Transportation Security
Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-616T April 1, 2003This testimony responds to the request of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for information on GAO's work in transportation security. It addresses (1) transportation security before September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) what long-term institutional challenges face the federal agencies responsible for transportation security. The testimony is based on a body of work that GAO has performed over the years.
Before September 2001, GAO's work in transportation security focused largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration, within the Department of Transportation. This work often demonstrated the existence of significant, long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security. Among these vulnerabilities were airport screeners' inadequate detection of threats when screening passengers and their carry-on bags prior to their boarding aircraft; the absence of any requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports; and inadequate security for air traffic control computer systems and facilities. Since September 2001, securing the nation's transportation systems from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. By the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal air marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked baggage for explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency preparedness, and conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also performed initial risk assessments of ports, established new security guidelines, and initiated a comprehensive assessment of security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. The Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have actions under way to strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo shipments, general aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain vulnerable to attack, and an effective port security environment may be many years away. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security face long-term transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a comprehensive transportation risk management approach; (2) ensuring that transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination among the many public and private entities responsible for transportation security; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. We have issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these challenges, and in response some actions are under way.
GAO-03-616T, Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST
in New York, New York:
Tuesday, April 1, 2003:
Transportation Security:
Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-03-616T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-616T, a testimony before the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Why GAO Did This Study:
This testimony responds to the request of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for information on GAO‘s work
in transportation security. It addresses (1) transportation security
before September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since
September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly
aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) what long-term
institutional challenges face the federal agencies responsible for
transportation security. The testimony is based on a body of work that
GAO has performed over the years.
What GAO Found:
Before September 2001, GAO‘s work in transportation security focused
largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of the
Federal Aviation Administration, within the Department of
Transportation. This work often demonstrated the existence of
significant, long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security. Among
these vulnerabilities were airport screeners‘ inadequate detection of
threats when screening passengers and their carry-on bags prior to
their boarding aircraft; the absence of any requirement to screen
checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate controls for limiting
access to secure areas at airports; and inadequate security for air
traffic control computer systems and facilities.
Since September 2001, securing the nation‘s transportation systems from
terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the
administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for
transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of
Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security
without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The
Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November
2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation
security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation
security challenges. By the end of December 2002, the agency had hired
and deployed a workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and
baggage screeners and federal air marshals, and was screening about 90
percent of all checked baggage for explosives. In addition, local mass
transit agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, increased training for
emergency preparedness, and conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard
has also performed initial risk assessments of ports, established new
security guidelines, and initiated a comprehensive assessment of
security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. The Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service have actions under way to
strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo shipments, general
aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain vulnerable to
attack, and an effective port security environment may be many years
away.
The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security face long-term
transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a
comprehensive transportation risk management approach; (2) ensuring
that transportation security funding needs are identified and
prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective
coordination among the many public and private entities responsible for
transportation security; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and
staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for
transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. We have
issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these
challenges, and in response some actions are under way.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony does not contain recommendations. However, GAO reports
and testimonies on aviation, transit, and port security and on
management issues are listed at the end of the statement. Many of these
reports and testimonies contain GAO recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-616T
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission[Footnote 1]:
We are here today to discuss our public work on transportation
security. As you know, the General Accounting Office is the audit,
evaluation, and investigative arm of the Congress. Our mission is to
support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and
to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal
government for the American people. We examine the use of public funds;
evaluate federal programs and policies; and provide analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help the Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. Our commitment to
good government is reflected in our core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability. We wish to thank the Commission for
inviting us today to share our knowledge of transportation security
issues, and we look forward to continuing to work with you.
Since September 11, 2001, securing our nation‘s transportation system
from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. On November 19, 2001,
the Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within
the Department of Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. DOT
then worked to strengthen security through its modal administrations
while simultaneously organizing the new agency to meet the longer-term
challenge of implementing security improvements that will not
excessively inhibit commerce and travel or interfere with other
critical agency missions. With the passage of the Homeland Security Act
on November 25, 2002, TSA was transferred to the new Department of
Homeland Security, which assumed overall responsibility for
transportation security.
My testimony today addresses (1) transportation security before
September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since
September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly
aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) the long-term
institutional challenges that face the federal agencies responsible for
transportation security.
