Aviation Security
Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed Gao ID: GAO-04-242 November 19, 2003To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service within the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Between November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer than 50 air marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include the protection of domestic as well as international flights. In March 2003, the Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from TSA and merged into DHS's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management control issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the Service, specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures and training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and (3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE.
To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited procedures to obtain interim secret security clearances for air marshal candidates and provided abbreviated training for them. These procedures allowed candidates with interim clearances to work until they received their final top-secret clearances. Because of a governmentwide demand for clearances, nearly a quarter of the active air marshals had not received their top-secret clearances as of July 2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were awaiting their top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before the Deputy Secretary's deployment deadline, the Service incrementally revised and abbreviated its curriculum. The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has not yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual system for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals' fatigue. In addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security incidents and on air marshals' reasons for separation from the Service to improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of this information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-up. Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support its expansion. The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its roles, responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for coordinating with TSA's security organizations, as well as administrative changes. GAO's recent work on mergers and organizational transformations proposes several key practices--set implementation goals, establish a communication strategy, and involve employees to obtain their ideas--and associated implementation steps that could help the Service implement such changes.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-242, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
November 2003:
Aviation Security:
Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded
Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed:
GAO-04-242:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-242, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the
Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service
within the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Between November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer
than 50 air marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include
the protection of domestic as well as international flights. In March
2003, the Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of
Homeland Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from
TSA and merged into DHS‘s Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management control
issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the Service,
specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures and
training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and
(3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE.
What GAO Found:
To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by
the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited
procedures to obtain interim secret security clearances for air
marshal candidates and provided abbreviated training for them. These
procedures allowed candidates with interim clearances to work until
they received their final top-secret clearances. Because of a
governmentwide demand for clearances, nearly a quarter of the active
air marshals had not received their top-secret clearances as of July
2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were awaiting their
top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before the
Deputy Secretary‘s deployment deadline, the Service incrementally
revised and abbreviated its curriculum.
The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and
procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has
not yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual
system for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has
not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of
its scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals‘ fatigue. In
addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security
incidents and on air marshals‘ reasons for separation from the Service
to improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of
this information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-
up. Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support
its expansion.
The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes
resulting from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its
roles, responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for
coordinating with TSA‘s security organizations, as well as
administrative changes. GAO‘s recent work on mergers and
organizational transformations proposes several key practices”set
implementation goals, establish a communication strategy, and involve
employees to obtain their ideas”and associated implementation steps
that could help the Service implement such changes.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations designed to improve the Service‘s data
on flight duty and information on separations. DHS agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations and expressed a commitment to continuous improvement
as the Service moves forward.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-242.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham
at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet
the Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline:
Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace
with Expanded Operations:
Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger
Implementation Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service:
Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field
Offices and Training Facility:
Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September
2001 through October 2002:
Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals,
by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 --September 16, 2003:
Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations:
Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by
Percentage, as of August 2003.
Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage,
as of August 2003.
Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage,
as of August 2003.
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
IG: Inspector General:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
LEAP: law enforcement availability pay:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
PDA: personal digital assistants:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 19, 2003:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Diane E. Watson:
House of Representatives:
Within 10 months of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States, the number of federal air marshals grew from fewer than
50 to thousands;[Footnote 1] and within 2 years, the Federal Air
Marshal Service (the Service) underwent three organizational transfers.
More specifically, the Congress, through a provision of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, enacted on November 19, 2001,[Footnote
2] authorized a dramatic expansion of the Service's mission and
workforce and transferred authority over the Service from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Under this legislation, the Service's mission
grew from preventing hijackings on international flights to protecting
passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities on both
domestic and international flights. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary
of Transportation set a goal of hiring, training, and deploying
thousands of new air marshals by July 1, 2002. After the passage of the
Homeland Security Act, the Service moved with TSA from the Department
of Transportation (DOT) to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003. Finally, in September 2003, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the Service would be
transferred from TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), another law enforcement agency within the new
department. Following this transfer, which was supposed to take place
on November 2, 2003, the Secretary said that the Bureau's three law
enforcement workforces--air marshals, immigration agents, and customs
agents--would be cross-trained to create a "surge capacity" for
responding to security threats.
The rapid expansion of the Service led to a number of operational and
management control issues, which surfaced in national media reports of
allegations that the Service conducted inadequate background checks on
newly hired air marshals, slashed its training program to expedite the
air marshals' deployment, and failed to meet the needs of its air
marshal workforce. For example, the Service allegedly over-or
underscheduled air marshals for flight duty and reneged on promises of
transfers to alternative locations, thereby creating dissatisfaction
with the Service that, according to some reports, led to a flood of air
marshal resignations.
Within the context of these allegations, our objective was to look at
operational and management control issues related to the Service's
expansion. We also considered implications of the Service's
organizational realignment. Specifically, as agreed with your offices,
we addressed the following questions:
* What procedures for obtaining background checks and providing
training did the Service use to expedite the deployment of its expanded
workforce to meet the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline?
* To what extent has the Service developed management information and
policies and procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce?
* What challenges is the Service likely to face as a result of its
recent mergers into DHS and ICE?
To answer these questions, we analyzed program data; interviewed
Service and TSA officials; and reviewed documentation from the Service
and TSA on background checks and training; scheduling, mission
incidents, employee misconduct, and separations; and reviewed several
workforce policies and procedures. We also visited several facilities
to look at the Service's operational and management control practices
and documents, including the Federal Air Marshal training facility and
Human Resource Center in New Jersey, the Federal Air Marshal
headquarters office in Virginia, the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in New Mexico, and the Federal Air Marshal field office in
Texas. To guide our assessment of the Service's training, management
information, and policies and procedures, we reviewed key GAO documents
on internal controls and human capital management. These include our
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-
21.3.1, November 1999), Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool
(GAO-01-1008G, August 2001), Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing
Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government
(GAO-03-893G, July 2003), and Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management (GAO-02-373SP, March 2002). In addition, we used our report,
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations (GAO-03-669, July 2003), to provide a
framework for evaluating the Service's challenges in merging into DHS.
We also reviewed a March 2003 report by the DOT Inspector General (IG),
which evaluated the Service's selection and hiring process, training
program, and scheduling process. Finally, we discussed the
governmentwide background investigation process with the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). Our analysis of the operational and
management control issues related to the Service's expansion focuses
primarily on the period from November 2001 through September 2003, when
the Service was part of TSA; our assessment of the challenges related
to the Service's mergers is, in part, prospective. We conducted our
review from September 2002 through October 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for a
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The Service used expedited procedures for obtaining background checks
and abbreviated the training for air marshals so that it could deploy
its expanded workforce by the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline.
Under the expedited background check procedures, which other federal
agencies also often use, candidates who pass preliminary background
checks are able, within about 24 hours, to obtain interim secret
security clearances that allow them to work until their full background
checks are completed. Thousands of candidates underwent preliminary
background checks, and the majority of them obtained interim security
clearances. Obtaining final top-secret clearances has taken longer--
sometimes up to a year--and as of July 2003, nearly a quarter of the
active air marshals were still operating under interim clearances. By
October 2003, about 3 percent of active air marshals were still
awaiting their top-secret clearances. OPM attributed the delays to the
governmentwide demand for security clearances after September 11, 2001.
To deploy the necessary number of air marshal candidates by the Deputy
Secretary's deadline, the Service identified the skills critical for
initial deployment and incrementally revised and abbreviated its
training curriculum between October 2001 and July 2002. Then, to ensure
that all newly hired air marshals were provided with training in
advanced skills, the Service established an additional 4-week course
and required all candidates hired after October 2001 to complete the
training by mid-2004. It is unclear how the Service's transfer to the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement will affect this
requirement.
The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and
procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce, but it has
not yet completed this major effort. For example, it has replaced the
manual system that it formerly used to schedule fewer than 50 air
marshals for flight duty with an automated system that it can use to
schedule thousands of air marshals on thousands of flights; however, it
has not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness
of controls designed to prevent overscheduling so that air marshals do
not become fatigued. Preventing fatigue is important because, if air
marshals are not alert, their ability to carry out their mission may be
diminished. The Service has made effective use of some management
information--by, for example, establishing a liaison with the airlines
after air marshals' mission reports indicated problems with
coordination and communication. However, supervisors' summaries of air
marshals' reasons for separating--as of July 2003, about 10 percent of
newly hired marshals had separated--are not detailed enough for
management to identify and respond to specific problems, such as
dissatisfaction with the Service's transfer policy. The Service
initially lacked a means of obtaining input from its employees for use
in improving its operations and management, but it has started to
implement such processes. Finally, the Service has implemented policies
and procedures needed to support its expansion from a single office
with a budget of about $4.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to an
organization with 21 field offices and a budget of $545 million in
fiscal year 2003. For example, it implemented a policy on transfers
between field offices and issued a written dress code policy. We are
recommending that the Service automate the comparison of actual hours
worked with scheduled hours to monitor the effectiveness of its
scheduling controls and develop improved information on air marshals'
reasons for separation. The Department of Homeland Security agreed that
information on actual hours worked should be automated and acknowledged
a need to improve the quality of the information the Service collects
from departing air marshals.
