Aviation Security
Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs Gao ID: GAO-04-285T November 20, 2003Commercial aviation has been a long-standing target for terrorists. Since the tragic attacts of September 11, 2001, substantial changes have been made to enhance security--including the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the federalization of the passenger screener workforce. However, despite these changes, vulnerabilities in aviation security continue to exist. Accordingly, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, (2) strengthen its passenger screening program, and (3) address additional challenges in further enhancing aviation security.
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on passenger screening found that little testing or other data exist that measure the performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps to collect additional data, including developing a 5-year performance plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well as fielding the Threat Image Projection system and increasing screener testing. In addition to collecting performance data, TSA could further strengthen passenger screening by fully deploying recurrent and supervisory training programs, determining the appropriate levels of screeners at the nation's airports, and improving oversight of the contract screener pilot program. Although TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs. In addition, TSA acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances at the nation's airports, and that it has taken limited action to assess the performance of the pilot airports using private, versus federal, screeners. TSA is undertaking a number of actions to address these concerns, including strengthening its training program and awarding contracts to assess its staffing model and the performance of the contract pilot airports. TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to enhance aviation security. Significant challenges include implementing the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), as well as strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, and air cargo and general aviation security. In implementing CAPPS II, TSA must ensure it addresses concerns surrounding travelers' privacy rights, the accuracy of databases used by CAPPS II, and obtaining international cooperation needed for the system to be fully operational. Additional challenges include integrating explosive detection systems into airport's in-line baggage handling systems, identifying cost-effective perimeter security technologies, effectively targeting air cargo for screening, and improving security at general aviation airports. Further, TSA faces challenges in funding increased aviation security measures and ensuring that these costs are controlled.
GAO-04-285T, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, November 20, 2003:
Aviation Security:
Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice:
GAO-04-285T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-285T, a report to the Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Commercial aviation has been a long-standing target for terrorists.
Since the tragic attacts of September 11, 2001, substantial changes
have been made to enhance security”including the creation of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the federalization of
the passenger screener workforce. However, despite these changes,
vulnerabilities in aviation security continue to exist. Accordingly,
GAO was asked to describe TSA‘s efforts to (1) measure the
effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, (2) strengthen its
passenger screening program, and (3) address additional challenges in
further enhancing aviation security.
What GAO Found:
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation
security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness
of these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent
work on passenger screening found that little testing or other data
exist that measure the performance of screeners in detecting threat
objects. However, TSA is taking steps to collect additional data,
including developing a 5-year performance plan detailing numerous
performance measures, as well as fielding the Threat Image Projection
system and increasing screener testing.
In addition to collecting performance data, TSA could further
strengthen passenger screening by fully deploying recurrent and
supervisory training programs, determining the appropriate levels of
screeners at the nation‘s airports, and improving oversight of the
contract screener pilot program. Although TSA has developed and
deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully
developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs. In
addition, TSA acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created
imbalances at the nation‘s airports, and that it has taken limited
action to assess the performance of the pilot airports using private,
versus federal, screeners. TSA is undertaking a number of actions to
address these concerns, including strengthening its training program
and awarding contracts to assess its staffing model and the
performance of the contract pilot airports.
TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to enhance
aviation security. Significant challenges include implementing the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), as well as
strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access
controls, and air cargo and general aviation security. In implementing
CAPPS II, TSA must ensure it addresses concerns surrounding travelers‘
privacy rights, the accuracy of databases used by CAPPS II, and
obtaining international cooperation needed for the system to be fully
operational. Additional challenges include integrating explosive
detection systems into airport‘s in-line baggage handling systems,
identifying cost-effective perimeter security technologies,
effectively targeting air cargo for screening, and improving security
at general aviation airports. Further, TSA faces challenges in funding
increased aviation security measures and ensuring that these costs are
controlled.
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports and testimonies, GAO has made numerous
recommendations to strengthen aviation security. We also have ongoing
reviews assessing many of the issues addressed in this testimony and
will issue separate reports on these areas at a later date.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-285T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick
at (202) 512-8777 or Berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss
our recent work on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
efforts to assess its performance and strengthen its security programs,
to include passenger screening. Securing commercial aviation is a
daunting task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and
tens of thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and
pieces of baggage and cargo. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
billions of dollars have been spent, and a wide variety of programs and
initiatives have been implemented to enhance aviation security.
However, recent reviews and covert testing conducted by GAO and the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General, as well
as recent media reports, indicate that weaknesses and vulnerabilities
in commercial aviation continue to exist. For example, the incident
involving a college student who placed box cutters, clay resembling
plastic explosives, and bleach on commercial aircraft show that
aviation security can still be compromised.
My testimony today highlights three key areas that TSA must focus on to
enhance aviation security. These areas include (1) measuring the
effectiveness of TSA's aviation security initiatives that have already
been implemented, (2) strengthening its passenger screening program,
and (3) addressing key programmatic and management challenges to
further enhance aviation security. My testimony is based on our prior
work, reviews of TSA documentation, and interviews with TSA officials.
In summary:
Although TSA has implemented numerous programs and initiatives to
enhance aviation security, it has collected limited information on the
effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. Our recent work on
TSA's passenger screening program showed that although TSA has made
enhancements in passenger screening, it has collected limited data on
screeners' ability to detect threat objects. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which was established with the
primary goal of strengthening aviation security, requires that TSA
establish acceptable levels of performance for security initiatives and
develop annual performance plans and reports to measure and document
the effectiveness of those initiatives.[Footnote 1] Although TSA has
developed an annual performance plan and report as required by ATSA, to
date these tools have focused on TSA's progress in meeting deadlines to
implement programs and initiatives mandated by ATSA rather than on the
effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. TSA has recognized
that it has collected limited performance data on its security
initiatives, and is taking steps to collect additional data, including
developing a 5-year performance plan, and increasing passenger screener
testing.
