Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
Department of Homeland Security Gao ID: GAO-03-102 January 1, 2003The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces unique opportunities and risks for ensuring the nation's homeland security. The implementation and transformation of DHS will be complex, and the components being merged into the new department already face a wide array of existing challenges. The information GAO presents in this report is intended to sustain congressional attention and a departmental focus on addressing these challenges. This report is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues.
DHS faces enormous challenges to protect the nation from terrorism. DHS must effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees specializing in various disciplines, including law enforcement, border security, biological research, computer security, and disaster mitigation. Further, DHS will oversee a number of non-homeland security activities. GAO has designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high risk for three reasons. First, the size and complexity of the effort make the challenge especially daunting, requiring sustained attention and time to achieve the department's mission in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components being merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges that must be addressed. Finally, DHS's failure to effectively carry out its mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences. Building an effective department will require sustained leadership from top management to ensure the transformation of disparate agencies, programs, and missions into an integrated organization. DHS leadership can learn from the best practices of the private and public sectors to become a high-performance organization. Achieving the national homeland security strategy will require the current transition plan to be more comprehensive by addressing the full transition period and by identifying key activities and milestones. Critical aspects of DHS's success will depend on well-functioning relationships with third parties that will take time to establish and maintain, including those with states and local governments, the private sector, and other federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities. DHS's leadership will also need to focus on certain critical success factors, including human capital, information technology management, acquisition management, and financial management to create a results-oriented and accountable department for the long term. The new department is being formed from components with a wide array of existing major management challenges and program risks. In fact, many of the major components merging into the new department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, face at least one major problem such as strategic human capital risks, information technology management challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities; they also confront an array of program operations challenges and risks. In the final analysis, the success of DHS's implementation and transformation will depend largely on its ability to attract and retain the right people; set the appropriate priorities for the department; and build effective partnerships with the appropriate public, private, and not-for-profit sector entities.
GAO-03-102, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security
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Performance and Accountability Series:
January 2003:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Homeland Security:
GAO-03-102:
A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on January
24, 2003. This new cabinet department‘s primary mission is to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability
of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
assist in the recovery from attacks that do occur. The new
department combines 22 federal agencies specializing in various
disciplines, such as law enforcement, border
security, biological research, computer security, and disaster
mitigation. With an anticipated budget of almost $40 billion and
an estimated 170,000 employees, DHS is expected to be the third
largest government agency. DHS will be organized into four
divisions: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness
and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection.
The Coast Guard and Secret Service will report directly to the
Secretary
for Homeland Security. The new department also will be responsible for
the non-homeland security functions of the agencies being merged into
DHS, including the Customs Service‘s trade enforcement mission, the
Coast Guard‘s marine safety responsibilities, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency‘s natural disaster recovery efforts.
This Series:
This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999
and updated in 2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability
Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003
Performance and Accountability Series contains separate reports
covering each cabinet department, most major independent agencies,
and the U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a
governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the government
does business in order to meet 21st century challenges and address
long-term fiscal needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An
Update identifies areas at high risk due to either their greater
vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or
major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency, or
effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in this series is included
at the end of this report.
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-102, a report to Congress included as part of
GAO‘s
Performance and Accountability Series
Why GAO Did This Report:
The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces unique
opportunities
and risks for ensuring the nation‘s homeland security. The
implementation and transformation of DHS will be complex, and the
components being merged into the new department already face a wide
array of existing challenges. The information GAO presents in this
report is intended to sustain congressional attention and a
departmental
focus on addressing these challenges. This report is part of a special
series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues.
What GAO Found:
DHS faces enormous challenges to protect the nation from terrorism.
DHS must effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000
employees specializing in various disciplines, including law
enforcement, border security, biological research, computer security,
and disaster mitigation. Further, DHS will oversee a number of
non-homeland security activities.
GAO has designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as
a high risk for three reasons. First, the size and complexity of
the effort make the challenge especially daunting, requiring
sustained attention and time to achieve the department‘s mission
in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components being
merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges
that must be addressed. Finally, DHS‘s failure to effectively
carry out its mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious
consequences.
Building an effective department will require sustained leadership
from top management to ensure the transformation of disparate agencies,
programs, and missions into an integrated organization. DHS leadership
can learn from the best practices of the private and public sectors to
become a high-performance organization. Achieving the national
homeland security strategy will require the current transition plan
to be more comprehensive by addressing the full transition period
and by identifying key activities and milestones. Critical aspects
of DHS‘s success will depend on well-functioning relationships with
third parties that will take time to establish and maintain, including
those with states and local governments, the private sector, and other
federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities. DHS‘s
leadership will also need to focus on certain critical success factors,
including human capital, information technology management,
acquisition
management, and financial management to create a results-oriented
and accountable department for the long term.
The new department is being formed from components with a wide array
of existing major management challenges and program risks. In fact,
many of the major components merging into the new department,
including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Transportation
Security Administration, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the Coast Guard, face at least one major problem such as
strategic human capital risks, information technology management
challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities; they also confront
an array of program operations challenges and risks.
In the final analysis, the success of DHS‘s implementation and
transformation will depend largely on its ability to attract and
retain the right people; set the appropriate priorities for the
department; and build effective partnerships with the appropriate
public, private, and not-for-profit sector entities.
What Needs to Be Done:
DHS must effectively integrate disparate agencies and activities
into a cohesive organization to achieve the synergy for providing
better homeland security against terrorism. DHS should adopt public
and private sector best practices, and build necessary management
capacity and oversight mechanisms to implement and transform the new
department. DHS also must create and maintain a structure that can
leverage partners and stakeholders to effectively implement the
national
homeland security strategy. Finally, DHS must confront a wide array of
existing major management challenges and program risks in its incoming
agencies.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-102.
To view the full report, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Randall Yim at (202) 512-3580 or
yimr@gao.gov or Patricia Dalton at (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov.
Transmittal Letter:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
GAO Contacts:
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
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protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
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Transmittal Letter January 2003:
The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives:
This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks
facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as it is formed
through one of the largest, most complex mergers ever undertaken. The
government has a unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of
agencies into a strong and effective cabinet department.
The implementation and transformation of this new department is an
enormous undertaking that comes with significant risk. GAO has
designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk
area for three reasons. First, the size and complexity of the effort
make the challenge especially daunting. Second, the components being
merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges that
must be addressed. Finally, DHS‘s failure to effectively carry out its
mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences.
This report provides an overview of the new department‘s challenges and
program risks as it seeks to simultaneously establish itself and
protect the nation from terrorism. This analysis should help the new
Congress and the administration carry out their responsibility and
improve government for the benefit of the American people. For
additional information about this report, please contact Randall Yim,
Managing Director, National Preparedness Team at (202) 512-3580, or at
yimr@gao.gov, or Patricia A. Dalton, Director, Strategic Issues, at
(202) 512-6806, or at daltonp@gao.gov.
David M. Walker
Comptroller General
of the United States:
Signed by David M. Walker
[End of section]
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
The November 2002 enactment of legislation creating the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) represents a historic moment of almost
unprecedented action by the federal government to fundamentally
transform how the nation will protect itself from terrorism.[Footnote
1] Rarely in the country‘s past has such a large and complex
reorganization of government occurred or been developed with such a
singular and urgent purpose. The government now has a unique
opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with multiple
missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet
department whose goal will be to, among other things, protect U.S.
borders, improve intelligence-and information-sharing activities, and
prevent and respond to potential terrorists acts. Together with this
unique opportunity, however, also comes significant risk to the nation
that could occur if this implementation and transformation is not
successful. A DHS that does not swiftly meet expectations for
protecting America could increase the vulnerability of our borders,
citizens, and economy, and not achieve anticipated effectiveness in
operations.
This Performance and Accountability Series report on DHS provides an
overview of the new department‘s challenges as it seeks to
simultaneously establish itself and protect the nation from terrorism.
This report is being issued as part of a special series of reports that
discuss major management challenges and program risks across the
government, including other reports highlighting issues affecting
homeland security. This report raises issues that deal with both the
broad transition and transformation concerns the department faces, and
also the many specific program operational and management challenges
that DHS will inherit from its component parts in such areas as border
security and disaster mitigation.
