Aviation Security
Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System Gao ID: GAO-03-344 December 20, 2002U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about one-half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten the entire air transport system. GAO agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been identified in the air cargo system, the status of key recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air cargo security, and ways in which air cargo security can be improved in the near-and long-term.
Numerous government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities in the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when cargo leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As a result, any weaknesses in this program could create security risks. FAA or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has responsibility for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number of key recommendations and mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by numerous government organizations. For example, FAA and the air cargo industry developed security training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations by those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA, or have not been implemented. Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve air cargo security in the near-term. Examples of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition, long-term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo-security plan, have been recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by TSA. Each potential improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk management approach and sets deadlines and performance targets, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing measures to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-344, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
December 2002:
AVIATION SECURITY:
Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System:
Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements:
GAO-03-344:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-344, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Aviation Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation; and another requester.
AVIATION SECURITY
Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System.
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both
passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about one-half of the
hull
of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any
vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten
the
entire air transport system. GAO agreed to determine the security
vulnerabilities that have been identified in the air cargo system, the
status
of key recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air
cargo
security, and ways in which air cargo security can be improved in the
near-
and long-term.
What GAO Found:
Numerous government and industry studies have identified
vulnerabilities
in
the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security
procedures
of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible tampering
with
freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when cargo
leaves a
shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As a result,
any
weaknesses in this program could create security risks. FAA or the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has
responsibility
for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number of key
recommendations
and mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by
numerous government
organizations. For example, FAA and the air cargo industry developed
security
training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air
cargo.
However, a few recommendations by those groups, such as conducting
research and
operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are
ongoing and
not yet completed by TSA, or have not been implemented. Federal
reports, industry
groups, and security experts have identified operational and
technological measures
that have the potential to improve air cargo security in the near-
term. Examples
of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making
cargo deliveries
and implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition,
long-term
improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo-security
plan, have been
recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by TSA.
Each potential
improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed against other
issues, such as
costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. Without a comprehensive
plan that
incorporates a risk management approach and sets deadlines and
performance targets,
TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources
are being
deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing
measures to
reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist
attack.
Cargo Being Loaded on an Airplane:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for air
cargo security that
identifies priority actions on the basis of risk, costs, and
performance targets,
and establishes deadlines for completing those actions.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology,
click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D., at
(202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Vulnerabilities Exist in Air Cargo Security:
Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Key Recommendations on Air Cargo
Security:
Near-Term Actions to Enhance Cargo Security Have Been Identified:
A Comprehensive Plan and Risk Management Approach Have Been Identified
As Ways to Improve Air Cargo Security in the Long Term:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Air Cargo Incidents and Follow-Up Actions:
Appendix II: Proposed Legislation on Air Cargo Security:
Appendix III: Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security:
Tables:
Table 1: Information on Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security:
Table 2: Information on Operational Practices to Enhance Air Cargo
Security:
Table 3: Status of Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security:
Figures:
Figure 1: Flow of Cargo from Shipper to Air Carrier:
Figure 2: Amount of Air Cargo Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996-2012:
Figure 3: Amount of U.S. Mail Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996-2012:
Figure 4: Summary Information on the Status of Key Recommendations for
Air Cargo Security:
Figure 5: Elements of a Risk Management Approach:
Figure 6: Time Line of Key Changes in Air Cargo Security:
Abbreviations:
DOT Department of Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
OIG Office of Inspector General
TSA Transportation Security Administration:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 20, 2002:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Ranking Minority Member
Aviation Subcommittee
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate:
U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both
passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Keeping that cargo secure is the
responsibility of the Department of Transportation‘s (DOT)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which was created in
November 2001 by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Prior to
that date, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had this
responsibility. To ensure air cargo security, the act requires the
screening of all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft and
requires TSA to have a system in place as soon as practicable to screen
or otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. To
date, TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs
and other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or in
their carry-on or checked luggage. However, about one-half of the hull
of each passenger aircraft is typically filled with cargo. If
vulnerabilities exist in the transport of air cargo, they potentially
threaten the air transport system. You asked us to examine the security
of air cargo. In doing so, we addressed the following research
questions:
* What security vulnerabilities have been identified in the air cargo
system?
* What is the status of key recommendations that have been made within
the past 12 years to improve air cargo security?
* How can air cargo security be improved in the near-and long-term?
To answer our research questions, we conducted a comprehensive
assessment of pertinent literature, including reports from TSA, FAA,
DOT‘s Volpe Transportation Center, the U.S. Customs Service, federal
commissions and working groups, aviation industry groups, and DOT‘s
Office of Inspector General (OIG). We also interviewed TSA officials,
industry officials representing passenger and cargo airlines and
consolidators of air freight, and aviation security experts. In
addition, to determine possible ways in which the security of air cargo
can be improved in the long-term, we reviewed our previous reports on
risk management techniques and compared the risk management approach
outlined in those reports with TSA‘s current procedures and plans for
air cargo security. We performed our work from August to December 2002
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Vulnerabilities in the air cargo system have been identified by
numerous government and industry studies. TSA inspectors have
identified vulnerabilities in the security procedures of some air
carriers and freight forwarders. Further vulnerabilities have been
identified by the aviation industry and government agencies, including
possible tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the
point when it leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an
aircraft and the adequacy of background investigations for all persons
handling cargo. In addition, the ’known shipper“ program, TSA‘s primary
approach for ensuring air cargo security and complying with the cargo-
screening requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
has been reviewed by DOT‘s Inspector General for possible security
weaknesses.
