Homeland Defense
Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security Gao ID: GAO-09-828 September 18, 2009A successful terrorist attack on a facility containing nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences. GAO was asked to compare the Department of Defense's (DOD) and Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to protect the nation's nuclear weapons where they are stored, maintained, or transported. This report (1) compares the nuclear weapons security policies and procedures at DOD and DOE, and the extent to which cost-benefit analyses are required; (2) compares DOD and DOE efforts to assess threats to nuclear weapons; and (3) identifies total current and projected funding requirements for securing nuclear weapons, including military construction costs. GAO analyzed DOD and DOE nuclear weapons security policies and procedures; visited sites that store, maintain, or transport nuclear weapons; and analyzed funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2013. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in May 2009.
DOD and DOE nuclear weapons security policies and guidance are similar in that both establish minimum security standards for nuclear weapons. However, DOD's guidance does not emphasize or require a cost-benefit analysis when considering alternative security measures, and therefore the full costs of alternatives may not be considered in a comprehensive manner when choosing among security measures. For example, the Navy plans to spend about $1.1 billion on security improvements to protect ballistic missile submarines while in transit, but selected one alternative without considering the full life cycle costs of the available alternatives. In contrast, DOE's policy for nuclear weapons security provides local officials greater flexibility than DOD's in determining how to meet security standards, and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a part of the decision-making process. Although DOD and DOE assess threats to nuclear assets as part of their nuclear weapons security programs, DOD has not provided adequate guidance or capabilities to fully develop local threat assessments where nuclear weapons are stored, maintained, or transported. DOD policies require installation commanders to develop threat assessments using a national assessment as a starting point and tailor that assessment to their installations. However, GAO identified instances where the local threat assessment generally reflected all threats contained in the national assessment, with only minimal adjustments to reflect the local environment. Further, the individuals developing the local assessments had limited guidance, were not trained as intelligence analysts and often used different methodologies. Without clear guidance and necessary threat assessment capabilities, the military services may not be fully leveraging local, regional, and national threat information in preparing local assessments. In contrast, DOE provides guidance and, at the time of GAO's review, was developing an approach to incorporate all available threat information more fully into its assessments, though GAO did not assess its effectiveness because this new approach had not been fully implemented. DOD and DOE have estimated the funds required to protect nuclear weapons to be approximately $11 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2013, but GAO identified shortfalls in the Air Force's ability to centrally manage and track funding that limits the visibility of Air Force requirements. The Air Force and Navy make up over $8 billion of the total estimated requirement for securing nuclear weapons. The remaining $3 billion is incurred by the two DOE organizations that handle nuclear weapons. Across all four organizations, over half the $11 billion is devoted to funding security forces. Although accountability over funding data is critical to enabling decision makers to address nuclear weapons security funding requirements, GAO found that the Air Force lacked a consistent method to identify requirements specifically related to nuclear weapons security because of the decentralized method through which it manages this funding. Without a method to track these costs, the visibility of these requirements is limited, and the Air Force may not be able to effectively manage its nuclear weapons security funding.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-828, Homeland Defense: Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Homeland Defense:
Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve
DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security:
Homeland Defense:
GAO-09-828:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-828, a report to Congressional Requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
A successful terrorist attack on a facility containing nuclear weapons
could have devastating consequences. GAO was asked to compare the
Department of Defense‘s (DOD) and Department of Energy‘s (DOE) efforts
to protect the nation‘s nuclear weapons where they are stored,
maintained, or transported. This report (1) compares the nuclear
weapons security policies and procedures at DOD and DOE, and the extent
to which cost-benefit analyses are required; (2) compares DOD and DOE
efforts to assess threats to nuclear weapons; and (3) identifies total
current and projected funding requirements for securing nuclear
weapons, including military construction costs. GAO analyzed DOD and
DOE nuclear weapons security policies and procedures; visited sites
that store, maintain, or transport nuclear weapons; and analyzed
funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2013. This report is an
unclassified version of a classified report issued in May 2009.
What GAO Found:
DOD and DOE nuclear weapons security policies and guidance are similar
in that both establish minimum security standards for nuclear weapons.
However, DOD‘s guidance does not emphasize or require a cost-benefit
analysis when considering alternative security measures, and therefore
the full costs of alternatives may not be considered in a comprehensive
manner when choosing among security measures. For example, the Navy
plans to spend about $1.1 billion on security improvements to protect
ballistic missile submarines while in transit, but selected one
alternative without considering the full life cycle costs of the
available alternatives. In contrast, DOE‘s policy for nuclear weapons
security provides local officials greater flexibility than DOD‘s in
determining how to meet security standards, and has a greater emphasis
on cost-benefit analysis as a part of the decision-making process.
Although DOD and DOE assess threats to nuclear assets as part of their
nuclear weapons security programs, DOD has not provided adequate
guidance or capabilities to fully develop local threat assessments
where nuclear weapons are stored, maintained, or transported. DOD
policies require installation commanders to develop threat assessments
using a national assessment as a starting point and tailor that
assessment to their installations. However, GAO identified instances
where the local threat assessment generally reflected all threats
contained in the national assessment, with only minimal adjustments to
reflect the local environment. Further, the individuals developing the
local assessments had limited guidance, were not trained as
intelligence analysts and often used different methodologies. Without
clear guidance and necessary threat assessment capabilities, the
military services may not be fully leveraging local, regional, and
national threat information in preparing local assessments. In
contrast, DOE provides guidance and, at the time of GAO‘s review, was
developing an approach to incorporate all available threat information
more fully into its assessments, though GAO did not assess its
effectiveness because this new approach had not been fully implemented.
DOD and DOE have estimated the funds required to protect nuclear
weapons to be approximately $11 billion for fiscal years 2006 through
2013, but GAO identified shortfalls in the Air Force‘s ability to
centrally manage and track funding that limits the visibility of Air
Force requirements. The Air Force and Navy make up over $8 billion of
the total estimated requirement for securing nuclear weapons. The
remaining $3 billion is incurred by the two DOE organizations that
handle nuclear weapons. Across all four organizations, over half the
$11 billion is devoted to funding security forces. Although
accountability over funding data is critical to enabling decision
makers to address nuclear weapons security funding requirements, GAO
found that the Air Force lacked a consistent method to identify
requirements specifically related to nuclear weapons security because
of the decentralized method through which it manages this funding.
Without a method to track these costs, the visibility of these
requirements is limited, and the Air Force may not be able to
effectively manage its nuclear weapons security funding.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense improve DOD‘s process for
evaluating and selecting among alternative security measures, improve
installation commanders‘ ability to assess threats, and improve
visibility and accountability over Air Force nuclear weapons security
funding. DOD partially agreed with the recommendations in this report,
noting several actions in process or needed to address the
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-828] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD and DOE Nuclear Weapons Security Policies Implement NSPD-28, but
DOD Policies Can Limit or Preclude Analysis of Alternatives:
DOD and DOE Require Local Threat Assessments, but DOD Installations
Lack Guidance and Capabilities to Prepare Them:
DOD and DOE Have Identified Funding Requirements of Approximately $11
Billion for Nuclear Weapons Security:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD and DOE Policy Framework:
Appendix III: Air Force and Navy Operating Environments for Nuclear
Weapons:
Appendix IV: Nuclear Weapons Security Funding for the Air Force, Navy,
OST, and Pantex:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Phases of the Risk Management Process:
Table 2: DOD and DOE Estimated Funding for Nuclear Weapons Security,
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Table 3: List of Nuclear Security Policies, Procedures, and Guidance
Documents Analyzed:
Table 4: DOD's Nuclear Weapons Security Policy Framework:
Table 5: DOE's Nuclear Weapons Security Policy Framework:
Table 6: Total Estimated Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Table 7: Total Estimated Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Table 8: Total Estimated OST Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Table 9: Total Estimated Pantex Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 18, 2009:
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael Turner:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
A successful terrorist attack on a facility containing nuclear weapons
could have devastating consequences for the facility and its
surrounding communities. As demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States and other nations face
increasingly diffuse threats. Terrorists have shown both the capability
and willingness to attack high-value U.S. targets within the homeland
and abroad. Accordingly, a recent presidential directive has noted that
it must be assumed that U.S. nuclear weapons and the associated nuclear
command and control system could be the target of a determined state or
non-state adversary with access to substantial resources, intelligence,
and advanced capabilities.
Recent incidents related to the storage and transportation of nuclear
weapons increased concerns about the adequacy of security measures for
these assets. In 2006, critical, nuclear-related intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) parts, labeled as helicopter batteries, were
mistakenly sent to Taiwan, and on August 30, 2007, a B-52 crew
mistakenly flew nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base, North
Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. As a result, the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force requested a
series of investigations and reviews that identified a serious erosion
of senior-level attention, focus, expertise, mission readiness,
resources, and discipline in the nuclear weapons mission area within
the Air Force, which ultimately resulted in disciplinary actions and
the resignation of Air Force personnel. We have also issued numerous
reports over the past decade that Department of Energy (DOE) sites had
not adequately addressed security-related issues, including delays in
implementing security measures to address updated security
requirements, challenges in developing a better-trained and better-
organized security force in order to ensure that its sites were
adequately prepared to defend themselves, and inconsistent
implementation of protective force policies at DOE sites.[Footnote 1]
To meet new and more varied threats against our national security, in
June 2003, the President signed National Security Presidential
Directive 28 (NSPD-28),[Footnote 2] which raised the importance of
nuclear weapon command and control systems. This directive established
a more stringent security requirement for nuclear weapons. It also
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE, among other agencies,
to implement policies, procedures, and systems to protect and control
nuclear weapons.
Both DOD and DOE play important roles in sustaining and protecting the
United States' nuclear weapons capabilities. Within the DOD, the Air
Force and the Navy operate and maintain the nation's strategic nuclear
weapons arsenal. They also have the responsibility to provide for the
security of those weapons in accordance with NSPD-28 and DOD
implementing guidance. DOE is charged with maintaining, assembling, and
disassembling nuclear weapons at its Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo,
Texas, and providing secure transport of nuclear weapons and other
material among and between DOD, DOE, and other sites within the
continental United States by the Office of Secure Transportation (OST).
[Footnote 3] DOE is also charged with the security of those materials
when they are in its possession in accordance with NSPD-28
requirements.
As we have previously reported, risk management is a systematic,
analytical process to determine the likelihood that a threat will harm
physical assets or individuals and then to identify actions to reduce
risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack.[Footnote 4] The
principles of risk management acknowledge that while risk generally
cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from known or potential
threats can serve to reduce risk. Key elements of risk management
include assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets
and selecting between alternative courses of action to mitigate risk.
Risk management can help policymakers make decisions about allocating
resources and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty.
Because of the importance of providing adequate security for our
nation's nuclear weapons and the significant investments required to
provide that security, you asked us to evaluate and compare DOD's and
DOE's policies and procedures for protecting the nation's nuclear
weapons and identify the resources being applied by both organizations
to achieve that goal. Accordingly, this report (1) compares the nuclear
weapons security policies, procedures, and guidance at DOD and DOE, and
determines the extent to which alternatives and cost-benefit analyses
are required; (2) compares DOD's and DOE's efforts to assess threats to
nuclear weapons facilities and in-transit nuclear assets; and (3)
identifies DOD's and DOE's total current and projected funding
requirements for securing nuclear weapons, including military
construction costs and the services' ability to track those costs. In
May 2009, we reported to you on the results of our work in a classified
report. This report is an unclassified version of that report.
