Nuclear Weapons
National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile Gao ID: GAO-11-100 October 7, 2010The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Tritium Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of tritium--a key isotope used in nuclear weapons--in order to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA's efforts to produce tritium have been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things.
NNSA has been unable to overcome the technical challenges it has experienced producing tritium. To produce tritium, stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate and zirconium --called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)--are irradiated in the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear power reactor. Despite redesigns of several components within the TPBARS, tritium is still leaking--or "permeating"--out of the TPBARs into the reactor's coolant water at higher-than-expected rates. Because the quantities of tritium in the reactor coolant are approaching regulatory limits, TVA has been significantly restricting the number of TPBARs that it will allow NNSA to irradiate in each 18-month reactor fueling cycle, and, consequently, NNSA has not been producing as much tritium as it planned. NNSA and TVA officials are continuing to develop plans to increase the number of TPBARs that will be irradiated, as well as, if necessary, the number of reactors participating in the program. However, these plans have not been coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which ultimately must approve any changes to the operation of the TVA reactors. NNSA currently meets the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, but its ability to do so in the future is in doubt. NNSA officials told us that they will be able to meet future requirements through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled nuclear warheads and irradiating TPBARs. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant decrease of tritium requirements and will not eliminate the need for a reliable source of new tritium because of the need to periodically replenish it in the remaining nuclear weapons stockpile due to tritium's decay. While NNSA has not, to date, been required to use tritium from a reserve that it maintains, use of this reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level. Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of tritium, GAO's review found two problems with NNSA's management of the Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA could not provide us with evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures when purchasing components and services for the program. Second, due to, among other things, the way the program's contracts with its suppliers are structured, the program is spending its funds more slowly than planned and is accumulating large unexpended balances. The program is subject to thresholds established by the Department of Energy of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from one fiscal year to the next. However, the program exceeded these thresholds by more than $48 million in 2008 and by more than $39 million in 2009. While large unexpended balances are not necessarily an indication that the program is being mismanaged, it does indicate that the program is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual basis--funds that could be appropriated for other purposes. GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the program's large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eugene E. Aloise Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-6870GAO-11-100, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2010:
Nuclear Weapons:
National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued
Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile:
GAO-11-100:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-100, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Nuclear Security Administration‘s (NNSA) Tritium
Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of
tritium”a key isotope used in nuclear weapons”in order to maintain the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of
5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the
stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA‘s efforts to produce tritium have
been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked
to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome
technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to
which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons
stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of
NNSA‘s Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities
involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements
established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things.
What GAO Found:
NNSA has been unable to overcome the technical challenges it has
experienced producing tritium. To produce tritium, stainless steel
rods containing lithium aluminate and zirconium-”called tritium-
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)-”are irradiated in the
Tennessee Valley Authority‘s (TVA) Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear
power reactor. Despite redesigns of several components within the
TPBARS, tritium is still leaking-”or ’permeating“-”out of the TPBARs
into the reactor‘s coolant water at higher-than-expected rates.
Because the quantities of tritium in the reactor coolant are
approaching regulatory limits, TVA has been significantly restricting
the number of TPBARs that it will allow NNSA to irradiate in each 18-
month reactor fueling cycle, and, consequently, NNSA has not been
producing as much tritium as it planned. NNSA and TVA officials are
continuing to develop plans to increase the number of TPBARs that will
be irradiated, as well as, if necessary, the number of reactors
participating in the program. However, these plans have not been
coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which
ultimately must approve any changes to the operation of the TVA
reactors.
NNSA currently meets the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for
tritium, but its ability to do so in the future is in doubt. NNSA
officials told us that they will be able to meet future requirements
through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled
nuclear warheads and irradiating TPBARs. Although the number of
nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions
are unlikely to result in a significant decrease of tritium
requirements and will not eliminate the need for a reliable source of
new tritium because of the need to periodically replenish it in the
remaining nuclear weapons stockpile due to tritium‘s decay. While NNSA
has not, to date, been required to use tritium from a reserve that it
maintains, use of this reserve in the relatively near future may be
necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its
current level.
Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of
tritium, GAO‘s review found two problems with NNSA‘s management of the
Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA could not provide us with
evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures
when purchasing components and services for the program. Second, due
to, among other things, the way the program‘s contracts with its
suppliers are structured, the program is spending its funds more
slowly than planned and is accumulating large unexpended balances. The
program is subject to thresholds established by the Department of
Energy of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried
over from one fiscal year to the next. However, the program exceeded
these thresholds by more than $48 million in 2008 and by more than $39
million in 2009. While large unexpended balances are not necessarily
an indication that the program is being mismanaged, it does indicate
that the program is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual
basis”funds that could be appropriated for other purposes.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases
from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production
strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting
procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the
program‘s large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-100] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Background:
NNSA Continues to Face Technical Challenges Producing Tritium:
NNSA Is Currently Meeting Tritium Requirements, but Uncertainty Exists
in Its Ability to Continue Doing So In the Future:
NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the
Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program
and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration:
Appendix II: Comments from the Tennessee Valley Authority:
Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Tritium Readiness Program Unexpended Funds, Fiscal Years 2006-
2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Diagram of a TPBAR:
Figure 2: NNSA's Tritium Production Enterprise:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
SRS: Savannah River Site:
TVA: Tennessee Valley Authority:
TPBAR: tritium-producing burnable absorber rod:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 7, 2010:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael R. Turner:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately
organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is working to
re-establish the country's capability to produce tritium--a key
radioactive isotope used to enhance the power of nuclear warheads and
bombs. Because tritium has a relatively short half-life of 12 years
and therefore decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year, tritium
in existing weapons must be periodically replenished, and an assured
source of tritium is necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. During the Cold War, tritium was produced in nuclear
reactors at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina and the
Hanford Site in Washington. However, due to safety concerns, the last
reactor used for tritium production was shut down in 1988. Since that
time, as the United States decreased the size of its nuclear arsenal,
NNSA has been able to meet its tritium requirements by harvesting and
recycling it from dismantled nuclear warheads. However, because of
tritium's short half-life, NNSA cannot meet its tritium needs in this
manner indefinitely and is attempting to re-establish new tritium
production.
Nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium are established
jointly by the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA. To meet these
requirements, the Tritium Readiness Program was established in 1996.
It is now a subprogram of NNSA's Readiness Campaign that develops
nuclear weapons component manufacturing technologies. The Tritium
Readiness Program operates with an annual budget of about $70 million.
To produce tritium, stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate
and zirconium--called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods
(TPBAR)--are irradiated in the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA)
Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear power reactor in Tennessee. Once
inserted into the reactor core during refueling, the TPBARs are
irradiated for approximately 18 months, after which they are
transported to SRS, where they are processed in a specialized facility
to extract the tritium and prepare it for nuclear warheads. However,
since the first regular production TPBARs were irradiated in TVA's
reactor in 2003, NNSA has experienced technical challenges.