FAA or TSA has implemented a number of the key recommendations and
mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security (also called the Gore Commission), the
Cargo Working Group (an FAA-industry partnership), and DOT‘s Office of
Inspector General. For example, in 1999, FAA, in cooperation with the
air cargo industry, developed security training guides for air carriers
and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few
recommendations made by those groups, such as conducting research and
operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are
either ongoing and not yet completed by TSA or have not been
implemented.
Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified
operational and technological measures that have the potential to
improve air cargo security in the near-term. The measures incorporate
some of the key recommendations made since 1990, as well as best
practices for cargo security identified in government reports. Examples
of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making
cargo deliveries and implementing a computerized cargo profiling
system. Each potential improvement, however, needs to be weighed
against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of
cargo. TSA has been developing some of these measures, such as
conducting research on blast-hardened cargo containers; however, other
potential measures have not been fully implemented. In addition, long-
term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo security
plan, have been recommended by the above sources but have not been
implemented by TSA. Moreover, we have recommended that the federal
government adopt a risk management approach to combat terrorism.
Although TSA has undertaken two elements of the approach we describe--
it has assessed some of the threats and vulnerabilities of air cargo--
it has not undertaken a third element--assessing the criticality of
deploying resources to address the vulnerabilities. Criticality is
assessed by evaluating and prioritizing actions in terms of specific
criteria. Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk
management approach, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know
whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as
possible to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a
terrorist attack. This report recommends that the Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo
security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes a list
of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing the actions.
DOT agreed with our report and stated that TSA will consider
implementing our recommendation as the agency moves forward with its
cargo-security program.
Background:
Transporting cargo by air involves many participants, including
manufacturers and shippers who make routine or occasional shipments,
freight forwarders who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers, and cargo facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers
that store cargo until it is placed aboard an aircraft. Figure 1
depicts these participants and the two primary ways in which a shipper
can send cargo by air.
Figure 1: Flow of Cargo from Shipper to Air Carrier:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
A shipper may take its packages to a freight forwarder, which
consolidates cargo from many shippers and delivers it to air carriers,
as illustrated in the top portion of figure 1. The freight forwarder
usually has cargo facilities in or near airports and uses trucks to
deliver bulk freight to commercial air carriers--either to a cargo
facility or to a small-package receiving area at the ticket counter.
Freight forwarders operate about 10,000 facilities nationwide.
According to TSA, about 80 percent of shippers use freight forwarders.
Another way for a shipper to send freight is to directly package and
deliver it to an air carrier‘s airport sorting center, as pictured in
the bottom half of figure 1. Many large companies, including some that
produce and distribute perishable goods, have direct accounts with
either all-cargo or passenger air carriers.
During fiscal year 2000, about 12.2 billion revenue ton miles of
freight were shipped in the United States by air.[Footnote 1] About 22
percent of that total was carried on passenger aircraft; the remainder
was carried on all-cargo aircraft.[Footnote 2] Freight is a significant
source of income to airlines, accounting for about 10 percent of
scheduled passenger airlines‘ revenue and bringing in about $13 billion
in 2001. DOT‘s projections indicate, moreover, that the amount of
freight transported by air will increase faster than the number of
passengers in the coming years, thus adding to its importance.[Footnote
3] Figure 2 shows the amount of air cargo actually transported from
fiscal years 1996 through 2001 and the amount that DOT projects will be
transported from fiscal years 2002 through 2012.
Figure 2: Amount of Air Cargo Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996-2012:
Notes: DOT‘s data show actual amounts of cargo for fiscal years 1996
through 2001 and projected amounts for fiscal years 2002 through 2013.
Our analysis includes only the even-numbered years.
[See PDF for Image]
[A] A revenue ton mile (RTM) equates to one ton of mail transported one
mile.
[End of Figure]
In addition to freight, air carriers also transport mail. In fiscal
year 2000, about 2.5 billion revenue ton miles of mail were shipped in
the United States by air and transported predominantly on passenger
aircraft (about 70 percent of the total). In September 2001, the amount
of domestic mail transported by air decreased significantly--down about
68 percent from the revenue ton miles of mail transported in September
2000. DOT‘s forecast through 2013 indicates that the amount of domestic
mail will resume growth in fiscal year 2004. However, the amount of
mail transported by air is not expected to return to 2001 levels during
the entire forecast period, in part because of security directives
issued by TSA in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Figure 3
shows the amount of U.S. mail actually transported by air from fiscal
years 1996 through 2001 and the amount that DOT projects will be
transported from fiscal years 2002 through 2012.
Figure 3: Amount of U.S. Mail Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996-2012:
Notes: DOT‘s data show actual amounts of mail for fiscal years 1996
through 2001 and projected amounts for fiscal years 2002 through 2013.
Our analysis includes only the even-numbered years.
[See PDF for Image]
[A] A revenue ton mile (RTM) equates to one ton of mail transported one
mile.