To compare DOD's and DOE's policies and procedures for protecting the
nation's nuclear weapons and determine the extent to which they require
alternatives and cost-benefit analyses, we analyzed DOD and DOE nuclear
weapons security policies and procedures; visited 6 of 10 sites that
store, maintain, or transport fully assembled nuclear weapons,
including Air Force and Navy installations and the two DOE entities
that handle fully assembled nuclear weapons--OST and Pantex; and
interviewed DOD, DOE, Air Force, Navy, and other officials at
headquarters and relevant field locations. We also compared DOD's and
DOE's policies and guidance for weighing costs and benefits to GAO and
OMB guidelines for analyzing costs and selecting among alternatives. We
selected two Navy programs requiring significant investment of
resources initiated after implementation of NSPD-28 as examples of how
alternatives were evaluated and costs and benefits were weighed based
on the existing policies. To evaluate the extent to which DOD and DOE
apply risk management principles in their approach to establish nuclear
security measures, we compared DOD, DOE, Air Force, and Navy policies,
procedures, site security plans, and any related cost-benefit analyses
to commonly accepted elements of risk management. Specifically, we
assessed each organization's approach to identify the extent to which
they address strategic goals and objectives, risk assessments (threat,
vulnerability, and criticality assessments), evaluating and selecting
alternative courses of action to mitigate risk, and management
oversight. DOE updated its threat policy in August 2008 and is
modifying related implementation manuals. Because the policy is new and
had not been fully implemented, we were unable to fully assess the
extent to which Pantex and OST are implementing new security
requirements to address DOE's revised policy. To determine DOD's and
DOE's total current and projected funding requirements for securing
nuclear weapons, and the reliability of the data, we obtained and
analyzed DOD and DOE funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2013
related to securing nuclear weapons and supporting documentation. We
identified major cost drivers and military construction costs during
those budget years for each organization. We determined the cost data
obtained to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted the
work for the classified report from November 2007 to April 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed description
of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD and DOE policies and guidance for nuclear weapons security are
driven by NSPD-28, and both departments established minimum security
standards for nuclear weapons, but DOD's guidance is more prescriptive
in that, in some instances, it sets forth very specific physical
security measures and does not require, or in some cases allow, the
military services to consider all available alternatives or weigh the
full costs and benefits of implementing them. On the other hand, DOE's
guidance permits consideration of alternative security measures and
life cycle costs. For example, DOD's nuclear weapons security manual
specifies barrier type and height, which precludes the military
services from identifying and considering alternative measures that may
achieve a similar result.[Footnote 5] The manual also states that "all
efforts must be made to build future storage and maintenance facilities
underground." As a practical matter, according to officials from the
Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, this policy requires all new facilities to be constructed
underground unless it is physically impossible to do so. Consequently,
in one case we examined, the Navy is pursuing the construction of an
underground facility for weapons storage and maintenance at one of its
Strategic Weapons Facilities without having considered other options or
the full cost of the project compared to other alternatives. Further,
while DOD nuclear security guidance states that affordability and life
cycle costs of a nuclear weapon system shall be considered, this
requirement applies primarily to the research and development and
acquisition process, not to the actual selection and implementation of
nuclear physical security measures. In addition, the guidance does not
specifically provide for cost-benefit analysis when considering and
selecting between alternative security measures. As a result, according
to DOD officials, security measures may be selected without full
consideration of their total costs. In another case we examined, the
Navy is planning to spend approximately $1.1 billion on security
improvements to protect ballistic missile submarines while in transit
between the wharf and the surface/dive point, but selected one
alternative without considering the full life cycle costs of the
alternative solutions that were available.[Footnote 6] Specifically,
the Navy did not consider all associated costs, such as additional
facilities and support needed for the blocking vessels that protect the
in-transit submarines or the full life cycle costs of the various
alternatives when making its decision. We are recommending DOD modify
nuclear weapons security guidance to place greater emphasis on
alternatives analysis and cost-benefit considerations, including life
cycle costs, when selecting alternative security measures.
Both DOD and DOE assess threats and vulnerabilities of facilities and
in-transit nuclear assets as part of their risk management approaches
to nuclear weapons security, but DOD has not provided adequate guidance
or capabilities to fully develop local threat assessments where nuclear
weapons are stored, maintained, or transported. DOD policies require
installation commanders to develop threat assessments using a national-
level threat assessment that discusses all known threats to nuclear
weapons as a starting point and tailor that assessment to their
respective installations. However, at the installations we visited, we
identified instances where the local threat assessment generally
reflected all of the threats contained in the national-level
assessment, with minimal adjustments to reflect the local threat
environment. Because of the uncertain and unpredictable nature of
terrorist threats, installation officials were reluctant to eliminate
any threat listed in the national assessment, and individuals
developing local threat assessments had limited guidance and were not
trained as intelligence analysts. Without clear guidance and the
necessary capabilities to comprehensively assess threats at nuclear
weapons facilities, DOD and the military services may not be fully
leveraging all available threat information at the local, regional, and
national levels as local threat assessments are being prepared. In
addition, in the absence of detailed guidance, we found that Air Force
and Navy officials prepare their local threat assessments using
different methodologies. Throughout the course of our review, DOD
officials agreed that local commanders lacked the necessary guidance
and capabilities to comprehensively assess threats at the installation
level. In contrast, DOE provides guidance on the process for
identifying and analyzing threats to its sites that handle nuclear
material, and at the time of our review, OST was developing an approach
to assess and incorporate local, regional, and national threat
information more fully into its threat assessments. Beginning in 2008,
DOE's Office of Secure Transportation placed intelligence analysts at
U.S. Northern Command and DOE's Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence to collect available intelligence information from
regional and national sources, and established an analysis center to
fuse that information, assess local threats, and provide this
information to appropriate security personnel. OST officials believed
it was important to obtain all available information to enhance the
local threat assessment process and provide that as a basis for
training and preparing security forces. However, because the initiative
has not been fully implemented, we did not assess its effectiveness in
this review. We are recommending that DOD provide more specific
guidance on the methodology to develop local threat assessments and
provide installation commanders with the capabilities necessary to
enhance the local threat assessment process.
DOD and DOE have estimated the funds required to protect nuclear
weapons to be approximately $11 billion for fiscal years 2006 through
2013, but we identified shortfalls in the Air Force's ability to
centrally manage and track this funding that limits its visibility. The
Air Force and Navy make up over $8 billion (73 percent) of the total
estimated requirement for securing nuclear weapons. The remaining $3
billion (27 percent) of the requirement is incurred by the two DOE
organizations that handle nuclear weapons, OST and Pantex. Across all
four organizations, over half of the $11 billion associated with
securing nuclear weapons is devoted to funding security forces.
Although accountability over funding data is critical to enabling
decision makers to address the funding requirements of the nuclear
weapons security program, we found that the Air Force lacked a
consistent method to identify funding requirements specifically related
to nuclear weapons security because of the decentralized method through
which it manages this funding. Therefore, it took the Air Force over 8
months to provide us with details related to its costs associated with
securing nuclear weapons. Without a method to track these costs, the
visibility of these requirements is limited, and the Air Force may not
be able to effectively manage its nuclear weapons security program as
it moves to a new nuclear command structure.[Footnote 7] We are
recommending that the Air Force establish a method to track funding
associated with nuclear weapons security as it moves to a new nuclear
command structure. Details related to major funding components for each
organization are shown in appendix IV.
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD partially
agreed with our recommendations and described actions in process or
needed to implement them. DOD also provided technical comments, which
we incorporated into the final report as appropriate. A summary of
DOD's comments and a summary of our response to these comments follow
the Recommendations for Executive Action section of this report. DOD's
written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOE also reviewed a draft
of this report and had no comments. However, it provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the final report as appropriate.
Background:
In June 2003, the President signed NSPD-28. This directive emphasized
the need to prevent the unauthorized or accidental use of U.S. nuclear
weapons. In response to NSPD-28, DOD updated its entire family of
nuclear weapons security policies and guidance to reflect the higher
security requirements of the new presidential directive. DOE has also
updated its family of nuclear weapons security policies and guidance
since NSPD-28 was issued. Within DOD, the Air Force and Navy are
responsible for implementing DOD's nuclear weapons security policies
and securing the weapons under their control. Within the Air Force,
four major commands have a role in the nuclear mission--Air Force Space
Command, Air Combat Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and U.S. Air
Force Europe. Air Force Space Command has authority over three Air
Force installations responsible for maintaining the ICBM fields that
are located in five states and span 23,500 square miles. Missile silos
located throughout the ICBM fields can often be hundreds of miles from
the main installation. Air Combat Command has authority over two
installations that store and maintain the nuclear weapons used on B-2
and B-52 aircraft. Air Force Materiel Command is responsible for one
installation that is home to DOD's only underground storage and
maintenance facility for nuclear weapons. U.S. Air Force Europe has
responsibility for U.S. nuclear weapons located on both U.S. and host
nation installations in Europe.
The Navy has a single, centralized command and control system for its
nuclear mission to oversee its two strategic weapons facilities that
operate in four environments that are distinct from the Air Force's
operating environments (see app. III for a detailed description of each
nuclear weapon operating environment for the Air Force and the Navy).
The Navy's installations are comparatively compact sites, unlike the
Air Force's missile fields, and support nuclear-powered submarines
(commonly referred to as SSBNs) equipped to launch Trident missiles.
DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration--a separately
organized agency within DOE--are responsible for implementing DOE's
nuclear security threat policy and overseeing the 10 entities in DOE
that currently handle types and quantities of special nuclear materials
that can be used in nuclear weapons. Of these entities that handle
nuclear material, only 2 handle fully assembled nuclear weapons--OST
and Pantex located in Amarillo, Texas. OST is responsible for securely
transporting nuclear weapons, components, and other sensitive nuclear
materials between authorized destinations in support of both DOD's and
DOE's nuclear missions. OST is not responsible for any work related to
maintaining or servicing the weapons or components--its purpose is
solely to provide secure transport. In contrast, Pantex is a fixed site
that carries out several missions related to maintaining and servicing
nuclear weapons, including the development, testing, and fabrication of
high explosive components; supporting the nuclear weapons life
extension programs;[Footnote 8] and dismantling weapons after they are
retired by the military.
Risk Management Framework:
Risk management is a widely accepted method within the federal
government and the private sector for protecting important assets,
identifying threats to those assets and vulnerabilities in protective
measures, and prioritizing security needs. Risk management principles
acknowledge that while risk generally cannot be eliminated, enhancing
protection from known or potential threats can reduce it. Risk
management includes a series of analytical and managerial steps that
can be used to assess risk, evaluate alternatives for reducing risks,
choose among those alternatives, implement the selected alternatives,
monitor their implementation, and continually use new information to
adjust and revise the assessments and actions, as needed. Table 1
summarizes the five phases of risk management.
Table 1: Phases of the Risk Management Process:
Phase: Setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining
constraints;
Description: Decisions should align with corresponding strategic goals
and objectives and should not go beyond the identified constraints of
the organization.
Phase: Assessing risks;
Description: Risk assessment consists of identifying threats,
vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. While threat assessments
identify and evaluate potential threats against an identified asset or
location, vulnerability assessments identify security weaknesses that
may be exploited by identified threats. Consequence information for a
terrorist attack or other hazard is combined with the threat
information and known vulnerabilities to complete the risk assessment
and help prioritize assets and allocate resources to protective
actions.
Phase: Evaluating alternatives for addressing risks;
Description: A process should be in place for identifying and
evaluating strategies to reduce risks through various measures designed
to prevent or mitigate an attack. Cost-benefit analysis is critical in
assessing alternatives because it links the benefits of alternative
measures to the costs associated with implementing and maintaining
them.
Phase: Selecting alternatives;
Description: Managers select the blend of options from the proposed
alternatives that achieves the greatest expected reduction in risk in
relation to cost for both the short and the long term.
Phase: Implementation and monitoring;
Description: Once the selected countermeasures are implemented,
monitoring is essential in order to help ensure that the process
remains current and relevant.
Source: GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[End of table]
DOD and DOE Nuclear Weapons Security Policies Implement NSPD-28, but
DOD Policies Can Limit or Preclude Analysis of Alternatives:
Both DOD and DOE have established policies and guidance for nuclear
weapons security that set minimum security standards for storing,
maintaining, or transporting nuclear weapons, but DOD's guidance can
limit or preclude analysis of alternatives and does not require or
emphasize costs and benefits to be weighed when selecting among
security alternatives to meet those standards. As a result, according
to DOD officials, security measures may be selected without full
consideration of their total costs. In the two cases we examined the
Navy did not fully consider life cycle costs in making decisions about
security investments, and it is unclear whether the most cost-effective
measures were selected.
