Homeland Security
Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense Gao ID: GAO-04-170T October 16, 2003Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism,business,or work) or, in some cases (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but others overstay. Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal visas overstayed their authorized periods of admission. This has heightened attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses in our current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic security.
Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. The Department of Homeland Security estimates the resident overstay population at 2.3 million as of January 2000. Because the starting point for this estimate is the 2000 census, it does not cover short-term overstays who have not established residence here. It also omits an unknown number of potential long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's current system for tracking arrivals and departures (e.g.,noncollection of some departure forms and inability to match other departure forms to arrivals), there is no accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended to address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more comprehensive,automated program, is being phased in. While its design and implementation face a number of challenges, evaluating US-VISIT against the weaknesses GAO identifies here would increase its potential for success. The current tracking system's weaknesses limit control options and make it difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the country legally. Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs with fraudulent identity documents, including jobs at critical infrastructure locations, such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can affect domestic security and are one component of a layered national defense. Improving the tracking system could work with intelligence, investigation, information-sharing, and other factors to help counter threats from foreign terrorists.
GAO-04-170T, Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, October 16, 2003:
Homeland Security:
Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense:
Statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research
and Methods:
GAO-04-170T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-170T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come
to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis”
that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a
specific date”either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism,
business, or work) or, in some cases, (2) as tourists or business
visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter group
includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter
under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are
tracked depart on time, but others overstay.
Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal
visas overstayed their authorized periods of admission. This has
heightened attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying,
(2) weaknesses in our current overstay tracking system, and
(3) how the tracking system weaknesses and the level of overstaying
might affect domestic security.
What GAO Found:
Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized
periods of admission. The Department of Homeland Security estimates
the resident overstay population at 2.3 million as of January 2000.
Because the starting point for this estimate is the 2000 census, it
does not cover short-term overstays who have not established residence
here. It also omits an unknown number of potential long-term overstays
from Mexico and Canada.
Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS‘s current system for tracking
arrivals and departures (e.g., noncollection of some departure forms
and inability to match other departure forms to arrivals), there is no
accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended
to address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and
Exit Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more
comprehensive, automated program, is being phased in. While its design
and implementation face a number of challenges, evaluating US-VISIT
against the weaknesses GAO identifies here would increase its
potential for success.
The current tracking system‘s weaknesses limit control options and
make it difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the
country legally. Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs
with fraudulent identity documents, including jobs at critical
infrastructure locations, such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can
affect domestic security and are one component of a layered national
defense. Improving the tracking system could work with intelligence,
investigation, information-sharing, and other factors to help counter
threats from foreign terrorists.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-170T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Nancy Kingsbury at
(202) 512-2700 or kingsburyn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss overstays--that is, foreign
citizens who enter the United States legally but do not leave when
their authorized period of admission expires. Overstay issues have
gained heightened attention because some of the 9/11 hijackers had
overstayed their periods of admission. While our work is ongoing, my
remarks will focus on describing our results to date concerning:
* the extent to which overstaying occurs,
* weaknesses in the current overstay tracking system, and:
* potential impacts on domestic security.
In examining these issues, our main information sources include (1)
relevant GAO and other government reports, (2) interviews with
officials and staff at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the U.S. Department of Justice, and (3) a variety of data,
including quantitative data from DHS's overstay tracking system (based
on the I-94 form), data that DHS developed, at our request, from
Operation Tarmac (the sweep that identified overstays and other illegal
immigrants working at U.S. airports), and facts about the arrivals,
departures, and overstay status of the 9/11 hijackers and others
involved in terrorism.
Our scope did not include aspects of immigration or domestic security
unrelated to overstaying. While the vast majority of overstays appear
to be motivated by economic opportunities, the few who are potential
terrorists could represent a significant threat to our domestic
security. An effective strategy to address this risk is best developed
within the larger context of a layered defense for domestic security.
Intelligence, investigation, and information-sharing are key
ingredients supporting this defense, which is designed and implemented
by a wide range of agencies, including DHS, the Department of Justice,
the Department of State, and the Social Security Administration, among
others.
To summarize the results of our analysis of overstay issues and
domestic security, we found that:
* Overstaying is significant and may be understated by DHS's recent
estimate.
* The current system for tracking foreign visitors has several
weaknesses.
* It is more difficult to ensure our domestic security because of the
weaknesses in the tracking system and the level of overstaying that
apparently occurs.
Viewing these results in the context of our nation's layered defense,
we believe that improving the tracking system could work together with
other factors--especially intelligence, investigation, and
information-sharing--to help counter threats from foreign terrorists.
Background:
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come
to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--
that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a
specific date--either with temporary visas (generally for tourism,
business, or work) issued by the Department of State or, in some cases,
as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without
visas. The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from
27 countries who enter under the Visa Waiver Permanent
program.[Footnote 1] The large majority of these visitors depart on
time, but others overstay.