[End of Figure]
The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, along with the crashes
in 1996 of ValuJet flight 592 and TWA flight 800, led to increased
national concerns about air cargo security. The federal government
responded to these incidents with studies of the vulnerabilities in the
civil aviation system and recommendations to enhance many aspects of
the system, including air cargo security. (See app. I for a chronology
of the incidents and the federal response.) For example, the Pan Am
bombing led to the passage of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990, which required FAA to begin an accelerated 18-month research and
development effort to find an effective explosives detection system to
screen baggage and cargo. Following the 1996 crashes, the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (known as the Gore
Commission) was created. The Commission recommended, among other
things, that FAA implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat
of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work with industry
to develop new initiatives in this area. After the 1996 crashes, FAA
established the Baseline Working Group and, later, the Cargo Working
Group--federal-industry partnerships--to find ways to enhance air cargo
security.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, renewed national concern
with cargo security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
enacted in November 2001, requires the screening of all passengers and
property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and carry-on and checked baggage,
that is carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft. It also requires
having a system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or
otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. The act
transferred responsibility for aviation security from FAA to the newly
established TSA. In November 2002, the Senate passed proposed
legislation on air cargo security.
Vulnerabilities Exist in Air Cargo Security:
Vulnerabilities have been identified in the air cargo system by the
1996 Gore Commission, DOT‘s OIG, TSA, experts with whom we spoke, and
other government and industry studies. Specifically, vulnerabilities
have been identified in the security procedures of some air carriers
and freight forwarders, including the adequacy of background
investigations for all persons handling cargo. For example, TSA
inspectors have found numerous security violations made by freight
forwarders and air carriers during routine inspections of their
facilities. Freight forwarders and air carriers are required to have
TSA-approved cargo-security programs, and only freight forwarders with
an approved security program are permitted to ship freight on passenger
aircraft. In addition, DOT‘s OIG has reviewed TSA‘s known shipper
program--which allows shippers that have established business histories
with air carriers or freight forwarders to ship cargo on planes--and
TSA‘s procedures for approving freight forwarders, checking for
possible security weaknesses. The known shipper program is TSA‘s
primary approach for ensuring air cargo security and complying with the
cargo-screening requirements of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act.
Other security vulnerabilities include possible tampering with cargo
during land transport to the airport or at the cargo-handling
facilities of air carriers and freight forwarders. The amount of cargo
theft that occurs in these locations indicates the security problem.
The National Cargo Security Council, a coalition of public and private
transportation organizations, estimates that cargo theft among all
modes of transportation accounts for more than $10 billion in
merchandise losses each year. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation estimates that the majority of cargo theft in the United
States occurs in cargo terminals, transfer facilities, and cargo-
consolidation areas. This type of theft also occurs in other parts of
the world. For example, during a series of robberies that took place at
the Brussels airport in 2001, robbers stole $160 million in diamonds
from the holds of Lufthansa jets. DOT has reported that thefts are
often committed by employees or with employee cooperation, and provided
examples of thefts perpetrated at the Port of New York/New Jersey
(which includes Kennedy International Airport) and the Port of Boston
(which includes Logan International Airport).
Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Key Recommendations on Air Cargo
Security:
FAA or TSA has implemented a number of key recommendations or mandates
to improve air cargo security made over the past 12 years by the
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Gore Commission, the
Cargo Working Group, and DOT‘s OIG. (See fig. 4.) For example, in 1999,
FAA, in cooperation with the air cargo industry, developed security
training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air
cargo. However, other recommendations by those groups, such as
conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo
for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA or have not
been implemented. According to TSA officials, in 1999 FAA requested
funds to conduct a feasibility study on a system of third-party
inspections, but the study was not funded by the Congress. Additional
information on the key recommendations is provided in appendix III and
in the subsequent section of this report.
Figure 4: Summary Information on the Status of Key Recommendations for
Air Cargo Security:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
Near-Term Actions to Enhance Cargo Security Have Been Identified:
Our research identified numerous actions that would enhance air cargo
security in the near-term. These actions include and expand upon some
of the key recommendations made since 1990, as well as best practices
identified for cargo security in government reports. These actions
include using existing technologies, such as explosives detection
devices, which are currently used to screen baggage, and conducting
further research and development of new technologies, such as blast-
hardened cargo containers, that have the potential to improve air cargo
security. These actions also include instituting additional security
procedures and best practices, such as developing an industrywide cargo
profiling system and conducting background checks on all individuals
who convey and handle air cargo.
Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security:
Our research identified a number of technologies, such as electronic
seals,[Footnote 4] that have the potential to strengthen air cargo
security by making it more difficult for freight to be tampered with
during transport by truck from the shipper to the aircraft and in
cargo-handling facilities. Other technologies, such as x-ray machines
and explosives detection equipment, could be used to screen cargo
before it is loaded on aircraft. While each technology has security-
enhancing benefits, each one also has potential limitations to
implementation that need to be weighed. Table 1 describes these
technologies as well as the potential cost, benefits, and drawbacks
associated with each. Some of the technologies are discussed in greater
detail after the table.
