Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected
Gao ID: GAO-03-713T May 13, 2003This testimony discusses the results of security tests we performed in which agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), acting in an undercover capacity, entered the United States from various countries in the Western Hemisphere using counterfeit documentation and fictitious identities. This work was initially undertaken at the request of the Senate Finance Committee and was continued at the request of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary. The purpose of our tests was to determine whether U.S. government officials conducting inspections at ports of entry would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
In summary, we created counterfeit identification documents in order to establish fictitious identities for our agents by using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. The agents entered the United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and Canada using fictitious names, counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Bureau of Customs & Border Protection (BCBP) staff never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, BCBP staff did not ask for any identification when our agents entered the United States from Mexico and Canada. We have briefed BCBP officials on the results and methods of our work.
GAO-03-713T, Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-713T
entitled 'Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From
Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected' which was released
on May 13, 2003.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims,
House Committee on the Judiciary:
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, May 13, 2003:
COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS USED TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES FROM CERTAIN
WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES NOT DETECTED:
Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director
Office of Special Investigations:
GAO-03-713T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am here today to discuss the results of security tests we performed
in which agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), acting
in an undercover capacity, entered the United States from various
countries in the Western Hemisphere using counterfeit documentation and
fictitious identities. This work was initially undertaken at the
request of the Senate Finance Committee and was continued at your
request.[Footnote 1] The purpose of our tests was to determine whether
U. S. government officials conducting inspections at ports of entry
would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
I am accompanied this morning by Ronald Malfi, Director for
Investigations, and Special Agent Ramon Rodriguez.
In summary, we created counterfeit identification documents in order to
establish fictitious identities for our agents by using off-the-shelf
computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. The
agents entered the United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and
Canada using fictitious names, counterfeit driver's licenses and birth
certificates. Bureau of Customs & Border Protection (BCBP)[Footnote 2]
staff never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents,
and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using
them. On two occasions, BCBP staff did not ask for any identification
when our agents entered the United States from Mexico and Canada. We
have briefed BCBP officials on the results and methods of our work.
Background:
Immigration regulations require that all persons who arrive at a U.S.
port of entry be inspected by a government official. A U.S. citizen
traveling from countries in the Western Hemisphere, such as those we
visited for purposes of these tests, is not required to show a passport
when entering the United States but is required to prove citizenship.
BCBP accepts as proof of citizenship documents, such as a United
States' state or federally issued birth certificate or a baptismal
record, and photo identification such as a driver's license. However,
since the law does not require that U.S. citizens who enter the United
States from Western Hemisphere countries present documents to prove
citizenship they are permitted to establish U.S. citizenship by oral
statements alone.
Border Crossings:
U.S. Border Crossing from Jamaica:
Two of our agents traveling on one-way tickets from Jamaica arrived at
an airport in the United States. After landing at the U.S. airport, the
two agents proceeded to the immigration checkpoint and presented to
BCBP immigration inspectors counterfeit driver's licenses in fictitious
names along with fictitious birth certificates purportedly issued by
two different states. One BCBP inspector asked one of the agents for
his date of birth, and inquired about where and when the agent had
obtained the birth certificate. The agent stated that he had obtained
the birth certificate about 4 or 5 years earlier. A different BCBP
inspector did not question the second agent. The BCBP inspectors did
not recognize any of the documents presented as counterfeit and allowed
the agents to enter the United States.
U.S. Border Crossing from Barbados:
Barbados immigration officials provide visitors entering Barbados with
a two-part immigration form to complete. They collect one part and
return the second part to the visitor stamped with the date of entry
into Barbados. Visitors are instructed to return the second part to
immigration officials upon departing Barbados. In May 2003, two of our
agents departed Barbados and provided Barbados immigration officials
with unstamped immigration forms in fictitious names. Barbados
officials accepted the forms without questioning why they were not
stamped.
Two agents traveled on one-way tickets from Barbados and arrived at an
airport in the United States. The two agents separately proceeded to
the immigration checkpoint and were checked by the same BCBP
immigration inspector. One agent was asked for his passport, and he
responded that did not have one. The agent provided a fictitious birth
certificate and a Customs declaration form. The BCBP inspector reviewed
the documents and asked for picture identification. In response to this
request, the agent provided a counterfeit driver's license. The BCBP
inspector then asked the agent several questions, reviewed the
documents again, asked additional questions, and instructed the agent
to proceed through Customs. The agent provided the BCBP customs officer
with the Customs form and subsequently left the airport without any
further scrutiny.
The second agent had a similar experience. The BCBP immigration
inspector asked for a passport. The agent explained that he did not
have one and provided a counterfeit birth certificate. The BCBP
inspector then asked for picture identification and the agent offered
to produce a driver's license. The BCBP inspector did not ask to see
the driver's license but asked several questions and then instructed
the agent to proceed to Customs. The agent turned in his Customs form
to a Customs official and then left the airport without any further
scrutiny.
The BCBP immigration inspector did not question any of the counterfeit
documents.
U.S. Border Crossings from Mexico:
On two occasions our agents crossed the border from Mexico into the
United States. On one occasion, at a land border crossing, a BCBP
immigration inspector asked our agent if he was a U.S. citizen and
whether he had brought anything across the border from Mexico. After
the agent responded that he was a U.S. citizen and that he was not
bringing anything into the United States from Mexico, the inspector
allowed him to proceed without requiring any proof of identity.
On a subsequent occasion at the same border crossing, two of our agents
were asked for identification by separate BCBP inspectors. Both agents
presented counterfeit driver's licenses and were allowed to cross into
the United States.
U.S. Border Crossings from Canada:
On three occasions our agents crossed the border from Canada into the
United States. The first border crossing occurred when two agents
entered the United States through a sea port of entry from Canada. On
that occasion, the agents were not asked to show identification. On a
subsequent occasion, two agents, driving a rented car with Canadian
plates, using fictitious names and counterfeit documents, crossed the
border into the United States at a Canadian border crossing. A BCBP
immigration inspector asked for identification and was provided the
counterfeit documents. After the inspector reviewed the documents, the
agents were allowed to cross the border.
During the Canadian land border crossing, the agents discovered a
further potential security problem. A park straddles the U.S. and
Canada at this border crossing. One of our agents was able to walk
across this park into the United States from Canada without being
stopped or questioned by any U.S. government official. Later, that
agent walked back to Canada through this park without being inspected
by Canadian authorities.
Conclusion:
We recognize that weaknesses in inspection processes for entrants into
the United States raise complex issues, and we are currently performing
an evaluation of those processes, which will be reported to Congress in
the coming months.[Footnote 3] Although BCBP inspects millions of
people who enter the United States and detects thousands of individuals
who attempt to enter illegally each year, the results of our work
indicate that BCBP inspectors are not readily capable of detecting
counterfeit identification documents. Further, people who enter the
United States are not always asked to present identification. While
current law does not require that U.S. Citizens who enter the U.S. from
Western Hemisphere countries provide documentary proof of U.S.
citizenship, this does provide an opportunity for individuals to enter
the United States illegally.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may
have at this time.
(601122):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Part of this work is described in our January 30, 2003, testimony
before the Finance Committee entitled Weaknesses in Screening Entrants
into the United States (GAO-03-438T).
[2] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the inspection of
people and goods functions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service were transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On March 1, 2003, BCBP became an
official agency of DHS, which includes the portions of INS and Customs
that monitor individuals entering the United States. For purposes of
describing our border crossings prior to the date that BCBP was
established officially, we refer to staff formerly employed by INS and
Customs as staff of BCBP.
[3] This evaluation of the inspection process is being performed
pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996.