In summary:
Before September 2001, our work in transportation security focused
largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of
DOT‘s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Together with other
studies, our work often demonstrated the existence of significant,
long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security. These
vulnerabilities included failure to detect threats when screening
passengers and their carry-on bags prior to their boarding aircraft and
the absence of any requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic
flights; inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at
airports; and failure to secure air traffic control computer systems
and facilities.
Since September 2001, securing our nation‘s transportation system from
terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the
administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for
transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of
Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security
without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. TSA has
made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges.
By the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a
workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and
federal air marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked
baggage for explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have
assessed vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency
preparedness, and conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also
performed initial risk assessments of ports, established new security
guidelines, and initiated a comprehensive assessment of security
conditions at 55 U.S. ports, and the Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service have actions under way to
strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo shipments, general
aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain vulnerable to
attack, and an effective port security environment may be many years
away.
DOT and the Department of Homeland Security face long-term
transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a
comprehensive risk-management approach; (2) ensuring that
transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized
and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination
among the many public and private entities responsible for
transportation security; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and
staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for
transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. We have
issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these
challenges, and some actions are under way.
Some Vulnerabilities in Transportation Security Were Known before
September 2001:
Our work on transportation security prior to September 2001 primarily
addressed vulnerabilities in aviation security. These included
ineffective screening of passengers and baggage for threat objects and
explosives, inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at
airports, and inadequate security for air traffic control computer
systems and facilities. Mass transit agencies were taking actions to
enhance security, and concerns about port security were raised.
Before September 2001, screeners, who were then hired by the airlines,
often failed to detect threat objects located on passengers or in their
carry-on luggage. As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners
conducted in 1987 revealed that screeners missed 20 percent of the
potentially dangerous objects that FAA used in its tests, and test data
from 1991 through 1999 showed a declining trend in the rate of
detection.[Footnote 2] At that time, FAA characterized this level of
performance as unsatisfactory. The more recent results showed that as
testing got more realistic--that is, as tests more closely approximated
how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint--screeners‘
performance declined significantly. A principal cause of screeners‘
performance problems was rapid turnover and insufficient training.
Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at most large airports,
leaving few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because of low
wages, limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous work.
Before September 2001, controls for limiting access to secure areas of
airports, including aircraft, did not always work as intended. As we
reported in May 2000, our special agents used fictitious law
enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas,
bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to
aircraft departure gates.[Footnote 3] The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. DOT‘s Inspector General also
documented numerous problems with airport access controls, and in one
series of tests, nearly 7 out of every 10 attempts by the Inspector
General‘s staff to gain access to secure areas were successful.
Before September 2001, our reviews of FAA‘s oversight of air traffic
control computer systems showed that FAA had not ensured the security
of these systems or of the facilities that house them.[Footnote 4] Our
reviews also found that FAA had not ensured that the contractors who
had access to the air traffic control computer systems had undergone
background checks. The air traffic control computer systems provide
information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to
help ensure the safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to
protect these systems and their facilities could cause a nationwide
disruption of air traffic or even a loss of life because of collisions.
Because of the vulnerabilities we identified, the air traffic control
system was susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks.
Over the years, we made numerous recommendations to FAA to improve
screeners‘ performance, strengthen airport access controls, and better
protect air traffic control computer systems and facilities. As of
September 2001, FAA had implemented some of these recommendations and
was addressing others, but its progress was often slow. In addition,
many initiatives were not linked to specific deadlines, making it
difficult to monitor and oversee their implementation.
Before September 2001, many transit agencies were implementing measures
to enhance transit safety and security, such as revising emergency
plans and training employees in emergency preparedness. According to
transit agency officials, the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
system and experiences during natural disasters had served as catalysts
for the agencies to focus on safety and security. The officials said
that the terrorist attacks on September 11th elevated the importance of
security.
