Nuclear Security
DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues Gao ID: GAO-10-275 January 29, 2010The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy's (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management and compensation--in terms of pay and benefits--of protective forces vary. Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as increasing the tactical skills of protective forces so that they can better "move, shoot, and communicate" as a unit. While one site has focused on implementing TRF requirements since 2004, other sites do not plan to complete TRF implementation until the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors have raised concerns about a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF's more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces' personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces--especially older members--to continue their careers until retirement age. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-275, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2010:
Nuclear Security:
DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues:
GAO-10-275:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-275, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the
security of Department of Energy‘s (DOE) sites with weapons-grade
nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to
transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical
Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the
U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of
separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides
sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites.
Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE
sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1)
analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective
forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE‘s
two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
What GAO Found:
Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE
and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites
that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE
protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate
contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and
protective force unions. As a result, the management and compensation”
in terms of pay and benefits”of protective forces vary.
Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as
increasing the tactical skills of protective forces so that they can
better ’move, shoot, and communicate“ as a unit. While one site has
focused on implementing TRF requirements since 2004, other sites do
not plan to complete TRF implementation until the end of fiscal year
2011. In addition, broader DOE efforts to manage post-retirement and
pension liabilities for its contractors have raised concerns about a
negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective
forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, unions, and DOE
security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF‘s more
rigorous requirements and the current protective forces‘ personnel
systems threaten the ability of protective forces”especially older
members”to continue their careers until retirement age.
Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on
either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a
federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might
provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result
in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected
federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the
transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in
security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current
contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and
by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a
standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment,
uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate
initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to
enhance protective forces‘ career longevity and retirement options,
but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these
recommendations.
Figure: DOE Protective Force Members in Tactical Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy develop plans to implement
the DOE study group‘s recommendations--and, as needed, conduct
research--to enhance protective forces‘ career longevity and
retirement options. DOE generally agreed with the report and the
recommendations.
View GAO-10-275 or key components. For more information, contact Gene
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Background:
Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed,
Trained, Equipped, or Compensated:
Tactical Response Force Implementation Varies and Has Raised Concerns
about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers:
With the Issuance of the Graded Security Protection Policy, Most Sites
Ceased Efforts to Implement the 2005 Design Basis Threat:
Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents and Protective Forces
Differ Significantly in Several Respects:
Protective Forces and Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents
Do Not Routinely Use Their Federal Law Enforcement Authority to Make
Arrests:
Either of the Two Principal Options DOE Has Considered Could Result in
More Uniform Management of Protective Forces:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Recommendations from the Protective Force Career Options
Initiative Study Group:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Characteristics of Sites with Enduring Category I SNM
Missions:
Table 2: Numbers and Categories of Protective Force Members, as of
September 30, 2008:
Table 3: Top Pay by Site, as of September 30, 2008:
Table 4: Benefits by Site, as of September 30, 2008:
Table 5: Required Qualifications by Protective Force Positions and
Combatant Standards:
Table 6: Protective Forces and Federal Agents' Pay Systems:
Table 7: Assessment Criteria for Management Options and Associated
Issues:
Figures:
Figure 1: Protective Force Equipment at One DOE Site:
Figure 2: Protective Force Constable, SRS:
Abbreviations:
DBT: Design Basis Threat:
DOE: U.S. Department of Energy:
FERS: Federal Employee Retirement System:
FB: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GSP: Graded Security Protection:
HSS: Office of Health, Safety and Security:
INL: Idaho National Laboratory:
LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory:
M&O: Management and Operations:
NE: Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NTS: Nevada Test Site:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
OST: Office of Secure Transportation:
PX: Pantex Plant:
SNM: special nuclear material:
SO: security officer:
SPO: security police officer:
SRS: Savannah River Site:
TRF: Tactical Response Force:
Y-12: Y-12 National Security Complex:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 29, 2010:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Contractor guard forces, or protective forces, are a key component of
security at Department of Energy (DOE) sites with special nuclear
material (SNM), which the department considers its highest security
risk. This material--including plutonium and highly enriched uranium--
is considered to be Category I when it is weapons grade and in
specified forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components,
metals, and oxides) and quantities. The risks associated with Category
I SNM include theft and the potential for sabotage through the use of
a radioactive dispersal device, also known as a "dirty bomb."
Currently, DOE and its National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), a agency within DOE responsible for the safety, security, and
reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, has six contractor-
operated sites that possess--and will possess for the foreseeable
future--Category I SNM (sites with "enduring" missions). The six sites
include the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, New Mexico;
the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas; the Nevada Test Site, outside
of Las Vegas, Nevada; the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, South
Carolina; and the Idaho National Laboratory, near Idaho Falls, Idaho.
[Footnote 1]
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with
Category I SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist
threat by changing policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)--a
classified document that specifies the potential size and capabilities
of adversary forces that the sites must defend against.[Footnote 2]
Protective forces have been an important focus of DOE security
improvements. Initially, DOE deployed a larger number of protective
force members at its sites. More recently, DOE has sought to improve
the effectiveness of its protective forces by deploying security
technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries at long
ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-fed
machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to
enhance protective forces' tactical skills--the ability to move,
shoot, and communicate in a combat environment--through its Tactical
Response Force (TRF) initiative.[Footnote 3] Among other things, this
initiative directed the development of new training curricula at DOE's
National Training Center, revised the application of DOE's existing
protective force categories to emphasize tactical skills, and
instituted more rigorous weapons and physical fitness qualifications
for many of DOE's protective forces.
However, protective force unions have been concerned that the planned
implementation of TRF--with its potentially more demanding
requirements--threatens the ability of protective forces to work until
retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective
force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader
issues in DOE and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE's
model for managing its protective forces. Unionized protective forces
can strike when their collective bargaining agreement ends and strikes
may create security vulnerabilities at DOE's sites with Category I
SNM. In addition, DOE's practice of managing its protective forces
through separate contracts at each site could create disparities in
protective force performance, pay, and benefits. A coalition of unions
that represent a large number of DOE protective forces has supported
federalizing contractor-operated protective forces to provide a
federal personnel system that better supports a TRF through
standardized pay and retirement benefits. The coalition noted that
DOE's Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) federal agents, who are
responsible for transporting Category I SNM among DOE sites and to
military bases and who have a unique federal job classification, could
serve as a template for federalization. In January 2009, DOE rejected
federalization of contractor protective forces on the grounds that it
would be costly and would likely provide little, if any, increase in
security effectiveness. However, a DOE study group, composed of DOE
and union representatives, recently made a number of recommendations
that, while maintaining contractor protective forces, may better
balance protective forces' concerns over their careers with the need
to provide effective security and control costs.
In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE's protective
forces at its sites with Category I SNM.[Footnote 4] As agreed with
your offices, we (1) analyzed information on DOE's protective forces,
including their contract and management structures, responsibilities,
number and categories, training, pay, and benefits; (2) examined the
implementation of TRF and any resulting issues; (3) assessed
compliance with the 2005 DBT; (4) compared relevant characteristics of
contractor protective forces with OST federal agents; (5) reviewed law
enforcement duties and capabilities of protective forces and OST
federal agents; and (6) assessed DOE's options for more uniformly
managing protective forces. The act also required DOE to submit a
report on the management of its protective forces 90 days after our
report is issued.
Scope and Methodology:
To obtain information on DOE's contractor protective forces, we
visited three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions--
Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory--
and met with protective force contractors, federal site office
officials, and protective force union representatives at these sites.
We selected these sites because each represented one of the three
different types of protective force contracts currently in place. In
addition, we distributed a data collection instrument to protective
force contractors and federal site office officials at each of these
sites and at the other three sites with enduring Category I SNM
missions--Y-12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National
Laboratory. From this instrument, we received site information about
the protective forces, the status of TRF and DBT implementations,
views on DOE options for managing the protective forces, and the
reliability of site data. We conducted interviews and reviewed
documents with NNSA and DOE's offices of Environmental Management
(EM); Nuclear Energy (NE); Science. We also met with several
organizations within DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security
(HSS), including the Office of Policy; the Office of Independent
Oversight, which regularly performs inspections at Category I SNM
sites; and the National Training Center, in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
which is responsible for developing protective force training
curricula and certifying site protective force training instructors
and programs. To obtain comparative information on OST and its federal
agents, we reviewed documents and met with officials from OST
headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico. All data collected to
describe contractor protective forces and OST federal agents were
current as of September 30, 2008. To identify and assess options for
the more uniform protective force management through federalization,
we met with the NNSA Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
[Footnote 5] and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on cost and
job classification of protective forces. We developed criteria for
options for more uniform management by reviewing past and ongoing DOE
protective force and federal agent studies that HSS, NNSA, and OST
provided. We also reviewed documents and met with officials from the
National Council of Security Police, which is a coalition of unions
that represent many of the protective forces at DOE's Category I SNM
sites.
We conducted our work from April 2008 to January 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require
us to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOE's HSS, which is the department's central security organization, is
responsible for developing the department's security policies and
overseeing their implementation. Specifically, HSS's Office of Policy
develops and promulgates orders and policies such as the DBT policy,
as well as manuals such as Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective
Forces, which details protective force's duties and requirements.
Other DOE organizations with diverse program missions--EM, NE, and
NNSA--are responsible for the six DOE sites in our review with
enduring Category I SNM missions.[Footnote 6] In accordance with DOE
policy, EM, NE, and NNSA must ensure that each of their sites has a
safeguards and security program with the necessary protections to
protect security interests against malevolent acts such as theft,
diversion, sabotage, modification, compromise, or unauthorized access
to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, special nuclear
material, or classified information. Each of these DOE organizations
has site offices staffed by federal employees located at or near each
site to oversee day-to-day operations, including security.
