Managing Critical Isotopes
Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage Gao ID: GAO-11-472 May 12, 2011Helium-3 gas is a key component of equipment used at ports and border crossings to detect radiation and prevent the smuggling of nuclear material into the United States, among other uses. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separate agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), extracts helium-3 and controls the inventory. Since 2003, NNSA has made helium-3 available for sale to DOE's Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program). After September 11, 2001, demand increased for radiation detection equipment, and in 2008, the federal government learned that it faced a severe domestic shortage of the gas. GAO was asked to review DOE's management of helium-3 to (1) determine the extent to which the federal government's response to the helium-3 shortage was affected by DOE's management of helium-3; (2) determine the federal government's priorities for allocating the limited supply of helium-3; and (3) describe the steps that the federal government is taking to increase the helium-3 supply and develop alternatives to helium-3. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents and interviewed cognizant agency officials.
The federal government's awareness of and response to the helium-3 shortage was delayed because no DOE entity had stewardship responsibility for the overall management of helium-3--a by-product of the radioactive decay of tritium, a key component of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Although the Isotope Program's mission includes selling isotopes and providing related isotope services, senior program officials said that they interpret this mission to exclude helium-3 and 16 other isotopes that the program sells but whose supply it does not control. As a result of this weakness in DOE's management of helium-3, officials at the Isotope Program and NNSA did not communicate about the helium-3 inventory or its extraction rate. According to NNSA and Isotope Program officials, they communicated with each other about how much helium-3 to sell each year and at what price but not about the size of the helium-3 inventory or extraction rate because NNSA generally treated this information as classified, due to concerns that the helium-3 inventory could be used to calculate the size of the U.S. tritium stockpile. NNSA and Isotope Program officials told GAO that this lack of communication contributed to the federal government's delayed response to the helium-3 shortage. The standards for internal control in the federal government state that information should be communicated to management and others within a time frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. Further, without stewardship by a DOE entity, key risks to managing helium-3, such as the lack of complete information on the production and inventory of helium-3, were not identified or mitigated. The federal standards for internal control state that management should assess the risks faced from external and internal sources and decide what actions to take to mitigate them. Facing this critical shortage of helium-3, DOE and other federal agencies are collaborating to bring supply and demand into balance. Specifically, in July 2009, an interagency policy committee was formed, which halted allocations of helium-3 for domestic radiation detection equipment and established three priorities for allocating helium-3: (1) applications for which there are no alternatives to helium-3 have first priority (e.g., research that can be achieved only with helium-3); (2) programs for detecting nuclear material at foreign ports and borders have second priority; and (3) programs for which substantial costs have already been incurred have third priority (e.g., a DOE research facility that conducts physics research). To increase the supply of helium-3, the federal government is, among other things, pursuing other sources and developing alternatives. Specifically, NNSA is in discussions with Ontario Power Generation (OPG), a power company in Ontario, Canada, to obtain helium-3 from its stores of tritium. OPG has accumulated tritium as a by-product of producing electricity using a type of nuclear reactor not found in the United States. Also, federal agencies and private companies are researching alternative technologies to replace helium-3 in several applications to decrease demand. GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE clarify whether the stewardship for those isotopes produced outside the Isotope Program, such as helium-3, rests with the program or another DOE entity. DOE stated that it understands and can implement these recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eugene E. Aloise Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-6870GAO-11-472, Managing Critical Isotopes: Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
May 2011:
Managing Critical Isotopes:
Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the Federal
Response to a Critical Supply Shortage:
GAO-11-472:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-472, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Helium-3 gas is a key component of equipment used at ports and border
crossings to detect radiation and prevent the smuggling of nuclear
material into the United States, among other uses. The National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separate agency within the
Department of Energy (DOE), extracts helium-3 and controls the
inventory. Since 2003, NNSA has made helium-3 available for sale to
DOE‘s Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications
Program (Isotope Program). After September 11, 2001, demand increased
for radiation detection equipment, and in 2008, the federal government
learned that it faced a severe domestic shortage of the gas. GAO was
asked to review DOE‘s management of helium-3 to (1) determine the
extent to which the federal government‘s response to the helium-3
shortage was affected by DOE‘s management of helium-3; (2) determine
the federal government‘s priorities for allocating the limited supply
of helium-3; and (3) describe the steps that the federal government is
taking to increase the helium-3 supply and develop alternatives to
helium-3. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents and interviewed
cognizant agency officials.
What GAO Found:
The federal government‘s awareness of and response to the helium-3
shortage was delayed because no DOE entity had stewardship
responsibility for the overall management of helium-3”a by-product of
the radioactive decay of tritium, a key component of the U.S. nuclear
weapons program. Although the Isotope Program‘s mission includes
selling isotopes and providing related isotope services, senior
program officials said that they interpret this mission to exclude
helium-3 and 16 other isotopes that the program sells but whose supply
it does not control. As a result of this weakness in DOE‘s management
of helium-3, officials at the Isotope Program and NNSA did not
communicate about the helium-3 inventory or its extraction rate.
According to NNSA and Isotope Program officials, they communicated
with each other about how much helium-3 to sell each year and at what
price but not about the size of the helium-3 inventory or extraction
rate because NNSA generally treated this information as classified,
due to concerns that the helium-3 inventory could be used to calculate
the size of the U.S. tritium stockpile. NNSA and Isotope Program
officials told GAO that this lack of communication contributed to the
federal government‘s delayed response to the helium-3 shortage. The
standards for internal control in the federal government state that
information should be communicated to management and others within a
time frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities.
Further, without stewardship by a DOE entity, key risks to managing
helium-3, such as the lack of complete information on the production
and inventory of helium-3, were not identified or mitigated. The
federal standards for internal control state that management should
assess the risks faced from external and internal sources and decide
what actions to take to mitigate them.
Facing this critical shortage of helium-3, DOE and other federal
agencies are collaborating to bring supply and demand into balance.
Specifically, in July 2009, an interagency policy committee was
formed, which halted allocations of helium-3 for domestic radiation
detection equipment and established three priorities for allocating
helium-3: (1) applications for which there are no alternatives to
helium-3 have first priority (e.g., research that can be achieved only
with helium-3); (2) programs for detecting nuclear material at foreign
ports and borders have second priority; and (3) programs for which
substantial costs have already been incurred have third priority
(e.g., a DOE research facility that conducts physics research).