Concerns about the security of the nation‘s ports were recognized even
before the September 11th attacks. Ports are inherently vulnerable to
terrorist attacks and make desirable targets because of their size,
accessibility by water and land, location in metropolitan areas, volume
of material transported, and ready transportation links to interior
locations. Moreover, a terrorist act at one of these seaports could
result in extensive loss of lives, property, and business, and could
impact the nation‘s economy if the free flow of trade is disrupted. In
August 2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports estimated that the costs to upgrade the security
infrastructure at the nation‘s 361 ports ranged from $10 million to $50
million per port.
Since September 2001, Federal Agencies Have Put People, Policies, and
Procedures in Place to Strengthen Transportation Security:
Since September 2001, federal and local agencies have been trying to
assess and address the monumental challenges they face in attempting to
strengthen the security of the nation‘s transportation systems. As we
testified on September 20, 2001, the enormous size of the U.S. airspace
alone defies easy protection, and no form of travel can ever be made
totally secure. Providing aviation security means protecting hundreds
of airports, thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of daily
flights. Providing transit and port security also poses daunting
challenges. For example, about 6,000 agencies provide transit services
through buses, subways, ferries, and light rail service to about 14
million Americans each weekday, and millions of containers are imported
into the United States through more than 300 public and private U.S.
seaports, with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals.
The federal government‘s role in transportation security has been
evolving since September 2001. TSA was created in November 2001 by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and has assumed overall
responsibility for transportation security. Although the agency has
thus far focused primarily on aviation, it is responsible under the act
for the security of all modes of transportation, which also include
mass transit, maritime, rail, highway, and pipelines. TSA is in the
early stages of working with the other transportation modes. We
highlight some of the progress that has been made in aviation, mass
transit, and port security.
Aviation Security:
Following the September 11th attacks, DOT faced several urgent aviation
security challenges, such as meeting newly established screening
deadlines and addressing security gaps that we and others, including
DOT‘s Inspector General, had identified. In November 2001, TSA assumed
responsibility under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act for
screening passengers and property. (See fig. 1.) The act required it to
hire and deploy federal passenger screeners by November 19, 2002, and
to screen all checked baggage using explosives detection systems by
December 31, 2002.[Footnote 5] In addition, FAA established a
requirement for installing reinforced cockpit doors in aircraft.
Figure 1: Passengers Being Screened at a Security Checkpoint:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSA has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security
challenges. For example, according to TSA, it:
* met the November 2002 deadline by hiring and deploying over 40,000
passenger screeners to screen passengers at 429 commercial airports;
* hired and deployed more than 20,000 of an estimated 22,000 baggage
screeners as of mid-December 2002 to screen all checked baggage;
* has been using explosives detection systems or explosives trace
detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage
as of December 31, 2002;[Footnote 6]
* has been using alternative means such as canine teams, hand searches,
and passenger-bag matching to screen the remaining checked baggage;
and:
* has made substantial progress in expanding the Federal Air Marshal
Service.
:
Furthermore, according to an FAA official, as of March 21, 2003, FAA
had approved designs for reinforcing the cockpit doors of over 98
percent of the commercial fleet‘s 5,750 aircraft, 80 percent of the
doors had been installed, and kits had been ordered for the remaining
doors. As of mid-December 2002, however, TSA still had to complete the
installation of most of the explosives detection equipment needed to
screen baggage to meet the act‘s baggage-screening requirements. At
that time, according to TSA, it had installed 239 of the 1,100
explosives detection machines and 1,951 of the 6,000 trace detection
machines that it had estimated were needed.
Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs
and other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or in
their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the cargo carried
aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act requires that all cargo carried aboard
commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA have a system in
place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure
the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. The ’known shipper“
program--which allows shippers that have established business histories
with air carriers or freight forwarders[Footnote 7] to ship cargo on
planes--is TSA‘s primary approach to ensuring air cargo security and
safety and to complying with the cargo-screening requirement of the
act. However, we and DOT‘s Inspector General have identified weaknesses
in the known shipper program and in TSA‘s procedures for approving
freight forwarders.[Footnote 8]
Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance
cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in
October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo-
profiling system similar to the computer-assisted passenger
prescreening system. However, in December 2002, we reported that
additional operational and technological measures, such as checking the
identity of individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to
improve air cargo security in the near term.[Footnote 9] We further
reported that TSA lacks a comprehensive plan with long-term goals and
performance targets for cargo security, time frames for completing
security improvements, and risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions
to achieve those goals.[Footnote 10] Accordingly, we recommended that
TSA develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that
incorporates a risk management approach, includes a list of security
priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA agreed with
this recommendation.