The management and operations (M&O) contractors that manage the six
sites we reviewed must develop effective programs to address DOE
security requirements. In particular, each site with Category I SNM
must prepare a Site Safeguards and Security Plan, which is a
classified document that identifies known vulnerabilities, risks, and
protection strategies for the site. The site's protection measures are
developed in response to site-specific vulnerability assessments and
become the basis for executing and reviewing protection programs.
Table 1 highlights some of the site differences in mission,
topography, and size that may dictate the site-specific protection
measures, including the protective forces' size and equipment.
Table 1: Characteristics of Sites with Enduring Category I SNM
Missions:
Primary mission (related to SNM):
Pantex Plant: Assembles and dismantles nuclear weapons and stores SNM
in the form of weapons and surplus plutonium pits;
Y-12 National Security Complex: Manufactures highly enriched uranium
components for nuclear weapons;
Los Alamos National Laboratory: Conducts research, design, and
development of nuclear weapons; manufactures plutonium pits;
Nevada Test Site: Maintains the capability to conduct underground
nuclear testing and other Category I missions;
Savannah River Site: Maintains Cat I/II quantities of SNM associated
with DOE activities;
Idaho National Laboratory: Engaged in research and development of
nuclear reactor technologies and nuclear fuels.
Topography:
Pantex Plant: Relatively flat plateau;
Y-12 National Security Complex: Hilly and heavily vegetated terrain;
Los Alamos National Laboratory: Sloping plateau with canyons and mesas;
Nevada Test Site: Dry lake beds and mountains;
Savannah River Site: Gently rolling forested hills with a swamp and
many streams;
Idaho National Laboratory: Rolling arid terrain.
Size of site area (square miles):
Pantex Plant: 25;
Y-12 National Security Complex: 1;
Los Alamos National Laboratory: 36;
Nevada Test Site: 1350;
Savannah River Site: 310;
Idaho National Laboratory: 890.
Size of protected area where SNM is stored (acres):
Pantex Plant: 389;
Y-12 National Security Complex: 154;
Los Alamos National Laboratory: 45;
Nevada Test Site: 17;
Savannah River Site: 16;
Idaho National Laboratory: 9.
Approximate number of site employees:
Pantex Plant: 3,800;
Y-12 National Security Complex: 4,440;
Los Alamos National Laboratory: 15,000;
Nevada Test Site: 5,500;
Savannah River Site: 14,430;
Idaho National Laboratory: 6,800.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
Protective forces are one of the key elements in DOE sites' layered
"defense-in-depth" protective systems. Specific elements vary from
site to site but almost always include, in addition to protective
forces,
* a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;
* physical barriers, such as fences and anti-vehicle barriers;
* numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;
* operational security procedures, such as the "two-person" rule--
which is designed to prevent only one person from having access to
SNM; and:
* hardened facilities and storage vaults to protect SNM from
unauthorized access.
Increasing security at DOE sites since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, has been costly and challenging. The complexwide
funding for protective forces and physical security systems rose
almost 60 percent (in constant dollars) from fiscal years 2001 through
2008, to $862 million. Protective forces--the single most costly
element of DOE security, as well as one of the most important[Footnote
7]--have been a major focus of DOE security efforts. The need to
increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible following the
2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked large amounts of
overtime for an extended period. DOE's Inspector General and Office of
Independent Oversight, as well as GAO, reported on the potential for
extended overtime to increase fatigue and reduce readiness, and
training opportunities for protective forces.[Footnote 8] Since then,
DOE has sought to control protective force costs by increasing the use
of security technology and advanced weaponry and by consolidating
material into fewer and better protected locations.
Since September 11, 2001, DOE security policies, including the DBT,
have been under almost constant examination and have undergone
considerable change. For example, DOE issued new DBTs in 2003, 2004,
and 2005, and, most recently, in November 2008. In its latest
iteration, the DBT was renamed the Graded Security Protection (GSP)
policy. The GSP is conceptually identical to DOE's previous DBTs.
However, compared with the 2005 DBT, the GSP identifies a generally
smaller and less capable terrorist adversary force for DOE sites with
Category I SNM.
DOE has also sought to increase the tactical effectiveness of
protective force performance. Specifically, according to a 2004
classified DOE review, the then-current organization and tactics of
DOE protective forces needed improvement to deal with possible
terrorist threats. The review found that, historically, DOE protective
forces had been more concerned with a broad range of industrial
security and order-keeping functions than with preparing to conduct a
defensive battle against a paramilitary attacker, as described in
DOE's previous DBTs and GSP. To address this situation, the review
recommended shifting to an aggressive militarylike, small-unit,
tactical defense posture, which included enhanced tactical training
standards to allow protective forces to move, shoot, and communicate
effectively as a unit in a combat environment. It also recommended
more frequent, realistic, and rigorous force-on-force performance
testing and training for the department's protective forces.
On the basis of this review, DOE has sought to transform DOE's
protective forces who safeguard special nuclear material into an
"elite force"--a TRF--with training and capabilities similar to
military units. To create TRFs at Category I SNM sites, in 2005 DOE's
policy for protective forces clarified which positions required more
demanding physical fitness and firearms qualification standards,
increased tactical training, and reorganized protective forces into
tactically cohesive units.
Although DOE and NNSA considered federalizing the contractor
protective forces to better support the TRF, the department's reviews
of this issue predate its post September 11, 2001, concerns. Since the
early 1990s, the department has intermittently considered
federalization because of variety of security challenges, often
involving actual or potential strikes by contractor protective forces:
* A 1992 DOE review concluded there was no clear evidence that
federalization of protective forces would significantly save costs or
improve security. DOE reviewed the issue of federalization in response
to a 1990 GAO report that examined a protective force strike at Los
Alamos National Laboratory in 1989.[Footnote 9]
* A 1997 DOE report raised concerns about the potential deterioration
of an aging protective force's physical and combat capabilities; the
increasing difficulties in meeting the sudden demand for additional
personnel in the event of a strike; and cost pressures, such as more
overtime pay after the department had downsized the protective forces.
The report considered federalization as a solution but recommended
other options using existing contractor protective forces.
* A 2004 DOE study group, examining ways to strengthen DOE's security
posture after September 11, 2001, recommended federalization to better
support tactical forces and to promote uniform, high-quality security
across sites, but the department did not implement the recommendation.
* Two 2008 NNSA studies, which followed the 2007 strike at the Pantex
Plant, compared contractor and federalized options for improving
protective forces, but these studies did not make any firm
recommendations.
* In 2009, partly in response to a union coalition calling for
federalization, NNSA and DOE's HSS started protective force
initiatives to address some of the goals that federalization was meant
to accomplish, such as improving efficiency and effectiveness.
Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed,
Trained, Equipped, or Compensated:
Contractor protective forces--including 2,339 unionized officers and
their 376 nonunionized supervisors--are not uniformly managed,
organized, staffed, trained, equipped, or compensated across the six
DOE sites. These differences occur because protective forces operate
under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements at each
site and because of DOE's long-standing contracting approach of
defining desired outcomes instead of detailed, prescriptive guidance
on how to achieve those outcomes.[Footnote 10] As we have previously
reported, DOE's contract model may allow security to be closely
tailored to site-and mission-specific needs.[Footnote 11]
Management and Organization Vary by Contract:
As of September 30, 2008, protective forces at the six sites we
reviewed operated under the following three separate types of
contracts:
* Direct contract with DOE. At Y-12, Nevada Test Site (NTS), and
Savannah River Site (SRS), NNSA and DOE contract directly with private
firms to provide protective forces. These contracts are separate from
NNSA's and DOE's contracts with the site M&O contractors. Protective
force managers report to officials from federal site offices. To
coordinate site operations and protective force operations, managers
from the M&O contractors meet regularly to discuss issues with
managers from the protective force and site office.
* Within the M&O contract. For two sites, Pantex Plant (PX) and Idaho
National Laboratory (INL), the M&O contractors provide the protective
forces. The M&O contractor directly manages the protective forces, and
DOE's or NNSA's site office oversees the protective force operations
as part of the overall M&O contract.
* Subcontract to the M&O contractor: At Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), the M&O contractor subcontracts the protective force
operations. The protective force manager reports to and is overseen by
the M&O contractor. Since NNSA has no direct contractual relationship
with the protective force manager, NNSA site office managers
coordinate oversight direction through the M&O contractor.
Protective force contractors at the six DOE sites have a management
and support structure that includes training and physical fitness,
human relations, legal and contract services, and procurement. Each
protective force also has uniformed supervisors who are not part of
the protective forces' collective bargaining agreements. The duties,
responsibilities, and ranks of these supervisors are generally site
specific and not detailed in DOE's protective force policies.
Protective Forces Differ in Number and Composition:
According to DOE's 2008 policy in Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor
Protective Force, protective forces are composed of unarmed and armed
positions. Security Officers (SO) are responsible for certain unarmed
security duties, such as checking for valid security badges at
entrances and escorting visitors. Security Police Officers (SPO), who
are armed, are divided into three main categories:
* SPO-I: Primary responsibility is protecting fixed posts during
combat.
* SPO-II: Primary responsibility is mobile combat to prevent
terrorists from reaching their target but can also be assigned to
fixed posts.
* SPO-III: Primary responsibilities are mobile combat and special
response skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM (on site) and
recover SNM (off site) if terrorists succeed in acquiring it. SPO-IIIs
are usually organized into special response teams.