DOD and DOE have similar nuclear weapons security responsibilities to
address the requirements of NSPD-28 and each has established its own
nuclear weapons security policy frameworks that seek to meet these
requirements and spell out specific minimum standards for sites to
implement. However, DOD's overarching policies and guidance are
generally more prescriptive in their requirements for physical security
measures than DOE's and in some cases this may limit the military
services' abilities to consider all available security options. For
example, DOD's Nuclear Weapons Security Manual requires installations
to construct a barrier around their borders and specifies that the
barrier must be a fence constructed of chain link material and stand 7
feet tall.[Footnote 9] In contrast, DOE's Physical Protection Manual
requires sites, such as Pantex, to construct a barrier around its area
boundaries in order to control, impede, or deny access to the site.
DOE's guidance provides local officials flexibility to meet the
requirement by building a wall, fence, or other barrier, so long as the
objectives of the barrier described in the manual are met. Other
differences in DOD's and DOE's approaches to nuclear weapons security
are primarily due to differences in their respective command
structures, operating environments, and missions. Additional detail on
the similarities and differences in DOD's and DOE's approaches to
nuclear weapons security can be found in appendix II.
DOD's Nuclear Weapons Security Guidance Does Not Emphasize Analysis of
Alternatives or Cost-Benefit Analyses When Choosing New Security
Measures:
DOD's nuclear weapons security guidance does not emphasize or require a
cost-benefit analysis when considering alternative security measures,
and therefore the full costs of various alternatives may not be
considered in a comprehensive manner when choosing among alternative
security measures.[Footnote 10] DOD nuclear weapons security guidance
states that affordability and life cycle costs of a nuclear weapon
system[Footnote 11] shall be considered; however, this requirement
applies primarily to the research and development and acquisition
process for the system, not to the actual selection and implementation
of nuclear security measures. In addition, the guidance does not
specifically provide for cost-benefit analysis, although costs are
occasionally cited as a criterion for deviations from security
requirements. As a result, according to DOD officials from the Office
of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, as well as Navy officials, security measures can and have been
selected without full consideration of their total life cycle costs.
In one case we examined, the Navy is planning to spend over $1.1
billion on a new program to enhance the security of its submarines
carrying nuclear weapons in transit between the wharf and the surface/
dive point. The Navy's analysis used modeling, exercises, and
simulations to evaluate 19 different alternatives, including
maintaining the status quo. Based on the results of modeling the 19
alternatives, Navy officials narrowed the candidate options to the ones
they thought provided an acceptable level of effectiveness and began to
compare the cost of those alternatives. Navy officials then selected
one option that in their view provided the best balance between cost
and effectiveness. The Navy's analysis included leasing, procurement,
operations and maintenance, and staffing costs for only the first 6
years of the program, however, which did not cover the entire life
cycle for these security measures.[Footnote 12] Furthermore, the Navy
did not consider the military construction costs of building new
facilities to support the new security measures, including those
required to berth the blocking vessels that protect the submarines
during transit and new storage and administrative space. In another
case, the Navy interpreted DOD's prescriptive nuclear weapons security
standards as precluding the consideration of costs and benefits.
Specifically, the Navy has undertaken a project at one of its nuclear
facilities to build an underground maintenance and storage facility
without conducting any comparative analysis of costs and benefits to
examine alternatives. Navy officials told us that building underground
facilities is the only alternative for replacing old, substandard
facilities because DOD's manual establishes what they consider a
requirement for new nuclear weapons storage and maintenance facilities
to be built underground.The Navy has defined life cycle cost estimates
as the total cost of a program over its full life from research and
development to final disposal. Specifically, Naval Sea Systems
Command's Cost Estimating Handbook[Footnote 13] identifies four phases
that a life cycle cost estimate must address:
* Research and development costs include those for development, design,
start-up, testing, and changing facilities, among other similar costs.
* Procurement and investment costs are those associated with production
and deployment of the system and related support equipment and
facilities.
* Operations and support costs are all direct and indirect costs
incurred when using the asset through its entire life, including fuel
and maintenance costs, among others.
* Disposal includes the costs of disposing or retiring the asset after
its useful life.
Analyzing costs and benefits is a critical component of risk management
when choosing among alternative security measures because it links the
benefits of alternatives to the costs associated with implementing and
maintaining them. Additionally, GAO and the Office of Management and
Budget have published guidelines for all agencies on analyzing costs
that explain that life cycle costs should be analyzed to determine the
most cost-effective alternative.[Footnote 14],[Footnote 15] Without
calculating and comparing the full life cycle costs for alternatives to
securing submarines, including supporting facilities, it is unclear
whether the alternative selected was the most cost-effective option.
Furthermore, DOD does not require costs and benefits of alternative
security measures to be weighed and, in some cases, prescribes specific
measures the services are required to implement without weighing their
costs and benefits.
DOE, in contrast, provides its sites with specific guidance on
analyzing alternative security measures, including steps to weigh costs
and benefits. DOE's Vulnerability Assessment Process Guide describes a
process for selecting and analyzing alternative security measures.
[Footnote 16] Following this guidance, OST and Pantex both established
their own respective processes for considering alternatives and
weighing costs--OST's Concept to Capability Process and Pantex's
Technology Integration Process. For example, officials at Pantex
recently followed its process to weigh the alternatives for replacing
armored security vehicles. Through this process, three alternative
vehicles were identified and analyzed before one was selected.
DOD and DOE Require Local Threat Assessments, but DOD Installations
Lack Guidance and Capabilities to Prepare Them:
Both DOD and DOE assess threats and vulnerabilities of facilities and
in-transit nuclear assets as part of their risk management approaches
to nuclear weapons security, but DOD has not provided adequate guidance
or capabilities to fully develop local threat assessments where nuclear
weapons are stored, maintained, or transported. DOD's nuclear weapons
security policies require commanders to prepare local threat
assessments for locations that store, maintain, or transport nuclear
weapons based on the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
(NSTCA),[Footnote 17] published in December 2005 by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, which describes the threat to DOD's U.S. nuclear
weapons based on historical precedents and plausible scenarios.
Essentially, the NSTCA is a compilation of information from a variety
of sources that attempts to identify all potential threats to the
nuclear weapons under DOD's control. The NSTCA focuses primarily on
threats from international terrorist groups, state actors, and domestic
groups acting solely within the United States. DOD's antiterrorism
standards also require installation commanders to conduct annual threat
assessments at every installation, including those with nuclear
weapons, and to assess threats using local, regional, and national
sources of information.[Footnote 18]
We reviewed the local threat assessments for Air Force and Navy
installations and found that although there are some differences in how
they incorporate information from the NSTCA, they all generally mirror
its threat information. For example, the local threat assessment
prepared by officials of the Navy Strategic Weapons Facility we visited
draws heavily from the NSTCA and, to a limited extent, on the threat
assessment prepared by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
for the local area surrounding the installation. In contrast, the local
assessment for the other Navy Strategic Weapons Facility simply states
that the threat to that location is "consistent with the threats
documented" in the NSTCA. In fact, one senior Navy official with
responsibility for nuclear security programs told us that strategic
weapons facility commanders are reluctant to eliminate any of the
threats in the NSTCA from their local threat assessments because of the
uncertain and unpredictable nature of terrorist threats. Similarly, the
local threat assessments for the Air Force installations we visited
generally highlighted the same threats as those documented in the
national assessment and contained the same information provided in the
installation threat assessments prepared by the local Air Force Office
of Special Investigations (OSI).
Officials at both Air Force and Navy facilities lack the guidance and
capabilities necessary to analyze available intelligence information
from the local, regional, and national levels. Officials told us that
the only guidance they have received is that contained in the March
2006 cover memo to the NSTCA, which directs installation commanders to
localize the NSTCA to each operating environment at each storage and
operational location, but does not provide any detailed guidance on how
the assessments should be prepared or the sources of information that
should be used to develop the local threat assessments. Throughout the
course of our review, DOD officials agreed that local commanders lacked
the necessary guidance and capabilities to comprehensively assess
threats at the installation level.
In the absence of detailed guidance, we found that Air Force and Navy
officials prepare their local threat assessments using different
methodologies. For example, at two of the Air Force installations we
visited, commanders relied on threat working groups comprising
installation officials to develop the local nuclear security threat
assessment.[Footnote 19] At the third Air Force installation we
visited, the installation intelligence officer worked independently to
identify and assess the threat and prepare the localized nuclear
security threat assessment. At each of the Air Force installations, the
officials charged with preparing the local nuclear threat assessment
reviewed local defense threat assessments prepared by the Air Force's
OSI in preparing their local assessments. At the Navy installation we
visited, the deputy security director coordinated with local NCIS
agents to obtain local threat information and compared the national-
level threats and capabilities identified in the NSTCA to the local
situation to develop a local threat assessment.
In addition to limited guidance, at the local level installation
commanders have limited capabilities to develop local threat
assessments. Specifically, the Air Force and Navy rely heavily on
assistance from their OSI and NCIS counterparts to provide local threat
information, prepare local threat assessments, and serve as a conduit
to local law enforcement agencies, the local Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) offices, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) or
fusion centers in the area.[Footnote 20] However, at the installations
we visited, these agents were field agents not intelligence analysts.
These agents stated that, in their view, they did not believe they were
in the best position to analyze and fuse intelligence information
collected from local, regional, and national levels as the basis for
the local NSTCA. Furthermore, at the installations we visited, the
local threat assessments are not generally vetted through OSI and NCIS
beyond the local office or any non-DOD organization, such as the FBI,
and the agents involved may not even see the final product. For
example, NCIS agents at the Navy installation we visited told us that
they had not seen or read the local threat assessment for that
installation. Also, an FBI official who was the principal liaison with
an Air Force installation we visited had not seen and was not familiar
with the local threat assessment for that installation, and he was not
aware of any process through which the local threat assessment would be
vetted through the local FBI office or intelligence analysts. Without
clear guidance and capabilities to prepare the local threat
assessments, DOD and the military services may not be fully leveraging
all available threat information as local threat assessments are being
prepared.
The DOD Nuclear Weapons Security Manual[Footnote 21] also requires
commanders at facilities that operate, maintain, store, or transport
nuclear weapons to conduct annual vulnerability assessments and
recommend actions to reduce or mitigate the identified vulnerabilities
as part of the threat and risk assessment process.[Footnote 22] The
manual states that a threat assessment, based on the postulated
national threat as well as the local threat assessment, is to be used
as the basis for the vulnerability assessment. However, if the local
threat assessment does not fully identify the threats present in the
area, that omission may also affect the installation commander's
ability to identify all vulnerabilities.
We reviewed the vulnerability assessments prepared by commanders of the
Air Force and Navy installations that we visited. We found that each
conducted annual vulnerability assessments based on the national-level
threat postulated in the NSTCA and on the local threat assessment. At
the two Navy installations, vulnerability assessment teams evaluated
each of the environments in which they operate in terms of available
security measures and the potential threats identified in the national-
level and localized threat assessments. At the Air Force installations,
we found that as for the Navy, vulnerability assessments were prepared
using the postulated threats outlined in the NSTCA and the locally
prepared threat assessments, as described above, and generally focus on
the threats identified at the national level. However, because
vulnerability assessments are based in part on threat assessments, an
incomplete assessment of the local threats could result in an
incomplete assessment of the installation's vulnerabilities.