Table 1: Information on Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security:
Type of technology: Technology to screen for threat objects;
Description: Technologies that are capable of detecting explosives and
weapons of mass destruction, including radiological, chemical, and
biological agents. They include:; * gamma-ray; * pulsed fast neutron
analysis; * thermal neutron activation; * x-ray, including bulk
explosives detection systems (EDS); * radiation detection; * trace
detection; * vapor detection; * canine use; Cost, benefits, and
drawbacks: Cost: Ranges from under $50,000 per unit for trace/vapor
detection and canine use to over $10 million per unit for pulsed fast
neutron analysis and certain x-ray.; Benefit: Can indicate potential
presence of threat objects without opening packages and containers;
canines are considered best means to screen air cargo because they have
fewest drawbacks.; Drawback: Some technologies (pulsed fast neutron
analysis, thermal neutron activation) can take an hour or more per
object to screen; some technologies (pulsed fast neutron analysis, bulk
EDS) are very costly; some technologies (x-ray, gamma-ray) do not
identify specific threat; some technologies (x-ray, gamma-ray) cannot
discriminate different materials in high density cargo; some
technologies (bulk EDS, pulsed fast neutron analysis) require building
modifications in order to accommodate the equipment; all technologies
have difficulty identifying biological threats..
Type of technology: Seals and other intrusion-detection technology;
Description: Technology that can be used to determine whether a
container or conveyance has been tampered with by visual inspection, or
that emits an alarm or notifies a central control station. Includes
tamper-evident tape that shows ’void“ when tampered with, tamper-
evident seals and locking devices, and electronic seals that emit a
radio signal when tampered with.; Cost, benefits, and drawbacks: Cost:
Ranges from under $1 per unit for tamper-evident tape to $2,500 per
unit for electronic seals.; Benefit: Easy and inexpensive way to verify
tampering within a container or other conveyance.; Drawback: All types
of seals are known to be vulnerable to tampering, given the appropriate
tools, time, and opportunity..
Type of technology: Blast-hardened containers; Description: Technology
to harden cargo containers to control the damage caused by an explosion
by confining it to a container.; Cost, benefits, and drawbacks: Cost:
At least $15,000 per unit.; Benefit: Designed to protect aircraft from
catastrophic structural damage or critical system failure caused by an
in-flight explosion.; Drawback: Containers are expensive and heavy,
which results in increased fuel costs..
Type of technology: Access control and authentication; Description:
Technologies to identify and authenticate individuals or vehicles
allowed into a restricted area, or to authenticate a driver or
individual loading goods. This technology includes picture badges,
biometrics, and ’smart cards.“; Cost, benefits, and drawbacks: Cost:
About $100 per unit for card reader devices; cards are a few cents
each.; Benefit: Ensures that only authorized persons are handling
cargo; creates a record of access to controlled areas.; Drawback: Does
not protect cargo shipments from tampering by persons who are
authorized access to cargo and cargo-handling areas..
Type of technology: Tracking systems; Description: Technology such as
global positioning systems and bar codes that can be placed on cargo
and used to identify freight being shipped or to track the shipment.;
Cost, benefits, and drawbacks: Cost: Ranges from about $.50 per unit
for bar coding to about $3,000 per unit for some radio frequency tags.;
Benefit: Tracks the cargo throughout transport.; Drawback: Does not
protect cargo shipments from tampering; technology only tracks the
location of cargo..
Type of technology: Closed circuit television (CCTV); Description:
Video camera to monitor and store video images. CCTV can be used to
record the loading of a container into the aircraft and the container
can be inspected by viewing the archived video.; Cost, benefits, and
drawbacks: Cost: Ranges from about $50 per camera to about $1,000 per
camera; cost of additional components (switching and recording devices)
vary greatly.; Benefit: Improves cargo surveillance by reducing time
and costs.; Drawback: Video screens require continuous monitoring; does
not protect cargo shipments from tampering..
Sources:
1. U.S. Treasury Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of the
U.S. Customs Service, Technology Report (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2002).
2. U.S. DOT, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
(Cambridge, Mass.: May 1999).
3. FAA; Air Transport Association, Airforwarders Association; Telair,
International.
[End of table]
Screening Technologies. Both the Gore Commission and the Cargo Working
Group recommended using existing technology to screen cargo for
explosives and developing new technologies to screen cargo for
explosives. Trace explosives detection devices and bulk explosives
detection systems, which are currently used to screen passenger baggage
for explosive material, could also be used to screen cargo containers.
According to TSA, the use of trace devices to screen cargo has shown
few problems.
Canines have been identified as one of the most effective ways to
screen cargo and their use has expanded significantly in recent years,
based upon recommendations from the Gore Commission and others. In
addition to screening cargo, canine teams are used at airports to
respond to suspicious events, such as bomb threats. According to TSA,
security experts, and industry officials, canine teams have proven
successful at detecting explosives and are the most promising method
for screening cargo. As a result, TSA has requested additional funding
in its fiscal year 2003 budget to expand the use of canine screening
for certain classes of U.S. mail.
FAA and the National Academy of Sciences have examined another method
for screening cargo for explosives. Pulsed fast neutron analysis uses
gamma rays to identify the chemical composition of items in the
container by measuring their density. This analysis, however, takes 1
hour per container, and each machine costs about $10 million. As a
result, according to an FAA official and an aviation security expert,
the financial cost and the time needed to screen a container make this
option not viable for current use.
Additionally, decompression chambers are used in some countries to
screen cargo for bombs. Items to be loaded on a plane are placed in a
chamber that simulates the pressures acting on aircraft during takeoff,
normal flight, and landing. These conditions will cause explosives that
are attached to barometric fuses to detonate.