Implementing and Transforming the New Department of Homeland Security
Is High Risk:
We believe that the implementation and transformation of DHS is a high
risk, and we have added it to our 2003 High Risk List. This designation
is based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation
of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an
effective and efficient manner. Second, DHS‘ prospective components
already face a wide array of existing management and operational
challenges. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission
exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, invigorating the nation‘s
homeland security missions has become one of the federal government‘s
most significant challenges. DHS, with an anticipated budget of almost
$40 billion and over 170,000 employees, will be the third largest
government agency; not since the creation of the Defense Department
more than 50 years ago has the government sought to integrate and
transform something of this magnitude. In the Defense Department‘s
case, the effective transformation took many years to achieve and, even
today, the department continues to face enduring management challenges
and high risk areas that are, in part, legacies to its unfinished
integration.
Effectively implementing and transforming DHS may be an even more
daunting challenge. The Defense Department, at least, was formed almost
entirely from agencies whose principal mission was national defense.
DHS will combine 22 agencies specializing in various disciplines,
including law enforcement, border security, biological research,
computer security, and disaster mitigation, for instance. Further, DHS
will take on some non-homeland security activities, such as the Coast
Guard‘s marine safety responsibilities and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency‘s (FEMA) natural disaster response functions. Yet,
only in the effective integration and collaboration of these entities
will the nation achieve the synergy that can help provide better
security against terrorism. The magnitude of the responsibilities,
combined with the challenge and complexity of the transformation,
underscore the perseverance and dedication that will be required of all
of DHS‘ leaders, employees, and stakeholders to achieve success.
Further, it is well recognized that mergers of this magnitude in the
public and private sector carry significant risks, including lost
productivity and inefficiencies. Generally, successful transformations
of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous
reorganizations and with less pressure for immediate results, can take
from 5 to 7 years to achieve. Necessary management capacity,
communication and information systems, as well as oversight mechanisms
must be established. Moreover, critical aspects of DHS‘ success will
depend on well-functioning relationships with third parties that will
take time to establish and maintain, including those with other federal
agencies with homeland security responsibilities, such as the State
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Department, and the Departments
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Transportation (DOT); state and
local government; and the private sector. Creating and maintaining a
structure that can leverage partners and stakeholders will be necessary
to effectively implement the national homeland security strategy.
The new department also is being formed from components with a wide
array of existing major management challenges and program risks. For
instance, one DHS directorate‘s responsibility includes the protection
of critical information systems--an area that GAO already considers a
high risk. In fact, many of the major components merging into the new
department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs Service,
FEMA, and the U.S. Coast Guard, face at least one major management
problem such as strategic human capital risks, information technology
management challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities. They
also confront an array of program operations challenges and risks. For
example, TSA has had considerable challenges in meeting deadlines for
screening baggage, and the agency has focused most of its initial
security efforts primarily on aviation security and is working with
other agencies towards defining the roles and responsibilities for
surface transportation security. INS has had difficulty tracking aliens
due to unreliable address information. Customs must meet challenges
from the potential threats of weapons of mass destruction smuggled in
cargo arriving at U.S. ports, and the Coast Guard faces the challenges
inherent in a massive fleet modernization.
DHS‘s national security mission is of such importance that the failure
to address its management challenges and programs risks could have
serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens‘
health and safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of DHS as
a high risk area and its inclusion on the 2003 High Risk List stems
from the importance of its mission and the nation‘s reliance on the
department‘s effectiveness in meeting its challenges for protecting the
country against terrorism.
Implementation and Transformation Challenges:
The creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge. The size,
complexity, and importance of the effort make the challenge especially
daunting and incomparably critical to the nation‘s security. Building
an effective department will require consistent and sustained
leadership from top management to ensure the needed transformation of
disparate agencies, programs, and missions into an integrated
organization. To achieve success, the end result should not simply be a
collection of components in a new department, but the transformation of
the various programs and missions into a high performance, focused
organization. The new department will need to build a successful
transformation that instills the organization with important management
principles, rapidly implements a phased-in transition plan, leverages
the new department and other agencies in executing the national
homeland security strategy, and builds collaborative partnerships with
federal, state and local, and private sector organizations. Management
capacity and an accountability structure should be built to ensure
continuity and achieve goals. Actions that must be taken to ensure the
success of DHS over the long term include:
* a comprehensive transformation process,
* strong partnerships,
* management capacity, and:
* performance, objectives, key milestones and an oversight structure.
Comprehensive Transformation Process:
The creation of DHS represents one of the largest and most complex
restructurings in the federal government. To improve opportunities for
success, DHS‘s leadership can gain important perspectives from the
lessons learned and best practices of other organizations that have
been involved in significant mergers and transformations. Indeed, major
mergers and acquisitions in the private sector often do not live up to
their expectations or potential. Moreover, in the short term, the
experience of major private sector mergers and acquisitions is that
productivity and effectiveness actually decline. This happens for a
number of reasons. For example, attention is concentrated on critical
and immediate integration issues and diverted from longer-term mission
issues. In addition, employees and managers inevitably worry about
their place in the new organization. The key is to adopt practices that
minimize the duration and the significance of factors that reduce
productivity and effectiveness and ultimately to create an organization
that is more than the ’sum of its parts.“:
On September 24, 2002, GAO convened a forum of public and private
sector leaders to discuss useful practices from major private and
public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and
transformations that federal agencies could learn from to successfully
transform their cultures and DHS could use to merge its various
originating components.[Footnote 2] The results of this forum provide
insights into the challenges facing the federal government in forming a
new cabinet department and in building a high performance organization.
Figure 1 below and the following sections outline key practices
identified in the forum that can serve as a guide to DHS as it seeks to
transform and meld disparate cultures in response to governance
challenges.
Figure 1: Lessons Learned Regarding Mergers and Transformations for
DHS:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Leadership, mission and goals, and priorities: Leadership is critical.
By its very nature, the transformation process entails fundamental
change. Consistent leadership helps the transformation process stay on
course and can help bridge the differences in leadership and management
styles among the originating components. Top leadership must set
priorities and focus on the most critical issues. While top leadership
is indispensable, it also will be important to have a management team
dedicated to the transformation process to ensure changes are
thoroughly implemented and sustained over time.
The mission and strategic goals of an organization must become the
focus of the transformation, define the culture, and serve as a vehicle
to build employee and organizational identity and support. Mission
clarity and a clear articulation of priorities will be critical, and
strategic goals must align with and support the mission and serve as
the continuing, visible guideposts for decision making. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002[Footnote 3] states that the DHS mission includes
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing
America‘s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and
assisting in the recovery from attacks that do occur. In addition, DHS
will assume many non-homeland security responsibilities, making it
important for the department to clearly articulate short-and long-term
goals and integrate these diverse missions into a strategic goal
framework. Top leaders have a critical role in setting policy and
goals, but management and employees must also be involved and support
the strategic goals in order to effectively understand and work to
achieve the department‘s mission.
In establishing DHS‘ strategic goals, the new department‘s leadership
also needs to address the National Strategy for Homeland Security,
which articulates the administration‘s plans for preventing and
responding to terrorism. DHS has a key role to play in implementing the
national strategy, which provides a definition of homeland security and
sets forth overarching goals. Although the strategy is an important
contribution to homeland security efforts, many of the implementation
plans and activities for achieving these goals are not yet developed,
such as establishing meaningful performance measures and articulating
clear roles and responsibilities. Through its own goal and priority
setting, DHS can make the national strategy much more robust and
comprehensive.
In bringing together various programs and missions, the new
organization must have a clear set of principles and priorities that
serve as a framework to help the organization create a common culture
and establish organizational and individual expectations. Principles
are the core values of an organization--they can help DHS to define the
attributes that are intrinsically important to what the new
organization does and how it will do it. Additionally, priorities
related to both the mission and the transition must be developed, to
ensure appropriate sequencing of activities and alignments. These
priorities provide the direction for implementing the new organization
and for DHS‘ initial mission accomplishments.
