Nuclear Weapons
Actions Needed to Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National Ignition Facility Gao ID: GAO-10-488 April 8, 2010In March 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, completed construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF). NNSA considers NIF critical to its stockpile stewardship program to ensure the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons, absent live nuclear testing. NIF is intended to simulate the extreme temperatures and pressures of "ignition"--an atomic fusion event propagating a nuclear explosion--for the first time in a laboratory. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which NNSA has addressed key scientific and technical challenges that could prevent ignition at NIF; (2) whether NNSA has an effective approach for managing the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities; and (3) potential impacts to NNSA's stockpile stewardship program if ignition at NIF is not achieved, as planned, between fiscal years 2010 and 2012. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant budgets, reports, and plans, and interviewed NNSA and national laboratory officials and independent experts.
Despite substantial progress, NNSA, its national laboratories, and the other organizations carrying out the NIF ignition effort face difficult scientific and technical challenges, which could limit the extreme temperatures and pressures that can be achieved using NIF's 192 lasers and, thus, delay or prevent ignition at NIF. As a result, successful ignition at NIF during the first attempt, scheduled for late 2010, remains unlikely, according to independent experts. In addition, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which operates NIF for NNSA, waited 4 years to implement a recommendation to form a standing external review committee of experts to advise on the challenges. Although a committee met for the first time in December 2009, three factors could limit its effectiveness. First, the committee may not be able to give fully objective, candid advice, because the committee will take direction from, and report to, Livermore's Director, rather than to NNSA. Second, the committee will mainly review ignition activities after the fact, rather than advising on them sooner. Third, although its membership includes at least one scientist with significant nuclear weapons design experience, the committee may lack sufficient expertise to determine whether ignition-related efforts will meet the future needs of scientists conducting stockpile stewardship research at NIF. Weak management by NNSA has allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities to increase substantially, and further increases are possible. In 2005, NNSA established the National Ignition Campaign (NIC) to focus the management of ignition activities. Since then, however, NIC's costs have increased by around 25 percent--from $1.6 billion to over $2 billion--and the planned completion date has slipped by 1 year to the end of fiscal year 2012. Also, major new scope activities and milestones were added to NIC in 2008 to prepare NIF for stockpile stewardship experiments by the 2012 date. In addition, NNSA allowed tasks critical for the first ignition attempt--such as constructing concrete doors to protect personnel from radiation--to be removed from the NIF construction effort, which began in 1997, and deferred years later to NIC. Delays in completing the long-deferred tasks under NIC could delay, beyond 2012, ignition or other goals. There would be no immediate impact to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program if ignition at NIF is not achieved by the end of fiscal year 2012, according to NNSA and national laboratory officials. The consequences of not achieving ignition, however, would become more serious over time, possibly reducing NNSA's confidence in the data it uses to certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. In September 2009, during the first stockpile stewardship experiments at NIF, Livermore scientists began using NIF to validate NNSA's data and models on weapon performance under nonignition conditions. However, Livermore and NNSA officials said that only ignition experiments can help address some significant areas of uncertainty in predicting weapon performance, particularly as weapons in the stockpile age or are refurbished.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eugene E. Aloise Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-6870GAO-10-488, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National Ignition Facility
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Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee
on Appropriations, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Nuclear Weapons:
Actions Needed to Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and
Management Weaknesses at the National Ignition Facility:
GAO-10-488:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-488, a report to the Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In March 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, completed
construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF). NNSA considers
NIF critical to its stockpile stewardship program to ensure the safety
and reliability of the nation‘s nuclear weapons, absent live nuclear
testing. NIF is intended to simulate the extreme temperatures and
pressures of ’ignition“-”an atomic fusion event propagating a nuclear
explosion”-for the first time in a laboratory. GAO was asked to
examine (1) the extent to which NNSA has addressed key scientific and
technical challenges that could prevent ignition at NIF; (2) whether
NNSA has an effective approach for managing the cost, schedule, and
scope of ignition-related activities; and (3) potential impacts to NNSA‘
s stockpile stewardship program if ignition at NIF is not achieved, as
planned, between fiscal years 2010 and 2012. To conduct this work, GAO
analyzed relevant budgets, reports, and plans, and interviewed NNSA
and national laboratory officials and independent experts.
What GAO Found:
Despite substantial progress, NNSA, its national laboratories, and the
other organizations carrying out the NIF ignition effort face
difficult scientific and technical challenges, which could limit the
extreme temperatures and pressures that can be achieved using NIF‘s
192 lasers and, thus, delay or prevent ignition at NIF. As a result,
successful ignition at NIF during the first attempt, scheduled for
late 2010, remains unlikely, according to independent experts. In
addition, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which operates NIF
for NNSA, waited 4 years to implement a recommendation to form a
standing external review committee of experts to advise on the
challenges. Although a committee met for the first time in December
2009, three factors could limit its effectiveness. First, the
committee may not be able to give fully objective, candid advice,
because the committee will take direction from, and report to, Livermore
‘s Director, rather than to NNSA. Second, the committee will mainly
review ignition activities after the fact, rather than advising on
them sooner. Third, although its membership includes at least one
scientist with significant nuclear weapons design experience, the
committee may lack sufficient expertise to determine whether ignition-
related efforts will meet the future needs of scientists conducting
stockpile stewardship research at NIF.
Weak management by NNSA has allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of
ignition-related activities to increase substantially, and further
increases are possible. In 2005, NNSA established the National
Ignition Campaign (NIC) to focus the management of ignition
activities. Since then, however, NIC‘s costs have increased by around
25 percent”from $1.6 billion to over $2 billion”and the planned
completion date has slipped by 1 year to the end of fiscal year 2012.
Also, major new scope activities and milestones were added to NIC in
2008 to prepare NIF for stockpile stewardship experiments by the 2012
date. In addition, NNSA allowed tasks critical for the first ignition
attempt”-such as constructing concrete doors to protect personnel from
radiation”-to be removed from the NIF construction effort, which began
in 1997, and deferred years later to NIC. Delays in completing the
long-deferred tasks under NIC could delay, beyond 2012, ignition or
other goals.
There would be no immediate impact to NNSA‘s Stockpile Stewardship
Program if ignition at NIF is not achieved by the end of fiscal year
2012, according to NNSA and national laboratory officials. The
consequences of not achieving ignition, however, would become more
serious over time, possibly reducing NNSA‘s confidence in the data it
uses to certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile. In September 2009, during the first stockpile stewardship
experiments at NIF, Livermore scientists began using NIF to validate
NNSA‘s data and models on weapon performance under nonignition
conditions. However, Livermore and NNSA officials said that only
ignition experiments can help address some significant areas of
uncertainty in predicting weapon performance, particularly as weapons
in the stockpile age or are refurbished.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NNSA take actions to improve its effectiveness in
(1) using outside experts to advise on scientific and technical
challenges”-by ensuring, for example, that the new committee reports
to NNSA and advises on ignition activities early”-and (2) managing NIC‘
s cost, schedule, and scope. NNSA agreed with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-488] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov or Tim Persons at 202-512-6412 or
personst@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NNSA Has Made Progress Toward Achieving Ignition at NIF, but Key
Scientific and Technical Challenges Remain:
Management Weakness Has Extended the Schedule and Increased the Cost
of Achieving Ignition and Could Delay the Fiscal Year 2012 Ignition
Goal:
Failure to Achieve Ignition in Fiscal Year 2012 Would Not Immediately
Impact NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, but Further Delays Could
Limit NNSA's Options for Maintaining the Stockpile:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: National Ignition Campaign (NIC) Budget, by Major Scope
Activity, for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2012:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The National Ignition Facility:
Figure 2: NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition:
Figure 3: How Laser-Plasma Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF:
Figure 4: How Hydrodynamic Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF:
Abbreviations:
EP: Extended Performance:
MJ: megajoule:
NIC: National Ignition Campaign:
NIF: National Ignition Facility:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 8, 2010:
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert F. Bennett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
In March 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, completed
construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a $3.5 billion
research facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California.[Footnote 1] In this stadium-sized laser facility, NNSA's
goal is to produce extremely intense pressures and temperatures that
may, for the first time in a laboratory setting, simulate on a small
scale the thermonuclear conditions created in nuclear explosions,
known as "ignition." If successful, NIF may improve scientists'
ability to evaluate the behavior of nuclear weapons without explosive
testing.