Intrusion-detection technology. Several technologies, including
electronic seals and tamper evident tape, could be used to help
indicate whether cargo has been tampered with during its chain-of-
custody from the point at which a package is sealed by a known shipper
to its placement on an aircraft. For example, an electronic seal (also
known as a radio seal) is a radio frequency device that transmits
shipment information as it passes reader devices and indicates whether
a container has been compromised. Once security staff are alerted to a
possible problem, they can physically inspect the cargo. Seals range in
cost from less than $1 per unit for tamper-evident tape to $2,500 per
unit for electronic seals. Within the industry, it is recognized that
seals can easily be tampered with, either by entering the cargo without
breaking the seal or by removing and replacing the seal. As a result,
security experts recommend that seals be used in conjunction with other
security procedures as part of a more comprehensive security plan.
Additionally, in tests conducted during the fall of 2001, FAA found
that electronic seals have limited signal strength and must be read at
relatively short, line-of-sight distances. Finally, industry officials
have indicated their concern about the use of electronic seals on
aircraft because of their potential to interfere with aircraft
electronics.
Blast-hardened cargo containers. Hardening cargo containers that are
loaded onto aircraft has the potential to reduce damage from
explosions, according to experts with whom we spoke. These containers
are designed to protect aircraft from catastrophic structural damage or
critical system failure caused by an in-flight explosion. TSA continues
to conduct research in this area, which FAA began in 1991 based on
requirements in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. TSA has
tested and approved containers made by two manufacturers for use on
aircraft. According to industry representatives, air carriers have
resisted using the containers because they are significantly more
expensive than standard containers. Specifically, a blast-hardened
container costs approximately $15,000, as compared with about $1,000
for a standard container, according to air carrier representatives.
Blast-hardened containers also weigh approximately 150 pounds more than
standard containers, which adds to the airplane‘s fuel costs, according
to air carrier representatives. For example, if a Boeing 747 aircraft
traveling from New York to Tokyo had blast-hardened containers, the
extra weight would result in $5,000 in additional fuel costs, according
to an industry official. Furthermore, as blast-hardened containers are
bumped and scratched during shipping, their blast-resistant
capabilities are reduced and their lifespan may be shortened to less
than 1 year, according to an industry official. By comparison, a
standard container lasts as long as 8 years, according to industry
officials. Industry officials said that the containers have been used
by very few air carriers.[Footnote 5] TSA has also conducted research
on hardened hulls--that is, placing blast-resistant liners in the cargo
hold to protect the aircraft if an explosion occurs--but liners did not
successfully resist explosions in initial testing, according to a TSA
official. FAA continues to conduct testing on aircraft hardening (both
containers and hulls) at a cost of approximately $3 million per year.
Operational Practices to Enhance Air Cargo Security:
Industry and government officials, security experts, and studies we
reviewed also identified procedures and best practices to strengthen
air cargo security. Some of these activities, such as developing an
industrywide cargo profiling system, were recommendations to FAA by the
Gore Commission and others; other activities were identified as best
practices for companies that transport and handle cargo. (See table 2.)
Some of the practices are discussed in greater detail after the table.
Table 2: Information on Operational Practices to Enhance Air Cargo
Security:
Practice: Develop an industrywide computer-assisted cargo profiling
system that can be integrated into air carriers‘ and freight
forwarders‘ reservation and operating systems.; Comments: * TSA has
developed a known shipper database. As of October 10, 2002, information
on the known shippers of 250 participating air carriers and freight
forwarders had been entered in the data base.; * TSA began making the
database available to participating air carriers and freight forwarders
in October 2002.; * Participation is voluntary..
Practice: Improve the oversight and enforcement of air carriers and
freight forwarders.; Comments: * TSA estimates that it will need
additional cargo inspectors for fiscal year 2003, especially because
some cargo inspectors will remain with FAA when TSA is transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security..
Practice: Use identification card systems to verify individuals
authorized to enter cargo-handling facilities.; Comments: * TSA
requires identity checks for individuals entering certain areas of
airports.; * Requirements for identity checks at cargo facilities that
are located off airport property are determined by the individual
facilities in accordance with their security plan..
Practice: Conduct background checks on all individuals who convey and
handle air cargo and have access to cargo areas and documentation.;
Comments: * TSA requires background checks for certain airport
workers.; * Requirements for background checks on other individuals who
convey and handle air cargo are determined by individual employers in
accordance with their security plan..
Practice: Collect and disseminate information concerning cargo
security, including threat-related information, among air carriers,
forwarders, and government agencies.; Comments: * TSA disseminates
general threat information to the industry in security directives and
information circulars.; * Industry officials state that specific threat
information is not getting to the airline workers who handle cargo..
Practice: Establish written policies and procedures and training
programs for the employees of companies that convey and handle cargo.;
Comments: * TSA requires air carriers that transport passengers to have
security programs..
Practice: Employ a sufficient number of qualified security officers at
cargo facilities to provide physical security and access control.;
Comments: * Use of security officers at cargo facilities is determined
by the individual facilities in accordance with their security plan..
Practice: Use physical barriers (walls, fences) to guard against
unauthorized access to cargo areas.; Comments: * Use of physical
barriers at cargo facilities is determined by the individual facilities
in accordance with their security plan..