As shown in table 2, the number of personnel and composition of
protective forces vary considerably across sites. It should be noted
that three sites--INL, LANL, and NTS--had few or no SPO-Is as of
September 30, 2008. At that time, not all sites had incorporated this
position into their collective bargaining agreements. In the interim,
some SPO-IIs were performing the SPO-I-type duties at these sites.
[Footnote 12]
Table 2: Numbers and Categories of Protective Force Members, as of
September 30, 2008:
SO:
PX: 1;
Y-12: 5;
LANL: 45;
NTS: 0;
SRS: 33;
INL: 26;
Total: 110.
SPO-I:
PX: 285;
Y-12: 301;
LANL: 0;
NTS: 7;
SRS: 209;
INL: 0;
Total: 802.
SPO-II:
PX: 180;
Y-12: 72;
LANL: 189;
NTS: 177;
SRS: 149;
INL: 139;
Total: 906.
SPO-III:
PX: 67;
Y-12: 89;
LANL: 92;
NTS: 50;
SRS: 99;
INL: 50;
Total: 447.
Other protective force positions[A]:
PX: 0;
Y-12: 42;
LANL: 24;
NTS: 0;
SRS: 0;
INL: 8;
Total: 74.
Total:
PX: 533;
Y-12: 509;
LANL: 350;
NTS: 234;
SRS: 490;
INL: 223;
Total: 2339.
Source: DOE.
[A] Protective forces may include additional unionized positions, such
as trainers, and alarm operators. At some sites, personnel in such
positions may be SPO qualified, and their positions are counted in the
appropriate SPO categories.
[End of table]
Training and Equipment Vary:
DOE policy mandates certain protective force training but allows sites
some flexibility in its implementation. For example, DOE Manual 470.4-
3A requires newly hired protective forces to complete the Basic
Security Police Officer Training course that the sites tailor to meet
their specific needs. The site-specific courses range in length from 9
to 16 weeks. Other required training includes annual refresher
training in a wide variety of topics; tactical exercises, including
force-on-force exercises; physical fitness training; and firearms
training. The content and frequency of this training varies by site
and, to some extent, by type of protective forces, with SPO-IIIs
generally receiving more training than other protective forces because
of their special response mission. To ensure some degree of
equivalency, DOE's National Training Center assesses sites' training
plans and, while most sites perform their own training, the National
Training Center certifies instructors.
Some training requirements are driven by the type of protective force
equipment, such as firearms and vehicles, that are used at each site.
The primary protective force weapon at most sites is the M4 rifle, a
weapon that is widely used in the U.S. military. Other weapons, such
as belt-fed machine guns, are generally versions of the M240 and M249
family, also widely used in the U.S. military. However, sites have
variously adopted other equipment, including the following:
* three models of handguns with two different calibers of ammunition;
* four types of grenade launchers, although all use 40mm grenades;
* several types of precision rifles, capable of accurate long range
fire, in three different calibers; and:
* several different armored vehicles, but older vehicles are being
replaced by a single type of vehicle across the six sites.
Figure 1: Protective Force Equipment at One DOE Site:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Pay and Benefits Vary:
Pay varies for protective forces, based on the site and the category
of protective forces. Table 3 shows that top pay, as negotiated in
collective bargaining agreements at each site, ranged from nearly $19
per hour to over $26 per hour. SOs received the lowest hourly pay, and
SPO-IIIs received the highest. Overtime pay, accrued in different ways
at the sites, and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night
shifts and holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay.
Table 3: Top Pay by Site, as of September 30, 2008:
Top hourly pay[A]:
DOE site: SO;
PX: $22.00;
Y-12: $19.83;
LANL: $22.74;
NTS: $22.42;
SRS: $18.81;
INL: $20.64.
DOE site: SPO-I;
PX: $22.90;
Y-12: $23.13;
LANL: Not available[B];
NTS: $23.41;
SRS: $22.69;
INL: Not available[B].
DOE site: SPO-II;
PX: $23.43;
Y-12: $23.65;
LANL: $25.14;
NTS: $24.44;
SRS: $24.84;
INL: $22.64.
DOE site: SPO-III;
PX: $24.44;
Y-12: $24.17;
LANL: $26.11;
NTS: $25.77;
SRS: $25.92;
INL: $23.64.
DOE site: Typical shift;
PX: 12 hours for 4 days;
Y-12: 12 hours for 4 days;
LANL: 8 hours for 5 days;
NTS: 12 hours for 4 days;
SRS: 12 hours for 4 days;
INL: 12 hours for 4 days.
Overtime rule for typical shift:
After 8 hours per day:
PX: Yes;
Y-12: No;
LANL: Yes;
NTS: Yes;
SRS: No;
INL: No.
After 40 hours per week:
PX: Yes;
Y-12: Yes;
LANL: Yes;
NTS: Yes;
SRS: Yes;
INL: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis of collective bargaining agreements.
[A] Cited pay is for nonspecialists within a position. Specialists,
such as dog handlers, may be eligible for different hourly pay.
[B] As of September 30, 2008, pay rates for SPO-Is had not been
negotiated into the collective bargaining agreement.
[End of table]
Table 4 shows the types of benefits by site. While all employers
contributed to active protective force members' medical, dental, and
life insurance benefits, they differed in the amount of their
contributions and in the retirement benefits they offered. In general,
new hires were offered defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k)
plan, that provides eventual retirement benefits that depend on the
amount of contributions by the employer or employee, as appropriate,
as well as the earnings and losses of the invested funds. At the time
of our review, two sites offered new hires defined benefit plans that
promised retirees a certain monthly payment at retirement. Two other
sites had defined benefit plans that covered protective force members
hired before a particular date but were not open to new hires. A
coalition of unions has expressed its preference for defined benefit
plans.
Table 4: Benefits by Site, as of September 30, 2008:
DOE site: Employer contributes to medical, dental, and basic life
insurance;
PX: Yes;
SRS: Yes;
LANL: Yes;
NTS: Yes;
INL: Yes;
Y-12: Yes.
Retirement plan: Defined contribution;
PX: 401(k);
SRS: 401(k);
LANL: Plan1: Money Purchase Plan[A]; Plan 2: 401(k);
NTS: 401(k);
INL: 401(k);
Y-12: 401(k).
Retirement plan: Employer contributes;
PX: Yes;
SRS: Yes;
LANL: Plan 1: Yes; Plan 2: No;
NTS: No;
INL: Yes;
Y-12: Yes.
Retirement plan: Defined benefit open to new hires;
PX: No;
SRS: No;
LANL: No;
NTS: Yes[B];
INL: No;
Y-12: Yes.
Retirement plan: Defined benefit closed to new hires but open to hires
before a certain date;
PX: Yes;
SRS: No;
LANL: No;
NTS: No[B];
INL: Yes;
Y-12: No.
Medical insurance for eligible retirees: Employer contributes to
premiums for eligible retirees;
PX: Yes;
SRS: Yes;
LANL: No;
NTS: No;
INL: Yes;
Y-12: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis of collective bargaining agreements.
[A] A money purchase pension plan requires the employer to put a fixed
annual contribution into an employee's individual account.
[B] The NTS defined benefit plan was open to new hires in 2008 but
closed to new hires after the 2009 collective bargaining negotiations.
[End of table]
Tactical Response Force Implementation Varies and Has Raised Concerns
about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers:
Sites are at different stages in the implementation of TRF
requirements. However, TRF implementation, coupled with broader DOE
efforts to limit post-retirement and pension liabilities, has raised
concerns with DOE security officials, protective force contractors,
and protective force unions about the longevity of protective forces'
careers and the adequacy of their personnel systems.
TRF Implementation Varies:
DOE has identified the following important TRF requirements for
protective forces:
* Improved tactical skills, so that protective forces "move, shoot,
and communicate" as a unit. To better facilitate tactical training to
meet a sophisticated terrorist attack, TRF calls for the development
and implementation of TRF training curricula as well as the creation
of training relief elements or shifts to allow protective forces to
participate in unit-level training.
* Revised application of DOE's offensive and defensive combatant
standards for protective forces. DOE's offensive combatant standard is
more demanding than its defensive combatant standard.[Footnote 13]
Nevertheless, prior to TRF, SPO-IIs hired before 2000 were allowed to
meet DOE's less demanding defensive combatant standard but could
retain their SPO-II designation and fill some offensive combatant
positions. TRF policy eliminated this approach, known as
"grandfathering," and restricted protective force members who meet
only defensive combatant standards to serve as SPO-Is. That is, SPO-
IIs that did not meet offensive combatant standards would be moved
into SPO-I positions.
* Career longevity plans to assist with the shift to the new
application of offensive and defensive combatant standards. TRF
mandates that all newly hired protective forces meet DOE's more
demanding offensive combatant standard as SPO-IIs. Protective force
members may advance to the SPO-III level, which requires qualifying at
a higher level of firearms proficiency. However, under TRF policy, the
forces who cannot maintain their current standards--perhaps as their
years of service accumulate and they age--may "fall back" by applying
for open protective force positions with less demanding standards. For
example, protective forces may move from meeting offensive combatant
standards to defensive combatant standards or unarmed SO positions,
although they may lose pay with each "fall back."
Table 5 summarizes the physical fitness, firearms and medical
qualifications protective forces must pass for DOE's combatant
standards.
Table 5: Required Qualifications by Protective Force Positions and
Combatant Standards:
SO:
DOE combatant standard: Not applicable;
Annual physical fitness qualification: Not applicable;
Semiannual firearms qualifications: Not applicable;
Medical qualifications: Numerous medical conditions may result in
disqualification for service.