Implementation goals, timeline, and resources: Since a successful
transformation process often takes 5 or more years to complete, it is
essential to establish action-oriented implementation goals and a
timeline with milestone dates to track the organization‘s progress
towards its intermediate and long-term transformation goals. By
demonstrating progress towards these transformation goals, the
organization builds momentum and demonstrates that real progress is
being made. In addition, having implementation goals and milestone
dates helps pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggests
midcourse corrections, including any needed adjustments to the
organization‘s future goals and milestones.
Dedicated resources are critical to the successful management of the
transformation process. A strong and stable implementation team that
will be responsible for the transformation‘s day-to-day management can
be an important vehicle to ensuring that the implementation and
transformation of the new department receive the focused, full-time
attention needed to sustain a successful effort. The implementation
team can ensure that the various change initiatives are sequenced and
implemented in a coherent and integrated way and that employees and
other stakeholders are kept informed. Such a team must have direct
access and be accountable to top leadership. At the same time, the team
must be given the necessary authority and resources to carry out its
responsibilities.
Transition planning efforts for DHS have been started, but more
sustained efforts will be necessary. In November 2002, the
administration, as required by law, submitted a Department of Homeland
Security Reorganization Plan to the Congress.[Footnote 4] The plan
provides information on the transfer of agencies, personnel, assets,
and obligations to DHS and any consolidation, reorganization, and
streamlining of agencies transferred to DHS as a result of the
legislation. In complying with the legislation requiring the
reorganization plan, the administration has identified the basic
functions that will be transferred to DHS and provided some initial
dates for transferring the incoming organizational entities. However,
the transition plan is limited in its description of actions and
activities that will be necessary, and it does not reflect the full
range of actions that must occur in order to achieve an effective
integration of agencies, programs, and missions into the new
department. More comprehensive planning is needed that addresses the
specifics of melding the new department‘s people, strategies, systems,
and processes in a smooth and integrated manner. Issues that need to be
addressed range from how the department will move to a single payroll
system and what that system will be; to how border entry points should
function--who operates the entry points, what do they do, what are
their support systems. We believe that a more comprehensive transition
plan will be necessary, one that addresses the full transition period
and includes the identification of key activities and milestones to
transform DHS into a fully integrated, high performance organization,
and establishes accountability for achieving results.[Footnote 5]
Employee involvement, communication, and performance: People will
determine the success of DHS and the transformation that must be
achieved. A change of culture is at the heart of a successful
transformation--and DHS is no exception. The importance of redefining
the organizational culture should not be avoided, but rather must be
aggressively addressed at the outset and throughout the transformation
process. Employee involvement, communication, and performance
management will be critical to this process.
Employee involvement is critical from the beginning of the
transformation process in order to achieve employee ownership of the
changes. Further, it strengthens the transformation process by
including frontline perspectives and experiences. However,
organizations and their employees must guard against being so involved
in implementing their transformation initiatives that they lose sight
of the fundamental reason for the transformation--improved results.
An effective and ongoing internal and external communication strategy
is essential to making the transformation occur. Communication is not
just about ’pushing the message out,“ but it should facilitate a two-
way honest exchange with and allow for feedback from employees,
customers, and stakeholders. This communication is central to forming
the effective internal and external partnerships that are vital to the
success of any organization.
A communication strategy is especially crucial in the public sector,
where policymaking and program management demand transparency and a
full range of stakeholders and interested parties are concerned not
only with what results are to be achieved, but also what processes are
to be used to achieve those results. This demand for transparency is a
fact that needs to be accepted in any public sector transformation.
Finally, a performance management system can help manage and direct the
transformation process. The performance management system must create a
’line of sight“ showing how team, unit, and individual performance can
contribute to overall organization results. The system serves as the
basis for setting expectations for employees‘ roles in the
transformation process. It also evaluates individual performance and
contributions to the success of the transformation process and
ultimately, organizational results.
Building a world-class organization: The formation of DHS is an
important step in the federal government‘s effort to improve homeland
security. In establishing a results-oriented culture that can reach its
full potential, the organization and its leaders should carefully
select the best solution for the new organization. It will be important
to have key positions filled with people who possess the critical
competencies needed by the organization. Further, systems and processes
need to be tailored to the organization. Best practices in systems and
processes should be sought wherever they may be found. The best
solution may not be to adopt the approaches or systems used by the
largest component.
Building Strong Partnerships:
The consolidation of many agencies, programs, and missions into DHS is
designed, in part, to improve coordination and collaboration of
organizations with homeland security missions. DHS must establish
effective mechanisms to strengthen the ability of its many entities to
share information and build partnerships that yield results and help
meet national homeland security objectives.
Even with the consolidation of many entities into DHS, there still
remain a significant number of federal agencies or mission areas that
are not being incorporated into the new department but which still need
to be integrated into the overall homeland security strategy. Agencies
such as the FBI, CIA, and the U.S. Marshals Service, for example, have
important roles to play--especially in information sharing and
intelligence activities--and their efforts must be coordinated with DHS
to ensure effective and efficient action. DHS must effectively
coordinate with the State Department on visa processing, with HHS on
smallpox vaccination preparations and public health preparedness, and
with many other agencies that are not being incorporated into the new
organization.
Likewise, DHS will need to establish effective collaboration with the
Defense Department, which also has a growing role to play in homeland
security. In 2002, the President approved the latest Defense Department
Unified Command Plan intended to realign and streamline the U.S.
military structure to better address 21st century threats.
Characterized as the most significant reform of the nation‘s military
command structure since the first command plan was issued shortly after
World War II, the plan, among other things, establishes the U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), responsible for land, aerospace, and sea
defenses of the United States. Its geographic area includes the
continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the
Caribbean, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans.
Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the
federal government‘s ability to form effective partnerships with
nonfederal entities. Although collaboration with state and local
governments and the private sector is increasing, more needs to be done
in order to enhance its effectiveness. DHS has a strong role to play in
achieving this objective. Prior to September 11, 2001, the public and
private sectors collaborated on homeland security activities, but the
catastrophic events heightened the recognition that more concrete and
long-term approaches were necessary. The new department needs to gain
the full participation and buy-in of partners in both policy
formulation and implementation to develop effective partnerships.
The new DHS legislation contains provisions that should help maintain
coordination among public sector entities by establishing within the
DHS‘ Office of the Secretary an Office for State and Local Coordination
that will coordinate DHS activities relating to state and local
government. In addition, this office is tasked with developing a
process for receiving meaningful input from state and local governments
on furthering the national strategy for combating terrorism and other
homeland security activities. DHS also includes an Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate that will have responsibility
for assessments and protection plans for key resources and critical
infrastructure. Part of that effort will include consultation and
cooperation with state and local governments and the private sector.
For example, the directorate will recommend protection measures in
cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities
and the private sector.
The DHS legislation and existing coordinating mechanisms provide a base
for fully developing a partnership structure that provides maximum
leverage of resources and information. Effectively implementing a
strong partnership network is critical to accomplishing DHS‘ homeland
security mission.
Building Management Capacity:
The multiple mission responsibilities of the new department will
require significant management capacity to ensure that DHS can
successfully transform the various agencies, programs, and missions
into a strong and effective organization. The new department must
grapple not only with operational issues that will require immediate
attention to better secure our borders or to enhance information
sharing, but to also create a well run, sustainable department for the
long term.
In our July 17, 2002, testimony entitled Homeland Security: Critical
Design and Implementation Issues (GAO-02-957T), we identified certain
critical success factors a new organization such as DHS should
emphasize in its initial implementation phase. Over the years GAO has
made observations and recommendations about many of these success
factors, including human capital, information technology management,
acquisition management, financial management, and several other
important tools critical to building and sustaining effective
organizations. The full list of success factors is described on page
32.
The DHS legislation created an Under Secretary for Management, who will
be responsible for the management and administration of the department.