The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes
resulting from its mergers into the new Department of Homeland Security
in March 2003 and into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in November 2003. While the new department, within the
context of guidance from the Congress and the administration, is
primarily responsible for determining what changes will occur, the
Service is responsible for implementing them. At this time, changes are
likely in the roles, responsibilities, and training of air marshals,
assuming that the Secretary of Homeland Security's plan to cross-train
the Bureau's three law enforcement workforces is implemented so that
each group can perform the others' responsibilities. Developing
procedures for coordinating with TSA will also be important to help
ensure a comprehensive, unified approach to aviation security, now that
the Service is separated organizationally from the other groups with
aviation security functions in TSA. Finally, changes will be needed to
resolve differences in the pay systems and compensation of air
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents. Our recent work on
mergers and organizational transformations proposes several key
practices--setting implementation goals and a time line to build
momentum and show progress from day one, establishing a communication
strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, and
involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for
the transformation--and associated implementation steps that can assist
the Service as it addresses the challenges in merging into the
department and the Bureau. In an earlier report, we recommended these
and other key practices to the department.[Footnote 3]
Background:
FAA's Federal Air Marshal program expanded the Sky Marshal program,
which was established as part of the Customs Service in the 1970s to
deter hijackings to and from Cuba. Shortly after TWA Flight 847 was
hijacked in Athens, Greece, in June 1985, then President Ronald Reagan
called for an expansion of the Sky Marshal program. On August 8, 1985,
the Congress enacted the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act,[Footnote 4] which established the statutory basis for
the program within DOT, which further delegated the responsibility to
FAA.[Footnote 5] Since then, the Federal Air Marshal program has
provided specially trained, armed teams of civil aviation security
specialists for deployment worldwide on antihijacking missions.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the President and the
Congress decided to rapidly expand the Service. On September 17, 2001,
FAA began to develop a plan to recruit federal air marshals in
unprecedented numbers. Accordingly, FAA designed a process and put
together a team of specialists, incorporating resources from its Human
Resource Management, Aviation Medical, Civil Aviation Security, and
Federal Air Marshal Training organizations to implement the recruitment
process. The process was designed to ensure that each air marshal
candidate met the medical entry standards, passed DOT's drug-testing
program, and was preliminarily judged suitable to obtain a top-secret
clearance, which is required for permanent employment with the Service.
As part of the assessment, each candidate was required to participate
in a security interview with an investigator from FAA, OPM, or the U.S.
Investigative Services (an OPM contractor[Footnote 6]), as well as
interviews with representatives of FAA's Office of Human Resource
Management and the Service. In October 2001, FAA implemented this
recruitment process, and the Deputy Secretary of Transportation also
set July 1, 2002, as the deadline for recruiting, hiring, and training
enough federal air marshals to provide coverage on flights that posed
high security risks. In November 2001, after the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act was passed, TSA assumed FAA's
responsibilities for aviation security and supported FAA's recruitment
effort through July 2002.
Between October 2001 and July 2002, TSA received nearly 200,000
applications for federal air marshal positions. Thousands of applicants
were assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full
background investigations for top-secret clearances. Other federal
agencies also made law enforcement officers available to augment the
Service until TSA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes
of new air marshals. See appendix II for a demographic profile of the
Service's expanded workforce.
With expansion, the Service's annual budget grew from $4.4 million for
fiscal year 2001 to $545 million for fiscal year 2003. Currently, the
Service operates a headquarters office in Virginia, 21 field offices,
and a specialized air marshal training and human resource facility in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. Basic law enforcement training takes place
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico.
See appendix III for a map of these facilities and appendix IV for a
time line of the major organizational events affecting the Service
since September 11, 2001.
DHS brings together some 23 federal agencies comprising over 100
organizations, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, in what the
department describes as the most significant transformation of the U.S.
government since the merger in 1947 of the various branches of the
armed forces into the Department of Defense. DHS is divided into five
directorates, one of which, Border and Transportation Security,
includes both TSA and ICE. Among other organizations, ICE includes a
portion of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, now
called the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S.
Customs Service now called Customs and Border Protection; and, as of
November 2, 2003, the Federal Air Marshal Service.
Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet
the Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline:
To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service
obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated
training before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. As a
result, the Service was able to meet the Deputy Secretary's deployment
deadline and carry out its mission.
Initial Deployment Was Swift, but Completion of Final Background
Investigations Has Been Slow:
To deploy its expanded workforce as quickly as possible between October
2001 and June 2002, the Service followed the same expedited background
check procedures that federal agencies have used since 1995, when
Executive Order 12968 authorized the temporary use of interim security
clearances.[Footnote 7] Under these procedures, candidates who require
security clearances and pass preliminary background checks may, within
about 24 hours, obtain interim security clearances that allow them to
work until their full background checks have been completed and they
obtain their final clearances. A preliminary background check consists
of an interview with a security specialist; a review of an applicant's
responses to a standard questionnaire for national security positions;
a criminal history check, based on fingerprints and a review of
biographical data from National Crime Information Center
files;[Footnote 8] and credit reports. An interim security clearance
may be revoked at any time if unfavorable information is identified
during an investigation.
Between October 2001 and July 2002, thousands of candidates were
assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full
background investigations for top-secret clearances. According to TSA
management, the majority of the candidates passed the preliminary
background checks and obtained interim security clearances that allowed
them to work while their full background checks were being completed.
Less than a quarter of the candidates did not pass the preliminary
checks because of bankruptcy, bad credit, or other problems. TSA placed
these candidates on a "pending/ready" list and did not allow them to
work as air marshals, but it pursued full background investigations for
them because many of the issues identified during preliminary
background checks are minor and are favorably resolved during full
background investigations. Full background checks for thousands of
candidates identified a small number as unsuitable. In June 2003, the
Service placed 80 air marshal candidates on administrative leave while
TSA resolved issues that surfaced during full background
investigations. By August 2003, 47 of these candidates had received
their top-secret clearances and have since been returned to flight
status. Of the 33 remaining candidates, 19 have been denied clearances,
and the Service is taking steps to terminate their employment; 4 have
been approved for, but have not yet received, top-secret clearances; 7
have resigned; and the remaining 3 are awaiting TSA's approval of their
top-secret clearances. The Service said it has continued to identify
some candidates as unsuitable, and as of October 2003, 14 air marshals
were on administrative leave because of issues that surfaced during
full background checks. When definitive information for each of these
cases is obtained, the Service said, the air marshal would be returned
to flight status or steps would be taken to terminate the air marshal's
employment.
During our review, we found that the background investigations used to
grant top-secret clearances for air marshals were not being expedited
as requested. According to TSA, an expedited background investigation
costs $3,195 and should be completed within 75 days, whereas a regular
background check costs $2,700 and should be completed within 120 days.
Consequently, for every 1,000 background investigations, the Service
paid a premium of about $495,000. TSA paid the expedited fees to OPM up
front, as required,[Footnote 9] but as of July 2003, about 23 percent
of the air marshals were still operating under interim security
clearances.[Footnote 10] Some candidates had been awaiting final
clearances for up to a year. The Service told us in April 2003 that it
had, on numerous occasions, raised concerns about the delays in
processing final security clearances but had met with little success.
Additionally, the Service said that its efforts to reclaim the
difference in cost were unsuccessful. DHS said that TSA's Credentialing
Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air
marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October
2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under
interim security clearances.
According to OPM, the primary reason for these clearance-processing
delays is that the agency has received an unprecedented number of
requests for background investigations governmentwide since September
2001.[Footnote 11] For fiscal year 2002, OPM's data indicated that the
average processing time for 75-day expedited background checks was 96
days. OPM said that the expedited requests received higher-priority
processing than the regular (120-day) background checks, resulting in
faster turnaround for services related to the expedited requests. OPM
added that its contractor charges premiums for expedited requests
because the costs for these requests are higher. Consequently,
according to OPM, no price adjustments are made when overall deadlines
are missed.