Since September 2001, TSA has taken only a few actions related to
general aviation security, leaving it far more open and potentially
vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation includes more
than 200,000 privately owned airplanes, which are located in every
state at more than 19,000 airports. Over 550 of these airports also
provide commercial service. General aviation‘s vulnerability was
revealed in January 2002, when a Florida teenager (and flight student)
crashed a single-engine Cessna airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. FAA
has since issued a notice with voluntary guidance for flight schools
that suggests such measures as using different keys to gain access to
an aircraft and start the ignition, not giving students access to
aircraft keys, ensuring positive identification of flight students, and
reporting suspicious activities. However, because the guidance is
voluntary, it is unknown how many flight schools have implemented these
measures.
Since September 2001, FAA has continued to strengthen the security of
the nation‘s air traffic control computer systems and facilities in
response to 39 recommendations we made between May 1998 and December
2000. However, more must be done to ensure that critical information
systems are not at risk of intrusion and attack. Among its
accomplishments, FAA has established an information systems security
management structure under its Chief Information Officer, whose office
has developed an information systems security strategy, security
architecture (that is, overall blueprint), security policies and
directives, and a security awareness training campaign. This office has
also managed FAA‘s incident response center and implemented a
certification and accreditation process to ensure that vulnerabilities
in current and future air traffic control systems are identified and
weaknesses addressed. Nevertheless, the office faces continued
challenges in increasing its intrusion detection capabilities,
obtaining accreditation for systems that are already operational, and
managing information systems security throughout the agency. In
addition, according to senior security officials, FAA has completed
assessments of the physical security of its staffed facilities, but it
has not yet accredited all of these air traffic control facilities as
secure in compliance with agency policy. Finally, FAA has worked
aggressively over the past 2 years to complete background
investigations on numerous contractor employees. However, ensuring that
all new contractors are assessed to determine which employees require
background checks, and that those checks are completed in a timely
manner, will be a continuing challenge for the agency.
Mass Transit:
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure, in part because certain characteristics that make them
vulnerable also make them difficult to secure. For example, the high
ridership of some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for
terrorists but also makes the use of certain security measures, like
metal detectors, impractical. Despite such challenges, transit agencies
have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems.
In December 2002, after visiting 10 transit agencies and surveying 200,
we reported that these agencies had implemented new security
initiatives or increased the frequency of existing activities since
September 2001.[Footnote 11] For example, many transit agencies had
assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency
preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency
drills. (See fig. 2.) Several agencies we visited had also implemented
innovative practices to enhance safety and security, such as training
police officers to drive buses and implementing an employee suggestion
program to solicit ideas for improving security.
Figure 2: Emergency Transit Drill in Progress:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
After September 2001, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), which
has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security,
launched a multipart security initiative. Although most of the transit
agencies we visited said this initiative was useful, they wanted the
federal government to provide more assistance to support transit
security, such as more information, help in obtaining security
clearances, increased funding, and more security-related research and
development. To give transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for
transit security improvements, we recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all
transit agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area they
serve, to use urbanized area formula funds[Footnote 12] for security-
related operating expenses. We also recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation develop risk-based criteria for distributing federal
funds to transit agencies for high-priority security improvements. The
department agreed to carefully consider our recommendations as it
continues working to improve transit security around the
country.[Footnote 13]
Port Security:
Since September 2001, federal agencies, state and local authorities,
and private-sector stakeholders have done much to address
vulnerabilities in the security of the nation‘s ports.[Footnote 14] The
Coast Guard, in particular, has acted as a focal point for assessing
and addressing security concerns. After September 11th, the Coast Guard
responded by refocusing its efforts and repositioning vessels,
aircraft, and personnel not only to provide security, but also to
increase visibility in key maritime locations. Some of its actions
included (1) conducting initial risk assessments of ports, which
identified high-risk infrastructure and facilities and helped determine
how the Coast Guard‘s small boats would be used for harbor security
patrols; (2) initiating new guidelines for developing security plans
and implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger
terminals; and (3) beginning a process to comprehensively assess the
security conditions of 55 U.S. ports over a 3-year period.