Specifically, tritium has been leaking--or "permeating"--out of the
TPBARs at higher-than-expected rates into the reactor's coolant water,
where it is eventually released to the environment under controlled
and monitored conditions. Although tritium decays relatively quickly
and, in small amounts, poses little risk to human health and the
environment, large amounts of tritium released into the environment
could expose the public to slightly higher radiation doses. To ensure
that any releases do not exceed safe amounts, releases of radioactive
materials, including tritium, from nuclear power plants are regulated
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using limits established by
the Environmental Protection Agency.
In this context, in response to your request that we review the
Tritium Readiness Program, we (1) determined the extent to which NNSA
has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2)
determined the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future
nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assessed
the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome
technical challenges producing tritium, we visited and interviewed
officials from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where the
TPBARs were designed and where work continues to overcome technical
problems, and WesDyne Corporation, NNSA's contractor that fabricates
the TPBARs. In addition, we reviewed TVA tritium management plans and
reports. We examined amendments to TVA's operating license for the
Watts Bar plant issued by NRC that approved TVA's irradiation of
TPBARs. We also reviewed relevant NRC regulations and documents
related to TVA tritium activities and interviewed officials from NRC
and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent agency
established in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear facilities.
We also visited and interviewed officials at TVA's Watts Bar 1 nuclear
power plant, where TPBARs are irradiated, and SRS, where the TPBARs
are processed to extract tritium for nuclear warheads.
To determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and
future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, we reviewed
NNSA's tritium production plans as well as requirements documents
prepared by DOD and NNSA, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. We
also reviewed NNSA's strategic plans for the Tritium Readiness
Program, including program execution and implementation plans; past
and planned schedules for completing TPBAR fabrication,
transportation, irradiation, and extraction activities; and the
program's risk management plan. We also interviewed NNSA officials
responsible for developing these plans.
Finally, to assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program,
we reviewed contracts between NNSA and WesDyne, as well as budget and
expenditure data obtained from DOE's Office of Programming, Planning,
Budget, and Evaluation. In addition, we examined past expenditure
projections, contracts and subcontracts for TPBAR fabrication, and
NNSA's planned and actual work schedules for conducting and completing
TPBAR fabrication, transportation, irradiation, and extraction
activities. We determined that the data used was sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of our report. We conducted this performance audit
from October 2009 to September 2010 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that exists naturally in
the environment, but in amounts that are too small for practical
recovery. Tritium is produced artificially when lithium-6 is bombarded
with neutrons (particles within an atom that have no electrical
charge) in the core of a nuclear reactor. When present in the center
of a nuclear weapon at the instant of its detonation, tritium
undergoes nuclear fusion, releasing enormous amounts of energy and
significantly increasing the explosive power, or "yield," of the
weapon.[Footnote 1]
From 1954 until 1988, the United States produced the majority of its
tritium using nuclear reactors at SRS.[Footnote 2] When the last of
SRS's reactors ceased operations for safety reasons in 1988, the
United States lost its capability to produce tritium for the nuclear
weapons stockpile. In August 1993 we reported that significant
reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as a result of, among
other things, arms reduction treaties signed with Russia would result
in sufficient supplies of tritium through 2012 without the need to
produce any new tritium.[Footnote 3] We reported, however, that after
that date a new source of tritium would be required for the stockpile.
To re-establish the nation's tritium production capability, NNSA's
predecessor--DOE's Office of Defense Programs--studied two different
approaches to make tritium. The first involved building an accelerator
to produce tritium. This device would accelerate protons (particles
within an atom that have a positive electrical charge) to nearly the
speed of light. The protons would be crashed into tungsten, releasing
neutrons through a process called spallation, which can be used to
change helium into tritium. After extensive research and development
of accelerator-based tritium production technology, DOE abandoned this
approach.[Footnote 4]
The second approach DOE pursued was to produce tritium using
commercial nuclear power reactors. In such a reactor, components
called burnable absorber rods are used to control the reactivity of
the core in a nuclear reactor during power production. With the
support of Sandia National Laboratories and the Idaho National
Laboratory using Idaho's Advanced Test Reactor, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory designed a new rod--called a TPBAR--that could be
substituted for standard burnable absorber rods in the reactor. As the
commercial reactor produces power, the TPBARs are irradiated,
controlling the nuclear reaction while simultaneously producing
tritium. The tritium produced within the TPBAR is stored within the
rod by a nickel-plated component known as a "getter." (See figure 1.)
Figure 1: Diagram of a TPBAR:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR):
Assemblies consist of 12 to 24 TPBARs suspended from a base plate.
Each TPBAR is about 12.5 feet long and 3/8 inch in diameter:
Lithium Aluminate Pellets;
Zircaloy Liner;
Aluminide Coating on Inner Surface of Cladding;
Nickel-Plated Zircaloy Tritium Getter;
Reactor Grade Stainless Steel Cladding.
Source: NNSA.
[End of figure]
In 1999 DOE entered into an interagency agreement with TVA to
irradiate TPBARs in TVA's Watts Bar and Sequoyah nuclear power
reactors. DOE, and subsequently NNSA after its establishment in 2000,
pays TVA an irradiation fee as well as reimburses TVA for any
additional costs associated with TPBAR irradiation. The agreement
anticipates that TVA would be paid approximately $1.5 billion for its
costs over the agreement's 35-year term. To allow it to irradiate
TPBARs in the reactor, TVA applied to NRC for an amendment to its
operating license. After completing a safety evaluation, NRC issued a
license amendment in 1997 that allowed TVA to irradiate 32 TPBARs for
testing purposes and, following successful testing, issued another
amendment in 2002 that allowed TVA to load up to 2,304 TPBARs in the
Watts Bar 1 reactor per reactor operating cycle. In 2003 the first
TPBARs intended to produce tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile
were loaded into the Watts Bar 1 reactor and were removed
approximately 18 months later as part of the reactor's normal
refueling cycle. To date, only the Watts Bar 1 reactor has been used
to irradiate TPBARs.
The first TPBARs were fabricated by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, which designed the rods as well as the tritium production
processes associated with them. In 2000 NNSA contracted with WesDyne
International--a subsidiary of Westinghouse--to fabricate TPBARs.
WesDyne procures and maintains an inventory of TPBAR components and
assembles TPBARs at a Westinghouse facility in Columbia, South
Carolina. This facility also supplies nuclear fuel for TVA's Watts Bar
1 reactor. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory continues to
serve as the TPBAR design agent, developing design changes as needed
and supporting WesDyne's fabrication of TPBARs. The laboratory also
maintains a backup capability to produce TPBARs in the event WesDyne
becomes unable or unwilling to fulfill its contract with NNSA.