Our definition of an overstay in this testimony is specifically this:
An overstay is a foreign visitor who is legally admitted to the United
States for a specific authorized period and remains in the United
States after that period expires, unless an extension or a change of
status has been approved.
Although overstays are sometimes referred to as visa overstays, this is
technically a misnomer for two reasons. First, a visitor can overstay
the authorized period of admission set by the DHS inspector at the
border while still possessing a valid visa. (For example, a visitor
with a 6-month multiple-entry visa from the Department of State might
be issued a 6-week period of admission by the DHS inspector and remain
here for 7 weeks, thus overstaying.) Second, some visitors are allowed
to enter the United States without visas and to remain for specific
periods of time, which they may overstay.[Footnote 2]
Form I-94 is the basis of the current overstay tracking system. For
visitors from most countries, the period of admission is authorized (or
set) by a DHS inspector when they enter the United States legally and
fill out this form. Each visitor is to give the top half to the
inspector and to retain the bottom half, which should be collected on
his or her departure.
When visiting the United States for business or pleasure, two major
groups are exempt from filling out an I-94 form:
* Mexicans entering the United States with a Border Crossing Card (BCC)
at the Southwestern border who intend to limit their stay to less than
72 hours and not to travel beyond a set perimeter (generally, 25 miles
from the border)[Footnote 3] and:
* Canadians admitted for up to 6 months without a perimeter
restriction.[Footnote 4]
Thus, the majority of Canadian and Mexican visits cannot be tracked by
the current system, because the visitors have not filled out Form I-94.
Tracking should be possible for almost all other legal temporary
visitors, including visitors from visa waiver countries, because they
are required to fill out the form.
Terrorists might be better prevented from legally entering the United
States if consular officials and DHS inspectors used improved watch
lists to screen visa applicants and make border inspections. However,
some terrorists may continue to slip through these border defenses.
Keeping all dangerous persons and potential terrorist-suspects from
legally entering the United States is difficult because some do not
match the expected characteristics of terrorists or suspicious persons;
in addition, some may not be required to apply for visas (that is,
citizens of Canada or one of the 27 visa waiver countries).
Watch lists have been improved somewhat since 9/11, but further
improvements are needed. For example, earlier this year we reported
that the State Department "with the help of other agencies, almost
doubled the number of names and the amount of information" in its
Consular Lookout and Support System.[Footnote 5] We also reported that
"the federal watch list environment has been characterized by a
proliferation of [terrorist and watch list] systems, among which
information sharing is occurring in some cases but not in
others."[Footnote 6]
In this testimony today, we focus primarily on an overstay's illegal
presence within the United States and the potential consequences for
domestic security. Viewed in terms of individuals, the overstay process
can be summarized as aliens' (1) legally visiting the United States,
which for citizens of most nations is preceded by obtaining a passport
and a visa and requires filling out Form I-94 at the U.S. border; (2)
overstaying for a period that may range from a single day to weeks,
months, or years; and, in some cases, (3) terminating their overstay
status by exiting the United States or adjusting to legal permanent
resident status (that is, obtaining a green card).[Footnote 7] Beyond
that, the overstay process can be viewed more broadly in the context of
our nation's layered defense. For example, figure 1 illustrates many
issues in this defense that we have analyzed in numerous reports--
ranging from overseas tracking of terrorists to stateside security for
critical infrastructure locations and aviation.
Figure 1: The Layered Defense for Domestic Security:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Extent of Overstaying Is Significant and May Be Understated by
DHS's Estimate:
Significant numbers of visitors overstay their authorized periods of
admission. A recent DHS estimate put the January 2000 resident overstay
population at 1/3 of 7 million illegal immigrants, or 2.3
million.[Footnote 8] The method DHS used to obtain the 1/3 figure is
complex and indirect, and we plan to evaluate that estimate further.
However, the 2.3 million overstay estimate excludes specific groups,
and we believe, therefore, that it potentially understates the extent
of overstaying.
By definition, DHS's estimate of 2.3 million overstays as of January
2000 represents only a part of the total overstay problem. DHS's
estimate of 7 million illegal immigrants is limited to illegals who
settled and were residing here at the time of the 2000 census.[Footnote
9] It includes only overstays who were in the actual census count or
included in corrections for possible undercounts of illegal immigrants.
DHS's estimate of overstays as of January 2000 is not defined to
include the following groups:
* Visitors filling out Form I-94 who:
* overstay for short periods of time. Many such persons are not likely
to be included in the 2000 census, which is the starting point of DHS's
2.3 million estimate of the resident overstay population. In our
ongoing work, we will examine indicators of the magnitude, and
significance, of short-term overstaying among visitors who fill out I-
94 forms.