To increase the supply of helium-3, the federal government is, among
other things, pursuing other sources and developing alternatives.
Specifically, NNSA is in discussions with Ontario Power Generation
(OPG), a power company in Ontario, Canada, to obtain helium-3 from its
stores of tritium. OPG has accumulated tritium as a by-product of
producing electricity using a type of nuclear reactor not found in the
United States. Also, federal agencies and private companies are
researching alternative technologies to replace helium-3 in several
applications to decrease demand.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE clarify whether the
stewardship for those isotopes produced outside the Isotope Program,
such as helium-3, rests with the program or another DOE entity. DOE
stated that it understands and can implement these recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-472] for key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov, or Timothy M. Persons at (202) 512-6412 or
personst@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Background:
Federal Response to the Helium-3 Shortage Was Delayed by Weaknesses in
DOE's Management of Helium-3:
The Federal Government's Three Priorities for Allocating the Limited
Supply of Helium-3 Exclude Domestic Radiation Detection Portal
Monitors:
Key Federal Agencies Are Collaborating to Increase the Helium-3 Supply
and Develop Alternatives:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Quantities of Helium-3 Sold or Transferred from 2003 through
2009:
Table 2: Quantities of Helium-3 Allocated and Used, in Liters, from
Fiscal Year 2009 to Fiscal Year 2011:
Table 3: Allocated Helium-3 Prices per Liter:
Figure:
Figure 1: Helium-3 Request and Receipt Process:
Abbreviations:
cGMP: current good manufacturing practices:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
Isotope Program: Isotope Development and Production for Research and
Applications Program:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NIH: National Institutes of Health:
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
OPG: Ontario Power Generation:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 12, 2011:
The Honorable Brad Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment:
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Donna Edwards:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight:
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology:
House of Representatives:
Helium-3 gas is a critical component of radiation detection equipment,
including radiation detection portal monitors that are used to screen
cargo and vehicles at ports and border crossings around the world to
prevent nuclear material from being smuggled into the United States.
For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has deployed
over 1,400 radiation detection portal monitors containing helium-3 at
U.S. ports and border crossings. In addition, helium-3 is used in
various industrial applications, such as oil and gas exploration and
road construction, and in research applications, including physics
research requiring ultra-low temperatures that can only be achieved
using helium-3. Until 3 years ago, the United States' helium-3 supply
was viewed as sufficient to meet demand. Outside the United States,
Russia has been the only other major source of commercially available
helium-3. But in 2008, the federal government abruptly learned that it
faced a severe shortage of helium-3. At the same time Russia has
curtailed its sales of helium-3, indicating that its supply is also
waning. Because of this global shortage, no future deployments of
radiation detection portal monitors containing helium-3 are planned in
the United States.
Helium-3 is a byproduct of the radioactive decay of tritium,[Footnote
1] a key component of the nation's nuclear weapons that is used to
enhance their power. The U.S. tritium stockpile is maintained by the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately
organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE).[Footnote 2] In
maintaining this tritium stockpile, NNSA removes the helium-3 that
accumulates as tritium decays because the helium-3 can diminish the
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons. In the past, NNSA and its
predecessor agencies considered helium-3 to be a waste product of the
weapons program and vented it to the atmosphere. From about 1980
through 1995, and again from 2003 through 2008,[Footnote 3] NNSA
provided helium-3 to DOE's Isotope Development and Production for
Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program) to sell. The
Isotope Program's mission is to produce and sell isotopes and related
isotope services, maintain the infrastructure required to do so, and
conduct research and development on new and improved isotope
production and processing techniques.[Footnote 4] DOE's Isotope
Program produces and sells about 200 isotopes, though it does not
control the supply--that is, the production or inventory--of all the
isotopes it sells, such as helium-3, which is extracted from tritium
by NNSA.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States has been reducing the
number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile, resulting in less tritium
and, therefore, less helium-3. In the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, however, demand for helium-3 increased due to
the deployment of radiation detection portal monitors at ports and
border crossings in the United States and other countries to prevent
the smuggling of nuclear material. Thousands of such portal monitors
were deployed across the United States and overseas, and more are
planned to be deployed. Additionally, large quantities of helium-3
have been used in the last 10 years by research facilities in the
United States and internationally for large-scale physics research
applications, and more is needed for this research to continue.
Overall, this decreasing supply during a period of increasing demand
resulted in a shortage of helium-3.
In June 2008, a contractor alerted DHS that the contractor was unable
to obtain a sufficient amount of helium-3 to fulfill its contract to
provide radiation detection portal monitors. DHS contacted the Isotope
Program to inquire about the helium-3 supply, and in September 2008,
DOE responded to this sudden awareness of the shortage by suspending
its helium-3 sales through public auction, which was the vehicle
through which the Isotope Program sold helium-3. In March 2009, DHS,
the Department of Defense (DOD), DOE, and NNSA formed an integrated
project team to collect and analyze information and make
recommendations to senior management at these departments on actions
to be taken to address the shortage. The overall shortage of helium-3
raises concerns about the United States' ability to provide a
sustainable supply of helium-3 for national security and research
applications. In this context, you asked us to review DOE's management
of helium-3. Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
the federal government's response to the helium-3 shortage was
affected by DOE's management of helium-3; (2) determine the federal
government's priorities for allocating the limited supply of helium-3
to various users; and (3) describe the steps that the federal
government is taking, if any, to increase the helium-3 supply and
develop alternatives to helium-3.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the federal government's response to
the helium-3 shortage was affected by DOE's management of helium-3, we
reviewed the DOE Isotope Program's strategic planning documents,
helium-3 sales data, and information on NNSA's inventory of helium-3.
