Mine Safety
MSHA's and Other Federal Agencies' Improved Oversight Could Enhance Safety for Coal Miners
Gao ID: GAO-07-855T May 16, 2007
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the Department of Labor's Office of the Solicitor, the states, and the mining industry share responsibility for ensuring mine safety. In two reports released today, GAO examined the challenges underground coal mines face in preparing for emergencies, how well MSHA oversees mine operators' training efforts, how well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate to enhance the development and approval of mine safety technology, MSHA's coal mine inspector recruiting efforts, and how civil penalties are assessed.
Underground coal mine operators reported facing significant challenges in preparing for emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. While mine operators recognize the importance of providing training in an environment that simulates an emergency, many of them reported challenges such as limited access to special training facilities and the cost of providing such training. In addition, mine operators reported that they anticipate challenges in implementing new mine rescue team requirements, such as conducting training annually at each mine the rescue team services. MSHA approves mine operators' training plans and inspects their training records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by several factors. For example, MSHA does not have current information on its instructors and does not ensure that they keep their knowledge and skills up to date. In addition, MSHA does not adequately monitor instructors or evaluate training sessions, and does not assess how well miners are learning the skills being taught. MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and health of coal miners, but they do not have a current memorandum of understanding to guide their coordination efforts. As a result, most of the coordination that occurs is initiated by individual staff members or by outside parties. Such informal coordination may not be sufficient given the pending retirements of many MSHA and NIOSH engineers and scientists and other challenges both agencies face. In 2004, MSHA began a new process for hiring mine inspectors, which has led to a number of improvements, such as being able to identify applicants who possess the basic skills needed to be successful inspectors and decreasing the time it takes to hire new inspectors. However, MSHA's human capital plan does not include a strategic approach for addressing the large number of retirements expected in the next 5 years. While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving more serious and higher dollar penalties are appealed, and those appealed are often reduced significantly. MSHA uses a standard formula to propose penalties, but the other entities involved in the appeals process use considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty amount. Approximately 6 percent of the 506,707 penalties proposed by MSHA between 1996 and 2006 were appealed by mine operators. About half of the penalties for the appealed violations were reduced by an average of 49 percent, regardless of the level of gravity of the violation initially cited by MSHA or the degree of the mine operator's negligence initially cited.
GAO-07-855T, Mine Safety: MSHA's and Other Federal Agencies' Improved Oversight Could Enhance Safety for Coal Miners
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, May 16, 2007:
Mine Safety:
MSHA's and Other Federal Agencies' Improved Oversight Could Enhance
Safety for Coal Miners:
Statement of Daniel Bertoni, Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security:
GAO-07-855T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-855T, a testimony before the Committee on
Education and Labor, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission, the Department of Labor‘s Office
of the Solicitor, the states, and the mining industry share
responsibility for ensuring mine safety.
In two reports released today, GAO examined the challenges underground
coal mines face in preparing for emergencies, how well MSHA oversees
mine operators‘ training efforts, how well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate to
enhance the development and approval of mine safety technology, MSHA‘s
coal mine inspector recruiting efforts, and how civil penalties are
assessed.
What GAO Found:
Underground coal mine operators reported facing significant challenges
in preparing for emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive
realistic training and organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new
requirements. While mine operators recognize the importance of
providing training in an environment that simulates an emergency, many
of them reported challenges such as limited access to special training
facilities and the cost of providing such training. In addition, mine
operators reported that they anticipate challenges in implementing new
mine rescue team requirements, such as conducting training annually at
each mine the rescue team services.
MSHA approves mine operators‘ training plans and inspects their
training records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by
several factors. For example, MSHA does not have current information on
its instructors and does not ensure that they keep their knowledge and
skills up to date. In addition, MSHA does not adequately monitor
instructors or evaluate training sessions, and does not assess how well
miners are learning the skills being taught.
MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and health
of coal miners, but they do not have a current memorandum of
understanding to guide their coordination efforts. As a result, most of
the coordination that occurs is initiated by individual staff members
or by outside parties. Such informal coordination may not be sufficient
given the pending retirements of many MSHA and NIOSH engineers and
scientists and other challenges both agencies face.
In 2004, MSHA began a new process for hiring mine inspectors, which has
led to a number of improvements, such as being able to identify
applicants who possess the basic skills needed to be successful
inspectors and decreasing the time it takes to hire new inspectors.
However, MSHA‘s human capital plan does not include a strategic
approach for addressing the large number of retirements expected in the
next 5 years.
