DOE Nuclear Waste
Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of Yucca Mountain Shutdown Gao ID: GAO-11-230 March 23, 2011The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for storing and managing a total of about 13,000 metric tons of nuclear waste--spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste--at five DOE sites in Colorado, Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and Washington. Also, a joint DOE-Navy program stores spent nuclear fuel from warships at DOE's Idaho site. DOE and the Navy intended to permanently dispose of this nuclear waste at a repository planned for Yucca Mountain in Nevada. However, that plan is now in question because of actions taken to terminate the site. This report assesses (1) agreements DOE and the Navy have with states at the five sites and the effects a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have on their ability to fulfill these agreements; (2) the effects a termination would have on DOE's and the Navy's operations and costs for storing the waste; and (3) DOE's and the Navy's plans to mitigate these potential effects. GAO reviewed state agreements and DOE plans, visited waste facilities, and interviewed federal and state officials.
Five states have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding the storage, treatment, or disposal of nuclear waste stored at DOE sites. Only agreements with Colorado and Idaho include deadlines, or milestones, for removing waste from sites that may be threatened by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program. Under the agreements, DOE and the Navy are expected to remove their spent nuclear fuel from Idaho, and DOE is to remove its fuel from Colorado, by January 1, 2035. If a repository is not available to accept the waste, however, DOE and the Navy could miss these milestones. As a result, the government could face significant penalties--$60,000 for each day the waste remains in Idaho and $15,000 for each day the waste remains in Colorado--after January 1, 2035. These penalties could total about $27.4 million annually. Navy officials told GAO, however, their greater concern is that Idaho might suspend Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the state until the Navy meets its agreement to remove spent nuclear fuel, a suspension that would interfere with the Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear warships. Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository would not affect DOE's or the Navy's nuclear waste operations on DOE sites in the near term, according to DOE and Navy officials. But it would likely extend on-site storage and increase storage costs, which could be substantial. For example, an EM analysis estimates that EM could need an additional $918 million to extend storage, assuming a 20-year delay in a repository's opening. Since it is not known when an alternative to Yucca Mountain will be available, it is difficult to estimate the total additional storage costs stemming from terminating the repository. Although EM officials told GAO that DOE can extend storage of nuclear waste on DOE sites for some time, additional information is needed to plan for longer storage. For instance, DOE does not know how long the lives of existing storage facilities can be extended beyond estimates in current site plans. In addition, although research is being planned for long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120 years, DOE has no plan for comparable research focusing on its unique long-term waste storage needs. DOE and the Navy have not yet developed plans to mitigate the potential effects of longer storage resulting from a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository. EM and Navy officials said they are waiting for recommendations from a Blue Ribbon Commission that DOE created in 2010 to clarify future nuclear waste management alternatives. Even after the commission's recommendations are available, however, DOE could face difficulties in planning how to mitigate the impact of a termination of the repository. For example, because it is not clear how specific the commission's recommendations will be, it may take time to develop the recommendations into a new nuclear waste management policy. Further, some recommendations may not lead to a solution soon enough to meet existing waste removal milestones. DOE and the Navy said it was too early to change existing plans since no final disposition path for the waste has been determined. GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess existing nuclear waste storage facilities and the resources and information needed to extend their useful lifetimes and (2) identify any additional research needed to address DOE's unique needs for long-term waste storage. DOE agreed with the recommendations, but objected to some of GAO's findings, which GAO continues to believe are sound.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eugene E. Aloise Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-6870GAO-11-230, DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of Yucca Mountain Shutdown
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
March 2011:
DOE Nuclear Waste:
Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of
Yucca Mountain Shutdown:
GAO-11-230:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-230, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy‘s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
(EM) is responsible for storing and managing a total of about 13,000
metric tons of nuclear waste”spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste”
at five DOE sites in Colorado, Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and
Washington. Also, a joint DOE-Navy program stores spent nuclear fuel
from warships at DOE‘s Idaho site. DOE and the Navy intended to
permanently dispose of this nuclear waste at a repository planned for
Yucca Mountain in Nevada. However, that plan is now in question
because of actions taken to terminate the site. This report assesses
(1) agreements DOE and the Navy have with states at the five sites and
the effects a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have
on their ability to fulfill these agreements; (2) the effects a
termination would have on DOE‘s and the Navy‘s operations and costs
for storing the waste; and (3) DOE‘s and the Navy‘s plans to mitigate
these potential effects. GAO reviewed state agreements and DOE plans,
visited waste facilities, and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found:
Five states have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy,
regarding the storage, treatment, or disposal of nuclear waste stored
at DOE sites. Only agreements with Colorado and Idaho include
deadlines, or milestones, for removing waste from sites that may be
threatened by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program.
Under the agreements, DOE and the Navy are expected to remove their
spent nuclear fuel from Idaho, and DOE is to remove its fuel from
Colorado, by January 1, 2035. If a repository is not available to
accept the waste, however, DOE and the Navy could miss these
milestones. As a result, the government could face significant
penalties”$60,000 for each day the waste remains in Idaho and $15,000
for each day the waste remains in Colorado”after January 1, 2035.
These penalties could total about $27.4 million annually. Navy
officials told GAO, however, their greater concern is that Idaho might
suspend Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the state until the
Navy meets its agreement to remove spent nuclear fuel, a suspension
that would interfere with the Navy‘s ability to refuel its nuclear
warships.
Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository would not affect DOE‘s or
the Navy‘s nuclear waste operations on DOE sites in the near term,
according to DOE and Navy officials. But it would likely extend on-
site storage and increase storage costs, which could be substantial.
For example, an EM analysis estimates that EM could need an additional
$918 million to extend storage, assuming a 20-year delay in a repository
‘s opening. Since it is not known when an alternative to Yucca
Mountain will be available, it is difficult to estimate the total
additional storage costs stemming from terminating the repository.
Although EM officials told GAO that DOE can extend storage of nuclear
waste on DOE sites for some time, additional information is needed to
plan for longer storage. For instance, DOE does not know how long the
lives of existing storage facilities can be extended beyond estimates
in current site plans. In addition, although research is being planned
for long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120
years, DOE has no plan for comparable research focusing on its unique
long-term waste storage needs.
DOE and the Navy have not yet developed plans to mitigate the
potential effects of longer storage resulting from a termination of
the Yucca Mountain repository. EM and Navy officials said they are
waiting for recommendations from a Blue Ribbon Commission that DOE
created in 2010 to clarify future nuclear waste management
alternatives. Even after the commission‘s recommendations are
available, however, DOE could face difficulties in planning how to
mitigate the impact of a termination of the repository. For example,
because it is not clear how specific the commission‘s recommendations
will be, it may take time to develop the recommendations into a new
nuclear waste management policy. Further, some recommendations may not
lead to a solution soon enough to meet existing waste removal
milestones. DOE and the Navy said it was too early to change existing
plans since no final disposition path for the waste has been
determined.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess existing nuclear waste storage
facilities and the resources and information needed to extend their
useful lifetimes and (2) identify any additional research needed to
address DOE‘s unique needs for long-term waste storage. DOE agreed
with the recommendations, but objected to some of GAO‘s findings,
which GAO continues to believe are sound.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-230] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Could Threaten DOE's and
the Navy's Ability to Fulfill Agreements with Colorado and Idaho:
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Would Not Affect Near-
Term Operations at DOE Sites but Would Likely Extend On-Site Storage
of Nuclear Waste:
DOE and the Navy Have Not Developed Plans to Mitigate the Impact of
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository on Nuclear Waste Storage:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Status of DOE's Preparation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Waste for Disposal:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Details of State Agreements Regarding Nuclear Waste at the
Five DOE Sites:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Nuclear Waste Storage Systems at DOE Sites:
Figure 2: A Transporter Lifting a High-Level Waste Canister over the
Concrete Storage Vault:
Figure 3: 2010 Inventories of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste
at DOE's Sites:
Abbreviations:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility, Compensation, and
Liability Act:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EM: Office of Environmental Management:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 23, 2011:
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz:
Chairman:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
House of Representatives:
After decades of nuclear weapons production, the nation now faces the
complex task of storing and eventually disposing of two types of
highly radioactive waste.[Footnote 1] The first type, called "spent
nuclear fuel," is the fuel that has been used and then removed from
nuclear reactors operated for weapons production. The Department of
Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing the spent nuclear fuel
primarily from weapons-related activities and other defense-related
activities but also from certain nondefense activities. The second
type of nuclear waste is "high-level waste," a by-product of weapons
production and other defense-related activities--much of it currently
stored in liquid or semiliquid form in large underground tanks. DOE's
Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for storing and
managing a total of almost 13,000 metric tons[Footnote 2] of nuclear
waste at five sites: the Hanford Site in Washington state, the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, Idaho National Laboratory in
Idaho, the Fort St. Vrain Site in Colorado, and the West Valley Site
in New York.
