodes-Kline; Mehrzad Nadji; Omari Norman; and Benjamin Shouse
made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report
were Nancy Kingsbury, Karen Keegan, and Timothy Persons.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In constant fiscal year 2009 dollars. Funding comes primarily from
fees collected from electric power companies operating commercial
reactors and appropriations for DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-
level waste.
[2] DOE, Analysis of the Total System Lifecycle Cost of the Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management Program, Fiscal Year 2007, DOE/RW-0591
(Washington, D.C., July 2008).
[3] For the purposes of our report, nuclear waste includes both spent
nuclear fuel”fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor
following irradiation”and high-level radioactive waste”generally the
material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear
waste”specifically spent nuclear fuel”is also very thermally hot. As
the radioactive elements in spent nuclear fuel decay, they give off
heat. However, according to DOE data, a spent nuclear fuel assembly can
lose nearly 80 percent of its heat 5 years after it has been removed
from a reactor and about 95 percent of its heat after 100 years.
[4] National Academy of Sciences, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on
Land, (Washington, D.C., September 1957). This report suggested several
potential alternatives for disposal of nuclear waste, stressing that
although there are many potential sites for geologic disposal of waste
at various depths and in various geologic formations, further research
was needed regarding specific waste forms and specific geologic
formations, including disposal in deep underground formations. The
report stated, ’the hazard related to radioactive waste is so great
that no element of doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety.“
Subsequent reports by the National Academy of Sciences and others have
continued to endorse geologic isolation of nuclear waste and have
suggested that engineered barriers, such as corrosion-resistant
containers, can provide additional layers of isolation.
[5] NRC has already issued license extensions for 54 reactors, enabling
them to operate for a total of 60 years. Extension requests for 21
units are currently under review and requests for as many as 25 more
are anticipated through 2017.
[6] As of October 2009, NRC has received 18 applications for 29 new
reactors. In addition to spent nuclear fuel and DOE-managed high-level
waste, the nation also generates so-called greater than class C nuclear
waste from the maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear power plants,
from radioactive materials that were once used for food irradiation or
for medical purposes, and from miscellaneous radioactive waste, such as
contaminated equipment from industrial research and development. DOE,
which is required to dispose of this nuclear waste, has not issued an
environmental impact statement describing potential options, which
could include disposal of the waste at the Yucca Mountain repository.
[7] See 73 Fed. Reg. 59551-59570 (Oct. 9, 2008).
[8] The U.S. government made this statement in a letter related to a
tentative settlement agreement in the lawsuit of State of Washington v.
Chu, No. CV-08-5085-FVS (E.D. Washington, filed Nov. 26, 2008). In
2008, the state of Washington filed suit claiming DOE had violated the
Tri-Party Agreement among DOE, the state, and the Environmental
Protection Agency by failing to meet enforceable cleanup milestones in
the agreement. On August 10, 2009, DOE and the state announced they had
reached a tentative settlement, including new cleanup milestones and a
2047 completion date for certain key cleanup activities. We have
questioned DOE‘s ability to meet this date. See GAO, Nuclear Waste:
Uncertainties and Questions about Costs and Risks Persist with DOE‘s
Tank Waste Cleanup Strategy at Hanford, GAO-09-913 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 30, 2009).
[9] Congressional Budget Office, Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly
Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel; Testimony before the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2007).
[10] DOE changed the name of this program from the Advanced Fuel Cycle
Initiative to the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program in its
fiscal year 2010 budget submission.
[11] Our cost range for a permanent repository differs from DOE‘s most
recent estimate of $96 billion for the following reasons: First, our
cost range is in 2009 present value, while DOE uses 2007 constant
dollars, which are not discounted. Our present value analysis reflects
the time value of money”costs incurred in the future are worth less
today”so that streams of future costs become smaller. Second, our cost
range does not include about $14 billion in previously incurred costs.
Third, our cost range is for 153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste while
DOE‘s estimated cost is for 122,100 metric tons. Finally, we use a
range while DOE provides a point estimate.
[12] The Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed EPA to base its health
standards on a National Academy of Sciences study of the health issues
related to radioactive releases. NRC has promulgated rules based on EPA‘
s October 2008 standards that require the Yucca Mountain repository to
limit the annual radiation dose of the public to at most 15 millirem
for the first 10,000 years after disposal and at most 100 millirem from
10,001 years to 1 million years after disposal. In contrast, the
average American is exposed to about 360 millirem of radiation
annually, mainly from natural background sources.
[13] As of October 2, 2009, NRC had suspended or deferred five
applications to build and operate six reactors at the request of the
applicants.
[14] The penalties in the settlement agreement specifically apply to
spent nuclear fuel and not to other high-level waste. However, the
agreement specifies that DOE must have the other high-level waste
treated and ready for shipment out of Idaho for disposal by 2035. DOE
officials acknowledged that Idaho could take further court action if
its milestones toward meeting these goals are not being met.
[15] As of July 2009, of the 71 lawsuits filed by electric power
companies, 51 cases were pending either in the Court of Federal Claims
or in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 had been
settled, 6 were voluntarily withdrawn, and 4 had been litigated through
final unappealable judgment.