While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators
without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving more
serious and higher dollar penalties are appealed, and those appealed
are often reduced significantly. MSHA uses a standard formula to
propose penalties, but the other entities involved in the appeals
process use considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty
amount. Approximately 6 percent of the 506,707 penalties proposed by
MSHA between 1996 and 2006 were appealed by mine operators. About half
of the penalties for the appealed violations were reduced by an average
of 49 percent, regardless of the level of gravity of the violation
initially cited by MSHA or the degree of the mine operator‘s negligence
initially cited.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations in the reports accompanying this
testimony to strengthen the efforts of MSHA, Labor, NIOSH, and the
Commission by improving mine operators‘ access to information and tools
for training their workers, strengthening MSHA‘s oversight of training,
improving the effectiveness of information sharing between MSHA and
NIOSH, strengthening MSHA‘s human capital strategic planning efforts,
and ensuring that there is transparency in penalty appeal
determinations. Each agency generally agreed with the recommendations
in the reports.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-855T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Daniel Bertoni at (202)
512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss worker safety in
underground coal mines. As you are aware, the tragic accidents that
occurred early last year brought the nation's attention to the perils
workers face in underground coal mining. In response, the Congress and
the Department of Labor's (Labor) Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) took steps to try to prevent future fatalities. The Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) required
mine operators and MSHA to undertake a variety of reforms, including
enhancing mine rescue teams, developing up-to-date accident response
plans, and instituting tougher penalties--including a criminal penalty-
-for mine operators who violate health and safety standards.[Footnote
1] In addition, MSHA implemented new standards aimed at instituting
immediate safety and health improvements, including requiring operators
to provide safety training on evacuation routes and opportunities for
miners to learn how to react in certain kinds of simulated emergency
situations. [Footnote 2] Other federal agencies share responsibilities
for improving mine safety. These agencies include the Office of Mine
Safety and Health of the Department of Health and Human Services'
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the
Department of Labor's Office of the Solicitor, and the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission.
In response to concerns about the safety of underground coal mines, my
testimony today will focus on five key issues:
1. the challenges underground coal mines face in preparing for mine
emergencies,
2. how well MSHA oversees mine operators' training efforts,
3. how well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate their efforts to enhance the
development and approval of mine safety technology,
4. how MSHA has revised its recruiting and hiring of underground coal
mine inspectors, and:
5. how civil penalties are assessed when underground coal mine
operators violate safety and health standards.
My comments are based on the findings of two reports to be released
today.[Footnote 3] We conducted all of our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary,
* Underground coal mine operators reported facing significant
challenges in preparing for emergencies, including ensuring that miners
receive realistic training and organizing mine rescue teams that
satisfy new requirements. While mine operators recognize the importance
of providing training in an environment that simulates an emergency,
many of them reported challenges such as having limited access to
special training facilities and the cost of providing such training. In
addition, mine operators reported that they anticipate challenges in
implementing new mine rescue team requirements, such as conducting
training at least annually at each mine the rescue team services.
* MSHA approves mine operators' training plans and inspects their
training records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by
several factors. For example, MSHA does not have current information on
its instructors and does not ensure that they keep their knowledge and
skills up to date. In addition, MSHA does not adequately monitor
instructors or evaluate training sessions, and it does not assess how
well miners are learning the skills being taught.
* MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and health
of coal miners, but they do not have a current memorandum of
understanding to guide their coordination efforts. As a result, most of
the coordination that occurs is initiated by individual staff members
or by outside parties. Such informal coordination may not be sufficient
given the pending retirements of many MSHA and NIOSH engineers and
scientists and other challenges both agencies face.
* In 2004, MSHA began a new process for hiring mine inspectors, which
has led to a number of improvements, such as being able to identify
applicants who possess the basic skills needed to be successful
inspectors and decreasing the time it takes to hire new inspectors.
However, MSHA's human capital plan does not include a strategic
approach for addressing the large number of retirements expected in the
next 5 years.
* While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine
operators without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving
more serious and higher-dollar penalties are appealed, and those
appealed are often reduced substantially. MSHA uses a standard formula
to propose penalties, but the other entities involved in the appeals
process use considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty
amount. Approximately 6 percent of the 506,707 penalties proposed by
MSHA between 1996 and 2006 were appealed by mine operators. About half
of the penalties for the appealed violations were reduced regardless of
the level of gravity of the violation initially cited by MSHA or the
degree of the mine operator's negligence initially cited. Appealed
penalties were reduced by an average of 49 percent.
In our reports released today, we are making a number of
recommendations to improve mine operators' access to information and
tools for training their workers, strengthen MSHA's oversight of
training, improve the effectiveness of information sharing between MSHA
and NIOSH, strengthen MSHA's workforce planning, and ensure
transparency in penalty appeal determinations.
Background:
MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and Health Administration is responsible for
carrying out enforcement activities related to surface and underground
coal mines. As of January 2007, MSHA employed approximately 550
underground coal inspectors in its 11 coal districts. MSHA's principal
enforcement responsibility for underground coal mines is fulfilled by
conducting a minimum of four comprehensive inspections of every
underground coal mine each year.[Footnote 4] When MSHA inspectors
observe violations of federal health and safety standards, they are
required to issue a citation to the coal mine operator.[Footnote 5]
Even if an operator does not agree with the violation or the penalty
amount, the operator must resolve the problems within the time frame
set by the inspector.
In assessing penalties, the Mine Act requires both the Commission and
MSHA to consider six statutory factors:
1. the mine operator's history of previous violations,
2. the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the mine,
3. whether the mine operator was negligent,
4. the effect on the operator's ability to continue in business,
5. the gravity of the violation, and:
6. the demonstrated good faith of the mine operator charged in quickly
remedying the situation after being notified of a violation.