DOE has agreements with these states governing how the nuclear waste
is managed. These agreements can include various dates by which DOE
agrees to complete certain activities, such as processing high-level
waste, transferring spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to safer
storage, and removing nuclear waste from the site. Some of these
agreements include penalties if these dates, known as milestones, are
not met. The Navy is also a party to agreements with Idaho, where it
stores spent nuclear fuel from submarines and aircraft carriers at
DOE's Idaho site.[Footnote 3]
For decades, DOE has planned to permanently dispose of these nuclear
wastes--some components of which remain dangerously radioactive for
thousands of years--in a deep geological repository at Yucca Mountain
in southwestern Nevada, but that plan is now in question. As amended
in 1987, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 directs DOE to study
Yucca Mountain as the site for a repository to store both DOE's
nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear reactors.
[Footnote 4] The act, as amended, also identifies the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsible for licensing the
development, construction, and operation of a repository at Yucca
Mountain. In June 2008, after spending more than $14 billion since
1983 to study potential repository sites and to develop the technical
documents for a license, DOE submitted an application to the NRC
seeking authorization to construct a repository at the Yucca Mountain
site. DOE planned to open the repository in 2020.
In a budget submission to Congress in 2009, however, the
administration stated its decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain
program and proposed eliminating funding for the development of the
Yucca Mountain repository. In March 2010, DOE filed a motion with
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board--which is responsible for
hearing legal and technical challenges to DOE's license application--
to withdraw its application with prejudice. DOE stated it was seeking
"this form of dismissal because it does not intend ever to refile an
application to construct a permanent geological repository for spent
fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain" and it "will
provide finality in ending the Yucca Mountain project." In June 2010,
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied DOE's withdrawal
motion, concluding that DOE lacks the authority under the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, as amended, to withdraw the license application. The
ultimate outcome of DOE's plan to terminate the Yucca Mountain program
remains unsettled. First, the commissioners who head the NRC can
choose whether to review the board's decision to deny DOE's motion and
can either uphold or reverse the board's decision. In addition, two
states, a county, and private citizens sued DOE and NRC in federal
court, arguing that DOE had no authority to terminate the proposed
Yucca Mountain repository. As of mid-March 2011, the consolidated
lawsuit for these parties has not been settled or decided.
To develop waste disposal alternatives, the administration directed
DOE to establish the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future. The commission, which was formed in January 2010, is to
conduct a comprehensive review of policies and provide advice,
evaluate alternatives, and make recommendations for managing the
storage, processing, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste, among other things. Its final report is expected by January 29,
2012. For now, the decision to forgo Yucca Mountain leaves DOE without
a pathway to permanently dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste. In the absence of a repository at Yucca Mountain, some affected
states and communities are concerned that DOE may store waste at its
sites indefinitely.
In this context, you asked us to assess the effect of a possible
termination of the Yucca Mountain repository on nuclear waste stored
at DOE sites. For this report, our objectives were to assess (1)
agreements DOE and the Navy have with states concerning spent nuclear
fuel and high-level waste at five DOE sites and the effects, if any, a
termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have on DOE's and
the Navy's ability to fulfill these agreements; (2) the effects, if
any, a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have on
DOE's and the Navy's operations and costs for storing spent nuclear
fuel and high-level waste; and (3) DOE's and the Navy's plans to
mitigate these potential effects.
To address the first objective, we reviewed the statutory and
regulatory frameworks, including agreements between DOE and states,
regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste at DOE sites. To
address the second objective, we reviewed documents, including waste
treatment plans, program missions, EM's 5-year plan for fiscal years
2008 to 2012, DOE annual budget justifications, public statements of
DOE and EM officials, recommendations of EM's citizen advisory boards,
and DOE, Congressional Research Service, and GAO reports. We also
analyzed EM's contingency planning for the costs that would arise from
a hypothetical delayed opening of the Yucca Mountain repository in
2040 rather than 2020 and EM's cost modeling for extending on-site
storage for up to 500 years, the latter of which was prepared at our
request for a prior report.[Footnote 5] To view storage and treatment
facilities, we visited the three DOE sites--the Hanford Site, the
Savannah River Site, and Idaho National Laboratory--that store most of
the DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. To address
the third objective regarding EM's and the Navy's mitigation plans and
other possible options, we examined presentation slides, statements,
and transcripts for the Blue Ribbon Commission meetings and
congressional hearings and other pertinent documents. To get
additional information on our research objectives, we conducted
interviews with DOE and contractor officials representing the five DOE
sites, EM headquarters, EM's Office of Environmental Compliance, and
DOE's Office of General Counsel. We attended EM conferences on
managing nuclear materials in March and September 2010. We also
interviewed officials from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and
its counsel and officials with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Environmental Protection
Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and state agencies in Colorado,
Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and Washington. We limited our review
of the Department of Defense to only the Navy because Defense and Navy
officials told us that the Navy was the only organization in the
department with responsibilities for disposal of nuclear materials
destined for the Yucca Mountain repository.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
From 1944 until the 1980s, the United States used nuclear reactors to
produce plutonium and other materials for nuclear weapons. Plutonium
was extracted from the fuels used by these reactors by a chemical
process known as reprocessing.[Footnote 6] As a result of these
activities, after the shutdown of weapons production and of some
reprocessing plants at the end of the Cold War, DOE retained an
inventory of spent nuclear fuel that had not been reprocessed, as well
as high-level waste--which is one of the byproducts of reprocessing.
Weapons production and related defense activities--such as the
reprocessing of the Navy's spent nuclear fuel to produce new fuel,
which also created high-level waste--are the source of about 87
percent of DOE's inventory of spent nuclear fuel and almost its entire
inventory of high-level waste. Because weapons production and
reprocessing of the Navy's spent nuclear fuel have ended, DOE's
inventories of this waste are largely fixed.
DOE is also responsible for managing other nuclear waste from a
variety of sources, including some active programs that continue to
add to DOE's inventory. For example, DOE is responsible for managing
spent nuclear fuel from the Navy through the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program, which is jointly operated by DOE and the Navy. The Navy uses
nuclear-powered ships and submarines in carrying out its missions. The
spent nuclear fuel removed from these vessels is the primary driver of
increases in DOE's inventory, but it totals only 1 percent of DOE's
spent nuclear fuel inventory. The remainder of DOE's inventory of
nuclear waste comes from various nondefense sources, including spent
nuclear fuel from its own test and experimental reactors, reactors at
U.S. universities, and other government research reactors; commercial
reactor fuel acquired by DOE for research and development; and fuel
from foreign research reactors. For example, DOE stores fuel debris
from the Three Mile Island accident that occurred in 1979 at a
commercial nuclear power plant. It also stores spent nuclear fuel from
three commercial power demonstration projects, including from the
first commercial-scale high-temperature gas-cooled reactor plant in
the United States, at the Fort St. Vrain site. In addition, the United
States operates a program to take custody of spent nuclear fuel from
foreign research reactors, which supports a U.S. policy to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; this program is scheduled for
completion in 2019.
DOE currently stores its inventories of nuclear waste at five DOE
sites. In 1995, DOE decided to consolidate nearly all of its spent
nuclear fuel from other sites at three primary locations--the Hanford
Site, Idaho National Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site--for
storage and preparation for permanent disposal. The exception to this
consolidation decision is DOE's Fort St. Vrain site, which stores less
than 1 percent of DOE's total inventory. In 1999, DOE decided to store
its high-level waste where it was generated, at the same three primary
sites. In addition, DOE manages a small amount of high-level waste
that resulted from the relatively brief operation of the only
commercial reprocessing plant ever run in the United States. This
waste was generated between 1966 and 1972 from reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel at a site near West Valley, New York, where DOE is now
responsible for storing it.[Footnote 7]
Some of the nuclear waste at these sites requires further processing
and packaging before it can be safely stored over the long term or
removed for final disposal. In the case of spent nuclear fuel, this
generally means removing it from storage pools of water and packaging
it in stainless steel canisters. The processing and packaging of high-
level waste is vastly more complicated--a massive enterprise in which
DOE is removing waste from storage tanks and transferring it to
treatment facilities. For example, at the Savannah River Site, DOE is
vitrifying high-level waste by mixing it with a glass-forming
material, melting the mixture into glass, and pouring it into
stainless-steel canisters to harden. Across all sites, DOE expects to
eventually produce about 20,000 canisters of solidified high-level
waste. Once the wastes are stabilized, removing them from the sites
would require a destination where they could be stored or permanently
disposed of and a decades-long shipping campaign to get them there.