SPO-I:
DOE combatant standard: Defensive standard;
Annual physical fitness qualification: Run one-half mile in 4 minutes,
40 seconds; and prone to 40-yard dash in 8.5 seconds;
Semiannual firearms qualifications: Proficiency on several required
day and night courses for each weapon carried on duty;
Medical qualifications: [Empty].
SPO-II:
DOE combatant standard: Offensive standard;
Annual physical fitness qualification: Run 1 mile in 8 minutes, 30
seconds; and prone to 40-yard dash in 8 seconds;
Semiannual firearms qualifications: [Empty];
Medical qualifications: [Empty].
SPO-III:
DOE combatant standard: Offensive standard;
Annual physical fitness qualification: [Empty];
Semiannual firearms qualifications: Must demonstrate higher day and
night proficiency on duty weapons and may have to qualify on a wider
variety of weapons;
Medical qualifications: [Empty].
Sources: DOE 473.4-3A and 10 C.F.R. 1046.
[End of table]
One site we visited had implemented most of TRF's key elements. Since
2005, this site has constructed new training facilities, implemented a
training cadre that allows unit-sized tactical training, increased the
amount of tactical training its protective forces receive, and
integrated protective force plans with other security elements and
response plans.
As of September 30, 2008, three sites were still using an older job
classification of SPO-II (that is, allowing a defensive combat
standard, rather than the offensive combatant standard), which is not
a TRF classification. In addition, while some sites have created
unarmed security officer positions to provide fallback positions for
protective forces that can no longer meet DOE's defensive combat
standard, there are relatively few unarmed positions (110--less than 5
percent--of the protective forces at the sites we reviewed), and some
of these positions, according to a protective force contract official
and a union representative, were eliminated for budgetary reasons.
We also found that TRF training was not uniform across the six sites:
* DOE's National Training Center piloted a more tactically oriented
basic training course (Tactical Response Force - 1) at one site in
2008, but according to a National Training Center official, this class
will not replace its existing multiweek Basic Security Police Officer
Training course for newly hired SPO-IIs until later in 2010.
* All sites have increased the amount of tactical training for
protective forces but have been separately developing courses and
training facilities.
* Some sites had purchased and deployed advanced weapons but had not
adequately trained their protective forces to use these weapons and
had not integrated these weapons into their response plans, according
to DOE's Inspector General and DOE's Office of Independent Oversight.
In 2007, DOE's Inspector General reported that one site's training
program for the use of a weapon that was key to the site's security
strategy did not provide protective forces with the knowledge, skills,
and abilities to perform assigned tasks.[Footnote 14] A follow-up
inspection in 2008 found similar problems at several other sites.
[Footnote 15]
* According to a NNSA official, NNSA sites did not receive dedicated
TRF training funds until fiscal year 2009. Also, according to NNSA's
fiscal year 2010 budget submission, NNSA does not expect its sites to
complete TRF activities until the end of fiscal year 2011.
TRF Implementation Has Raised Concerns:
Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security
organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective
force unions about the ability of protective forces--especially older
individuals serving in protective forces--to continue meeting DOE's
weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As we reported
in 2005,[Footnote 16] some site security officials recognized they
will have to carefully craft transition plans for currently employed
protective force officers who may not be able to meet the new
standards required for an elite force, which is now known as TRF.
Adding to these concerns are DOE's broader efforts to manage its long-
term post-retirement and pension liabilities for its contractors,
which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and
benefits for protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor
Pension and Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed
to limit DOE's long-term pension and post-retirement
liabilities.[Footnote 17] A coalition of protective force unions
stated that this policy moved them in the opposite direction from
their desire for early and enhanced retirement benefits.
These concerns contributed to the 44-day protective force strike at
the Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially the site designated all of its
protective force positions as offensive positions, a move that could
have disqualified a potentially sizable number of protective forces
from duty. Under the collective bargaining agreement that was
eventually negotiated in 2007, some protective forces are allowed to
meet the less demanding defensive combat standards. DOE has also
rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits Policy.
However, according to protective force union officials, tensions over
TRF implementation and retirement benefits remain driving forces
behind protective force unions' drive to federalize.
With the Issuance of the Graded Security Protection Policy, Most Sites
Ceased Efforts to Implement the 2005 Design Basis Threat:
With the issuance of the new GSP policy in August 2008, most sites
ceased 2005 DBT implementation efforts.[Footnote 18] However, unlike
its practice with previous DBTs, DOE did not establish a deadline for
GSP implementation. While sites study GSP requirements and develop
implementation plans, the GSP directs that they continue to meet the
requirements of the 2003 DBT. Under the 2003 DBT, most DOE sites are
required to maintain denial protection strategies for Category I SNM.
Under these strategies, DOE requires that adversaries be denied "hands-
on" access to nuclear weapons and nuclear test devices at fixed sites,
as well as all Category I SNM in transit. For other Category I SNM at
fixed sites, DOE requires that adversaries be prevented from having
enough time to complete malevolent acts. If adversaries gain access to
Category I SNM, DOE requires that protective forces engage in
recapturing the SNM on site or recovering the material if it leaves
the site. As required by the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act,[Footnote 19] DOE reported to Congress in 2007 that
all its sites could meet the 2003 DBT.
To verify the information DOE reported, we examined whether the sites
had approved Site Safeguards and Security Plans and whether they had
undergone an Office of Independent Oversight Inspection to test those
plans. We found that all sites (except for the one DOE site that had
implemented the 2005 DBT) had approved Site Safeguards and Security
plans for the 2003 DBT, and almost all had undergone inspections by
the Office of Independent Oversight to test those plans. In most
cases, protective forces performed effectively in these inspections.
However, in a 2008 inspection, one site's protective forces received a
"needs improvement" rating--that is, it only partially met identified
protection needs or provided questionable assurance that identified
protection needs were met.
Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents and Protective Forces
Differ Significantly in Several Respects:
Although they are both responsible for protecting SNM, OST federal
agents substantially differ from site protective forces in terms of
numbers, organization, management, pay, benefits, mission, and
training:
* OST forces totaled 363 as of September 30, 2008, or less than one-
seventh the total number of protective forces members at DOE sites
with enduring Category I missions.
* OST forces are geographically dispersed, but unlike protective
forces, management is centralized. OST operations are organized into
three commands, which are collocated at two DOE sites and a Department
of Defense military base. These commands report to a central command
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is under a single organization,
NNSA. In contrast, the protective forces at six sites have
decentralized management and are overseen by one of three DOE
organizations.
* Federal managers directly operate the OST organization and supervise
federal agents.
Unlike protective forces, OST federal agents cannot collectively
bargain and are covered by a single pay system.[Footnote 20] Effective
in March 2008, the NNSA's Pay Band Demonstration is a pay system for
most NNSA federal employees--including OST federal agents.[Footnote
21] Table 6 shows the differences between the protective forces' many
negotiated pay rates and the nonsupervisory federal agents' single pay
band, which is linked to federal pay grades that are established
governmentwide.
Table 6: Protective Forces and Federal Agents' Pay Systems:
Basis for pay provisions:
Protective forces: Collective bargaining agreements with various
contractors;
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: 2008 NNSA pay band demonstration.
Range of base pay rates:
Lowest pay rates:
Highest pay rates:
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: $19.54 to 30.90/hour[A].
Range of base pay rates: SPO-I;
Lowest pay rates: $15.00-22.90/hour;
Highest pay rates: $22.69-23.41/hour;
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: $19.54 to 30.90/hour[A].
Range of base pay rates: SPO-II;
Lowest pay rates: $15.00-22.90/hour;
Highest pay rates: $22.64-25.14/hour;
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: $19.54 to 30.90/hour[A].
Range of base pay rates: SPO-III;
Lowest pay rates: $17.53-25.77/hour;
Highest pay rates: $23.64-26.11/hour;
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: $19.54 to 30.90/hour[A].
Overtime pay rate;
Protective forces: Generally 1.5 times base rate;
Nonsupervisory OST federal agents: 1 times base rate plus 0.5 times
regular rate[B].
Sources: Collective bargaining agreements and NNSA.
[A] These hourly rates are derived from the annual salary range (the
pay grades of GS-8, step 1 through GS-10, step 10) for OST federal
agents in NNSA's Pay Band 1, a range that was at $40,779 to $64,482 at
the end of fiscal year 2008.
[B] A regular rate is potentially greater than a base rate, because it
is calculated on total remuneration that reflects the base rate plus
applicable premium pays, if any, such as a night shift premium.
[End of table]
In addition, while OST's pay system is designed for more flexible pay,
protective forces' pay rules generally do not provide for any
variation in a position's pay rate after a few years of service.
Specifically, OST agents' pay rates can vary more when they are hired
and in later years because the NNSA pay system is designed to give OST
managers more flexibility to offer exceptional candidates higher entry
salaries and to provide faster or slower annual pay progression,
depending on individual performance. In contrast, fixed pay rules
allow a contracted SPO to start at the top pay rate or to reach or
closely approximate it after only about 1 to 3 years of service.
However, as table 6 shows, both protective forces and federal agents
receive significantly higher pay for overtime hours.
Concerning benefits, OST federal agents generally receive those that
are broadly available to other federal employees, such as through the
Federal Employee Health Benefit program and the Federal Employee
Retirement System (FERS), which has a defined benefit component and a
defined contribution component. In contrast, at each site, protective
force unions negotiate for benefits such as medical insurance and
retirement plans, and new hires in protective forces generally do not
receive defined benefits for retirement. In addition, in 1998,
Congress made OST federal agents eligible to retire earlier (at age 50
after 20 years of service) with a higher monthly retirement annuity
(defined benefit) than is typical for other federal employees.