While the Service is not responsible for the delays in completing air
marshals' full background investigations, we found that it could have
provided OPM with information for scheduling the investigations more
efficiently. As candidates applied for positions between October 2001
and June 2002 and their preliminary background checks were completed,
the Service offered conditional employment to some of the candidates
and, as discussed, placed others on a "pending/ready" list. However,
the Service did not make this information available to OPM. As a
result, some potential employees received their top-secret clearances
ahead of other candidates who were being trained or deployed on
flights.[Footnote 12] We brought this issue to the attention of the
Service in March 2003; and in May, the Service sent OPM a list of
candidates and asked OPM to give highest priority to investigations of
those who were already deployed on flights. In addition, the Service
has asked OPM to schedule the investigations for senior managers first
and then to schedule investigations for other applicants on a first-in,
first-out basis. On May 28, 2003, the Service also detailed a liaison
from its Office of Field Operations to assist TSA's Office of Security
in setting priorities for reviewing and adjudicating the backlog of
background investigations.
Changes to the Training Curriculum Helped Expedite Deployment:
To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy
Secretary's July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its
training program. From October 2001 through July 2002, it modified the
air marshal curriculum incrementally, eventually reducing the original
14-week program to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law
enforcement experience and about 1 week for candidates with such
experience. The revised curriculum was designed to provide candidates
with the basic law enforcement knowledge, skills, and abilities needed
to perform their duties as air marshals, including knowledge of the
Service's rules and regulations, physical skills, and basic and
advanced marksmanship. The curriculum no longer included certain
elements of the original training program, such as driving skills and
cockpit familiarization, because these were not deemed critical for air
marshals to perform their duties. The curriculum also eliminated a 1-
week's visit to an airline and some instruction in the Service's
policies and procedures, which was to be provided on the job. Moreover,
although the curriculum retained instruction in both basic and advanced
marksmanship, air marshal candidates no longer had to pass an advanced
marksmanship test to qualify for employment. Candidates were still
required to pass a basic test[Footnote 13] with a minimum score of 255
out of a possible 300--the highest qualification standard for any
federal law enforcement agency, according to the Service.
To provide all the newly hired air marshals with needed skills, beyond
the basic abilities the Service determined were critical for immediate
deployment, the Service instituted a new 4-week advanced training
course in October 2002. All air marshals hired from October 2001
through July 2002, regardless of their previous law enforcement
experience, were required to complete the course by January 2004. This
course includes some elements, such as emergency evacuation and flight
simulator training, that the Service did not include in the 5-week
course because, although it considered the elements important for air
marshals to carry out their mission, it did not consider them critical
for immediate deployment. In addition, the course provides further
training in advanced marksmanship skills. Air marshals hired after
August 2002 attend this advanced training course after completing their
basic training. The Service has developed a centralized tracking system
to ensure that all air marshals take this course.
Although the Service is now providing additional marksmanship training,
its decision not to restore the advanced marksmanship test[Footnote 14]
as a qualification standard for employment has proved controversial.
Passing this test would require candidates to demonstrate their speed
and accuracy in a confined environment similar to the environment on
board an aircraft. The DOT IG's report suggested that the Service
needed to adopt a firearms qualification standard that was more
stringent and comprehensive than the basic firearms qualifying test.
The Service disagreed, emphasizing that its minimum score is the most
stringent in federal law enforcement and adding that its 4-week course
provides further training in advanced firearms skills. Our review of
the Service's documentation confirmed that instruction in advanced
marksmanship is a critical part of this training, even though passing
this element is no longer a condition of employment.
In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its
training funds would require it to extend the date for all air marshals
hired from October 2001 through July 2002 to complete the 4-week
advanced course from January 2004 to mid-2004. According to DHS, the
Service's transfer to ICE will not adversely affect either the funding
for air marshals' training or the schedule for newly hired air marshals
to complete the 4-week training course, since a total of $626.4 million
is being transferred from TSA to ICE. While this funding exceeds the
$545 million that the Service received for fiscal year 2003, it is not
clear how much of the funding will be allocated for training. Given the
importance of training to ensure that air marshals are prepared to
carry out their mission, we believe that maintaining adequate funding
for training should remain a priority. Additionally, should reductions
in the funding for training be required, our recent work on strategic
training and development efforts provides alternatives that an agency
can consider to across-the-board cuts--such as evaluating training
needs, setting training priorities, developing alternative training
requirement scenarios, and determining how much funding each of these
scenarios would require.[Footnote 15] Our work further suggests that it
is important for agencies to ensure that their training and development
efforts are cost effective, given the anticipated benefits and to
incorporate measures that can be used to demonstrate contributions that
training and development programs make to improve results. These
principles are applicable at all times, but especially when funds are
limited. Determining whether air marshals with prior law enforcement
experience have the same training needs as those without such
experience could help set cost-effective training priorities.
We found that a cornerstone of human capital management is the ability
to successfully acquire, develop, and retain talent. Investing in and
enhancing the value of employees through training and development is a
crucial part of addressing this challenge. This investment can include
not only formal and on-the-job-training but also other opportunities,
such as rotational assignments. Our work further specifies that
agencies should link their training curriculum to the competencies
needed for them to accomplish their mission. The Service has begun
developing a formal training curriculum beyond the basic and advanced
training courses described above. This curriculum requires air marshals
to participate in 5 days of recurrent training each quarter that, in
addition to the quarterly weapons qualification, includes training in
advanced firearms, operational tactics, defensive tactics,
surveillance detection, emergency medicine, physical fitness, and legal
and administrative elements. Additionally, the Service is developing
rotational assignments for air marshals that allow them to participate
in law enforcement task forces, as well as fill a variety of
operational and training positions in headquarters and the field. The
Service recognizes that such opportunities can not only enhance
professional development but also help to prevent problems such as
boredom and burnout. According to the Secretary of Homeland Security,
one of the advantages of the Service's transfer to ICE is that it will
enhance air marshals' professional development opportunities.
Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace
with Expanded Operations:
As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an
organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need
for information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded
workforce and operations also grew. The Service collects several types
of information that it can use to continually improve its operations
and oversight and, in some instances, it has used the information to do
so. In other instances, however, the Service lacks sufficiently
detailed information for effective monitoring and oversight. The new,
decentralized organization has also required new or written policies
and procedures to cover new situations and ensure that the same
guidance is available to air marshals in all locations. According to
DHS, it recognized that the Service would need to revise its existing
policies[Footnote 16] or draft new ones, and it has been working to do
so since March 2002. Nonetheless, its policy-development efforts
sometimes responded to problems, rather than anticipating and
preventing them. DHS told us that it is committed to proactively
addressing policy issues and developing procedures.
Management Information Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Comprehensive
for Effective Monitoring and Oversight:
The Service collects information on air marshals' work schedules and
other issues, including potential security incidents documented in
reports filed by air marshals after completing their missions,
allegations of misconduct by air marshals, and reasons provided by air
marshals for leaving the Service. Such information can be useful to
managers in monitoring mission operations and retention. According to
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote
17] the information should be recorded and communicated to management
and others within the agency who need it, and it should be provided in
a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their
responsibilities. For example, one way to do this would be to ensure
that pertinent information is captured in sufficient detail to help
management identify specific actions that need to be taken. Moreover,
according to our human capital model, a fact-based, performance-
oriented approach to human capital management is a critical success
factor for maximizing the value of human capital. In addition, high-
performing organizations use data to determine key performance
objectives and goals, which enable them to evaluate the success of
their human capital approaches. For example, obtaining employee input
and suggestions can provide management with firsthand knowledge of the
organization's operations, which management can use to ensure ongoing
effectiveness and continuous improvement. The Service has analyzed and
made effective use of its mission reports and conduct data, but other
management information that it currently collects is not sufficiently
well defined or detailed for monitoring and managing the workforce.
Although the Service initially had no systematic means of obtaining
regular input from its employees, it has recently put processes in
place to solicit air marshals' opinions and suggestions. In addition,
the Service is participating in an Office of Management and Budget
program assessment project. As part of this effort, DHS said it has
identified annual and long-term performance measures and related
performance outcome targets to evaluate the Service's organizational
effectiveness along key strategic goals and objectives. Through this
project and other strategic planning initiatives, DHS says it expects
to systematically measure and analyze the Service's organizational
performance along human capital, mission scheduling, professional
development, and quality of work-life dimensions.