Appendix I describes how the sites are in different stages of
preparing spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste for final disposal.
In the meantime, DOE manages many types of storage facilities, as
illustrated in figure 1, of widely varying ages and conditions. For
example, DOE has generally been moving spent nuclear fuel from wet
storage in pools of water, designed to cool the fuel and provide
radiation protection, to dry storage. Dry storage has numerous
configurations, including underground storage vaults, only some of
which are covered by a building, and casks on an outdoor pad or a
railroad car. Overall, these storage facilities vary from aging to
almost new; for instance, they range from a 1950s building at the
Idaho National Laboratory to a high-level waste canister building
constructed in 2005 at the Savannah River Site.
Figure 1: Examples of Nuclear Waste Storage Systems at DOE Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Spent nuclear fuel being moved in a wet storage pool at the Savannah
River Site.
Source: DOE.
Spent nuclear fuel canisters stored in undersurface tubes in a storage
building at the Hanford Site.
Source: DOE.
High-level waste canisters in a shielded room at the West Valley Site
(viewed through protective glass).
Source: West Valley Demonstration Project.
Navy‘s spent nuclear fuel canisters surrounded by protective concrete
overpacks in a storage building at DOE's Idaho site.
Source: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
[End of figure]
DOE operates these five sites under a legal framework that includes
self-regulation, as well as regulation by federal agencies and states.
In contrast to the commercial nuclear industry's sites, which are
regulated by NRC, DOE generally operates under its own regulations for
nuclear safety at its sites.[Footnote 8] In addition, DOE's treatment,
storage, and disposal of radioactive and hazardous wastes are governed
by a number of federal and state laws, including the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), as amended, which
regulates the management of hazardous waste from generation to
disposal. The Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992 amended RCRA to
require federal agencies, including DOE, to develop waste treatment
plans for their sites that contain mixed wastes--certain wastes with
both radioactive and chemically hazardous materials. For example, high-
level waste is sometimes considered a mixed waste because it contains
highly corrosive, organic, or heavy metal components that may be
regulated under RCRA. These plans are approved by states that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authorized to administer
RCRA or by EPA in states that have not been so authorized.
Activities carried out under these plans are often governed by
compliance agreements between DOE, EPA, and the states (state
agreements), which regulate and oversee the activities. State
agreements establish the scope of work to be performed at given sites,
as well as "milestones"--specific dates by which these activities
should be achieved. The agreements may also impose monetary or other
penalties for missing milestones. Milestones may cover actions to
treat, store, and dispose of hazardous wastes located at the DOE
sites. Agreements differ by state. Some cover virtually all cleanup
activities at a site, while others cover just a portion. These
activities may include soil and groundwater remediation, low-level
radioactive waste disposition, and special nuclear material
consolidation; in this report, we focus on state agreement cleanup
activities involving spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. States
and DOE can negotiate to amend or modify the agreements, including
extending or eliminating milestones.
State agreements may be created in at least four ways. First, states
may enter into Federal Facilities Agreements (also known as Tri-Party
Agreements) with DOE and EPA, which implement the Comprehensive
Environmental Responsibility, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) and RCRA, as well as state hazardous waste law requirements
to set the cleanup schedules at sites. CERCLA, among other things,
authorizes EPA to compel responsible parties to initiate cleanup
activities at hazardous waste sites. Second, states may take legal
action against DOE seeking review of its compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act, which can result in settlement agreements
between the parties and may outline activities and milestones. Third,
Congress may address the management of wastes at a specific site.
Finally, federal government officials may enter into agreements with
states concerning DOE-managed radioactive waste, which may include
specific cleanup milestones.
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Could Threaten DOE's and
the Navy's Ability to Fulfill Agreements with Colorado and Idaho:
The five states with DOE sites storing nuclear waste have agreements
with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding how nuclear waste
will be managed. However, only the agreements with Colorado and Idaho
would be affected by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository
because only those agreements specify dates for removing the waste
from the DOE sites.
All Five States Have Agreements Regarding the Management of Nuclear
Waste at DOE Sites:
Each DOE site falls under at least one state agreement that specifies
certain treatment, storage, or disposal activities for high-level
waste, spent nuclear fuel, or both. The agreements with four sites
deal with the safe storage and treatment of high-level waste. (DOE's
site in Colorado, does not store any high-level waste; it stores only
spent nuclear fuel.) In addition, state agreements for some DOE sites
focus on the storage of spent nuclear fuel or its removal from the
states. Major state agreements at each site are as follows:
* Idaho National Laboratory. DOE and the Navy are party to a 1995
settlement agreement and consent decree (the Idaho Settlement
Agreement), entered into the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, to settle a lawsuit brought by the state. The
agreement commits DOE to prepare its high-level waste for shipment out
of Idaho for disposal. The agreement also contains provisions for
managing spent nuclear fuel. Specifically, it requires DOE and the
Navy to move their spent nuclear fuel from storage in pools of water
to dry storage--given state concerns that the water pools might leak
and radioactively contaminate the underlying groundwater--and later to
move the spent nuclear fuel out of Idaho.
* Fort St. Vrain Site. In 1996 the Governor of Colorado signed an
agreement with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management at
DOE, referred to as the "Agreement Between the Department of Energy
and the State of Colorado Regarding Shipping Spent Fuel Out of
Colorado." The agreement states that DOE is committed to shipping its
spent nuclear fuel stored at Fort St. Vrain out of Colorado.
* Hanford Site. The Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent
Order (Tri-Party Agreement) of 1989, as amended, entered into by DOE,
EPA, and the state of Washington's Department of Ecology, focuses on
completing DOE's closure of tanks that store liquid waste and
solidifying its high-level waste for safer storage. The agreement also
requires DOE to develop a disposition plan for cesium and strontium
capsules, which are managed as high-level waste, if vitrification is
not planned.[Footnote 9]
* Savannah River Site. The 1993 Federal Facility Agreement for the
Savannah River Site and the Savannah River Site Treatment Plan of 1995
between DOE and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control focus on completing DOE's closure of tanks that
store liquid waste and solidifying its high-level waste for safer
storage.
* West Valley Site. The West Valley Demonstration Project Act, enacted
in 1980, directs the Secretary of Energy to enter into a cooperative
agreement with New York and to carry out a radioactive waste
management demonstration project at the western New York Service
Center in West Valley, New York. The project includes solidifying high-
level waste, developing waste containers suitable for permanent
disposal, and transporting the solidified waste to an appropriate
federal repository for permanent disposal.
Agreements with Idaho and Colorado Have Milestones for Waste Removal
That Could Be Affected by Terminating the Yucca Mountain Repository:
A termination of the Yucca Mountain repository may prevent DOE and the
Navy from meeting agreements with Colorado and Idaho that establish
milestones for shipping the spent nuclear fuel out the states. As
shown in table 1, the other agreements do not set dates for removing
spent nuclear fuel from DOE sites. No state agreement sets a date for
removing high-level waste.
Table 1: Details of State Agreements Regarding Nuclear Waste at the
Five DOE Sites:
DOE sites: Idaho site: Idaho National Laboratory;
High-level waste: Stored at site: Yes;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: No[A];
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: Yes;
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: Jan. 1, 2035.
DOE sites: Idaho site: Navy;
High-level waste: Stored at site: No;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: Not applicable;
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: Yes;
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: Jan. 1, 2035.
DOE sites: Fort St. Vrain in Colorado;
High-level waste: Stored at site: No;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: Not applicable;
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: Yes;
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: Jan. 1, 2035.
DOE sites: Hanford Site in Washington;
High-level waste: Stored at site: Yes;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: No;
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: Yes;
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: No.
DOE sites: Savannah River Site in South Carolina;
High-level waste: Stored at site: Yes;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: No;
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: Yes;
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: No.
DOE sites: West Valley Site in New York;
High-level waste: Stored at site: Yes;
High-level waste: Milestones for removal: No[B];
Spent nuclear fuel: Stored at site: No[C];
Spent nuclear fuel: Milestones for removal: Not applicable.
Source: GAO analysis of state agreements.
[A] In the Idaho Settlement Agreement, DOE committed to a target date
to have high-level waste prepared for shipment out of Idaho by 2035,
but not to a milestone date for removal.