Our recent work on TSA's passenger screening program showed that the
program can be strengthened in the areas of training, staffing, and the
contract screener pilot program.[Footnote 2] Although TSA has developed
and deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully
developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs to
ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. In
addition, TSA has acknowledged that its initial screener staffing
levels created imbalances at the nation's airports--a situation that it
is attempting to address. TSA also has not yet determined how to
evaluate and measure the performance of its contract screening pilot
program. Since we issued our preliminary report on TSA's passenger
screening program in September 2003, TSA has taken a number of actions
to address these concerns, including enhancing its recurrent and
supervisory training programs, and awarding a contract to assess the
contract screening pilot program. However, TSA has recognized that
assessing the performance of the pilot airports will be difficult
because of a lack of performance data.
TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to address
threats to our nation's aviation system. Significant challenges include
implementing various aviation security programs, such as the Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System[Footnote 3] (CAPPS II), and
addressing broader security concerns related to the security of air
cargo and general aviation.[Footnote 4] TSA also faces challenges in
managing the costs of aviation security and in strategically managing
its workforce of about 60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at
airports to detect weapons and explosives. TSA has been addressing
these and other challenges through a variety of efforts. We have work
in progress that is examining TSA's efforts in addressing many of these
challenges.
Background:
The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a long-
standing concern. As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S.
airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1995 plot to blow up 12 U.S.
aircraft in the Pacific region discovered by Philippine authorities,
U.S. commercial aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks.
Over the years, numerous initiatives have been undertaken to improve
aviation security. However, as we and others have documented in
numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue to exist. It was
because of these weaknesses that terrorists were able to hijack four
commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic results.
In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the
President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) on November 19, 2001. ATSA created TSA as an agency within the
Department of Transportation with the responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation, including aviation. ATSA mandated specific
improvements to aviation security and established deadlines for
completing many of these initiatives. Consequently, TSA's main focus
during its first year of operation was on meeting these deadlines,
particularly federalizing the screener workforce at commercial airports
nationwide by November 19, 2002, while at the same time establishing a
new federal organization from the ground up. On March 1, 2003, pursuant
to the Homeland Security Act, TSA was transferred from the Department
of Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security.[Footnote
5]
Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA.
One of the most substantial of these is passenger screening. Passenger
screening involves the use of metal detectors, X-ray machines,
explosive trace detection machines, and physical searches to examine
passengers and their baggage to identify threat objects. Passenger
screening has historically been an area of concern. As we reported in
1987, and again in 2000, passenger screeners who conducted these
examinations have had difficultly in detecting weapons and other
dangerous objects. At the time we issued these reports, air carriers
were responsible for performing passenger screening. With the passage
of ATSA, this responsibility has now become the responsibility of TSA.
TSA is also responsible for ensuring the security of air cargo,
limiting access to restricted areas of airports to authorized
personnel, securing airport perimeters, and conducting background
checks for airport personnel, among other responsibilities.
Limited Information Exists on the Effectiveness of Aviation Security
Initiatives:
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation
security, but it has collected limited information on the effectiveness
of these initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program.
ATSA requires that TSA establish acceptable levels of performance and
develop annual performance plans and reports to measure and document
the effectiveness of its security initiatives.[Footnote 6] Although TSA
has developed these performance tools as required by ATSA, the tools
currently focus on TSA's progress toward meeting ATSA deadlines, rather
than on the effectiveness of its programs and initiatives. Although TSA
has collected limited data on the effectiveness of its initiatives, it
is taking several steps to collect objective data to assess its
performance.
Evaluation of Program Effectiveness:
Although there are a number of methods that TSA can use to measure the
effectiveness of its passenger screening program, none are being fully
utilized. As we reported in September 2003,[Footnote 7] the primary
source of information collected on screeners' ability to detect threat
objects is covert testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs
and Program Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these
covert tests as a measure of performance, but rather a "snapshot" of a
screener's ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in
time and as a system-wide performance indicator. At the time we issued
our report, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review had
conducted 733 covert tests of passenger screeners at 92 airports. As a
result, only a small percentage of TSA's passenger screeners had been
subject to a covert test.
In addition to conducting covert tests at screening checkpoints, TSA
conducts tests to determine whether the current Computer-Assisted
Passenger Screening System is working as designed; threat objects are
detected during the screening of checked baggage; and access to
restricted areas of the airport is limited only to authorized
personnel.[Footnote 8] While the Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review has conducted about 2,000 access tests, it has conducted only
168 Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System and checked baggage
tests. Based on an anticipated increase in staff from about 100 in
fiscal year 2003 to 200 in fiscal year 2004, the Office of Internal
Affairs and Program Review plans to conduct twice as many covert tests
next year.[Footnote 9]
Another key source of data on screener performance in detecting threat
objects is the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which places
images of threat objects on the X-ray screen during actual operations
and records whether screeners identify the threat object.[Footnote 10]
The Federal Aviation Administration began deploying TIP in late 1999 to
continually measure screener performance and to train screeners in
becoming more adept at detecting hard-to-spot threat objects. However,
TIP was shut down immediately following the September 11 terrorist
attacks because of concerns that it would result in screening delays
and panic, as screeners might have thought that they were actually
viewing a threat object. Although TSA officials recognized that TIP is
a key tool in measuring, maintaining, and enhancing screener
performance, they only recently began reactivating TIP on a wide-scale
basis because of competing priorities, a lack of training, and a lack
of resources needed to deploy TIP activation teams. As TIP becomes
operational at each airport, TSA headquarters and federal security
directors[Footnote 11] will have the capability to query and analyze
performance data in a number of ways, including by individual
screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports. TIP is expected to be
fully deployed and operational by April 2004.
When fully deployed, the annual screener recertification test results
will provide another source of data on screener performance. ATSA
requires that TSA collect performance information on each screener
through conducting an annual proficiency review to ensure he or she
continues to meet all qualifications and standards required to perform
the screening function. Although TSA began deploying federal screeners
to airports in April 2002, TSA only recently began implementing the
annual recertification program and does not expect to complete testing
at all airports until March 2004. The recertification testing is
comprised of three components: (1) image recognition; (2) knowledge of
standard operating procedures; and (3) practical demonstration of
skills, to be administered by a contractor. TSA officials consider
28,000 screeners as having completed the first two components because
they successfully passed competency tests TSA administered at many
airports as part of a screener workforce reduction effort. However,
these competency tests did not include the third component of TSA's
planned annual screener recertification program--the practical
demonstration of skills. TSA officials awarded a contract for this
component of the annual proficiency reviews in September 2003.