Automated System Improved Scheduling, but More Information Is Needed
for Monitoring:
When the Service was first directed to expand its mission and
operations, it was using a manual system to schedule air marshals for
flight duty. This system was quickly overwhelmed as the number of air
marshals and flights grew, leading to the concern that air marshals
were being scheduled inconsistently for flight duty. The Service
acknowledged that during this period, some air marshals were overworked
while others were underutilized. In June 2002, the Service replaced the
manual system with an automated system, which, according to Service
officials, improved the agency's ability to schedule and deploy its
workforce.
While the automated system expanded the Service's scheduling
capability, it did not provide the Service with all of the information
it needed for effective monitoring. For example, it did not initially
break down data on air marshals' use of leave into enough categories
for the Service to assess whether some air marshals were abusing sick
leave in order to get a day off. Specifically, an article in USA Today
reported that about 1,250 air marshals called in sick over an 18-day
period. Eventually, the Service determined that the article was based
on a report generated by the automated scheduling system that
overrepresented the number of air marshals who were on sick leave.
Although the report was labeled "Sick Leave," it included data on all
air marshals who were unavailable for flight duty, not only for
sickness but also for other reasons such as administrative leave, and
it listed each day of unavailability for flight duty as a separate
incident, although the same air marshal might have been unavailable for
several days in a row for the same reason.
In analyzing data from the scheduling system, we found that because the
system reported all leave charges--sick, administrative, military, or
other--as sick leave, the Service could not distinguish air marshals
who were unavailable to fly because they were out sick from air
marshals who were unavailable to fly because of injuries but were
available for light field office duty. For example, an air marshal with
an injured ankle might not be able to fly, but could perform
administrative work in the field office. The Service has since modified
the scheduling system to obtain better information on the type of
leave--sick, military, or administrative--charged by air marshals who
are unavailable to fly. The DOT IG also investigated cases concerning
sick leave abuse and likewise found that it was based on a
misunderstanding of the report's contents stemming from the report's
label.
Although the automated scheduling system provides information for
managers to monitor how many hours air marshals are scheduled for work,
automated information is not available for comparing the number of
hours actually worked with the number of hours initially scheduled.
These numbers can differ when flights are delayed or cancelled because
of bad weather or mechanical problems. Information on these differences
is important for Service managers to consider because of their
implications for both the Service's mission and air marshals' quality
of life. For example, if air marshals work too many hours, they may
become too tired to concentrate on their mission, or if they spend too
much time away from home, they may become dissatisfied with their jobs.
Information on the number of hours flown will also be important for the
Service to carry out a new long-term study, initiated by the Director
in the summer of 2002, on the medical and physiological effects of
flying. To date, the Service, in collaboration with FAA's Civil
Aviation Medical Institute and the Air Force, has identified a
methodology and objectives for the study and completed a literature
review to identify trends, possible risks, and other pertinent
information. As part of the study, the Service plans to collect and
analyze data from recurrent air marshal physical examinations and to
compare these data with physiological data from the Civil Aviation
Medical Institute. Although the Service is still awaiting funding
approval to conduct the physical examinations and develop the database,
Service officials plan to begin both efforts in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2004. The study team has also developed a training course
on human physiology as it relates to the aviation environment. The
Service expects this course to be available early in fiscal year 2004.
On the basis of some early findings from the study team's literature
search, the Service set limits in its automated flight-scheduling
system to address mission, quality-of-life, and health concerns. The
system limits scheduled "duty time" to 10 hours a day or 50 hours a
week.[Footnote 18] Our analysis of schedules from the automated system
for 37 weeks found that about 92 percent of the schedules were
consistent with these controls.[Footnote 19] The Service added that
further guidance has been developed that results in scheduling air
marshals to fly an average of 4.2 hours per day, 18 days per month.
Thus, air marshals should fly about 75 hours per month, which the
Service said was within the aviation and military standards for pilots-
-90 and 100 hours per month, respectively. As part of implementing this
guidance, the Service is conducting a detailed analysis of individual
flight schedules to determine if the goals are being met. The Service
reported on the basis of this analysis that, as of September 2003,
scheduled flight time averaged 76.5 hours per month. The Service's
analysis, however, focuses on flight schedules and not on actual hours
worked by the air marshals. Information on the hours air marshals
actually work is not available for automated comparison with the hours
they are scheduled to work because the actual work hours are recorded
manually on time and attendance sheets and are not transferred to the
automated system. Without an automated way to compare actual hours
worked with scheduled hours, the Service lacks a tool needed to
determine if the automated flight-scheduling system is meeting its
objectives related to mission, quality-of life, and health concerns.
DHS agreed that the information on actual hours should be automated and
said that the Service intended to incorporate this capability via
personal digital assistants (PDA) issued to all air marshals.
The Service Has Used Mission Reports to Improve Operations, but Some
Coordination Issues Remain:
Between September 2001 and September 2003, air marshals submitted
reports of almost 2,100 incidents that occurred during their missions.
A little over 40 percent of these mission reports describe passengers
that exhibited suspicious behavior to the air marshals. About 18
percent of the reports discuss disagreements or conflicts between air
marshals and airline or airport personnel over airport or airline
procedures. The remaining mission reports cover a wide variety of
incidents that the Service grouped into 17 other categories, as shown
in appendix V.
The Service has taken some action to follow up on the air marshals'
mission reports, but it has not addressed all of the issues the reports
raise. For example, the Service established a liaison with the airlines
in response to reports of disagreements and conflicts with the
airlines. According to an official with the Air Transport
Association,[Footnote 20] this action has improved relations between
the air marshals and the airlines. Nevertheless, some coordination and
communication issues remain. In October 2002, for instance, the Service
purchased PDAs for distribution to all air marshals. Service officials
told us that before making the purchase, they contacted FAA about
obtaining approval to use the feature that would allow the air marshals
to communicate with one another aboard aircraft. In August 2002, FAA
advised the Service that it planned to approve this PDA feature for use
by air marshals during flight. However, FAA's approval was never
finalized, and the airlines have not allowed the air marshals to use
the PDAs for this purpose because of concerns about interference with
flight control or navigational signals. According to Service officials,
air marshals have stopped using their PDAs' communication feature in
flight until FAA approves its use, and the Service continues to work
with FAA to obtain such approval. The Service reports that air marshals
continue to use other features of the PDAs, such as their cell phone,
pager, e-mail, surveillance, and photo-display capabilities.
The Service Has Used Reports of Misconduct to Improve Management
Controls:
Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service collected data on
almost 600 reports of misconduct by air marshals, which it classified
into over 40 categories. Among the categories with large numbers of
reported cases were "insubordination or failure to follow orders,"
"loss of government property," and "abuse of government credit cards."
According to Service officials, they have used the misconduct database
to identify issues such as abuse of government credit cards and cell
phones that need to be investigated.[Footnote 21] For example, during
the Service's rapid expansion, management noted an unacceptable number
of unauthorized charges and late payments associated with air marshals'
use of the government-issued travel card. Further investigation
revealed that the process of claiming reimbursement for travel was slow
and burdensome and there were misunderstandings about what charges were
proper. After corrective action, the delinquency rate dropped
dramatically. Similarly, an analysis of the misconduct data indicated
that a number of air marshals were accused of being abusive to airline
personnel during the boarding process. A detailed review of the data
pointed to differences in the Service's and the airlines procedures for
boarding aircraft. Subsequently, the Service negotiated a mutually
agreeable solution with the airlines to resolve these differences. In
these instances, the Service used misconduct reports to effectively
refine its management controls.
Information on Air Marshals' Reasons for Leaving the Service Is Not
Detailed Enough to Target Retention Efforts:
The Service maintains data on the number of air marshals who leave the
Service and categorizes their reason for leaving.[Footnote 22] However,
these data are not detailed enough for management to identify and
follow up on issues that could affect retention. Retention is important
both to ensure the continued deployment of experienced personnel who
can carry out the Service's security mission and to avoid the costs to
recruit, train, and deploy new personnel, which, according to the
Service, total about $40,275 per person.
Our analysis of the Service's data on separations indicates that from
September 2001 through July 2003, about 10 percent of the thousands of
newly hired air marshals left the Service. However, during August 2002,
when the media reported a "flood" of resignations from the Service, our
analysis indicated that slightly more than 4 percent of the newly hired
air marshals had left.[Footnote 23] We found that the most frequently
recorded reasons for air marshals separating from the Service were to
take other jobs and personal reasons.[Footnote 24] Such reasons are not
detailed enough for management to identify and target issues that may
hinder retention.