[B] The West Valley Demonstration Project Act commits DOE to "as soon
as feasible, transport, in accordance with applicable provisions of
law," the solidified high-level waste to a federal repository, but
does not specify a milestone date for removal.
[C] A DOE official told us that DOE took title to some spent nuclear
fuel from West Valley after the demonstration project began and
shipped it to the Idaho National Laboratory for storage. Earlier
during the commercial reprocessing efforts, a small amount of other
spent nuclear fuel was disposed of in the NRC-Licensed Disposal Area
at the site. The official said no decision has been made regarding
removal and disposal of this material at a geological repository.
[End of table]
DOE and the Navy, under the 1995 Idaho Settlement Agreement, are
required to remove from the state by January 1, 2035, spent nuclear
fuel stored at Idaho National Laboratory. In addition, DOE's head of
EM signed an agreement to remove the spent nuclear fuel stored at the
Fort St. Vrain site from Colorado by the same date.[Footnote 10] When
the agreements were signed, DOE had intended to remove the spent
nuclear fuel from these sites and ship it to the Yucca Mountain
repository for final disposition.[Footnote 11] Similarly, the Navy had
planned to transport its spent nuclear fuel from Idaho to the Yucca
Mountain repository starting after 2020. If the Yucca Mountain
repository is terminated, DOE and the Navy would lose their planned
shipping destination for their spent nuclear fuel, which could cause
them to miss the 2035 removal date they have committed to.
DOE and the Navy may be faced with significant penalties for missing
these removal milestones. For example, under the Idaho Settlement
Agreement, the federal government may be liable to pay the state
$60,000 for each day past January 1, 2035, that DOE and the Navy have
not removed their spent nuclear fuel from the state. Under the
Colorado state agreement, DOE may be liable to pay the state $15,000
for each day after January 1, 2035, that DOE fails to remove its spent
nuclear fuel. These penalties would total approximately $27.4 million
per year, although both state agreements stipulate that any possible
future payments of these penalties will be subject to the availability
of appropriations specifically for that purpose.
Under the Idaho Settlement Agreement, the state may also have the
ability to suspend any further DOE or Navy shipments of spent nuclear
fuel to DOE's Idaho site until the agreement's obligation for removal
of spent nuclear fuel is met. According to Navy officials, this would
be of much greater concern than the financial penalties. After
removing spent nuclear fuel from its warships as part of the refueling
process, the Navy transports it to the Idaho site for examination and
storage. No other sites are available for these critical activities. A
Navy official told us that developing the infrastructure for these
activities at a new site outside of Idaho would be time consuming and
costly, and other states might oppose such a facility within their
boundaries if there were no disposal pathway for the spent nuclear
fuel. If Idaho were to suspend the Navy's shipments of spent nuclear
fuel, the Navy would not be able to refuel its nuclear warships, which
Navy officials said would raise national security concerns. In
addition, suspension might effectively prevent the Navy from
continuing to examine its spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho site after
2035.[Footnote 12]
If DOE determines that it will not be able to meet the removal
milestones in the Idaho and Colorado agreements, it is unclear when
the department would approach these states or whether either state
would be amenable to renegotiating the agreement milestones. For
example, Idaho officials said they still expect DOE and the Navy to
meet the milestones. They stated that the 25 years remaining to remove
spent nuclear fuel from Idaho may not be enough time to establish an
alternative repository, but they noted that the Idaho Settlement
Agreement does not require the spent nuclear fuel to be sent to the
Yucca Mountain repository, only that it be removed from Idaho. These
officials also said Idaho might seek remedies in court if it becomes
evident that DOE is not positioned to meet a future milestone.
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Would Not Affect Near-
Term Operations at DOE Sites but Would Likely Extend On-Site Storage
of Nuclear Waste:
According to DOE and Navy officials, a termination of the Yucca
Mountain repository would not generally affect their nuclear waste
operations in the near term. However, it would likely extend on-site
storage of nuclear waste, which would lead to increased storage costs
for the federal government. In addition, DOE officials said they will
need additional information on storage facilities to plan storage
beyond the time set forth in the current site plans.
Near-Term Operations at DOE Sites Generally Would Be Unaffected:
According to EM officials, a termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository is not expected to affect site operations in the near term
because current DOE operations are primarily focused on treating high-
level wastes and moving spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage--
activities that do not depend on having a repository available.
Operations at the primary DOE sites we reviewed--Hanford, Idaho, and
Savannah River--are currently focused on treating high-level
radioactive liquid tank waste or moving spent nuclear fuel from wet to
dry storage. These efforts are intended to immobilize high-level waste
and provide safer storage on site until disposal at a repository.
Savannah River is vitrifying the site's high-level waste by combining
it with glass-forming chemicals to make a glass that is poured into
stainless steel canisters and sealed by welding; Hanford is building a
$12.3 billion complex to do the same. Savannah River and Hanford
officials said they intend to continue these operations through
completion, regardless of the status of the Yucca Mountain repository,
because of EM's mission to mitigate environmental risk and because the
officials are trying to meet milestones in their state agreements for
removing high-level waste from tanks. Idaho National Laboratory has
treated much of its high-level waste[Footnote 13] with a different
process, called calcination, which turns the waste into a dry granular
powder. In a 2009 record of decision, DOE decided to take additional
steps to put the calcine waste into a monolithic form within canisters
for permanent disposal, but according to EM officials, this work has
not yet been started. Regarding spent nuclear fuel, Idaho is in the
process of moving all of it from wet to dry storage, and Hanford has
generally completed the process. According to EM officials, there are
no plans at this time for the Savannah River Site to move spent
nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage.
Furthermore, at a 2010 hearing, the head of the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program stated that termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository would have no near-term effect on its operations at Idaho.
The Navy intends to continue moving its spent nuclear fuel out of wet
storage and placing it into canisters that are ready for transport
when an alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository is available. In
the meantime, the Navy will store the canisters at the Idaho site, as
it anticipated doing while waiting for the Yucca Mountain repository
to open.
Some officials, such as those from the Washington State Department of
Ecology, raised concerns that a termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository could affect current operations if a replacement repository
is selected with different requirements for accepting waste. Waste
acceptance criteria govern aspects such as the waste canister's shape,
size, and radioactive content. According to EM officials, however,
continuing operations in accordance with the treatment and packaging
requirements established for the Yucca Mountain repository license
application likely does not raise any significant issues. They said
that EM, in coordination with NRC and EPA, strives to develop waste
forms and package designs that will likely be accepted at any geologic
repository, and they expect that any new repository would be designed
to safely hold the high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel that has
already been packaged.
While the sites can generally continue with their operations and plans
without the opening of a repository, a termination of the Yucca
Mountain repository may change some plans related to disposal. For
example, if a repository is not available, sites can delay building
shipping facilities, which would need to be in place about 5 years
before a repository is available.
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Will Likely Extend On-
Site Storage and Increase Costs:
Without a Yucca Mountain repository, DOE will likely have to extend
storage of nuclear wastes at DOE sites, which will increase its
storage costs--although it is difficult to predict by how much.
According to a 2009 Congressional Research Service report, halting the
development of the Yucca Mountain repository would almost certainly
require that nuclear waste remain at on-site storage facilities longer
than currently planned. This is because a new repository to replace
the Yucca Mountain repository would be unlikely to open by
2020.[Footnote 14] Similarly, senior EM officials told us they
understand that high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel may remain at
DOE sites for a "considerable" period of time. On-site storage can be
safe and secure for long periods, according to a National Research
Council report, but it would require a continuing commitment of
resources for the storage to be continuously monitored, maintained,
and periodically rebuilt.[Footnote 15]
For our analysis, we used DOE's own estimate that the Yucca Mountain
repository would be open in 2020. This 2008 estimate was made before
DOE took steps to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program.
While we recognize the 2020 date was not certain, we know of no better
assumption to meaningfully assess the impact of a termination of the
Yucca Mountain repository. In a written comment to us, DOE officials
stated that it is incorrect to conclude there will be a delay in
moving the nuclear materials or disposing of them using an alternative
strategy compared to pursuing the Yucca Mountain program.
Specifically, they stated it is speculation to say a new strategy will
take longer to implement than continuing with the Yucca Mountain
program because there is no guarantee of when, if ever, the many
significant steps for opening the Yucca Mountain repository would have
occurred. Since the comment provides only a hypothetical bounding
possibility--the Yucca Mountain repository might have never opened,
even without DOE's current steps to terminate it--rather than a new
estimate for when the repository might have opened, we note the DOE
officials' position but do not analyze it further.
Longer storage would increase costs at DOE sites because it would
require additional years of storage beyond current plans, which
assumed shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository starting in 2020.