Once fabricated, the TPBARs are shipped to Watts Bar where they are
loaded into the reactor core during a normal refueling outage. After
being irradiated for approximately 18 months, the TPBARs are removed
from the reactor core and, after cooling for several months, are
transported to SRS. The TPBARs, which are now highly radioactive
because of the time spent inside the reactor, are processed at a
specialized new Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS. This facility,
which began operations in 2007 at a cost of nearly $500 million, cuts
the tops off the TPBARs and processes them to extract tritium. Waste
from the extraction process, such as scrap pieces from cut-apart
TPBARs, is permanently disposed of as low-level radioactive waste. The
steps involved in NNSA's tritium production enterprise are illustrated
in figure 2. Tritium extracted from TPBARs is then loaded into
specially designed reservoirs that are shipped to DOD for installation
into nuclear weapons. Tritium reservoirs are periodically removed from
each weapon in the stockpile as part of their routine maintenance and
then shipped to SRS, where any remaining tritium that has not decayed
is recovered. The reservoirs are then refilled with tritium and
returned to DOD.
Figure 2: NNSA's Tritium Production Enterprise:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (design agent);
Idaho National Laboratory: Advanced test reactor.
Manufacture TPBAR components:
Assemble components: WesDyne:
Irradiation at TVA:
Transport irradiated TPBARs to Savannah River Site:
Tritium Extraction Facility: Extract tritium from TPBARs.
Sources: NNSA and Art Explosion (images).
[End of figure]
NNSA Continues to Face Technical Challenges Producing Tritium:
Despite the fact that the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has
redesigned several components within the TPBARs to reduce the amount
of tritium permeating into the reactor coolant at the Watts Bar 1
reactor, tritium is still leaking from the TPBARs at higher-than-
expected rates. As a result, significantly fewer TPBARs than planned
are being irradiated in the reactor, which has considerably reduced
the amount of tritium NNSA is producing. NNSA and TVA officials told
us that they are developing plans to increase the number of TPBARs
being irradiated and the number of reactors participating in tritium
production, as well as plans to modify the reactors to better manage
tritium releases to the environment. However, to date, these plans
have not been actively coordinated with NRC, which ultimately must
approve any modifications to reactor operations.
Tritium is Still Permeating at Higher-Than-Expected Rates From TPBARs
Into the Reactor Coolant at TVA's Watts Bar 1 Reactor:
NNSA has been unable to solve the technical challenges it has been
experiencing producing tritium. Specifically, tritium is permeating
from the TPBARs at higher-than-expected rates into the water used to
cool the reactor core at TVA's Watts Bar 1 nuclear plant rather than
being captured in the TPBARs as designed. Watts Bar's operating
license is based on the assumption that 2,304 TPBARs would be loaded
into the reactor and that tritium would permeate from the TPBARs into
the reactor coolant at an average rate of 1.0 curie of tritium per
year per TPBAR.[Footnote 5] However, according to NNSA reports,
tritium is permeating from the TPBARs at levels of up to 4.2 curies of
tritium per year per TPBAR out of a total of 10,000 curies produced by
one TPBAR.
To keep the total amount of tritium released into the reactor coolant
below regulatory limits, TVA has limited the number of TPBARs being
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor, according to TVA officials.
NNSA's original plans called for irradiating 1,160 TPBARs per reactor
fueling cycle by 2010 before ramping up to nearly 2,700 TPBARs per
fueling cycle by 2013 using both the Watts Bar 1 reactor and TVA's
Sequoyah 1 reactor. However, as a result of the tritium permeation
problem, TVA currently irradiates only 240 TPBARs per fueling cycle
using only the Watts Bar 1 reactor. While the interagency agreement
between DOE and TVA allows NNSA to use the two Sequoyah reactors to
irradiate TPBARs, TVA officials told us that TVA is reluctant to allow
NNSA to use these reactors because, among other things, TVA would
prefer to meet tritium requirements using only a single reactor.
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has redesigned several
components within the TPBARs in an attempt to reduce the amount of
tritium permeating into the reactor coolant. For example, national
laboratory researchers have modified the nickel-plated "getter" in the
TPBAR to better capture tritium within the rod. However, despite this
redesign, no discernable improvement in TPBAR performance was made and
tritium is still permeating from the TPBARs at higher-than-expected
rates. NNSA, TVA, and national laboratory officials told us that the
obvious design changes to address the tritium permeation problem have
been made and that scientists and engineers charged with investigating
the issue and identifying solutions have not been able to identify the
root cause of the permeation problem. NNSA officials told us that it
is unknown whether any technical breakthrough will be made to
substantially correct the problem. However, scientists and engineers
at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are continuing to conduct
research to identify the root cause of the permeation problem and to
determine whether a technical solution can be found.
Because significantly fewer TPBARs are being irradiated than NNSA
originally called for, much less tritium is being produced than NNSA
planned. As a result, SRS's Tritium Extraction Facility, which began
operations in 2007 and cost nearly $500 million to build and
approximately $30 million per year to operate, sits essentially idle
for 9 months out of the year. During this time, equipment and systems
must be routinely maintained while NNSA prepares for the 3 months the
facility operates during the year. At congressional direction, NNSA
investigated shutting down the Tritium Extraction Facility completely
for an extended period until sufficient TPBARs had been irradiated to
justify continuous operations. However, NNSA determined that shutting
down the facility for an extended period would cost at least $60
million more over 10 years than continuing to maintain it for limited
operations. According to NNSA officials, these additional costs
consist of, among other things, costs to replace and/or recertify the
operational readiness of equipment that would degrade during the time
the facility was shut down.
NNSA and TVA Are Developing Plans to Increase Tritium Production but
Have Not Actively Coordinated These Plans With NRC:
Faced with significantly lower tritium production than originally
planned due to tritium permeation, NNSA and TVA have been developing
plans to increase the number of TPBARs being irradiated at Watts Bar 1
during each reactor fueling cycle as well as the number of reactors
irradiating TPBARs, according to NNSA and TVA officials. Planning
continues to be adjusted based upon changes to tritium requirements
that are still being determined. Although these plans have changed
several times over the past year and are still subject to significant
uncertainty, current plans call for the number of TPBARs being
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor to increase from 240 per cycle
to 544 per cycle for the next three fueling cycles beginning in 2011,
according to NNSA officials. In addition, NNSA and TVA are developing
plans to irradiate TPBARs, using TVA's Sequoyah 1 and Sequoyah 2
reactors--as provided for in the interagency agreement between DOE and
TVA--beginning in 2017 if this proves necessary to meet tritium
requirements. NNSA and TVA officials also told us that they discussed
the option of using the Watts Bar 2 reactor, which is currently under
construction. However, this reactor will not be operational until 2012
at the earliest and is not included in the interagency agreement
between DOE and TVA. Moreover, TVA likely would not attempt to
irradiate TPBARs in it until its second or third fueling cycle--18 to
36 months after the reactor begins operations. Therefore, according to
TVA officials, Watts Bar 2 is no longer being considered to irradiate
TPBARs.