Mexican and Canadian visitors not filling out Form I-94 who:
* overstayed and settled here.[Footnote 10] Overstays in this group are
included in DHS's estimate of 7 million illegal immigrants, but they
are categorized as illegal immigrants other than overstays. This is
because DHS used I-94 data from the early 1990s and projected these
data forward to obtain the 1/3 overstay proportion.
* overstay for short periods. As indicated above, many short-term
overstays are not included in the 2000 census, which is the starting
point of DHS's 2.3 million estimate of the resident overstay
population.
These groups are illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2: Key Groups Covered and Not Covered by DHS's Overstay
Estimate:
[See PDF for image]
[A] During fiscal year 2001, nearly 33 million visits were tracked by
I-94 arrival forms. Of these tracked visits, 14 percent (about 4.6
million) were by Mexican and Canadian citizens.
[B] Aliens not tracked were mainly Canadian citizens or Mexican holders
of BCCs issued by the Department of State. During fiscal years 1999 to
2003, the Department of State issued 6.4 million Mexican BCCs.
According to unofficial DHS planning figures for fiscal year 2002,
there were approximately 156 million "inspections conducted" for visits
by visa-exempt aliens and aliens with Mexican BCCs at land border
crossings. (See Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Program
Overview (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).) DHS's Office of
Immigration Statistics told us that very few such visits are tracked by
the I-94 system. Because some persons may repeatedly visit the United
States, the number of persons inspected is less than the number of
inspections.
[End of figure]
In part because of coverage issues, the extent of overstaying has not
been definitively measured. In addition, the accuracy of DHS's estimate
of the resident overstay population is not known with
precision.[Footnote 11] Other limited data points may help illustrate
the possible magnitude.[Footnote 12]
For this testimony, we obtained two small-sample sources of data.
First, we identified a government-sponsored survey, reported in 2002,
that had (1) sampled more than 1,000 adult green-card holders, (2)
asked them about their prior immigration status, and (3) found that
more than 300 respondents self-reported prior illegal status.[Footnote
13] From the computer run we requested, we found that of the roughly
300 former illegals, about 1/3 said they were former overstays, with
most of the remaining 2/3 reporting prior illegal border
crossing.[Footnote 14]
Second, we obtained data from Operation Tarmac, the 2001-03 sweep of
airport employees who had access to sensitive areas. Although Operation
Tarmac investigators had collected information on overstaying, they did
not systematically record data for overstays versus illegal border
crossers. We requested that DHS manually review a sample of case files
and identify overstays. DHS reported to us that of 286 sampled cases in
which illegal immigrant airport workers (that is, overstays and illegal
border crossers) were arrested or scheduled for deportation, 124
workers, or about 40 percent, were overstays.
While both the survey data and the airport data represent rough small-
sample checks, they provide some additional support for concluding that
overstays are not rare.
Unresolved Tracking System Weaknesses Heighten the Overstay Problem:
I-94 Tracking System Weaknesses Limit Control Options:
One weakness in DHS's system for tracking the paper Form I-94--its
limited coverage of Mexican and Canadian visitors--was discussed in the
section above. In our previous work, we have pointed to at least three
other weaknesses in this tracking system:
* Failure to update the visitor's authorized period of admission or
immigration status. We reported earlier this year that DHS does not
"consistently enter change of status data . . . [or] integrate these
data with those for entry and departure."[Footnote 15] DHS told us that
linkage to obtain updated information may occur for an individual, as
when a consular official updates information on an earlier period of
admission for someone seeking a new visa, but DHS acknowledged that
linkage cannot be achieved broadly to yield an accurate list of
visitors who overstayed.
* Lack of reliable address information and inability to locate
visitors. Some visitors do not fill in destination address information
on Form I-94 or they do so inadequately. A related issue that we
reported in 2002 is DHS's inability to obtain updated address
information during each visitor's stay; such information could be a
valuable addition to the arrival, departure, and destination address
information that is collected.[Footnote 16]
* Missing departure forms. We reported in 1995 that "airlines are
responsible for collecting . . . departure forms when visitors leave
[by air]
* . . . . But for some visitors who may have actually left the United
States [there is no] record of the departures."[Footnote 17] DHS
acknowledges that this is still a concern, that the situation is
analogous for cruise lines, and that noncollection is a larger problem
for land exits.
Our recent work has also drawn attention to identity fraud,
demonstrating how persons presenting fraudulent documents (bearing a
name other than their own) to DHS inspectors could enter the United
States.[Footnote 18] Visitors whose fraudulent documents pass
inspection could record a name other than their own on their I-94 form.
In our current work, we have identified two further weaknesses in the
tracking system. One weakness is the inability to match some departure
forms back to corresponding arrival forms. DHS has suggested that when
a visitor loses the original departure form, matching is less certain
because it can no longer be based on identical numbers printed on the
top and bottom halves of the original form. The other weakness is that
at land ports (and possibly airports and seaports), the collection of
departure forms is vulnerable to manipulation--in other words, visitors
could make it appear that they had left when they had not. To
illustrate, on bridges where toll collectors accept I-94 departure
forms at the Southwestern border, a person departing the United States
by land could hand in someone else's I-94 form.