[Footnote 22] This early retirement provision contrasts with the
provisions for the two defined benefit plans open to new protective
force hires as of September 2008, which provides for retirement with
more years served or at older ages.
OST federal agents' mobile mission also differs significantly from
that of protective forces that guard fixed sites. OST agents operate
convoys of special tractor trailers and special escort vehicles to
transport Category I SNM. These agents travel on U.S. highways that
cross multiple federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement
jurisdictions. They also travel as many as 15 days each month. Agents
may also provide security for weapons components that are flown on
OST's small fleet of aircraft. In contrast to the public setting of
agents' work, protective forces that guard Category I SNM at fixed
sites typically have elaborate physical defenses and tightly
restricted and monitored public access.
Finally, the training for OST federal agents and protective forces
differs. Although both OST and protective force contractors must
comply with DOE orders and regulations when developing and executing
training, OST agents undergo longer, more frequent, and more diverse
training than do most protective forces. For example, newly hired OST
trainees undergo longer basic training, lasting 21 weeks at OST's
academy in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. To operate OST's fleet of vehicles,
federal agents must also complete the requirements for a commercial
driver's license. In addition, all agents must meet DOE's offensive
combatant standard throughout their careers. Overall, OST officials
estimate that OST federal agents spend about a third of their time in
training, which, according to an NNSA official, is much more frequent
than most contractor protective forces. Much of the training is
tactically oriented, and OST convoy elements are organized into
tactical units.
Protective Forces and Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents
Do Not Routinely Use Their Federal Law Enforcement Authority to Make
Arrests:
In the performance of their official duties, both protective forces
and OST federal agents have limited arrest authority for a variety of
misdemeanors and felonies,[Footnote 23] though neither routinely
exercises this arrest authority. Both protective forces and OST
federal agents are also authorized to use deadly force to protect SNM
and may pursue intruders in order to prevent their escape and to
arrest those they suspect have committed certain misdemeanors or
felonies or have obtained unauthorized control of SNM. DOE's Federal
Protective Force manual (DOE M 470.4-8) and DOE's Contractor
Protective Force manual (DOE 470.4-3A) set guidelines and direct DOE
sites to develop policies for using deadly force and for fresh
pursuit, which involves pursuing suspected criminals who flee across
jurisdictional boundaries, such as leaving the property of a DOE site.
These actions include developing memorandums of understanding that
establish, among other things, fresh pursuit guidelines with other law
enforcement agencies.
DOE protective forces and OST federal agents have limited authority to
make arrests for specific misdemeanors and felonies, such as
trespassing on, or the theft or destruction of, federal property.
Other offenses against government property subject to arrest include
sabotage, civil disorder, conspiracy, and the communication of or
tampering with restricted data. For the covered misdemeanors and
felonies, protective forces and OST federal agents have authority to
arrest if they observe the offenses while they are performing their
official duties; for the covered felonies, they may also make arrests
if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
committed a felony. If other federal law enforcement agencies, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are involved in the
apprehension of suspected criminals, even on DOE property, protective
forces and OST federal agents must relinquish arresting authority to
the other federal agencies. While both protective forces and OST
federal agents receive initial and annual refresher training in law
enforcement authorities and duties, we found that protective forces at
the six sites last made an unassisted arrest using their federal
authority more than 25 years ago. The protective forces at Pantex
arrested nine individuals, six in 1981 and three in 1983, for
trespassing on site property. In both instances, the offenders were
convicted and sentenced to a federal detention facility.
According to OST officials, federal agents do not routinely make
arrests because they have not encountered individuals attempting to
steal SNM from their shipments, which is the focus of their legal
concerns. Protective forces do not routinely use their federal
authority to make arrests for several reasons, in addition to limited
authority. First, one contractor site official told us, federal
courts, which have jurisdiction for all arrests made by protective
forces using their federal authority, are reluctant to pursue what may
be considered minor cases associated with a DOE site. Instead, this
official said, the site had more success prosecuting crimes in state
and local courts. In these cases, arrests are made by local and state
law enforcement agencies. Second, DOE security officials told us that
sites may be concerned about the legal liability of using contractor
employees to make arrests and potential lawsuits that could ensue.
[Footnote 24] Finally, both DOE and site contractor officials told us
that routine law enforcement duties may distract protective forces
from performing their primary duty to protect Category I SNM.
Rather than make arrests when witnessing possible crimes, protective
forces may gather basic facts, secure the crime scene, and notify
management, which decides whether to refer the matter to local law
enforcement agencies, DOE's Inspector General, the U.S. Marshall, or
the FBI for arresting and transporting suspects. However, we could not
determine how often the forces take these actions because sites do not
typically document detainments or have facilities in which to hold
such detainees.
While protective forces and OST federal agents seldom use their
federal arrest authority, protective forces have used other legal
authorities to make arrests. For example, specially designated
protective force officers at the Savannah River Site (SRS), are
authorized under South Carolina law to make arrests and investigate
crimes.[Footnote 25] The SRS protective force includes 26 Special
State Constables (about 5 percent of SRS's total protective force) who
have state law enforcement jurisdiction on the 310-square-mile SRS
complex, which spans three counties and includes public highways.
These officers wear special uniforms and drive specially marked
vehicles. In addition, they must complete and maintain state law
enforcement qualification requirements, in order to retain their state
law enforcement authority. This additional authority, according to SRS
officials, allows the remaining protective force personnel to focus on
the other aspects of the site's national security mission.
Figure 2: Protective Force Constable, SRS:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Either of the Two Principal Options DOE Has Considered Could Result in
More Uniform Management of Protective Forces:
To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, DOE
has considered two principal options--improving elements of the
existing contractor system or creating a federal protective force. We
identified five major criteria that DOE, protective force contractors,
and union officials have used to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of these options. Overall, in comparing these criteria
against the two principal options, we found that neither contractor
nor federal forces seem overwhelmingly superior, but each has
offsetting advantages and disadvantages. Either option could result in
effective and more uniform security if well-managed. However, we
identified transitional problems with converting the current
protective force to a federalized force. Furthermore, while DOE has
sought to improve protective force management by reforming protective
forces, this effort is still at an early stage and budgetary
limitations may constrain some changes.
Both a Contractor Force and a Federalized Force Present Advantages and
Disadvantages:
Table 7 summarizes the five criteria that DOE, protective force
contractors, and union officials have used to discuss whether to
improve the existing contractor system or federalize protective
forces, as well as associated issues or concerns.
Table 7: Assessment Criteria for Management Options and Associated
Issues:
Criteria: A personnel system that supports force resizing and ensures
high-quality protective force members;
Issues associated with stakeholders' views on how the options align
with the criteria:
* Several contractors and DOE managers believe the current contractor
system provides more flexibility than a federal system to hire and
fire quickly to meet changing DOE personnel needs and to handle poor
performers;
* A union coalition advocates federalization to get early and enhanced
retirement benefits, which are available for law enforcement officers
and some other federal positions, to ensure a young and vigorous
workforce.
Criteria: Greater standardization of protective forces across sites to
more consistently support high performance and ready transfer of
personnel between sites;
Issues associated with stakeholders' views on how the options align
with the criteria:
* Protective forces perform inconsistently across sites, in part
because DOE culture and policy give each site leeway to manage itself,
which can result in differences, such as various interpretations of
DOE orders;
* Protective forces are also trained and equipped differently, making
it difficult to provide reinforcements from other sites for strikes or
other emergencies;
* A 2004 DOE work group concluded federalization might drive
standardization across the DOE complex, which would benefit from more
uniform training and application of policies and from more uniform and
efficient procurement of, among other things, equipment and services.
Criteria: Better DOE management and oversight to ensure effective
security;
Issues associated with stakeholders' views on how the options align
with the criteria:
* Federalization could enhance DOE's direct control and awareness of
protective force operations;
* Some DOE officials are concerned that more centralized federal
control might slow and impede protective forces' support of the site
contractors' operations and federalization could confuse the roles,
responsibilities, and interfaces between contractor personnel in other
types of security positions and federal protective force personnel.
Criteria: Prevention or better management of protective force strikes;
Issues associated with stakeholders' views on how the options align
with the criteria:
* Contractor protective forces can legally strike when their
collective bargaining agreements expire, creating a potential lapse in
security. Security operations during a strike must be managed through
temporary replacement protective forces;
* According to OPM, a federalized protective force could not legally
strike.
Criteria: Containment costs within expected budgets;
Issues associated with stakeholders' views on how the options align
with the criteria:
* Protective forces are the most expensive component of security
costs, which have increased dramatically since September 11, 2001;
* DOE officials are concerned that future security budgets will be
relatively flat and may not support changes that require significant
new expenditures, which federalization may involve.
Source: GAO analysis of information from federal, contractor, and
union sources.
[End of table]
Evaluating the two principal options against these criteria, we found
that, for several reasons, either contractor or federal forces could
result in effective and more uniform security if the forces are well-
managed. First, both options--maintaining the current security force
structure or federalizing the security force--have offsetting
advantages and disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly
superior. For example, one relative advantage of a contractor force is
the perceived greater flexibility for hiring, disciplining, or
terminating an employee; one relative disadvantage of a contractor
force is that it can strike. In contrast, federalization could better
allow protective forces to advance or laterally transfer to other DOE
sites to meet protective force members' needs or DOE's need to resize
particular forces.