TSA's Performance Management Information System for passenger and
baggage screening operations is also designed to collect performance
data, but currently it contains limited information on screener
performance in detecting threat objects. The Performance Management
Information System collects a wide variety of metrics on workload,
staffing, and equipment and is used to identify some performance
indicators, such as the level of absenteeism, the average time for
equipment repairs, and the status of TSA's efforts to meet goals for
100 percent electronic baggage screening.[Footnote 12] However, the
system does not contain any performance metrics related to the
effectiveness of passenger screening. TSA is planning to integrate
performance information from various systems into the Performance
Management Information System to assist the agency in making strategic
decisions. TSA further plans to continuously enhance the system as it
learns what data are needed to best manage the agency. In addition to
making improvements to the Performance Management Information System,
TSA is currently developing performance indexes for both individual
screeners and the screening system as a whole. The screener performance
index will be based on data such as the results of training and
recertification tests, and the index for the screening system will be
based on information such as TIP results. TSA has not yet fully
established its methodology for developing the indexes, but it expects
to have them developed by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Performance Evaluation Tools under Development:
TSA has recognized the need to strengthen the assessment of its
performance, and it has initiated efforts to develop and implement
strategic and performance plans to clarify goals, establish performance
measures, and evaluate the performance of its security initiatives.
Strategic plans are the starting point for an agency's planning and
performance measurement efforts. Strategic plans include a
comprehensive mission statement based on the agency's statutory
requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a
description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals. The
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)[Footnote 13] establishes
a framework for strategic plans that requires agencies to:
* clearly establish results-oriented performance goals in strategic and
annual performance plans for which they will be held accountable,
* measure progress toward achieving those goals,
* determine the strategies and resources needed to effectively
accomplish the goals,
* use performance information to make programmatic decisions necessary
to improve performance, and:
* formally communicate results in performance reports.
Although the Department of Homeland Security plans to issue one
strategic plan for the department, it plans to incorporate strategic
planning efforts from each of its component agencies. TSA recently
completed a draft of its input into the Department of Homeland
Security's strategic plan. TSA officials stated that the draft is
designed to ensure their security initiatives are aligned with the
agency's goals and objectives and that these initiatives represent the
most efficient use of their resources. TSA officials submitted the
draft plan to stakeholders in September 2003 for their review and
comment. The Department of Homeland Security plans to issue its
strategic plan by the end of the year.[Footnote 14]
In addition to developing a strategic plan, TSA is developing a
performance plan to help it evaluate the current effectiveness and
levels of improvement in its programs, based on established performance
measures. TSA submitted to the Congress a short-term performance plan
in May 2003, as required by ATSA, that included performance goals and
objectives. The plan also included an initial set of 32 performance
measures, including the percentage of bags screened by explosive
detection systems and the percentage of screeners in compliance with
training standards. However, these measures were primarily output-based
(measuring whether specific activities were achieved) and did not
measure the effectiveness of TSA's security initiatives. TSA officials
acknowledge that the goals and measures included in the report were
narrowly focused and that in moving forward additional performance-
based measures are needed.
In addition to developing a short-term performance plan, ATSA also
requires that TSA develop a 5-year performance plan and annual
performance report, including an evaluation of the extent to which its
goals and objectives were met. TSA is currently developing performance
goals and measures as part of its annual planning process and will
collect baseline data throughout fiscal year 2004 to serve as a
foundation for its performance targets. TSA also plans to increase its
focus on measuring the effectiveness of various aspects of the aviation
security system in its 5-year performance plan. According to TSA's
current draft strategic plan, which outlines its overall goals and
strategies for fiscal years 2003 through 2008, its efforts to measure
the effectiveness of the aviation security system will include:
* random and scheduled reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of
security processes;
* oversight of compliance with security standards and approved programs
through a combination of inspections, testing, interviews, and record
reviews--to include TIP;
* measurement of performance against standards to ensure expected
standards are met to drive process improvements; and:
* collection and communication of performance data using a state-of-
the-art data collection and reporting system.
In our January 2003 report on TSA's actions and plans to build a
results-oriented culture, we recommended next steps that TSA should
take to strengthen its strategic planning efforts.[Footnote 15] These
steps include establishing security performance goals and measures for
all modes of transportation that involves stakeholders, and applying
practices that have been shown to provide useful information in agency
performance plans. We also identified practices that TSA can apply to
ensure the usefulness of its required 5-year performance plan to TSA
managers, the Congress, and other decision makers or interested
parties. Table 1 outlines the practices we identified for TSA.
Table 1: Summary of Opportunities to Help Ensure Useful Annual Plans
and Applied Practices:
Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans: Articulate a results
orientation; Applied practices: 1. Create a set of performance goals
and measures that addresses important dimensions of program performance
and balances competing priorities; 2. Use intermediate goals and
measures to show progress or contribution to intended results; 3.
Include explanatory information on the goals and measures; 4. Develop
performance goals to address mission-critical management problems; 5.
Show baseline and trend data for past performance; 6. Identify
projected target levels of performance for multiyear goals; 7. Link
the goals of component organizations to departmental strategic goals.
Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans: Coordinate cross-
cutting programs; Applied practices: 8. Identify programs that
contribute to the same or similar results; 9. Set complementary
performance goals to show how differing program strategies are mutually
reinforcing and establish common or complementary performance measures,
as appropriate; 10. Describe--briefly or refer to a separate document-
-planned coordination strategies.
Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans: Show how strategies
will be used to achieve goals; Applied practices: 11. Link strategies
and programs to specific performance goals and describe how they will
contribute to the achievement of those goals; 12. Describe strategies
to leverage or mitigate the effects of external factors on the
accomplishment of performance goals; 13. Discuss strategies to resolve
mission-critical management problems; 14. Discuss--briefly or refer to
a separate plan--plans to ensure that mission-critical processes and
information systems function properly and are secure.
Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans: Show performance
consequences of budget and other resource decisions; Applied practices:
15. Show how budgetary resources relate to the achievement of
performance goals; 16. Discuss--briefly and refer to the agency
capital plan--how proposed capital assets (specifically information
technology investments) will contribute to achieving performance
goals; 17. Discuss--briefly or refer to a separate plan--how the
agency will use its human capital.
Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans: Build the capacity to
gather and use performance information; Applied practices: 18. Identify
internal and external sources of data; 19. Describe efforts to verify
and validate performance data; 20. Identify actions to compensate for
unavailable or low-quality data; 21. Discuss implications of data
limitations for assessing performance.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
TSA agreed with our recommendations and plans to incorporate these
principles into its 5-year performance plan and annual performance
report. TSA plans to complete its 5-year performance plan and annual
performance report by February 2004, as required by GPRA.
The Congress has also recognized the need for TSA to measure the
effectiveness of its security initiatives and, as part of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) reauthorization act--Vision 100:
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act--is currently considering a
provision that would require the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security to conduct a study of the effectiveness of the
aviation security system.
Challenges in Strengthening TSA's Passenger Screening Program:
In addition to collecting performance data on the effectiveness of its
passenger screening program, TSA can strengthen other areas of the
program to help improve screeners' ability to detect threat objects. In
our September 2003 report that discussed our preliminary observations
on TSA's passenger screening program, we noted that TSA can strengthen
recurrent and supervisory training, staffing of screeners, and
oversight of its contract screener pilot program. Since that report was
issued, TSA has identified a number of actions it has taken or plans to
take to address these concerns. We will be reviewing TSA's efforts to
address these challenges as part of our ongoing review of this program.
Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed:
In fulfilling its passenger screening mandate, TSA must ensure that
screeners are adequately trained and sufficiently skilled in
identifying threat or dangerous objects at screening checkpoints. To
help accomplish this, TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial
screener training programs. Basic screener training consists of 40
hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training that
screeners must successfully complete prior to making independent
screening decisions. Additionally, TSA requires remedial training for
any screener who fails an operational test and prohibits screeners from
performing the screening function related to the test they failed until
they successfully complete remedial training. TSA screening supervisors
may also require remedial training for screeners they observe needing
strengthening of their skills.
Although TSA has deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has
not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training
programs to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and
supervised. Recurrent training--the ongoing training of screeners on a
frequent basis--is critical in maintaining and enhancing screener
skills. Although TSA has not fully developed a recurrent training
program, it is in the process of deploying six recurrent training
modules and is pilot testing an Online Learning Management System for
recurrent training comprised of about 360 components. TSA officials
said that budget limitations had delayed implementation of the
recurrent training modules and the online learning system.
Similarly, TSA has not fully developed or deployed a supervisory
training program, even though it describes its screening supervisors as
the key to a strong defense in detecting threat objects. However, TSA
is taking steps in developing such a program, including working with
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Graduate School to tailor its off-
the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific training needs of
TSA's screening supervisors. TSA reported that it is sending
supervisors to the U.S. Department of Agriculture off-the-shelf
supervisory course until the customized course is fielded in 2004. TSA
also plans to establish a technical supervisor training component for
recurrent training.
TSA Continues to Work to Identify Appropriate Staffing Levels at
Airports:
To conduct passenger and baggage screening functions at the nation's
airports, TSA hired about 56,000 screeners. Initially, screener staff
levels for all airports was developed by TSA headquarters without
active input from the agency's federal security directors who are
responsible for overseeing security at each of the nation's commercial
airports. This has led to staffing imbalances, and concern by federal
security directors that they had limited authority to respond to
airport-specific staffing needs, such as reacting to fluctuations in
daily and seasonal passenger flow. TSA officials acknowledged that
their initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener
workforce, and reported that as they work to further reduce the
screener workforce,[Footnote 16] they will solicit input from the
Federal Security Directors as well as airport and air carrier
officials. TSA has also taken steps such as authorizing the hiring of
part-time screeners at over 200 airports--the first of whom began
working in September 2003.
To better address airport-specific staffing needs and accomplish
workforce reduction goals, TSA developed its current screener staffing
levels using a computer-based modeling process that took into account
the number of screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport;
originating passengers; the number of airport workers requiring
screening; projected air carrier service increases and decreases during
the year; and hours needed to accommodate screener training, leave, and
breaks. TSA recently hired an outside consultant to conduct a study of
screener staffing levels at various airports. TSA officials stated that
they will continue to review the staffing allocation process through
the modeling efforts to assess air carrier and airport growth patterns,
and adjustments will be made as appropriate. We will continue to review
TSA's staffing efforts as part of our ongoing review.
Assessment of Contract Screening Pilot Program:
Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract
screeners at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot
program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening
companies rather than federal screeners. TSA initially required private
screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures and protocols
used by federal screeners. As a result, these airports had limited
flexibility in running screening operations. However, TSA recently
provided the contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing them
to determine and maintain their own staffing levels and to make
independent hiring decisions. ATSA gives all airport operators the
option of applying to change from using federal screeners to using
private screeners beginning in November 2004.
TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance
of the pilot program airports or determine the feasibility of using
contract screening companies. TSA recently awarded a contract to
BearingPoint, Inc., to compare the performance of pilot screening with
federal screening, including the overall strengths and weaknesses of
both systems, and determine the reasons for any differences.[Footnote
17] The evaluation is scheduled to be completed by March 31,
2004.[Footnote 18] TSA has acknowledged that designing an effective
evaluation of the screeners at the pilot airports will be challenging
because key operational areas, including training, assessment,
compensation, and equipment, have to a large extent been held constant
across all airports, and therefore are not within the control of the
private screening companies.[Footnote 19] In its request for proposal
for the pilot airport evaluation, TSA identified several data sources
for the evaluation, including the Performance Management Information
System and the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review's covert
testing of passenger screeners. However, as we recently reported, data
from these systems in measuring the effectiveness of screening
operations is limited. As a result, it will be a challenge for TSA to
effectively compare the performance of the contract pilot airports with
that of airports using federal screeners.