Sources:
1. U.S. DOT, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
(Cambridge, Mass.: May 1999).
2. U.S. Treasury Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of the
U.S. Customs Service, Technology Report (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2002).
3. TSA; final report by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security; Cargo Working Group; Air Transport Association;
Airforwarders Association; Cargo Airlines Association.
[End of table]
Cargo profiling. The Gore Commission recommended that FAA work with
industry to develop a computer-assisted cargo profiling system that
could be integrated into airlines‘ and freight forwarders‘ reservations
and operating systems. Since 1997, FAA and now TSA have been working to
develop a cargo profiling system that is similar to the Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System.[Footnote 6] The first phase of
developing the cargo profiling system is the nationwide deployment of a
database of known shippers. TSA began field-testing a computerized
known shipper database in October 2002. About 250 air carriers and
freight forwarders have provided information on their known shippers
for TSA‘s database, which contains about 165,000 shipping companies,
according to TSA officials. In addition, the database includes the
names of restricted entities from the Department of the Treasury‘s
Office of Foreign Assets Control. Participants in the field test have
the opportunity to query a TSA Internet site to ascertain the status of
shippers unknown to them. An electronic message is provided, indicating
whether the shipper is known or unknown. If the shipper is known, a
unique identification number is electronically provided to the
participant and the cargo can be accepted from that shipper as ’known
shipper cargo.“ If the shipper is a restricted entity, the participant
receives a warning against receiving shipments from that entity.
According to security experts and industry association officials, this
system would enhance air cargo security by allowing freight forwarders
to quickly determine whether a company is a known shipper. In addition,
this system would allow a shipper that is known to one freight
forwarder to become known to all freight forwarders. However, during
the pilot phase the use of this system is voluntary, and its success
will depend, in part, upon widespread participation. According to TSA
officials, the agency has made no decision about whether participation
will be voluntary after the pilot is completed, at the end of December
2002. According to industry representatives, some freight forwarders
are reluctant to participate because of concerns about placing
themselves at a competitive disadvantage by including their customers
in the database.
Oversight and enforcement. To enhance its oversight of freight
forwarders and air carriers, TSA conducts routine inspections.
According to TSA officials, the agency is considering increasing the
frequency of these inspections. To achieve targeted increases in the
number of inspections, TSA estimates that it needs to hire several
hundred additional cargo inspectors in fiscal year 2003, especially
since some of its current inspector workforce will remain with FAA when
TSA is transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
Identification checks. Identification checks of individuals making
deliveries to freight forwarders and airline cargo facilities would
help to ensure the identities of employees of known shippers and has
been recommended as a best practice for cargo security by DOT. Freight
forwarders and air carriers are not required to check and record
identification information for employees of known shippers. TSA
regulations require identification checks of individuals who enter
restricted areas of airports, which include cargo-handling areas. That
information is usually recorded manually, according to industry
officials. However, the use of technology such as smart cards can make
this process more efficient and reliable, according to security
experts. For example, Chicago‘s O‘Hare Airport, with a $1.5 million
research grant provided by FAA in 1997, developed and operationally
tested a smart card/biometric-based security access system. This system
uses fingerprint biometrics to verify the identity of truck drivers
delivering cargo to the airport and information encoded on a smart card
to match the driver with the cargo being delivered. The results of the
operational tests, completed in July 1999, indicated that fingerprints
provide a highly reliable means of confirming driver identity, and that
having the cargo manifests and related information on the smart card
dramatically reduces the time required to process cargo deliveries.
According to TSA officials, the agency does not have plans to further
deploy such identification verification technology to airports.
Threat information. Dissemination of security-related information,
including threat information, to carriers and freight forwarders has
been recommended by DOT as a best practice for cargo security across
the transportation modes.[Footnote 7] According to TSA, it provides
such information to the aviation industry by means of security
directives and information circulars. Since September 2001, TSA has
issued three directives related to air cargo. However, industry
officials told us that the threat information provided is usually not
sufficiently specific to be acted upon by the workers who handle the
cargo. Air carrier officials stated that more specific information
about threats would allow them to conduct targeted inspections of
cargo, which they believe would be more effective than the random
inspections that have been proposed in legislation and suggested by
some, including DOT‘s OIG. However, according to TSA officials, the
agency provides the best threat information that is generally
available.
A Comprehensive Plan and Risk Management Approach Have Been Identified
As Ways to Improve Air Cargo Security in the Long Term:
The Gore Commission and aviation industry representatives have
suggested that FAA implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat
of explosives and other dangerous objects in cargo. In addition, we
have recommended that the federal government adopt a risk management
approach to combat terrorism. Without a comprehensive plan for air
cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, TSA and
other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being
deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the risk
and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. Moreover, as air
cargo security is viewed in the larger context of transportation and
homeland security, the lack of a risk management approach hinders
efforts to set strategic priorities.
Developing a Comprehensive Plan for Air Cargo Security:
Neither FAA nor TSA has developed a comprehensive plan for air cargo
security as recommended by the Gore Commission, which would provide a
first step toward meeting the requirement of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act to have a system in place to ensure the
security of cargo. TSA officials have told us that the agency intends
to issue a long-term plan for cargo security, but they were unsure when
that would occur. Meanwhile, according to agency officials, TSA is in
the early stages of developing an agencywide strategic plan that is to
include the air cargo security program. As of April 2002, the draft
strategic plan had identified one performance measure concerning air
cargo security. Our analysis indicated that this measure--the progress
of federalization of the cargo-screening process--focused more on
process than on results. However, TSA has stated that it intends to
further develop measures in the future. TSA also said that it would
include these measures and their associated goals in its fiscal year
2003 performance plan.