Second, key disadvantages, such as potential strikes, do not preclude
effective operations if the security force is well-managed. According
to one protective force manager, a well-managed protective force is
less likely to strike. In addition, a 2009 memo signed by the NNSA
administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can
effectively manage strikes through the use of replacement protective
forces. With respect to federal protective forces, a 2004 department
work group on protective force issues observed that even federal
operations like OST had experienced difficult labor-management
relations that had to be carefully managed in order to ensure
effective performance.
Third, as can be seen in the following examples, distinctions between
the two options, each of which could have many permutations, can be
overstated by comparing worse-and best-case scenarios, when similar
conditions might be realized under either option.
* While federalization might improve effectiveness and efficiency by
driving standardization, NNSA recently announced initiatives to
increase standardization among contract protective forces to achieve
some of the same benefits, including cost savings.
* Federalization could potentially provide early and enhanced
retirement benefits, which could help to ensure a young and vigorous
workforce. However, such benefits might also be provided to contractor
protective forces.
* Although more centralized federal control might impede both
protective forces' support of a site's operations and the coordination
between contractors and federal managers, this concern presumes a
scenario in which the department would choose a highly centralized
organization, whereas it might delegate responsibility for day-to-day
operations to its site managers.
* Either option could be implemented with more or less costly
features. For example, adding the early and enhanced retirement
benefits would increase costs for either contractor or federal
protective forces.
Reliably estimating the costs of protective force options proved
difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it for two broad
reasons. First, since contractor and federal forces could each have
many possible permutations, choosing any particular option to assess
would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study
identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as federalizing
all or some SPO positions at some or all facilities or reorganizing
them under an existing or a new agency. Second, DOE will have to
decide on the hypothetical options' key cost factors before it can
reasonably compare costs.[Footnote 26] For example, when asked about
some key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service Center
official said that a detailed workforce analysis would be needed to
decide whether DOE would either continue to use the same number of
SPOs with high amounts of scheduled overtime or hire a larger number
of SPOs who would work fewer overtime hours. Also, the official said
that until management directs a particular work schedule for
federalized protective forces, there is no definitive answer to the
applicable overtime rules, such as whether overtime begins after 8
hours in a day. The amount of overtime and the factors affecting it
are crucial to a sound cost estimate because overtime pay can now
account for up to about 50 percent of pay for worked hours.
Transition to a Federalized Security Workforce Creates Difficult
Issues Either under Current Laws or with Special Provisions for
Enhanced Retirement Benefits:
If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the
current forces might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. OPM told
us that legislation would be required to provide these federalized
protective forces with early and enhanced retirement benefits.
However, provisions associated with these benefits could create hiring
and retirement difficulties for current older members of the
protective forces.
Federalization under Existing Laws May Not be Palatable to Current
Protective Force Members and Their Unions:
According to officials at OPM and NNSA's Service Center, if contractor
SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would likely be placed
into the security guard (GS-0085) federal job series. Although a
coalition of unions has sought federalization to allow members to have
early and enhanced retirement benefits, which allows employees in
certain federal jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of service,
security guards under the GS-0085 job series are not eligible for
these benefits. Under the applicable rules for federal security
guards, transitioning protective forces would not become eligible to
retire with immediate federal annuities until at least age 55, and
only after accruing sufficient years of federal service. For example,
transitioning protective forces could begin receiving a federal
annuity at age 62 with 5 years of service or, with reduced benefits,
at age 55 to 57 (depending on birth year) with 10 years of service.
[Footnote 27]
In addition, transitioning force members may receive lower pay as
federal employees, according to our analysis of two tentative federal
pay levels for protective force positions at SPO levels of I, II, and
III.[Footnote 28] As of September 30, 2008, contractors are generally
paid higher top rates than the top rates for the applicable federal
General Schedule (GS) pay grades.[Footnote 29] Only SPO-III positions
at three sites and SPO-II positions at one site could have their top
rates potentially matched by 2008 federal rates, but only under
certain assumptions.[Footnote 30] Also, to reach federal pay rates
that better approximate the contractor rates, transitioning contractor
protective forces might have to wait many years. While most collective
bargaining agreements allow protective forces to reach a position's
top pay rate after 3 years or fewer, federal guards could take much
longer because the 10 steps within a GS pay grade have progressively
longer periods of service between incremental increases. This step
progression means reaching the top of a pay grade (step 10) could take
up to 18 years.
Finally, if protective forces are federalized, OPM officials told us
that current members would not be guaranteed a federal job. According
to those officials, current members would have to compete for the new
federal positions, and thus they risk not being hired. Nonveteran
members are particularly at risk because competition for federal
security guard positions is restricted to those with veterans'
preference, if they are available. According to NNSA Service Center
officials, veterans groups would likely oppose any waiver to this
hiring preference. Thus, if the protective forces were to be
federalized, the department might lose some of the currently trained
and experienced personnel.
Legislation Could Provide Federalized Forces with Early and Enhanced
Retirement Benefits, but Providing These Benefits Could Pose Problems
for Current Force Members:
According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to provide
federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement because
their positions do not fit the current definition of law enforcement
officers that would trigger such a benefit.[Footnote 31] For the same
reason, DOE had to pursue legislation to extend early and enhanced
retirement for OST federal agents in 1998. OPM had determined that OST
federal agents did not meet the definition for law enforcement officer
that would have made them eligible for early and enhanced retirement
benefits. Consequently, at DOE urging, Congress enacted legislation to
give OST federal agents the special 20-year retirement provisions.
[Footnote 32]
Although a coalition of unions has supported federalization to get
early and enhanced retirement benefits, provisions associated with
these benefits could create hiring and retirement difficulties for
older force members. Older members might not be rehired because
agencies are typically authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37,
for entry into federal positions with early retirement. In addition,
even if there were a waiver from the maximum age of hire, older
protective forces members could not retire at age 50 because they
would have had to work 20 years to meet the federal service
requirement for "early" retirement benefits. These forces could retire
earlier if they were granted credit for their prior years of service
under DOE and NNSA contracts. However, OPM officials told us OPM would
strongly oppose federal retirement benefits being granted for previous
years of contractor service (retroactive benefits). According to these
officials, these retroactive benefits would be without precedent and
would violate the basic concept that service credit for retirement
benefits is only available for eligible employment at the time it was
performed. Moreover, retroactive benefits would create an unfunded
liability for federal retirement funds. When the law changed to allow
OST federal agents early retirement, these agents were already federal
employees, and they received retroactive enhanced credit for service;
DOE paid the extra liability (approximately $18 million over 4 years).
DOE Seeks to Address Protective Forces Issues by Reforming Contractor
Forces, but Some Changes May Be Constrained by Budgetary Limitations,
and Progress Has Been Limited to Date:
In a joint January 2009 memorandum, the NNSA Administrator and DOE's
Chief Health Safety and Security (HSS) Officer rejected the
federalization of protective forces as an option and supported the
continued use of contracted protective forces--but with improvements.
They concluded that, among other things, the transition to a federal
force would be costly and would be likely to provide little, if any,
increase in security effectiveness. However, these officials
recognized that the current contractor system could be improved by
addressing some of the issues that federalization might have resolved.
In particular, they announced the pursuit of an initiative to better
standardize protective forces' training and equipment. According to
these officials, more standardization serves to increase effectiveness
and cost efficiency as well as to better facilitate responses to
potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, the Chief HSS
Officer commissioned a study group, which included DOE officials and
protective force union representatives and had input from protective
force contractors, to recommend ways to overcome the personnel system
problems that might prevent protective force members from working to a
normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65, and building reasonable
retirement benefits.
Both of these initiatives might benefit the department and its
programs. For example, the initiative to standardize protective forces
has started focusing on the inefficiencies arising from having each
contractor separately choose and procure security equipment and
support services; one identified inefficiency is that smaller separate
orders hinder contractors from negotiating better prices. In NNSA's
fiscal year 2010 budget request, NNSA predicted that standardizing
procurement and security equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and
ammunition, could save NNSA, cumulatively, 20 percent of its costs for
such equipment by 2013. With respect to the career and retirement
initiative, the DOE study group reported, among other potential
benefits, that improving career incentives for individuals to enter a
protective force career and then remain in the DOE security community
for a lifetime of service could help the department minimize the
significant costs associated with hiring, vetting, and training
protective force members.
NNSA has established a Security Commodity Team--composed of security
and procurement professionals from NNSA, some DOE sites, and other DOE
organizations--to focus first on procuring ammunition and identifying
and testing other security equipment that can be used across sites.
According to NNSA officials, NNSA established a common mechanism in
December 2009 for sites to procure ammunition. Another effort will
seek greater standardization of protective force operations across
sites, in part by HHS or NNSA clarifying protective force policies
when sites do not have the same understanding of these policies or
implement them in different ways. To move toward more standardized
operations and a more centrally managed protective force program, NNSA
started a broad security review to identify possible improvements. As
one result of this security review, according to NNSA officials in
January 2010, NNSA has developed a draft standard for protective force
operations, which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and
a consistent security approach that is both effective and efficient.
For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and
retirement options, in June 2009, a DOE-chartered study group made 29
recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to
reach a normal retirement age within the protective force, take
another job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study
group identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as
involving low-or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented
quickly. For example, some recommendations seek to ensure that
protective force members are prepared for job requirements through
expanding fitness and wellness programs and reviewing the
appropriateness of training. Other recommendations call for reviews to
find ways to maximize the number of armed and unarmed positions that
SPOs can fill when they can no longer meet their current combatant
requirements. Other recommendations focus on providing training and
planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. (All 29
recommendations are described in appendix I.)
The study group recognized that some of its personnel system
recommendations may be difficult to implement largely because of
budget constraints. The study group had worked with the assumption
that DOE security budgets will remain essentially flat for the
foreseeable future, and may actually decline in real dollars.