NNSA considers NIF a critical component of its multibillion-dollar
stockpile stewardship program, which is responsible for ensuring the
safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in
the absence of underground nuclear testing.[Footnote 2] Stockpile
stewardship involves refurbishing or dismantling aging weapons,
conducting advanced nuclear weapons research, and maintaining the
nation's nuclear production capabilities. In addition to NIF, NNSA has
other experimental research facilities to support stockpile
stewardship in all three of its national nuclear weapons laboratories:
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and
Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. Although
stockpile stewardship will be its primary mission, NNSA also plans to
make NIF available to outside researchers for investigating basic and
applied science issues, such as the physical properties of stars and
planets and fusion energy production.
Lawrence Livermore was responsible for carrying out the design and
construction of NIF, with NNSA oversight, in a capital construction
project that began in March 1997.[Footnote 3] At the same time,
Lawrence Livermore and other institutions were conducting research and
other activities--separate from the NIF construction project--to
prepare for the first attempt at ignition that would take place
sometime after NIF construction was completed. In 2004, Congress
directed NNSA to develop a project management approach for controlling
the cost, schedule, and scope of these separate activities.[Footnote
4] In response, in 2005, NNSA established the National Ignition
Campaign (NIC) to provide project management focus on the activities.
The NIC participants, which include NNSA's national nuclear weapons
laboratories and other research and industrial organizations, are
responsible for planning and carrying out scientific experiments and
related activities designed to set the stage for, and demonstrate,
ignition at NIF, and for the completion of construction projects
needed for the safe operation of NIF. In 2004, Congress also directed
NNSA to enlist a group of outside experts, known as the JASON study
group, to evaluate the NIC's initial plans and prospects for achieving
ignition by the end of fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 5] In its 2005
report, the JASON study group found that achieving ignition within
this time frame would be unlikely and made a series of recommendations
for addressing the many scientific and technical challenges that could
delay or prevent ignition at NIF.[Footnote 6]
As they focus on achieving ignition and preparing for NIF's role in
supporting the stockpile stewardship program, NNSA and the NIC
participants face scientific and technical challenges that have the
potential to keep them from meeting their goals within the expected
cost and time frame. In this context, you asked us to examine NNSA's
progress toward its ignition-related goals for NIF. Specifically, we
reviewed (1) the extent to which NNSA has addressed key scientific and
technical challenges for achieving ignition at NIF; (2) the extent to
which NNSA has an effective approach for managing the cost, schedule,
and scope for achieving ignition at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and
2012; and (3) the potential impact to NNSA's stockpile stewardship
program if ignition is not achieved at NIF within that time frame.
To conduct our work, we reviewed NIC project documents, relevant
studies, and reports, and with assistance from GAO's Chief Scientist,
analyzed scientific presentations and peer-reviewed articles by NIC or
other scientists, as well as independent review reports by the JASON
study group. We met with officials from the main organizations
participating in the NIC, including Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,
and Sandia National Laboratories; the University of Rochester's
Laboratory for Laser Energetics in New York; and General Atomics in
California. We toured NIF; facilities at the University of Rochester,
Los Alamos, and Sandia for ignition-related stockpile stewardship
research; and the target manufacturing facility at General Atomics.
With assistance from GAO's Chief Scientist, we interviewed NIC
participants to identify the key scientific and technical challenges
for achieving ignition at NIF and their efforts to address those
challenges. We also spoke with independent experts about the
challenges of achieving ignition at NIF, including five members of the
JASON study group, former NNSA laboratory scientists with expertise in
fields related to ignition, and scientists from the Naval Research
Laboratory's Laser Fusion Program. To assess the extent to which NNSA
has an effective approach for managing NIC's cost, schedule, and
scope, we examined NIC project execution plans, budget requests,
progress reports, and other management documents. We also met with
NNSA officials from the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and
National Ignition Facility Project, responsible for formulating policy
and budget guidance related to NIC and monitoring the NIC
participants' efforts to adhere to NIC's cost, schedule, and scope
requirements. To evaluate the potential impact of not achieving
ignition at NIF by the end of fiscal year 2012 to NNSA's stockpile
stewardship program, we analyzed briefings and studies of NIF's role
in addressing aging and weapons performance issues and met with the
lead weapons scientists at NNSA's three defense laboratories, who plan
or carry out research in support of the stockpile stewardship program.
We also discussed, with the independent experts, NIF's expected
contributions to stockpile stewardship.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 to April 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Nuclear fusion--the reaction that powers the sun--occurs when extreme
temperatures and pressures force the nuclei of two or more atoms
together. Scientists have previously achieved fusion during
underground nuclear tests and in laboratory fusion experiments.
Ignition--a fusion reaction resulting in a net gain of energy--has,
however, only been recreated during nuclear tests. Scientists at NIF
hope to use another man-made approach, laser-induced inertial
confinement fusion, to recreate the intense temperatures and pressures
under laboratory conditions necessary to fuse the nuclei of deuterium
and tritium atoms (forms of hydrogen) and release helium atoms,
neutrons, and a large quantity of energy. If ignition at NIF works as
planned, the released energy would, in turn, fuse nearby atoms in a
self-sustaining process known as thermonuclear burn.
To achieve ignition, NIF will focus energy from its 192 laser beams
simultaneously to deliver as much as 1.8 million joules (more commonly
referred to by its acronym, MJ, which stands for "megajoules") of
laser energy onto a target smaller than a dime. In a process that
takes about one millionth of a second, the laser beams pass through a
series of glass optics that amplify the energy and focus it onto a
target located inside of a large spherical target chamber 10 meters,
or over 3 stories, in height (see figure 1).
Figure 1: The National Ignition Facility:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The illustration depicts the National Ignition Facility, with the
following sections specifically identified:
Optics assembly building:
Control room:
Laser beams with optics and amplifiers:
Final optics system:
Target chamber:
Target chamber wall:
Target positioner:
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
[End of figure]
The target at the center of this chamber is a hollow gold cylinder,
known as a hohlraum, which contains a tiny, peppercorn-sized fuel
capsule consisting of a frozen deuterium-tritium layer surrounding
cooled deuterium-tritium gas. As shown in figure 2, NIF's lasers
rapidly heat the interior wall of this hohlraum, which converts the
lasers' energy into X-rays. These X-rays then rapidly heat the outside
surface of the fuel capsule. After sufficient heating, the capsule's
outside surface blows off with rocket-like force, driving the
remaining capsule wall and deuterium-tritium fuel layer within to
implode. If this implosion occurs symmetrically, and at a sufficient
velocity, it is expected that the deuterium and tritium atoms will be
forced together in a fusion reaction, lasting about 10 trillionths of
a second, and the fuel in the capsule will be ignited to temperatures
greater than approximately 100 million degrees Celsius--hotter than
the center of the sun. As the reaction is occurring, diagnostic
instruments placed inside and around the target chamber are to take
measurements and provide data on the reaction.
Figure 2: NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The illustration depicts NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition, with
the following specifically identified:
Fuel capsule (10 mm wide):
Hohlraum wall:
X-rays;
Laser beams.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
[End of figure]
To prepare for the first ignition attempt, NIC participants have been
conducting experiments at various NNSA-funded facilities, including,
very recently, NIF. The participants have also, among other
activities, been developing many of the diagnostic instruments for
NIF, including instruments to determine whether ignition has occurred.
For purposes of NIC, ignition is being defined as a reaction in which
the fusion energy output is greater than or equal to the laser energy
used to create the fusion reaction. Currently, NIC's budget totals
around $2 billion and covers activities from fiscal year 2006 through
NIC's scheduled completion date at the end of fiscal year 2012 (see
appendix I).