We also interviewed officials at DOE, DOE's Savannah River Site, NNSA,
and DHS, as well as representatives from Linde[Footnote 5] and GE
Reuter-Stokes, the two principal companies that purchased helium-3
from the Isotope Program. Also, we used the federal standards for
internal control to assess DOE's management of helium-3.[Footnote 6]
To determine the federal government's priorities for allocating the
limited supply of helium-3 to various users, we reviewed documents of
the integrated project team. We also reviewed the helium-3 allocation
decisions, criteria, and process of the interagency policy committee
convened in 2009 by the National Security Staff, which report to the
National Security Advisor,[Footnote 7] to oversee the integrated
project team and make policy decisions to manage the helium-3
shortage. The policy committee is a multi-agency committee consisting
of key agencies and departments that use helium-3 applications to
support their missions, including the Department of Commerce's
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), DOD's Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of State, DOE, and DHS. We
also interviewed officials at NIST, the Department of Health and Human
Services' National Institutes of Health (NIH), DHS, DOD, DOE, DOE's
Oak Ridge and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, and NNSA, as
well as National Security Staff. To describe the steps that the
federal government is taking, if any, to increase the helium-3 supply
and develop alternatives to helium-3, we reviewed feasibility studies
that presented options for alternative sources and recycling unused
equipment and interviewed representatives from Ontario Power
Generation, a Canadian power company. We reviewed research and
documentation, including test results, on alternatives to helium-3
that are being developed by companies and interviewed representatives
from these companies and officials at DHS, DOD, DOE, NIH, NIST, NNSA,
and Oak Ridge National and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories. We
conducted this performance audit from April 2010 to May 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The unique physical properties of helium-3 have led to its use in a
wide variety of national security, scientific, industrial, and medical
applications. Helium-3 is widely used for detecting nuclear material
and safeguarding nuclear weapons because, among other things, of its
ability to efficiently absorb neutrons. In radiation detection
equipment, helium-3 is used to detect neutrons that are emitted by
nuclear material. In radiation detection portal monitors, long, thin
metal tubes are filled with helium-3; neutrons passing through these
tubes react with the helium-3, creating charged particles that are
detected by the monitors. Also, as a nontoxic gas that is not absorbed
by the human body, helium-3 is used in magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) to research pulmonary disorders, such as chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.[Footnote 8]
Helium-3 is rare because it is currently extracted solely as a
byproduct of the radioactive decay of tritium. During the Cold War,
the United States produced tritium in nuclear reactors and stockpiled
it for the nuclear weapons program. Helium-3 is also available from
natural sources, such as subterranean natural gas deposits, but it has
not been pursued commercially in the past because it is found in very
low concentrations. NNSA and its predecessor agencies produced tritium
at the Savannah River Site K-reactor in South Carolina and purified
tritium by removing helium-3 at the Mound Plant, a weapons research
laboratory in Ohio. Following the end of the Cold War, as the United
States reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile and ceased producing
tritium, its inventory of helium-3 decreased commensurately. In 1988,
DOE shut down the K-reactor for safety reasons and, in 1995, closed
the Mound Plant, thus eliminating the U.S. government's large-scale
ability to produce and purify tritium. NNSA has been able to meet the
tritium needs of the nuclear weapons program by maintaining the
existing stockpile and recycling tritium from dismantled nuclear
warheads.
To maintain the current tritium stockpile, NNSA extracts helium-3 from
tritium on a daily basis and stores the helium-3 in pressurized
cylinders at the Savannah River Site. To remove trace amounts of
tritium and other impurities, NNSA ships these cylinders of helium-3
to Linde in New Jersey, which operates the only commercial facility in
the United States licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
purify helium-3 of trace amounts of tritium. While NNSA's helium-3
inventory at the Savannah River Site is constantly changing, as of
early February 2011, it was almost 31,000 liters. NNSA estimates that
about 8,000 to 10,000 liters of helium-3 will be made available per
year from the current tritium stockpile. Like the United States,
Russia extracts helium-3 from its tritium stockpile. According to
National Security Staff documentation and representatives of Linde,
Russia has curtailed its sales of helium-3, indicating that its supply
is likely waning.
Isotope production and distribution has been a long-standing mission
of DOE. DOE's Isotope Program provides isotopes to support the
national need for a reliable supply of isotopes used in medicine,
industry, and research. DOE transferred the Isotope Program to DOE's
Office of Science from DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy starting in
fiscal year 2009. In anticipation of this transfer, in August 2008,
the Isotope Program organized a workshop to discuss the nation's needs
for isotopes, and identified those isotopes with supply challenges. As
noted in the workshop summary report, the workshop assembled, for the
first time, stakeholders from all the different areas of the diverse
isotope community to discuss the nation's current and future needs for
isotopes and to consider options for improving the availability of
needed isotopes.[Footnote 9] The workshop enabled the Isotope Program
to discuss and develop program priorities, including those isotopes,
such as helium-3, that were in short supply. This workshop identified
12 isotopes, including helium-3, that faced supply challenges and had
less than 3 years before their supplies at that time were completely
consumed.
In August 2003, the Isotope Program signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with NNSA to make available an initial 103,570
liters of helium-3 for sale, followed by at least 10,000 liters of
helium-3 per year from 2004 through 2008. At the time the MOU was
signed, NNSA's inventory of helium-3 was estimated at about 260,000
liters. Following this agreement, the Isotope Program held a series of
public auctions to sell helium-3. A public auction process was used,
according to program officials, to encourage competition. The Isotope
Program and NNSA determined the quantity and minimum price of helium-3
for each auction; the price was set to recover the costs to extract
helium-3 and the administrative costs of selling it. Linde and GE
Reuter-Stokes, a company that manufactures helium-3 tubes for
radiation detection portal monitors and other neutron detection
applications, have been the two buyers of helium-3 who participated in
the Isotope Program's public auctions. From 2003 through 2009, the
Isotope Program sold, or NNSA transferred, more than 209,000 liters of
helium-3--an average of almost 30,000 liters of helium-3 per year, as
shown in table 1. Given NNSA's capacity to extract between 8,000 and
10,000 liters of helium-3 annually, this rate of sale exceeded the
extraction rate and decreased the inventory.
Table 1: Quantities of Helium-3 Sold or Transferred from 2003 through
2009:
Date sold: March 2003;
Customer: Spectra Gases[A];
Quantity (liters): 7,826.
Date sold: February 2004;
Customer: G.E. Reuter-Stokes;
Quantity (liters): 95,791.
Date sold: June 2005;
Customer: Spectra Gases[A];
Quantity (liters): 23,310.
Date sold: July 2006;
Customer: Spectra Gases[A];
Quantity (liters): 26,963.
Date sold: August 2008;
Customer: DOE Spallation Neutron Source (interagency transfer from
NNSA);
Quantity (liters): 34,325.
Date sold: January 2009;
Customer: Lind[E];
Quantity (liters): 10,585.
Date sold: January 2009;
Customer: G.E. Reuter-Stokes;
Quantity (liters): 11,088.
Total sold:
Quantity (liters): 209,888.
Source: GAO analysis of NNSA and Isotope Program data.