NNSA and TVA are also discussing a number of modifications to the
Watts Bar reactor to ensure that any tritium released from the reactor
coolant into the environment stays below regulatory limits, according
to NNSA and TVA officials. Specifically:
* NNSA and TVA officials told us that they are considering the
construction of a large holding tank at the Watts Bar 1 reactor that
could be used to more effectively manage the presence of tritium in
the reactor coolant. A large holding tank will enable TVA to better
control the timing of releases of coolant containing tritium over time
to stay within NRC and EPA limits. NNSA's initial cost estimate for
the construction of a large holding tank is approximately $13 million
and may increase annual operations costs by as much as $500,000.
* NNSA and TVA officials also told us that they considered
constructing a tritium removal system at the reactors to remove excess
tritium from reactor coolant water before it is released into the
Tennessee River. NNSA's initial cost estimate for the construction of
a tritium removal system is approximately $50 to $60 million per
reactor and would add $9 to $10 million in annual operations costs.
According to NNSA officials, NNSA and TVA are continuing to monitor
the development of this technology.
According to NNSA and TVA officials, NNSA, with the cooperation of
TVA, is assessing the environmental impacts associated with
irradiating increased numbers of TPBARs with higher-than-expected
rates of tritium permeation. Such an increase would have to be
approved by NRC and incorporated into an amendment to the reactors'
operating licenses. TVA officials told us that reactor license
amendments cost up to $5 million. In addition, NNSA officials told us
that completing this environmental analysis could cost between $2
million and $5 million.
NNSA and TVA officials, however, have not been actively coordinating
their plans with NRC, which ultimately must approve these plans and
incorporate them into operating license amendments for the TVA
reactors. At the time we spoke with them, NRC officials were not aware
that fewer TPBARs than planned were being irradiated in the Watts Bar
1 reactor. Subsequently, in a February 2010 letter from TVA, the NRC
was officially informed of how many TPBARs were being irradiated in
the reactor. With regard to plans that were discussed to irradiate
TPBARs in the Watts Bar 2 reactor when it is completed, NRC officials
pointed out that technical issues that usually accompany any new
reactor startup may not be resolved in time for TPBARs to be
irradiated by the reactor's second fueling cycle. NRC officials were
also not informed of proposals being developed to install reactor
coolant holding tanks or tritium removal systems at the reactors and
of potential future license amendment applications to increase the
amount of tritium the reactors would be allowed to release into the
environment. NRC's approval of these modifications, such as the
construction of tritium removal systems at the TVA reactors, is
uncertain because, according to NRC officials, there is currently no
regulatory framework for the construction and operation of tritium
effluent management technologies in the United States.
NNSA Is Currently Meeting Tritium Requirements, but Uncertainty Exists
in Its Ability to Continue Doing So In the Future:
DOD is responsible for implementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent
strategy, which includes establishing the military requirements
associated with planning for the nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA and
DOD work together to produce the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
This memorandum outlines a proposed plan for the President to sign to
guide U.S. nuclear stockpile activities. This plan specifies the size
and composition of the stockpile and other information concerning
adjustments to the stockpile for a projected multi-year period. While
the exact requirements are classified, NNSA uses the detailed
information included in the memorandum on the number of weapons to be
included in the stockpile to determine the amount of tritium needed to
maintain these weapons. In addition, NNSA maintains a reserve of
additional tritium to meet requirements in the event of an extended
delay in tritium production. Small quantities of tritium are also
needed by the national laboratories and other entities for scientific
research and development purposes.
According to NNSA officials, NNSA is meeting current requirements
through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled
nuclear warheads and producing lower-than-planned amounts of tritium
through the irradiation of TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor. However,
tritium in the stockpile as well as in NNSA's tritium reserve
continues to decay, making increased production of tritium critical to
NNSA's ability to continue meeting requirements.
Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is
decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant
decrease to tritium requirements. Specifically, the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty signed in April 2010, if ratified by the Senate, will
reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 30
percent. However, it has not yet been determined whether some or all
of these warheads will be maintained in reserve--where the warheads
would continue to be loaded with tritium--or dismantled--where the
tritium could be removed from the weapons. Moreover, even if some or
all of the warheads reduced under the treaty were dismantled, tritium
requirements are unlikely to decrease by a significant amount. While
the specific reasons for this lack of decrease in tritium requirements
are classified, NNSA officials we spoke with said that the additional
tritium supply that would be available as a result of increased
warhead dismantlements is unlikely to fill what they estimate will be
a steady tritium demand in the future.
To date, NNSA has not had to use tritium in the reserve it maintains.
However, according to NNSA officials, use of some of the tritium
reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is
unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level of 240
TPBARs being irradiated in a single reactor. In addition, if NNSA
takes longer than expected to increase tritium production, even
reserve quantities may be insufficient to meet requirements for an
extended period of time. Information on the dates when NNSA will need
to begin using the tritium reserve and when the reserve will be
depleted is classified. Nevertheless, NNSA officials told us that they
were confident that NNSA will be able to meet tritium requirements in
the future without substantially reducing the nation's tritium reserve
and are not considering alternative ways of producing tritium for the
stockpile.
NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the
Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program
and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding:
Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of
tritium, our review found two problems with NNSA's management of the
Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA was unable to provide us with
evidence about its adherence to the appropriate contracting procedures
when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness
Program. Second, because of, among other things, the contract
structure NNSA has entered into with suppliers of components and
services for the Tritium Readiness Program, program funds are being
expended much more slowly than planned. As a result, the program is
accumulating large unexpended funding balances beyond thresholds
established by DOE.
NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the
Appropriate Contracting Procedures When Entering Its Long-Duration
TPBAR Procurement Contract:
NNSA relies largely on commercial suppliers to provide TPBARs, TPBAR
components, and other services to the program through fixed price
contracts. Although the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
originally designed the TPBARs and fabricated initial supplies, NNSA
believed that the commercial sector was better able to meet nuclear
industry quality requirements at lower cost. Therefore, in 2000, NNSA
entered into a contract with WesDyne International to manufacture
TPBARs. WesDyne International is a subsidiary of Westinghouse which is
owned by the Japanese company Toshiba. Because of the relatively few
companies capable of manufacturing TPBAR components, and to minimize
the possibility of one of these companies exiting the industry or
losing interest in working with the program, the contract was
structured as a 44-year fixed price contract with an approximately 4-
year initial phase and a 40-year second phase consisting of a 10-year
base period and three 10-year options.