These storage costs generally fall into three categories:[Footnote 16]
* Annual and recurring storage costs: Annual costs include costs for
operations, maintenance, surveillance, and security for the storage
facilities. Recurrent costs are generally maintenance or repair costs
that are not annual, such as the anticipated cost of replacing a
storage building's roof every 25 to 30 years.
* Increased storage capacity: Beyond storage already available or
planned, the Hanford Site, the Savannah River Site, and the Naval
Reactor Facility at the Idaho site would have to build additional
storage if their canister inventory cannot be reduced by sending
canisters to the Yucca Mountain repository. This capacity can be
expensive. For example, an EM analysis estimated that Hanford would
need three additional storage facilities to accommodate all of the
waste canisters. These facilities would be built as needed, at an
estimated cost of $100 million (2010 dollars) each.
* Replacement of storage facilities and containers. Existing storage
systems must be replaced once they exceed their useful lives. DOE has
not yet determined the design of these replacement storage systems,
and these costs could be incurred well into the future. For example,
in a 2002 analysis, DOE assumed that the storage facilities would
undergo complete replacement after the first 100 years and every 100
years thereafter.
EM estimates that it could need an additional $918 million (2010
dollars) to extend storage if the opening of a permanent repository
were delayed from 2020 to 2040.[Footnote 17] About two-thirds of these
costs would fall into the category of annual and recurring storage
costs.[Footnote 18] For example, costs for storing spent nuclear fuel
at the Hanford Site were estimated at $6 million per year for an
additional 20 years. The remaining one-third of the projected
additional costs fall into the category of increased storage capacity
beyond what would be needed if the Yucca Mountain repository had
opened in 2020.[Footnote 19] EM's estimate did not include any costs
in the category of replacing storage facilities and containers because
it assumed a delay of 20 years would not necessitate the replacement
of any existing storage buildings or containers. If storage were
extended well into the future, however, some buildings would need to
be replaced. For instance, Savannah River Site officials said the high-
level waste canister storage buildings at the site have a design life
of 50 years,[Footnote 20] but are expected to have a usable life of
100 years if properly maintained. According to the officials, if
storage needs to be extended beyond the storage buildings' usable
life, these buildings would have to be replaced at an estimated cost
of about $75 million each, the cost when the last one was built in
2005.
DOE may also have to replace or reinforce waste containers.
Specifically, spent nuclear fuel canisters might need to be either
repackaged or left in the original canister but then placed into a
larger one, called a canister overpack. For the high-level waste
canisters, which are not amenable to repackaging (which would involve
the removal of the high-level waste glass from the original stainless
steel canisters), Savannah River officials stated that they could
likely be stored safely on site for a long time, perhaps 1,000 years,
without the canisters breaching from corrosion. Problems could arise
earlier for transport to a repository, however. After an estimated 200
years, DOE could face problems safely retrieving and moving the
canisters from the on-site storage vault to the permanent repository
because of potential corrosion at the neck of the canister. Savannah
River officials explained that a transporter lifts the canister by its
neck to move it in or out of storage in subsurface vaults, as
illustrated in figure 2. If a corroded neck breaks when lifted, DOE
would have difficulties retrieving the canister. Breaking the neck of
the canister could also contaminate the vault, which would require
cleanup. Because of these concerns, according to a site official and
an EM expert, DOE might decide to overpack the high-level waste
canisters, perhaps as early as after 100 to 150 years of storage.
Moreover, if DOE did overpack the canisters, it would also need to
design and construct new storage buildings because the new larger
overpack would not fit into the storage positions in the existing
buildings at Savannah River.
Figure 2: A Transporter Lifting a High-Level Waste Canister over the
Concrete Storage Vault:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Crosscut illustration of a storage building at Savannah River Site:
Shielded canister transporter:
Source: Savannah River Remediation.
[End of figure]
It is difficult to accurately estimate these increased on-site storage
costs because of three key factors. First, how long the wastes will
remain on-site cannot be projected with certainty because it is
unclear when an alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository will be
available. Reflecting the degree of uncertainty, presenters at a March
2010 EM conference on managing spent nuclear fuel considered a wide
variety of possible periods of storage, from 40 to 300 years. Second,
the actual configuration and cost of any future storage systems are
not yet known. This is because DOE has not devised a plan for long-
term storage and because DOE has yet to make certain decisions that
could change the type of future storage and costs, according to EM
officials. For example, because DOE has not decided whether to process
spent nuclear fuel through Savannah River Site's H-Canyon facility, it
does not know the final configuration of the waste storage system or
the cost of storing it. Third, because DOE does not know how long
current storage systems can be used safely, it does not know the
appropriate timing for replacing them, EM officials said. They
emphasized that the useful lives of existing storage systems are
uncertain and will only be discovered over time through continuous
surveillance to identify degradation.
Additional Information on Storage Facilities and Any Unique Storage
Needs Would Be Required for DOE to Plan for Longer Storage:
EM officials told us that DOE can extend storage of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level waste on DOE sites for some time but will need
additional information on storage facilities to plan storage beyond
the time set forth in the current site plans. These officials said the
current plans generally assume that the nuclear waste will be shipped
to a repository by about 2050, and the sites' facilities are designed
to last approximately until then. A major exception is that Idaho
National Laboratory had planned to use its spent nuclear fuel storage
facilities only through 2035, a date chosen because of the Idaho
Settlement Agreement's milestone.
One option for extending on-site storage would be to extend the lives
of existing storage facilities when they reach the end of their design
lives. EM officials said they do not know how long a storage facility
may last because long-term storage at sites is unprecedented. In
addition, they said they know of no studies that verify the estimates
of facilities' useful lives beyond their design lives. It is also
unclear how long the canisters or the spent nuclear fuel can be stored
without degradation, which would interfere with safe retrieval and
transport to another location. Such degradation could necessitate
repackaging or overpacking to meet NRC transportation requirements
before sending the canisters to a disposal site.
Although EM officials told us EM has not yet planned for extending the
lives of storage buildings, an official at Idaho National Laboratory
told us that studies could be designed to provide confidence that
storage buildings will last for an additional 20 or 30 years.
Specifically, these longevity studies could identify components of the
storage facility that are at risk for failure and repairs that could
extend storage. For example, a longevity study may conclude that Idaho
National Laboratory needs to shore up a particular wall in a storage
area for spent nuclear fuel in order to assure that the area will last
for another 30 years. Such information would be useful to EM in
budgeting for the maintenance and repairs that are needed to extend
the lives of existing facilities or for their replacement at the end
of their useful lives. Similarly, to assess how to manage aging
facilities for the long term, EM officials told us about some internal
proposals for research and development on spent nuclear fuel storage,
including ways to monitor wet and dry storage for degradation.
However, it is uncertain how much information this intended effort
will ultimately provide, since EM officials said that EM has not
budgeted any funds for this work.
A second option would be to build new storage facilities for very long-
term storage--such as beyond 120 years--that may exceed the useful
lives of existing facilities. However, to plan for very long-term
storage, DOE may need to conduct research to get information about its
sites' unique storage needs. EM officials said EM currently has no
research plan for very long-term storage for the wastes at DOE sites.
An NRC official stated that NRC and other groups are planning to
research the technical basis for the very long-term storage of
commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120 years. However, it is unclear
whether this research will address all of DOE's waste storage needs
since EM officials said DOE storage systems generally differ from
those used for commercial waste. NRC is not evaluating DOE spent
nuclear fuel because it generally does not have authority over DOE,
according to an NRC official. According to NRC officials, NRC also is
not yet looking at long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in the two
NRC-licensed storage facilities at DOE's Idaho and Colorado sites.
Because this spent nuclear fuel also differs from commercial spent
nuclear fuel, it will require a unique analysis that NRC is not likely
to undertake soon, NRC officials said.
More information would also be needed for DOE and the Navy to decide
between these two options. New facilities might increase the cost-
effectiveness of storage over the long term and be better designed to
monitor deterioration and address security issues. However, DOE and
the Navy cannot determine the resulting benefit without knowing the
costs and time periods involved for each of the two options. For
example, EM officials said DOE would not want to invest in costly new
storage facilities that could last hundreds of years, only to discover
that a shorter period of storage was needed. Furthermore, DOE may need
more information about state and local support for the two options.
Based on our discussions and review of documents, some states and
communities may oppose any signs that DOE is planning long-term
storage at the sites. As New York officials told us, for instance, the
local community may react negatively to a new storage facility at the
West Valley site because it would be a visible sign that the nuclear
waste is not moving.[Footnote 21] On the other hand, some states and
communities may favor building robust storage facilities to help
ensure safety.