DOE Provides More Specific Guidance to Assess Threats, and an
Assessment Approach That Allows Greater Access to Information Sources:
In contrast to DOD's approach to threat assessments, DOE has provided
its two sites that handle nuclear weapons more specific guidance and
resources than DOD to identify and assess local threats. Like DOD, DOE
requires that its two sites that handle nuclear weapons--OST and
Pantex--incorporate local, regional, and national threat information
into their annual assessments. DOE's guidance states that the Graded
Security Protection (GSP) policy--DOE's national-level threat policy--
must be the baseline threat definition but that regional and local
threats should be identified and considered in conducting site
vulnerability assessments. In practice, OST and Pantex conduct their
threat assessments in cooperation with the FBI and other federal
agencies. At Pantex, for example, local FBI agents are stationed on-
site to identify local and regional threats and provide a conduit to
state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, in 2008, OST
established a new threat assessment approach that includes placing its
intelligence analysts at U.S. Northern Command and DOE's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The approach also provides a
capability to fuse threat information from these and other sources--
including the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, JTTF, and others-
-and includes intelligence analysts who process this information and
provide threat assessments to DOE personnel involved in transporting
nuclear materials. According to the OST Assistant Deputy Administrator
with responsibility for security, OST's new approach was necessary
because DOE's former threat policy, the Design Basis Threat (DBT),
focused on the more severe but less likely threats.[Footnote 23] In his
opinion, it was important for OST to obtain all available information
to identify potentially less severe, but more likely threats as a basis
for training and preparing security forces. According to DOE officials,
these threats although less severe include events that may embarrass
the United States, affect the entire continental United States-based
nuclear weapons program, or both. In its technical comments on a draft
of this report, DOE stated that its new threat policy, the GSP, will
serve as a strategic-level planning document that addresses a range of
assets, threats, and adversary types. DOE further commented that the
security approach instituted by OST and other sites in the department
represents a mechanism for implementing the GSP on a day-to-day basis
that considers each site's specific mission. Because the new initiative
has not been fully implemented, we did not assess its effectiveness in
this review.
DOD and DOE Have Identified Funding Requirements of Approximately $11
Billion for Nuclear Weapons Security:
DOD and DOE have estimated the funds required to protect nuclear
weapons to be approximately $11 billion for fiscal years 2006 through
2013.[Footnote 24] However, we identified shortfalls in the Air Force's
ability to centrally manage and track funding that limit the visibility
of Air Force requirements. DOD estimated nuclear weapons security
funding to be $8.1 billion--approximately $4.7 billion for the Air
Force and almost $3.4 billion for the Navy. Within DOE, the two
organizations that handle fully assembled nuclear weapons, OST and
Pantex, estimated the funding for nuclear weapons security to be
approximately $1.9 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively. Personnel
costs are the single largest driver in security costs across both DOD
and DOE--representing approximately $6.2 billion, or 56 percent of the
$11 billion total. Table 2 summarizes the nuclear weapons security
funding requirements for the Air Force, Navy, OST, and Pantex. The
funding categories used by DOD and DOE organizations differ somewhat
because of differences in the departments and missions. Additional
detail concerning the nuclear weapons security funding requirements of
each of these organizations can be found in appendix IV.
Table 2: DOD and DOE Estimated Funding for Nuclear Weapons Security,
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Military personnel;
FY 2006: $454.9 million;
FY 2007: $462.3 million;
FY 2008: $473.6 million;
FY 2009: $417.4 million;
FY 2010: $423.7 million;
FY 2011: $439.0 million;
FY 2012: $456.7 million;
FY 2013: $471.4 million;
Grand total: $3,599.0 million.
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Weapons procurement;
FY 2006: $40.8 million;
FY 2007: $79.1 million;
FY 2008: $98.9 million;
FY 2009: $93.7 million;
FY 2010: $80.8 million;
FY 2011: $27.4 million;
FY 2012: $24.5 million;
FY 2013: $19.2 million;
Grand total: $464.4 million.
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Operations and maintenance (equipment);
FY 2006: $42.0 million;
FY 2007: $48.4 million;
FY 2008: $71.9 million;
FY 2009: $51.7 million;
FY 2010: $43.7 million;
FY 2011: $51.0 million;
FY 2012: $44.7 million;
FY 2013: $45.4 million;
Grand total: $398.8 million.
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Military construction;
FY 2006: 0.0;
FY 2007: 0.0;
FY 2008: 0.0;
FY 2009: 0.0;
FY 2010: 0.0;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: $4.6 million;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Grand total: $4.6 million.
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Other appropriations;
FY 2006: $32.6 million;
FY 2007: $27.2 million;
FY 2008: $16.4 million;
FY 2009: $30.3 million;
FY 2010: $34.2 million;
FY 2011: $30.4 million;
FY 2012: $24.4 million;
FY 2013: $18.8 million;
Grand total: $214.3 million.
Organization: Air Force;
Funding category[A]: Total Air Force funding requirement;
FY 2006: $570.3 million;
FY 2007: $617.0 million;
FY 2008: $660.8 million;
FY 2009: $593.1 million;
FY 2010: $582.4 million;
FY 2011: $547.8 million;
FY 2012: $554.9 million;
FY 2013: $554.8 million;
Grand total: $4,681.1 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Operations and maintenance;
FY 2006: $99.7 million;
FY 2007: $150.1 million;
FY 2008: $150.5 million;
FY 2009: $171.9 million;
FY 2010: $167.1 million;
FY 2011: $166.5 million;
FY 2012: $169.8 million;
FY 2013: $173.3 million;
Grand total: $1,248.9 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Military construction;
FY 2006: $94.3 million;
FY 2007: $48.1 million;
FY 2008: $39.8 million;
FY 2009: $50.7 million;
FY 2010: $133.7 million;
FY 2011: $309.0 million;
FY 2012: $44.6 million;
FY 2013: $56.0 million;
Grand total: $776.2 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Navy and Marine Corps manpower;
FY 2006: $62.9 million;
FY 2007: $70.0 million;
FY 2008: $72.2 million;
FY 2009: $85.7 million;
FY 2010: $88.3 million;
FY 2011: $90.9 million;
FY 2012: $93.6 million;
FY 2013: $96.4 million;
Grand total: $660.0 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Other procurement;
FY 2006: $112.7 million;
FY 2007: $41.1 million;
FY 2008: $53.1 million;
FY 2009: $52.9 million;
FY 2010: $33.9 million;
FY 2011: $27.3 million;
FY 2012: $95.9 million;
FY 2013: $97.8 million;
Grand total: $514.7 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Weapons procurement;
FY 2006: $5.1 million;
FY 2007: 0.0;
FY 2008: $7.0 million;
FY 2009: $45.4 million;
FY 2010: $44.3 million;
FY 2011: $31.2 million;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Grand total: $133.0 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Other appropriations;
FY 2006: 0.0;
FY 2007: $41.9 million;
FY 2008: $5.8 million;
FY 2009: $0.9 million;
FY 2010: $0.9 million;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Grand total: $49.5 million.
Organization: Navy;
Funding category[A]: Total Navy funding requirement;
FY 2006: $374.7 million;
FY 2007: $351.2 million;
FY 2008: $328.4 million;
FY 2009: $407.5 million;
FY 2010: $468.2 million;
FY 2011: $624.9 million;
FY 2012: $403.9 million;
FY 2013: $423.5 million;
Grand total: $3,382.3 million.
Total DOD funding requirement;
Grand total: $8,063.4 million.
Organization: OST;
Funding category[A]: Mission capacity;
FY 2006: $121.0 million;
FY 2007: $117.0 million;
FY 2008: $122.7 million;
FY 2009: $123.0 million;
FY 2010: $149.8 million;
FY 2011: $160.0 million;
FY 2012: $165.2 million;
FY 2013: $166.1 million;
Grand total: $1,124.8 million.
Organization: OST;
Funding category[A]: Program management;
FY 2006: $39.7 million;
FY 2007: $47.0 million;
FY 2008: $46.6 million;
FY 2009: $48.2 million;
FY 2010: $52.6 million;
FY 2011: $54.1 million;
FY 2012: $56.9 million;
FY 2013: $58.0 million;
Grand total: $403.1 million.
Organization: OST;
Funding category[A]: Infrastructure;
FY 2006: $26.1 million;
FY 2007: $28.7 million;
FY 2008: $24.0 million;
FY 2009: $28.0 million;
FY 2010: $25.1 million;
FY 2011: $30.2 million;
FY 2012: $30.7 million;
FY 2013: $30.5 million;
Grand total: $223.3 million.
Organization: OST;
Funding category[A]: Security/safety capability;
FY 2006: $23.1 million;
FY 2007: $16.5 million;
FY 2008: $23.6 million;
FY 2009: $21.8 million;
FY 2010: $23.8 million;
FY 2011: $21.8 million;
FY 2012: $22.1 million;
FY 2013: $22.1 million;
Grand total: $174.8 million.
Organization: OST;
Funding category[A]: Total OST funding requirement;
FY 2006: $209.9 million;
FY 2007: $209.2 million;
FY 2008: $216.9 million;
FY 2009: $221.0 million;
FY 2010: $251.3 million;
FY 2011: $266.1 million;
FY 2012: $274.9 million;
FY 2013: $276.7 million;
Grand total: $1,926.0 million.
Organization: Pantex;
Funding category[A]: Protective forces;
FY 2006: $90.3 million;
FY 2007: $92.5 million;
FY 2008: $100.3 million;
FY 2009: $105.5 million;
FY 2010: $117.6 million;
FY 2011: $117.6 million;
FY 2012: $123.5 million;
FY 2013: $117.0 million;
Grand total: $864.3 million.
Organization: Pantex;
Funding category[A]: Physical security systems;
FY 2006: $6.9 million;
FY 2007: $7.3 million;
FY 2008: $10.3 million;
FY 2009: $4.8 million;
FY 2010: $8.7 million;
FY 2011: $10.2 million;
FY 2012: $9.7 million;
FY 2013: $20.0 million;
Grand total: $77.9 million.
Organization: Pantex;
Funding category[A]: DBT security enhancements;
FY 2006: $14.7 million;
FY 2007: $9.1 million;
FY 2008: $25.5 million;
FY 2009: 0.0;
FY 2010: 0.0;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Grand total: $49.3 million.
Organization: Pantex;
Funding category[A]: All other programs;
FY 2006: $11.1 million;
FY 2007: $13.1 million;
FY 2008: $14.7 million;
FY 2009: $15.1 million;
FY 2010: $8.8 million;
FY 2011: $15.0 million;
FY 2012: $14.6 million;
FY 2013: $15.0 million;
Grand total: $107.4 million.
Organization: Pantex;
Funding category[A]: Total Pantex funding requirement;
FY 2006: $123.0 million;
FY 2007: $122.0 million;
FY 2008: $150.8 million;
FY 2009: $125.4 million;
FY 2010: $135.1 million;
FY 2011: $142.8 million;
FY 2012: $147.8 million;
FY 2013: $152.0 million;
Grand total: $1,098.9 million.
Total DOE funding requirement:
Grand total: $3,024.9 million.
Total DOD and DOE nuclear security funding requirement:
Grand total: $11,088.3 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD (Air Force and Navy) and DOE (OST and
Pantex) data.
[A] Funding categories include appropriation accounts for the Air Force
and Navy, subprograms for OST, and programs for Pantex.
[End of table]
DOD has estimated the funds required to protect the Air Force arsenal
of nuclear weapons to be approximately $ 4.7 billion for fiscal years
2006 through 2013. The most significant component of this estimate is
the funding for security forces. Air Force personnel who protect the
nuclear weapons account for over three-fourths--$3.6 billion (over 76
percent)--of the Air Force's total estimated funding. Safeguarding the
Air Force nuclear weapons arsenal is a labor-intensive mission because
of the vast geographic areas that its security forces must operate in
and the specific response times required by DOD's nuclear weapons
security policies. The Air Force's funding estimate also includes $4.6
million in military construction funds to construct a weapons storage
area security control facility for the Air Combat Command in fiscal
year 2012. The Air Force's military construction requirement is small
in comparison to the Navy's investment in military construction
projects for fiscal years 2006 through 2013, because, according to Air
Force officials, many of the Air Force facilities that store and
process nuclear assets were constructed prior to fiscal year 2006.