According to NNSA officials, a 44-year fixed price contract with
lengthy options was intended to assure companies that there would be
sufficient work required far enough into the future to make a
contractor's initial investment in new facilities and capabilities
worthwhile. Because of the highly specialized manufacturing processes
involved in fabricating TPBARs, the relatively low production
quantities planned by the program, and the length of time required to
set up facilities for manufacturing classified components, NNSA
identified the loss of one or more component suppliers as a major
program risk. For example, several components can only be obtained
from a single supplier, and if any of these companies were to decide
it was no longer profitable to continue working with NNSA or were
acquired by foreign firms, it could take NNSA several years and
millions of dollars to find and develop a new supplier.
While these considerations led NNSA to use a 44-year contract to
procure TPBARs, NNSA did not provide us evidence that it adhered to
the appropriate contracting procedures typically involved when
entering into a contract of this length. Federal statutes as
implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation are the principal
set of rules that govern the process through which the federal
government acquires and purchases goods and services. NNSA officials
did not document the legal authority used in entering into a contract
of this length.[Footnote 6] In contrast, NNSA waived application of a
statutory provision prohibiting contract awards under certain
circumstances to foreign-controlled entities--by permitting a foreign-
owned company to produce TPBARs--and provided us with evidence of its
compliance with the waiver requirements.[Footnote 7]
In its comments on a draft of this report, NNSA stated that it
provided documentation of a solicitation review that was conducted as
well as its explanation of its legal authority to enter into contracts
with periods of performance in excess of 5 years. While we agree that
a review of the solicitation took place, the documentation NNSA
provided contained no evidence that the long period of performance of
this contract--a period of performance that NNSA agreed in its
comments was unusually long--was considered as part of this
solicitation review. NNSA asserts that it followed the appropriate
procedures when approving a contract of this length. However, the
procedures NNSA cited in its comments were not implemented until about
10 years after the contract with WesDyne was initially awarded.
Moreover, while NNSA claimed that it had the legal authority to enter
into a contract of this length, none of the documentation NNSA
provided to us before we sent our draft report to NNSA for its
comments stated the specific legal authority that was used to enter
into a contract of this length. In fact, it was not until NNSA's
comments on our draft report that it provided us with its explanation
of its legal authority to enter into contracts with periods of
performance in excess of 5 years.
NNSA is Spending Program Funds More Slowly Than Planned And Has
Accumulated Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding:
NNSA is spending program funds more slowly than planned and has
accumulated large amounts of unexpended funding. NNSA receives "no-
year" appropriations from Congress that have no limit on how long the
agency may take to obligate and expend those funds. However, to ensure
large amounts of unexpended funding do not accumulate that could be
better used for other purposes, DOE has established thresholds of
acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from
one fiscal year to the next. DOE also analyzes individual program
budgets to determine a percentage of program funds which each program
can reasonably be expected to carry over each year. For example, in
fiscal year 2009, DOE determined that NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program
could expect to carry over 16 percent--or approximately 2 months
worth--of funding, or $20.7 million. However, the program has
routinely exceeded DOE's threshold for unexpended funds. For example,
it exceeded the threshold by $23.4 million at the end of fiscal year
2006, $27.6 million at the end of fiscal year 2007, $48.4 million at
the end of fiscal year 2008, and $39.1 million at the end of fiscal
year 2009. Officials with the Tritium Readiness Program estimate that
the program will exceed DOE's threshold by approximately $50 million
by the end of fiscal year 2010. Table 1 outlines the Tritium Readiness
Program's unexpended funds.
Table 1: Tritium Readiness Program Unexpended Funds, Fiscal Years 2006-
2009:
Fiscal year: 2006;
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $38,324,160;
DOE threshold: $14,891,346;
Difference: $23,432,814.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $42,710,961;
DOE threshold: $15,127,566;
Difference: $27,583,396.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $67,963,852;
DOE threshold: $19,554,741;
Difference: $48,409,111.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $59,798,262;
DOE threshold: v20,680,935;
Difference: $39,117,327.
Source: GAO presentation of data from NNSA.
[End of table]
The contract structure NNSA has entered into with suppliers of
components and services contributes to these high unexpended funding
balances. An agency must generally obligate the full amount of a
contract at the time it enters into the contract. These obligated
funds are then expended over time as components and other services are
delivered to NNSA by the contractor. Although NNSA's TPBAR fabrication
contract is structured as a 44-year contract with 10-year options, the
program has been funding each option in 5-year increments. Under this
arrangement, the program obligates sufficient funds for 5 years at the
beginning of each increment, which NNSA officials told us should
result in high unexpended funding balances during the first year which
are gradually reduced over the following 5 years as the program pays
out the funds to its contractors. NNSA also uses a number of 3-4 year
subcontracts to procure TPBAR components, which also require funding
at the time NNSA enters into the contract and are often awarded in
different years than the main contract's 5-year periods. Consequently,
NNSA's contracting strategy periodically results in high levels of
unexpended funds as funds for different awards are obligated and
expended at different times.
However, the fact that fewer than expected numbers of TPBARs are being
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor is also contributing to NNSA's
accumulation of large unexpended funding balances. Irradiating fewer
than expected TPBARs impacts the program's costs by lowering the total
irradiation fees NNSA pays to TVA for each reactor cycle.
Specifically, NNSA pays TVA an irradiation fee of $4,950 per year per
TPBAR irradiated. Irradiating fewer than expected TPBARs has also
lowered expenses associated with operating the Tritium Extraction
Facility at SRS. In addition, funds under NNSA's contract for TPBAR
fabrication are being expended much more slowly than planned. In 2008
and 2009, the program planned to order 812 TPBARs from WesDyne, but
due to the permeation problem at Watts Bar, the program eventually
reduced that number to 240. Furthermore, NNSA's contract with WesDyne
originally planned for fabricating more than 2,500 TPBARs between 2004
and 2009, but NNSA had ordered fewer than half that many by the end of
fiscal year 2009. Because fewer TPBARs are being ordered than
originally planned for, the price to fabricate each TPBAR has
increased over time from about $700 per TPBAR in 2000 to approximately
$1,300 per TPBAR today. NNSA and WesDyne officials told us that the
price per TPBAR is likely to increase further when the next contract
increment is finalized later this year.