Implementing a Risk Management Approach:
Over the past year, we have determined that a risk management approach
used by the Department of Defense to defend against terrorism also has:
relevance for other organizations responsible for security.[Footnote 8]
This approach can provide those organizations with a process for
enhancing their preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks and to
support decisionmaking to manage security risks in a cost-effective
manner. Figure 5 describes this approach.
Figure 5: Elements of a Risk Management Approach:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
TSA has partially developed a risk management approach. In the fall of
2001, FAA completed an assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities
of air cargo. The assessment examined a single scenario--a terrorist
attempting to place a bomb on a commercial passenger aircraft. The
assessment did not examine the vulnerabilities associated with the
pathways by which shipments are transported by truck or other means
from the shipper to the aircraft (see fig. 1 above). According to TSA
officials, the agency does not have plans to conduct further threat
assessments for air cargo.
TSA has not undertaken a criticality assessment--the third element we
identified in a risk management approach--and therefore has no explicit
criteria for determining the priority of actions to enhance air cargo
security. However, according to TSA officials, passenger aircraft
security is a higher priority than all-cargo aircraft security.
According to TSA officials, their priorities are spelled out in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which has laid out specific
deadlines dealing primarily with passenger and baggage screening for
TSA to address over the past year. As we have reported, TSA has faced
an extraordinary challenge in meeting some of those deadlines, such as
hiring and training 33,000 employees to conduct passenger security
screening by November 19, 2002.[Footnote 9] The act provides no
specific deadlines for enhancing air cargo security but requires having
a system in place as soon as practicable to screen cargo on all-cargo
aircraft or otherwise ensure its security.
Conclusion:
Over the past year, with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, our nation has placed new emphasis on aviation security.
However, few changes have been made to air cargo security, as TSA has
focused its efforts on improving passenger and baggage security to meet
specific legislative deadlines. The act requires the screening of all
cargo aboard commercial passenger aircraft and requires TSA to have a
system in place as soon as practicable to screen or otherwise ensure
the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. The large volume of air
cargo and the fact that its delivery is generally considered time-
critical result in a limited amount of cargo being screened. Other
means to ensure air cargo security include technological and
operational improvements that have been identified or recommended by
various government and industry groups over the past decade. While TSA
has been developing some of these measures, such as blast-hardened
containers and a cargo profiling system, it has not implemented other
identified improvements. Moreover, TSA lacks a comprehensive plan with
long-term goals and performance targets for cargo security, time frames
for completing security improvements, and risk-based criteria for
prioritizing actions to achieve those goals. A comprehensive plan for
air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach could
provide a framework for systematically evaluating and prioritizing the
various technological and operational improvements that have already
been identified, and for identifying and implementing additional
improvements. Such a plan would also provide a framework for developing
a system to ensure air cargo security, as required by the act.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that includes
priority actions identified on the basis of risk, costs of these
actions, deadlines for completing those actions, and performance
targets.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT
provided oral comments. FAA‘s Deputy Director, Office of Security and
Investigations, and agency officials from TSA with responsibility for
cargo-security issues generally agreed with the information presented
in the report. TSA officials stated that the recommendation was
reasonable and that they will consider implementing it as the agency
moves forward with its cargo-security program. These officials provided
a number of clarifying comments, which we have incorporated where
appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce the contents of this
report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation,
and the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. Copies will
also be made available to others upon request and this report will be
available for no charge on GAO‘s Web site at www.gao.gov. If you or
your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-2834.
Individuals making key contributions to this report included Wayne A.
Ekblad, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Colin J. Fallon, Bert Japikse, Maren
McAvoy, John W. Shumann, Teresa F. Spisak, and Cindy M. Steinfink. In
addition, we would like to acknowledge, in memoriam, the contributions
to this report made by Angela Davis.
Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by Gerald Dillingham:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Air Cargo Incidents and Follow-Up Actions:
Agency actions and the introduction of new legislation to improve
security and safety have often come in reaction to aviation tragedies.
The following time line (fig. 6) reflects key changes in air cargo
security following the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland; the crashes of ValuJet flight 592 in the Florida Everglades
and TWA flight 800 over Long Island; and the terrorist attacks in the
United States involving four jet airliners on September 11, 2001.
Figure 6: Time Line of Key Changes in Air Cargo Security:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Proposed Legislation on Air Cargo Security:
In November 2002, the Senate approved S. 2949. The bill, comprising
seven sections, includes clauses affecting air cargo security under
Title II.
Title II of S. 2949 would instruct TSA to develop a strategic plan to
establish systems to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security
of all cargo transported through the nation‘s air transportation
system. It also imposes measures that would require TSA to increase
inspections of air cargo shippers and their facilities and to work with
foreign countries to conduct regular inspections at facilities
transporting air cargo to the United States. Title II would require the
creation of an industrywide pilot database of known shippers of cargo
in passenger aircraft. TSA would also be required to conduct random
inspections of freight forwarder facilities, perform an assessment of
the current Indirect Air Carrier Program,[Footnote 10] and report to
Congress on the random audit system. Upon the recommendation of the
Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, the Secretary of
Transportation would be required to suspend or revoke the certificate
of a noncompliant freight forwarder.