NNSA's Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition
Facility Project--which is part of the Office of Defense Programs, the
organization responsible for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile--has oversight responsibility for NIF and NIC. Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in California manages and operates NIF
for NNSA and has the lead role in managing and coordinating NIC
activities and receives most of NIC's annual funding. The other
partners in the NIC campaign, listed in order, from highest to lowest,
of the share of annual NIC funding they typically receive include the
following:
* University of Rochester's Laboratory for Laser Energetics (New
York): This laboratory's OMEGA and OMEGA Extended Performance (EP)
laser systems are considered to be NNSA's workhorse for ignition-
related research due to the high number of experiments conducted at
the facility. Prior to the completion of NIF, OMEGA and OMEGA EP were
capable of the world's most powerful laser pulse. For NIC, this
laboratory performed target implosion experiments and developed
diagnostic instruments.
* General Atomics (California): A private company that manufactures
NIF targets, including the hohlraum and fuel capsule, as well as
targets for other NNSA research facilities.
* Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico): Los Alamos scientists
have developed nuclear diagnostics for NIC, conducted target design
research, and worked on-site at NIF to lead or assist with experiments.
* Sandia National Laboratories (New Mexico and California): Sandia's
pulsed-power "Z Machine," which converts electromagnetic energy into X-
rays to create conditions of extreme temperature and pressure,
supports NIC by conducting ignition-related stockpile stewardship
research. Also, researchers at Sandia have developed diagnostic
instruments for NIC experiments and worked at NIF during experiments.
NNSA Has Made Progress Toward Achieving Ignition at NIF, but Key
Scientific and Technical Challenges Remain:
Despite progress, difficult scientific and technical challenges are
likely to affect NIF's ability to achieve the temperatures and
pressures needed for ignition. Furthermore, a newly established
committee to evaluate NIC's progress toward achieving ignition may not
be as effective as the JASON study group intended.
Scientific and Technical Challenges Could Hinder Efforts at NIF to
Achieve Extreme Temperatures and Pressures Needed for Ignition:
While NNSA and the NIC participants have made substantial progress
toward achieving ignition, two key scientific challenges, and a
technical challenge, may affect NIF's ability to create the extreme
temperatures and pressures needed for ignition. According to NIC
scientists and independent experts such as the JASON study group, a
key scientific challenge is to minimize the amount of laser energy
that is reflected out of, or misdirected within, the hohlraum.
Reflected laser light reduces the amount of energy available to heat
and compress the fuel capsule, while misdirected light can negatively
affect the symmetry of the resulting compression, thus risking the
desired ignition reaction. As NIF's laser beams heat the inner walls
of the hohlraum, a plasma, or ionized (electrically charged) gas, is
created. While crucial for generating the X-ray energy needed for the
implosion of the capsule, this plasma can also deflect incoming laser
light out of the hohlraum, resulting in an important loss of energy.
Scientists refer to the interaction between laser light and this
plasma as laser-plasma instability. Alternatively, this instability
can misdirect a portion of the laser energy from one beam into the
pathway of another beam. If enough of this energy is misdirected to
undesired locations on the hohlraum's inner wall, the fuel capsule
might not implode symmetrically. Rather than maintaining its spherical
shape as it compresses, the fuel capsule could instead flatten,
lowering the probability of ignition (see figure 3).
Figure 3: How Laser-Plasma Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 illustrations]
1. NIF‘s laser beams and the energy they provide enter the hohlraum,
generating X-rays as they heat the hohlraum‘s inner walls. The X-rays
then heat the fuel capsule, helping it to implode and drive the
ignition reaction. (For simplicity, only a few of NIF‘s 192 beams are
depicted.)
2. As the beams contact the hohlraum‘s inner walls, or as the X-rays
contact the fuel capsule‘s outside surface, ionized (electrically
charged) gasses known as ’plasmas“ form at those locations.
3. The plasmas can deflect the beams‘ energy back out of the hohlraum,
resulting in an important energy loss. Or, the plasmas can deflect the
energy to undesired locations within the hohlraum, preventing a
sufficiently symmetrical implosion of the fuel capsule.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
[End of figure]
Another widely recognized key scientific challenge is achieving a fuel
capsule implosion with sufficient velocity for ignition, according to
NIC scientists and independent experts. For ignition to occur, NIC
scientists believe that the fuel capsule has to shrink to a size that
is about 40,000 times smaller than its original size. During this
compression, the capsule must not only maintain its spherical shape,
but it must implode at an extremely fast velocity in order to achieve
the pressures needed for ignition. However, if the capsule's outside
surface is not sufficiently smooth, or the X-rays produced in the
hohlraum strike the capsule unevenly, the capsule's outside surface
can protrude inward into the fuel capsule rather than blow away from
the capsule with rocket-like force. The resulting protrusions are the
result of "hydrodynamic instabilities," which occur when a material of
lower density (i.e., the outside surface of the fuel capsule) makes
contact with a material of higher density (i.e., the capsule's inner
layer of frozen deuterium-tritium fuel). Having too many of these
protrusions can prevent ignition, because they lower the temperature
inside the fuel capsule, potentially reducing the compression velocity
below that which is needed for ignition (see figure 4).
Figure 4: How Hydrodynamic Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
1. The fuel capsule must maintain its spherical shape as it compresses.
Specifically identified are the following:
Fuel capsule‘s outside surface;
Inner layer of frozen deuterium-tritium fuel;
Deuterium-tritium gas.
2. Hydrodynamic instabilities can cause the fuel capsule‘s outside
surface to protrude in finger-like patterns, into the frozen deuterium-
tritium fuel layer. These instabilities can prevent a fast,
symmetrical compression.
3. As a result, the fuel capsule may not compress spherically,
reducing the likelihood of ignition.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
[End of figure]
In addition to these two scientific challenges, NIC scientists face a
technical challenge: controlling damage to NIF's glass optics--
particularly, the optics leading into the target chamber--caused by
NIF's laser beams as they pass through the optics on their way to the
target. Though the damaged areas on an optic initially may be few in
number or very small in size--about the width of a human hair--they
can increase in number or size the more the damaged optics are exposed
to energy from NIF's lasers. According to the 2005 report by the JASON
study group, if optical damage is beyond expected levels, the time and
cost of repairing or replacing damaged optics could make it difficult
or impractical to operate NIF at higher laser energy levels, including
the 1.8 MJ-capability for which NIF was originally designed.
Since NIF's construction, NIC scientists have taken steps to address
these scientific and technical challenges, such as the following:
* To minimize the amount of laser energy that is deflected out of, or
misdirected within the hohlraum, NIC scientists have made several
modifications to the hohlraum's original design and composition. For
example, they removed the laser entrance hole liner, originally put in
place to allow for more laser light to enter the hohlraum, after
learning that it led to increased laser-plasma instabilities. NIC
scientists also chose a new width for the laser entrance holes,
allowing them to deliver less-intense laser energy into the hohlraum.
Finally, they decided to fill the hohlraum with pure helium gas,
rather than a mixture of hydrogen and helium, as originally designed.
Following the completion of NIF's construction in March 2009, NIC
scientists were able to test these modifications during the initial
phase of their experimental campaign. As a result of these
experiments, NIC scientists report that they are now able to limit
laser-light deflection and misdirection due to laser-plasma
instabilities to acceptable levels.
* To improve their understanding of fuel capsule implosions, NIC
scientists used two-and three-dimensional computer simulations to help
predict how the fuel capsule's outside surface might mix with the
frozen deuterium-tritium fuel layer during an implosion. They have
also used other laser facilities, such as OMEGA, to study hydrodynamic
instabilities, although, at lower velocities and pressures than are
expected at NIF.