The effectiveness of this position will be critical to the department‘s
performance. Essentially, the person should function as a chief
operating officer (COO). A COO can provide the sustained management
attention essential for addressing key infrastructure and stewardship
issues, while helping to facilitate the transition and transformation
process. This position can be the focal point for building and
sustaining management capacity. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary can
then focus their efforts on policy and strategic issues. To be
successful, the Under Secretary must be given the necessary authority
to successfully lead departmentwide initiatives. Further, the person
filling this position should have the demonstrated leadership skills in
managing large and complex organizations and experience achieving
results in connection with ’good government“ responsibilities and
initiatives.
With respect to human capital, DHS will face significant challenges
that will require a comprehensive strategy capable of ensuring the new
department can acquire, develop, and retain the skills and talents
needed to prevent and protect against terrorism. This will require
identifying skill needs; attracting people with scarce skills, such as
language proficiency, into government jobs; melding diverse
compensation systems that can support the new department‘s many needs;
and establishing a results-oriented, accountable culture that can meet
national goals and priorities. An environment that promotes employee
involvement and empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative
labor-management relations, will be critically important. The various
unions whose members are slated to become employees of DHS will,
together with the department‘s leadership, need to work in unity of
purpose to achieve the goals of transforming DHS and strengthening
national security.
Moreover, agencies slated to move into DHS have long-standing human
capital problems that will need to be addressed. One of these
challenges has been the ability to hire and retain a talented and
motivated staff. For example, We have reported that INS has been unable
to reach its program goals in large part because of such staffing
problems as hiring shortfalls and agent attrition.[Footnote 6] Several
INS functions have been impacted by the lack of a staff resource
allocation model to identify staffing needs.[Footnote 7] Therefore, it
is likely that increased attention to the enforcement of immigration
laws and border control will test the capacity of DHS to hire large
numbers of inspectors for work at our nation‘s border entry points.
Other agencies being integrated into DHS are also expected to
experience challenges in hiring security workers and inspectors. For
example, the Agriculture Department‘s Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) has been seeking to increase the size of its
inspection force by 50 percent at the same time that the Customs
Service, INS, and other agencies are increasing the size of their
inspection staffs.[Footnote 8]
The DHS legislation provided certain human capital flexibilities in
order to establish a contemporary human capital system to better meet
the needs of the new department. These flexibilities can be important
tools in addressing the department‘s pressing human capital needs,
including recruiting, retaining, and aligning staff. DHS should
consider the six key practices for the effective use of human capital
flexibilities that we identified as part of a recent review.[Footnote
9] In addition, DHS should look to other agencies that have been given
flexibilities in the past--the Defense Department, the Internal Revenue
Service, TSA--to learn and build on their experiences to achieve the
maximum benefit. As required by the legislation, there also needs to be
transparency and accountability in designing the system, involving
stakeholders--particularly employees--and keeping the Congress
informed. These human capital flexibilities can greatly benefit the
department, but only if properly used.
Improving information technology management will also be critical to
transforming the new department. Not only will DHS face considerable
challenges in integrating the many systems and processes that provide
management with decision information, but it must sufficiently identify
its future needs in order to build effective systems that can support
the national homeland security strategy in the coming years. The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), in its current reexamination of ongoing
technology and management information systems, has taken an initial
first step to evaluate the new department‘s component systems. Much
more needs to be done, however, before DHS can achieve the needed
systems integration, including the development and implementation of an
enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, to guide its
information technology investments. Other key information technology
management capacities that DHS will need to establish include effective
computer security, investment management processes, and system and
service acquisition management practices.
Several of the agencies being incorporated into DHS will bring the new
department inherited information technology problems. For instance, INS
has had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information
systems to support its program operations. Since 1990, we have reported
that INS managers and field officials did not have adequate, reliable,
and timely information to effectively carry out the agency‘s mission.
For example, INS‘ benefit fraud investigations have been hampered by a
lack of integrated information systems.[Footnote 10] Because INS‘ four
service centers investigating benefit fraud operate different
information systems that do not interface with each other, INS officers
may be making decisions without routine access to significant
information, resulting in benefits being granted to individuals not
entitled to receive them. More recently, INS‘s alien address
information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were
believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would
assist the nation in its antiterrorism efforts.[Footnote 11]
Contributing to this situation was INS‘ lack of written procedures and
automated controls to help ensure that reported changes of address by
aliens are recorded in all of INS‘ automated databases. Our work has
identified weaknesses in INS‘ information technology management
capacities as the root cause of its system problems, and we have made
recommendations to correct the weaknesses. INS has made progress in
addressing our recommendations.
Much also remains to be done to strengthen the government‘s ability to
leverage information sharing between and among important government and
private sector stakeholders. The success of the national homeland
security strategy relies on the ability of all levels of government and
the private sector to communicate effectively with one another.
Activities that are hampered by organizational fragmentation,
technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration blunt the
nation‘s collective efforts to prevent or minimize terrorist acts.
DHS will be faced with the challenge of integrating the procurement
functions of many of its constituent programs and missions. Early
attention to strong systems and controls for acquisition and related
business processes will be critical both to ensuring success and
maintaining integrity and accountability. Several of the incoming
agencies, such as Customs and the Coast Guard, have major procurement
programs under way that must be closely managed to ensure they achieve
expectations. Inherited challenges exist in several agencies. Despite
some progress, Customs still lacks important acquisition management
controls.[Footnote 12] For its new import processing system, Customs
has not begun to establish process controls for determining whether
acquired software products and services satisfy contract requirements
before acceptance, nor to establish related controls for effective and
efficient transfer of acquired software products to the support
organization responsible for software maintenance. Agreeing with one of
our recommendations, Customs continues to make progress and plans to
establish effective acquisition process controls.
With respect to financial management, the new department has a
stewardship obligation to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, to use tax
dollars appropriately, and to ensure financial accountability to the
President, the Congress, and the American people. DHS can only meet
these goals if it establishes systems, processes, and controls that
help to ensure effective financial management. DHS must also insist on
the adherence of strong financial principles for its incoming agencies,
many of which have ongoing challenges in their systems, processes, or
internal controls over financial information. For instance, FEMA
received a qualified opinion on its financial statements following its
fiscal year 2001 financial audit, and it has a number of material
internal control weaknesses.[Footnote 13] For fiscal year 2001, INS
received its first unqualified opinion on its financial statements.
However, it took significant effort to achieve this opinion and the
auditors reported several material internal control weaknesses. DOT,
from which several DHS agencies are coming, has financial management
deficiencies, including with its accounting system. In addition to
addressing the many ongoing challenges existing in the programs of
incoming agencies, DHS will need to focus on building future systems as
part of its enterprise architecture approach to ensure an overarching
framework for the agency‘s integrated financial management processes.
Plans must be developed and implemented to bridge the many financial
environments in which incoming agencies currently operate to an
integrated DHS system.
Successful financial management of homeland security will also be
dependent on greater budgetary transparency and a level of detail that
provides useful information for congressional budget deliberations and
executive decision making. Collaboration and coordination will be
critical to avoiding duplicative or wasteful spending on homeland
security, both within DHS as well as among other agencies that have
homeland security missions. DHS will need to work with OMB and the
Congress to achieve the needed level of transparency as funding is
transferred or merged to ensure that intended results are achieved and
funds are effectively leveraged.
DHS is also expected to extensively utilize third parties, including
state and local governments and the private sector, to meet national
homeland security goals. Through a variety of important tools,
including grants and regulations, tax incentives, and other activities,
as well as the purchase of goods and services, the new department must
not only ensure that the tools it uses are the most appropriate for the
situation but that it also receives the intended benefit. Through
effective program and financial management, DHS will need to build
strong oversight mechanisms to ensure that third party obligations are
met.
Establishing Performance Milestones and Oversight for DHS:
The new department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the challenge
of developing a national homeland security performance focus, which
relies on related national and agency strategic and performance
planning efforts of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), OMB, and
other departments and agencies. Indeed, the planning activities of the
various departments and agencies represent a good start in the
development of this focus; however, our past work on implementation of
the Government Performance and Results Act has highlighted ongoing
difficulty with many federal departments and agencies setting adequate
performance goals, objectives, and targets. Accordingly, attention is
needed to developing and achieving appropriate homeland security
performance expectations and measures and in ensuring that there is
linkage between DHS, other agency plans, and the national strategy.