DOE and the Navy Have Not Developed Plans to Mitigate the Impact of
Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository on Nuclear Waste Storage:
EM and Navy officials told us they will not make any mitigation plans
until those plans can be informed by the Blue Ribbon Commission's
recommendations, which are expected by January 29, 2012. EM officials
told us that it is too early for EM to jettison its current plans
because of the uncertainties about the possible alternatives to the
Yucca Mountain repository. In addition, according to EM management, EM
will not make any plans for extended storage before the Blue Ribbon
Commission has made its recommendations because it does not want to
preclude any strategies or options the Blue Ribbon Commission might
recommend.
For some years after the commission's recommendations are available,
however, DOE and the Navy could experience difficulties planning how
to mitigate the impact of a termination because uncertainties about
the alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository may take time to
resolve. Establishing an alternative site for a repository, for
example, would likely require new legislation, according the officials
at DOE's Office of General Counsel. This might reopen lengthy and
contentious political debates over repository siting. It took almost 4
years of congressional effort to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, followed by about 5 years of additional effort, before Congress
narrowed the evaluation of possible repository sites to Yucca
Mountain. In addition, because it is not clear how specific the Blue
Ribbon Commission's recommendations will be, it may take DOE
additional work and time to use these recommendations to develop a new
nuclear waste management policy. For example, it may take time to
reassess whether to use the same procedures in siting a repository for
DOE and Navy materials and commercial spent nuclear fuel. According to
a 1982 Office of Technology Assessment report, this issue was a major
obstacle to passing nuclear waste legislation in 1979 and 1980.
[Footnote 22]
With a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository, both DOE and the
Navy recognize they will need to devise alternative strategies to meet
state commitments for removing spent nuclear fuel from both Colorado
and Idaho, and both are waiting for the Blue Ribbon Commission
recommendations before planning a strategy. Navy officials said they
expect that the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations will define a
potential alternate path for defense waste that will allow it to
comply with the Idaho Settlement Agreement and to continue operations
at DOE's Idaho site. EM officials believe it is too early to talk with
states about renegotiating agreements and told us that they plan to
wait until alternative plans to the Yucca Mountain repository can be
made. In any event, they stated, DOE intends to remain in compliance
with milestones and requirements in agreements with the states of
Colorado and Idaho.
A termination of Yucca Mountain, however, may threaten DOE's and the
Navy's ability to meet state commitments. Specifically, some
alternatives that the Blue Ribbon Commission might consider may not
provide a solution soon enough--in the less than 25 years remaining
before the 2035 milestones--or may not be applicable to DOE's and the
Navy's spent nuclear fuel. Although the commission has not indicated
what it plans to recommend, it has heard testimony on alternatives
that have previously been discussed and that might allow for removal
of nuclear waste from DOE sites. One of these alternatives is to
establish one or more new permanent repositories to replace the Yucca
Mountain repository. However, establishing another repository may not
allow enough time to meet the 2035 milestones unless the process is
more expeditious for a new repository than it was for Yucca Mountain.
For the Yucca Mountain repository, in 2008 this process was projected
to ultimately last at least 37 years--from the beginning of the siting
process in 1983 to the earliest possible start of operations, in 2020.
The commission is also considering changes to the way nuclear waste is
stored prior to final disposal. One alternative that DOE previously
studied for commercial spent nuclear fuel is storing it at a
centralized site. For our November 2009 report on alternatives to the
Yucca Mountain repository, an expert in centralized storage estimated
that opening a centralized facility could take between 17 and 33 years
from site selection until the facility began accepting waste.[Footnote
23] A third alternative, which DOE has also previously considered, is
for the United States to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to create new
fuel for reactors. However, current reprocessing technology may not be
cost-effective and, if not managed properly, creates proliferation
concerns because the resulting materials could be used in a nuclear
weapon. Transitioning the nuclear industry to new technologies to
address these concerns could take 50 to 100 years, according to a 2010
report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[Footnote 24]
Even then, this solution might apply mainly to commercial spent
nuclear fuel, rather than the fuel stored at DOE sites, because it may
be impractical or uneconomical to reprocess the relatively small
quantities and many different types of spent nuclear fuels stored at
DOE sites, according to DOE documents and Navy officials.
Conclusions:
For decades, the United States has been struggling with the issue of
what to do with the nuclear waste from weapons production and several
other sources. With the possible termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository, it may be about to restart this potentially time-consuming
and contentious process. In the short term, this is unlikely to affect
nuclear waste operations for DOE or the Navy. However, long-term
storage costs at sites are likely to increase since DOE would need to
store waste for longer periods prior to permanent disposal.
Furthermore, as a result of the potential termination, DOE and the
Navy may fail to meet commitments they have made with Colorado and
Idaho to remove spent nuclear fuel by 2035.
The fate of the Yucca Mountain repository is still uncertain, and
DOE's Blue Ribbon Commission may not provide recommendations on a new
direction for nuclear waste management until January 2012. Given this
situation, DOE and the Navy cannot yet easily plan or wisely invest in
long-term storage since they will not know how long they will have to
store waste at DOE sites. Nevertheless, it seems likely that some
extension of on-site storage will be needed, and additional
information about storage systems will be needed to even start
planning for extended storage. For example, it is not known how long
the lives of existing facilities can be extended or what will happen
to the waste or the storage containers during long-term on-site
storage. EM officials told us that EM currently has no plan for
developing information on extending the lives of existing facilities,
but longevity studies could identify components of the storage
facilities that are at risk for failure and repairs that could extend
storage. Moreover, although NRC and other groups are planning to
research the long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel, DOE
does not have comparable research planned for somewhat different
storage systems at its sites. Thus, without taking some preliminary
steps to assess the information necessary to plan for long-term
storage, DOE and the Navy will not have the understanding needed to
proceed with such planning when the future direction becomes clearer.
The alternative is to wait until there is further clarity about
national and departmental policy, which may take years after the Blue
Ribbon Commission provides recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help prepare for longer storage of nuclear waste at DOE sites, we
recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, and other DOE officials as appropriate, to
take the following two actions:
* Assess the condition of existing nuclear waste storage facilities
and the resources and information needed to extend the facilities'
useful lifetimes.
* Identify any gap between past and ongoing research into long-term
nuclear waste storage and any additional actions needed to address
DOE's unique waste storage needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE and the Navy with a draft of this report for their
review and comment. The Navy chose not to provide formal comments. DOE
provided written comments on March 11, 2011, which are summarized
below and reproduced in appendix II. DOE stated that it agreed with
our recommendations but disagreed with two aspects of our report--that
(1) there would likely be delay and increased costs due to DOE's
decision to terminate a repository at Yucca Mountain and (2) DOE may
not meet its commitments to the states of Idaho and Colorado. After
reviewing DOE's comments, we believe that our findings are adequately
supported and that any assumptions upon which those findings are based
are appropriately acknowledged.
We are encouraged that DOE agrees that it needs better information on
the condition of existing nuclear waste storage facilities as well as
research on very long-term storage to meet its unique needs. DOE
recognizes that the waste may remain on its sites for a considerable
period of time. This will likely require DOE to revise the target date
in its current plans, which assume that a repository will be available
in 2020.
DOE disagreed with parts of the draft report that stated there would
likely be a delay in removing waste from DOE sites and increased costs
as a result of DOE's decision to terminate the proposed repository at
Yucca Mountain. DOE stated that there was no "certain" date for
opening the Yucca Mountain repository and that any opening was subject
to contingencies beyond DOE's control. DOE characterized our finding
of a likely delay as speculation. DOE also stated that the Blue Ribbon
Commission could propose options that will lead to more rapid disposal
of waste than the Yucca Mountain approach.
We believe that using 2020 as an opening date for the Yucca Mountain
repository was a reasonable assumption for analyzing the effects of a
possible termination of the program. In 2008, DOE itself established
this target date for opening the planned Yucca Mountain repository,
before it took steps to terminate the program. DOE did not provide an
alternative target or any basis for one in its comments, which would
be necessary for conducting a meaningful analysis. We agree that the
opening date for the Yucca Mountain repository was uncertain, and
therefore we have made clear in the report that our analysis is based
on DOE's own assumption of a 2020 opening. Regarding DOE's assertion
that the Blue Ribbon Commission could propose options for more rapid
disposal, this also provides no new basis for analysis. It is unclear
how specific the commission's recommendations will be, whether DOE
will choose to implement them, or how quickly they can be implemented.