[A] Spectra Gases was acquired by Linde in 2006 and changed its name
to Linde in 2009.
[End of table]
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the demand for
helium-3 nearly tripled, because of the increased focus on radiation
detection applications. Specifically, DHS's Radiation Portal Monitor
program, NNSA's Second Line of Defense program, and DOD's Guardian
program all use helium-3 in radiation detection portal monitors
deployed at domestic and foreign ports, border crossings, and military
installations. DHS alone has deployed over 1,400 radiation detection
portal monitors domestically. The largest demand for helium-3 has
historically been for homeland security and scientific research, but
demand for other applications, such as in MRIs for lung research, has
also increased.
Federal Response to the Helium-3 Shortage Was Delayed by Weaknesses in
DOE's Management of Helium-3:
The federal government's awareness of and response to the helium-3
shortage was delayed because no DOE entity had stewardship
responsibility for the overall management of helium-3. As a result of
this lack of stewardship responsibility, officials from DOE's Isotope
Program, which sold helium-3, and NNSA, which extracted it from
tritium, did not communicate about the helium-3 inventory or its
extraction rate. Without stewardship responsibility, key risks to
managing helium-3, such as the lack of understanding of the helium-3
inventory and the demand for helium-3, were not identified or
mitigated by either entity.
Officials from DOE's Isotope Program and NNSA Did Not Communicate
about the Helium-3 Inventory or Its Extraction Rate:
While the Isotope Program's mission includes selling isotopes and
providing related isotope services, senior program officials said that
they interpret this mission to exclude helium-3 and other isotopes
that the program sells but whose supply it does not control.
Accordingly, Isotope Program officials noted that the program sold and
distributed helium-3 solely as a courtesy to NNSA, not because it was
a core part of the program's mission or because it believed it had a
stewardship responsibility to do so. NNSA officials also noted that
helium-3 stewardship was not part of NNSA's mission of managing the
nation's nuclear weapons. Without such stewardship responsibility,
NNSA and Isotope Program officials did not communicate about the
helium-3 inventory or its rate of extraction.
The Isotope Program's management of helium-3 sales was hampered by
this lack of communication regarding the size of the helium-3
inventory and the rate at which helium-3 is extracted from tritium.
Prior to selling helium-3 at public auction, officials from the
Isotope Program and NNSA communicated with each other regarding how
much helium-3 would be available to sell that year and the minimum
price for which it would be sold at auction. However, Isotope Program
and NNSA officials did not discuss the size of the helium-3 inventory,
how much was being added to the inventory each year, or how quickly
the inventory was being depleted. Additionally, NNSA officials did not
inform Isotope Program officials when they transferred more than
34,000 liters of helium-3 in August 2008 to DOE's Spallation Neutron
Source, a physics research facility at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory that uses helium-3 in large-scale neutron detectors. This
transfer--more than what the Isotope Program sold per year, on average
from 2003 to 2009--greatly reduced the helium-3 inventory, but NNSA
officials did not inform Isotope Program officials about it until
after the transfer was completed. Despite the helium-3 inventory being
greatly reduced, in September 2008 the Isotope Program and NNSA
renewed their MOU to continue selling helium-3 for an additional 5
years without discussing the size of the helium-3 inventory or the
rate at which sales and large transfers--such as the one to DOE's
Spallation Neutron Source--were reducing the inventory.
Helium-3 inventory and production information was not shared between
officials at the Isotope Program and NNSA because, according to NNSA
officials, this information was generally treated as classified by
NNSA out of concern that the inventory and annual extraction rate
could be used to calculate the size of the U.S. tritium stockpile,
which is classified. In describing the situation, Isotope Program
officials stated that they did not have the requisite "need to know"
to gain access to this information, and consequently, did not discuss
it. In other words, Isotope Program officials did not believe that
they needed complete information on the size of the helium-3 inventory
or how much was being added to the inventory each year in order to
carry out the program's mission because helium-3 does not fall within
its mission. One of the standards for internal control in the federal
government--information and communications--states that information
should be recorded and communicated to management and others within an
entity in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry
out their responsibilities.[Footnote 10] The lack of communication
between NNSA and Isotope Program officials was not consistent with
this standard. Isotope Program and NNSA officials told us that this
lack of communication contributed to the government's delayed response
to the helium-3 shortage. NNSA officials acknowledged the ambiguity
about what information can be communicated about the helium-3
inventory and, in January 2010, issued a memorandum to clarify and
broaden what information about helium-3 can be shared publicly. As a
result, NNSA now reports that 8,000 to 10,000 liters of helium-3 will
be made available per year.
Without Stewardship Responsibility, Key Risks to Managing Helium-3
Were Not Identified or Mitigated:
Senior Isotope Program officials said that they did not identify and
mitigate key risks to managing helium-3 sales because, unlike most
isotopes that the program sells, officials do not consider stewardship
of helium-3 to be part of the program's mission. Specifically, these
Isotope Program officials did not consider their lack of understanding
of the helium-3 inventory or the demand for helium-3 as risks to
managing helium-3 sales. According to these officials, for those
isotopes that are included in its mission--the isotopes that it
produces--the Isotope Program developed strategic planning documents
and generally updated these documents on an annual basis. We reviewed
the Isotope Program's strategic planning documents and found examples
where the program assessed risks to isotopes that it produces and
sells. The Isotope Program, however, did not perform strategic
planning for helium-3, including assessing risks, because program
officials do not consider stewardship of helium-3 to be part of the
program's mission. For those isotopes that the Isotope Program sells
but whose supply it does not control, such as helium-3, Isotope
Program officials told us that they see their role as a conduit that
sells these isotopes to customers as a courtesy. There are 17
isotopes, including helium-3, that the program sells but, according to
program officials, does not have stewardship responsibility for
because the Isotope Program does not control their supply. For
example, lithium-6, which is used in neutron detection applications
and battery research, is sold by the Isotope Program, but its supply
is controlled by NNSA.
Although program officials do not consider helium-3 to be part of the
program's mission, it nonetheless collected information in order to
forecast demand. To do this, the Isotope Program recorded the number
of telephone inquiries from potential customers and the volume of
helium-3 discussed. Because it does not view helium-3 as a part of its
mission, program officials said that the Isotope Program did not take
proactive steps to solicit information to better understand future
demand. For example, according to representatives, the Isotope Program
did not solicit information from Linde, the company that had purchased
or purified nearly all the helium-3 in the United States, which gave
Linde a more complete understanding of the historical and future
demand for helium-3. In tracking telephone inquiries, the Isotope
Program's records show that it received nine telephone calls in 2008
from customers who were interested in acquiring 1,226 liters of helium-
3. In contrast, according to Linde documentation, based on its actual
use, the demand for helium-3 in 2008 was nearly 60,000 liters. Linde
representatives also noted that the Isotope Program did not seek
demand-related information from Linde until after the shortage was
realized.