To gain greater insight into the reasons for separation, we examined
the Service's documentation for 95 selected cases.[Footnote 25] For 37
of these cases, the departing air marshals cited multiple reasons for
leaving the Service. For example, one departing air marshal cited
personal reasons and going back to his previous job. Even with this
additional information, we could not identify management issues that
might have led to the separations because the reasons documented by the
Service were too general and vague.
The Service's method of collecting data on air marshals' reasons for
separation may be responsible, in part, for the generality and
vagueness of the information. Specifically, the Service uses either an
open-ended exit interview with the air marshal's first-line supervisor,
the air marshal's resignation letter, or both to collect the
data.[Footnote 26] The supervisor conducts and writes up the exit
interview and an administrative official in the field forwards the
interview write-up, resignation letter, or both to human resource
officials in Service headquarters. A human resource specialist then
reviews the documentation and determines which of the reasons cited is
the primary reason for the separation. This method of collecting
information has several limitations. First, the open-ended exit
interview may not prompt responses that go beyond generalities, such as
taking another job or personal reasons, to determine whether management
issues, such as problems in transferring to a duty station closer to
home or burdensome work schedules, contributed to the air marshal's
resignation. Second, using the first-line supervisor to conduct the
interview may discourage detailed responses, either because the air
marshal may not want to reveal his or her concerns or reasons or
because the supervisor may not want to report specific issues. Finally,
using a human resource specialist to determine the primary reason for a
separation means that the reason is filtered through another party
rather than provided directly by the air marshal who is resigning. Our
work on human capital has determined that feedback from exit interviews
can guide workplace-planning efforts. If these exit interviews are
constructed to collect valid and reliable data, they allow managers to
spotlight areas for attention, such as employee retention.
According to the DOT report, air marshals interviewed by the IG's
office were concerned about the way the air marshal program was being
managed, which contributed to low morale in the Service. The air
marshals the IG interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the
Service's work schedules, aircraft boarding procedures, and dress code
policy.[Footnote 27]
The Service Initially Lacked, but Has Recently Begun to Implement,
Processes for Obtaining Employee Input:
During the early stages of its expansion, the Service did not have
processes or mechanisms in place to gather input and suggestions from
its employees. Such processes and mechanisms would not only allow the
Service to monitor air marshals' concerns about management issues, as
the DOT IG's report also noted, but it would also provide the Service
with its employees' firsthand knowledge and insights that it could use
to improve operations and policies. According to our work on human
capital, leaders at agencies with effective human capital management
seek out the views of employees at all levels and communication flows
up, down, and across the organization, facilitating continuous
improvement. Tools commonly used for obtaining employee input include
employee satisfaction surveys, employee advisory councils, and employee
focus groups.
Recently, the Service began putting processes and mechanisms in place
to gather input from its employees. The Service reports that all field
offices have methods, such as advisory committees, for air marshals to
ask questions or express concerns to senior field office management.
Additionally, question and answer sessions are held when the Director,
Deputy Director, or Assistant Director visits a field office and during
the basic and advanced training classes. To obtain further employee
input, the Service participated in an ombudsman program that TSA
sponsors to improve its operations and customer service. According to
the Service, it is also developing a lessons learned and best practices
intranet site that will allow substantive communication on issues of
interest and concern to all air marshals.
Developing and Implementing Policies and Procedures for an Expanded
Organization Took Time and Created Some Confusion:
Policies and procedures that were designed to support a small,
centralized Service were not designed for and could not accommodate the
needs of a vastly expanded and decentralized workforce. According to
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote
28] internal control should provide for an assessment of the risks an
agency faces from both external and internal sources. For example, when
an agency expands its operations to new geographic areas, it needs to
give special attention to the risks that the expansion presents. In
attempting to hire, train, and deploy its new workforce by the Deputy
Secretary's deadline and establish a new field organization to support
its new domestic mission, the Service had little time to systematically
assess the risks of expansion and ensure that its policies and
procedures were appropriate and adequate. Efforts to develop new
policies or modify existing ones to accommodate new circumstances took
time, and during the transition, some air marshals voiced concerns to
the media. Delays in hiring supervisors and the discretion they were
given in interpreting policies may have contributed to air marshals'
confusion.
Policy on Transfers Was Not Implemented until May 2003:
Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with
one office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Because there were no field
offices, the Service had no policy on transfers between field
locations. The vacancy announcement used during the hiring process
stated that field offices would be located in various major
metropolitan areas, and a Service official stated that air marshal
applicants were allowed to express their preferences for particular
field locations. According to a media report, air marshals alleged that
transfers to their preferred locations were promised but that those
promises were not kept. Our review of a recruiting video and other
documents related to the hiring process did not find any evidence that
transfers were promised; however, the recruiting video indicated that
opportunities for transfer existed. Service officials said that no
transfers were promised and that as the Service hired air marshals and
implemented its new field office structure, it assigned the newly hired
marshals to the 21 field offices as needed. Service officials later
added that except in hardship cases, the air marshals were expected to
remain in the originally assigned field offices for 3 to 5 years. The
DOT IG also investigated this issue and interviewed air marshals who
alleged that promises of transfers made during the hiring process were
not kept, but the IG did not determine whether there was a legitimate
basis for the air marshals' concerns.
By June 2002, the Service had received over 500 applications for
transfers. Until a policy was issued, the Service tried to respond to
the air marshals' requests and to address quality-of-life issues by
developing guidance that provided for transferring any air marshal (1)
who owned a home within 100 miles of an established field office and
(2) whose immediate family resided in that location--provided that both
of these conditions existed before the air marshal's employment with
the Service. While the Service communicated this guidance orally to
field managers, some air marshals were reportedly confused about why
their requests for transfers were denied.
In January 2003, the Service postponed further action on transfer
requests, officials said, until applicable policies--on hardship and
transfers--were finalized. On May 29, 2003, the Service implemented a
hardship transfer policy that established processes and criteria for
approving transfer requests when an air marshal or an immediate family
member incurs a medical or child-custody hardship. In developing the
policy, the Service said it looked into other law enforcement agencies'
transfer programs to identify best practices.
Unwritten Policy on Dress Created Confusion:
During the early months of the Service's expansion, air marshals
expressed confusion and dissatisfaction to the media about policies
covering their attire. At that time, the Service had no written dress
code policy. Instead, according to Service officials, the agency
carried over an unwritten FAA policy that air marshals should dress
appropriately for their missions and the air marshal in charge of a
mission should determine what attire was appropriate for that mission.
According to the Service, some airline personnel complained to the
Service that marshals were not dressed to blend in with other
passengers in the location of the air marshals' assigned seats. The
Service said that the lack of a written policy might have created
confusion for some newly hired air marshals whose initial training did
not cover the Service's policy on dress and whose field office
supervisors had discretion in interpreting the policy. In May 2002, the
Service issued a policy that directed air marshals to dress so as to
present a professional image and blend into their environment. The
Service believes that this policy enables air marshals to perform their
duties without drawing undue attention to themselves. For example, an
air marshal might wear a business suit on a morning flight to New York
and a sports shirt on an afternoon flight to Orlando. To explain and
ensure consistent application of the policy, the Director of the
Service discussed this policy with supervisors and staff during his
visits to many field offices and to the Service's training center.
Air Marshals Expressed Concern about Reasons for Changes in Workweek
Policy:
Air marshals also discussed concerns about the Service's workweek
policy with the media. Some air marshals complained that they had been
promised 4-day workweeks to compensate for the rigors of travel but
were being required to work 5-day workweeks. Other air marshals
reported being confused about the reasons for the change from a 4-day
to a 5-day workweek and questioned whether this change was necessary.
According to Service officials, the change in workweek policy occurred
on July 1, 2002, when the Director of the Service brought the air
marshals into compliance with the requirements of law enforcement
availability pay (LEAP), a pay premium for unscheduled duty equaling 25
percent of a law enforcement officer's base salary. Under this pay
computation method, air marshals are required to average 10 hours of
overtime per week. LEAP became applicable to the Service with the
passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act on November 19,
2001, but the Service initially continued to compute air marshals'
schedules according to the method it had previously used, called the
"first forty" method. Under this method, the first 40 hours worked in a
week constituted the basic workweek, and 4-day and even 3-day workweeks
were allowed if air marshals accrued 40 hours within that time.
However, Service officials determined, in consultation with TSA's legal
department and human resources office, that a change to a 5-day
workweek was necessary for the Service to comply with LEAP.
Accordingly, the Director ordered a 5-day basic workweek, effective
July 1, 2002.