Because of these weaknesses, DHS has no accurate list of overstays to
send to consular officials or DHS inspectors. This limits DHS's ability
to consider past overstaying when issuing new visas or allowing
visitors to reenter.
More generally, the lack of an accurate list limits prevention and
enforcement options. For example, accurate data on overstays and other
visitors might help define patterns to better differentiate visa
applicants with higher overstay risk. And without an accurate list and
updated addresses, it is not possible to identify and locate new
overstays to remind them of penalties for not departing. Such efforts
fall under the category of interior enforcement: As we previously
testified, "historically . . . over five times more resources in terms
of staff and budget [have been devoted to] border enforcement than . .
. [to] interior enforcement."[Footnote 19] Despite large numbers of
overstays, current efforts to deport them are generally limited to (1)
criminals and smugglers, (2) employees identified as illegal at
critical infrastructure locations, and (3) persons included in special
control efforts such as the domestic registration (or "call in"
component) of the NSEERS program (the National Security Entry and Exit
Registration System).[Footnote 20] DHS statisticians told us that for
fiscal year 2002, the risk of arrest for all overstays was less than 2
percent.[Footnote 21] For most other overstays (that is, for persons
not in the targeted groups), the risk of deportation is considerably
lower.
The effect of tracking system weaknesses on overstay data is
illustrated by the inaccurate--and, according to DHS, inflated--lists
of what it terms "apparent overstays" and "confirmed overstays." For
fiscal year 2001 arrivals, the system yielded:
* a list of 6.5 million "apparent overstays" for which DHS had no
departure record that matched the arrivals and:
* an additional list of a half million "confirmed overstays," or visits
that ended after the visitors' initial periods of admission expired
(see appendixes I and II).
However, DHS has no way of knowing how many of the 6.5 million are real
cases of overstaying and how many are false (because some of these
visitors had, for example, departed or legally changed their status).
Even the half million "confirmed overstays" are not all true cases of
overstaying, because some visitors may have legally extended their
periods of admission.
In the past, we made a number of recommendations that directly or
indirectly address some of these system weaknesses, but these
recommendations have not been implemented or have been only partially
implemented. (Of these, four key recommendations are in appendix III.):
DHS Intends Its New Tracking Initiatives to Address System Weaknesses,
but Issues Remain:
DHS has begun two initiatives intended to remedy some of the weaknesses
we have discussed. DHS recently began, as part of NSEERS, an effort to
register visitors at points of entry (POE) to the United States,
conduct intermittent interviews with registered visitors while they are
here, and have government inspectors register departures. But the POE
effort does not cover most visitors because it focuses on persons born
in only eight countries.[Footnote 22] Moreover, NSEERS procedures do
not involve inspectors' observing departures--for example,
registration occurs not at airport departure gates but at another
location at the airport. Also, inspectors do not generally accompany
registrants to observe their boarding.[Footnote 23]
US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology,
is DHS's new tracking system intended to improve entry-exit data. The
first phase of US-VISIT, now being rolled out, uses passenger and crew
manifest data, as well as biometrics, to verify foreign visitors'
identities at airports and seaports. DHS plans three additional phases
and will link its data to other systems that contain data about foreign
nationals. If successfully designed and implemented, US-VISIT could
avoid many of the weaknesses associated with the Form I-94 system.
We believe special efforts are needed to ensure US-VISIT's success. DHS
concurred with our recent report, pointing to risks and the need for
improved management of US-VISIT. For example, we reported that, among
other issues, "important aspects defining the [US-VISIT] program's
operating environment are not yet decided [and its] facility needs are
unclear and challenging."[Footnote 24] Our recommendations included,
among others, that DHS develop acquisition management controls and a
risk management plan for US-VISIT, as well as defining performance
standards.
We also believe that checking US-VISIT's program design against the
weaknesses of the Form I-94 system, outlined here, might help in
evaluating the program and ensuring its success.
Overstay Issues May Complicate Efforts to Ensure Domestic Security:
Tracking System Weaknesses Encourage Overstays and Hamper Some
Counterterrorism Efforts:
Tracking system weaknesses may encourage overstaying on the part of
visitors and potential terrorists who legally enter the United States.
Once here, terrorists may overstay or use other stratagems--such as
exiting and reentering (to obtain a new authorized period of admission)
or applying for a change of status--to extend their stay. As shown in
table 1, three of the six pilots and apparent leaders were out of
status on or before 9/11, two because of short-term overstaying.
Table 1: Overstay and Other Immigration Status Data on 9/11 Terrorists:
Hijacker group: 6 pilots[A] and apparent leaders; Immigration status
issue: 2 prior overstays;[B]; 1 out-of-status student[C]; Entries: 18
total; (1 to 7 entries each); Change-of-status applications: 3.