[16] DOE estimated the Nuclear Waste Fund at about $23 billion in June
2009, some of which is interest that has accrued. DOE is required to
invest the Nuclear Waste Fund in U.S. Treasury securities, resulting in
the government paying about $11.2 billion interest to the fund. Both
the principal and the interest might be returned, if the fund is
returned to the electric power companies.
[17] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal and
Technical Challenges, (Washington, D.C., 2001).
[18] Section 801 (c) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires DOE to
provide indefinite oversight to prevent any activity at the site that
poses an unreasonable risk of (1) breaching the repository‘s engineered
or geologic barriers or (2) increasing the exposure of the public to
radiation beyond allowable limits. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776,
2921-2922.
[19] The Nuclear Energy Institute represents the nuclear power industry
and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
represents state public utility commissions that regulate the electric
power industry.
[20] Minnesota House File No. 894, introduced February 16, 2009, and
Michigan Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 8, introduced March 25, 2009.
[21] NWPA caps the amount of nuclear waste that can be disposed of at
Yucca Mountain at 70,000 metric tons. The estimated amount of current
waste plus additional commercial spent nuclear fuel that would be
generated if all currently operating commercial reactors received
license extensions is 153,000 metric tons. Our analysis did not
consider new reactors because of the uncertainty if or when new
reactors would be built, how many would be built, and their impact on
waste streams.
[22] We excluded historical costs for the Yucca Mountain repository
because these costs represent challenges unique to Yucca Mountain and
may not be applicable to a future repository. However, the bulk of
future cost for construction, operation, and closure may be
representative of a new repository.
[23] We used a commercially available risk analysis program called
Crystal Ball for our Monte Carlo simulation. Crystal Ball is a commonly
used spreadsheet-based software for predictive modeling and
forecasting.
[24] DOE acknowledged that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
does provide the authority for DOE to accept and store spent nuclear
fuel under certain circumstances, which DOE has used in the past to
accept and store spent nuclear fuel. For example, pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act authority, DOE has accepted and stored U.S.-supplied
spent nuclear fuel from foreign reactors, as well as damaged spent
nuclear fuel from the Three Mile Island reactor site. However, DOE
asserts that the NWPA‘s detailed statutory scheme limits its authority
to accept spent nuclear fuel under Atomic Energy Act authority except
in compelling circumstances, such as an emergency involving spent
nuclear fuel threatening public health.
[25] In addition, lawsuits filed against the government by nuclear
reactor owners have included claims to recover the cost of the Private
Fuel Storage facility. At least one utility has recovered these costs
from the government, while a court did not allow another utility to
recover these costs.
[26] Western Governors‘ Association Policy Resolution 09-5: Interim
Storage and Transportation of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel.
[27] NWPA prohibits development of a centralized storage facility in
any state where a site is being characterized for development of a
repository.
[28] GAO, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: DOE Should Reassess Its
Approach to Designing and Building Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-483]
(Washington, D.C.: April 2008).
[29] The studies used in the Congressional Budget Office‘s analysis
were: Boston Consulting Group, Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel
Management in the United States (study prepared for AREVA Inc., July
2006); and Matthew Bunn and others, The Economics of Reprocessing vs.
Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 2003).
[30] Legislative action by the Congress could also affect the amount of
compensation the government ultimately pays to the reactor operators.
For example, the Congress could amend NWPA to change contract
provisions that would be applicable to newly constructed reactors.
[31] DOE, Analysis of the Total System Lifecycle Cost of the Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management Program, Fiscal Year 2007, DOE/RW-0591
(Washington, D.C., July 2008). The 122,100 metric tons of nuclear waste
included the spent nuclear fuel expected to be generated from all
commercial nuclear reactors that had received NRC license extensions
through January 2007.
[32] We excluded historical costs for the Yucca Mountain repository
because these costs represent challenges unique to Yucca Mountain and
may not be applicable to a future repository. However, the bulk of
future cost for construction, operation, and closure may be
representative of a new repository.
[33] The 67 sets of comments do not reflect the total number of experts
who responded because some groups of affiliated experts compiled their
comments into a single response. For example, DOE's Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management provided a consolidated set of comments
for its nine experts.
[34] The 70,000 metric tons is the statutory limit placed on the amount
of waste that can be disposed of at Yucca Mountain. The 153,000 metric
tons is the estimated amount of current waste plus additional
commercial spent nuclear fuel that would be generated by 2055 if all
currently operating commercial reactors received license extensions.
[35] DOE management costs include spent nuclear fuel managed at the
Hanford Reservation, Idaho National Laboratory, and Fort St. Vrain, in
Colorado, and high-level waste at the Hanford Reservation, Savannah
River Site, Idaho National Laboratory, and West Valley.
[36] We used DOE estimates for Yucca Mountain to represent the cost of
a permanent repository. We, however, did not include historical costs
for Yucca Mountain as we felt that these historical costs represent
challenges unique to Yucca Mountain and may not be applicable to a
future repository whereas the bulk of future cost for construction,
operation, and closure would be replicated for a new repository.
[End of section]
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