In conjunction with this evaluation, TSA will need to plan for the
possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private
screening company. Numerous airport operators have expressed an
interest in obtaining more information to assist in their decision
regarding using private screeners. Specifically, airport operators
stated that they would like to determine who would bear responsibility
for funding the screening contract, airport liability in the event of
an incident linked to a screener failure, how well the current pilot
program airports are performing, performance standards to which
contract screeners would be held, and TSA's role in overseeing
contracted screening. If airports are permitted to opt out of using
federal screeners, this could have a significant impact on TSA's role
in overseeing the screening function as well as the number of federal
screeners needed.
TSA Faces Additional Programmatic and Management Challenges:
In addition to the challenges it faces in conducting its passenger
screening program and assessing program effectiveness, TSA faces a
number of other programmatic and management challenges in strengthening
aviation security. These challenges include implementing the new
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System; strengthening baggage
screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and
general aviation security; managing the costs of aviation security
initiatives; and managing human capital. TSA has been addressing these
challenges through a variety of efforts. We have work in progress that
is examining TSA's efforts in most of these areas, and we will be
reporting on TSA's progress in the future.
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II):
TSA is developing a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System, or CAPPS II. This system is intended to replace the current
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening program, which was developed in
the mid-1990s by the Federal Aviation Administration to enable air
carriers to identify passengers requiring additional security
attention. The current system is maintained as a part of the airlines'
reservation systems and, operating under federal guidelines, uses a
number of behavioral characteristics to select passengers for
additional screening.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of
weaknesses in the current prescreening program were exposed. For
example, although the characteristics used to identify passengers for
additional screening are classified, several have become public
knowledge through the press or on the Internet. Although enhancements
have been made to address some of these weaknesses, the behavioral
traits used in the system may not reflect current intelligence
information. It is also difficult to quickly modify the system to
respond to real-time changes in threats. Additionally, because the
current system operates independently within each air carrier
reservation system, changes to each air carrier's system to modify the
prescreening system can be costly and time-consuming.
In contrast, CAPPS II is planned to be a government-run program that
will provide real-time risk assessment for all airline passengers.
Unlike the current system, TSA is designing CAPPS II to identify and
compare personal information with commercially available data to
confirm a passenger's identity. The system will then run the
identifying information against government databases and generate a
"risk" score for the passenger. The risk score will determine the level
of screening that the passenger will undergo before boarding. TSA
currently estimates that initial implementation of CAPPS II will occur
during the fall of 2004, with full implementation expected by the fall
of 2005.
TSA faces a number of challenges that could impede its ability to
implement CAPPS II. Among the most significant are the following:
* concerns about travelers' privacy rights and the safeguards
established to protect passenger data;
* the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and
whether inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives
and erroneously prevent or delay passengers from boarding their
flights;
* the length of time that data will be retained by TSA;
* the availability of a redress process through which passengers could
get erroneous information corrected;
* concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data
and impersonates another individual to obtain that person's low risk
score, may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of
the system; and:
* obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be
fully effective, as some countries consider the passenger information
required by CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws.
We are currently assessing these and other challenges in the
development and implementation of the CAPPS II system and expect to
issue a final report on our work in early 2004.
Checked Baggage Screening:
Checked baggage represents a significant security concern, as explosive
devices in baggage can, and have, been placed in aircraft holds. ATSA
required screening of all checked baggage on commercial aircraft by
December 31, 2002, using explosive detection systems to electronically
scan baggage for explosives. According to TSA, electronic screening can
be accomplished by bulk explosives detection systems (EDS)[Footnote 20]
or explosives trace detection (ETD) systems.[Footnote 21] However, TSA
faced challenges in meeting the mandated implementation date. First,
the production capabilities of EDS manufacturers were insufficient to
produce the number of units needed. Additionally, according to TSA, it
was not possible to undertake all of the airport modifications
necessary to accommodate the EDS equipment in each airport's baggage-
handling area. In order to ensure that all checked baggage is screened,
TSA established a program that uses alternative measures, including
explosives-sniffing dogs, positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 22]
and physical hand searches at airports where sufficient EDS or ETD
technology was not available. Section 425 of the Homeland Security Act
allowed the Under Secretary for Transportation Security to grant
airports unable to meet the December 31, 2002, 100 percent screening
deadline an extension until December 31, 2003. Although TSA has made
progress in implementing EDS technology at more airports, it has
reported that it will not meet the revised mandate for 100 percent
electronic screening of all checked baggage. Specifically, as of
October 2003, TSA reported that it will not meet the deadline for
electronic screening by December 31, 2003, at five airports. Airport
representatives with whom we spoke expressed concern that there has not
been enough time to produce, install, and integrate all of the systems
required to meet the deadline.
In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist
in integrating these systems into airport baggage-handling systems. For
those airports that have installed EDS equipment, many have been
located in airport lobbies as stand-alone systems. The chief drawback
of stand-alone systems is that because of their size and weight there
is a limit to the number of units that can be placed in airport
lobbies, and numerous screeners are required to handle the checked bags
because each bag must be physically conveyed to the EDS machines and
then moved back to the conveyor system for transport to the baggage-
handling room in the air terminal. Some airports are in the process of
integrating the EDS equipment inline with the conveyor belts that
transport baggage from the ticket counter to the baggage-handling area.