DOD has estimated the funds required to protect the Navy stockpile of
nuclear weapons to be approximately $3.4 billion for fiscal years 2006
through 2013.[Footnote 25] Operations and maintenance is the major
component of this estimate, encompassing about $1.2 billion (36.9
percent) of the total. The majority of the operations and maintenance
funding--$633.5 million (50.7 percent)--is borne by one program, the
Transit Protection System, which is a group of vessels, personnel, and
weapons systems intended to protect SSBNs transiting between a homeport
and a safe surface/dive location. However, the total cost of the
Transit Protection System project is estimated to be about $1.1
billion. Over $776.2 million (22.9 percent) of the Navy's funding
estimate includes military construction projects. The Navy's largest
building project is the construction of a secure production and storage
complex at both Strategic Weapons Facility locations. These complexes
provide a secure, hardened location for storage and processing
facilities at an estimated cost of $459.7 million.
DOE has estimated the funds required to protect fully assembled nuclear
weapons and other nuclear material and components that OST transports
from one location to another, for fiscal years 2006 through 2013, to be
over $1.9 billion. OST organizes its work into four subprograms:
mission capacity, program management, infrastructure, and security/
safety capability. Each of the subprograms is further described below:
* Mission capacity ($1.1 billon) consists of raising and maintaining
its capacity to meet projected workloads, including annual training
classes; recruiting, equipping, and training federal agent candidates;
and maintaining vehicles, among other things.
* Program management ($403.1 million) includes business supplies and
operations and evaluation of work functions and processes.
* Infrastructure ($223.3 million) covers the maintenance and
modernization of communications systems at OST, among other things,
including maintaining classified command, control, and communications
systems for oversight of nuclear convoys.
* Security/safety capability ($174.8 million) encompasses security and
safety programs--such as liaison with local law enforcement--and the
identification, design, and testing of new technologies, among other
things.
DOE has estimated the funds required to protect the fully assembled
nuclear weapons and other nuclear material and components at Pantex to
be about $1.1 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2013. Pantex
organizes its funding information in the following categories:
* Protective forces program ($864.3 million) pays for an armed,
contracted security force and equipment, facilities, training,
management, and administrative support.
* Physical security systems program ($77.9 million) provides intrusion
detection and assessment capabilities, access controls, and maintenance
of security systems at Pantex.
* The DBT Security Enhancements program ($49.3 million) pays for
upgrades associated with implementation of DOE's 2005 DBT policy,
including hiring and training of additional officers, deploying new
weapons and ammunition, and upgrading physical security systems.
[Footnote 26]
* All other programs ($107.4 million) include program management and
support, information protection, materials control and accountability,
and the personnel security program.
Air Force Lacks a Centralized Approach to Manage and Track Funding:
Although accountability over funding data is critical to enabling
decision makers to address the funding requirements of the nuclear
weapons security program, we found that the Air Force lacked a
consistent method to identify nuclear weapons security funding because
of the decentralized method through which it manages this funding. As a
result, Air Staff officials made data calls to all commands with
nuclear weapons security responsibility to obtain and assimilate the
funding information before forwarding it to us. With this process, it
took Air Force personnel over 8 months to provide us with the
information and supporting documentation. In the course of our work,
Air Force officials indicated that they recognize the limitations of
the current decentralized approach to managing and tracking nuclear
security funding. In contrast, the Navy and the two DOE organizations--
OST and Pantex--have a more centralized approach to managing nuclear
weapons security funding and were therefore able to provide their
respective nuclear weapons security funding estimates and supporting
documentation in a more timely manner. In October 2008, the Air Force
announced plans to reorganize its nuclear command and control system
and will consolidate the management of nuclear weapons under one major
command to oversee its nuclear mission--Global Strike Command--that is
scheduled to reach initial operating capability in September 2009.
According to Air Force officials this reorganization has the potential
to provide them with different methods to manage and track funding
associated with nuclear weapons.
We have previously reported that producing timely, useful, and reliable
performance information, including related cost data, is critical for
achieving the goals that Congress established in the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 and other federal financial
management reform legislation.[Footnote 27] Further, the Air Force
recently reported that any nuclear enterprise funding decisions should
be based upon relevant, accurate, consistent, defendable, repeatable,
and transparent data and analysis.[Footnote 28] In light of the
significance of nuclear assets and two well-publicized events in which
control of nuclear weapons was lost, there is now a renewed emphasis on
nuclear security, including the allocation of additional resources.
However, without a more systematic approach to providing timely,
reliable funding data--and therefore visibility and accountability over
funding--the Air Force cannot effectively prioritize its nuclear
security resources and requirements to develop a sound investment
strategy.
Conclusions:
In an era of scarce resources and competing demands, a risk management
approach to nuclear weapons security can provide DOD and DOE managers
with necessary tools to help identify and prioritize necessary
investments and optimize the security provided to these critical
assets. We have identified several areas where DOD can broaden its
application of risk management principles and improve its approach to
nuclear weapons security. First, the prescriptive nature of DOD's
nuclear security policies and guidance combined with a limited emphasis
on cost-benefit analysis can result in expenditure of funds on security
measures that have not been fully analyzed. Without a requirement to
perform cost-benefit analyses and fully consider life cycle costs for
alternative nuclear weapons security measures, DOD organizations may
not consider the full range of alternatives or may not select the most
cost-effective option available. In contrast, we found that DOE's
policy for nuclear weapons security provides local officials greater
flexibility than DOD's in determining how to meet security standards,
and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a part of the
decision-making process.
Second, the foundation of risk assessment is a comprehensive and
current assessment of potential threats, but DOD has not provided
installation commanders with clear guidance or the necessary
capabilities to develop local threat assessments where nuclear weapons
are stored, maintained, or transported. A more comprehensive approach
for assessing threats at the local level could enhance DOD security
forces' awareness and preparedness. While DOE has recently adopted the
new GSP policy, it is too soon to determine whether it will be
effective. OST has identified limitations in its threat assessment
process and is taking steps to improve its access to available threat
information at all levels--local, regional, and national--and the
ability to analyze it and how it is used to prepare security measures.
OST officials believe that this approach will improve the training and
readiness of its security forces.
Finally, the Air Force has difficulty effectively managing and
overseeing the significant resources planned to improve nuclear weapons
security because it lacks sufficient visibility into its nuclear
security spending. The establishment of a new major command that will
centralize the nuclear enterprise in the Air Force provides an
opportunity to enhance the visibility of funding to sustain and improve
security.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions.
To improve DOD's process for evaluating and selecting among alternative
security measures, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the:
* Deputy Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
to modify DOD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear
Weapons, to require alternatives and cost-benefit analyses of nuclear
security measures as appropriate and:
* Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense to modify DOD S-5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapons Security
Manual, to provide appropriate guidance to the military services for
weighing costs, including life cycle costs, and benefits when
considering alternative security measures for nuclear weapons.
To improve installation commanders' ability to assess threats where
nuclear weapons are stored, maintained, or transported, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the:
* Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters to
provide more specific guidance on the methodology to develop local
threat assessments and:
* Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy to provide installation
commanders with the capabilities necessary to more fully collect and
assess local, regional, and national intelligence information.
To more effectively manage its nuclear weapons security program and
provide visibility and accountability as the Air Force moves to a new
nuclear command structure, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a method to
centrally manage and track funding associated with nuclear weapons
security.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with four of our recommendations and agreed with one, stating that in
some cases, actions were already underway that would address the issues
identified in this report. DOD's comments appear in their entirety in
appendix V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated into the draft as appropriate. DOE also reviewed a draft
of this report and had no comments, but provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
to modify DOD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear
Weapons, to require alternatives and cost benefit analysis of nuclear
security measures, DOD partially agreed. DOD stated that the policy
already provides guidance which meets the recommendation's intent and
inherently requires the department to examine alternatives in regard to
cost benefit. Specifically, DOD noted that the policy states that
"physical security requirements associated with nuclear weapons shall
take into consideration the affordability and life-cycle costs of a
nuclear weapon system." However, as discussed in this report, our
review of the policy indicates that, as implemented by the Nuclear
Weapons Security Manual (DOD S-5210.41-M), it primarily applies to the
research, development, and acquisition process for nuclear weapons
systems. It is unclear if or how this requirement applies to the
procurement of security systems or equipment. Therefore, we believe
that DOD should take additional steps to modify guidance in order to
strengthen the requirement for cost-benefit analysis when considering
and selecting among alternative nuclear security measures.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs to modify the Nuclear Weapons Security
Manual, DOD S-5210.41-M, to provide appropriate guidance to the
Services for weighing costs, including life-cycle costs, and benefits
when considering alternative security measures for nuclear weapons, DOD
partially agreed. DOD agreed that greater emphasis on costs and
benefits and security effectiveness in selecting and implementing
nuclear physical security measures is appropriate and stated that this
issue is addressed in its proposed revision of the Nuclear Weapons
Security Manual. If the changes made to the manual provide clearer
guidance for weighing costs and benefits that applies directly to
nuclear weapons security, we believe it will address the intent of our
recommendation. In its response, DOD further states that this report
implies that the Navy relied solely on Nuclear Weapons Security Manual
requirements in deciding to replace existing maintenance and storage
facilities by building new facilities underground. DOD asserts that the
Navy assessed a variety of options and determined that the most cost-
effective approach that would meet performance requirements was a
hardened, underground structure. However, when we discussed this
example with Navy officials during the course of our work, they told us
that they made the decision to build the new facility underground
because they believe that the Nuclear Weapons Security Manual requires
new storage and maintenance facilities to be constructed underground.
Further, we asked for documentation supporting any cost benefit
analysis that was performed prior to making the decision and Navy
officials were unable to provide such documentation. Without any
documentation we were unable to verify or evaluate the Navy's claim
that it assessed a variety of options or any cost and benefit analysis
that may have been completed. Additionally, DOD states that this report
notes that the Navy did not include the full life cycle costs in its
analysis of alternatives prior to selecting its new Transit Protection
System for in-transit SSBNs. DOD states that a 2006 Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) review of the Navy's analysis of alternatives
concluded that the system selected provided the most significant
benefit when evaluated in terms of deployment time, effectiveness,
ability to evolve, impact to SSBN operations and cost. However, PA&E
only reviewed the costs the Navy used in making its decision and, as
discussed in this report, the Navy's methodology excluded life-cycle
costs beyond the Future Years Defense Program and military construction
costs for building new facilities to support the new security measures.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Matters to provide more specific guidance on the methodology
for developing local threat assessments. While DOD notes that DOD
Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards, prescribes procedures
for conducting annual local threat assessments, it also states that the
proposed revision to the Nuclear Weapons Security Manual provides more
detailed guidance on preparing local threat assessments at nuclear
installations. We believe that if the revision to the manual provides
such guidance for installation commanders when published, it will
address the intent of our recommendation.
The Department also partially agreed with our recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy
to provide installation commanders with the capabilities necessary to
more fully collect and assess local, regional, and national
intelligence information. DOD states that a comprehensive study by the
Services to determine capability gaps in intelligence collection is
needed to determine if installation commanders lack the resources and
personnel to meet the requirements or if better, more efficient use of
existing resources and personnel is needed. We continue to believe that
the capability to fully collect and assess intelligence information
from all levels is critical to the installation commanders' ability to
assess the threat and localize the threat assessment to his or her
installation. While DOD's proposed study is a good first step, we are
unable to assess the extent to which such a study addresses our
recommendation until it is completed and actions identified. Therefore,
we believe that our recommendation is still warranted.
Finally, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a method to
centrally manage and track funding associated with nuclear weapons
security. However, the department did not specify any actions that it
plans to take to address this recommendation. As a result, we have no
basis for determining whether it will take steps to address the intent
of our recommendation. We believe our recommendation is still
warranted.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov or
Gene Aloise at (202) 512-6870 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this
product are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate and compare the Department of Defense's (DOD) and
Department of Energy's (DOE) policies and procedures and guidance
including how they are interpreted and applied by the major
organizations within each department that handle nuclear weapons and
the extent to which each department requires alternatives and cost-
benefit analyses, we obtained and compared DOD's and DOE's nuclear
security policies and procedures; visited several sites that store,
maintain, or transport fully assembled nuclear weapons; and interviewed
DOD, DOE, Air Force, and Navy officials at headquarters and relevant
field locations. We analyzed policies, guidance, and implementation
manuals that instruct DOD installations and DOE sites in their nuclear
security practices. (Table 3 lists the specific polices, procedures,
and guidance that we analyzed.)