While large unexpended funding balances do not necessarily indicate
that the tritium program is being mismanaged, the fact that they have
been increasing indicates that NNSA is requesting more funding than it
needs on an annual basis--funds that could be appropriated for other
purposes. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, NNSA's unexpended
balances in the Tritium Readiness Program exceeding DOE's threshold
more than doubled from $23.4 million to $48.4 million, and as a
result, Congress reduced the program's funding by $10.4 million for
fiscal year 2009. Although the program's unexpended funds were lower
at the end of fiscal year 2009, this was largely due to $8.7 million
which was deobligated at the end of the year because of an ongoing
subcontract proposal audit. These funds were returned to the program
in fiscal year 2010, and had they not been deobligated, the program's
unexpended balances would have remained approximately the same from
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009, even with the congressional
reduction in funding. Finally, by the end of the second quarter of
fiscal year 2010, NNSA had spent less than half the funds it had
originally planned to spend by that time, and NNSA officials stated
that the program will likely end fiscal year 2010 with even higher
levels of unexpended funds. Thus, while NNSA's contracting approach
does contribute to its high unexpended funds, the fact that these
unexpended funds are increasing each year indicates that the program
is receiving more funding than it is able to execute due to the
reduced scope of work caused by the tritium permeation problem.
Conclusions:
NNSA's inability to overcome the technical challenges and meet its
original tritium production goals has raised serious questions about
the agency's ability to provide a reliable source of tritium to
maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in the future. While
NNSA has taken steps to attempt to solve the tritium permeation
problem, it is unlikely that anything less than a complete redesign of
the TPBARs will solve the problem. Unfortunately, existing supplies of
tritium in the stockpile and the tritium reserve are unlikely to
fulfill requirements for the time a complete redesign would take. It
is also not clear that a redesign would solve the problem since NNSA
does not fully understand the reasons behind tritium permeation.
Therefore, NNSA and TVA are working together to not only increase the
number of TPBARs being irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor but also
to increase the number of reactors being used for the program.
Increasing the number of TPBARs irradiated will also require
substantial and costly modifications to TVA facilities to ensure that
tritium emissions comply with applicable nuclear safety and
environmental regulations. Because such modifications to the operation
of TVA's reactors must be approved by NRC, it is important that NNSA
and TVA coordinate their efforts closely with the regulatory agency.
In addition, it is critical that DOD--the ultimate customer of NNSA's
tritium production program--is also kept informed of the challenges
facing the program and the impact of these challenges on current and
future availability of tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile.
NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program has taken a number of steps to ensure
the long-term availability of critical components needed for tritium
production. We are concerned, however, that NNSA was unable to provide
evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures
when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness
Program. In addition, the contract structure NNSA has put in place for
the program in conjunction with lower than expected rates of tritium
production has led the program to accumulate large amounts of
unexpended funding. These large balances make it difficult for NNSA
management and Congress to accurately determine the amount of funding
the program actually requires, what the program is accomplishing with
the appropriated funding, and how much could potentially be
appropriated for other priorities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To increase confidence in the nation's continued ability to produce a
reliable supply of tritium in the future and to improve the management
of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program, we recommend that the Secretary
of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following four
actions:
* In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to
manage releases of tritium from TVA's Watts Bar 1 and any other
reactors chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future.
* Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives to the current
tritium production strategy in the event that NNSA continues to be
unable to meet its tritium production goals. This alternatives
analysis should be coordinated closely with DOD and take into account
current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium.
* Complete an acquisition strategy that reflects the outcome of the
analysis of alternatives and aligns the contracting structure to that
plan and, if necessary, ensures adherence to the appropriate
contracting procedures for long-duration contracts.
* Ensure NNSA's future budget requests account for the large
unexpended balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better
reflect the amount of funding the program is able to spend annually.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided NNSA, TVA, and NRC with a draft of this report for their
review and comment.
In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with the facts in the report
and the recommendations. However, NNSA noted that, in its view, it has
a high probability of meeting its tritium mission requirements without
risk of using reserve inventories. In response to the draft report's
discussion of the Tritium Readiness Program's TPBAR manufacturing
contract with WesDyne, NNSA commented that the program's unique
contracting structure enables the program to leverage and maintain a
commercial supply chain over a period of more than 40 years while
providing some assurances of cost controls for the life of the
contracts. Finally, NNSA noted that it provides responsible financial
stewardship of government resources by adjusting future budget
requests for changes in the Tritium Readiness Program planning
requirements and risks.
With regard to meeting tritium requirements, NNSA commented that
irradiating 544 TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor per reactor fueling
cycle until fiscal year 2016 will provide proof of NNSA's ability to
meet near term requirements without using reserves. Our draft report
discussed NNSA's plans to increase the number of TPBARs being
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor from 240 per fueling cycle to
544 per fueling cycle. However, it is important to note that NNSA's
plans have changed several times and are still subject to considerable
uncertainty. In particular, NNSA's original plans called for
irradiating 1,160 TPBARs per fueling cycle by 2010 before ramping up
to nearly 2,700 TPBARs per fueling cycle using both the Watts Bar 1
reactor and the Sequoyah 1 reactor. While we are encouraged that NNSA
and TVA are working together to increase the number of TPBARs being
irradiated, continued uncertainty about NNSA's and TVA's ability to
irradiate additional TPBARs in a single reactor while not exceeding
limits on the amount of tritium released into the environment raises
doubts about the program's ability to provide a reliable supply and
predictable quantities of tritium over time.
Regarding its TPBAR manufacturing contract with WesDyne, NNSA stated
that it provided documentation of a solicitation review that was
conducted as well as its explanation of its legal authority to enter
into contracts with periods of performance in excess of 5 years. We
modified our draft report to clarify that, although we agree that a
review of the solicitation took place, the documentation of the review
that NNSA provided to us contained no evidence that the long period of
performance in this contract--a period of performance that NNSA agreed
in its comments was unusually long--was considered as part of this
solicitation review. Although NNSA asserts that it followed the
appropriate procedures when approving a contract of this length, the
procedures NNSA cited in its comments were not implemented until about
10 years after the contract with WesDyne was initially awarded.
Finally, with regard to NNSA's management of the Tritium Readiness
Program's finances, NNSA commented that it monitors its unexpended
funding and meets quarterly with DOE to discuss and justify its
unexpended balances. NNSA also stated that adjustments to its budget
requests and refinements to its acquisition strategy will continue as
part of its efforts to accommodate changes to the nuclear weapons
stockpile. We are encouraged by NNSA's pledge to adjust its budget
requests in response to changes in program needs and by other actions
NNSA is taking to reduce its unexpended funding balances. However, as
our draft report notes, unexpended funding balances in excess of DOE's
threshold for unexpended funds increased every year since fiscal year
2006 with the exception of fiscal year 2009 and NNSA estimates the
program will exceed DOE's threshold by approximately $50 million by
the end of fiscal year 2010. In our view, these increases in
unexpended funding call into question the effectiveness of NNSA's
monitoring of the program's financial management.
NNSA also provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate. NNSA's comments are presented in appendix I.
TVA commented that it shared our perspectives regarding the importance
of NNSA's ability to assure that the nuclear weapons stockpile
requirements for tritium will be met in the future. TVA noted that it
has been and continues to be dedicated to working with NNSA in
evaluating and deciding among alternative approaches to help better
assure that future tritium production will be a the necessary levels.