Isotope Program officials told us that forecasting the demand for
isotopes is very difficult because demand for isotopes can quickly
change. Because of its effect on isotope inventories, changing demand
is a risk to the program's management of the sale of all isotopes. One
of the federal standards for internal control--risk assessment--states
that management should assess the risks faced entity-wide, and at the
activity level, from both external and internal sources, and that once
risks have been identified, management should decide what actions
should be taken to mitigate them. Risk identification methods may
include, among other things, forecasting and strategic planning, and
consideration of findings from audits and other assessments. A DOE
advisory committee has also noted the importance of understanding
demand for isotopes. In August 2008, DOE tasked its Nuclear Science
Advisory Committee with establishing a standing subcommittee to
research the needs and challenges of the Isotope Program and make
recommendations to address them. According to the subcommittee report,
for the Isotope Program to be efficient and effective, it is essential
that it accurately forecasts the demand for isotopes.[Footnote 11] The
report noted that the "ability of the program to predict demand for
certain isotopes needs vast improvement." It went on to recommend that
the program "maintain a continuous dialogue with all interested
federal agencies and commercial isotope customers to forecast and
match realistic isotope demand and achievable production capabilities."
Isotope Program officials told us that they are considering convening
a workshop, possibly in the summer of 2011, with federal agency
stakeholders to discuss supply and demand of all isotopes that are
produced or sold by the Isotope Program. According to the Director of
the Facilities and Project Management Division, which manages the
Isotope Program, while the program does not consider this role a part
of its mission, it is volunteering to convene this workshop to be
helpful to the isotope user community.
The Federal Government's Three Priorities for Allocating the Limited
Supply of Helium-3 Exclude Domestic Radiation Detection Portal
Monitors:
In July 2009, the National Security Staff, under the National Security
Advisor, established an interagency policy committee consisting of
officials from DOD, DOE, DHS, the Department of Commerce, and the
Department of State to address the helium-3 shortage. In doing so, the
policy committee established the following three priorities for
allocating the limited supply of helium-3:
* Priority 1: Applications for which there are no alternatives to
helium-3, which includes, for example, research that requires ultra-
low temperatures that can be achieved only with helium-3.
* Priority 2: Programs for detecting nuclear material at foreign ports
and borders, which includes, for example, NNSA's Second Line of
Defense program that deploys radiation detection portal monitors at
key overseas ports and border crossings.
* Priority 3: Programs for which substantial costs have already been
incurred, such as DOE's Spallation Neutron Source research facility
that conducts physics research.
Furthermore, the committee eliminated further allocations of helium-3
for domestic radiation detection portal monitors beginning in fiscal
year 2010 because, according to committee documents, it determined
there are alternatives to using helium-3 to detect neutrons in these
portal monitors. The policy committee also determined that it will not
support allocating helium-3 for any new applications that would
increase the demand for helium-3.
Following this approach, the policy committee has allocated helium-3
to federal agency and commercial customers from 2009 through 2011, as
shown in table 2. These allocations have brought the supply and demand
of helium-3 into closer balance and mark a significant decrease from
the amount the Isotope Program previously sold or transferred from
2003 through 2009--an average of about 30,000 liters per year.
Table 2: Quantities of Helium-3 Allocated and Used, in Liters, from
Fiscal Year 2009 to Fiscal Year 2011:
Customer: Low temperature research;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 452[B];
Quantities: FY 2011: 700.
Customer: DHS;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 438[C];
Quantities: FY 2011: 1,218.
Customer: DOD;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 1,530;
Quantities: FY 2011: 3,521.
Customer: NNSA;
Quantities: FY 2009: 6,367;
Quantities: FY 2010: 5,098[D];
Quantities: FY 2011: 5,791.
Customer: DOE's Office of Science;
Quantities: FY 2009: 2,400;
Quantities: FY 2010: 341;
Quantities: FY 2011: 315.
Customer: Intelligence Community;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2011: 763.
Customer: NIH;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 260[E];
Quantities: FY 2011: 1,400.
Customer: NIST;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 607[F];
Quantities: FY 2011: 236.
Customer: Oil and gas industry;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: 695[G];
Quantities: FY 2011: 1,000.
Customer: Road construction industry;
Quantities: FY 2009: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2010: N/A[A];
Quantities: FY 2011: 350.
Customer: Total;
Quantities: FY 2009: 8,767;
Quantities: FY 2010: 9,421;
Quantities: FY 2011: 15,294.
Source: GAO analysis of information from the interagency policy
committee and Linde.
[A] N/A refers to instances when a customer either did not receive an
allocation or received its allocation through another customer.
[B] Low temperature research was allocated 1,800 liters but used only
452 liters.
[C] DHS was allocated 772 liters but used only 438 liters.
[D] NNSA was allocated 5,150 liters but used only 5,098 liters.
[E] NIH was allocated 1,800 liters but used only 260 liters.
[F] NIST was allocated 832 liters but used only 607 liters.
[G] The oil and gas industry was allocated 1,000 liters but used only
695 liters.
[End of table]
The policy committee developed a process for customers to request
allocations of helium-3 using "champions," which are agency officials
who represent the federal agencies for which they work and its
grantees; a champion is appointed by the Isotope Program for
nonfederal customers, such as the oil and gas industry. The champion
for a specific category of customer gathers all the helium-3 requests
and determines whether the requests are consistent with the policy for
allocating helium-3. If so, the champion submits the requests to the
policy committee. The policy committee weighs the requests against the
helium-3 priorities and the amount of helium-3 that is available to
make allocation decisions. After allocation decisions are made,
customers are notified and, if they received an allotment, they must
submit a request for the helium-3 to Linde, which is contracted by the
Isotope Program to purify and distribute the helium-3 allocations.
When Linde receives a request for helium-3, according to Linde
representatives, they verify the customer's allocation with the
appropriate champion. Once verification is received, Linde ships the
allotted amount of helium-3 to the customer. This allocation and
receipt process is the same for all customers--federal agencies,
researchers, and private companies, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Helium-3 Request and Receipt Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration]
Requesting Annual Helium-3 Allocations:
1) Helium-3 customer submits request to champion.