Hijacker group: 13 other hijackers; Immigration status issue: 2
overstays; Entries: 13 total; (1 each); Change-of-status applications:
0.
Hijacker group: Total = 19 hijackers; Immigration status issue: 4
overstays total; 5 violations (including overstays and the out-of-
status student); Entries: 31 total; (from 1 to 7 entries each); Change-
of-status applications: 3 total; (0 to 1 each).
Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and GAO analysis.
Note: We define an overstay as a legally admitted foreign visitor who
remains even 1 day after his or her authorized period of admission
expires, if an extension or status change has not been approved.
[A] Pilots or co-pilots. (Three were both pilots, or co-pilots, and
apparent leaders.):
[B] The two prior overstays had remained here beyond their authorized
period of admission. They accrued days of overstay.
[C] Violated terms of student visa by not attending school.
[End of table]
Additionally, a current overstay recently pled guilty to identity
document fraud in connection with the 9/11 hijackers. Two others with a
history of overstaying were recently convicted of crimes connected to
terrorism (money-laundering and providing material support to
terrorists); both had overstayed for long periods.
Terrorists who enter as legal visitors are hidden within the much
larger populations of all legal visitors, overstays, and other illegals
such as border crossers. Improved tracking could help counterterrorism
investigators and prosecutors track them and prosecute them,
particularly in cases in which suspicious individuals are placed on
watch lists after they enter the country. The director of the Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force told us that he considered overstay
tracking data helpful. For example, these data--together with
additional analysis--can be important in quickly and efficiently
determining whether suspected terrorists were in the United States at
specific times.
As we reported earlier this year, between "September 11 and November 9,
2001 [that is, over the course of 2 months], . . . INS compiled a list
of aliens whose characteristics were similar to those of the hijackers"
in types of visa, countries issuing their passports, and dates of entry
into the United States.[Footnote 25] While the list of aliens was part
of an effort to identify and locate specific persons for investigative
interviews, it contained duplicate names and data entry errors. In
other words, poor data hampered the government's efforts to obtain
information in a national emergency, and investigators turned to
private sector information. Reporting earlier that INS data "could not
be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were of interest to the
United States," we had indicated that the Form I-94 system is relevant,
stressing the need for improved change-of-address notification
requirements.[Footnote 26] INS generally concurred with our findings.
Overstays' Employment in Sensitive Airport Jobs Illustrates Potential
Effects on Domestic Security:
DHS has declared that combating fraudulent employment at critical
infrastructures, such as airports, is a priority for domestic
security.[Footnote 27] DHS has planned and ongoing efforts to identify
illegal workers in key jobs at various infrastructures (for example,
airport workers with security badges). These sweeps are thought to
reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, because, as experts
have told us, (1) security badges issued on the basis of fraudulent IDs
constitute security breaches, and (2) overstays and other illegals
working in such facilities might be hesitant to report suspicious
activities for fear of drawing authorities' attention to themselves or
they might be vulnerable to compromise.
Operation Tarmac swept 106 airports and identified 4,271 illegal
immigrants who had misused Social Security numbers and identity
documents in obtaining airport jobs and security badges.[Footnote 28] A
much smaller number of airport employees had misrepresented their
criminal histories in order to obtain their jobs and badges. The
illegal immigrant workers with access to secure airport areas were
employed by airlines (for example, at Washington Dulles International
Airport and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, this included
American, Atlantic Coast, Delta, Northwest, and United Airlines as well
as SwissAir and British Airways) and by a variety of other companies
(for example, Federal Express and Ogden Services). Job descriptions
included, among others, aircraft maintenance technician, airline agent,
airline cabin service attendant, airplane fueler, baggage handler,
cargo operations manager, electrician, janitorial supervisor, member of
a cleaning crew, predeparture screener, ramp agent, and skycap.
In the large majority of these cases, identity fraud or counterfeit IDs
were involved; without fraud or counterfeit documents, illegal workers
would not have been able to obtain the jobs and badges allowing them
access to secure areas.[Footnote 29]
As we discussed earlier in this testimony, when we obtained data on the
specific immigration status of workers who were arrested or scheduled
for deportation at 14 Operation Tarmac airports, we found that a
substantial number were overstays. A DHS official told us that
Operation Tarmac is likely not to have identified all illegal aliens
working in secure areas of airports.
Conclusion:
Weaknesses in DHS's current overstay tracking system and the magnitude
of the overstay problem make it more difficult to ensure domestic
security. DHS has recently initiated two efforts to develop improved
systems, but challenges remain. Designing and implementing a viable and
effective tracking system is a critical component of the nation's
domestic security and continues to be a DHS priority. Viewing our
results in the context of our nation's layered defense, we believe that
improvements in the tracking system must work together with other
factors--such as intelligence, investigation, and information-sharing-
-to help ensure domestic security.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond
to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.