* To address the challenge of optics damage caused by NIF's lasers,
NIC scientists have developed a process to address routine damage by
quickly repairing or replacing damaged optics so that the facility can
seamlessly continue operations. During the first series of
experiments, they have been slowly and methodically increasing the
levels of laser energy delivered to the target, in part, to prevent
optical damage. Laser energies during the first series of experiments,
which were completed in December 2009, were gradually increased from
laser pulses with 660 kilojoules (or less than a megajoule) of laser
energy to pulses with laser energies as high as 1.2 MJ.[Footnote 7]
While NIC scientists have made progress in addressing the scientific
and technical challenges, independent scientific experts told us these
challenges could still impede efforts to achieve the extreme
temperatures and pressures needed for ignition. They also cautioned
that, despite some early experimental successes, NIF will likely
encounter unexpected or confounding scientific results or technical
problems that are common in cutting-edge research and development. In
2005, the JASON study group recognized the uncertainty of resolving
these complex challenges and reported that achieving ignition at NIF
in 2010, while possible, would be unlikely.[Footnote 8] In its 2009
follow-up report, the JASON study group recognized the NIC
participants' substantial progress since 2005 but cautioned that
substantial scientific challenges remained.[Footnote 9] According to
the 2009 JASON study group report, even after 4 years of additional
research, the likelihood of achieving ignition at NIF in 2010 still
remains unlikely. In particular, NIC scientists have not been able to
fully resolve each scientific challenge because computer simulations,
while important for developing an understanding of the science
involved, are not sufficient by themselves to predict the results of
actual ignition attempts or other experiments at NIF. And while the
scientists have recently begun getting data from experiments conducted
at NIF, questions remain that will require further investigation at
NIF. For example, NIC scientists have not yet conducted any
experiments at NIF testing the effects of hydrodynamic instabilities
under ignition-like conditions. Until they begin using deuterium-
tritium capsules in experiments at NIF, instead of the plastic
surrogate capsules currently being used, NIC scientists cannot be
certain as to how well the deuterium-tritium capsules--planned for use
during the first ignition attempt--will compress and whether a
sufficiently symmetrical implosion will be possible.
Additionally, independent experts are concerned that NIC scientists,
for the first ignition attempt that is planned to take place at NIF at
the end of fiscal year 2010, may not use enough of NIF's laser energy
to compensate for inevitable energy losses out of the hohlraum. NIF
was designed with the capability of delivering 1.8 MJ of laser energy
to the target chamber. However, NIC scientists said they plan to
conduct the first ignition attempt using laser energies between 1.2
and 1.3 MJ. They predict that, at this level, there would still be
enough energy left over for the capsule to reach ignition conditions,
even after losses due to laser-plasma instabilities and other
phenomena are taken into account. The scientists told us their
innovations in target design, among other factors, will make it
possible to achieve ignition with considerably less laser energy than
NIF's 1.8 MJ designed capability. As a result, they do not plan to
fire NIF's lasers at 1.8 MJ until the first half of fiscal year 2011,
after the first ignition attempt. Moreover, during experiments in
early fiscal year 2010 at NIF, months before the planned ignition
attempt, energy losses due to laser-plasma instabilities were found to
be within NIC's acceptable levels, according to NIC scientists. Even
at laser energies of 1.2 MJ, the amount of total energy lost to laser-
plasma instabilities was 6 percent, meeting NIC's goal of keeping
these energy losses below 15 percent.
Furthermore, optical damage remains a concern. In March 2009, for
example, NIC scientists noticed that some of the laser light moving
toward the optics around the target chamber was being reflected back
into the laser pathway, causing unexpected damage to the mirrors that
direct NIF's laser light to the target chamber. Though the impact was
limited, affecting only about 4 percent of NIF's mirrors, the damage
occurred even at low laser energies. Additionally, according to NIC
scientists, NIF's optics cannot, at present, adequately withstand
routine exposure to higher laser energies, including the 1.8 MJ of
energy for which NIF was designed. Despite major improvements in NIF's
optics over the years, when NIF construction was completed in 2009,
NIF's optics were incapable of withstanding repeated shots at 1.8 MJ
without experiencing extensive damage. To improve the optics'
performance under increasingly high energy levels, Lawrence Livermore
recently began resurfacing certain optics with newly developed
coatings, designed to provide better protection against high laser
energy levels. Lawrence Livermore will take advantage of a 4-month
pause in experiments at NIF, which began in December 2009, to continue
resurfacing NIF's optics and complete other critical tasks. NIC
scientists expect that NIF's optics will be prepared for 1.8 MJ
operations in December 2010.
Effectiveness of Committee Established to Evaluate NIC's Progress
Toward Achieving Ignition May Be Limited:
The committee formed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to
review the NIC may not be structured in such a way that will allow it
to be fully effective in evaluating NIC's progress toward achieving
ignition. In 2005, the JASON study group recommended the formation of
a standing review committee that would advise top NIF leadership on
the allocation of scientific resources and provide peer reviews of
critical scientific efforts, such as designing ignition targets. The
JASON study group also suggested that the committee should hold
regularly scheduled meetings and reviews, where proposals for
scientific work, target designs, and the ignition shot plan could be
discussed. Four years later, the NIC responded to this recommendation
by stating that its activities had, in fact, been broadly examined
during the intervening period, including semiannual reviews by a
committee that reports to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Director, as well as occasional internal and external reviews of its
target design and experimental plan. The JASON study group, however,
determined that the narrow focus and ad hoc nature of these reviews
made them insufficient to evaluate NIC's progress in addressing the
complex scientific and technical challenges facing NIF.
In February 2009, the JASON study group again recommended that NNSA
and Lawrence Livermore establish a standing review committee of
subject-matter experts to help manage technical and scientific risks
and recommend the best course of action to achieve ignition. In
response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory then established a
NIC review committee that first met in December 2009. Chaired by a
former national laboratory Director, the 13-member committee consists
of scientists with recognized credentials and expertise in plasma
physics, materials science, inertial confinement fusion, and other
related fields. The laboratory's charter asked the committee to review
scientific and technical issues, such as NIF laser performance,
planned ignition experiments, and target designs.
However, several issues could reduce the committee's effectiveness.
First, the committee may not be structured in a way that will allow it
to objectively analyze and render candid judgment on NIC's scientific
progress. For example, Lawrence Livermore officials selected and
appointed the committee's members. The committee will also report to,
and take direction from, the laboratory Director. Reporting to the
Lawrence Livermore Director, rather than to NNSA, may limit its
members' ability to report honestly and frankly on any findings
related to the scientific and technical progress of the NIC
participants. In contrast, the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory
Committee--a standing Department of Energy review committee
established in the early 1990s--reports its findings to, and takes
direction from, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, which
has broad oversight responsibility over much of the department's
nonweapons-related scientific research, or from NNSA's Administrator,
if the findings are applicable to weapons scientists. This advisory
committee is not limited to reporting to the organizations most
closely tied to fusion energy research, such as the Office of Fusion
Energy Sciences, which more directly manages fusion energy research
for the Office of Science, or the national laboratories and other
organizations that carry out the research. Second, the NIC review
committee may not be as extensively involved in reviewing the NIC's
scientific progress as the JASON study group intended. For example,
officials at Lawrence Livermore told us they do not plan on asking the
review committee to review experimental results until mid-2010,
following the next series of experiments focusing on hydrodynamic
instabilities. These plans do not meet the intent of the JASON study
group recommendation or the general purpose of a standing review
committee. According to the JASON study group, the review committee
should be involved in making decisions on what experiments to conduct
and what approach to take before experiments are completed. Further,
the 2005 JASON study report called for the establishment of two
separate subcommittees for the NIC: one to review laser-plasma
instabilities and the other to review ignition fuel capsules. This
recommendation signals the JASON study group's recognition that NIC's
complicated ignition experiments should be reviewed with a high level
of detail. Third, the committee may not have adequate representation
from each of NIF's primary users, including those with significant
experience in nuclear weapons design. For example, the committee has
only one scientist with significant experience in nuclear weapons
design. Since NIF's primary mission is stockpile stewardship, the
committee might not have sufficient experience to determine whether
NIC's approach is appropriate for creating a platform for future
stockpile stewardship experiments.