2) Champion determines whether request meets policy:
Request rejected: Customers may resubmit their helium-3 requests to
the champion the following year.
3) Request approved.
4) Champion submits request to policy committee.
5) Policy committee reviews helium-3 request:
Request rejected: Customers may resubmit their helium-3 requests to
the champion the following year.
6) Request approved.
Receiving Annual Helium-3 Allocations:
7) Helium-3 customer submits request to Linde.
8) Linde verifies request with appropriate champion.
9) Allocation of helium-3 verified by champion.
10) Linde ships helium-3 to customer.
Source: GAO analysis of information from DOE and Linde.
[End of figure]
The helium-3 champions or the policy committee may reject a request
for helium-3, as shown in figure 1. If rejected, customers may
resubmit a request the following year. According to seven of the
agency champions, customers are aware of the policy committee's
priorities and have usually reduced the amount of their request to the
absolute minimum amount of helium-3 that is needed. As a result, the
committee has approved most requests.
When determining the annual allocations for helium-3, the policy
committee also recommends to the Isotope Program a price at which
helium-3 should be sold to different customers--including the federal,
medical, and commercial entities. When the policy committee first
began to allocate helium-3 in 2009, the Isotope Program, in
consultation with the policy committee, established two different
prices--one for medical applications and the other for all other
applications. For use in the manufacture of drugs, medical devices,
and other products, the Food and Drug Administration requires that
helium-3 must be certified to meet specific requirements, called
current good manufacturing practices (cGMP).[Footnote 12] In 2009, the
price for cGMP helium-3 was $600 per liter; helium-3 for all other
applications was priced at $450 per liter.[Footnote 13] Certifying
helium-3 under cGMP requirements is more expensive, according to Linde
representatives, because of the extra certification and purity testing
that is required. This practice was continued for allocations in 2010.
In 2011, however, the Isotope Program divided the price for helium-3
to be used for non-cGMP applications into two categories: one for
federal agencies and their grantees and one for commercial and
nonfederal agencies. Table 3 shows the different prices for helium-3,
per liter, beginning with 2009.
Table 3: Allocated Helium-3 Prices per Liter:
Customer: Federal agencies and their grantees;
2009: $450;
2010: $365;
2011: $600.
Customer: Commercial and nonfederal agencies;
2009: $450;
2010: $365;
2011: $1,000.
Customer: cGMP;
2009: $600;
2010: $485;
2011: $720.
Source: GAO analysis of information from DOE and Linde.
[End of table]
Key Federal Agencies Are Collaborating to Increase the Helium-3 Supply
and Develop Alternatives:
DOE and NNSA are taking actions to increase the supply of helium-3 by,
among other things, pursuing other sources and recycling helium-3 from
retired equipment. Specifically, NNSA officials said that NNSA is in
discussions with Ontario Power Generation (OPG) to determine the
feasibility of obtaining helium-3 from OPG's stores of tritium. OPG
has accumulated this tritium as a by-product of producing electricity
using heavy-water nuclear reactors.[Footnote 14] According to OPG
officials, it owns 16 heavy-water nuclear reactors that are currently
operating that have produced enough tritium to initially yield
approximately 100,000 liters of helium-3. According to NNSA officials,
once this initial amount is recovered, OPG estimates that its stores
of tritium may yield about 10,000 liters of helium-3 annually.
Combined with NNSA's current annual production of helium-3, obtaining
helium-3 from OPG could boost the United States' supply to about
18,000 to 20,000 liters per year. In addition, DHS and DOE have
expressed interest in exploring the option of extracting helium-3 from
natural helium, or helium-4. Helium-3 is found in small quantities in
natural helium and could possibly be extracted from the nation's
helium reserve near Amarillo, Texas, that is managed by the Department
of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management. The Bureau of Land
Management estimates that approximately 125,000 liters of helium-3 may
be present in the helium reserve, which could be extracted over the
next 10 years. DOE officials estimate that a similar reserve of
natural helium in Wyoming could yield another 200,000 liters of helium-
3 that could be extracted over the life of the reserve. DHS officials
note, however, that a feasibility study is needed to determine whether
it would be cost-effective to extract helium-3 from natural helium.
Federal agencies and private sector companies have started to recycle
helium-3 from unused equipment in order to boost the supply. For
example, an analysis conducted by DOE shows that it can extract helium-
3 from retired tritium storage beds at its tritium extraction facility
at the Savannah River Site. DOE estimates that it could extract 8,000
to 10,000 liters from these storage beds every 8 to 10 years,
beginning as early as 2012. Additionally, DOE surveyed its national
laboratories and identified over 1,500 liters of helium-3 in unused
equipment and storage cylinders that could be reused immediately. DHS
has also identified retired equipment from which helium-3 can be
extracted. Private companies have also started to recycle helium-3
from decommissioned radiation detection portal monitors. For example,
according to a representative from a helium-3 tube manufacturing
company, the company is buying retired radiation detection equipment
to extract the helium-3.
In addition to increasing the supply of helium-3, federal agencies and
private companies are researching alternatives to helium-3 for several
applications in order to decrease demand. For example, the government
is conducting research to develop alternatives for neutron detection
applications, including radiation detection portal monitors and
nuclear physics research, which together use more helium-3 than any
other application. DHS, DOE, DOD, and NIST, for example, are
supporting approximately 30 different programs, some of which may
result in technologies available for use in radiation detectors that,
according to agency documents, could be ready by 2012.[Footnote 15]
Similarly, DOE's Spallation Neutron Source research facility is
coordinating with similar facilities internationally--including those
in Germany, Japan, Russia, and Sweden--to develop alternative
technologies for large-scale physics research applications. The
private sector is also researching alternatives to helium-3 for
radiation detection portal monitors and other applications, including
MRIs for the lungs. For example, equipment using the isotopes lithium-
6 and boron-10 may be able to replace helium-3 in radiation detection
portal monitors, according to representatives from companies that are
developing them. Like helium-3, lithium-6 is produced by NNSA and sold
by the Isotope Program. According to one program official, this
official contacted NNSA to inquire about the inventory and production
rate of lithium-6 because of the potential for increased demand if
lithium-6-related technologies are chosen to replace helium-3 in
radiation detection portal monitors. NNSA officials told the Isotope
Program official, however, that such information is classified and
cannot be shared, but assured the official that NNSA has enough
lithium-6 to meet any future increase in demand. In March 2011, the
Director of the Facilities and Project Management Division, which
manages the Isotope Program, said that, although classified, program
officials do have access to this information through NNSA's Office of
Nuclear Materials Integration. DOE officials said that they have
evaluated the potential demand for lithium-6 and have taken steps to
ensure there is an adequate supply. According to its director, the
Office of Nuclear Materials Integration is responsible for, among
other things, coordinating management of certain isotopes produced by
NNSA, including tracking the inventory of these isotopes, and
coordinating communication within DOE and NNSA. The director stated
that it is the responsibility of the Isotope Program, however, to
manage the activities under its control for these isotopes, such as
selling them outside DOE and NNSA and conducting 5-year supply and
demand forecasts. This raises concerns that without stewardship
responsibility for the overall management of the supply and demand of
lithium-6, or the other isotopes produced by NNSA, neither the Isotope
Program nor any other DOE or NNSA entity may detect an imbalance,
resulting in the shortage of another isotope.