Table 3: List of Nuclear Security Policies, Procedures, and Guidance
Documents Analyzed:
Department: Office of the President;
Number (date): NSPD-28 (June 20, 2003);
Title: National Security Presidential Directive 28.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): DODD 2000.12 (Aug. 18, 2003);
Title: DOD Antiterrorism Program.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): DOD O 2000.12-H (February 2004);
Title: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): DODI 2000.16 (Oct. 2, 2006);
Title: DOD Antiterrorism Standards.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): DODD 5210.41 (Nov. 1, 2004);
Title: Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): DOD S-5210.41-M (Nov. 22, 2004);
Title: Nuclear Weapons Security Manual.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): (July 30, 2008);
Title: Nuclear Weapons Physical Security Roadmap, 2008-2018.
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): (December 2005);
Title: Nuclear Security Threat Capability Assessment 2005 to 2015
(NSTCA).
Department: Department of Defense;
Number (date): (Mar. 17, 2006);
Title: NSTCA Transmittal Memorandum.
Department: Department of the Air Force;
Number (date): Air Force Manual 31-108 (Feb. 1, 2007);
Title: Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.
Department: Department of the Air Force;
Number (date): [Empty];
Title: Analysis of Alternatives for U.S. Air Force/A7S Program
Objective Memorandum Fiscal Year 10 Submission.
Department: Air Combat Command;
Number (date): Air Force Manual 31-108, Air Combat Command Supplement;
Title: Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.
Department: Air Force Materiel Command;
Number (date): Air Force Manual 31-108, Air Force Materiel Command
Supplement;
Title: Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.
Department: Air Force Space Command;
Number (date): Air Force Space Command Instruction 31-1101;
Title: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Security
Standard.
Department: Navy;
Number (date): Secretary of the Navy Instruction S8126.1 (Apr. 4,
2006);
Title: Naval Nuclear Security Policy.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE P 226.1 (May 25, 2007);
Title: DOE Oversight Policy.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE 470.3A (Nov. 29, 2005);
Title: Design Basis Threat Policy.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 413.3-1 (Mar. 28, 2003);
Title: Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE P 470.1 (May 8, 2001);
Title: Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Policy.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 470.4-1 (Aug. 26, 2005);
Title: Safeguards and Security Planning and Management Manual.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 470.4-2 (Aug. 26, 2005);
Title: Physical Protection.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE O 470.2 B (Oct. 31, 2002);
Title: Independent Oversight & Performance Assurance Program.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 470.4-3 (Aug. 26, 2005);
Title: Protective Force.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 470.4-5 (Aug. 26, 2005);
Title: Personnel Security.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE M 470.4-6 (Aug. 26, 2005);
Title: Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): DOE O 470.3B (Aug. 12, 2008);
Title: Graded Security Protection Policy.
Department: Department of Energy;
Number (date): (Sept. 30, 2004);
Title: Vulnerability Assessment Process Guide.
Department: National Nuclear Security Administration;
Number (date): (Oct. 2006);
Title: Defense Nuclear Security Strategic Plan.
Department: National Nuclear Security Administration;
Number (date): (Apr. 2008);
Title: Strategic Planning Guidance.
Department: National Nuclear Security Administration;
Number (date): (Dec. 2007);
Title: Draft Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement.
Department: National Nuclear Security Administration;
Number (date): (Mar. 21, 2009);
Title: Defense Nuclear Security Program Executing Guidance.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
We reviewed DOD and DOE's policies, procedures, and guidance to
identify differences in their approaches to achieve desired security
levels for nuclear weapons. We also visited four DOD installations and
two DOE sites to meet with knowledgeable officials and discuss and
observe the nuclear security procedures and practices in place at each
facility. For security reasons, we do not discuss location-specific
information in this report. In addition, we met with headquarters DOD
and DOE officials to obtain their perspectives on how nuclear security
policies and procedures are applied. Specifically, we met with
officials from the following DOD organizations: Office of the Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict;
Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Navy
Strategic Systems Program Office; Office of Naval Intelligence; Naval
Criminal Investigative Service; Air Force Intelligence Directorate; Air
Force Office of Special Investigation; Air Force Operations and Force
Protection Division; and Air Force Space Command. We also met with DOE
officials from the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and
three offices within the Office of Health, Safety, and Security: Office
of Security Technology and Assistance, Office of Security Assistance,
and Office of Security Policy.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD and DOE apply risk management
principles in their approach to establishing nuclear security measures,
we compared DOD, DOE, Air Force, and Navy policies, procedures, site
security plans, and any related cost-benefit analyses to commonly
accepted elements of risk management. Specifically, we assessed each
organization's approach to identify the extent to which it addresses
strategic goals and objectives, risk assessments (threat,
vulnerability, and criticality assessments), evaluating and selecting
alternative courses of actions to mitigate risk, and management
oversight. We also met with DOD and DOE officials to discuss how they
implemented the risk management principles to protect nuclear assets
from terrorist attack. Specifically, we met with officials from the
following DOD organizations: Office of the Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence; Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; and Air Force
Operations and Force Protection Division. We also discussed the
application of risk management principles with officials at Air Force
Space Command, and at two Air Force installations we visited. In
addition, we met with DOE officials from the OST and three offices
within the Office of Health, Safety, and Security: Office of Security
Technology and Assistance, Office of Security Assistance, and Office of
Security Policy.
To determine DOD and DOE's total funding requirements for securing
nuclear weapons, we obtained and analyzed funding data related to
nuclear weapons security from DOD and DOE for fiscal years 2006 through
2013. Specifically, we obtained information relating to the amount of
funds received for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 and the amount
programmed for fiscal years 2009 to 2013, as of the President's fiscal
year 2008 budget. To assess the reliability of this information, we
obtained and analyzed funding information by funding category for each
of the four organizations in our review.[Footnote 29] We also met with
budget officials from the Air Force, Navy, OST, and Pantex to discuss
the reliability of the data. Using the 2008 funding information
obtained from the four organizations, we selected a nonprobability
sample of three estimated funding requirements for each of the
organizations, obtained source documentation for each funding
requirement, and compared it to each of the sample funding estimates.
Both the Navy and OST provided source documentation supporting the
funding requirement represented by each sample item to within 97
percent. Pantex provided source documentation supporting the funding
requirement represented by one sample item to within 95 percent.
Although Pantex officials did not provide detailed documentation
supporting the other two sample items selected, they were able to
provide reports of independent reviews of the systems used to produce
the estimated funding requirements, to include reviews by the National
Nuclear Security Administration. The reports supported the reliability
of the Pantex systems used to produce the funding requirements
information. Conversely, the Air Force was unable to provide supporting
documentation for three selected funding requirements from the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget or any independent reviews of the
systems used to produce the funding estimate. We updated our analysis
with data from the President's fiscal year 2009 budget, which are used
throughout this report for all four organizations. Therefore, we
selected another nonprobability sample of four funding requirements
from the Air Force's fiscal year 2009 estimate. The Air Force provided
source documentation supporting the funding requirement for three
sample items to within 96 percent of the estimate. It was unable to
provide source documentation for one item. The Air Force's inability to
provide source documentation for the 2008 funding requirements and one
of the four requested 2009 funding requirements raised questions for us
regarding the reliability of the Air Force data reporting process,
though we found only minor discrepancies with the three 2009 funding
requirements where we were able to examine source documentation.
Overall, we found the funding requirements data obtained from each of
the four organizations in our review to be sufficiently reliable for
our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to April 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD and DOE Policy Framework:
DOD and DOE have each established their own nuclear weapons security
policy framework that seeks to meet national requirements and spells
out specific minimum standards for sites to implement. National
Security Presidential Directive 28 requires DOD and DOE to establish
policies, procedures, and systems to deny access by unauthorized
personnel to nuclear weapons and warheads. Tables 4 and 5 outline DOD's
and DOE's frameworks for nuclear weapons security, respectively, from
high-level policies to implementation manuals.
Table 4: DOD's Nuclear Weapons Security Policy Framework:
Issuing organization: DOD (Defense Intelligence Agency);
Document: Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment;
Description: DOD's national-level threat assessment that establishes
security objectives and seeks to identify the greatest threats to DOD
installations.
Issuing organization: DOD;
Document: Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons (Directive
5210.41);
Description: Establishes DOD's policy for nuclear weapons security.
Issuing organization: DOD;
Document: Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (5210.41-M);
Description: DOD's implementing guidance that sets minimum standards
for nuclear weapons security at DOD installations.
Issuing organization: Air Force;
Document: Air Force Manual 31-108;
Description: Air Force's supplemental guidance that instructs its
installations on meeting standards set in DOD's 5210.41-M.
Issuing organization: Air Force;
Document: Major command guidance;
Description: Each of Air Force's major commands published guidance that
provides its respective installations with additional instruction AFMAN
31-108 and 5210.41-M.
Issuing organization: Navy;
Document: Naval Nuclear Security Policy (Secretary of the Navy
Instruction 8126.1);
Description: Navy's supplemental guidance that instructs its
installations on meeting standards set in DOD's 5210.41-M.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of table]
Table 5: DOE's Nuclear Weapons Security Policy Framework:
Issuing organization: DOE;
Document: Graded Security Protection (DOE O 470.3B);
Description: DOE's national-level threat policy that identifies the
threats and their capabilities to DOE's entities that store, maintain,
or transport nuclear material or components. OST's and Pantex's
security systems must meet the threats defined in the GSP, at a
minimum.
Issuing organization: DOE;
Document: Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Policy
(P470.1);
Description: DOE's policy that establishes a framework of requirements
and guidance for implementing safety and security standards, including
those for nuclear weapons.
Issuing organization: DOE;
Document: M 470 series of implementation manuals;
Description: A series of manuals that provide specific requirements and
guidance for implementing security standards.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE information.
[End of table]
To address the requirements of NSPD-28 and provide implementation
guidance, DOD and DOE have issued policies and guidance for their
respective sites to follow when securing nuclear weapons. To respond to
NSPD-28, DOD updated its security policy and provided implementation
guidance to the services by revising the Security Policy for Protecting
Nuclear Weapons (Directive 5210.41) and the Nuclear Weapons Security
Manual (5210.41-M) in November 2004. In addition, DOD, in cooperation
with the Defense Intelligence Agency, published a new assessment of the
threats to nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities
Assessment (NSTCA) in December 2005. To supplement DOD's Nuclear
Weapons Security Manual, both Air Force and Navy published additional
guidance for installations under their command. Additionally, Air
Force's major commands published implementing instructions for their
respective sites that handle nuclear weapons. Together, these documents
establish DOD's security policy and an implementation framework for
securing nuclear weapons; describe nuclear security policy, objectives,
and concepts; and prescribe minimum security standards for protecting
nuclear weapons. For example, DOD's manual prescribes specific minimum
security standards that must be met at each installation that stores,
maintains, or transports nuclear weapons.
DOE's recently updated nuclear weapons threat policy--the Graded
Security Protection (GSP) policy--and the safeguards and security
policy establish DOE's framework for securing nuclear weapons and other
materials.[Footnote 30] These policies are further detailed in a series
of DOE implementation manuals that provide specific requirements and
guidance, including the Safeguards and Security Program Planning and
Management Manual (M 470.4-1), the Physical Protection Manual (M 470.4-
2), and the Protective Force Manual (M 470.4-3). For example, the
Safeguards and Security Program and Planning Management Manual
establishes standards for documenting a site's security plan. According
to DOE officials, they are reviewing security requirements to provide a
more consistent and integrated set of policies. OST and Pantex are also
currently developing implementation plans and finalizing the updates of
their security plans.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Air Force and Navy Operating Environments for Nuclear
Weapons:
Air Force operating environments: Launch facility;
Operating environment definitions: These facilities consist of
underground missile silos and associated support facilities.