However, the reconfiguring of airports for in-line checked baggage
screening can be extensive and costly.[Footnote 23] TSA has reported
that in-line EDS equipment installation costs range from $1 million to
$3 million per piece of equipment. In February 2003, we identified
letters of intent[Footnote 24] as a funding option that has been
successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.[Footnote 25]
TSA has since written letters of intent covering seven airports
promising multiyear financial support totaling over $770 million for
in-line integration of EDS equipment.[Footnote 26] Further, TSA
officials have stated that they have identified 25 to 35 airports as
candidates for further letters of intent pending Congressional
authorization of funding. We are examining TSA's baggage screening
program, including its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing
assignment.
Perimeter and Access Controls:
Prior to September 2001, work performed by GAO and others highlighted
the vulnerabilities in controls for limiting access to secure airport
areas. In one report, we noted that GAO special agents were able to use
fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to
secure areas, bypass security checkpoints, and walk unescorted to
aircraft departure gates.[Footnote 27] The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. Concerns over the adequacy of
the vetting process for airport workers who have unescorted access to
secure airport areas have also arisen, in part as a result of federal
agency airport security sweeps that uncovered hundreds of instances in
which airport workers lied about their criminal history, or immigration
status, or provided false or inaccurate Social Security numbers on
their application for security clearances to obtain employment.
ATSA contains provisions to improve perimeter access security at the
nation's airports and strengthen background checks for employees
working in secure airport areas, and TSA has made some progress in this
area. For example, federal mandates were issued to strengthen airport
perimeter security by limiting the number of airport access points, and
they require random screening of individuals, vehicles, and property
before entry at the remaining perimeter access points. Further, TSA
made criminal history checks mandatory for employees with access to
secure or sterile airport areas. To date, criminal history checks have
been conducted on approximately 1 million of these employees. TSA also
has plans to develop a pilot airport security program and is reviewing
security technologies in the areas of biometrics access control
identification systems (i.e., fingerprints or iris scans), anti-
piggybacking technologies (to prevent more than one employee from
entering a secure area at a time), and video monitoring systems for
perimeter security. TSA solicited commercial airport participation in
the program. It is currently reviewing information from interested
airports and plans to select 20 airports for the program.
Although progress has been made, challenges remain with perimeter
security and access controls at commercial airports. Specifically, ATSA
contains numerous requirements for strengthening perimeter security and
access controls, some of which contained deadlines, which TSA is
working to meet. In addition, a significant concern is the possibility
of terrorists using shoulder-fired portable missiles from locations
near the airport. We reported in June 2003 that airport operators have
increased their patrols of airport perimeters since September 2001, but
industry officials stated that they do not have enough resources to
completely protect against missile attacks.[Footnote 28] A number of
technologies could be used to secure and monitor airport perimeters,
including barriers, motion sensors, and closed-circuit television.
Airport representatives have cautioned that as security enhancements
are made to airport perimeters, it will be important for TSA to
coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration and the airport
operators to ensure that any enhancements do not pose safety risks for
aircraft. To further examine these threats and challenges, we have
ongoing work assessing TSA's progress in meeting ATSA provisions
related to improving perimeter security, access controls, and
background checks for airport employees and other individuals with
access to secure areas of the airport, as well as the nature and extent
of the threat from shoulder-fired missiles.
Air Cargo Security:
As we and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General have
reported, vulnerabilities exist in ensuring the security of cargo
carried aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. TSA has
reported that an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported
each year--9.7 million tons on all-cargo planes and 2.8 million tons on
passenger planes. Potential security risks are associated with the
transport of air cargo--including the introduction of undetected
explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft. To
reduce these risks, ATSA requires that all cargo carried aboard
commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA have a system in
place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure
the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. Despite these
requirements, it has been reported that less than 5 percent of cargo
placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened.[Footnote 29]
TSA's primary approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety is to
ensure compliance with the "known shipper" program--which allows
shippers that have established business histories with air carriers or
freight forwarders to ship cargo on planes. However, we and the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General have identified
weaknesses in the known shipper program and in TSA's procedures for
approving freight forwarders, such as possible tampering with freight
at various handoff points before it is loaded into an
aircraft.[Footnote 30]
Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance
cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in
October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo
profiling system similar to the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System. However, in December 2002, we reported that
additional operational and technological measures, such as checking the
identity of individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to
improve air cargo security in the near term.[Footnote 31] We further
reported that TSA lacks a comprehensive plan with long-term goals and
performance targets for cargo security, time frames for completing
security improvements, and risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions
to achieve those goals. Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a
comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk
management approach, includes a list of security priorities, and sets
deadlines for completing actions. TSA agreed with this recommendation
and expects to develop such a plan by the end of 2003. It will be
important that this plan include a timetable for implementation to help
ensure that vulnerabilities in this area are reduced.
General Aviation Security:
Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general
aviation security, leaving general aviation far more open and
potentially vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is
vulnerable because general aviation pilots and passengers are not
screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are
not screened at any point. General aviation includes more than 200,000
privately owned airplanes, which are located in every state at more
than 19,000 airports.[Footnote 32] More than 550 of these airports also
provide commercial service. In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have
been stolen from general aviation airports, indicating a potential
weakness that could be exploited by terrorists. This vulnerability was
demonstrated in January 2002, when a teenage flight student stole and
crashed a single-engine airplane into a Tampa, Florida skyscraper.
Moreover, general aviation aircraft could be used in other types of
terrorist acts. It was reported that the September 11th hijackers
researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or chemical
agents.
We reported in September 2003 that TSA had chartered a working group on
general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory
Committee.[Footnote 33] The working group consists of industry
stakeholders and is designed to identify and recommend actions to close
potential security gaps in general aviation. On October 1, 2003, the
working group issued a report that included a number of recommendations
for general aviation airport operators' voluntary use in evaluating
airports' security requirements. These recommendations are both broad
in scope and generic in their application, with the intent that every
general aviation airport and landing facility operators may use them to
evaluate that facility's physical security, procedures,
infrastructure, and resources. TSA is taking some additional action to
strengthen security at general aviation airports, including developing
a risk-based self-assessment tool for general aviation airports to use
in identifying security concerns. We have ongoing work that is
examining general aviation security in further detail.