Underground Coal Mines Face Challenges in Preparing Mine Workers and
Rescue Teams for Emergencies:
Underground coal mine operators face significant challenges preparing
for emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic
training and organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new
requirements. MSHA issued new requirements in March 2006[Footnote 6]
that direct mine operators to conduct mine emergency evacuation drills
every 90 days, including drills that simulate actual emergency
conditions; install directional lifelines to help miners find their way
out of a dark mine; and instruct miners in the procedures for
evacuating the mine in emergencies, such as those involving fires or
explosions.[Footnote 7] Based on our survey completed in February 2007,
almost all mines had conducted evacuation drills and installed
lifelines, but we estimate that half of the mines had not conducted
drills in environments that simulated actual emergency
situations.[Footnote 8] According to the survey, simulated mine
emergency training presents the greatest challenge in preparing miners
for and responding to mine emergencies. Specifically, the most common
challenges were the availability of training centers that can simulate
an emergency situation, the availability of training in a simulated
mine emergency situation, and the cost associated with providing
simulated mine emergency training (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Mines' Assessment of Challenges in Preparing Workers for Mine
Emergencies:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of survey data.
[End of figure]
Although MSHA has materials that mine operators can use to provide
hands-on training on specific topics, it does not provide all mine
operators with information and tools for training under simulated
emergency conditions. MSHA has a catalog of various training tools,
including classroom exercises, that mine operators can obtain upon
request. For example, to support the new standards issued in March that
require miners to train with breathing devices, MSHA distributed a
training packet to all underground coal mines and appropriate state
grantees.[Footnote 9] However, MSHA does not provide all mine operators
with critical information on how to provide training in simulated
emergency environments such as smoke-filled mines or information on
resources that are available for providing such training. Some mine
operators use a number of techniques to simulate emergency conditions,
but other mine operators may be unaware of them.
Based on our survey, cost concerns and opportunities for conducting
simulated training with all stakeholders are the greatest challenges in
preparing rescue teams for mine emergencies (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Mines' Assessment of Rescue Team Challenges in Preparing for
Mine Emergencies:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of survey data.
[End of figure]
Mine operators also reported that they anticipated further challenges
stemming from new requirements in the MINER Act. We estimate that half
of underground coal mines anticipate changing the composition of at
least one of their designated mine rescue teams as a result of the
MINER Act. Specifically, mine operators pointed to the requirement that
teams train at least annually at the mines they are responsible for
covering. This change could present a particular challenge for mine
rescue teams in several key coal mining states that serve many or all
of the states' mines. According to respective state officials, all
mines in Kentucky and many in Virginia and Pennsylvania rely on the
state to provide or arrange for mine rescue services. In Kentucky, for
example, mines receive rescue services from state teams composed of
state mine inspectors whose primary duties are to inspect coal mines.
According to a state official, a Kentucky team would be required to
conduct 120 training exercises annually under the MINER Act, compared
to the 12 exercises it currently conducts. Depending on the final
regulations developed by MSHA to implement the requirements of the
MINER Act, officials in Kentucky said they might stop offering mine
rescue services because of the amount of time that will be needed to
meet the training requirements.
Some mine operators have already started making changes to their mine
rescue teams based on the MINER Act, while others are taking a more
cautious approach, given the costs of training and equipping new rescue
teams. For example, one company that operates multiple mines reported
that it was creating new backup mine rescue teams to satisfy the new
requirement that rescue teams be within 1 hour travel time from the
mines they serve. In other cases, however, according to mine and
industry officials, mines were waiting to see how MSHA implements the
new mine rescue requirements before changing their team
designations.[Footnote 10] For example, the extent of the required
training at each mine could affect how mine operators designate rescue
teams.
MSHA Reviews Mines' Training Plans and Inspects Training Records but
Does Not Adequately Monitor Instructors or Training:
MSHA has the authority to oversee certain aspects of miner training to
help ensure that miners work safely and are prepared for potential
emergencies, but its oversight of training is hindered by several
factors.
* Inconsistent instructor approval standards:
To become an approved instructor, MSHA requires that an applicant prove
his or her mining and teaching experience in one of three ways: by (1)
submitting written qualifications, (2) attending new instructor
training, or (3) teaching a class monitored by MSHA under provisional
approval from an MSHA district manager. MSHA suggests factors that
district managers may use in determining an applicant's skills, but it
does not have firm criteria that new instructors must meet. In
addition, the approval procedures are not standardized across MSHA's 11
coal districts, according to MSHA officials. For example, some
districts grant provisional authority to new instructors only if they
can be monitored by MSHA staff. Other districts grant provisional
approval for individuals to teach specific courses but, according to
MSHA officials, may not monitor these instructors' teaching skills.
According to MSHA officials, staff resources limit districts' ability
to monitor applicants' teaching skills.
* Lack of up-to-date information on approved instructors:
MSHA maintains a database of approved instructors that includes contact
information for each instructor, the courses they are approved to
teach, and whether they have full or provisional authority to teach the
courses. But according to MSHA officials, the database contains
outdated contact information because some instructors move without
notifying MSHA. Without accurate information on its instructors, MSHA
cannot ensure that instructors receive training policy updates and
cannot determine whether there are enough qualified instructors to meet
mine operators' needs.