Nevertheless, it identified 15 of its 29 career and retirement
recommendations as challenging because they involve additional program
costs, some of which are likely to be substantial, and may require
changes to management structures and contracts.[Footnote 33] For
example, to provide some income security when protective officer
members must take a lower-paying position because of illness, injury,
or age, one recommendation would include provisions in collective
bargaining agreements to at least temporarily prevent or reduce drops
in pay. Among the more challenging recommendations is a call to
enhance retirement plans and to make them more equivalent and portable
across sites--the types of changes that a coalition of unions had
hoped federalization might provide.
Progress on the 29 recommendations has been limited to date. When
senior department officials were briefed on the personnel system
recommendations in late June 2009, they took them under consideration
for further action but immediately approved one recommendation--to
extend the life of the study group by forming a standing committee.
They directed the standing committee to develop implementation
strategies for actions that can be done in the near term and, for
recommendations requiring further analysis, additional funding, or
other significant actions, to serve as an advisory panel for senior
department officials. According to a DOE official in early December
2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying stages of reviews to advance the
other 28 recommendations. Later that month, NNSA achieved aspects of
one recommendation about standardization, in part by formally
standardizing protective force uniforms, as well as the uniforms'
cloth shields. In the Conference Report for the fiscal year 2010
National Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 34] the conferees
directed the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide
plan to identify and implement the recommendations of the study group.
Conclusion:
Protective forces are a key component of DOE's efforts to secure its
Category I SNM, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorism
attacks. Since the attacks, DOE has made multiple changes to its
security policies, including more rigorous requirements for its
protective forces. However, in making these changes, DOE and its
protective force contractors through their collective bargaining
agreements have not successfully aligned protective force personnel
systems--which affect career longevity, job transitions, and
retirement--with the increased physical and other demands of a more
paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in our opinion,
there is greater potential for a strike at a site, and potential risk
to site security, when protective forces' collective bargaining
agreements expire. In the event of a strike at one site, the
differences in protective forces' training and equipment make it
difficult to readily provide reinforcements from other sites. Even if
strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may be
reduced if tensions exist between labor and management. The potential
for a strike and for declines in protective forces' performance have
elevated the importance of finding the most effective approach to
maintaining protective force readiness, including an approach that
better aligns personnel systems and protective force requirements. At
the same time, DOE must consider its options for managing protective
forces in a period of budgetary constraints.
With these considerations in mind, DOE and NNSA, to their credit, have
recognized that the decentralized management of protective forces
creates some inefficiencies and that some systemic career and
longevity issues are not being resolved through actions at individual
sites. NNSA's recent standardization initiatives and the 29
recommendations made by a DOE study group in June 2009 offer a step
forward. The responsibility lies with DOE, working with protective
force unions and contractors, to further develop and implement these
initiatives and recommendations. However, if DOE decides not to take
meaningful actions or if its actions will not achieve the intended
goals, an examination of other options, including the federalization
of protective forces, may be merited.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To better align protective force personnel policies and systems with
DOE's security requirements for Category I SNM sites, we recommend
that the Secretary of Energy promptly develop implementation plans
and, where needed, undertake additional research for the DOE study
group's 2009 recommendations to improve career longevity and
retirement options for protective force personnel. Specifically, we
recommend the Secretary take the following two actions:
* For actions such as reviewing the appropriateness of training that
the study group identified as low or no cost, unless DOE can state
compelling reasons for reconsideration, it should develop and execute
implementation plans.
* For actions that may involve substantial costs or contractual and
organizational changes, such as enhancing the uniformity and
portability of retirement benefits, DOE should plan and perform
research to identify the most beneficial and financially feasible
options.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and
comment. In its written comments for the department, NNSA generally
agreed with the report and the recommendations. However, NNSA stated
that the report does not sufficiently credit the department for its
significant efforts taken to address protective force issues. We added
some information to the report about the status of the department's
efforts that NNSA provided separately from its comment letter.
Nevertheless, we continue to view DOE's progress on its study group's
29 recommendations as generally limited to date. The complete text of
NNSA's comments are presented in appendix II. NNSA also provided
technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
OPM also received a draft of this report for review and comment. It
chose not to provide formal comments because it said our report fairly
and accurately represented the facts and policy issues that OPM
provided to us.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees with
responsibilities for energy issues; the Secretary of Energy; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report is also
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in
appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Recommendations from the Protective Force Career Options
Initiative Study Group:
In March 2009, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Chief Health, Safety
and Security (HSS) Officer commissioned a study to examine "realistic
and reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and
retirement prospects of protective force (PF) members while
maintaining, within current and anticipated budgetary constraints, a
robust and effective security posture." Under the leadership of HSS
and with input from protective force contractors, a study group was
formed consisting of senior leaders of the National Council of
Security Police and senior technical staff from the National Nuclear
Security Administration, the Office of Environmental Management, the
Office of Nuclear Energy, and the Office of Fossil Energy.
The study group's report, Enhanced Career Longevity and Retirement
Options for DOE Protective Force Personnel, released on June 30, 2009,
included 29 recommendations to overcome the problems that prevent
protective force members from working to a normal retirement age and
building reasonable retirement benefits. Summaries of these
recommendations follow.
Study Groups Recommendations:
The study group thought the following 14 recommendations were
achievable mostly within existing management structures and
anticipated budgetary constraints.
1. PF deployment strategies should be re-examined to ensure that
appropriate Security Police Officers' (SPO) skill sets and response
capabilities (e.g., offensive or defensive capabilities) are matched
to current response plan requirements in a manner that maximizes
reliance on defensive combatants. The intent is to maximize the number
of defensive positions that could be filled by personnel who can no
longer meet the higher offensive combatant requirements.
2. Anticipated requirements for security escorts and other security-
related unarmed positions (including current outsourcing practices)
should be reviewed and procedures implemented to maximize work
opportunities for unarmed PF members (Security Officers). The intent
of this recommendation and the next is to provide positions to be
filled by PF members who can no longer meet either the offensive or
the defensive combatant standards.
3. Unarmed PF-related work should be identified as part of the career
path for PF members.
4. Measures should be adopted to minimize the impact of current
physical fitness standards upon career longevity, and these standards
should be reviewed against current job requirements.
5. Revisions to current medical requirements should be developed to
ensure that existing medical conditions do not represent (given the
current state of the medical arts) unreasonable barriers to career
longevity.
6. So long as the department expects PF personnel to meet explicit
medical and fitness standards, it should provide reasonable means to
prepare for testing and evaluation.
7. Existing "fitness/wellness" programs should be expanded to help
SPOs maintain and prolong their ability to meet physical fitness
requirements and to achieve medical cost savings that result from
maintaining a well-managed program. According to the study group, this
recommendation is not cost-neutral.
8. Retirement/transition planning should be integrated into PF
training.
9. The capabilities of the National Training Center should be used to
facilitate career progression and job transition training.
10. PF organizations should be encouraged to appoint "Career
Development/Transition" officers to assist personnel in career path
and transition planning.
11. The Human Reliability Program (HRP) monitors employees to ensure
they have no emotional, mental, or physical conditions that impede
them from reliably conducting their work. Under this program, if a
reasonable belief or credible evidence indicates that employees are
not reliable, they should be immediately removed from their duties as
an interim precautionary measure. The study group recommended taking
strong actions to correct HRP administrative errors and to rigorously
enforce existing prohibitions against using HRP in a punitive manner.
This recommendation and the next arise from a concern that some
protective force members may be punished without the opportunity for
timely recourse.
12. Contractor policies and actions that lead to placing PF members in
nonpaid status without appropriate review or recourse should be
closely monitored (and, where necessary, corrected).
13. DOE M 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force, should be reviewed to
ensure that requirements are supportable by appropriate training.
14. To encourage future communication on the issues considered in this
study, the life of the present study group should be extended as a
standing committee, and union participation in the DOE HSS Protective
Force Policy Panel should be ensured.
The study group thought the following 15 recommendations would require
currently unbudgeted resources or changes to existing contracts.
15. Existing defined contribution plans should be reviewed in order to
identify methods to improve benefits, to ensure greater comparability
of benefits from one site to the next, and to develop methods to
improve portability of benefits. This recommendation, and those
through number 19, involve changes to retirement plans that could
enhance benefits and allow protective force personnel to transfer
benefits more easily when moving to other sites.
16. Consistency in retirement criteria should be established across
the DOE complex (e.g., a point system incorporating age and years of
service or something similar).
17. The potential for incorporating a uniform cost-of-living allowance
into defined benefit retirement programs based on government indexes
should be examined.
18. Portability of service credit between PF and other DOE contractors
should be explored. This could be directed in requests for proposals
for new PF contracts.
19. Potential actions should be explored to create a reasonable
disability retirement bridge for PF personnel when alternate job
placement is unsuccessful.
20. Job performance requirements (such as firearms proficiency) should
be supported by training sufficient to enable PF members to have
confidence in meeting those requirements.
21. A retraining fund should be created to assist personnel with job
transitions and second careers.
22. A centralized job registry should be established to facilitate
identification of job opportunities across the complex.
23. Consideration should be given to sponsoring a student loan program
to assist PF members in developing second careers.
24. The department, as a matter of policy and line management
procedure, should establish the position that SPOs be considered for
job placement within each respective site's organizational structure
before a contractor considers hiring personnel from outside of the
site.
25. "Save pay" provisions should be included in collective bargaining
agreements to cover specified periods when a PF member must be
classified to a lower-paying position because of illness, injury, or
aging.