Management Weakness Has Extended the Schedule and Increased the Cost
of Achieving Ignition and Could Delay the Fiscal Year 2012 Ignition
Goal:
The cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities at NIF
and supporting facilities have expanded substantially because NNSA
officials and NIC participants failed to follow required processes. In
addition, weak oversight by NNSA has allowed the lead NIC participant,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to defer critical performance
requirements, construction activities, and key equipment acquisitions
needed for ignition experiments at NIF, which could delay ignition or
other NIC goals beyond 2012.
NNSA Officials and NIC Participants Did Not Always Follow Required
Processes for Controlling Cost, Schedule, Scope Increases:
The cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities at NIF
and supporting facilities have expanded substantially, in part,
because NNSA and the NIC participants did not always follow the
required procedures for controlling cost, schedule, and scope
increases. To better manage NIC's cost, schedule, and scope, NNSA
designated NIC as an "enhanced management program," requiring more
rigorous standards and project-management practices than typical NNSA
programs. In particular, NNSA's program management policies require
that enhanced management programs follow an execution plan, which
identifies the program's mission and establishes its cost, schedule,
and scope. NNSA's policies also require that participants in enhanced
management programs adhere to a formal process for approving any
changes to the established cost, schedule, or scope.[Footnote 10]
To meet these requirements, NNSA and the NIC participants adopted an
execution plan in June 2005, formally establishing both NIC's total
cost at $1.6 billion and its completion date at the end of fiscal year
2011. The execution plan also defined NIC's mission and major scope
elements for achieving ignition at NIF by the completion date.
Furthermore, the plan outlined a process for controlling cost,
schedule, and scope changes, which requires the NNSA Administrator's
written approval for changes that would affect NIC's total cost,
extend its completion date by more than 6 months, or change the scope
in ways that would impact the overall mission. The plan requires
approval from lower-ranking NNSA or NIC officials for less significant
changes to cost, schedule, or scope.
Despite NIC's enhanced management designation, the NIC participants
did not consistently follow the more rigorous standards, and NNSA
failed to ensure that the standards were being followed. Since NIC's
cost, schedule, and scope were established in June 2005, its total
costs have increased by around 25 percent--from $1.6 billion to over
$2 billion--and its planned completion date has been extended by 1
year to the end of fiscal year 2012. At the same time, NIC's mission
and scope have expanded significantly. For example, in addition to
achieving ignition once by NIC's planned 2012 completion date, the
participants will need to achieve ignition repeatedly and reliably, as
well as understand and control the results of ignition experiments.
Moreover, within this same time frame, under the enhanced management
program, the NIC participants must create a reliable "platform" for
future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments at NIF. To
create such a platform, the NIC participants plan to, among other
things, develop and install special diagnostic instruments and optics
for future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments, in addition
to the ones for NIC experiments.
NNSA officials and the NIC participants implemented these cost,
schedule, and scope changes without following the required processes.
Because the changes were extensive--affecting NIC's total costs,
extending its completion date by more than 6 months, and changing its
scope in ways that impacted the overall mission--the participants were
required, under the provision of the enhanced management program, to
obtain the NNSA Administrator's written approval before implementing
the changes. On three separate occasions, however, the NIC
participants revised the cost, schedule, or scope in the execution
plan and implemented the revised plan without the NNSA Administrator's
written approval as follows:
* May 2006: The first revision to NIC's execution plan called for
reducing NIC's total costs by around $14 million (1 percent) in
response to a directive from an NNSA official in the Office of
Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project,
the office responsible for overseeing NIC. According to officials from
that office, the revised plan was never submitted to the Administrator
because Sandia National Laboratories, one of the NIC participants, did
not agree with the changes. The NIC representative from Sandia told us
the plan did not include detailed criteria for completing NIC's scope.
* July 2007: In the second revision, NIC's costs were increased by $74
million (4.5 percent) over the $1.6 billion total cost figure cited in
the original June 2005 execution plan. Also, NIC's planned completion
date was extended by one quarter through December 2011. NNSA officials
from the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition
Facility Project said they did not seek formal approval for the
revisions because NNSA did not know, at the time, whether funding
would be available to cover the cost increase.
* August 2008: In the third and most recent revision, NIC's costs were
increased by $404 million (24.8 percent) over the original costs, and
the planned completion date was extended to the end of fiscal year
2012. Furthermore, NIC's mission and scope were expanded to include
the aforementioned effort to achieve ignition reliably, as well as the
platform for future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments at
NIF. NNSA officials told us that achieving ignition reliably at NIF
was always planned as a follow-on effort, but NNSA decided, instead,
to include this work in the NIC. The officials said they did not seek
the NNSA Administrator's approval for the changes because, at the
time, the increased costs for NIC exceeded NNSA's overall budget for
ignition-related activities in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, of which
NIC is a major component. Similarly, the NIC representative from
Sandia said he did not sign the revised plan because it was not budget
compliant, and he felt it increased NIC's scope too far beyond the
goal of achieving ignition at NIF. In the absence of a formally
approved execution plan the NIC participants have been using the
August 2008 revision to plan and prioritize their activities.
In January 2010, officials from the Office of Inertial Confinement
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project told us they were
considering further changes to NIC's scope but that these changes
would not impact the overall mission. They also said that efforts to
revise the August 2008 NIC execution plan, which were previously under
way, have been put on hold, until the fiscal year 2011 budget is in
place. In addition, they said that NNSA plans to end the NIC enhanced
management program at the end of fiscal year 2012, even if the NIC
participants have not achieved ignition or a reliable platform for
future experiments. Work on any remaining NIC scope, as well as
routine operation of NIF, would continue beyond 2012 as a standard
NNSA program, rather than an enhanced management one.
Deferral of Key Activities Could Delay Ignition or Other NIC Goals
Beyond 2012:
Weak oversight by NNSA has allowed the lead NIC participant, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, to delay critical performance
requirements, construction activities, and key equipment acquisitions
needed for ignition experiments at NIF, increasing the risk that
ignition or other NIC goals may not be completed by the end of fiscal
year 2012. In particular, NNSA has allowed Lawrence Livermore to defer
constructing major aspects of NIF's safety infrastructure, initially
required under the NIF construction project.[Footnote 11] The
infrastructure will be needed to protect personnel and the environment
from exposure to radiation and hazardous materials during the first
and subsequent ignition attempts. Without the infrastructure, the NIC
participants would have to delay ignition experiments because they
involve using tritium, a radioactive material that is key to an
ignition reaction. Although NIF construction was officially completed
in 2009, construction and installation of the safety infrastructure is
currently under way as part of NIC.[Footnote 12] The work is expected
to cost around $50 million, including:
* $16 million for facilities and equipment to handle the radioactive
tritium left inside of NIF's target chamber during ignition shots and
other experiments with tritium-laced targets;
* $13 million for concrete doors and other target-area shielding to
contain radiation from neutrons generated during an ignition (or near-
ignition) reaction; and:
* $21 million for ventilation, filtration, detection, and
decontamination systems and other safeguards.
Deferring this work from NIF could delay completion of ignition or
other NIC goals. As of September 2009--several months before the
scheduled ignition attempt--construction of this safety infrastructure
was considered to be behind schedule and over budget, in part because
NIC's fiscal year 2009 funding was uncertain, according to NIC
officials from Lawrence Livermore. According to NIC progress reports,
by November 2009, satisfactory progress had been made, and the
construction was no longer considered to be behind schedule and over
budget. To speed progress, in December 2009, Lawrence Livermore halted
all NIC experiments at NIF for an expected 4-month period, focusing
instead on the safety construction and other critical tasks to prepare
for ignition experiments. But, even if the safety construction is
completed on time, the Lawrence Livermore officials told us that
further delays are possible. Before ignition experiments can take
place, the Department of Energy will need to inspect and approve the
construction, and NIF staff will need to be trained and certified to
work in exposed areas and handle dangerous materials. A delay in these
or subsequent activities could threaten the NIC participants' schedule
for the first ignition attempt or other NIC goals, thus increasing the
risk of not completing NIC's goals by the fiscal year 2012 deadline.