TVA also provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate. TVA's comments are presented in appendix II.
In its comments, NRC agreed with our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. NRC also provided technical comments that we
incorporated as appropriate. NRC's comments are presented in appendix
III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, Secretary of Energy, Administrator of NNSA, Chairman of
NRC, President and Chief Executive Officer of TVA, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration appreciates the
opportunity to review and provide comments on the Governmental
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, Nuclear Weapons: National
Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued Availability
of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile, GA0-10-817. I understand that
this review was performed at the request of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, United States House of
Representatives. GAO was asked to: (1) determine the extent to which
NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium;
(2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and
future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium; and (3)
assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program.
NNSA generally agrees with the facts in the report and the
recommendations. NNSA would like to clarify some of the context in
which these facts are used and, therefore, the conclusions contained
in this report. The recommendations are in line with actions already
being taken by the Tritium Readiness Program to ensure that it has the
technology and infrastructure to meet the stockpile requirements as
they are being understood to support the post-Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) stockpile. NNSA understands GAO's concerns; however, current
direction and actions, being taken by the program, should soon
alleviate these concerns and provide clear indications of mission
success.
To address three key points from the draft report, NNSA provides the
following comments:
1. NNSA has a high probability of meeting its tritium mission
requirements, without risk of using reserve inventories.
NNSA's ability to meet the tritium requirements of the future hinges
primarily on the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) notification to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inserting 544 Tritium
Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) into the next Watts Bar
reactor cycle. Currently, TVA is designing its reactor core for 544
TPBARs and plans to provide the required NRC notification soon.
Once 544 TPBARs are being irradiated at Watts Bar, NNSA will have
proof positive of its ability to meet near term requirements. Future
production plans call for irradiation of 544 TPBARs at Watts Bar until
FY 2016. Continuing at this level is neither a programmatic nor
technical challenge. However, without appropriate funding this level
of irradiation and necessary increases in the future cannot be
sustained.
Looking to the future, NNSA has three reactors available under the
Interagency Agreement with the TVA. With this available
infrastructure, the production capacity is sufficient to provide about
1,500 TPBARs per cycle. This production rate will meet the planned
steady-state requirement needed in FY 2017.
Both TVA and NNSA would experience programmatic and operational
benefits from keeping tritium production in one reactor, and will be
working to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, NNSA does have this backup
plan that can meet mission requirements with existing technologies and
assets. NNSA has sufficient inventory to support stockpile
requirements for several more years without using reserves. Thus,
irradiating 544 TPBARs in the next cycle will demonstrate the
capability to support the mission and provide an assured supply in the
future.
The rate of permeation of tritium into the reactor coolant water,
which is higher than expected, is a constraint, but it does not
imperil accomplishment of the mission. Consistent data on tritium
releases accumulated from tritium production since late 2003 provides
a high degree of confidence that tritium production plans can be
executed with currently available technologies and infrastructure,
while maintaining margins to protect public safety and the environment.
2. The Tritium Program's unique contracting structure enables the
program to leverage and maintain a commercial supply chain - where low
rates of production quantities are involved - over a period of more
than 40 years while providing some assurances of cost controls for the
life of the contracts.
TPBARs are similar to a nuclear industry item, i.e. equivalent to
burnable poisons used in reactors. On the other hand, TPBARs have some
very unique specifications as well as being a classified item. During
the original contractor solicitation, it was recognized that few
vendors would bid on the contracts because of required initial
investments and potential for low production rates. As the
solicitation progressed, it was clear that the Department would be
limited in the number of bidders willing to make these required
investments given the low rates of production compared to similar
commercial items. At the same time, the program was expected to
continue for 40 years, presenting challenges to contain cost growth
over the life of the program. As acknowledged in the GAO report, these
considerations formed the basis for the contractor solicitation and
are still relevant conditions today.
At program inception, the fabrication contract for TPBARs was awarded
as a 44 year contract, structured into ten-year option periods after
the startup period. This is an unusually long option period, and GAO
found what they considered to be insufficient documentation of the
review and approval process conducted in the late 1990's. NNSA would
politely disagree with this conclusion, having provided documentation
of the solicitation review conducted by the then-acting Department of
Energy (DOE) Senior Procurement Executive who is the individual
authorized to make such determinations. In addition, the Source
Selection Plan for the Selection of a Contractor for Tritium Producing
Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) Fabrication, RFP No. DE-RP02-99DP0029,
indicates DOE Headquarters reviewed the solicitation on May 13, 1999.
The Source Selection Plan also indicated the period of performance was
a maximum of 44 years in duration. Therefore, the conditions of FAR
7.105 and FAR 17.204e requiring programs to justify any required
deviations from the FAR in an acquisition plan prepared prior to
contract award have been met. Current DOE procedures for approving
periods of performance in excess of 5 years are described in DOE
Acquisition Letter AL 2010-05.
Because of the attention surrounding the uncosted balances, the
program is looking into the feasibility of partially exercising the
remaining options in one- or two-year increments after the current
option periods expire. If such contracting actions will
retain continuity in meeting program requirements, protect the
viability of the commercial supply base, and provide some assurance of
cost control over the life of the contract, the actions will be
implemented after the current option period expires. All actions will
continue to be made in accordance with the FAR, DEAR, and acquisition
guidance.
3. NNSA provides responsible financial stewardship of government
resources by adjusting future budget requests for changes in planning
requirements and program risks.
As noted by the GAO report, the fixed price contract with lengthy
options was intended to assure companies of sufficient work into the
future to make investments in new facilities and processes worthwhile.
That long-term contract contributes to the higher than average
uncosted as those funds will be costed out over a longer period than
normal. In appreciation of that fact, NNSA monitors the uncosted and
meets quarterly with the Department to discuss and justify Tritium's
uncosted balances. Transferring all the related TPBAR and component
contracts from the design agent, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL), to the commercial TPBAR fabrication contractor, WesDyne
International, over the last several years, has resulted in these
larger than usual unexpended funds on a number of multi-year contracts.
In addition, earlier plans to irradiate up to 800 TPBARs in cycle 10
at Watts Bar were changed to irradiate only 240 TPBARs currently in
the reactor. Accordingly, the FY 2011 budget request was reduced from
an earlier estimate of $69M to $50.2M. Adjustments to the budget
requests and refinements to the acquisition strategy will
continue in our efforts to accommodate the post-NPR stockpile and to
minimize unexpended funds while at the same time minimizing risks to
the highly specialized supply chain for TPBARs and components.
Our responses to the recommendations are:
1. In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to
manage releases of tritium from TVA's Watts Bar 1 and any other
reactors chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future.