Ensuring these capabilities and linkages will be vital in establishing
a comprehensive homeland security planning and accountability framework
that will not only guide the nation‘s homeland security efforts but
also help assess how well they are really working.
The new DHS legislation does require some specific planning efforts
that include goals and measures. For example, the Directorate of
Science and Technology is to develop a national policy and strategic
plan for developing countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. The
directorate must develop comprehensive, research-based definable goals
and annual measurable objectives and specific targets to evaluate the
goals.
Accountability is also a critical factor in ensuring the success of the
new department. The oversight entities of the executive branch,
including OMB and OHS, will have a vital role to play in ensuring
expected performance and accountability. As stated in the President‘s
June 2002 DHS proposal, OHS is seen as continuing to play a key role in
advising the President and coordinating a simplified interagency
process. Likewise, congressional committees, with their long-term and
broad institutional roles, will also play a role in overseeing the
transformation of the federal government as it meets the demands of its
homeland security mission. The creation of DHS has raised questions
regarding how the Congress can best meet its oversight, authorization,
and appropriations responsibilities for the new department. DHS will be
comprised of some 22 federal agencies or their components overseen by
numerous congressional committees of jurisdiction. In recognizing this
complexity, the DHS legislation instructs both Houses of Congress to
review their committee structures in light of the reorganization of
homeland security responsibilities within the executive branch. As a
result, the Congress has begun to explore ways to facilitate conducting
its responsibilities in a more consolidated and integrated manner.
During this period of transformation, the Congress may need to
periodically reassess its structure to maximize the effectiveness of
its DHS oversight.
Addressing Significant Program Operational and Management Challenges:
In addition to the high risk associated with implementing and
transforming a new department from the multitude of agencies and
activities, DHS‘ leadership will be confronted with a number of
operational and management challenges emanating from the functions and
organizations being transferred to it. We have identified a number of
major operational and management challenges in the programs and
missions being transferred into the department. These challenges are
discussed in depth in our Performance and Accountability reports on
their current departments and in other GAO work on homeland security.
However, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the new department,
summaries of these risks and challenges follow.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:
Within DHS, a new directorate is responsible for accessing, receiving,
and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence information,
and other information from agencies of federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector, and to integrate such information
to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. The
new directorate‘s role also includes the protection of the nation‘s
critical information systems. In a separate report, we have designated
protecting information systems supporting the federal government and
the nation‘s critical infrastructures as a governmentwide high risk.
Because of the new department‘s central role in this issue, resolution
of this high risk will, in part, be a responsibility and significant
challenge for DHS.
Since 1997, we have designated information security as a governmentwide
high-risk issue. This year, we have expanded the high-risk issue to
emphasize the increased importance of protecting the information
systems that support critical computer infrastructure such as national
defense, power distribution, and water supply.[Footnote 14] Terrorist
attacks and threats have further underscored the need to manage
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities that enhance the
security of the cyber and physical public and private infrastructures
that are essential to national security, national economic security,
and/or national public health and safety.
At the federal level, cyber CIP activities are perhaps the most
critical component of a department or agency‘s overall information
security program. In addition, although the government has made steady
progress in working with the private sector to better secure critical
infrastructures, this issue is also designated as part of our
information security high-risk issue because:
* the failure to adequately protect these infrastructures could have
consequences for national and economic security and /or national public
health and safety,
* terrorist groups and others have stated their intentions of attacking
our critical infrastructures,
* federal influence over the private sector‘s management of our
nation‘s critical infrastructure poses unique challenges, and:
* further actions on GAO‘s CIP recommendations are needed.
A number of significant actions have taken place to better position the
nation to protect our critical infrastructures, including issuance of
(1) Presidential Decision Directive 63, which described a strategy for
cooperative efforts by government and the private sector and
established organizations to provide central coordination and support,
(2) Executive Order 13231, which established the President‘s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, and (3) a comment draft of a National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.[Footnote 15]
Although the actions taken to date are major steps to more effectively
protect our nation‘s critical infrastructures, we have identified and
made numerous recommendations over the last several years concerning
CIP challenges that still need to be addressed. For each of these
challenges, improvements have been made and continuing efforts are in
progress. However, much more needs to be done. These challenges include
developing a national CIP strategy, improving analysis and warning
capabilities, and improving information sharing on threats and
vulnerabilities.
Moreover, the transformation of the FBI at the same time as the
formation of DHS will add an additional level of complexity to the
challenge of ensuring effective coordination, communication, and
sharing of information. In previous work, we have noted that changes in
the FBI must be part of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide
transformations that are taking place.[Footnote 16] As a result, the
FBI needs to develop a comprehensive transformation plan with key
milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation
efforts. With the FBI as a key partner, it will be important for DHS to
be aware of ongoing changes at the FBI and assess their impact on its
operations and the integration of activities between the two agencies.
Border and Transportation Security:
The new Border and Transportation Security Directorate faces
considerable challenges and its success will require sustained
attention from the new department‘s leadership. The operational and
management challenges include:
* Customs Service: As a result of the homeland security legislation,
the Customs Service will be transferred to DHS from the Treasury
Department. However, the Secretary of the Treasury will retain
authority over customs revenue functions. The splitting of revenue
functions from other authorities will initially pose a challenge to
developing clarity in roles and responsibilities and effective,
efficient, and seamless operations. Further, in our report on the
Treasury Department, we have identified improving Customs‘ management
of multiple missions as a performance and accountability challenge.
Customs has the dual missions of enforcing laws to safeguard borders
against illegal entry of goods and of regulating legitimate commercial
activity. While September 11has focused Customs on keeping out of the
country any ’implements of terrorism,“ such as chemical, biological, or
nuclear materials that could be used as weapons, the agency still faces
challenges associated with trade compliance and overall border
security.
* Our recently completed and ongoing work has identified additional
challenges that directly or indirectly affect Customs‘ efforts to
improve security at U.S. borders to safeguard against the illegal entry
of goods, including potentially harmful, hazardous, or otherwise
illegal commodities. These challenges include improving different
international mail and package inspections processes, ensuring that
various illegal items, including weapons of mass destruction, do not
enter the country in cargo containers at seaports, and acquiring a new
import processing system. According to Customs, the inspection of
incoming foreign mail remains largely a manual process that relies
primarily on physical examination. One courier is working with Customs
to pilot test an advance manifest system, a computerized database that
receives cargo manifest information. The database will allow Customs to
analyze incoming package information and make more informed decisions
about what packages to inspect. Since our work on international mail
and containerized cargo processing[Footnote 17] involves information
that Customs considers to be law enforcement sensitive, we are
precluded from further discussing the challenges posed by mail and
cargo processing in this unclassified report. Whatever their nature,
Customs‘ challenges could likely be complicated during its proposed
transition to the new Department of Homeland Security.
* Transportation Security Administration: We have identified
transportation security as a performance and accountability challenge
for the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation. As
discussed in our DOT report, the transformation of transportation
security in order to reduce the vulnerability of the nation‘s surface
and air transportation systems to terrorism and other disruptions
represents a significant challenge to the new department.[Footnote 18]
On November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act[Footnote 19] was enacted, which created TSA and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. DOT
has worked to make urgent security improvements throughout its modal
administrations while simultaneously organizing TSA to meet the longer-
term challenge of implementing security improvements that will not
excessively inhibit commerce and travel or interfere with other
critical missions. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused
primarily on aviation security challenges and is working towards
defining the roles and responsibilities for surface transportation
security. Specifically, TSA is developing memoranda of understanding
with the other modal administrations within DOT that are expected to
delineate the lines of authority between the parties and establish the
specific responsibilities of various parties for transportation
security. TSA plans to complete the memoranda by March 1, 2003.