Key alternatives to Yucca Mountain that we reviewed--centralized
storage, reprocessing, or a new repository--could take decades to
implement. Therefore, the Yucca Mountain repository could have opened
many years after 2020 and still possibly have been available sooner
than these alternatives. Such uncertainties for both the availability
of the Yucca Mountain repository and for any alternative led us to
report a "likely" lengthening of the duration of on-site storage.
DOE's comments provide no basis for revising our finding.
Second, DOE objected to the suggestion that DOE may not meet its
commitments to the states of Idaho and Colorado. DOE stated in its
comments that it intends to meet its commitments to remove spent
nuclear fuel from those states by 2035, and that there is no factual
basis to support that the commitments will not be met. However, we
disagree with DOE's representation of our findings and supporting
facts. Although our report does conclude that DOE may not meet it
commitments, it does not state that DOE "will not" meet them. Instead,
we highlight some challenges to meeting these commitments if the Yucca
Mountain repository program were terminated. Without the Yucca
Mountain repository, DOE currently has no planned shipping destination
for its spent nuclear fuel, and it is not clear when a new destination
will be available. We also reported that some alternatives that the
Blue Ribbon Commission might consider may not provide a solution soon
enough--in the less than 25 years remaining before the 2035
milestones--or may not be applicable to DOE's spent nuclear fuel. We
are unable to say more because, as we reported, DOE has yet to
announce a new plan for meeting its commitments. Its likelihood of
meeting them will be clearer after DOE specifies how it plans to
establish a new destination and ship its spent nuclear fuel there by
2035.
DOE and the Navy also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Energy and
Defense, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Status of DOE's Preparation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Waste for Disposal:
The five Department of Energy (DOE) sites manage very different
amounts of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, all of which will
have to be prepared for disposal in a repository. The inventories
differ in terms of metric tons of heavy metal for spent nuclear fuel
and in terms of the number of canisters of high-level waste that will
be produced (see figure 3).[Footnote 25] The Hanford Site has about 85
percent of the spent nuclear fuel by weight and is projected to have
about 45 percent of the canisters of high-level waste.
Figure 3: 2010 Inventories of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste
at DOE's Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Fort St. Vrain Site, Colorado:
* about 15 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel.
Hanford Site, Washington:
* about 2,130 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel;
* about 9,700 high-level waste canisters projected.
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho:
* about 280 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel;
* about 3,590 to 5,090 high-level waste canisters projected.
Savannah River Site, South Carolina:
* about 30 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel;
* about 2,900 high-level waste canisters produced of about 7,600
projected.
West Valley Site:
* 275 high-level waste canisters produced.
Totals:
* about 2,458 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel[A];
* about 3,175 high-level waste canisters produced of about 21,165 to
22,655 projected.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.
[A] The total includes an approximate two metric tons of spent nuclear
fuel located at other domestic sites. In addition to this total, about
25 metric tons of the Navy's spent nuclear fuel is at DOE's Idaho site.
[End of figure]
Sites are in very different stages of preparing spent nuclear fuel and
high-level waste for final disposal. Preparation generally involves
loading and sealing the materials into stainless steel canisters
suitable for permanent disposal in a repository. For spent nuclear
fuel, the Hanford Site has placed almost all of its spent nuclear fuel
in multicanister overpacks for placement in a repository. DOE has
planned to place the remaining Hanford inventory of spent nuclear
fuel--less than 1 percent of Hanford's total--and most of the spent
nuclear fuel inventory at Idaho National Laboratory into DOE standard
canisters. DOE, however, has not yet built the needed canister
packaging facilities.[Footnote 26] At DOE's Idaho site, the Navy's
spent nuclear fuel is being placed into a different type of canister
for disposal. DOE also intends to ship the spent nuclear fuel from the
Fort St. Vrain facility to Idaho National Laboratory for packaging
into DOE standard canisters shortly before shipping it to a
repository. For the Savannah River Site, DOE has planned to ship its
non-aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel to Idaho National Laboratory
and, in exchange, receive the laboratory's aluminum-based spent
nuclear fuel to add to its own inventory.[Footnote 27] The Savannah
River Site would process the aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at its
H-Canyon facility, where uranium would be extracted for fuel
production and a resulting liquid waste stream would be vitrified for
final disposal as high-level waste in canisters. To date, the spent
nuclear fuel exchange has not occurred between Idaho National
Laboratory and the Savannah River Site, and DOE is still considering
whether to proceed with processing the aluminum-based spent nuclear
fuel at the H-Canyon facility.
To prepare high-level waste for shipment to a repository, DOE has been
converting it to a solid glass form and sealing it in stainless steel
canisters. Depending on the stage of the processing for disposal, high-
level radioactive waste can be in a liquid, sludge, or crystallized
form in waste tanks; a solid glass form in a canister; a solid
granular form (calcine); or a solid ceramic form in a canister. DOE
initially prepares high-level radioactive waste for disposal by
transferring the radioactive waste from storage tanks to a treatment
facility. Treatment can include separation of the waste into high-and
low-radioactive streams, followed by vitrification that combines the
high-level waste with glass-forming chemicals to make a glass that is
poured into stainless steel canisters and sealed by welding.[Footnote
28] Instead of using vitrification at Idaho National Laboratory, DOE
first solidified the high-level waste into a granular form, known as
calcine, and placed it in stainless steel storage bins within concrete
vaults. To prepare it for transportation and disposal, DOE decided in
2009 to next process the calcine into a monolithic, possibly ceramic,
form within a canister. Both the solidified, immobilized glass and
ceramic forms are designed to keep the waste stable, confined, and
isolated from the environment. DOE has planned to store the solidified
high-level waste canisters on site until they are shipped to a
repository.
DOE sites are in markedly different stages of preparing high-level
waste for final disposition, and, overall, DOE has produced about 15
percent of the projected number of canisters. By early 2010, the
Hanford Site and Idaho National Laboratory had not yet produced
canisters of immobilized high-level waste. The Savannah River Site was
approaching completion of almost 40 percent of its projected number of
canisters, after starting vitrification operations in 1996. Similarly,
the West Valley Site began vitrifying waste in 1996 but completed
production in 2002. Preparing the many remaining canisters of waste is
expected to be a lengthy process. For example, the Hanford waste
treatment plant currently being built is not scheduled to begin
operations until 2019 and then is expected to take almost three
decades to produce about 10,000 canisters of waste.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
March 11, 2011:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director of Natural Resources and Environment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report entitled "DOE
Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites
as a Result of Yucca Mountain Shutdown."
The Department of Energy (DOE) agrees with the draft report's
conclusion that the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository will
not affect near-term nuclear waste operations at DOE sites. However,
DOE disagrees with, and objects to, statements in the draft report
that there would likely be delay and increased costs due to DOE's
decision to terminate a repository at Yucca Mountain. As the report
itself concedes (at page 20),[now on p. 16] there was no "certain"
date for opening the Yucca Mountain repository, and any opening was
always subject to contingencies beyond DOE's control. By the same
token, the report disregards the fact that the Blue Ribbon Commission
is currently considering these matters and could propose options that
will lead to more rapid disposal of waste than the Yucca Mountain
approach. Indeed, after DOE highlighted these and other points, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that DOE's
decisions with regard to Yucca Mountain created no irreparable injury.
While the U.S. Government Accountability Office may view there is
increased risk of a delay in repository operation, it should not base
its analysis (as it currently does) on speculation that there will be
a delay.
DOE also objects to the suggestion that DOE may not meet its
commitments to the States of Idaho and Colorado in 2035. DOE intends
to meet these commitments, and there is no factual basis, and
certainly nothing in the report, that would support that they will not
be met at this time.
That said, we do agree with the two recommendations made in the
report. The first recommendation suggests that the Office of
Environmental Management (EM) assess the condition of existing nuclear
waste storage facilities and of the resources and information needed
to extend their useful lifetimes. EM has already initiated activities
to implement the first recommendation (to assess the condition of
existing nuclear waste storage facilities and of the resources and
information needed to extend their useful lifetimes). In this regard,
while we agree that EM is responsible for most of DOE's nuclear waste
management activities, other Departmental elements have
responsibilities with respect to nuclear waste and this should be
acknowledged in this recommendation. [See comment]
The second recommendation suggests that EM identify any gap between
past and ongoing research into very long-term nuclear waste storage
and any additional research needed to address DOE's unique waste
storage needs. EM has identified innovative technologies and
strategies needed for long-term storage of high-level waste (HLW) and
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (also referred to as used nuclear fuel)
(Reference: Science and Technology to Reduce the Life Cycle Cost of
Closure, January 2011). EM is also actively collaborating with other
Departmental elements to identify other research and development
activities that address efforts needed to assure safe storage
capabilities for the very long-term, should that be necessary.