In addition, shortly after September 11th, the Coast Guard began
requiring ships to provide earlier notification of their scheduled
arrival at a U.S. port. All vessels over 300 gross tons are now
required to contact the Coast Guard 96 hours--up from 24 hours--before
they are scheduled to arrive at a U.S. port. Each vessel must provide
information on its destination, its scheduled arrival, the cargo it is
carrying, and a roster of its crew members. The information, which is
processed and reviewed by the Coast Guard‘s National Vessel Movement
Center, is used in conjunction with data from various intelligence
agencies to identify ’high-interest“ vessels. Decisions on appropriate
actions to be taken with respect to such vessels, such as whether to
board, escort, or deny entry to them, are based on established criteria
and procedures.[Footnote 15] (See fig. 3.):
Figure 3: Inspecting Millions of Containers That Arrive at U.S. Ports
Remains a Challenge:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Two other key federal agencies--the Customs Service and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service--also have actions under way to begin to
address such issues as container security and the screening of persons
seeking entry into the United States. With more than 6 million
containers a year entering U.S. ports, examining them all has not been
possible. Using a targeted approach, Customs physically inspects about
2 percent of the containers that enter the country. New initiatives by
the Customs Service would widen inspection coverage. For example, the
Customs Service‘s Container Security Initiative focuses on placing U.S.
Customs inspectors at the ports of embarkation to target containers for
inspection; the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism focuses on
efforts by importers and others to enhance security procedures along
their supply chain; and Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new
technology, such as container seals, to help shippers ensure the
integrity of the cargo included in containers being sent to the United
States.
Transportation Security Poses Long-Term Institutional Challenges:
Efforts to strengthen transportation security face several long-term
institutional challenges that include (1) developing a comprehensive
risk management approach; (2) ensuring that funding needs are
identified and prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3)
establishing effective coordination among the many responsible public
and private entities; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and
staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for
transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment.
Risk Management:
To achieve transportation security as well as homeland security, it
will be important to effectively manage the risks posed by terrorist
threats and to direct national resources to the areas of highest
priority. We have advocated the use of a risk management approach to
guide federal programs and responses to better prepare for and
withstand terrorist threats.[Footnote 16] A risk management approach is
a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the
criticality (or relative importance) of assets, to better support key
decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results.
Figure 4 describes this approach.
Figure 4: Elements of a Risk Management Approach:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our work has shown that TSA and some of DOT‘s modal administrations
have partially developed risk management approaches. For example, in
the fall of 2001, FAA completed an assessment of the threats to and
vulnerabilities of air cargo. The assessment examined a single
scenario--a terrorist attempting to place a bomb on a commercial
passenger aircraft--but did not address the shipment‘s vulnerability to
tampering along the route from the shipper to the aircraft. In December
2002, we also reported that FTA obtains threat information from a
variety of sources, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
had started to identify the most critical transit infrastructure.
Moreover, according to agency officials and our survey results, many
transit agencies are conducting vulnerability or security assessments.
Finally, as noted, the Coast Guard has already conducted initial risk
assessments of the nation‘s ports, has established new security
guidelines, and is planning for comprehensive assessments of security
conditions at 55 U.S. ports. We have recommended that TSA conduct a
comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk
management approach, and we have recommended that FTA use a risk-based
approach in prioritizing funding decisions for security projects. Both
TSA and FTA agreed with our recommendations. Comprehensive risk-based
assessments are important for all the modes, and they support effective
planning and resource allocation.
Funding:
Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1) paying for
increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are
controlled. The costs associated with acquiring equipment and personnel
for improving aviation security alone are huge. Although TSA estimates
that it will need about $4.8 billion for aviation security in fiscal
year 2003, it estimates that revenues from the new passenger security
fee will pay for only around one-third ($1.7 billion) of that amount.
As a result, TSA will need a major cash infusion at a time when federal
budget deficits are growing. Similarly, many of the planned security
improvements for surface transportation facilities, such as seaports
and mass transit, require costly outlays for infrastructure,
technology, and personnel at a time when weakening local economies have
reduced local transportation agencies‘ abilities to fund security
improvements.