Title II would direct TSA to develop a training program for air cargo
handlers. TSA would also be required to create a program for all-cargo
air carriers to develop an approved plan for the security of their
facilities, operations, cargo, and personnel. Any plan would need to
address the security of the carrier‘s property at each airport it
serves, the background checks for all employees with access to
operations, the training for all employees and contractors with
security responsibilities, the screening of all flight crews and others
aboard flights, the security procedures for cargo, and other necessary
measures.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security:
Since 1990, recommendations have been made or mandates issued to
improve air cargo security by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (also
called the Gore Commission), the Cargo Working Group (an FAA-industry
partnership), and DOT‘s Office of Inspector General (OIG). Table 3
summarizes key recommendations. The left column describes the
recommendation, the group(s) that made the recommendation, and the date
it was made; the right column shows the status of the recommendation.
Table 3: Status of Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security:
Recommendation: Tighten the definition of ’known shipper“ to ensure a
greater measure of security in the transportation of cargo on passenger
aircraft.; (Cargo Working Group,1996); Status: FAA changed the
definition of known shipper in September 1999. The change required that
a known shipper must have an established business history with the air
carrier or freight forwarder..
Recommendation: Conduct a feasibility study on the establishment of a
third party inspection and compliance program for the Indirect Air
Carrier Program,[A] and distribute inspection results to the industry.;
(Cargo Working Group, 1996); Status: Not conducted by FAA..
Recommendation: Cooperate with industry to explore technologies to
develop a profile to be applied to cargo shipments.; (Gore Commission,
1997); Status: FAA issued a final report on how to develop a computer-
assisted cargo profiling system. TSA began field testing the system in
October 2002 and expects to issue a progress report in December 2002..
Recommendation: Establish, in cooperation with the air cargo industry,
a training program directed at passenger air carriers, freight
forwarders, and contract ground personnel. The training program will:
1) include cargo acceptance and ground transport measures, 2) require
initial and recurrent participation and documentation, and 3) be
incorporated in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program and the
Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security
Program.; (Cargo Working Group, 1996); Status: FAA worked with the air
cargo industry to develop a training tape and guidance for
understanding and implementing program requirements..
Recommendation: Improve the line of communication between FAA field,
principal security inspectors, and regional cargo-security
coordinators through a training program coordinated with the industry.;
(Cargo Working Group, 1996); Status: In September 1999, FAA developed a
Cargo Security Basic Course to familiarize newly hired FAA cargo
security inspectors with the regulatory requirements placed on domestic
and international shippers, and on air carriers who submit and accept
freight for air carriage..
Recommendation: Conduct research and development to find an effective
explosives detection system to screen baggage and cargo; institute
interim screening measures until this system is developed.; (Aviation
Security Improvement Act, 1990); ; Deploy advanced technology on a
test-and-evaluation
for use in screening cargo in an operational environment.; (Cargo
Working Group, 1997); Status: TSA conducted operational tests of trace
explosives detection devices to screen air cargo, and it considered the
test successful. The agency also conducted research on Pulsed Fast
Neutron Analysis to screen cargo for explosives and found it not viable
because of cost ($10 million per unit) and time (screens one container
per hour). TSA budgeted $7 million in fiscal year 2002 to conduct
research on new technologies to screen air cargo, and budgeted $13
million in fiscal year 2003 for that purpose..
Recommendation: Implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of
explosives and other threat objects in cargo, and work with industry to
develop new initiatives in this area.; (Gore Commission, 1997); Status:
Not implemented..
Recommendation: Conduct regularly scheduled assessments of air carrier
and freight forwarder operations.; (OIG, 1998); Status: FAA inspections
were expanded to include shippers and freight forwarders, and a
database was established to record assessment information..
[A] An indirect air carrier is a freight forwarder.
Sources: GAO analysis of reports by the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security (Gore Commission), Cargo Working Group,
and DOT‘s Office of Inspector General; the Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990; and information provided by TSA.
[End of table]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] A revenue ton mile is one ton of cargo transported one mile.
[2] In this report, ’passenger aircraft“ refers to both commercial
passenger aircraft and ’combination aircraft,“ in which the fuselage is
configured to accommodate both passengers and cargo. The term ’cargo
aircraft“ refers to all-cargo aircraft.
[3] According to DOT, air cargo (measured in revenue ton miles) carried
by U.S. commercial air carriers is expected to grow annually by about
one percentage point more than that forecasted for passenger travel
(measured in revenue passenger miles) for the 12-year period 2002-2013.
[4] An electronic seal is a radio frequency device that transmits
shipment information as it passes reader devices and transmits an alarm
if a container has been compromised.
[5] El Al Airline, Israel‘s national airline, uses some blast-resistant
containers to transport cargo.
[6] This system identifies passengers as greater security risks based
on characteristics of their travel and targets these individuals for
additional screening.
[7] U.S. DOT, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
(Cambridge, Mass.: May 1999).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges,
GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002).
[10] An indirect air carrier is another term for a freight forwarder.
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