NNSA Response: NNSA has two initiatives underway that will address
this recommendation. First, NNSA in conjunction with TVA, is beginning
an update of the Environmental Impact Statement for tritium production
in TVA reactors. This will document in very specific and quantitative
terms the expected environmental releases and how they relate to
allowable limits to maintain the safety of the public and workers at
the plants. In addition, PNNL and TVA have collaborated on the
development of a quantitative model of the flow of reactor cooling
water and associated dilution, holdup, and release management process
to enable assessment of impact of tritium permeation on a range of
variables including numbers of TPBARs, measured permeation, and flow
in the river that may vary throughout the year.
With regards to the NRC, NNSA defers to TVA to submit appropriate
documentation to NRC for licensing and regulation of its reactors.
2. Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives to the current
tritium production strategy in the event that NNSA continues to be
unable to meet its tritium production goals. This alternatives
analysis should be coordinated closely with the Department of Defense
(DOD) and take into account current and future nuclear weapons
stockpile requirements for tritium.
NNSA Response: NNSA has been coordinating with DOD on determining Post-
NPR Stockpile requirements and continues to provide annual updates to
DOD on the tritium production status. NNSA interprets this
recommendation to address contingency plans should the program not be
successful in gaining approval for 544 TPBARs in cycle 11 at Watts
Bar. The fuel assemblies containing the 544 TPBARs required for cycle
11 operations are scheduled for delivery to the Watts Bar site in
January 2011. Cycle 11 begins in the spring of 2011, so the best
response will be to confirm that cycle 11 is irradiating 544 rods. At
this time, TVA is designing its reactor core for 544 TPBARs and has
approved the technical basis for notifying the NRC for this quantity.
In the unlikely event that cycle 11 does not load 544 rods, NNSA will
embark on development of contingency plans to ensure that mission
requirements are met without using reserves. By spring of 2011, the
program will conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to ensure that
all potential program risks have been identified and that any risk
mitigation steps have been incorporated into the program plans.
3. Complete an acquisition strategy that reflects the outcome of the
analysis of alternatives and aligns the contracting structure to that
plan and, if necessary, ensures adherence to the appropriate
contracting procedures for long-duration contracts.
NNSA Response: NNSA is currently reviewing the acquisition strategy
and approach for sourcing TPBARs and components to meet the post-NPR
stockpile requirements. This review will balance minimizing uncosted
balances together with minimizing risks to the TPBAR supply chain, as
determined from the risk assessment. The contracts will then be
revised, as appropriate, to implement the outcome of this review. All
contracting modifications will continue to comply with appropriate
contracting procedures.
4. Ensure NNSA's future budget requests account for the large
unexpended balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better
reflect the amount of funding the program is able to spend annually.
NNSA Response: NNSA has recently reduced budget requests to account
for the utilization of unexpended funds and will continue to do so in
the future. However, it should be noted that production plans show
increased numbers of TPBARs scheduled for fabrication and irradiation
in the future to meet inventory requirements. As such, overall budget
requirements for tritium production should be expected to increase
over the next several years until the steady-state production rate is
reached.
Enclosed are more detailed comments on specific topics from the draft
report. We believe the NNSA responses to these topics will help the
reader appreciate that the challenges we have are being well managed,
that the mission requirements will be met, and that the program is
working hard to manage its contracts well and to steward financial
resources responsibly.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls, at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
Enclosures:
cc: Donald L. Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Tennessee Valley Authority:
NA
Tennessee Valley Authority:
1101 Market Street:
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801:
July 23, 2010:
Mr. Ryan T. Coles:
Assistant Director:
U.S. & International Nuclear Security and Cleanup:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Natural Resources & Environment:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Reference: GAO Draft Report: GAO-10-817 Tritium Production:
Dear Mr. Coles:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide the comments of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) on the subject draft of GAO's report entitled
"National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued
Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile."
Because all four of the draft report's recommendations are directed to
the Secretary of Energy, and none are directed to TVA itself, the
enclosed comments which we offer are made in the spirit of helping
assure that the final version provides the audience for this report
with clear and complete descriptions of:
* the performance-related issues regarding the irradiation of tritium-
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) at TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1
that GAO has reviewed in this performance audit; and;
* the appropriate relationship between considerations by the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and TVA of possible options for
increasing tritium production to expected levels and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulatory responsibilities in
connection with Watts Bar Unit 1.
TVA shares GAO's perspectives regarding the importance of NNSA's
ability to assure that our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile
requirements for tritium will be met in the future. TVA has been, and
continues to be, dedicated to working with NNSA in evaluating and
ultimately becoming able to decide among alternative approaches to
help better assure that future tritium production will be at the
necessary levels.
With regard to our specific comments set forth in the Enclosure, TVA
respectfully requests that GAO modify its draft report to accommodate
those comments in order to help assure that the final report will
provide as clear and complete descriptions as are possible when
discussing this matter of critical importance. Further, it is our
understanding that this letter and our enclosed comments will be set
forth in the final report. If there are any questions, please contact
Wayne R. Gildroy, Assistant General Counsel, at 865/632-7361.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ashok S. Bhatnagar:
Senior Vice President:
Nuclear Generation Development & Construction:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
July 23, 2010:
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit
comments on the July 2010 draft of the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report, "National Nuclear Security Administration Needs
to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile"
(GA0-10-817).
In general, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) agrees with
GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, the NRC has
certain comments in the enclosure.
Should you have any questions about these comments, please contact Mr.
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at (301) 415-1785 or Jesse.Arildsen@nrc.gov.
The NRC appreciates the opportunity to comment on GA0-10-817.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R.W. Borchardt:
Executive Director for Operations:
Enclosure:
NRC Comments Regarding GAO Draft Report GAO-10-817:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant
Director; Allison Bawden; Will Horton; Jonathan Kucskar; Alison
O'Neill; Tim Persons; Peter Ruedel; Ron Schwenn; and Rebecca Shea made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Nuclear fusion--the reaction that powers the sun--occurs when
extreme temperatures and pressures force the nuclei of two or more
atoms together.
[2] Smaller amounts of tritium were also produced using nuclear
reactors at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington.
[3] GAO, Nuclear Materials: Nuclear Arsenal Reductions Allow
Consideration of Tritium Production Options, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-189] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
17, 1993).
[4] For additional information on accelerator-based tritium
production, see GAO, Nuclear Science: Consideration of Accelerator
Production of Tritium Requires R&D, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-154] (Washington, D.C.: June
15, 1992).
[5] A curie is a measure of radioactivity equivalent to 37 billion
nuclear disintegrations per second.
[6] See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation 17.104(a) (limiting
multi-year contracts to 5 years, unless otherwise authorized by
statute).
[7] 10 U.S.C. § 2536(b)(1)(A); 48 C.F.R. § 904.7102(a).
[End of section]
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