Estimates of the funding needed to pay for port security far outstrip
the amounts made available to date.[Footnote 17] As we reported in
August 2002, the Congress appropriated $93 million to fund security
improvements at the nation‘s 361 ports in fiscal year 2002, but TSA
received applications for as much as $697 million for these
improvements. Efforts by the Coast Guard to develop security standards
for ports, which we reported in August 2002, should help to identify
and prioritize needs so that limited funds can be targeted to the
highest risks at each port. Additional funding will be needed to comply
with provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, enacted in
November 2002, which require, among other things, that regulations be
developed for the preparation and submission of vessel and facility
security plans, and that vulnerability assessments be conducted for
vessels and U.S. port facilities.
In July 2002, we reported that long-term attention to cost and
accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes
will be critical both to ensuring TSA‘s success and to maintaining its
integrity and accountability.[Footnote 18] According to DOT‘s Inspector
General, although TSA has made progress in addressing certain cost-
related issues, it has not established an infrastructure that provides
effective controls to monitor contractors‘ costs and performance. To
ensure control over TSA contracts, DOT‘s Inspector General has
recommended that the Congress set aside a specific amount of TSA‘s
contracting budget for overseeing contractors‘ performance with respect
to cost, schedule, and quality.[Footnote 19]
In considering the federal government‘s role in meeting long-term
funding challenges, several issues will need to be addressed beyond
determining who should pay for the security enhancements and to what
extent the agency functions should be funded. An important
consideration is, which criteria are most appropriate for distributing
federal funds? The chief criteria considered have been ridership level,
population, identified vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets.
Another important consideration, as we reported in September 2002, is,
which federal policy instruments--grants, loan guarantees, tax
incentives, or partnerships--are most appropriate to motivate or
mandate other levels of government or the private sector to help
address security concerns?[Footnote 20] Finally, it will be important
to consider how to allocate funds between competing needs and to
measure whether we are achieving the increased security benefits
envisioned.
Coordination:
Since September 2001, federal, state, and local surface transportation
agencies and the private sector have begun rethinking roles and
responsibilities for transportation security. One challenge to
achieving national preparedness hinges on the federal government‘s
ability to form effective partnerships among entities that implement
security measures at the local level. Effective, well-coordinated
partnerships require identifying roles and responsibilities;
developing effective, collaborative relationships with local and
regional transportation, emergency management, and law enforcement
agencies; agreeing on performance-based standards that describe desired
outcomes; testing procedures that implement roles and responsibilities;
and sharing intelligence information.
Although TSA has focused primarily on aviation security challenges
since its creation in 2001, it is working toward defining the roles and
responsibilities for other modes. TSA has developed a memorandum of
agreement with FAA that laid out general principles of cooperation and
consultation between the two agencies. DOT and TSA expect that
agreement to also serve as a guide to relations between TSA and DOT‘s
other modal administrations.
Coordination challenges will continue now that TSA has been transferred
to the new Department of Homeland Security. TSA will act as a national
transportation system security manager and expects to work closely with
DOT to establish security standards for all modes of transportation
(air, mass transit, maritime, rail, highway, and pipelines). Both TSA
and DOT will have to ensure the development of sound security policies
and procedures and the effective implementation of those procedures by
the many public and private transportation systems‘ stakeholders.
TSA will also have to ensure that the terrorist and threat information
gathered and maintained by law enforcement and other agencies--
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Department of State--is quickly and efficiently communicated among
federal agencies and to state and local authorities, as needed. In
aviation security, timely information-sharing among agencies has been
hampered by organizational cultures reluctant to share sensitive
information and by outdated, incompatible computer systems. In surface
transportation, timely information-sharing has been hampered by the
lack of standard protocols to exchange information among federal,
state, and local government agencies and private entities. Finally, as
we reported in September 2002, intelligence-sharing can be hampered if
personnel in surface transportation agencies have difficulty in
acquiring the security clearances needed to obtain critical
intelligence information.[Footnote 21]
Human Capital:
As it organizes itself to protect the nation‘s transportation system,
TSA faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of more
than 60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at airports or on
aircraft to detect weapons and explosives and to prevent them from
being taken aboard and used on aircraft. To assist agencies in managing
their human capital more strategically, we have developed a model that
identifies cornerstones and related critical success factors that
agencies should apply and steps they can take.[Footnote 22] Our model
is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their
people and integrate human capital considerations into daily
decisionmaking and the program results they seek to achieve. In January
2003, we reported that TSA is addressing some critical human capital
success factors by hiring personnel, using a wide range of tools
available for hiring, and beginning to link individual performance to
organizational goals.[Footnote 23] However, concerns remain about TSA‘s
approach to compensation and progress in setting up a performance
management system. For example, DOT‘s Inspector General expressed
concern about TSA‘s approach to compensation. TSA is basing its
compensation system on FAA‘s pay banding approach, which allows the
agency to hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands for their
positions. Last summer, the Inspector General reported that TSA‘s
salary levels for law enforcement and general and administrative
positions were higher than for comparable positions in other agencies.