Examples of these research and development activities include: (1)
aging management studies to assure fuel and storage system integrity
in wet or dry storage systems such as remote corrosion
characterization; repairing aging concrete; and the effects.of water
chemistries on concrete and fuel corrosion; and (2) improving
technologies for preparing and packaging SNF for disposal over a broad
range of future scenarios. We will continue to evaluate and adapt our
research efforts in light of new plans and information regarding
nuclear waste management requirements.
Thank you for providing us an opportunity to review your draft report
and your assistance in strengthening our HLW and SNF management
programs. We also appreciate the opportunity for direct dialog with
you on these important issues prior to receiving the draft report. We
have enclosed specific comments for your consideration.
If you have any questions, please contact me or Mr. Frank Marcinowski,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical and Regulatory Support, at
(202) 586-0370.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Inez R. Triay:
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Enclosure:
cc:
D. Chung, EM-2:
C. Anderson, EM-3:
F. Marcinowski, Acting EM-4:
K. Picha, Acting EM-20:
Y. Collazo, EM-30:
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Energy's letter
dated March 11, 2011.
GAO Comment:
We acknowledged in our recommendations that they may need to be
directed to other DOE officials, as appropriate.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members
made key contributions to this report: Janet Frisch, Assistant
Director; Arkelga Braxton; Kevin Bray; Penney Harwell-Caramia; Scott
Fletcher; Eugene Gray; Terry Hanford; Jonathan Kelly; Anne Rhodes-
Kline; Mehrzad Nadji; Ben Shouse; and Vasiliki Theodoropoulos.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For this report, we use the phrase "nuclear waste" to include both
DOE's spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, since both
were planned for permanent disposal at Yucca Mountain. However, spent
nuclear fuel is potentially a resource rather than simply a waste for
disposal. Although spent nuclear fuel (also known as used nuclear
fuel) is no longer efficient in generating power in a reactor, it can
be reprocessed to separate uranium or plutonium that can be used to
construct nuclear weapons or to again fuel a reactor. Moreover,
according to EM officials, spent nuclear fuel on DOE sites is not
managed under waste regulations.
[2] DOE's estimated quantity is based on the metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel and an assumption that each canister of high-level waste
contributes a half metric ton.
[3] For this report, we refer to responses about the joint DOE and
Navy managed Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as responses from the
Navy to distinguish the program from other DOE operations. Within DOE,
this program is under the National Nuclear Security Administration,
which is a separate organization from EM. EM is responsible for
managing almost all of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste on
DOE sites.
[4] The majority of waste intended for the Yucca Mountain repository
is commercial spent nuclear fuel from electric power companies that is
not in DOE's possession. We are preparing a separate report on the
impacts of a possible termination of the Yucca Mountain repository on
the storage of this fuel, stored at 75 commercial reactor sites in 33
states.
[5] GAO, Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and
Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential
Alternatives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009).
[6] A reprocessing plant was used to dissolve the spent nuclear fuel
in acid and then to extract the uranium and plutonium, leaving behind
a highly radioactive liquid referred to as high-level waste.
[7] DOE now manages part of the West Valley site, but the state of New
York owns the site.
[8] DOE operates some sites under NRC regulations, such as the NRC-
licensed storage facilities at Idaho National Laboratory--for fuel
debris from the Three Mile Island accident--and at Fort St. Vrain.
[9] In October 2010, a federal district court approved a consent
decree that imposes a new, enforceable schedule for cleaning up the
tank waste at Hanford. In addition, the Tri-Party Agreement was
amended to revise milestones related to this cleanup.
[10] The document is titled "Agreement Between the Department of
Energy and the State of Colorado Regarding Shipping Spent Fuel Out of
Colorado" and was signed February 13, 1996.
[11] For the spent fuel from Fort St. Vrain, DOE intended to send it
first to Idaho National Laboratory for further treatment, but the
Idaho state agreement commits DOE to do so only if a permanent
repository or alternative interim storage site outside of Idaho is
open and is accepting spent nuclear fuel.
[12] A 2008 addendum to the 1995 Idaho Settlement Agreement allowed
the Navy to continue receiving and examining a limited volume of its
spent nuclear fuel after 2035. By 2035, any Naval spent nuclear fuel
that arrived at Idaho National Laboratory prior to 2026 must be
removed from Idaho.
[13] DOE is still making a decision about whether a radioactive liquid
in tanks at Idaho National Laboratory, known as sodium bearing waste,
should be classified as high-level waste or some other type of
radioactive waste for disposal.
[14] Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Waste Disposal:
Alternatives to Yucca Mountain (Washington, D.C., Feb. 6, 2009).
[15] The National Research Council, Disposition of High-Level Waste
and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal and Technical
Challenges (Washington, D.C., 2001). However, the report recommends
geological disposal for long-term storage because it is the only
available alternative that does not require ongoing control and
resource expenditures by future generations. Similarly, international
experts conclude that nuclear waste will eventually need permanent
disposal because the active controls required for storage cannot be
guaranteed over the thousands of years that the wastes can remain
radioactively hazardous. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Long
Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability, A
Position Paper of International Experts (Vienna, 2003).
[16] Our framework of cost categories focuses on the costs of extended
storage on DOE sites as a result of a termination of the Yucca
Mountain repository. It does not consider the costs of a yet-to-be-
determined alternative to shipping the nuclear waste to the Yucca
Mountain repository or whether the alternative would be more or less
costly than proceeding with the Yucca Mountain repository program.
[17] These estimates were part of EM's analysis of its 2010
environmental liability. DOE uses such studies to develop its annual
financial statement report. The estimate of EM's environmental
liability is composed of expected costs arising from current planning
assumptions and from contingency costs, which reflect uncertainties in
future environmental costs if current planning assumptions--such as
Yucca Mountain opening in 2020--are not met.
[18] This category would also include any relicensing costs for DOE's
two NRC-licensed storage facilities.
[19] EM's liability estimate is sensitive to assumptions and scope.
For example, although an EM official told us various scenarios are
possible, the estimate assumes a decision to defer the packaging of
Idaho calcine waste into canisters for 20 years, which avoids the
costs for new on-site canister storage. It also assumes that the
Savannah River Site will process spent nuclear fuel at a facility
called H-Canyon. If this does not occur, the site may eventually have
to build dry storage for the spent fuel. In addition, the EM analysis
excludes Navy spent nuclear fuel because it is not managed by EM.
According to a Navy official, if the spent nuclear fuel canisters are
not shipped to a repository starting about the time of the expected
opening of Yucca Mountain, then the Navy will have additional costs
for more storage capacity and protective concrete overpacks, as well
as additional annual costs for monitoring, maintaining, and operating
the storage facility.
[20] Design life is an engineer's assessments of how long the concrete
vaults in the storage building can last.
[21] The community's reaction to the new facility occurs in the
context of a potential termination of Yucca Mountain. However, EM
officials stated this new storage facility is needed to support the
cleanup of the West Valley site and is not the direct result of a
termination of the Yucca Mountain program.
[22] Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-Level
Radioactive Waste: Summary (Washington, D.C., 1982).
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48].
[24] Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of the Nuclear
Fuel Cycle: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, Summary Report (2010).
[25] Quantities of spent nuclear fuel are expressed in terms of metric
tons of heavy metal (MTHM), which refers to the weight of the heavy
metal, typically uranium, excluding other materials such as cladding
around the fuel. The relative quantities of high-level waste are only
roughly captured by the number of projected canisters, partly since
the size of the canisters is not uniform across all sites. In
addition, EM officials said the amount of high-level waste in each
individual canister is not uniform in terms of heavy metal, because of
the different compositions of waste in various storage tanks and
differences in the amount of waste loaded into canisters over time and
across sites.
[26] Because of concerns that metallic sodium creates risks for
corrosion and explosions in a repository, Idaho National Laboratory is
processing a portion of its spent nuclear fuel, a type known as sodium-
bonded, with an electrometallurgical treatment that results in high-
level waste for disposal.
[27] Spent nuclear fuel may differ in many ways, including the
cladding around the fuel that may be aluminum or other types of
material such as stainless steel or zirconium.
[28] Some other radioactive materials may be disposed of by adding
them to the high-level waste stream for vitrification. For example,
DOE is considering vitrifying a portion of surplus plutonium at the
Savannah River Site and has considered vitrifying strontium and cesium
that were extracted from tank waste and placed in capsules at the
Hanford Site.
[End of section]
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