Conclusions:
Facing a critical shortage of helium-3 since 2008, DOE and other
federal agencies are collaborating to bring supply and demand into
balance, while supporting essential applications for which there are
no alternatives. This shortage occurred because the demand for helium-
3 rose sharply in response to the increased deployment of radiation
detection portal monitors, in addition to the increased use of helium-
3 in research and other applications. The amount of helium-3 sold by
the Isotope Program quickly outpaced the annual production, and this
imbalance went undetected until the supply of helium-3 reached a
critical shortage. The overall federal awareness of and response to
the helium-3 shortage was delayed because no entity within DOE had
stewardship responsibility for coordinating the production and sale of
helium-3. Furthermore, there was a lack of communication between NNSA
and Isotope Program officials over the size of the helium-3 inventory,
how much was added to the inventory annually, and how quickly the
Isotope Program's sales were depleting the inventory. While the
Isotope Program's mission is to manage the production and sale of
isotopes, including developing strategic plans and assessing risks for
these isotopes, it has not taken a similar stewardship role in
managing the 17 isotopes, including helium-3, whose supply it does not
control. A key risk to managing the sale of all these isotopes is the
lack of control over, and knowledge of, their supply. Under the
federal standards for internal control, federal managers are to assess
the risks faced entity-wide, and at the activity level, from external
and internal sources and decide what actions to take to mitigate such
risks. Because Isotope Program officials do not believe that they have
a stewardship role for helium-3, they did not take steps to mitigate
the risk of selling helium-3 without information on the size of the
inventory or its rate of replenishment. Similarly, without a
stewardship role, the program did not take sufficient steps to
accurately forecast the increased demand for helium-3. Such
forecasting is important in order to align demand with current
inventory levels. In this regard, the subcommittee report of the
Nuclear Science Advisory Committee stated that for the Isotope Program
to be efficient and effective, it needs accurate forecasts for the
demand for isotopes. A lack of communication and failure to identify
risks and forecast demand ultimately delayed the Isotope Program's
awareness of, and the federal government's response to, the helium-3
shortage. In conclusion, we believe that all isotopes without clear
stewardship responsibilities may face the same risks that led to the
helium-3 shortage.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making four recommendations to the Secretary of Energy designed
to avoid future shortages associated with managing all isotopes that
the Isotope Program sells but whose supply it does not control,
including helium-3. First, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy
clarify whether the stewardship for all these isotopes belongs with
the Isotope Program or elsewhere within the Department of Energy. Once
the stewardship for these isotopes has been assigned, we further
recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the head of the
responsible office(s) to take the following three actions:
* develop and implement a communication process that provides complete
information to the assigned entity on the production and inventory of
isotopes that are produced outside the Isotope Program;
* develop strategic plans that, among other things, systematically
assess and document risks to managing the isotopes and supporting
activities, such as not having control over the supply of these
isotopes, and implement actions needed to mitigate them; and:
* develop and implement a method for forecasting the demand of
isotopes that is more accurate than the one that is currently used. In
this regard, the actions taken should be consistent with the
forecasting recommendation from the subcommittee report of the Nuclear
Science Advisory Committee.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and
Homeland Security for their review and comment. DHS had no comments on
the findings of the draft report or our recommendations. In a written
response for DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration's
Associate Administrator for Management and Budget stated that he
understands our recommendations and can implement them but took
exception to our characterization of the Isotope Program's mission. In
the report, we state that the Isotope Program's mission is to produce
and sell isotopes and related isotope services, maintain the
infrastructure required to do so, and conduct research and development
on new and improved isotope production and processing techniques,
which was its mission from 2003 through 2008--the time during which
the Isotope Program was selling helium-3 by auction and the helium-3
shortage occurred. In its response, NNSA explained that the Isotope
Program has been working to clarify its responsibilities for isotopes
since 2009. In this regard, the DOE fiscal year 2012 Congressional
Budget request describes the Isotope Program's mission as that of
producing and distributing isotopes that are not commercially
available and distributing other materials as a service to DOE.
However, according to NNSA's comments, the Isotope Program does not
have the mission to be the steward of stockpiles of other materials
and their byproducts, including helium-3. Neither DOE's fiscal year
2012 Congressional Budget request, nor NNSA's comments explain what
entity does have stewardship responsibility for helium-3 and several
other isotopes that are sold by the Isotope Program, but produced
elsewhere. Regardless of how the Isotope Program defines its mission
today, at the most crucial time when helium-3 should have been
carefully managed in order to avoid the sudden awareness of the
shortage, no one entity believed it had the responsibility to do so.
As a result, the shortage of an isotope that is critical to national
security, research, industrial, and medical applications went
undetected until the supply reached a critical level. Our
recommendations are intended to assist in avoiding such a problem with
helium-3 and other isotopes in the future.
DOE also provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate throughout the report. DOE's comments on our draft report
are included in appendix I.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, Secretaries of Energy and
Homeland Security, Administrator of NNSA, National Security Staff, and
other interested parties. The report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov or Timothy M.
Persons at (202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by:
Timothy M. Persons, Ph.D.