[Footnote 24] TSA was also behind schedule in establishing a
performance management system linked to organizational goals. Such a
system will be critical in order for TSA to motivate and manage staff,
ensure the quality of screeners‘ performance, and, ultimately, restore
public confidence in air travel.
Security Standards for Surface Transportation:
Security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security
equipment define the level of security that is needed and the
safeguards that should be in place to meet identified security needs.
Adequate standards, consistently applied, are important to ensure that
operators improve their security practices in modes where lax security
could make surface transportation facilities attractive targets for
terrorists. New security standards are being developed in some modes
and are being considered in other modes. For example, new security
standards are being developed for ports, to prevent unauthorized
persons from gaining access to sensitive areas, to detect and intercept
intrusions, to check the backgrounds of those whose jobs require access
to port facilities, and to screen travelers and other visitors to port
facilities. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, enacted
November 25, 2002, requires the development of (1) port security
regulations for access controls, background checks, and vessel and
facility security plans and (2) performance standards for seals and
locks on shipping containers. In addition, legislation proposed in the
last session of Congress would require DOT to prescribe standards for
pipeline security programs and to approve or disapprove each pipeline
operator‘s program on the basis of the operator‘s adherence to these
standards.[Footnote 25] However, industry representatives have told us
that they would prefer a nonregulatory approach, citing concerns about
the need for flexibility in designing security programs suitable for
each pipeline facility.
While progress has been made in developing security standards,
challenges remain in implementing them. There is little precedent for
how to enforce standards, because the size, complexity, and diversity
of surface transportation facilities do not lend themselves to an
enforcement approach similar to the one adopted for airports after
September 11th. Implementing standards is also difficult because it
requires consensus and compromises on the part of stakeholders. To the
degree that some stakeholders believe that security actions are
unnecessary or conflict with other goals and interests, achieving
consensus about what to do will be difficult.
Concluding Observations:
Where do we stand today? How much more secure are we now than we were
before September 11th? After spending billions of dollars on people,
policies, and procedures to improve security, we are much more secure
now than we were then, but we can never be completely secure. Today, we
have better intelligence, coordination, and communication; we have
plans to alert the public to threats; and we are all more alert to the
possibility of threats. Yet major vulnerabilities remain, particularly
in air cargo, general aviation, mass transit, and port security.
Addressing these vulnerabilities will continue to require risk
assessments and plans that balance security concerns against mobility
needs, and that consider how much the nation can afford to spend for
security improvements in light of other, competing demands for limited
funds.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Commission may have.
Contact information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony include Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Maren McAvoy, John W.
Shumann, and Teresa Spisak.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security:
Aviation Security: FAA Needs to Update Curriculum and Certification
Requirements for Aviation Mechanics. GAO-03-317. Washington, D.C.:
March 6, 2003.
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3,
2003. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT‘s
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by
Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.:
December 3, 2002.
Aviation Safety: Better Guidance and Training Needed on Providing Files
on Pilots‘ Background Information. GAO-02-722. August 30, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GA0-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED):
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation‘s Air
Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation‘s Air Transportation
System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation‘s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
(RESTRICTED):
FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing
Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000.
Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses
That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington,
D.C.: September 27, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other
Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16,
2000.
Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners‘
Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems
Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June
22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but Further
Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000.
Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10.