* No continuing education requirements for approved instructors:
Once instructors are approved, according to an MSHA official, they are
not required to demonstrate that they are staying current on emerging
mining issues. As a result, MSHA cannot ensure that instructors are
keeping their mining knowledge and skills up to date, including their
knowledge of emerging safety and health issues and new training tools.
* Limited monitoring and evaluation of training sessions:
According to MSHA officials, the agency monitors few miner training
sessions relative to the number conducted, and instructor evaluations
occur on an ad hoc basis. According to mine operators and trainers,
MSHA rarely oversees training, and it monitors sessions primarily for
enforcement purposes rather than to enhance instructors' knowledge and
abilities. In addition, many of the training sessions occur on the
weekends, when MSHA staff do not normally work, limiting their ability
to monitor training. MSHA does not collect or analyze training
evaluations obtained from miners to help gauge whether learning
objectives are taught effectively, and an estimate of 80 percent of
mines do not seek feedback on training sessions from their workers. As
a result, MSHA cannot determine how well miners are learning the skills
taught by MSHA-approved trainers and recommend corrective measures as
necessary.
MSHA and NIOSH Lack a Formal Agreement to Guide Mine Safety
Coordination:
MSHA and NIOSH have complementary roles in improving the safety and
health of coal miners, but coordination between the two agencies is
largely informal and inconsistent due to a lack of a formal agreement
or policies to guide their efforts. MSHA is primarily involved in
setting health and safety standards and enforcing them through mine
inspections that can result in citations and penalties, whereas NIOSH's
mining program is focused on research into the causes of and ways to
prevent the safety and health hazards miners face.
MSHA and NIOSH currently lack a formal agreement, such as a memorandum
of understanding or other policy to guide their coordination efforts, a
practice we have identified as effective in prior work.[Footnote 11] In
1978, NIOSH's predecessor and MSHA had a signed memorandum of
understanding that specified how they would coordinate to ensure that
technology resulting from mine safety research would be used to the
fullest extent.[Footnote 12] The memorandum embodied many of the key
practices identified in prior GAO work that can help federal agencies
enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts, such as defining roles
and responsibilities and developing joint strategies. However, the
memorandum is no longer used, and MSHA officials were unaware of any
plan to update the document. As a result of not having a formal
agreement or policies to guide their activities, coordination between
MSHA and NIOSH is primarily driven by informal relationships between
staff at both agencies. Officials from both agencies and labor union
representatives told us that coordination has been primarily at the
initiative of individuals at both agencies and, as such has not always
been consistent across the agencies.
NIOSH and MSHA face a potentially large workforce turnover in coming
years, and informal coordination based on working relationships between
staff members may not continue when the individuals leave. As at many
federal agencies, MSHA and NIOSH have a large proportion of employees,
including many engineers and scientists, who are eligible to retire
over the next several years. MSHA data show that more than 50 percent
of its 140 engineers and scientists will be eligible for retirement
within the next 10 years, with 31 percent eligible within 5 years.
Similarly, about half of NIOSH's employees--most of whom are scientists
and engineers--are eligible to retire in 5 years.
In addition, MSHA and NIOSH face other challenges that require them to
work more closely together, particularly in developing and approving
safety technologies under tight time frames. An influx of new and
inexperienced miners brought on due to the increased demand for coal
and the aging of the workforce, rising dangers as miners go deeper
underground to mine coal, and recent mine disasters have heightened
interest in promising new safety technology. The MINER Act addresses
some of these issues and underscores NIOSH's and MSHA's roles in
developing and approving safety technologies. For example, the act
requires NIOSH to study the use of refuge chambers for miners and
requires MSHA to review the results of NIOSH's work to determine what
actions, such as making regulatory changes, are appropriate. Both
agencies must take action within a relatively short period of
time.[Footnote 13]
MSHA Has Improved Its Hiring Process, but Its Human Capital Strategic
Plan Does Not Adequately Project or Address Its Future Workforce Needs:
While MSHA has taken significant steps to improve its hiring process,
the agency's human capital plan does not include a strategic approach
for addressing the large number of retirements expected over the next 5
years. In 2004, MSHA began using the Federal Career Intern Program
(FCIP) to hire new mine inspectors, which has resulted in a number of
improvements to the hiring and recruitment process, such as hiring new
inspectors more quickly. Since it began using the program, MSHA has
hired 301 interns, 236 of whom are coal mine inspector
trainees.[Footnote 14] Through the FCIP, MSHA developed a process for
assessing applicants' skills, conducting interviews, and providing
applicants with immediate feedback on their aptitude during 1-day job
fairs held in locations around the country. As of October 2004, all
applicants for inspector positions must attend job fairs and pass a
test on basic math and writing skills before interviewing with MSHA.