Chief Scientist:
Director, Center for Science, Technology, and Engineering:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
NNSA:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
May 4, 2011:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington. DC: 20458:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The Department or Energy (Department) and National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) appreciates the opportunity to review the
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report, Managing Critical
Isotopes: Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the
Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage, GAO-11-472. In
response to a request made by the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives. GAO was asked to review the Department of
Energy's (DOE) management of He-3 to: (1) determine the extent to
which the federal government's response to the He-3 shortage was
affected by DOE's management of He-3; (2) determine the federal
government's priorities for allocating the limited supply of
He-3; and (3) describe the steps that the federal government is taking
to increase the He-3 supply and develop alternatives to He-3. NNSA is
responding on behalf or the Department.
The Department recognizes the need for improvements in managing He-3
and began to address this issue in 2008 via the Integrated Product
Team (Team). As described in this report, He-3 allocation priorities
have been established that have brought the supply and demand into a
better balance. The result has been to defer the total exhaustion of
US-origin He-3 from 2011 until the 2017-2018 timeframe, allowing the
Team to develop alternative technologies to reduce the need for He-3,
as well as secure additional supply.
We understand the GAO recommendations and can implement them. We are
concerned, however, that the report does not accurately reflect the
mission of the Isotope Program (IP), which in important aspects is
determined by Congressional direction to both the Office of
Science (SC) and the NNSA, and is not open to interpretation. To
clarify the roles of both SC and NNSA regarding isotope production, in
2009, Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman directed SC and NNSA to
develop a joint statement, describing the Department's approach to
isotope research, development, and production to minimize risk or
misuse. As a result. since the FY 2011 Congressional Budget request
the Department has included a joint SC/NNSA statement on
responsibility for isotopes in the SC budget Overview. A copy of the
statement in the FY 2012 Budget Request is enclosed. While the IP has
the mission to produce and distribute isotopes that are not
commercially available and can distribute legacy materials as a
service to the Department, it does not have the mission to be the
steward of stockpiles of legacy materials and their byproducts. We
believe the report, as written, may mislead the reader with an
impression of the IP's mission and role as related to He-3.
Below are a couple of points that we feel need some clarification:
* Throughout the report, the GAO says that NNSA "produces" He-3. NNSA
does not produce He-3; rather He-3 is extracted. While this may seem
an issue of semantics, we feel it is important to note that we never
manufactured He-3 for the purpose of commercial sales. Rather, NNSA
extracted He-3 as part of our mission to maintain the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile. Additionally, on Page 5 of the report states that
He-3 is rare because it is only produced through the radioactive decay
of tritium. While He-3 is currently only extracted from the
radioactive decay of tritium it exists in very low concentration in
natural sources, for example natural gas.
* With respect to using Lithium 6 (Li-6) as an alternative technology,
we are fully aware of the need to avoid incurring the same issues with
the U.S. Li-6 supply. We have taken steps to evaluate the potential
demand using the most conservative estimates for Li-6. Should the
decision be made to use Li-6, we will take all necessary steps to
ensure there is an adequate supply to meet demand.
Further, as a result of the Team's discussions, and a Workshop held in
August 2008 on the Isotope Program's initiative, the supply of other
isotopes which are sold by the Isotope Program, but produced
elsewhere, such as Li-6 mentioned in the report, is being addressed.
In the case of Li-6, for example, Portal Monitor users within the USG
were asked to estimate their long term needs, assuming that all their
monitors would use Li-6 rather than He-3. As a result of that
discussion, a Li-6 stockpile has been established to ensure supply of
Li-6 for Portal Monitor use. We would be happy to provide GAO with
documents showing our work in this area.
Also enclosed are specific comments to help clarify and improve the
report in areas that may be confusing or misleading.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls, at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Associate Administrator for Management and Budget:
Enclosures:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov Timothy M. Persons,
(202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgment:
In addition to the contact named above, Ned H. Woodward, Assistant
Director; Eric Bachhuber; R. Scott Fletcher; and Wyatt R. Hundrup made
key contributions to this report. Kendall Childers, Nancy Crothers,
Cindy Gilbert, Jonathan Kucskar, and Mehrzad Nadji also made important
contributions.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Tritium radioactively decays into helium-3 at an annual rate of
5.5 percent. For further information about tritium production, please
see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration
Needs to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons
Stockpile, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-100]
(Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010).
[2] Congress created NNSA as a semiautonomous agency within DOE under
title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3211, 113 Stat. 957 (1999)). NNSA is
responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
[3] The Isotope Program did not sell helium-3 from about 1995 through
2001 because helium-3 was being stockpiled for use in NNSA's
Accelerator Production of Tritium project. During this time, Russia
was the primary source of commercially available helium-3.
[4] Isotopes are chemical elements or varieties of a given chemical
element with the same number of protons but different numbers of
neutrons (e.g., helium-3 has one less neutron than helium-4, the
helium isotope that is commonly used in party balloons).
[5] Linde acquired Spectra Gases, one of the principal buyers of
helium-3, in 2006; Spectra Gases changed its name to Linde in 2009.
[6] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] ("Green
Book") (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[7] The National Security Staff, established under the National
Security Advisor, support all White House policymaking activities
related to international and homeland security matters.
[8] Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, commonly referred to as
COPD, is a lung disease in which the lungs are partially blocked,
making it difficult to breathe. In this type of research, a patient
inhales helium-3 during the MRI so that doctors may get a clear view
of the entire pulmonary structure.
[9] DOE, Workshop on the Nation's Needs for Isotopes: Present and
Future, DOE/SC-0107 (Rockville, Maryland, December 2008).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[11] Nuclear Science Advisory Committee, NSAC Isotopes Subcommittee,
Isotopes for the Nation's Future: A Long Range Plan. Final Report:
Second of Two NSAC Charges on the Isotope Development and Production
and Research for Applications Program (August 27, 2009).
[12] Current good manufacturing practices (cGMP) are regulations set
by the Food and Drug Administration for the manufacture of drugs,
medical devices, and other products to ensure that companies' products
meet specific requirements for identity, strength, quality, and purity.
[13] From 2003 through 2009, before helium-3 allocations were managed
by the policy committee, the price for helium-3 ranged from about $40
per liter to about $85 per liter.
[14] Heavy-water reactors are nuclear power reactors that use water
containing deuterium oxide as a coolant and natural (not enriched)
uranium as its fuel source.
[15] We are currently conducting a technology assessment of
alternatives for detecting neutrons. This technology assessment will
examine the potential and maturity of various technologies that could
lower demand for helium-3. We expect to issue a report on this
assessment later in 2011.
[End of section]
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