There are also continuing challenges for aviation security. Despite an
impressive start in building the infrastructure of a large
organization, TSA still faces formidable short-and long-term challenges
in aviation security. According to TSA, it met the November 2002
deadline by hiring and deploying over 40,000 passenger screeners to
screen passengers at 429 commercial airports. In addition, TSA reports
that it met the December 31, 2002, deadline to screen all checked
baggage. TSA reports that it hired and deployed more than 20,000 of an
estimated 22,000 baggage screeners as of mid-December 2002 to screen
all checked baggage and that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent
of all checked baggage will be screened using explosive detection
systems or explosive trace detection equipment, and the remaining
checked baggage will be screened using alternative means such as canine
teams, hand searches, and passenger-bag matching. Nevertheless,
significant challenges remain. As of mid-December 2002, TSA has
installed only 239 of the estimated 1,100 explosive detection machines
and 1,951 of the estimated 6,000 trace detection machines needed to
screen baggage to meet baggage screening requirements in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act.
In addition to securing passenger carry-on luggage and checked luggage
TSA faces other immediate challenges in securing cargo aboard
commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. To address these
challenges, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for
air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach,
includes a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for
completing actions. TSA agreed with this recommendation.[Footnote 20]
TSA faces numerous transportation security challenges over the long
term. The agency must ensure that transportation security funding needs
are identified and prioritized and costs are controlled. Moreover, TSA
believes its current funding levels are inadequate. The agency
estimates that it will need about $4.8 billion in fiscal year 2003, but
that revenues from the new passenger security fee will pay for only
about one third ($1.7 billion) of that amount. As a result, TSA will
need a major cash infusion at a time when federal budget deficits are
growing. TSA needs to establish effective coordination among the many
public and private entities responsible for transportation security.
The agency must also ensure adequate workforce competence and staffing
levels. TSA has experienced difficulty in hiring and training its
screening workforce and continues to face issues with its compensation
and performance management systems. Finally, standards define the level
of security that is needed and the safeguards that should be in place
to meet the identified needs. New standards are being developed in some
modes and are being considered in other modes. In addition to
continuing challenges in standard development, there also are
challenges in standards‘ implementation.
* Visa processing: Another important element in border and
transportation security is the improvement of the nation‘s visa
processing system. In our report on the Department of State, we
identify strengthening the visa process to help prevent terrorism as a
performance and accountability challenge.[Footnote 21] Since the
September 11 attacks, some changes have been introduced to strengthen
visa processing. For example, State has, with the help of other
agencies, almost doubled the names and information on persons in the
lookout system. Although these actions have strengthened the visa
process, opinions and practices among overseas posts continue to
diverge regarding the authority of consular officers to deny
questionable applicants a visa and the role of the visa process in
ensuring national security. Opinions and practices also differ
regarding the appropriate changes to individual posts‘ visa policies
and procedures that need to be made given the need for heightened
border security. We have made a number of recommendations to State to
address urgent and fundamental operational and coordination issues, and
the department has indicated that it has taken steps to implement a
number of our recommendations. However, more needs to be done. In the
creation of DHS, the Secretary for DHS has been given certain visa
policy-making responsibilities. It will be critical for DHS and State
to work together to address the underlying challenge in visa
processing, ensure a smooth transfer of certain responsibilities, and
integrate visa processing activities to maximize effectiveness as an
antiterrorism tool.
* Immigration: Numerous challenges also face INS, which is being
integrated into the new department. The Congress has continued to
express concern about INS‘ ability to carry out its enforcement and
service functions. Over the last several years the Congress has
significantly increased budget and staffing at INS to help the agency
deal with its considerable workload. In creating DHS, the Congress
established within DHS the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services to help improve the performance of these activities. Further,
the Bureau of Border Security has responsibility for enforcement
functions.
These actions have resulted in a significant change in responsibilities
for carrying out immigration functions. However, additional challenges
remain, and will have to be addressed by DHS. In a memorandum dated
November 8, 2002, the DOJ Inspector General enumerated the top
management challenges for INS. Many of these challenges parallel our
reporting. In our performance and accountability report on DOJ, we
identify the following challenges:
* effective use of INS resources is necessary to fully implement a
border control strategy,
* fragmented and unfocused INS efforts must be improved to combat
immigration benefit fraud,
* impediments to reducing unauthorized employment need to be overcome,
* improvements are needed in identifying and removing criminal aliens,
* shortcomings in alien anti-smuggling efforts need to be eliminated,
* problems managing INS‘s application workload must be corrected,
* problems coordinating with State Department‘s visa operations need
attention, and:
* weaknesses in information technology management must be corrected.
Our report on DOJ contains an extensive discussion of these issues and
our related recommendations. However, several are highlighted here.
The Border Patrol has been responsible for preventing and deterring
aliens from illegally entering the United States between ports of
entry. We reported in August 2001 that INS‘s preliminary estimates
indicated that gaining control of the southwest border could take at
least 5 more years and between 11,700 and 14,000 Border Patrol agents,
additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in
technology and infrastructure.[Footnote 22] Further, the Justice
Department‘s Inspector General reported in 2002 that INS developed a
northern border strategy in 2000, but implementation was initially
delayed because of changes in administration and in INS leadership, and
then overwhelmed by the events of September 11.[Footnote 23] In
response to September 11, INS accelerated deployment of personnel and
resources to the northern border, including increasing the number of
Border Patrol agents from 24 to 245 in fiscal year 2001.
Despite years of increasing budgets and staff, INS has continued to
experience significant problems managing its workload of processing
applications. As of October 2002, INS had an application backlog of 5.2
million applications, an almost five-fold increase since October 1994.
We reported in May 2001 that better automation capability and a more
streamlined application process would enable INS to provide improved
levels of service.[Footnote 24] In 2002, the President announced a $50
million initiative to eliminate backlogs. It should be noted that
despite the importance and prevalence of information technology (IT)
systems in accomplishing organizational core missions, INS has not yet
fully implemented effective controls for managing its IT resources,
although it is working to do so. This will provide an added level of
difficulty in addressing other management problems.
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
The new department will include a directorate for emergency
preparedness and response and will inherit challenges from FEMA and
HHS. FEMA will be transferred to DHS, thus the department will have
responsibility for both FEMA‘s homeland security and non-homeland
security responsibilities. Currently a stand-alone agency, we have
issued a separate report on FEMA in which four mission and management
challenges are identified. These challenges are: (1) ensuring effective
coordination of preparedness and response efforts, (2) enhancing
provision and management of disaster assistance for efficient and
effective response,
(3) reducing the impact of natural hazards by improving the efficiency
of mitigation and flood programs, and (4) resolving financial
management weaknesses to ensure fiscal accountability.
The first challenge deals with preparing for and responding to
terrorism and nonterrorism-related disasters. Although FEMA and its
missions will be transferred to DHS, its homeland security and
nonhomeland security missions will be under separate DHS directorates.
Specifically, preparedness for terrorism disasters will be placed in
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and other
preparedness and response efforts will be located in the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate. This divisional separation could
complicate FEMA‘s historical all-hazards approach--a comprehensive
approach focused on preparing for and responding to all types of
disasters, either natural or manmade. Separation of preparedness and
response activities among differing federal entities has been a
recurring problem in the past, and while consolidation of these
activities within DHS does achieve a measure of consolidation, the
separation of disaster and emergency responsibilities across two
directorates of the new department will present coordination challenges
for the appropriate DHS undersecretaries.
With respect to enhancing the provision and management of disaster
assistance for efficient and effective response, FEMA will be
challenged to:
* improve its criteria for determining state and local eligibility to
receive federal disaster assistance;
* assess whether broadened determinations of federal disaster
assistance in response to the terrorist attacks may establish precedent
for future disasters;
* build on lessons learned from charities‘ response to September 11,
and enhance disaster assistance training and resource planning;
* enhance oversight of disaster assistance; and:
* improve an existing information system before it is used as a
building block for a multiagency disaster management web site.
With respect to natural hazards, two of FEMA‘s major efforts have been
its mitigation programs and the National Flood Insurance Program.
Concerns have been raised regarding the demonstration of cost
effectiveness of some mitigation projects in these programs. For the
National Flood Insurance Program, cumulative program costs exceeded
income by about $1.3 billion during fiscal years 1993 through 2001
because the program is not actuarially sound.