For information regarding this testimony, please contact Nancy R.
Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods, on 202-512-
2700. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are
Donna Heivilin, Judy Droitcour, Daniel Rodriguez, and Eric M. Larson.
[End of section]
Appendix I: I-94 Data: Number of Foreign Visitor Arrivals by Air, Sea,
and Land and "Overstay Cases," Fiscal Year 2001:
Mode of arrival: Air and sea; Annual arrivals[A]: 29,688,000; Annual
"overstay cases": (a mixture of real and false cases): "Apparent":
nondepartures[B]: 4,349,000; Annual "overstay cases": "Confirmed":
late departures[C]: 212,000; Annual "overstay cases": Total "overstay
cases": 4,561,000.
Mode of arrival: Land; Annual arrivals[A]: 3,109,000; Annual "overstay
cases": (a mixture of real and false cases): "Apparent":
nondepartures[B]: 2,217,000; Annual "overstay cases": "Confirmed":
late departures[C]: 231,000; Annual "overstay cases": Total "overstay
cases": 2,448,000.
Mode of arrival: All modes; Annual arrivals[A]: 32,799,000; Annual
"overstay cases": (a mixture of real and false cases): "Apparent":
nondepartures[B]: 6,566,000; Annual "overstay cases": "Confirmed":
late departures[C]: 443,000; Annual "overstay cases": Total "overstay
cases": 7,010,000.
Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics, and GAO analysis.
Note: Includes visitors' arrivals October 2000 through September 2001
and their departures through January and February 2002. Arrival data
represent arrivals rather than the number of visitors who arrived; that
is, the data do not correct for multiple entries, and possibly multiple
exits, by the same person. Figures may not sum because of rounding and
because the "all modes" category includes some visits for which the
mode of arrival is not known.
[A] Excludes many Mexicans and Canadians who, visiting for business and
pleasure, are exempt from Form I-94 procedures.
[B] Includes cases in which no departure form could be matched to the
arrival form (including some departing visitors who had lost their
departure forms and filled out another form that could not be matched
to their arrival form).
[C] Includes some departing visitors who had extended their stay or
adjusted their status.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: I-94 Data: "Overstay Cases" (A Mix of Real and False Cases)
by Mode of Arrival and Citizenship, Fiscal Year 2001:
Citzenship group: Mexico[C]; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors
who arrived by: Air and sea: 446,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: Land: 1,825,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A]
for visitors who arrived by: All modes: 2,270,000; "Confirmed"
late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 18,000;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Land:
222,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by:
All modes: 240,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who
arrived by: Air and sea: 463,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors
who arrived by: Land: 2,046,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors
who arrived by: All modes: 2,510,000.
Citzenship group: Canada[C]; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors
who arrived by: Air and sea: 45,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: Land: 41,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: All modes: 86,000; "Confirmed" late
departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 1,000;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Land:
2,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: All
modes: 3,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived
by: Air and sea: 46,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who
arrived by: Land: 43,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who
arrived by: All modes: 89,000.
Citzenship group: Countries in visa waiver program[D]; "Apparent"
nondepartures[A] for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 1,963,000;
"Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors who arrived by: Land: 207,000;
"Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors who arrived by: All modes:
2,171,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who
arrived by: Air and sea: 62,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for
visitors who arrived by: Land: 4,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B]
for visitors who arrived by: All modes: 66,000; Total
"overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 2,025,000;
Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by: Land: 210,000;
Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by: All modes:
2,236,000.
Citzenship group: Countries subsequently listed in the NSEERS domestic
registration program[E]; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors who
arrived by: Air and sea: 103,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: Land: 12,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: All modes: 115,000; "Confirmed" late
departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 7,000;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Land: --;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: All modes:
8,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by: Air
and sea: 110,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by:
Land: 13,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by: All
modes: 123,000.
Citzenship group: Rest of world; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 1,793,000; "Apparent"
nondepartures[A] for visitors who arrived by: Land: 132,000; "Apparent"
nondepartures[A] for visitors who arrived by: All modes: 1,924,000;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by:
Air and sea: 123,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who
arrived by: Land: 4,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors
who arrived by: All modes: 128,000; Total "overstay cases" for
visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 1,916,000; Total "overstay cases"
for visitors who arrived by: Land: 136,000; Total "overstay cases" for
visitors who arrived by: All modes: 2,052,000.
Citzenship group: Total; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for visitors who
arrived by: Air and sea: 4,349,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A] for
visitors who arrived by: Land: 2,217,000; "Apparent" nondepartures[A]
for visitors who arrived by: All modes: 6,566,000; "Confirmed"
late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Air and sea: 212,000;
"Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by: Land:
231,000; "Confirmed" late departures[B] for visitors who arrived by:
All modes: 443,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors who
arrived by: Air and sea: 4,561,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors
who arrived by: Land: 2,448,000; Total "overstay cases" for visitors
who arrived by: All modes: 7,010,000.
Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics, and GAO analysis.
Note: Includes visitors' arrivals October 2000 through September 2001
and their departures through January and February 2002. Arrival data
represent arrivals rather than the number of visitors who arrived; that
is, the data do not correct for multiple entries, and possibly multiple
exits, by the same person. Figures may not sum because of rounding and
because the "all modes" category includes some visits for which the
mode of arrival is not known.
[A] Includes cases in which no departure form could be matched to the
arrival form (including some departing visitors who had lost their
departure forms and filled out another form that could not be matched
to their arrival form).
[B] Includes some departing visitors who had extended their stay or
adjusted their status.
[C] Excludes many Mexicans or Canadians who, visiting for business and
pleasure, are exempt from Form I-94 procedures.
[D] Most, but not all, visitors from Permanent Visa Waiver countries
enter under this program. Visa waiver countries in this tally are
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,
Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
(Excludes Argentina and Uruguay, which were visa waiver countries in
fiscal year 2001.):
[E] The 25 countries in the NSEERS domestic registration program
include (1) 8 countries also subject to point-of-entry (POE)
registration (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen) and (2) 17 other countries (Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, and United Arab
Emirates). The 123,000 total "overstay cases" (all modes of arrival)
from these countries in fiscal year 2001 include approximately 49,000
cases from the countries subject to POE registration and approximately
73,000 cases from the other countries, excluding North Korea. The data
exclude North Korea from the NSEERS countries tally because DHS did not
provide information separately for North and South Korea.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Four Prior Recommendations to INS/DHS Related to Overstay
Tracking, Data, or Estimates:
1. We recommended that to improve the collection of departure forms,
the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service should
ensure that INS examine the quality control of the Nonimmigrant
Information System database and determine why departure forms are not
being recorded. For example, this could involve examining a sample of
the passenger manifest lists of flights with foreign destinations to
determine the extent of airline compliance and possibly developing
penalties on airlines for noncompliance. Discovery of the incidence of
various causes of departure loss could allow more precise estimation of
their occurrence and development of possible remedies. (U.S. General
Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current
Methods Provide Better Population Estimates, GAO/PEMD-93-25
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 1993).):
INS agreed in principle with our recommendation to study why departure
forms are not being collected and subsequently initiated a pilot
project that was criticized by the Department of Justice Inspector
General and then discontinued. DHS has not told us of any further
efforts to study or determine why departure forms are not being
collected.
2. We recommended that the Commissioner of INS should have new overstay
estimates prepared for air arrivals from all countries, using improved
estimation procedures such as those discussed in this report,
including, as appropriate, the potential improvements suggested by INS
or by reviewers of this report. (U.S. General Accounting Office,
Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement,
GAO/PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995).):
INS initially concurred and produced revised estimates as part of its
comments on our report. However, in our response to INS's comments, we
described the new estimates as a "first step" and identified concerns
about INS's methodological procedures that we said needed further
study. DHS told us that it has not further studied making overstay
estimates by air arrivals. Valid estimation of overstays is extremely
difficult, given current tracking system weaknesses.
3. We recommended that to promote compliance with the change of address
notification requirements through publicity and enforcement and to
improve the reliability of its alien address data, the Attorney General
should direct the INS Commissioner to identify and implement an
effective means to publicize the change of address notification
requirement nationwide. INS should make sure that, as part of its
publicity effort, aliens are provided with information on how to comply
with this requirement, including where information may be available and
the location of change of address forms. (U.S. General Accounting
Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens because It
Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO-03-188 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
21, 2002).):
INS/DHS concurred with this recommendation and has identified it as a
long-term strategy that will require 2 years to fully implement. It has
been less than a year since we made this recommendation, and thus there
has not been sufficient time for DHS to implement it fully or for us to
review that implementation.
4. We recommended that to provide better information on H-1B workers
and their status changes, the Secretary of DHS take actions to ensure
that information on prior visa status and occupations for permanent
residents and other employment-related visa holders is consistently
entered into current tracking systems and that such information become
integrated with entry and departure information when planned tracking
systems are complete. (U.S. General Accounting Office, H-1B Foreign
Workers: Better Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B Program's
Effects on U.S. Workforce, GAO-03-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2003).):
DHS concurred with this recommendation, made just a month ago.
Sufficient time has not elapsed for DHS to implement this
recommendation.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Visa Waiver Permanent program allows visitors from 27 countries
to enter the United States without visas for up to 90 days for business
or pleasure; the majority of visitors from these countries do enter
under the visa waiver program. (The countries are listed in appendix
II.)
[2] For example, Canadians are allowed to enter without visas for
purposes of business or pleasure and to remain for up to 6 months.