Air Force operating environments: Off-base convoy;
Operating environment definitions: Off-base convoys are conducted to
move reentry vehicles from weapons storage areas to launch facilities
and vice versa. Convoys transit base, local, state, and federal
interstate routes, both paved and dirt/gravel.
Air Force operating environments: On-base convoy;
Operating environment definitions: On-base convoys are conducted to
move nuclear weapons from weapons storage areas to aircraft. These
movements transit paved roads, and distances traveled are generally
limited to a few miles or shorter.
Air Force operating environments: Prime nuclear airlift force (PNAF);
Operating environment definitions: PNAFs take place in conjunction with
on-base convoys and may deliver nuclear weapons to or remove them from
aircraft.
Air Force operating environments: Aircraft (bomber) generation;
Operating environment definitions: Aircraft generation[A] takes place
in conjunction with on-base convoys and may deliver or remove nuclear
weapons.
Air Force operating environments: Weapons storage area;
Operating environment definitions: This kind of above-ground weapons
storage area is located on select Air Force bases and contains
hardened, alarmed storage bunkers, called igloos, for storing nuclear
weapons.
Air Force operating environments: Underground storage area;
Operating environment definitions: The underground storage area stores
weapons in hardened, alarmed underground storage bunkers.
Air Force operating environments: Weapons storage and security
(WS3)/MUNS;
Operating environment definitions: The WS3/MUNS systems are a series of
underground vaults located within hardened/protective aircraft shelters
in a foreign country; this environment does not exist in the United
States. Host nations provide security within the MUNS environment.
Navy operating environments: Limited area;
Operating environment definitions: The limited area is a heavily
guarded area away from the waterfront where nuclear weapons are
received, processed, maintained, stored, and shipped.
Navy operating environments: Convoy route;
Operating environment definitions: The convoy route area includes and
bounds the path that mated Trident missiles take when they are
transported between the limited area and the wharf for ballistic
missile submarine off-loading and on-loading. The convoy route also
includes the dockside handling building and a landside waterfront
facility where the missiles are prepared for installation on a Trident
nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN).
Navy operating environments: Waterfront and harbor;
Operating environment definitions: The waterfront and harbor area
encompasses the waterfront restricted area and all landside and harbor
countermeasures that provide security for moored SSBNs.
Navy operating environments: SSBN transit;
Operating environment definitions: The SSBN transit environment
includes countermeasures that provide security for SSBNs while they are
en route between the harbor and the dive/surface point.
Source: DOD information.
[A] Aircraft generation is an operational situation when nuclear forces
are ordered to regenerate to alert status or where forces are
reestablished to an operational status. This applies to forces that are
not in this posture as a normal (day-to-day peacetime) practice.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Nuclear Weapons Security Funding for the Air Force, Navy,
OST, and Pantex:
DOD and DOE have estimated the funds required to protect nuclear
weapons to be approximately $11.1 billion for fiscal years 2006 through
2013.[Footnote 31] The nuclear weapons security funding requirements
estimated by each of the organizations in our review--Air Force, Navy,
OST, and Pantex--are presented in greater detail below.
Total Funding to Protect Air Force Nuclear Assets Is $4.7 Billion:
DOD has estimated the funds required to protect the Air Force stockpile
of nuclear weapons to be about $ 4.7 billion for fiscal years 2006
through 2013, as shown in table 6.
Table 6: Total Estimated Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Appropriation: Military personnel;
FY 2006: $454.9 million;
FY 2007: $462.3 million;
FY 2008: $473.6 million;
FY 2009: $417.4 million;
FY 2010: $423.7 million;
FY 2011: $439.0 million;
FY 2012: $456.7 million;
FY 2013: $471.4 million;
Total: $3,599.0 million.
Appropriation: Weapons procurement;
FY 2006: $40.8 million;
FY 2007: $79.1 million;
FY 2008: $98.9 million;
FY 2009: $93.7 million;
FY 2010: $80.8 million;
FY 2011: $27.4 million;
FY 2012: $24.5 million;
FY 2013: $19.2 million;
Total: $464.4 million.
Appropriation: Operations and maintenance (equipment);
FY 2006: $42.0 million;
FY 2007: $48.4 million;
FY 2008: $71.9 million;
FY 2009: $51.7 million;
FY 2010: $43.7 million;
FY 2011: $51.0 million;
FY 2012: $44.7 million;
FY 2013: $45.4 million;
Total: $398.8 million.
Appropriation: Other procurement;
FY 2006: $22.4 million;
FY 2007: $11.1 million;
FY 2008: $3.7 million;
FY 2009: $16.6 million;
FY 2010: $22.3 million;
FY 2011: $18.0 million;
FY 2012: $11.4 million;
FY 2013: $5.5 million;
Total: $111.0 million.
Appropriation: Operations and maintenance (civilian pay);
FY 2006: $5.2 million;
FY 2007: $5.4 million;
FY 2008: $5.5 million;
FY 2009: $6.1 million;
FY 2010: $7.5 million;
FY 2011: $7.9 million;
FY 2012: $8.3 million;
FY 2013: $8.6 million;
Total: $54.5 million.
Appropriation: Aircraft procurement;
FY 2006: $3.1 million;
FY 2007: $8.6 million;
FY 2008: $4.9 million;
FY 2009: $4.4 million;
FY 2010: $1.1 million;
FY 2011: $1.1 million;
FY 2012: $1.2 million;
FY 2013: $1.2 million;
Total: $25.6 million.
Appropriation: Munitions;
FY 2006: $1.9 million;
FY 2007: $2.1 million;
FY 2008: $2.3 million;
FY 2009: $3.2 million;
FY 2010: $3.3 million;
FY 2011: $3.4 million;
FY 2012: $3.5 million;
FY 2013: $3.5 million;
Total: $23.2 million.
Appropriation: Military construction;
FY 2006: 0.0;
FY 2007: 0.0;
FY 2008: 0.0;
FY 2009: 0.0;
FY 2010: 0.0;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: $4.6 million;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Total: $4.6 million.
Appropriation: Total;
FY 2006: $570.3 million;
FY 2007: $617.0 million;
FY 2008: $660.8 million;
FY 2009: $593.1 million;
FY 2010: $582.4 million;
FY 2011: $547.8 million;
FY 2012: $554.9 million;
FY 2013: $554.8 million;
Total: $4,681.1 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force information.
[End of table]
Total Funding to Protect Navy Nuclear Assets is $3.4 Billion:
DOD has estimated the funds required to protect the Navy arsenal of
nuclear weapons to be about $3.4 billion for fiscal years 2006 through
2013, as shown in table 7.[Footnote 32]
Table 7: Total Estimated Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Appropriation: Operations and maintenance;
FY 2006: $99.7 million;
FY 2007: $150.1 million;
FY 2008: $150.5 million;
FY 2009: $171.9 million;
FY 2010: $167.1 million;
FY 2011: $166.5 million;
FY 2012: $169.8 million;
FY 2013: $173.3 million;
Total: $1,248.9 million.
Appropriation: Military construction;
FY 2006: $94.3 million;
FY 2007: $48.1 million;
FY 2008: $39.8 million;
FY 2009: $50.7 million;
FY 2010: $133.7 million;
FY 2011: $309.0 million;
FY 2012: $44.6 million;
FY 2013: $56.0 million;
Total: $776.2 million.
Appropriation: Other procurement;
FY 2006: $112.7 million;
FY 2007: $41.1 million;
FY 2008: $53.1 million;
FY 2009: $52.9 million;
FY 2010: $33.9 million;
FY 2011: $27.3 million;
FY 2012: $95.9 million;
FY 2013: $97.8 million;
Total: $514.7 million.
Appropriation: Marine Corps manpower;
FY 2006: $39.6 million;
FY 2007: $40.8 million;
FY 2008: $42.1 million;
FY 2009: $45.7 million;
FY 2010: $47.1 million;
FY 2011: $48.5 million;
FY 2012: $49.9 million;
FY 2013: $51.4 million;
Total: $365.1 million.
Appropriation: Navy manpower;
FY 2006: $23.3 million;
FY 2007: $29.2 million;
FY 2008: $30.1 million;
FY 2009: $40.0 million;
FY 2010: $41.2 million;
FY 2011: $42.4 million;
FY 2012: $43.7 million;
FY 2013: $45.0 million;
Total: $294.9 million.
Appropriation: Weapons procurement;
FY 2006: $5.1 million;
FY 2007: 0.0;
FY 2008: $7.0 million;
FY 2009: $45.4 million;
FY 2010: $44.3 million;
FY 2011: $31.2 million;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Total: $133.0 million.
Appropriation: Research, development testing and evaluation;
FY 2006: 0.0;
FY 2007: $41.9 million;
FY 2008: $5.8 million;
FY 2009: $0.9 million;
FY 2010: $0.9 million;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Total: $49.5 million.
Appropriation: Total;
FY 2006: $374.7 million;
FY 2007: $351.2 million;
FY 2008: $328.4 million;
FY 2009: $407.5 million;
FY 2010: $468.2 million;
FY 2011: $624.9 million;
FY 2012: $403.9 million;
FY 2013: $423.5 million;
Total: $3,382.3 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy information.
[End of table]
Total Funding to Protect OST's Nuclear Assets is $1.9 Billion:
For fiscal years 2006 through 2013, DOE has estimated the funds
required to protect fully assembled nuclear weapons and other nuclear
material and components that OST transports from one location to
another to be over $1.9 billion, as shown in table 8.
Table 8: Total Estimated OST Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Subprogram: Mission capacity;
FY 2006: $121.0 million;
FY 2007: $117.0 million;
FY 2008: $122.7 million;
FY 2009: $123.0 million;
FY 2010: $149.8 million;
FY 2011: $160.0 million;
FY 2012: $165.2 million;
FY 2013: $166.1 million;
Total: $1,124.8 million.
Subprogram: Program management;
FY 2006: $39.7 million;
FY 2007: $47.0 million;
FY 2008: $46.6 million;
FY 2009: $48.2 million;
FY 2010: $52.6 million;
FY 2011: $54.1 million;
FY 2012: $56.9 million;
FY 2013: $58.0 million;
Total: $403.1 million.
Subprogram: Infrastructure;
FY 2006: $26.1 million;
FY 2007: $28.7 million;
FY 2008: $24.0 million;
FY 2009: $28.0 million;
FY 2010: $25.1 million;
FY 2011: $30.2 million;
FY 2012: $30.7 million;
FY 2013: $30.5 million;
Total: $223.3 million.
Subprogram: Security/safety capability;
FY 2006: $23.1 million;
FY 2007: $16.5 million;
FY 2008: $23.6 million;
FY 2009: $21.8 million;
FY 2010: $23.8 million;
FY 2011: $21.8 million;
FY 2012: $22.1 million;
FY 2013: $22.1 million;
Total: $174.8 million.
Subprogram: Total;
FY 2006: $209.9 million;
FY 2007: $209.2 million;
FY 2008: $216.9 million;
FY 2009: $221.0 million;
FY 2010: $251.3 million;
FY 2011: $266.1 million;
FY 2012: $274.9 million;
FY 2013: $276.7 million;
Total: $1,926.0 million.
Source: GAO analysis of OST information.
Note: The budget for each subprogram also includes Program Direction
funding requirements, which include the funding requirement for
personnel, such as salaries and benefits, travel, and other related
expenses.
[End of table]
Total Funding to Protect Nuclear Assets at Pantex is $1.1 Billion:
DOE has estimated the funds required to protect fully assembled nuclear
weapons and other nuclear material and components at Pantex for fiscal
years 2006 through 2013 to be about $1.1 billion, as shown in table 9.
Table 9: Total Estimated Pantex Nuclear Weapons Security Funding
Requirements for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Program: Protective forces;
FY 2006: $90.3 million;
FY 2007: $92.5 million;
FY 2008: $100.3 million;
FY 2009: $105.5 million;
FY 2010: $117.6 million;
FY 2011: $117.6 million;
FY 2012: $123.5 million;
FY 2013: $117.0 million;
Total: $864.3 million.