Aviation Security Funding:
TSA faces two key funding and accountability challenges in securing the
commercial aviation system: (1) paying for increased aviation security,
and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. These challenges are
particularly critical due to the government incurring large and
increasing deficits. The rapid rise in needed funding for aviation
security enhancements further exacerbates budget challenges. The costs
associated with aviation security are huge. The Department of Homeland
Security appropriation includes $3.7 billion for aviation security for
fiscal year 2004. The passenger and baggage screening functions alone
account for most of this funding, with about $1.8 billion appropriated
for passenger screening and $1.3 billion for baggage screening. ATSA
created passenger and air carrier security fees to pay for the costs of
aviation security, but the fees have not generated enough money to do
so. The Department of Transportation's Inspector General reported that
the security fees are estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion
during fiscal year 2004.
A major funding challenge is paying for the purchase and installation
of the remaining explosives detection systems, including integration
into airport baggage-handling systems. Integrating the equipment with
the baggage-handling systems is expected to be costly because it will
require major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed
to integrate the equipment at Boston's Logan International Airport are
estimated to cost $146 million. Modifications for Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport are estimated to cost $193 million. According to
TSA and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General, the cost
of integrating the equipment nationwide could be $3 billion.
A key question that must be addressed is how to pay for these
installation costs. The Federal Aviation Administration's Airport
Improvement Program (AIP) and passenger facility charges have been
eligible sources for funding this work.[Footnote 34] During fiscal year
2002, AIP grant funds totaling $561 million were used for terminal
modifications to enhance security. However, using these funds for
security reduced the funding available for other airport development
and rehabilitation projects. To provide financial assistance to
airports for security-related capital investments, such as the
installation of explosives detection equipment, proposed aviation
reauthorization legislation would establish an aviation security
capital fund that would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years.
In February 2003, we identified letters of intent as a funding option
that has been successfully used to leverage private sources of
funding.[Footnote 35] TSA has since signed letters of intent covering
seven airports--Boston Logan, Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles,
McCarran (Las Vegas), Ontario (California), and Seattle/Tacoma
international airports. Under the agreements, TSA will pay 75 percent
of the cost of integrating the explosives detection equipment into the
baggage-handling systems. The payments will stretch out over 3 to 4
years. TSA officials have identified more airports that would be
candidates for similar agreements.
Another challenge is ensuring continued investment in transportation
research and development. For fiscal year 2003, TSA was appropriated
about $110 million for research and development, of which $75 million
was designated for the next-generation explosives detection systems.
However, TSA proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these funds to be
used for other purposes, leaving about $12.7 million to be spent on
research and development in that year. This proposed reprogramming
could limit TSA's ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security
by continuing to invest in research and development for more effective
equipment to screen passengers, their carry-on and checked baggage, and
cargo. In ongoing work, we are examining the nature and scope of
research and development work by TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security, including their strategy for accelerating the development of
transportation security technologies.
Human Capital Management:
As it organizes itself to protect the nation's transportation system,
TSA faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of
about 60,000 people--more than 80 percent of whom are passenger and
baggage screeners. Additionally, over the next several years, TSA faces
the challenge of sizing and managing this workforce as efficiency is
improved with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and
procedures. For example, as explosives detection systems are integrated
with baggage-handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive
screening methods, such as trace detection techniques and manual bag
searches, can be reduced. Other planned security enhancements, such as
CAPPS II and a registered traveler program, also have the potential to
make screening more efficient. Further, if airports opt out of the
federal screener program and use their own or contract employees to
provide screening instead of TSA screeners, a significant impact on TSA
staffing could occur.
To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically,
we have developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related
critical success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can
take.[Footnote 36] Our model is designed to help agency leaders
effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital
considerations into daily decision making and the program results they
seek to achieve. In January 2003, we reported that TSA was addressing
some critical human capital success factors by using a wide range of
tools available for hiring, and beginning to link individual
performance to organizational goals.[Footnote 37] However, concerns
remain about the size and training of that workforce, the adequacy of
the initial background checks for screeners, and TSA's progress in
setting up a performance management system. TSA is currently developing
a human capital strategy, which it expects to be completed by the end
of this year.
TSA has proposed cutting the screener workforce by an additional 3,000
during fiscal year 2004. This planned reduction has raised concerns
about passenger delays at airports and has led TSA to begin hiring
part-time screeners to make more flexible and efficient use of its
workforce. In addition, TSA used an abbreviated background check
process to hire and deploy enough screeners to meet ATSA's screening
deadlines during 2002. After obtaining additional background
information, TSA terminated the employment of some of these screeners.
TSA reported 1,208 terminations as of May 31, 2003, that it ascribed to
a variety of reasons, including criminal offenses and failures to pass
alcohol and drug tests. Furthermore, the national media have reported
allegations of operational and management control problems that emerged
with the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service, including
inadequate background checks and training, uneven scheduling, and
inadequate policies and procedures. We reported in January 2003 that
TSA had taken the initial steps in establishing a performance
management system linked to organizational goals. Such a system will be
critical for TSA to motivate and manage staff, ensure the quality of
screeners' performance, and, ultimately, restore public confidence in
air travel. In ongoing work, we are examining the effectiveness of
TSA's efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners, and
we are assessing the effects of expansion on the Federal Air Marshal
Service.[Footnote 38]
Concluding Observations:
TSA faces many challenges in strengthening its passenger screening and
other security programs. To best address these challenges, it needs the
information and tools necessary to ensure that its efforts are
effective, are appropriately focused, and are achieving expected
results. Without knowledge on the effectiveness of its programs, TSA
and the public have little assurance regarding the level of security
provided, and whether TSA is using its resources to maximize security
benefits. As TSA implements new security initiatives and addresses
associated challenges, measuring program effectiveness will help it
best focus on the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that TSA is
undertaking efforts to develop the information and tools needed to
measure its performance.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Mike Bollinger, Lisa Brown, Jack Schulze, and Maria
Strudwick.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24,
2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003:
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3,
2003. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by
Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.:
December 3, 2002:
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED):
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation's Air
Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation's Air Transportation
System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
(RESTRICTED):
FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing
Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000.
Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses
That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington,
D.C.: September 27, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other
Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16,
2000.
Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems
Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June
22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10.
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] P.L. 107-71.
[2] ATSA required TSA to implement a pilot program using contract
screeners at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot
program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening
companies rather than federal screeners.
[3] CAPPS II is a system intended to perform a risk assessment of all
airline passengers to identify those requiring additional security
attention.
[4] General aviation consists of all civil aircraft and excludes
commercial and military aircraft.
[5] P.L. 107-296.
[6] An annual performance plan is to provide the direct linkage between
the strategic goals outlined in the agency's strategic plan and the
day-to-day activities of managers and staff. Additionally, annual
performance plans are to include performance goals for an agency's
program activities as listed in the budget, a summary of the necessary
resources that will be used to measure performance, and a discussion of
how the performance information will be verified. An annual performance
report is to review and discuss an agency's performance compared with
the performance goals it established in its annual performance plan.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening:
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining,
GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).
[8] The original Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a
stand-alone application residing in an air carrier's reservation system
that analyzes certain behavioral patterns to score and calculate each
passenger's need for additional screening.
[9] Currently, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has 7
team leaders assigned full-time to covert testing, and plans to have a
total of 14 full-time team leaders by the end of fiscal year 2004. The
team leaders draw from the remaining staff within the office, such as
auditors and analysts, to perform the testing. According to TSA
officials, overall, 95 percent of the staff in the Office of Internal
Affairs and Program Review participates in covert testing as a
collateral responsibility.
[10] TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by
projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as
they are screened. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying
the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted,
TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then
records the screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed
for performance trends.
[11] Federal security directors oversee security at each of the
nation's commercial airports.
[12] The Performance Management Information System also contains
metrics on human resources, sizing, checkpoint, feedback, and
incidents.
[13] The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 shifts the
focus of government operations from process to results by establishing
a foundation for examining agency mission, performance goals and
objectives, and results. Under the act, agencies are to prepare 5-year
strategic plans that set the general direction for their efforts, and
annual performance plans that establish connections between the long-
term strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the day-to-day
activities of managers and staff. Finally, the act requires that each
agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its annual
performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those
goals that have not been met.
[14] TSA is also developing a National Transportation Security System
Plan, a draft of which is currently under review within TSA. TSA plans
to promote consistent and mutually supporting intermodal planning in
cooperation with administrators and in collaboration with key
stakeholders from all modes of transportation. TSA designed the plan
for use by agencies, owners, and operators of the transportation system
to guide them as they develop their individual security plans.
Accordingly, the National Transportation System Security Plan will
include national modal plans to capture and tailor transportation
security requirements for each mode of transportation, with particular
emphasis on intermodal connections. Each modal plan will focus on
security for people (workforce and passengers), cargo (baggage and
shipments), infrastructure (vehicles, facilities, and right of ways),
and response preparedness.
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security
Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture,
GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003).
[16] TSA's screener workforce totaled 55,600 on March 31, 2003. The
agency cut 3,000 positions for a screener workforce of 52,600 by June
1, 2003. An additional 3,000 positions were cut for a workforce of
49,600 full-time equivalents (FTE) by September 30, 2003, the end of
the fiscal year. TSA officials predicted that the screener staffing
level will be down to 45,000 by the end of fiscal year 2004. Beginning
with the enactment of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, Public Law 107-206 (August 2, 2002), and in subsequent
appropriations acts, there have been restrictions on TSA impacting
staffing levels. The current fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, Public Law 108-90, contains a provision
requiring that none of the funds in the act be used to recruit or hire
personnel into TSA, which would cause the agency to exceed a screener
staffing level of 45,000 full-time equivalents.
[17] According to the August 8, 2003, request for quotation for the
evaluation of the contract screening pilot program, BearingPoint must
include informed performance comparisons, both quantitative and
qualitative, of private versus federal screeners overall and within
different sizes and categories of airports.
[18] Based on the time frames established in the request for quotation,
BearingPoint, Inc. is required to develop a project plan and evaluation
model no later than December 12, 2003.
[19] TSA's request for proposal for the pilot program evaluation notes
that there are a significant number of operational and managerial
elements at the discretion of the private screening companies that
should be considered in the evaluation, including supervision,
overhead, materials, recruiting, and scheduling.
[20] Explosives detection systems use probing radiation to examine
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of
threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.
[21] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials.
[22] Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening
checked baggage, which requires that the passenger be on the same
aircraft as the checked baggage.
[23] In-line screening involves incorporating EDS machines into airport
baggage handling systems to improve throughput of baggage and to
streamline airport operations.
[24] A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an
agency to provide multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current
authorization period. Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed
with a project without waiting for future federal funds because the
airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be
reimbursed.
[25] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding
Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover Airports' Planned Capital
Development, GAO-03-497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003).
[26] The seven airports include Denver International Airport, Las Vegas
McCarran International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport,
Ontario International Airport, Seattle/Tacoma International Airport,
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, and Boston Logan International
Airport. The purpose is to help defray the costs of installing
permanent explosive detection systems that are integrated with
airports' checked baggage conveyor systems.
[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal
Agencies and Airports, GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2000).
[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal
Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
[29] Congressional Research Service, Air Cargo Security, September 11,
2003.
[30] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities
and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Progress since
September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T (Washington,
D.C.: September 9, 2003).
[32] Of the 19,000 general aviation airports, 5,400 are publicly owned.
TSA is currently focusing its efforts on these publicly owned airports.
TSA is still unclear about its role in inspecting privately owned
general aviation airports.
[33] GAO-03-1150T.
[34] The Airport Improvement Program trust fund is used to fund capital
improvements to airports, including some security enhancements, such as
terminal modifications to accommodate explosive detection equipment.
[35] GAO-03-497T.
[36] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
[37] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[38] The Federal Air Marshal Service has been transferred out of TSA
and into the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement.