Similarly, NIC participants expressed concerns that a key diagnostic
instrument would not be completed in time for the first ignition
attempt. Known as the Advanced Radiographic Capability, the instrument
would dramatically improve NIC researchers' ability to observe the
fuel capsule as it implodes and reaches ignition-level temperatures
and pressures. According to NIC officials from Lawrence Livermore, the
need for such a capability had been identified long before NIC began,
but NNSA instructed them to defer working on the instrument until 2009
due to budget constraints. As a result, the NIC officials do not
expect to complete the instrument--which is expected to cost nearly
$42 million--until fiscal year 2011. Officials from NNSA's Office of
Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project
said they did not specifically instruct the NIC participants to defer
the instrument, but given budget constraints, encouraged them to defer
activities that were not absolutely necessary for the first ignition
attempt in fiscal year 2010. Although the participants could attempt
ignition in 2010 without the diagnostic instrument, the Lawrence
Livermore officials said it will be more difficult to determine why
ignition succeeded or failed without data from the instrument.
Failure to Achieve Ignition in Fiscal Year 2012 Would Not Immediately
Impact NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, but Further Delays Could
Limit NNSA's Options for Maintaining the Stockpile:
While there would be no immediate impact, the consequences to the
stockpile stewardship program of not achieving ignition at NIF would
become more serious over time--from delaying nuclear weapons research,
to ultimately, reducing NNSA's confidence in its ability to certify
the safety and reliability of the stockpile. NIF was designed to
support nuclear weapons research and obtain additional data about
nuclear weapon performance to increase confidence in the long-term
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. As weapons
age, cracks, corrosion, and the decaying of materials may affect
weapon performance. Through the stockpile stewardship program, NNSA
has assessed weapon performance by relying on data from past nuclear
tests, sophisticated computer simulations, and routine surveillance of
nuclear weapons in the stockpile to spot signs of deterioration as the
weapons age.[Footnote 13] When the United States stopped underground
nuclear testing in 1992, scientists did not fully understand all of
the important details of how a nuclear weapon works. NNSA scientists
told us that scientific knowledge and computational capabilities
acquired in the meantime are still inadequate to understand all of the
impacts on weapon performance and safety as nuclear weapons age.
According to NNSA officials, when ignition has been achieved, and NIF
is fully operational, scientists will be better positioned to address
many significant gaps in their knowledge, as well as maintaining the
skills of nuclear weapons designers.
Despite the eventual importance of achieving ignition, there would be
no immediate impact on the stockpile stewardship program if ignition
is not achieved at NIF by the end of fiscal year 2012, according to
NNSA and national laboratory officials. Most of the planned stockpile
stewardship experiments at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and 2012 do
not require ignition. According to NNSA officials, scientists will be
able to obtain key weapons physics data by achieving temperatures and
pressures just short of ignition, known as nonignition experiments.
These nonignition experiments will, among other things, test the
strength of materials inside nuclear weapons as they are exposed to
intense radiation, temperatures, and pressures approaching those found
in a nuclear weapons explosion.
In September 2009, NNSA completed the first series of stockpile
stewardship nonignition experiments at NIF. These experiments exposed
materials to intense radiation, and scientists used the data to
compare the predicted results with the actual results and make changes
to computer models, as necessary, to predict weapon performance. To
obtain these data, scientists used 700 kilojoules of laser energy--
less than half of NIF's full laser capability but more than 20 times
the energy of OMEGA. According to NNSA scientists, understanding how
these materials behave under extreme temperature and pressure,
especially as the materials age, is crucial to understanding how a
nuclear weapon will perform. Because models to accurately predict the
behavior of materials in nuclear weapons are too complex for even the
most state-of-the-art supercomputers, weapons scientists have long
made predictions using less complete models that cannot precisely
account for all performance factors. The inexact performance data
provided by the current models raises uncertainties about the accuracy
of predicting a weapon's performance as it ages or as changes are made
to the weapon. Nonignition, as well as ignition, experiments at NIF
are intended to allow scientists to improve these models and reduce
some of this uncertainty.
According to NNSA and Lawrence Livermore officials, however, some of
the significant stockpile stewardship issues, and areas of
uncertainty, can be addressed only with ignition experiments.
According to NNSA officials, only NIF will be able to achieve the
temperatures and pressures needed to study in a controlled laboratory
setting the conditions that approach those found in a nuclear weapons
explosion. The extreme temperatures and pressures that will be used to
compress targets at NIF will help scientists simulate the conditions
of actual nuclear explosions, providing them better data with which to
predict the performance of similar implosions in actual weapons--
particularly in the presence of design irregularities that are
sometimes found in those weapons as they age. New data from NIF on the
nuclear reactions observed in imploding targets will be used in the
annual assessment and certification of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. According to NNSA officials, the closer NNSA can get to
nuclear weapons conditions, the less extrapolation is required, and
the greater the confidence in its understanding of weapons physics. As
a result, many of the stockpile stewardship experiments will require
ignition reactions that, much like a nuclear detonation, produce
significant energy gains--releasing 10 times the amount of energy, or
more, than was used to initiate the reaction. According to NIC
officials, achieving these high energy gains could require that NIF
operate reliably at 1.8 MJ, although operation at lower laser energies
may be sufficient.
A long-term failure to achieve ignition, among other factors, could
limit NNSA's options for refurbishing and making design changes to
nuclear weapons to improve their safety and reliability. Although
experts believe that current weapons refurbishment activities, which
include replacing aging components, may be sufficient for extending
the lives of deployed nuclear weapons for 20 to 30 years, doing so
without ignition could constrain NNSA's options for ensuring a safe
and reliable nuclear stockpile. An August 2009 review by the JASON
study group found that life extension programs have not increased the
risk of certifying the safety and reliability of currently deployed
nuclear weapons. The JASON study group concluded that the lifetimes of
currently deployed weapons could be extended for decades, with no
anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those
employed in life extension programs. However, NNSA officials told us
that this approach necessarily requires manufacturing the same
materials used in the original weapons and maintaining the same
designs, because assessing a weapon's safety and reliability is
partially tied to historical data from live nuclear tests. Changing
the original design of the weapons increases the uncertainty about its
potential performance, because the refurbished weapon cannot be tested
using live detonations, and NNSA's ability to simulate similar
conditions is limited. Furthermore, NNSA is finding it increasingly
difficult to manufacture the same materials made 20 to 30 years ago
and would, therefore, like to introduce some design changes to
increase the safety and reliability of currently deployed weapons. If
ignition is achieved, experiments at NIF could be used to study the
potential effects of design changes, possibly giving NNSA greater
confidence to make changes to weapons in the stockpile. But, without
ignition at NIF or some other facility, NNSA's options for doing so
would likely remain limited.
In addition, according to NNSA in a March 2006 letter to Congress, a
failure to achieve ignition may reduce NNSA's confidence in certifying
the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, according
to NNSA and national laboratory officials, depending on the reason for
the failure. These officials told us that as weapons continue to age
or are refurbished, the risk and uncertainty about predicting weapon
performance increases, and only ignition experiments at NIF can fully
address those uncertainties. A long-term failure to achieve ignition
could signify problems with NNSA's models and computer simulations and
call into question some aspects of NNSA's knowledge about weapon
performance. However, these officials also told us that a failure to
achieve ignition would not necessarily signal a need to return to
underground nuclear testing. Nonignition experiments could continue to
validate certain models for predicting weapon performance, and NNSA
could continue to rely on other stockpile stewardship tools, such as
supercomputing facilities, to maintain the safety and reliability of
nuclear weapons. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified
stockpile safety and reliability for the past 15 years without NIF or
underground nuclear testing and could continue do so.[Footnote 14]
Conclusions:
Given the significant scientific and technical challenges that NNSA
faces before it can achieve ignition at NIF, NNSA's ability to fully
use NIF to generate new data in support of stockpile stewardship
depends on achieving ignition. Although NNSA and the NIC participants
have made significant progress toward ignition at NIF, it could take
them longer than expected to reach this milestone, and any long-term
failure to achieve ignition and produce significant energy gains could
erode NNSA's confidence in its ability to certify the safety and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. In light of this, we are
concerned that NNSA and the NIC participants have been slow to solicit
help and ideas from outside experts with knowledge in inertial
confinement fusion. In particular, we question NNSA's and the NIC
participants' decision to wait 4 years--only months before the first
ignition experiment is expected to take place--to implement the JASON
study group's 2005 recommendation to form a standing external review
committee of experts that could provide expert advice on the
scientific and technical challenges.