Finally, FEMA faces challenges in resolving financial management
weaknesses. FEMA‘s financial management effectiveness has become a
concern because it received a qualified audit opinion on its most
recent financial statements due to inadequate accounting for property
and unliquidated obligations. Additionally, auditors identified
material internal control weaknesses and compliance issues requiring
correction.
In addition to FEMA, HHS‘ Office of Emergency Response will be
transferred to DHS. In our report on HHS, we identify strengthening
preparedness for public health emergencies, including bioterrorism, as
a performance and accountability challenge.[Footnote 25] Ensuring that
every community and each of the approximately 3,000 local health
departments across the nation meets a basic standard of preparedness is
a significant challenge. Our reports have found significant weaknesses
in key elements of the public health infrastructure that are critical
to emergency response at the state and local level. In addition, we
have noted a lack of coordination among programs with responsibility
for public health emergency preparedness at the local, state, and
federal levels. The creation of DHS has the potential to streamline
overall funding and oversight responsibilities for preparedness and
response. However, key public health preparedness functions will remain
with HHS, and will present coordination challenges to DHS.
Further, we note that HHS faces challenges in strengthening the public
health infrastructure, as well as related aspects of the private-sector
health care system. Areas requiring strengthening include laboratory
capacity, infectious disease surveillance, hospital surge capacity,
blood supply, communications, human capital, and research and
development. Clearly, addressing these challenges will impact the
success of DHS in achieving its mission. Coordination between the two
departments will be critical.
Science and Technology:
The new department‘s Directorate of Science and Technology will have a
diverse set of responsibilities and its effectiveness will depend upon
strong relationships with other federal departments. Several components
of the Department of Energy will be transferred to the new directorate,
as will the Department of Agriculture‘s Plum Island Animal Disease
Center and the Defense Department‘s National Bio-Weapons Defense
Analysis Center. In addition to its own research activities, DHS will
have to collaborate with HHS, the Department of Energy, and others to
ensure essential research is accomplished for homeland security
activities. Achieving balance among competing priorities will present
unique challenges. Science and technology activities often serve
multiple purposes and, as we have indicated in recent testimony before
the Congress,[Footnote 26] collaboration between and among federal
agencies will be important to the success of missions that serve dual
purposes.
The integration of these components will present unique challenges,
particularly as DHS moves to address important needs of homeland
security. For instance, one potential area where the new department
will play a role is biometric technology, which can be used in
associating a person with travel documents such as visas and passports.
When used at a border inspection, the biometric comparison can be used
to help decide whether to admit a traveler into the United States.
Before any decision is made to implement biometrics in a border control
system, the benefits of the system must be weighed against its costs.
The purpose of any biometrics initiative is to prevent the entry of
travelers who are inadmissible to the United States. The costs of a
biometric border control system will not be trivial. Important policy
implications must be addressed in trade-offs between increasing
security and the impact on areas such as privacy, economy, traveler
convenience, and international relations.
Coast Guard:
The Coast Guard will also be transferred to DHS, but it will remain as
an independent unit and will not be incorporated into any of the new
directorates. In recent reports and testimonies, we raise issues
regarding the need for the Coast Guard to balance multiple
missions.[Footnote 27] Additionally, in our report on DOT, we identify
a performance and accountability challenge of enhancing aviation and
Coast Guard acquisition management to maximize returns from investment
of public funds in large, complex, high-cost procurements.[Footnote 28]
Our report noted that aging and obsolete equipment has limited the
Coast Guard‘s ability to achieve its safety and security missions, and
that the agency is undertaking a costly, complex, and long-term
program, called the Deepwater Capability Replacement Project, to
modernize and replace its aging ships and aircraft. In 2002, the Coast
Guard awarded a $17 billion contract and projected sustained funding
needs of $500 million a year (in 1998 dollars) over the next 2 to 3
decades to develop the Integrated Deepwater System. The Coast Guard is
addressing many of the concerns we reported in our 2001 Performance and
Accountability Series[Footnote 29] report, but uncertainties still
exist in key areas such as attaining stable, sustained funding over a
20-to 30-year period, and controlling costs, especially in the
contract‘s later years.
Critical Success Factors for New Organizations:
In our July 17, 2002, report entitled Homeland Security: Critical
Design and Implementation Issues9 (GAO-02-957T), we identified certain
critical success factors a new organization such as DHS should
emphasize in its initial implementation phase. These factors are:
* Strategic planning: Leading results-oriented organizations focus on
the process of strategic planning that includes involvement of
stakeholders, assessment of internal and external environments, and an
alignment of activities, core processes, and resources to support
mission-related outcomes.
* Organizational alignment: The organization of a new department should
be aligned to be consistent with the goals and objectives established
in the strategic plan.
* Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any
major consolidation or transformation effort.
* Building partnerships: One of the key challenges of this new
department will be the development and maintenance of homeland security
partners at all levels of the government and the private sector, both
in the United States and overseas.
* Performance management: An effective performance management system
fosters institutional, unit, and individual accountability.
* Human capital strategy: A new department must ensure that its
missions are not adversely impacted by the government‘s pending human
capital crisis, and that it can recruit, retain, and reward a talented
and motivated workforce, which has required core competencies, to
achieve its mission and objectives. The people factor is a critical
element in any major consolidation or transformation.
* Information technology management: A new department should leverage
enabling technology to enhance its ability to transform capabilities
and capacities to share and act upon timely, quality information about
terrorist threats.
* Knowledge management: A new department must ensure it makes maximum
use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought together
in the consolidation.
* Financial management: A new department has a stewardship obligation
to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; to use tax dollars appropriately;
and to ensure financial accountability to the President, the Congress,
and the American people.
* Acquisition management: Early attention to strong systems and
controls for acquisition and related business processes will be
critical both to ensuring success and maintaining integrity and
accountability. As one of the largest federal departments, DHS will
potentially have some of the most extensive acquisition requirements in
government.
* Risk management: In setting goals, priorities, and implementation
plans, risks must be understood and managed. The new department must be
able to maintain and enhance current states of homeland security
readiness while transitioning and transforming itself into a more
effective and efficient structural unit. DHS will also need to
immediately improve the government‘s overall ability to perform risk
management activities that can help to prevent, defend against, and
respond to terrorist acts.
* Change management: Assembling a new organization out of separate
pieces and reorienting all of its processes and assets to deliver the
desired results while managing related risks will take an organized,
systematic approach to change. A new department will both require an
executive and operational capability to encourage and manage change.
[End of section]
GAO Contacts:
Subjects covered in this report: National preparedness; Contact person:
Randall Yim, Managing Director; National Preparedness; (202) 512-3580;
yimr@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Management challenges for homeland
security; Contact person: Patricia A. Dalton, Director; Strategic
Issues; (202) 512-6806; daltonp@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Transforming transportation security;
Contact person: John H. Anderson, Jr. Managing Director; Physical
Infrastructure Issues; (202) 512-2834; andersonj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Information security issues and
critical infrastructure protection; Contact person: Robert F. Dacey,
Director; Information Technology; (202) 512-3317; daceyr@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Better manage programs designed to
support state and local efforts to reduce crime; Contact person: Laurie
E. Ekstrand, Director; Justice Issues; (202) 512-8777;
ekstrandl@gao,gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Strengthen the visa process of as an
antiterrorism tool; Contact person: Jess T. Ford, Director;
International Affairs and Trade; (202) 512-4268; fordj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Coordination of preparedness and
response efforts; ; Enhancing the management of the U.S. Coast Guard
acquisitions; Contact person: JayEtta Hecker, Director; Physical
Infrastructure; (202) 512-2834; heckerj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Public health emergency preparedness;
Contact person: Janet Heinrich, Director; Health Care--Public Health
Issues; (202) 512-7119; henrichj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: INS‘ information technology management
weaknesses; Contact person: Randolph C. Hite, Director; Information
Technology Architecture and Systems Issues; (202) 512-6204;
hiter@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Building human capital strategies;
Contact person: J.C. Mihm, Director; Strategic Issues; (202) 512-3236;
mihmj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report: Efforts to combat immigration benefit
fraud; Contact person: Richard M. Stana, Director; Tax Administration;
(202) 512-8777; stanar@gao.gov.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security:
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.
GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned
for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-
03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally Owned and
Leased Facilities. GAO-03-8. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.
Homeland Security: Department of Justice‘s Response to Its
Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry
Vulnerabilities. GAO-03-24R. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2002. :
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: OMB‘s Temporary Cessation of Information Technology
Funding for New Investments. GAO-03-186T. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2002.
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T.
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.
Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited
Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities. GAO-02-1004. Washington,
D.C.: September 17, 2002. :
September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities. GAO-02-
1037. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2002.
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing
Challenges. GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002. :
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1012T. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1011T. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2002.
Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of
Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO-02-799. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2002. :
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-
957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO-
02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will
Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships
Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1,
2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO-
02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001,
Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center. GAO-02-700R. Washington,
D.C.: May 29, 2002. :
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. :
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership
Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA‘s Role in Strengthening Federal
Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation‘s Issues.
GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Combating Terrorism:
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services‘ Antiterrorism
Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1,
2002.
Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export
Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.
Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses. GAO-03-5.
Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2002. :
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD
Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-03-15. Washington, D.C.:
October 22, 2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD‘s Risk Assessment
of Defense Capabilities. GAO-03-137T. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2002.
Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could
Be Improved and Expanded. GAO-02-890. Washington, D.C.: September 10,
2002. :
Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of
Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972.
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002. :
Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA‘s Program Develops Successful Technologies,
but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO-02-904. Washington,
D.C.: August 23, 2002. :
Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing
and Cost Benefit Analysis before Implementation. GAO-02-838.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. :
Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but
Challenges Remain. GAO-02-365. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2002. :
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-
550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD‘s Antiterrorism
Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President‘s
Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 9,
2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.
GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist
Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. :
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of
Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21,
2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and
Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1999. :
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:
November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2,
1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.:
December 1, 1997.
Border Security and Immigration:
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.
GAO-03-38. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks
Reliable Address Information. GAO-03-188, November 21, 2002.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002.
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03-
174. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2002. :
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12,
2002.
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2002. :
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior
Enforcement Strategy. GAO-02-861T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002.
Customs Service Modernization: Management Improvements Needed on High-
Risk Automated Commercial Environment Project. GAO-02-545. Washington,
D.C.: May 13, 2002.
Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address
Problems. GAO-02-66. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002.
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring
Management Challenges. GAO-02-168T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.
INS‘ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After
Seven Years. GAO-01-842. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.
Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede the Timeliness of
Application Processing. GAO-01-488. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks. GAO-
01-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001.
Public Health:
Homeland Security: CDC‘s Oversight of Select Agent Programs. GAO-03-
315R. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply Is Key to Emergency
Preparedness. GAO-02-1095T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2002. :
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but
Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns.
GAO-02-954T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D
Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts. GAO-02-924T.
Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention‘s Role in
Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,
2001.
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness.
GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe
Food. GAO-02-47T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.
Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington,
D.C.: October 5, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-
915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and
Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2001.
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. GAO/
HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7,
1999.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.:
August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public
Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
1999.
Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 13,
2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:
July 25, 2002. :
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation‘s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners‘
Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.
Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2000.
Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is
Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998.
Aviation Security: FAA‘s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.
GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives
Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-119R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997.
Aviation Security: Technology‘s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.
GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996.
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed.
GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996.
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security.
GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996.
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and
Assets Remain at Risk. GAO-03-303T. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2002.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security
Should Be More Fully Addressed. GAO-02-781. Washington, D.C.: August
30, 2002.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed. GAO-02-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information
Systems. GAO-02-474. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-02-918T. Washington, D.C.: July 9,
2002.
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection. GAO-02-24. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. :
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-
Based Attacks. GAO-01-1168T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning
Capabilities. GAO-01-1132T. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2001.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-1005T.
Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2001.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-769T.
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2001.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing National Capabilities. GAO-01-323. Washington, D.C.: April
25, 2001.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a
Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination. GAO/T-
AIMD-00-268. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber
Security Information Act of 2000. GAO/T-AIMD-00-229. Washington, D.C.:
June 22, 2000.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information
Systems Protection. GAO/AIMD-00-90R. Washington, D.C.: February 11,
2000.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection. GAO/T-AIMD-00-72. Washington, D.C.:
February 1, 2000.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to
Assure Security of Federal Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-7. Washington,
D.C.: October 6, 1999.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on
Year 2000 Experiences. GAO/AIMD-00-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
1999.
Disaster Assistance:
September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan in
Response to the Terrorist Attacks. GAO-03-88. Washington, D.C.:
November 1, 2002. :
Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States
for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington,
D.C.: July 9, 2001.
Budget and Management:
Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in
Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.: December 6,
2002.
Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept: A
Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance Challenges. GAO-03-
192SP. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2002.
Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information
Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals. GAO-02-923. Washington,
D.C.: September 30, 2002.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Using Balanced Expectations to Manage Senior
Executive Performance. GAO-02-966. Washington, D.C.: September 27,
2002.
Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. GAO-02-1106T.
Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2002. :
Electronic Government: Proposal Addresses Critical Challenges.
GAO-02-1083T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002. :
Results-Oriented Cultures: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other
Countries‘ Performance Management Initiatives. GAO-02-862. Washington,
D.C.: August 2, 2002. :
Acquisition Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the
Training of Their Employees. GAO-02-737. Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2002. :
Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002. :
U.S. Government Financial Statements: FY 2001 Results Highlight the
Continuing Need to Accelerate Federal Financial Management Reform. GAO-
02-599T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2002.
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond.
GAO-02-538T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002. :
Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human
Capital Reform. GAO-02-528T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2002.
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002. :
Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 27, 2002. :
Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans with
Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington, D.C.: January
4, 2002.
Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.
Washington, D.C.: August 2001.
Managing for Results: Federal Managers‘ Views on Key Management Issues
Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.: January
2001.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-01-241. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-01-253. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington, D.C.:
August 29, 1997.
Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal
Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7,
1995.
Reorganization:
FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation
Needed. GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002.
Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the Environmental
Protection Agency to Cabinet Status. GAO-02-552T. Washington, D.C.:
March 21, 2002.
Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations. GAO/GGD-
81-75. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 1981.
Grant Design:
Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and
Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22,
1998.
Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/AIMD-
95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
[End of section]
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Agriculture. GAO-03-96.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce.
GAO-03-97.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education.
GAO-03-99.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy.
GAO-03-100.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services. GAO-03-101.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing
and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice.
GAO-03-105.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.
GAO-03-106.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.
GAO-03-107.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury. GAO-03-109.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. GAO-03-110.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for
International Development. GAO-03-111.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency. GAO-03-112.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency. GAO-03-113.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-03-114.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel
Management. GAO-03-115.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business
Administration. GAO-03-116.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration. GAO-03-117.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service.
GAO-03-118.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation‘s Critical Infrastructures.
GAO-03-121.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers
and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland
Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 14, 2002).
[3] Pub. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.
[4] Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan (The White
House, Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2002).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management
Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 20, 2002).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges
to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-02-861T
(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration and Naturalization
Service: Overview of Recurring Management Challenges, GAO-02-168T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2001).
[8] GAO-03-260.
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of
Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces, GAO-03-
2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2002).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot
Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO-
03-188 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2002).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service Modernization:
Management Improvements Needed on High-Risk Automated Commercial
Environment Project, GAO-02-545 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2002).
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Financial
Statements: FY 2001 Results Highlight the Continuing Need to Accelerate
Federal Financial Management Reform, GAO-02-599T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 9, 2002).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[15] The President‘s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace--For Comment Draft, September
2002.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps
Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO-02-865T (Washington,
D.C.: June 21, 2002).
[17] The Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
requested this work.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[19] Pub. L. 107-71.
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities
and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of State, GAO-03-107 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS‘ Southwest Border Strategy:
Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).
[23] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Follow-up Report on Border Patrol‘s Efforts to Improve Northern Border
Security (Redacted Version). Report No. I-2002-004 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2002).
[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
[25] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Health and Human Services, GAO-03-101
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Critical Design
and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2002).
[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for
Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington,
D.C.
June 25, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Budget and
Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-02-538T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 19, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard:
Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks, GAO-01-659T
(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-01-253 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2001).
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