[3] The Department of State considers the Mexican BCC, termed a B-1/B-
2 Visa and Border Crossing Card, to be (1) a visa authorizing its
holder to be lawfully admitted to the United States temporarily for
business or pleasure (for example, as a tourist), as well as (2) a BCC
(that is, used with the 72-hour and perimeter limits). When the card is
used as a visa, Form I-94 must be completed. It should also be noted
that DHS inspectors may, at their discretion, require any Mexican using
the card as a BCC to fill out Form I-94 as a condition of admission and
that Form I-94 is required for visits that exceed 72 hours or include
travel beyond the general 25-mile limit (in some cases in Arizona,
travel up to 75 miles from the border is allowed).
[4] DHS inspectors may, at their discretion, require any such Canadian
to fill out Form I-94.
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process,
GAO-03-1013T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003), p. 3.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist
Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and
Sharing, GAO-03-322 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003), p. 28.
[7] In general, aliens who are present illegally in the United States
are prohibited from obtaining green cards by adjusting, while here, to
permanent resident alien (legal immigrant) status. There are
exceptions; for example, this prohibition was waived for certain aliens
who applied for such adjustment between 1994 and 2001 under §245(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.
[8] The other two-thirds were generally categorized as illegal border
crossers (see U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of
Policy and Planning, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
2003)).
[9] Essentially, DHS's estimate of 7 million illegal residents is based
on subtracting foreign-born persons here legally (who are reflected in
statistical immigration records) from census counts of total foreign-
born; subtraction is carried out separately for annual cohorts of
arrivals in the United States.
[10] As we noted previously, the majority of Mexican and Canadian
visits do not require Form I-94.
[11] We identified challenges and potential weaknesses in INS's
previous estimates of overstays in U.S. General Accounting Office,
Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement,
GAO/PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995). We note that INS's
previous estimates were higher than 1/3. INS testified in 1999 that
overstays constituted 40 to 50 percent of that population (see Michael
D. Cronin, Acting Associate Commissioner, Programs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Testimony Regarding Nonimmigrant Overstays
before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House Judiciary
Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1999).
[12] Earlier reports from INS and the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice indicated that overstays constituted substantial
percentages of groups of illegal residents who legalized their status.
See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration Reform and
Control Act: Report of the Legalized Alien Population (Washington,
D.C.: 1992), and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector
General, Immigration and Naturalization Service Monitoring of
Nonimmigrant Overstays, report I-97-08 (Washington, D.C.: 1997).
[13] The survey was sponsored by DHS and the National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development, in partnership with other federal
agencies. The sample was drawn from nearly 150,000 adults who had
obtained their green cards in July and August 1996 (see Douglas S.
Massey and Nolan Malone, "Pathways to Legal Immigration," Population
Research and Policy Review 21 (2002): 473-504).
[14] As previously noted, in general, aliens who are present illegally
in the United States are prohibited from obtaining green cards by
adjusting, while here, to permanent resident alien (legal immigrant)
status. There are exceptions; for example, this prohibition was waived
for certain aliens from 1994 to 2001 under §245(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, H-1B Foreign Workers: Better
Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B Program's Effects on U.S.
Workforce, GAO-03-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003), p. 5. See
also U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot
Locate Many Aliens because It Lacks Reliable Address Information,
GAO-03-188 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2002).
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration, GAO/
PEMD-95-20, p. 2. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal
Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better
Population Estimates, GAO/PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 1993).
[18] Our investigators have tested DHS inspectors by using counterfeit
driver's licenses and fictitious names to enter the United States from
Barbados, Canada, Jamaica, and Mexico; DHS did not question the
authenticity of the counterfeit documents (see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud
Raise Security Concerns, GAO-03-1147T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2003).)
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Challenges to
Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy,
GAO-03-660T, statement by Richard M. Stana before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003), p. 1.
[20] NSEERS domestic registration has required selected groups of
aliens from a number of countries to register with immigration
authorities; for a subset of these countries, special registration at
the point of entry is required for arriving visitors.
[21] They calculated this by counting arrests for all legal visitors
and overstays, including the targeted groups, and dividing by DHS's
estimate of the resident overstay population.
[22] The eight NSEERS POE registration countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Seventeen additional
countries (listed in appendix II) are included in the NSEERS domestic
registration component of this program.
[23] It is also possible for NSEERS registrants to exit without
registering, although there are penalties for doing so.
[24] Highlights page in U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland
Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program
Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).
[25] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Justice
Department's Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001,
GAO-03-459 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003). In that report, we also
reviewed other problems with the post-9/11 interviewing initiative.
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot
Locate, GAO-03-188.
[27] After 9/11, DHS shifted its interior enforcement focus to jobs
with access to sensitive, critical-infrastructure areas.
[28] Such employees must have a security badge to work in (or escort
others into) a secure area.
[29] Efforts to combat domestic identity fraud are part of our nation's
layered defense, and we have testified that "identity theft is a major
facilitator of international terrorism" (see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal
Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002), p. 9).