26. DOE should explore the potential for facilitating partnerships
among the various contractor organizations in order to broaden
employment opportunities for aging or injured personnel and to
encourage PF personnel seeking alternative career paths to actively
compete for those opportunities.
27. Where possible, the department should review its separate PF prime
contracts and convert them to "total" security and emergency
management contracts. The intent of this recommendation is to permit
protective force personnel to better compete for emergency management
positions when they lack the ability or desire to continue with their
security positions.
28. PF arming and arrest authority should be reviewed with the
objective of enhancing the capabilities of SPOs. The intent of this
recommendation is to, among other things, ease SPOs' post-retirement
path into law enforcement positions.
29. Where possible, equipment, including uniforms, weapons, and
badges, should be standardized throughout the department. According to
the study group, more standardized uniforms might improve protective
forces' morale and could offer some offsetting cost savings for the
department.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
January 22, 2010:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective
Forces' Personnel Issues, GA0-10-275. I understand that this review
was performed due to a congressional mandate that directed GAO to
review protective forces at the Department of Energy (DOE) sites that
possess Category I Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). Specifically, GAO
(1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of
protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of Tactical
Response Force (TRF), and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more
uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
NNSA generally agrees with the report and the recommendations. The GAO
auditors provided a fairly accurate picture of the protective force
situation and practices. Additionally, the report reflects the aligned
but separate interests of DOE and the unions. We believe that the
report does not give full credit to the Department for significant
efforts taken to address protective force issues, and we have noted
some inaccuracies within the report. Enclosed are technical comments
that, if accepted, would address these concerns.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Acting Director, Policy and Internal Controls
Management, at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration;
Enclosure:
cc: Brad Peterson:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant
Director; John Cooney; Don Cowan; Cindy Gilbert; Terry Hanford;
Mehrzad Nadji; Cheryl Peterson; and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key
contributions to this report. Other contributors include Carol
Kolarik, Peter Ruedel, and Robert Sanchez.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We excluded three other DOE Category I SNM sites from this review
because they are likely to downsize or downgrade their protective
forces in the near future. These sites include the Office of
Environmental Management's Hanford Site, near Richland, Washington,
which recently transferred its highest value Category I SNM off site
but will maintain lower value Category I SNM for the foreseeable
future; NNSA's Lawrence Livermore's National Laboratory, in Livermore,
California, which plans to transfer its Category I SNM off site by the
end of fiscal year 2012; and the Office of Science's Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which plans to dispose
of its Category I SNM by the end of fiscal year 2015.
[2] In 2008, DOE changed the name of its DBT (DOE Order 470.3A) to the
Graded Security Protection policy (DOE 470.3B).
[3] DOE announced this initiative, originally known as "Elite Force"
initiative in 2004, and began to formalize it into policy through the
issuance of DOE Manual 470.4-3, Protective Force, in 2005. DOE revised
this policy in 2006 with DOE Manual 470.4-3 Change 1, Protective
Force. In 2008, DOE further revised this policy, which is now
contained in DOE Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force.
[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 3124 (2008).
[5] NNSA's Service Center provides business, technical, financial,
legal, human resources, and management support to NNSA site
organizations.
[6] NNSA is primarily responsible for ensuring the continued safety
and reliability of nuclear weapons; EM is responsible for cleaning up
former nuclear weapons sites; and NE is primarily responsible for
nuclear energy research.
[7] According to DOE's fiscal year 2010 budget request, protective
forces accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of its field-site
security funding in fiscal year 2008.
[8] DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Management of the
Department's Protective Forces, DOE/IG-0602, (Washington, D.C.: June
3, 2003); DOE Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (now
known as the Office of Health, Safety and Security), Department of
Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (a classified
report), (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004); and GAO, Nuclear Security:
DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New
Design Basis Threat. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-623] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27,
2004).
[9] GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos
and Other DOE Facilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-9l-12] (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
11, l990).
[10] DOE Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program specifies that
DOE directives should focus on results by specifying the goals and
requirements that must be met and to the extent possible, refraining
from mandating how to fulfill the goals and requirements.
[11] Our recent review showed that DOE's policy for nuclear weapons
security provides local officials greater flexibility than the
Department of Defense's policy for determining how to best meet
security standards and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
as a part of the decision-making process. See GAO, Homeland Defense:
Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to
Improve DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-828] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2009).
[12] According to NNSA security officials, by September 30, 2009, LANL
had converted all of its SPO-II positions to SPO-I positions, and NTS
had converted almost half of its SPO-II positions to SPO-I positions.
[13] DOE's combatant standards are defined by physical fitness,
firearms, and medical qualifications.
[14] DOE Office of Inspector General, Protective Force MK-19 Grenade
Launcher Use at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Pantex
Facility, DOE/IG-0770 (Washington, D.C., July 2007).
[15] DOE Office of Inspector General, 40 MM Grenade Launcher
Qualification Requirements at Department of Energy Sites, DOE/IG-0806
(Washington, D.C., November 2008).
[16] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-611] (Washington, D.C., July 15,
2009).
[17] GAO, Department of Energy: Information on Its Management of Costs
and Liabilities for Contractors' Pension and Postretirement Benefit
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-642R]
(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008).
[18] One DOE site completed 2005 DBT implementation efforts on
schedule and approved a Site Safeguards and Security Plan for the 2005
DBT.
[19] Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 3113 (2006).
[20] 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b). Exec. Order No. 12171, 44 FR 66565, (1979),
recently amended by Exec. Order No. 13480, 73 Fed. Reg. 73991 (2008),
provides that NNSA's federal workers cannot be represented by unions.
[21] The NNSA Pay Band Demonstration establishes a pay framework by
creating a career path and pay bands for OST federal agent positions
as well as the rules for pay for performance. In addition, the pay
system for OST federal agents must conform to other relevant legal and
regulatory requirements and agency rules and procedures covering, for
example, premium pay for overtime, holiday worked, Sunday worked and
night work. In contrast, aspects of such premium pay could be
variously negotiated for contractor protective forces.
[22] Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 3154 (1998).
[23] Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 161.k (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2201(k)). Defense Programs: Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force
by Protective Force Officers, 10 C.F.R. § 1047.
[24] A DOE Inspector General report found this to be the case at a DOE
site not covered in our review. See DOE, Inspection Report: Protective
Force Response to a Security Incident at Sandia National Laboratory,
California, DOE/IG-0658 (August 2004).
[25] This authority is contained in S. Carolina Code § 23-7-10 through
7-50.
[26] In terms of retirement benefits, for example, the features and
costs are not clear for hypothetical contractor options, for which any
variety of retirement plans could potentially apply. In contrast, the
likely features and costs are fairly clear for hypothetical federal
forces because they would likely be placed under existing retirement
plans. According to OPM estimates for fiscal year 2008, for instance,
annuities under the Federal Employee Retirement System for regular or
early and enhanced retirement cost the government an average of 11.2
percent or 24.9 percent of basic pay, respectively.
[27] Although transitioning members would still be required to work
beyond age 50, they could also work for even more federal service
years, retiring with an immediate annuity at age 60 with 20 years of
service or at age 55 to 57 (depending on birth year) with 30 years of
service. These retirement eligibility provisions are for FERS, which
is the federal plan open to new hires.
[28] We separately asked OPM and the NNSA Service Center to
tentatively classify SPOs at levels I, II, and III for the applicable
federal pay grades using the contractor job descriptions for SPOs. The
NNSA service center classified SPO levels I, II, and III at GS pay
grades of 5, 6, and 7, respectively. OPM classified each SPO level at
one higher grade level. For a more definitive classification of
federal pay, more information on the positions at each site may be
required.
[29] According to a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study, the current contractor
pay rates might be matched by federal pay under the flexibility
allowed by NNSA's new pay demonstration that established pay bands
that may cover more than one GS grade. Indeed, our analysis confirmed
that the likely pay band--spanning the pay range of GS grades 5
through 8 and applicable to all SPO levels--will generally accommodate
the top contractor pay rates at NNSA sites, particularly because it
allows higher pay rates for SPO I and II positions than is likely
through the regular GS pay grades. Nevertheless, transitioning SPOs
may still fail to match their contractor pay rates for two reasons.
First, according to the NNSA service center, if DOE hires all forces
under the regular General Schedule for pay, no forces will then fall
under the NNSA pay banding. Alternatively, if the protective forces
were organized under separate DOE organizations, at most only those
protective forces employed by NNSA would be paid under its pay
banding. Second, to match the contractor rates, new hires must be paid
at the top end of the pay band. However, according to the NNSA Service
Center, it would be unusual to hire employees at rates close to the
top of a pay band, since a pay band is intended to allow for annual
pay-for-performance raises.
[30] According to NNSA Service Center officials, DOE has flexibility
to hire at above step 1 of the GS grade when a candidate demonstrates
superior qualifications. However, DOE might not use this hiring
authority to put new hires at the top end of a GS pay grade because
its use must be consistent with, among other things, merit system
principles and budgetary considerations.
[31] According to a 2004 OPM report, the retirement definition for a
law enforcement officer has a more restrictive meaning than the common
understanding of law enforcement. The main element of the definition
is that the employee's duties must be primarily the investigation,
apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of
offenses against the criminal laws of the United States. This
definition generally excludes federal guards and even uniformed police
officers from being eligible for law enforcement officer retirement
because they prevent or detect violations instead of investigating
them.
[32] Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 3154 (1998).
[33] According to officials in DOE's Office of General Counsel, one
issue for changing benefits is that the department does not set
protective forces' benefits because their members are not department
employees. Instead, protective forces and their various employing
contractors would have to negotiate changed benefits into the
collective bargaining agreements.
[34] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-288 (2009).
[End of section]
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