The DOT IG reported that over 85 percent of the air marshals its staff
interviewed expressed concern about working 5 consecutive 10-hour
mission days (with 2 consecutive off-duty days), saying that it
resulted in fatigue and illness.[Footnote 29] Service officials
acknowledged that working 10-hour days can create fatigue,[Footnote 30]
but said that such days are routine in the law enforcement community.
Service officials also maintained that fatigue can be managed by
applying scheduling controls and monitoring air marshals' schedules.
However, as noted, the Service lacks the data to ensure that air
marshals' actual work hours are consistent with the scheduling
controls.
Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger
Implementation Challenges:
The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes
resulting from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in
November 2003. While changes in the size of its workforce could
eventually occur in light of the many recent improvements to aviation
security and federal budget constraints, the plans announced to date
point to changes in the roles, responsibilities, and training of ICE's
workforces; the Service's coordination with TSA and other
organizations; and administrative matters. DHS reported looking forward
to the opportunities accompanying the Service's pending merger into
ICE. Our recent work on mergers and organizational transformations
proposes several key practices and implementation steps that could
assist the Service and other departmental organizations as they face
these challenges.
The Service Is Likely to Face Challenges in Implementing Changes:
One challenge for the Service will be to implement any changes in the
size or in the roles and responsibilities of its workforce that the
department determines are warranted after the Service is transferred to
ICE. The right size of a security organization's workforce appears to
depend, among other things, on the nature and scope of the terrorist
threat and on the totality of measures in place to protect against that
threat. When the Service was first directed to expand, there were fewer
protective measures in place than there are today. Over the past 2
years, an entire "system of systems" has been established for aviation
security alone. This system includes not only the expanded Federal Air
Marshal Service, but also about 50,000 federal security screeners in
the nation's airports, 158 airport security directors, explosives
detection equipment for passengers and baggage, requirements for
performing background checks on about 1 million airline and airport
employees, reinforced cockpit doors on all passenger aircraft, and
authorization for pilots to carry guns in the airplane cockpit. Now, as
the department assesses the nation's homeland security risks, considers
the constraints on federal resources, and sets priorities, it will need
to determine its appropriate size. It has already begun to make changes
in the federal security screener workforce by reducing the total number
of full-time screeners by 6,000 in fiscal year 2003 and by planning a
further reduction of 3,000 full-time screeners in fiscal year 2004
together with the hiring of part-time screeners to meet daily and
seasonal periods of higher demand.
In announcing the Service's merger into ICE, the Secretary of Homeland
Security did not propose a change in the size of the Service's or of
ICE's other two law enforcement workforces, but his statement pointed
to an expansion of their roles and responsibilities that would give the
department greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources
according to varying threats. Through cross-training, the Secretary
said, thousands more law enforcement agents would be available for
deployment on flights, providing a surge capacity during times of
increased aviation security threats. At the same time, air marshals may
be assigned to other law enforcement duties, as threat information
dictates.
This planned expansion of the roles and responsibilities of air
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents will pose training
challenges for ICE and its component organizations. According to the
Secretary's announcement, the training will be centralized, which could
eventually produce some cost efficiencies, but initially a needs
assessment will have to be conducted to identify each law enforcement
workforce's additional training requirements. Cross-training
requirements and curriculums will also have to be established and
approved. Finally, each component organization will have to coordinate
the new training requirements with its other mission requirements and
schedule its officers for the cross-training.
The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following
its transfer from TSA to ICE. In part, the transfer is designed to
improve coordination by unifying DHS's law enforcement functions, but
it also divides aviation security responsibilities that, for about 2
years, were under TSA. According to the Secretary, the transfer will
facilitate the coordination and sharing of law enforcement information,
thereby enhancing aviation security. However, TSA has raised questions
about how air marshals' flights will be scheduled, and the TSA
Administrator has expressed a desire to influence the scheduling.
Immigration agents have reportedly also wondered how ICE would juggle
air marshal deployments with the bureau's current investigative work.
Finally, the Service's transfer to ICE poses administrative challenges
for the three component organizations. For example, the planned changes
in the roles and responsibilities of the federal law enforcement
officers could have implications for their performance evaluations and
compensation. Currently, the three groups of law enforcement officers
are under different pay systems and are compensated at different rates.
Efforts are under way to resolve these challenges.
Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help the Service Address
Potential Merger Challenges:
On the basis of our work on mergers and organizational transformations,
we identified nine key practices and 21 implementation steps that could
assist DHS in successfully merging the roles, responsibilities, and
cultures of the Service and the department's other component
organizations.[Footnote 31] While these practices will ultimately be
important to a successful merger and we have previously recommended
them for the department,[Footnote 32] there are three, we believe, that
are particularly applicable to the Service, given the concerns about
communication and other allegations reported in the media. These three
practices emphasize communicating with employees and obtaining and
using their feedback to promote continuous improvement. See appendix VI
for a complete listing of the practices and implementations steps.
One key practice in a merger or transformation is to set implementation
goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one.
These goals and the time line are essential to pinpoint performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Research
indicates that people are at the heart of successful mergers and
transformations. Thus, seeking and monitoring employee attitudes and
taking appropriate follow-up actions is an implementation step that
supports this practice. Our work suggests that obtaining employee input
through pulse surveys, focus groups, or confidential hotlines can serve
as a quick check of how employees are feeling about large-scale changes
and the new organization. As discussed in this report, the Service did
not initially have such tools in place--in large part because of the
enormous demands it faced in recruiting, training, and deploying
thousands of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary's deadline--and it
was not monitoring employee attitudes. Furthermore, although monitoring
provides good information, it is also important for agency management
not only to listen to employees' concerns but also to take action. By
not taking appropriate follow-up actions, negative attitudes may
translate into actions such as employee departures--or, as was the case
with the Service, complaints to the media. Identifying cultural
features of merging organizations is another important step in setting
implementation goals. Cultural similarities between the Service and the
other organizations within ICE could facilitate the Service's merger
into ICE. As the Director of the Service and others have noted, air
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents are all law
enforcement officers and share a common culture. Moreover, as a
spokesperson for ICE pointed out, many air marshals came to the Service
from Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and some
other agents served as air marshals temporarily after September 11.
Establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress is another key practice in implementing a
merger or transformation. According to our work on transformations and
mergers, communication is most effective when it occurs early, clearly,
and often and when it is downward, upward, and lateral. Organizations
have found that a key implementation step is to communicate information
early and often to build trust among employees as well as an
understanding of the purpose of planned changes. As the Service found
when modifying its workweek policy to implement LEAP premium pay, the
absence of ongoing communication can confuse employees. Two-way
communication is also part of this strategy, facilitating a two-way
honest exchange with, and allowing for feedback from, employees,
customers, and stakeholders. Once this solicited employee feedback is
received, it is important to consider and use it to make appropriate
changes when implementing a merger or transformation.
Involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership is a
third key practice for a successful transformation or merger. Employee
involvement strengthens the transformation process by including
frontline perspectives and experiences. A key implementation step in
this practice is incorporating employee feedback into new policies and
procedures. After obtaining sufficient input from key players, the
organization needs to develop clear, documented, and transparent
policies and procedures. Not having such policies and procedures was an
impediment to the Service as it expanded, creating confusion about
issues such as transfers and dress codes. DHS said that it fully
recognizes the value and importance of communicating with employees and
of obtaining and using their feedback to promote continuous
improvement. It further noted that as the Service merges into ICE, it
is committed to involving employees to obtain their opinions and gain
their ownership.
Conclusions:
The rapid expansion of the Service's mission and workforce posed
significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address.
In the 2 years that have elapsed since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, the Service has deployed thousands of new air marshals on
thousands of domestic and international flights. During this time, the
Service has also established a decentralized organization and begun to
integrate its operations with those of a new department. While these
accomplishments initially came at some cost, as evidenced by air
marshals' concerns with the Service's management, the Service has taken
steps to provide advanced training, improve scheduling, obtain and use
more detailed management information, develop and communicate policies
and procedures, and obtain and respond to employee feedback.
Continuing these efforts will be important for the Service as it moves
forward. Developing and analyzing information on the hours air marshals
actually work is key to ensuring that the Service's scheduling controls
are operating as intended. Flying for too many hours can cause fatigue,
potentially diminishing air marshals' alertness and reducing their
effectiveness. Capturing detailed, firsthand information on air
marshals' reasons for separation is critical to developing cost-
effective strategies for promoting retention and would also allow the
Service to identify and analyze the root causes of issues and to
address vulnerabilities through changes to its policies, procedures,
and training. While retention has not been an issue to date, the cost
of recruiting, training, and deploying air marshals is too high to risk
separations that could be avoided through better understanding of and
attention to air marshals' concerns.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to
support the Service's continued commitment to developing into a high-
performing organization by taking the following actions to improve
management information and to implement key practices that contribute
to successful mergers and organizational transformations:
* Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with
scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of
its scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the
effects of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission.