MSHA reported that this screening process has helped the agency
maximize its resources, since the exams identify applicants who do not
have the basic skills needed to become a successful inspector at an
early stage of the hiring process. For example, of the 1,256 applicants
tested in 2005 and 2006, 49 percent failed either the math or written
exam, or both. MSHA's previous hiring process considered experience
over basic skills, and officials told us that this resulted in some new
hires with significant mining experience but weak reading and writing
skills. As a result, MSHA spent time during new mine inspector training
teaching these basic skills.
MSHA officials reported that this new approach has reduced the amount
of time it takes to hire a new mine inspector from up to 180 days to 45
days or less.[Footnote 15] In addition, the Office of Personnel
Management approved MSHA's request to hire mine inspectors through the
FCIP under a broader range of pay scale levels, which allows the agency
to hire individuals with different experiences.[Footnote 16] For
example, an applicant might have little experience in mining but
possess relevant experience in construction and electrical engineering.
This applicant would be hired as a mine inspector trainee at the lower
end of the pay scale and be given additional training in areas specific
to mine health and safety. Further, MSHA officials commented that the
job fairs have helped the agency reduce the number of interagency
transfers that occurred under its old hiring process, which was a
significant problem. Since job fairs are held in the locations where
applicants are being sought and applicants must attend the job fairs in
person, they tend to live in those communities and are less likely to
request a transfer to another location once they are hired.[Footnote
17]
Appointments to the FCIP are generally for 2 years, at which point the
intern may be offered a permanent position.[Footnote 18] During the
internship, new hires are required to participate in a formal training
program, which consists of training provided by the Mine Academy and
structured on-the-job training. However, district managers and Mine
Academy officials agreed that, realistically, new inspectors can take
up to 5 years to become fully competent and confident in their roles as
underground coal mine inspectors.
While the improvements MSHA has made to its recruiting process are an
important part of addressing impending retirements, the agency has not
developed a long-term strategy for replacing mine inspectors. MSHA
estimates that over 40 percent of its inspectors will be eligible for
retirement by 2012 (see table 1), and agency officials told us that in
the last 3 years, between 32 and 47 percent of the coal mine
enforcement employees eligible to retire actually did so in the first
year of eligibility.
Table 1: Number of Underground Coal Mine Inspectors and Those Eligible
for Retirement by 2012:
Number of underground coal mine inspectors;
District office: 1: 6;
District office: 2: 38;
District office: 3: 39;
District office: 4: 71;
District office: 5: 35;
District office: 6: 56;
District office: 7: 52;
District office: 8: 24;
District office: 9: 26;
District office: 10: 16;
District office: 11: 14;
District office: Total: 377.
Number of underground coal mine inspectors eligible to retire within 5
years;
District office: 1: 3;
District office: 2: 23;
District office: 3: 15;
District office: 4: 36;
District office: 5: 12;
District office: 6: 16;
District office: 7: 13;
District office: 8: 10;
District office: 9: 13;
District office: 10: 8;
District office: 11: 5;
District office: Total: 154.
Percentage eligible to retire within 5 years;
District office: 1: 50%;
District office: 2: 61%;
District office: 3: 38%;
District office: 4: 51%;
District office: 5: 34%;
District office: 6: 29%;
District office: 7: 25%;
District office: 8: 42%;
District office: 9: 50%;
District office: 10: 50%;
District office: 11: 36%;
District office: Total: 41%.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
Note: Data are as of January 31, 2007.
[End of table]
District officials expressed concern over loss of highly experienced
coal mine inspectors and the impact such retirements can have on
achieving the goals of the agency. For example, one district official
told us that recent retirements have left the district short-handed and
expressed concern over the inspectors' ability to complete the required
annual mine inspections on time.
While MSHA human resources officials told us about steps they are
taking to mitigate the turnover, the agency has not developed a
strategic plan that clearly links measurable outcomes to the mission
and goals of the agency. In our review of the plan and discussions with
MSHA officials, the agency has not yet demonstrated how it is planning
for its future needs, what targets and goals are established to meet
those needs, and how the goals will be monitored. For example, given
the amount of time needed to train new inspectors, it is not clear how
the agency will take into account the potential increases in future
hiring and the time necessary to fully train replacements.
GAO has reported on effective strategies for workforce planning that
require a more strategic approach to meeting the challenges of the
future.[Footnote 19] Among other elements, strategic planning serves as
a tool to help agencies address challenges in a manner that is clearly
linked to achieving their mission and goals. For example, by using data
to make long-term projections, an agency can design a transition
program to ensure that experienced employees are available in critical
areas of the agency and that the institutional knowledge would not be
lost because of turnover. Further, the agency can revisit the
projections on a regular basis and use the information to address
broader agency goals for improvement.