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous Objects
during FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/T-RCED-00-143. Washington,
D.C.: April 6, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD-00-85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for
Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results. GAO/GGD-00-38.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Not Adequately Detecting Threat Objects
during FAA Testing. GAO/T-RCED-00-124. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION):
Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2000.
Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign
Nationals to Remediate and Review Software. GAO/AIMD-00-55. Washington,
D.C.: December 23, 1999.
Aviation Security: FAA‘s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding
for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/RCED-99-
53. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1999.
Aviation Security: FAA‘s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of
Explosives. GAO/RCED-99-32R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-155. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998.
Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is
Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998.
Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-60. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998. (LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE -DO NOT DISSEMINATE):
Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/RCED-98-102. Washington, D.C.:
April 24, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. T-NSIAD-98-
164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
Identifying and Responding to Risks. GAO/RCED-98-6. Washington, D.C.:
February 27, 1998.
Aviation Security: FAA‘s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.
GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives
Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-ll9R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997.
Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the
Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security. GAO/T-RCED-97-90. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 1997.
Aviation Security: Technology‘s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.
GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996.
Aviation Security: Oversight of Initiatives Will Be Needed. C-GAO/T-
RCED/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1996. (CLASSIFIED):
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/T-RCED/
NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996.
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. GAO/T-
RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996.
Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That Airports‘ Access Control
Systems Are Cost Effective. GAO/RCED-95-25. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
1995.
Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
Expectations. GAO/RCED-94-142. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1994.
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges. GAO/RCED-94-38. Washington, D.C.: January
27, 1994.
Transit Security:
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address
Security Challenges. GAO-03-263. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002.
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T.
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.
Maritime Security:
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.
Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions
to the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 12,
2003.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Other:
Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,
2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership
Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
A Model of Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP. Washington, D.C.:
March 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
is an independent, bipartisan commission created by Public Law 107-306
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the events of September
11, 2001, and make recommendations for corrective measures that can be
taken to prevent acts of terrorism.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing
Problems Impair Airport Screeners‘ Performance, GAO/RCED-00-74
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal
Agencies and Airports, GAO-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000).
[4] Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize
Flight Safety, GAO/AIMD-98-155 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998);
Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls over Use of Foreign
Nationals to Remediate and Review Software, GAO/AIMD-00-55 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 23, 1999); Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel
Weaknesses, but Further Action Is Required, GAO/AIMD-00-169
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000); FAA Computer Security: Concerns
Remain Due to Personnel and Other Continuing Weaknesses, GAO/
AIMD-00-252 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2000); and FAA Computer
Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses, GAO-01-171
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2000).
[5] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 amends this requirement.
According to the legislation, if, in his discretion or at the request
of an airport, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
determines that TSA is not able to deploy the explosives detection
systems required in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act by
December 31, 2002, then for each airport for which the Under Secretary
makes this determination, the Under Secretary shall submit to specific
congressional committees a detailed plan for the deployment of the
number of explosives detection systems at that airport necessary to
meet the requirements as soon as practicable at that airport but no
later than December 31, 2003; the Under Secretary shall take all
necessary action to ensure that alternative means of screening all
checked baggage are implemented until the requirements have been met.
[6] Explosives detection machines are used to screen baggage for
explosives and work by using CAT scan X-ray to take fundamental
measurements of materials in bags to recognize characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. Explosives trace detection systems
(trace detection machines) are used to screen baggage for explosives,
and work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives.
[7] Freight forwarders consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers and cargo facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities
and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[9] GAO-03-344.
[10] GAO-03-344.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Federal Action Could
Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2002).
[12] The federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds
to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more)
for transit capital investments, operating expenses, and
transportation-related planning.
[13] We are currently examining TSA‘s role in the security of transit
and all other modes of transportation. We expect to report on this work
later this spring.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces
Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002).
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Container Security: Current
Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges,
GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2002).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
[17] GAO-02-993T.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges,
GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002).
[19] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Key Challenges Facing the Transportation Security Administration, CC-
2002-180 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002).
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2002).
[21] GAO-02-1075T.
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
[23] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security
Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture,
GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2003).
[24] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Progress in Implementing Provisions of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, CC-2002-203 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 7, 2002).
[25] Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety
Act, H.R. 3609, 107th Congress (2001).
