Homeland Security
Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions Gao ID: GAO-03-902T June 16, 2003Balancing our nation's security and commercial needs is a longstanding issue that is especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the nation's security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections component of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a former component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly affected by BCBP's commercial and border and immigration control workload. Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U.S. Customs Services processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over $1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U.S. sea ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin growing again, when an economic recovery is underway at some point in the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding border and immigration control workload, in fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U.S. illegally between the ports of entry.
With respect to cargo, BCBP has attempted to select and inspect the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of legitimate commercial activities. But, additional challenges remain, including the need to improve its trade compliance program and to successfully implement its new trade processing information system. BCBP also faces many challenges with respect of preventing illegal entry by individuals into the United States. These challenges impact BCBP's ability to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry and to identify those individuals who should not be permitted entry at the ports. BCBP is faced with continuing to implement its southwest border strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on communities, and responding to continuing concern over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation's borders, the challenges include detecting false admissibility documents, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and providing timely intelligence to the field, and successfully implementing the new entry-exit system. In our recent Performance and Accountability series report, we designed implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS, including those forming BCBP, already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which are described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences.
GAO-03-902T, Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, Select
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT:
Monday, June 16, 2003:
Homeland Security:
Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its
Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues:
GAO-03-902T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the longstanding challenge of
balancing our nation's security and commercial needs, an issue that is
especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks that changed the nation's security environment.
Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security
directorate. Within this directorate, the responsibility has been
assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S.
Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections components of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and a former
component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS).[Footnote 1]
Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly
affected by BCBP's commercial and border and immigration control
workload. Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the
former U.S. Customs Service processed 24.9 million trade import entries
valued at over $1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and
fees; it also processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at
U.S. sea ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a
result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin
growing again when an economic recovery is underway at some point in
the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding
border and immigration control workload, in fiscal year 2002,
inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected nearly 450 million
travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens
trying to enter the U.S. illegally between the ports of entry.
BCBP faces many challenges as it performs its important missions. In my
testimony today, I make the following points:
* With respect to cargo, BCBP has attempted to select and inspect the
highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be
cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges,
from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence
to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect
potentially harmful contraband. BCBP has made some progress in
implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of
its regulation of legitimate commercial activities. But, additional
challenges remain, including the need to improve its trade compliance
program and to successfully implement its new trade processing
information system.
* BCBP also faces many challenges with respect to preventing illegal
entry by individuals into the United States. These challenges impact
BCBP's ability to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry
and to identify those individuals who should not be permitted entry at
the ports. BCBP is faced with continuing to implement its southwest
border strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over
illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives
affects the strategy may have on communities, and responding to
continuing concerns over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and
desolate areas. At our nation's borders, the challenges include
detecting false admissibility documents, unifying and enhancing
inspector training, providing timely intelligence to the field, and
successfully implementing the new entry-exit system.
* In our recent Performance and Accountability series report, we
designated implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based
on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS
is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an
effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into
DHS, including those forming BCBP, already face a wide array of
existing challenges, some of which are described in this statement.
Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the
nation to potentially very serious consequences.
My testimony today is intended to provide an overview based primarily
on the results of work that we have completed in recent years, namely,
our Performance and Accountability Series and High-Risk reports related
to DHS, Justice and Treasury;[Footnote 2] DHS's international mail and
package inspection processes;[Footnote 3] DHS's acquisition and
deployment of radiation detection equipment;[Footnote 4] the Border
Patrol's southwest border strategy;[Footnote 5] DHS's spending plans
for its planned system to monitor the flow of foreign nationals in and
out of the United States;[Footnote 6] and our investigators' efforts to
enter the country using fraudulent documents.[Footnote 7] My testimony
also highlights our ongoing work related to cargo inspections and
individual inspections at land ports of entry.[Footnote 8]
Challenges Related to Cargo Processing:
BCBP has undertaken efforts to focus its enforcement on selecting and
inspecting the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate
cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. It has a number of initiatives
underway aimed at improving its ability to identify potentially risky
cargo for inspection. BCBP and Customs before it have longstanding
efforts to use information, personnel, and technology to identify such
cargo. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability
of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of
nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful
contraband. From a trade facilitation perspective, BCBP has made some
progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the
efficiency of its regulation of commercial activities. But additional
challenges remain, including the need to improve its evolving trade
compliance program and acquire a new trade processing system.