* Seek and monitor employee attitudes by obtaining detailed, firsthand
information on air marshals' reasons for separation, using such means
as confidential, structured exit surveys, that will allow management to
analyze and address issues that could affect retention and take
appropriate follow-up actions, such as improving training, career
development opportunities, and communication.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
DHS agreed with our report's information and recommendations and said
it welcomes our proposals for practices that it believes will
ultimately maximize its ability to protect the American public,
contribute to the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure,
and preserve the viability of the aviation industry. DHS also expressed
a commitment to continuous improvement as it moves forward, including
actions designed to build on the accomplishments the Service has
already achieved in expanding its mission and workforce since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. According to DHS, the Service
has ongoing activities in several areas, such as continuing to address
policy issues and develop procedures and establishing field office
mechanisms and groups to discuss employee issues and concerns. We
included this information in the final report.
Additionally, DHS identified references in the draft report to
"overscheduling" of air marshals, with an explicit suggestion that such
"overscheduling" was among air marshals' reasons for separating from
the Service. We revised the report to avoid this implication, since we
had not intended to suggest that air marshals were being overscheduled.
Our intent was to point out that without an automated method to compare
actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the Service would not readily
be able to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls. We
also agreed with DHS that there were no data in the Service's
separation information to suggest that "overscheduling" was among air
marshals' reasons for leaving the Service, and we modified the report
accordingly. DHS agreed with our recommendation to automate air
marshals' time and attendance data to facilitate comparisons of actual
hours worked with scheduled hours and said that the Service was taking
steps to implement the recommendation. DHS also agreed that there was a
need to improve the quality of the Service's separation information.
In its comments, DHS also emphasized its belief that the Service's
merger with ICE would have a number of significant benefits,
particularly from cross-training personnel. DHS noted that after cross-
training, the air marshals, as well as personnel in the other ICE
components, would have far more law enforcement capability and could
supplement each other's functions during times of heightened threat.
Additionally, DHS said that the aviation system would benefit from the
concentration and coordination of DHS law enforcement personnel under
the direction of a single Assistant Secretary. We discuss these changes
in our report by examining them in the context of issues that may arise
as the Service merges with other agencies. In addition, we discuss key
practices and implementation steps that could be useful in dealing with
the changes. We note, however, that it is too early to assess any
possible benefits or repercussions of the changes.
Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications to the report, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, other interested congressional committees, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Undersecretary for Border and
Transportation Security, the Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This report is also
available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact Carol Anderson-Guthrie or me at (202) 512-2834 if you
have any questions about the report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VII.
Gerald L. Dillingham:
Director, Civil Aviation Issues:
Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address each of our study objectives and research questions, we
reviewed and analyzed data and documentation provided by the Federal
Air Marshal Service (The Service) on background checks and training;
scheduling, mission incidents, employee misconduct, and separation; and
several workforce policies and procedures. We also interviewed
officials responsible for implementing and operating the Service.
Additionally, we used our Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government, Internal Control Management and Evaluation
Tool,[Footnote 33] Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic
Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government,[Footnote
34] and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,[Footnote 35] to
help assess the Service's training, management information, and
policies and procedures. We also reviewed an audit report by the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General (IG) on the
Federal Air Marshal program.[Footnote 36] To guide our examination of
the Service's future challenges, we used our Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations.[Footnote 37]
To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air
marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and
reviewed Service documents that described the process and procedures
used to apply for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim
secret clearance waiver. We interviewed officials at the Service's
Human Resource Center in New Jersey who were knowledgeable about the
process and were coordinating the Service's requirements with the
responsible Security Management Offices at both the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). We also analyzed data provided by the Office of Personnel
Management's (OPM) Investigative Service and had discussions with OPM
personnel on the number of clearances processed and the procedures that
are used.
To determine what changes were made in the training curriculum for the
newly hired air marshals, we analyzed documents related to the air
marshal training curriculum. In order to identify the curriculum in
place before the changes were made, we interviewed air marshals who had
been with the Service before September 2001. To understand the
Service's curriculum from September 2001 through July 2003, we
evaluated class schedules, training materials, and training data that
tracked the completion of coursework and firearms qualification
training. We visited the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Artesia, New Mexico and the Service's training center in New Jersey,
where we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing the air
marshal training program. In addition, we interviewed representatives
of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Transport Association, and
current and former air marshals.
To determine what management information and policies and procedures
the Service had developed to support its expanded mission and
workforce, we examined the Service's automated scheduling system and
management information on mission incidents, reported misconduct, and
reasons for separation. We analyzed the automated scheduling system
data to determine if the current system controls were operating as
expected. Additionally, to determine the extent of sick leave use and
to address allegations of excessive use, we analyzed the "sick calls"
generated from the scheduling system between July and October 2002. We
also reviewed and discussed with Service management its policies and
procedures for air marshals' transfers between offices, dress code
requirements, and work schedules.
To determine how many newly hired air marshals have left the Service
and why, we used agency data on the number of air marshals on board,
hired, and separated each month; supervisory memorandums summarizing
exit interviews; resignation letters; personnel action forms; and the
Service's summary database on separations. Using the summary database,
we determined the number of air marshals who separated, by reason, and
calculated the percentage of total employees that separated for a
specific reason. We discussed the process for collecting these data
with agency officials responsible for maintaining the Service's
personnel data from the Service's Human Resource Center in New Jersey.
The Service provided information on the processing and maintenance of
its data and on the relationships among its data systems. When we had
concerns about the consistency and validity of the data, we asked
agency officials to address each concern. On the basis of the
information provided by the agency and our review, we determined that
the required data elements were adequate for the purpose of this work.
To gain a basic understanding of the issues surrounding staff decisions
to leave the Service, we reviewed the agency's separation data. For
each departed staff, these data capture only one predominant reason
(for leaving). To supplement this analysis, we selected 95 cases (36
percent of 264 separation cases) that had some form of documentation,
had occurred at various times between January 2002 and March 2003, and
had originated at various field offices. For each selected case, we
reviewed any available resignation letters, exit interviews, and forms
documenting personnel actions. This approach allowed us to conduct a
limited quality check of the Service's data and determine whether
reasons outside of those reported by the Service provided a broader
view of air marshals' reasons for leaving the Service.
To get a better understanding of the types of misconduct that air
marshals have been charged with, we reviewed the electronic
spreadsheets that the Service uses to track the status of each case of
reported misconduct. The spreadsheets included cases reported between
October 2001 and July 2003. We sorted the cases of misconduct by
category to determine if a particular category was prevalent. We also
spoke with Service management about the adjudication of alleged
misconduct and the issues related to the completeness and definition of
misconduct measures.
To determine the types and frequency of the mission reports submitted
by air marshals, we analyzed the database maintained by the Federal Air
Marshals' Mission Operations Control Center. This database contained
approximately 1,600 incidents that were reported by air marshals
between September 11, 2001, and September 16, 2003. We then sorted the
incidents into broad categories, including mission-related incidents
and incidents that occurred between air marshals and airport or airline
personnel. We also received information on the Service's use and
dissemination of the incident data from the Special Agent in Charge of
Field Operations.
We reviewed the DOT IG's report on the Federal Air Marshal program as
an additional source of information about the Service. This report
evaluated various aspects of the Service, including its selection and
hiring process and its procedures for properly training and fully
qualifying air marshals to respond to incidents aboard aircraft. For
one aspect of the report, the IG interviewed 112 air marshals in a one-
on-one format at their field office duty stations. The air marshals
were not selected for interview using structured or random selection
methods. Information obtained through these interviews highlights
employee concerns with the Service but is anecdotal and therefore
cannot be projected to the universe of the Service's air marshal
workforce.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service:
Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by
Percentage, as of August 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage,
as of August 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage,
as of August 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field
Offices and Training Facility:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September
2001 through October 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals,
by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 --September 16, 2003:
Table 1:
Incident category: Suspicious person; Number of incidents reported:
444; Percentage of total: 21.3.
Incident category: Suspicious activities by person; Number of incidents
reported: 394; Percentage of total: 18.9.
Incident category: Issues with airport or airline personnel:
Incident category: * Assigned seating and/or boarding procedures;
Number of incidents reported: 159; Percentage of total: 7.6.
Incident category: * Screening and/or escort procedures; Number of
incidents reported: 106; Percentage of total: 5.0.