Program: Physical security systems;
FY 2006: $6.9 million;
FY 2007: $7.3 million;
FY 2008: $10.3 million;
FY 2009: $4.8 million;
FY 2010: $8.7 million;
FY 2011: $10.2 million;
FY 2012: $9.7 million;
FY 2013: $20.0 million;
Total: $77.9 million.
Program: Design Basis Threat security enhancements;
FY 2006: $14.7 million;
FY 2007: $9.1 million;
FY 2008: $25.5 million;
FY 2009: 0.0;
FY 2010: 0.0;
FY 2011: 0.0;
FY 2012: 0.0;
FY 2013: 0.0;
Total: $49.3 million.
Program: Program management and support;
FY 2006: $3.0 million;
FY 2007: $4.3 million;
FY 2008: $5.3 million;
FY 2009: $6.9 million;
FY 2010: $4.7 million;
FY 2011: $5.7 million;
FY 2012: $5.5 million;
FY 2013: $5.7 million;
Total: $41.1 million.
Program: Information protection;
FY 2006: $3.7 million;
FY 2007: $4.4 million;
FY 2008: $4.5 million;
FY 2009: $3.4 million;
FY 2010: $0.3 million;
FY 2011: $4.6 million;
FY 2012: $4.5 million;
FY 2013: $4.6 million;
Total: $30.0 million.
Program: Materials control and accountability;
FY 2006: $3.3 million;
FY 2007: $3.3 million;
FY 2008: $3.7 million;
FY 2009: $3.2 million;
FY 2010: $3.7 million;
FY 2011: $3.6 million;
FY 2012: $3.5 million;
FY 2013: $3.6 million;
Total: $27.9 million.
Program: Personnel security program;
FY 2006: $1.1 million;
FY 2007: $1.1 million;
FY 2008: $1.2 million;
FY 2009: $1.6 million;
FY 2010: $0.1 million;
FY 2011: $1.1 million;
FY 2012: $1.1 million;
FY 2013: $1.1 million;
Total: $8.4 million.
Program: Total;
FY 2006: $123.0 million;
FY 2007: $122.0 million;
FY 2008: $150.8 million;
FY 2009: $125.4 million;
FY 2010: $135.1 million;
FY 2011: $142.8 million;
FY 2012: $147.8 million;
FY 2013: $152.0 million;
Total: $1,098.9 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Pantex information.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense:
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs:
3050 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3050:
April 20, 2009:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-463, "Homeland Defense: Greater Focus on Analysis of
Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve DoD's Strategic Nuclear
Weapons Security," dated March 20, 2009 (GAO Code 351119). The
Department provides the enclosed comments. Detailed technical comments
were provided separately.
If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to call me
at 703-697-3060. The point of contact for this matter is Colonel
Patrick Vetter, Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Nuclear Matters), 703-697-7130, patrick.vetter@osd.mil.
Signed by:
Steve Henry:
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters):
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated March 20, 2009:
GAO Code 351119/GAO-09-463:
"Homeland Defense: Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and
Threats Needed to Improve DoD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics), to modify DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for
Protecting Nuclear Weapons, to require alternatives and cost benefit
analysis of nuclear security measures as appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially concur. DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy
for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, provides guidance which meets the
recommendation's intent. Paragraph 4.8 states: "physical security
requirements associated with nuclear weapons shall take into
consideration the affordability and life-cycle costs of a nuclear
weapon system." In its current form, this policy statement inherently
requires the department to examine alternatives in regard to cost
benefit.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs to modify DoD S-5210.41-M,
Nuclear Weapons Security Manual, to provide appropriate guidance to the
Services for weighing costs, including life-cycle costs, and benefits
when considering alternative security measures for nuclear weapons.
DOD Response: Partially concur. DoD S-5210.41-M. Nuclear Weapons
Security Manual, is intended to implement the policy established in the
governing DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear
Weapons. It establishes specific requirements to meet the Nuclear
Weapons Security Standard delineated in National Security Presidential
Directive 28. Paragraph C3.1.9 of DoD S-5210.41-M dictates that system
security consideration and updating of existing security systems should
be integrated into the system engineering process, consistent with
mission requirements and cost effectiveness consistent with DoD
Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, and DoD Instruction
5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. Additionally, DoD
S-5210.41-M Chapter 10 provides instructions on deviating from
established requirements while providing the equivalent levels of
security through other means. To support this recommendation, the
report implies, on page 13, the Navy relied solely upon DoD S-5210.41-M
requirements in building an underground maintenance and storage
facility. The Navy assessed a variety of options from a performance
perspective and determined the most cost effective approach that would
meet performance requirements was a hardened, underground structure. As
further support for this recommendation, the report notes the Navy
failed to include costs for the entire life cycle of their Ship,
Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear (SSBN) transit protection system (TPS).
A 2006 PA&E review of TPS alternatives concluded that the TPS selection
which provided the most significant benefit when evaluated in terms of
deployment time, effectiveness, ability to evolve, impact to SSBN
operations and cost was the system selected by the Navy. However,
greater emphasis on cost-benefit and security effectiveness in
selection and implementation of nuclear physical security measures is
appropriate. This issue is addressed in the proposed revised DoD S-
5210.41-M.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters (DATSD(NM)) to provide more specific guidance on the
methodology to develop local threat assessments.
DOD Response: Partially concur. DoD Instruction 2000.16, DOD
Antiterrorism (AT) Standards paragraph E3.4 prescribes procedures for
conducting an annual local threat assessment. The proposed revision to
DoD S-5210.41-M, provides more detailed guidance on preparing local
threat assessments at nuclear installations.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide
installation commanders with the capabilities necessary to more fully
collect and assess local, regional, and national intelligence
information.
DOD Response: Partially concur. A comprehensive study by the Services
to determine capability gaps in intelligence collection is needed to
determine if installation commanders lack resources and personnel to
meet requirements or better, more efficient use of existing resources
and personnel is needed.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a method to
centrally manage and track funding associated with nuclear weapons
security.
DOD Response: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Davi D'Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Gene Aloise (202) 512-6870 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above Ryan T. Coles, Assistant
Director; Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Steven D. Boyles;
Grace A. Coleman; Penney M. Harwell Caramia; Wyatt R. Hundrup; Ronald
La Due Lake; Gregory A. Marchand; and Charles W. Perdue also made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Nuclear Security:
Nuclear Safety: Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its
Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-61]. Washington, D.C.: October 23,
2008.
Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of Classified
Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project
Management Weaknesses. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-173R]. Washington, D.C.: January 10,
2008.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy,
Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to
Meet the New Design Basis Threat. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-611]. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2005.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It
Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-623]. Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2004.
Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and
Security Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-471].
Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Nuclear Security: Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSA's
Security Enhancement., [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-358]. Washington, D.C.: March 29,
2002.
Nuclear Security: Security Issues At DOE and Its Newly Created National
Nuclear Security Administration. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-00-123]. Washington, D.C.: March
14, 2000.
Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's Safeguards and Security
Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-62].
Washington, D.C.: February. 24, 2000.
Risk Management:
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in
Homeland Security. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-
904T]. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2008.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-386T].
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91].
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-13]. Washington, D.C.: November 15,
2005.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-74]. Washington, D.C.: April
9, 1998.
Homeland Security:
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-160T]. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
21st Century Challenges: Performance Budgeting Could Help Promote
Necessary Reexamination. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-709T]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2005.
Best Practices:
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing
and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2009.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The following GAO reports address problems with DOE's security that
we have identified in the past: GAO, Nuclear Security: Improving
Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE's Weapons Facilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-10] (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 16, 1992); Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's
Safeguards and Security Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-62] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24,
2000); Nuclear Security: Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSA's
Security Enhancements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-358] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29,
2002); Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and
Security Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-471]
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003); Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to
Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis
Threat, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-623]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004); Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of
the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take
Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-611] (Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2005); and Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on
Security of Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and
Worker Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-173R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10,
2008).
[2] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 28,
United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security
(Washington, D.C., June 20, 2003).
[3] OST also transports nuclear material between DOE sites and some
sites licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing
Short-and Long-Term National Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-160T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7,
2001.
[5] DOD S-5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (Nov. 22, 2004).
[6] In its Naval Sea Systems Command 2005 Cost Estimating Guide, the
Navy has defined life-cycle cost estimates as the total cost of a
program over its full life. The costs can be grouped into the following
four categories: research and development, procurement, operation and
support, and disposal.
[7] To address the recommendations of several task forces chartered to
assess the Air Force's nuclear security posture in the aftermath of
security breaches at one of its installations, the Air Force
restructured its nuclear enterprise. The restructuring will ultimately
include the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office, a
newly created headquarters organization of the Air Staff, and the
Global Strike Command, a new organization that will command all of the
service's nuclear capability. A provisional command began operations on
January 12, 2009, and the new command is expected to achieve initial
operating capability in September 2009.
[8] The life extension programs were developed to extend the expected
lifetime of warheads or warhead components by at least 20 years; the
programs include the B61 and W76 life extension programs.
[9] DOD S-5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (Nov. 22, 2004).
[10] DOD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear
Weapons (Nov. 1, 2004), and DOD S-5210.41-M.
[11] A nuclear weapon system is one or more nuclear weapons that is/are
on or physically attached to their delivery platform in combination
with all related equipment, material, services, and personnel required
for self-sufficiency. A nuclear weapon system is distinct and different
from a nuclear command and control system.
[12] The first 6 years of the program covered fiscal year 2006 through
fiscal year 2011.
[13] Naval Sea Systems Command, 2005 Cost Estimating Handbook
(Washington, D.C.; Nov. 18, 2004).
[14] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[15] Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 1992).
[16] Department of Energy, Vulnerability Assessment Process Guide
(Washington, D.C.: September 2004).
[17] Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Nuclear
Security Threat Capabilities Assessment 2005 - 2015 (Washington, D.C.,
December 2005).
[18] DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards (Dec. 8,
2006).
[19] Members of the threat working groups typically include
representatives from the installation security forces, the
antiterrorism and force protection officer, the intelligence officer,
and an Air Force Office of Special Investigations agent.
[20] JTTFs are multi-agency teams led by the Justice Department and the
FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law
enforcement. The JTTFs are small cells of highly trained, locally based
investigators, analysts, linguists, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. Fusion Centers have been created by many states
and larger cities to share information and intelligence within their
jurisdictions as well as with the federal government.
[21] DOD S-5210.41-M.
[22] These assessments are specific to the nuclear facility and are in
addition to the vulnerability assessments required by DOD's
antiterrorism policy. DOD's antiterrorism policy requires that
installation commanders or unit antiterrorism officers conduct annual
vulnerability assessments of the entire installation to identify
physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets
vulnerable to terrorists.
[23] The DBT, most recently updated in 2005 and replaced by the GSP in
August 2008, is a classified document that identifies the potential
size and capabilities of terrorist threats to DOE facilities that
handle nuclear material. DOE requires its sites to provide sufficient
security measures to defend against the threat identified in the DBT.
[24] Funding data provided by DOD and DOE were based on the fiscal year
2009 President's Budget.
[25] Funding information for base operations support and facilities,
sustainment, restoration, and modernization at the Navy's two strategic
weapons facilities is not included in this estimate.
[26] DOE O 470.3A, Design Basis Threat Policy, (Nov. 29, 2005).
[27] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Performance Budgeting Could Help
Promote Necessary Reexamination, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-709T] (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2005).
[28] Department of the Air Force, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear
Enterprise (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2008).
[29] The funding category differed among three of the four agencies.
The funding category for DOD was an appropriation account, for OST a
goal, and for Pantex a program.
[30] The GSP was signed by the Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy in
August 2008. Since then, DOE has been updating its directives and OST
and Pantex are currently updating their security plans.
[31] Funding data provided by DOD and DOE were based on the fiscal year
2009 President's Budget.
[32] Funding information for base operations support and facilities,
sustainment, restoration, and modernization at the Navy's two strategic
weapons facilities is not included in this estimate.
[End of section]
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