Most Penalties Assessed by MSHA Are Paid without Opposition, but Many
of Those Appealed Are Reduced Significantly:
Most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators
without opposition, but a small percentage of more serious and higher-
dollar penalties are appealed, and many of those appealed are reduced
significantly. In order to determine the amount of a proposed penalty,
MSHA uses a standard formula that generally results in larger penalties
being proposed for more serious violations. MSHA assigns point values
to each of the six broad factors outlined in the Mine Act, and two of
these factors--whether the operator was negligent and the gravity of
the violation--carry the greatest weight in deciding the amount of the
proposed penalty.[Footnote 20] MSHA inspectors are responsible for
making an initial determination regarding the magnitude of these two
elements during their inspections.[Footnote 21] After an inspector
issues a citation and makes an initial finding regarding the gravity
and negligence of the violation, MSHA determines the magnitude of the
remaining four factors and tallies the points to determine the proposed
penalty amount. Between 1996 and 2006, MSHA proposed 506,707 penalties
for safety and health violations, and the average penalty was $234 per
violation. Table 2 details the range of average penalties, by degree of
gravity and negligence, proposed by MSHA from 1996 through 2006.
Table 2: Average Proposed Penalty by Gravity and Negligence Indicators,
1996 to 2006:
Likelihood of accident:
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Accident
occurred;
Percentage of citations issued: 0.2%;
Average proposed penalty: $12,324.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Highly
likely to occur; Percentage of citations issued: 0.9%; Average proposed
penalty: $2,362.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Reasonably
likely to occur;
Percentage of citations issued: 38.6%;
Average proposed penalty: $367.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Unlikely
to occur;
Percentage of citations issued: 55.5%;
Average proposed penalty: $74.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: No
likelihood;
Percentage of citations issued: 2.4%;
Average proposed penalty: $168.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Total;
Percentage of citations issued: 97.6%[B];
Average proposed penalty: [Empty].
Potential injury or illness.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Fatal;
Percentage of citations issued: 3.5%;
Average proposed penalty: $1,185.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Permanent
injury; Percentage of citations issued: 7.4%; Average proposed penalty:
$569.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Lost days;
Percentage of citations issued: 62.4%;
Average proposed penalty: $202.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: No lost
work days;
Percentage of citations issued: 24.4%;
Average proposed penalty: $77.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Total;
Percentage of citations issued: 97.7%[B];
Average proposed penalty: [Empty].
Number of miners affected.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: 0-1
miners;
Percentage of citations issued: 82%;
Average proposed penalty: [C].
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: 2-5
miners;
Percentage of citations issued: 10.8%;
Average proposed penalty: [C].
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: 6-9
miners;
Percentage of citations issued: 4.5%;
Average proposed penalty: [C].
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: 10 or more
miners;
Percentage of citations issued: 2.7%;
Average proposed penalty: [C].
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Total;
Percentage of citations issued: 100.0%;
Average proposed penalty: [Empty].
Negligence by mine operator.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Reckless;
Percentage of citations issued: 0.1%;
Average proposed penalty: $8,458.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: High;
Percentage of citations issued: 3.5%;
Average proposed penalty: $1,757.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Moderate;
Percentage of citations issued: 84.3%;
Average proposed penalty: $179.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Low;
Percentage of citations issued: 9.4%;
Average proposed penalty: $91.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: None;
Percentage of citations issued: 0.3%;
Average proposed penalty: $454.
Elements of gravity and negligence: Gravity of violation[A]: Total;
Percentage of citations issued: 97.6%[B];
Average proposed penalty: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of data MSHA penalty and violation data.
Note: These data represent the points accumulated under the former
assessment process. MSHA expects its new regulations to result in
higher proposed penalty amounts for each of these categories.
[A] Each subelement of gravity is an exclusive category.
[B] Percentage does not add to 100 due to a small amount of missing
data.
[C] We did not calculate the average proposed penalty for the number of
miners, because most (75 percent) of the violations involved only one
miner.
[End of table]
MSHA recently changed its regulations governing civil penalty
assessments to update them and increase proposed penalty amounts, and
to implement the new civil penalty requirement of the MINER Act. The
new regulations will increase the points for most of the six statutory
factors, and MSHA officials predicted that the new penalty structure
will increase total proposed penalties by 234 percent. For example,
these changes will increase the maximum points allotted for gravity
from 30 to 88 points. MSHA officials asserted that these changes will
likely lead to greater rates of compliance and subsequently a safer
working environment for the nation's miners.
Between 1996 and 2006, approximately 6 percent (31,589) of the
penalties proposed by MSHA for violations of underground coal mine
safety and health standards were contested by mine operators, and about
half of the contested penalties were reduced. The average amount of a
contested penalty was $1,107, compared to an average of $176 for a
noncontested penalty, and more than half of all contested penalties
were for the most serious violations.[Footnote 22] Almost half of all
penalties contested by underground coal mine operators are reduced
through the appeals process, even those involving the highest levels of
gravity and negligence. From 1996 to 2006, 47 percent of all contested
penalties (14,723 penalties) were decreased from the amount originally
proposed by MSHA. On average, these penalties were reduced by about
half of the amount initially proposed by MSHA using its standard
formula.[Footnote 23]
While all of the entities involved in the appeals process--the Labor's
Solicitor's Office, MSHA's conference litigation representatives
(CLR)[Footnote 24], and the Commission's administrative law judges
(ALJ)--are required by law to apply the six statutory factors specified
in the Mine Act, they are not legally obligated to use any particular
method to determine a final penalty amount when they determine that a
reduction from MSHA's proposed penalty is appropriate. As a result,
they have considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty
amount. Officials from all three of the entities involved in the
appeals process told us that in determining the size of a final
penalty, they apply the six statutory factors on a case-by-case basis
and use their professional judgment. For example, officials from the
Solicitor's Office and CLRs told us that, when appropriate, the
Department of Labor generally views penalty settlements as being in the
best interest of both the agency and the mine operators because
settlements allow them to avoid costly litigation.[Footnote 25]
Attorneys from the Solicitor's Office also told us that they analyze
the evidence presented by MSHA inspectors and mine operators and assess
their chances of winning the case in deciding whether to settle a case
or go to trial.