Incident category: * Check-in procedures; Number of incidents reported:
59; Percentage of total: 2.8.
Incident category: * Flight crew briefings; Number of incidents
reported: 57; Percentage of total: 2.7.
Incident category: Subtotal: (Issues with airport or airline
personnel); Number of incidents reported: 381; Percentage of total:
18.3.
Incident category: Suspect items or objects; Number of incidents
reported: 164; Percentage of total: 7.9.
Incident category: Third-party information reported to air marshal;
Number of incidents reported: 129; Percentage of total: 6.2.
Incident category: Undercover status compromised; Number of incidents
reported: 113; Percentage of total: 5.4.
Incident category: Disruptive/disorderly person; Number of incidents
reported: 73; Percentage of total: 3.5.
Incident category: Security breeches; Number of incidents reported: 49;
Percentage of total: 2.3.
Incident category: Medical problems; Number of incidents reported: 35;
Percentage of total: 1.7.
Incident category: Arrest/detainment by or at request of air marshal;
Number of incidents reported: 28; Percentage of total: 1.3.
Incident category: Interference with flight crew by passenger; Number
of incidents reported: 20; Percentage of total: 1.
Incident category: Verbal threats or threatening behavior; Number of
incidents reported: 19; Percentage of total: 0.9.
Incident category: Use of nonlethal force by an air marshal; Number of
incidents reported: 16; Percentage of total: 0.8.
Incident category: Searches; Number of incidents reported: 12;
Percentage of total: 0.5.
Incident category: Equipment retrieval/turn-in; Number of incidents
reported: 7; Percentage of total: 0.3.
Incident category: Tampering with aircraft or aircraft equipment;
Number of incidents reported: 4; Percentage of total: 0.2.
Incident category: Discharge of an air marshal firearm; Number of
incidents reported: 3; Percentage of total: 0.2.
Incident category: To be determined; Number of incidents reported: 2;
Percentage of total: .1.
Incident category: Not applicable; Number of incidents reported: 1;
Percentage of total: 0.1.
Incident category: Other; Number of incidents reported: 189; Percentage
of total: 9.
Incident category: Total; Number of incidents reported: 2,083;
Percentage of total: 100.
Source: Federal Air Marshal Incident Reports Database, September 15,
2001, through September 16, 2003.
Notes: Total includes some incidents counted more than once, because
multiple codes for a reportable incident might have been reported
(e.g., a suspicious person incident might also have been reported as a
drunk and disorderly incident). The information above represents the
major categories of information on incidents that air marshals report
to the Service's Operations Center.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations:
Table 2:
Practice: Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.;
Implementation step: * Define and articulate a succinct and compelling
reason for change.; * Balance continued delivery of services with
merger and transformation activities..
Practice: Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals
to guide the transformation.; Implementation step: * Adopt leading
practices for results-oriented strategic planning and reporting..
Practice: Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset
of the transformation.; Implementation step: * Embed core values in
every aspect of the organization to reinforce the new culture..
Practice: Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and
show progress from day one.; Implementation step: * Make public
implementation goals and timeline.; * Seek and monitor employee
attitudes and take appropriate follow-up actions.; * Identify cultural
features of merging organizations to increase understanding of former
work environments.; * Attract and retain key talent.; * Establish an
organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to allow knowledge
exchange among merging organizations..
Practice: Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation
process.; Implementation step: * Establish networks to support
implementation team.; * Select high-performing team members..
Practice: Use the performance management system to define the
responsibility and assure accountability for change.; Implementation
step: * Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance
management systems with adequate safeguards..
Practice: Establish a communication strategy to create shared
expectations and report related progress.; Implementation step: *
Communicate early and often to build trust.; * Ensure consistency of
message.; * Encourage two-way communication.; * Provide information to
meet specific needs of employees..
Practice: Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership
for the transformation.; Implementation step: * Use employee teams.; *
Involve employees in planning and sharing performance information.; *
Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures.; *
Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels..
Practice: Build a world-class organization.; Implementation step: *
Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization..
Source: GAO-03-699.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834 Carol Anderson-Guthrie, (214) 777-
5739:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Bess Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Kevin
Jackson, Maren McAvoy, Minette Richardson, Laura Shumway, Rick Smith,
Gladys Toro, and Alwynne Wilber made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.
[2] Public Law 107-71, November 19, 2001.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management
Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 20, 2002).
[4] Public Law 99-83, August 8, 1985.
[5] 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1.47(p)(1).
[6] OPM contracts primarily with U.S. Investigative Services to check
the applicants' personal records and often to conduct face-to-face
interview with friends, colleagues, and family.
[7] Executive Order 12968, dated August 2, 1995, authorizes agencies to
grant employees temporary eligibility for access to classified
information while the initial investigation is under way. When such
eligibility is granted, the initial investigation shall be expedited.
[8] The National Crime Information Center is a computerized index of
criminal justice information (i.e., information on criminal record
histories, fugitives, stolen properties, missing persons) located at
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information
Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is available to
federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice
agencies 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
[9] OPM bills an agency for the full amount of an investigation at the
time the investigation is scheduled.
[10] TSA's Credentialing Program Office is responsible for adjudicating
the results of air marshals' background investigations. This function
was formerly under TSA's Office of Security.
[11] In his statement on June 3, 2003, before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations, the Associate
Director for Human Resources Products and Services, said that OPM was
working to increase its capacity to provide background investigations
for all federal customers and had streamlined its internal processes to
make as much use as possible of automated systems.
[12] OPM told us in March that it had not received a prioritized list
of clearances from the Service, but noted that it had occasionally
received requests to expedite or check the status of particular
investigations or to discontinue investigations that were no longer
needed.
[13] The federal law enforcement Practical Pistol Course (PPC).
[14] The Aircraft Tactical Pistol Course (ATPC).
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Guide for
Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal
Government, GAO-03-893G (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
[16] Before being transfered to TSA in March 2002, the Service
continued to follow standard operating procedures designed for a small
organization with one facility.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999).
[18] According to an analysis done by the Service, air marshals spend
an average of 4 hours and 25 minutes per workday in flight and use the
remainder of the workday to prepare for flights or layovers. Air
marshals must be at the airport 1.5 hours before their first flight and
stay there 15 minutes after arrival. The combination of flight time and
the aforementioned 1.5 hours and 15 minutes is referred to as "duty
time."
[19] The remaining 8 percent, Service officials explained, could be due
to inconsistencies that resulted when the Service overrode the controls
to meet mission needs--to, for example, provide sufficient coverage for
Super Bowl weekend.
[20] The Air Transport Association is a trade association for 22 major
U.S. airlines and five foreign carriers.
[21] Generally, Service staff members in headquarters investigate
reports of misconduct, but for more serious cases, the Service has been
coordinating its investigations with TSA's Office of Internal Affairs.
[22] The Service selects and records one predominant reason for an air
marshal's separation from the Service, although the air marshals may
have cited more than one reason.
[23] Because TSA was a newly created agency without a workforce history
(including, for example, information on deaths, retirements, transfers,
and resignations), we were unable to meaningfully compare attrition
data for the Service to other federal agencies during this period.
Therefore we are not making a value judgment on the meaning of the
number of persons leaving the Service or their rate of departure.
However, these data are relevant to the resources that have to be
expended to maintain a specified number of marshals in the Service.
[24] A small number of air marshals left because they could not pass
training.
[25] The details of our selection process are provided in appendix I.
[26] This documentation included an exit information form that the
Service began using in 2002 to gather data from separating air
marshals.
[27] As discussed in appendix I, the DOT IG's sample results cannot be
projected to the universe of the Service's air marshal workforce.
[28] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
[29] Between November 2002 and February 2003, 112 air marshals were
interviewed. However, because of the methodology employed, the results
are anecdotal and may not reflect the views or experiences of all
Service employees.
[30] As previously discussed, the 10-hour workday includes the time
that air marshals are required to be in the airport before and after a
flight as well as the time they spend in flight.
[31] Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003).
[32] GAO-03-260.
[33] GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal
government as required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. 3512©. GAO first issued the standards in 1983.
GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1(Washington,
D.C.: November 1999). These standards provide the overall framework for
establishing and maintaining internal control and for identifying and
addressing major performance challenges and areas at greatest risk for
fraud, waste, and abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued its Internal
Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.:
August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or implementing
effective internal control and, when needed, to help determine what,
where, and how improvements can be implemented.
[34] GAO-03-893G.
[35] GAO/02-373SP.
[36] SC-2003-029.
[37] GAO/03-669.
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