In addition, we are concerned that the committee currently in place
falls short of meeting the intent of the JASON study group
recommendation. In particular, we believe that the committee might not
be as effective as it could be, given its reporting structure, its
limited involvement in NIC's decision-making process, and the
possibility that it may not have adequate representation from each of
NIF's primary users. Committee activities, such as closely reviewing
detailed experimental plans, could help create the needed level of
committee involvement. Though the NIC has taken a positive step in
forming the committee, we believe that an unprecedented, complex
endeavor such as ignition requires a more effective external review
component that can better evaluate whether NNSA and the NIC
participants are in fact taking the correct approaches in their
experimental campaign. Otherwise, NNSA and the NIC participants may be
missing a valuable opportunity to draw on and implement the advice of
recognized experts--and their contacts throughout the United States--
who may be able to provide fresh perspectives on such a challenging
scientific experiment.
Furthermore, because NNSA has not approved the most recent NIC
execution plan, including its cost, schedule, and scope, as required
by its own guidance, NNSA, in our view, has not been executing its
oversight responsibilities as effectively as it should. Especially
problematic is NNSA's failure to follow the processes required for
making important changes to NIC's cost, schedule, or scope--as
evidenced by the fact that NNSA's Administrator was never asked to
formally approve major scope changes, which made the NIC participants
responsible for achieving ignition repeatedly and reliably by the end
of fiscal year 2012. Confidence in achieving ignition at NIF, and
financial support for this expensive endeavor, could be jeopardized if
the NIC participants do not achieve ignition at NIF by the end of
fiscal year 2012 or complete these more ambitious goals within the
proposed time frames and budget.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making six recommendations for addressing the scientific and
technical challenges and management weaknesses. To enhance the NIC
review committee's effectiveness, we recommend that the Administrator
of NNSA direct the Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project to take the following
three actions:
* Have the NIC review committee report to, and receive direction from,
NNSA's Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and
National Ignition Facility Project on its review activities, instead
of reporting to Lawrence Livermore's laboratory Director.
Alternatively, the Director of NNSA's Office of Inertial Confinement
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project could appoint a separate
review committee, serving a substantially similar function as the NIC
review committee, to advise and report to that office's Director.
* Involve the NIC review committee, or the separately appointed review
committee, in NIC's critical decision-making, such as evaluating
experiments planned on NIF, identifying potential weaknesses to the
experimental plan, and recommending, if necessary, alternative
approaches to address scientific and technical challenges.
* Ensure that the review committee adequately involves nuclear weapons
scientists that can help evaluate whether NIC's approach is
appropriate for creating a platform for future stockpile stewardship
experiments. This can involve increasing the number of nuclear weapons
scientists on the NIC review committee or sharing information with
weapons scientists at the national laboratories.
To better manage NIC, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA
direct the Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and
National Ignition Facility Project, with assistance from the NIC
participants, to take the following three actions:
* Develop an execution plan to establish NIC's cost, schedule, and
scope.
* Ensure that all NIC participants and appropriate NNSA officials have
formally approved the execution plan.
* Ensure that all changes to NIC's cost, schedule, and scope receive
formal written approval from appropriate officials, as required.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the National Nuclear Security Administration with a draft
of this report for its review and comment. In commenting on the draft
report, NNSA's Acting Associate Administrator for Management and
Administration said that NNSA agreed with the recommendations and,
overall, found that the report was fair and properly reflected the
progress at NIF. NNSA's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
NNSA also provided clarifying comments related to NNSA's oversight of
NIC's cost, schedule, and scope, and the potential impact to NNSA's
stockpile stewardship program if ignition is not achieved at NIF by
the end of fiscal year 2012. We have incorporated these comments with
one exception. We did not incorporate NNSA's proposed revision related
to our statement on pages 22-23 of the report that scientific
knowledge and computational capabilities, acquired since the United
States stopped its underground nuclear testing, are inadequate to
fully understanding the safety and performance impacts to nuclear
weapons as they age. NNSA expressed concern that such statements would
be misconstrued as meaning that NNSA's current stockpile certification
methods are not adequate. We disagree since NNSA's own documents state
that, as the stockpile continues to age and weapons are refurbished,
existing stockpile assessment methods, without NIF--and, hence,
without the capability to reliably and repeatedly demonstrate
ignition--may become inadequate. Our report cites a 2006 NNSA letter
to Congress, and NNSA has made similar statements to help justify NIF.
For example, in its fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget request,
NNSA stated, "Without the NIF, the nation's computational capabilities
and scientific knowledge are inadequate to ascertain all of the
performance and safety impacts from changes in the nuclear warhead
physics packages due to aging, remanufacturing, or engineering and
design alterations."
In addition, NNSA provided detailed technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate Congressional
Committees, the Secretary of Energy, the NNSA Administrator, and other
interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or Tim Persons at (202)
512-6412 or by email at aloisee@gao.gov or personst@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by:
Dr. Timothy M. Persons:
Chief Scientist:
[End of section]
Appendix I: National Ignition Campaign (NIC) Budget, by Major Scope
Activity, for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2012:
Table:
NIC scope activity[A]: Target development and manufacturing;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$195.9 million;
Description: Design and fabrication of targets”including hohlraums,
fuel capsules, and related components”for NIC target physics
experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF).
NIC scope activity[A]: Target physics experiments;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$504.0 million;
Description: The experimental campaigns to be conducted under NIC,
including the first ignition attempt, which is scheduled for the end
of fiscal year 2010.[C]
NIC scope activity[A]: Cryogenic target system;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$55.7 million;
Description: Equipment and processes for positioning targets for
ignition experiments and keeping cryogenic targets frozen at extremely
low temperatures.
NIC scope activity[A]: Target diagnostic instruments;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$216.7 million;
Description: Design, fabrication, and operation of a suite of
diagnostic instruments to detect and measure various physical
phenomena during experiments, including ignition.
NIC scope activity[A]: Personnel and environmental protection systems;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$49.5 million;
Description: Equipment, infrastructure, and processes for protecting
personnel from the effects of radioactive and hazardous materials that
may be released during experiments, including the first ignition
attempt.
NIC scope activity[A]: NIF operation and maintenance;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$575.6 million;
Description: Personnel, equipment, and other expenses for day-to-day
operation and maintenance of NIF, as well as efforts to prepare for
routine operation at peak laser energy (1.8 million joules) in fiscal
year 2011.
NIC scope activity[A]: All other activities;
446.8 million;
Description: Includes such activities as management and administration
of NIC, development and acquisition of laser optics and systems for
acquiring data from target diagnostic instruments.
NIC scope activity[A]: Total;
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]:
$2,044.2 million.
Source: GAO analysis of National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan,
Revision 3.1, August 2008, and other data provided by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
[A] We grouped the scope activities in the table for purposes of the
discussion in this report. The groupings do not necessarily reflect
those that NNSA or the NIC participants use for budgeting, reporting,
or other purposes.
[B] Data on the total cost of NIC activities is current as of August
2009.
[C] NIC's budget for target physics experiments includes around $5.9
million for experiments using "direct drive" ignition, in addition to
the "indirect drive" approach for which NIF was primarily designed.