Prior decisions by the Commission require ALJ decisions to be
sufficiently explained.[Footnote 26] However, in some cases we
reviewed, while the reasons supporting a reduction from MSHA's proposed
penalty are clearly explained, the rationale for the final penalty
amount is not always well documented. For example, in one case decided
in October 2005, the ALJ reduced MSHA's proposed penalty from $50,000
to $10,000.[Footnote 27] Although the judge concluded that the gravity
of the violation was less than MSHA had originally found, thereby
supporting a penalty reduction, he appeared to agree with MSHA's
assessment regarding the other five statutory factors, including MSHA's
finding that the operator's degree of negligence was high.[Footnote 28]
In conclusion, the events of the last year heightened interest in
protecting miners and preparing them for the perils in their workplace.
While Congress, federal and state officials, mine operators, miners and
their representatives have taken important steps to improve safety in
mines, more can be done in several areas. First, without assistance for
mine operators in providing training under simulated emergency
conditions and adequate monitoring of instructors and the training
miners receive, miners may not be able to safely and confidently escape
a mine. Further, the high rates of retirement eligibility among MSHA
and NIOSH scientists and engineers as well as the need to work together
under tight time frames may render current informal coordination
ineffective, thus hampering the agencies' efforts to speed the
implementation of new safety technology in mines. Similarly, the
expected high attrition among MSHA's inspector corps, coupled with the
amount of time needed to train new inspectors to become proficient at
their duties, calls for a more strategic approach. Absent a clear plan
to address expected turnover, MSHA could jeopardize its success to date
in reforming the inspector recruitment and hiring process.
Finally, given the trends over the past 10 years, the higher proposed
penalties under MSHA's new penalty structure will likely lead more
operators to appeal. As a result, it is important that decisions on
contested penalties are transparent and contain the necessary
information to understand how final penalty amounts are determined.
Without such information, it will be difficult to monitor their
decisions over time to ensure that all of the entities involved in the
appeals process are appropriately and consistently applying the six
statutory factors in altering penalty amounts and that the impact of
penalties in protecting miners' safety through greater compliance by
mine operators is not diminished.
In the reports, we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Labor and
Health and Human Services, and the Chairman of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission. These recommendations are designed to
strengthen the efforts of Labor, MSHA, NIOSH, and the Commission by:
* improving mine operators' access to information and tools for
training their workers,
* strengthening MSHA's oversight of training,
* improving the effectiveness of information sharing between MSHA and
NIOSH,
* strengthening MSHA' s human capital strategic planning efforts, and:
* ensuring that there is transparency in final penalty amounts for
appealed cases.
Each agency generally agreed with the recommendations after reviewing a
draft of the reports.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to respond
to any questions you or other members of the committee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information, please contact Daniel Bertoni at (202) 512-
7215. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include
Revae Moran, Sara L. Schibanoff, and Rachael C. Valliere.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. 109-236.
[2] 30 C.F.R. Parts 48, 50, and 75, Emergency Mine Evacuation; Final
Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,252 (March 9, 2006); 30 C.F.R. Parts 3, 48, 50,
and 75, Emergency Mine Evacuation; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,430
(December 8, 2006).
[3] GAO, Mine Safety: Better Oversight and Coordination by MSHA and
Other Federal Agencies Could Improve Safety for Underground Coal
Miners, GAO-07-622 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007); MSHA's Revised
Hiring Process Has Improved the Agency's Recruiting Efforts, but Its
Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Adequately Project or Address Its
Future Workforce Needs, GAO-07-704R (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007).
[4] Mines that are recognized as more dangerous, such as those
containing high levels of methane gas, are inspected more frequently.
[5] MSHA inspectors are authorized to issue either a citation or a
withdrawal order when they observe a health and safety violation. All
withdrawal orders compel the removal of miners from the affected work
areas until the observed hazard is terminated. This, in essence, could
halt production in a particular area of the mine.
[6] The new requirements were finalized in December 2006, with some
modifications and clarifications.
[7] To ensure that four major scenarios--fire, explosion, gas, and
water inundation--are covered each year, the final rule requires that a
different scenario be used each quarter in conducting evacuation
drills.
[8] Percentage estimates are based on a sample and are subject to
sampling error. See GAO-07-622 for more information on the survey
methodology. We are 95 percent confident that the results we obtained
are within plus or minus 8 percentage points of the true values of the
in-scope population. Each sample element was subsequently weighted in
the analysis to account for all members of the in-scope population,
including those that were not selected.
[9] The packet contained a DVD on the protocol for how to transfer from
one breathing device to another, training manuals on six types of
breathing devices, an article on how to disinfect the devices, and
other related information.
[10] MSHA has not yet determined how the mine rescue team requirements
in the MINER Act will be implemented. MSHA officials said they plan to
hold public hearings on the requirements of the act before publishing
final rules, which are due in December 2007.
[11] We have reported that agencies can strengthen their commitment to
work collaboratively by articulating their agreements in formal
documents, such as a memorandum of understanding, interagency guidance,
or an interagency planning document, signed by senior officials in the
respective agencies. See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices
That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
GAO-06-15, (Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2005).
[12] This agreement was originally executed between MSHA's predecessor
in the Department of Interior, the Mining Enforcement and Safety
Administration (MESA) and NIOSH's predecessor, the Division of Mining
Research - Health and Safety in the Bureau of Mines in 1976. The MOU
was updated in 1978 after MESA was transferred to the Department of
Labor and renamed MSHA.
[13] NIOSH is required to report out on its work within 18 months after
the enactment of the MINER Act. MSHA then has 180 days after receiving
the report from NIOSH to determine what actions it intends to take.
[14] These data are as of February 2007. The noncoal interns were hired
as inspector trainees for metal/nonmetal mining operations.
[15] According to an MSHA human resources official, this time frame
begins when an applicant receives a job offer and includes time for the
agency to review the results from a medical exam and drug test. It does
not include any time that an applicant might be placed on a waiting
list if the district does not have a job opening available.
[16] MSHA can offer new mine inspectors positions under the government
general schedule (GS) that range from GS-5 to GS-11. As of January
2007, the potential pay ranged from $25,623 to $61,068.
[17] For example, between October 2006 and April 2007, MSHA held job
fairs in each of its 11 coal mine districts.
[18] Inspectors with relatively little experience (and hired at the
lower end of the pay scale) participate in the FCIP longer--3 years
instead of 2 years--to give the agency time to assess their performance
and knowledge before a decision is made on whether to convert them to
permanent employee status.
[19] GAO, Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st
Century, GAO-07-556T (Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2007); GAO, Human
Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-
04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
[20] Under regulations effective as of April 23, 2007, MSHA's penalties
are assessed in two different penalty categories: regular and special.
Prior to the recent regulatory changes, MSHA issued a third type of
penalty called the single penalty. The single penalty was a flat $60
penalty for violations that are unlikely to cause injury or illness.
This type of penalty accounted for approximately 60 percent of the
penalties issued between 1996 and 2006. MSHA's new regulations
eliminate the single penalty. A regular assessment is the agency's
general penalty and ranges from $112 to $60,000. Special assessments
are reserved for violations in which MSHA elects to waive the regular
assessment, and set another penalty consistent with the six statutory
factors. For example, special assessments may be used when an operator
fails to correct certain violations or notify MSHA of certain kinds of
accidents. A special assessment can be as high as $220,000, but this is
for the new flagrant violation established under the MINER Act; the
maximum for most special assessments is also $60,000. Eligibility
guidelines and assessment formulas for special and regular assessments
are outlined in MSHA regulations and agency policies.
[21] MSHA inspectors also determine whether mine operators have made
good faith efforts to correct the violation, which results in a 10
percent reduction in the proposed penalty. Under regulations that were
in effect through April 22, 2007, the good faith reduction was 30
percent.
[22] Sixty-three percent of contested penalties are considered
"significant and substantial," or "S&S," violations. An inspector
designates violations as S&S if they are deemed at least reasonably
likely to cause an injury that results in lost work days. This
designation can trigger more serious sanctions, such as closing a
portion of a mine or closing an entire mine.
[23] For more detailed information about penalty reductions, see GAO-07-
622.
[24] CLRs are MSHA enforcement staff and are located in every MSHA coal
district. They have been provided with specialized legal training and
are authorized by the agency to negotiate settlements for penalties
that are no higher than $350 and are limited in legal complexity.
[25] In addition to the general costs of litigation, in some cases, the
Equal Access to Justice Act requires that the Department of Labor pay a
mine operator's fees and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees,
if the ALJ finds that the agency's position was not substantially
justified, such as when an MSHA-proposed penalty is lowered
significantly in formal proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 29 C.F.R. Part
2704.
[26] In August 2006, the Commission reminded ALJs of the importance of
adequately documenting penalty decisions. Specifically, the Commission
wrote "When . . . it is determined that penalties are appropriate which
substantially diverge from those originally proposed, it behooves the
Commission and its judges to provide a sufficient explanation of the
bases underlying the penalties assessed by the Commission. If a
sufficient explanation for the divergence is not provided, the
credibility of the administrative scheme providing for the increase or
lowering of penalties after contest may be jeopardized by an appearance
of arbitrariness." Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 28 FMSHRC 579, 606-07
(August 2006) (citing Sellersburg Stone Co., 5 FMSHRC 287, 293 (March
1983)).
[27] Wabash Mine Holding Co., 27 FMSHRC 672 (October 2005).
[28] See also Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 28 FMSHRC 1068 (December
2006) and Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 28 FMSHRC 579 (August 2006).
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