Under direct drive, NIF's lasers would directly strike an ignition
target rather than indirectly "driving" the target to ignition by
striking a hohlraum to create X-rays. According to NIC participants,
NIF will need significant facility modifications in order to field
direct drive experiments.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
April 2, 2010:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20458:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
report, Nuclear Weapons Research: Actions Needed to Address Scientific
and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National
Ignition Facility, GAO-I 0-488. In response to a request by the Senate
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, we understand that GAO performed this review to
determine (1) to what extent has NNSA addressed key scientific and
technical challenges for achieving ignition at the National Ignition
Facility (NIF); (2) to what extent does NNSA have an effective
approach for managing the cost, schedule, and scope of achieving
ignition at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and 2012; and (3) what is
the,potential impact to NNSA's stockpile stewardship program, if
ignition is not achieved at NIF within that time frame?
Overall, NNSA believes the report is fair and properly reflects the
significant progress NIF has made. For the sake of clarity and
correctness, below are some specific comments that, if accepted, would
make a more balanced report.
1. Page 17 ” Second full paragraph:
NNSA believes there might be a misimpression that "achieve ignition
repeatedly and reliably" is a new assumed burden for the ICI, Program.
This could be corrected by replacing sentence, "For example,
...ignition experiments." with the following sentence:
"Achievement of repeatable and reliable ignition was always planned as
a follow on to NIC in order to prepare ignition for weapons program
requirements. It was decided that it would be efficient to include
this essential work in the body of the NIC effort."
2. Page 19 ” First paragraph:
NNSA does not recall saying anything about an implicit action by the
Administrator. We believe that it would be more accurate to replace
the second sentence with the following:
"The NNSA officials said they allowed the NIC participants to continue
FY 2009 activities without a revised directed change because of the FY
2009 budget being consistent with the proposed revised NIC Execution
Plan."
It was in the FY 2011 and FY 2012 budgets where we had concerns of
major shortfalls. Also, NNSA officials did not move the proposed NIC
Execution Plan Rev. 3.1 forward because it was not budget compliant.
This is the reason it was not signed.
3. Page 20 ” First full paragraph:
NNSA believes that adding the following sentence to the end of this
paragraph will enhance both clarity and accuracy:
"The NIF Project was completed according to the completion criteria of
the rebaseline of 2000, as confirmed by reviews from the Laser
Performance Review Committee in a letter to the NIF Project Manager
signed on February 25, 2009."
4. Page 23 ” First paragraph:
NNSA is concerned with the use of the terms like "inadequate"
regarding nuclear weapons. An unequivocal term like "inadequate" might
imply that our current weapons assessment methods are not adequate for
certifying the stockpile when in fact they are. Our scientific
advances will improve the assessment and certification process and
meet the future needs of an aging stockpile. Replace "...mean time are
still inadequate..." with "...mean time still need improvement...".
5. Page 26 ” First paragraph: [Now on p. 23]
NNSA believes the sentence beginning with; "A long-term failure
...weapons physics." is too strong and implies a broad lack of
understanding of weapons performance. Thus, in a similar concern to
the item above, NNSA suggests replacing this sentence with: "A long-
term failure to achieve ignition might limit the options that could be
included for future weapons life extension programs. However
officials...".
6. Page 27 ” Last paragraph: [Now on p. 24]
NNSA believes it would be more accurate if the last sentence is
deleted and replaced with:
"If ignition is not achieved by the end of fiscal year 2012 then
confidence in achieving ignition at all at NIF and financial support
for this endeavor could be jeopardized."
I am also enclosing general/technical comments for your consideration.
NNSA agrees with the recommendations. We recognize that even good
programs can improve, and we are committed to quickly and effectively
addressing GAO's recommendations for further improvement.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Acting Director, Policy and Internal Controls
Management at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Acting Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
Enclosure:
cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs:
NNSA Senior Procurement Executive:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov Tim Persons, (202) 512-
6412, or personst@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant
Director; Leland Cogliani; Kevin Craw; R. Scott Fletcher; Alison
O'Neill; Cheryl Peterson; Kim Raheb; Jeff Rueckhaus; and John Smale
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The $3.5 billion cost includes $2.2 billion to design and
construct the NIF facility and $1.3 billion to assemble and install
NIF's 192 lasers and their associated components.
[2] In 1992, the United States began a moratorium on testing nuclear
weapons. Subsequently, the President extended this moratorium in 1993,
and Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994,
directed the Department of Energy to establish a science-based
stockpile stewardship program to maintain the nuclear weapons
stockpile without nuclear testing (Pub. L. No. 103-160, sec. 3138
(1994)).
[3] In 2000, we found that poor management and oversight of the NIF
construction project had increased NIF's cost by $1 billion and
delayed its scheduled completion date by 6 years. Among the many
causes for the cost overruns or schedule delays, the Department of
Energy and Lawrence Livermore officials responsible for managing or
overseeing NIF's construction failed to plan for the technically
complex assembly and installation of NIF's 192 laser beams. They also
failed to use independent review committees effectively to help them
identify and correct issues before they turned into costly problems.
For more information, see GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management
and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-271] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).
[4] Congress directed this in a report accompanying the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005, H.R. 4614, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 108-554 (2004).
[5] JASON is an independent group of accomplished scientists that
advises the U.S. government on matters of science and technology. The
name "JASON" is not an acronym. Its sponsors include the Department of
Defense, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence
community. Congress directed the JASON review of ignition-related
activities at NIF in the Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4818
(Pub. L. No. 108-447 [2004]), the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2005 (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-792 (2004)).
[6] JASON, NIF Ignition, JSR-05-340 (McLean, VA: June 29, 2005).
[7] Although less than NIF's 1.8 MJ design capability, the 1.2 MJ of
laser energy achieved during a December 2009 NIC-funded experiment,
using all 192 lasers simultaneously, is the world's most powerful
laser pulse to date. When operating at 1.8 MJ, NIF will be able to
deliver 45 times more energy to a target than OMEGA. In addition,
prior to producing the 1.2 MJ pulse using NIF's 192 laser beams,
Lawrence Livermore produced a 78-kilojoule pulse using 8 of the beams,
which Lawrence Livermore officials we spoke with said they considered
to be equivalent to achieving nearly 1.9 MJ of laser energy, if the 78-
kilojoule value is applied to all 192 beams.
[8] JSR-05-340.
[9] JASON, Letter report addressed to the Office of Inertial
Confinement Fusion, JSR-09-330 (McLean, VA: Feb. 13, 2009).
[10] Standards for NNSA program management, including "enhanced
management programs," are found in NNSA's NA-10 Defense Program-
Program Management Manual, November 2005. Enhanced management programs
share many of the requirements of programs and projects carried out
under Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, including an
execution plan and a formal process for approving changes. However,
requirements under the Department of Energy order are generally more
rigorous than for enhanced management programs. For example,
independent peer review and formal departmental or NNSA approval is
required before programs and projects managed under the department's
order can proceed through various stages of planning, design, and
implementation.
[11] National Ignition Facility System Design Requirements,
Conventional Facilities, April 1996; National Ignition Facility
Subsystem Design Requirements, Laser and Target Area Building, August
1996; and an addendum to the NIF project completion criteria dated
Feb. 27, 1997.
[12] According to NNSA, the NIF construction project, upon its
completion in March 2009, complied with the project completion
criteria, as revised by NNSA in 2000. Furthermore, in February 2009, a
committee of outside experts verified that the project completion
criteria related to the performance of NIF's lasers had been met or
surpassed.
[13] A key component of the stockpile stewardship program is annual
surveillance testing, in which active stockpile weapons are randomly
selected, disassembled, inspected, and portions tested--either in
laboratory tests or in flight tests--to identify any problems that
might affect a weapon's safety or reliability. Problems identified
during surveillance testing can result in a "significant finding
investigation" to determine the problems' cause, extent, and effect on
the performance, safety, and reliability of the stockpile.
[14] In 1995, the President established an annual stockpile assessment
and reporting requirement to help ensure that the nation's nuclear
weapons remain safe and reliable without underground nuclear testing.
Subsequently, Congress enacted into law the requirement for an annual
stockpile assessment process in section 3141 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. No. 107-314 (2002)).
Specifically, section 3141 requires that the Secretaries of Energy and
Defense submit reports to the President providing their assessment of
the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon type in the
nuclear stockpile.
[End of section]
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