Major Cargo Security Initiatives:
According to the Commissioner of BCBP, the priority mission is to
prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. This important mission means improving security at our physical
borders and ports of entry, as well as extending the zone of security
beyond our physical borders. BCBP has a number of initiatives underway
aimed at improving security, including:
* Container Security Initiative, which stations BCBP personnel in key
international ports to examine high-risk cargo before it is placed on
ships bound for the United States.
* Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the Free and Secure
Trade Program, which are designed to increase supply chain security and
expedite the clearance of legitimate trade.
* Non-Intrusive Inspection technology, which increases the ability to
detect conventional explosives, nuclear weapons, radioactive
components, and other weapons of mass destruction.
* Automated Targeting System, which is used by the National Targeting
Center and field targeting units in the United States and overseas to
help target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the United States.
We have work underway to review most of these initiatives and will make
our results available to the Subcommittee as soon as the work is
completed.
Selecting Highest-Risk Cargo for Inspection:
Separating high-risk cargo from low-or no-risk cargo is extremely
important to BCBP because searching each and every cargo and traveler
that enters the United States would cripple the flow of legitimate
trade and travel and would require a huge resource commitment. Over the
years Customs has recognized that it needed to identify what is high
risk--and to do so as early in the process as possible--and target its
limited resources accordingly. To select, or "target," and inspect the
highest-risk cargoes and travelers, BCBP relies on the use of threat
assessments and actionable intelligence, the ability of inspectors to
quickly discover or sense an unlawful cargo, and the use of
nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful
contraband. Each of these poses challenges to BCBP.
Information is key to identifying high-risk cargo. Such information can
come from manifests for air and sea shipments, from importers, or from
intelligence units within or outside DHS. Accurate information can help
BCBP make reliable risk determinations, particularly when it is used in
DHS computerized models that help assess cargo risk. Obviously, when
information or intelligence is incomplete or unreliable, it can
adversely impact on BCBP's ability to identify potentially risky cargo
for inspection.
We are currently reviewing how BCBP is targeting cargo for further
inspection and how such cargo is inspected at ports. In this regard, we
are reviewing how BCBP developed the model used in targeting, how BCBP
is handling the targets generated by the model at sea ports, and
whether and how BCBP intends to evaluate targeting. Since this work is
ongoing, and involves information that BCBP also considers to be law
enforcement sensitive, we are precluded from discussing specific
aspects of this matter in this unclassified statement. However, in the
broadest terms, our work to date shows that BCBP's targeting efforts
face a range of challenges relating to threat assessments, actionable
intelligence, and nonintrusive inspection technology.
Having sufficient numbers of well-trained and motivated staff is also
key to identifying high-risk cargo. Inspectors and canine officers are
trained to detect unusual or abnormal behaviors or circumstances that
suggest a potential threat or unlawful activity. Many have developed a
"sixth sense" in that they pick up on latent clues and unconnected
information. Nevertheless, these inspectors are challenged by the tight
timeframes and pressures they work under to move legitimate cargo
through the ports.
Our recent work on the inspection of international mail showed that
relying on inspectors alone can increase the risk that contraband
enters the country. The inspection of incoming foreign mail remains
largely a manual process that relies primarily on physical examination.
We found several challenges relating to this process, but BCBP's
determination that our results were law enforcement sensitive precludes
our discussing them here. However, at the time our work was completed,
one courier was working with the former Customs Service to pilot test
an advance manifest system--a computerized database that receives cargo
manifest information. The database is intended to allow Customs to
analyze incoming package information and make more informed decisions
about what packages to inspect.
In addition to information and staff, technology provides for a more
effective and efficient process. Large-scale x-ray and gamma-ray
imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and portable and hand-held
radiation detection devices can reduce the need for costly, intensive
inspections and save inspection time and resources.
As important as the use of technology is, there are certain limitations
and challenges that need to be considered. For example, we reviewed
Customs' acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment.
We found that some of the radiation detection equipment being used--
radiation pagers--have a limited range and are not designed to detect
weapons-usable nuclear material. Furthermore, experts we contacted did
not view pagers as search instruments but rather as personal safety
devices. We plan to report later this summer on BCBP's acquisition and
deployment of radiation detection equipment.
Assuring the Timely Flow of Legitimate Cargo:
In trying to achieve the commercial-security balance, BCBP is
challenged to ensure that antiterrorism efforts do not slow the flow of
legitimate international commerce and travel. According to BCBP, it has
worked with importers on concerns such as where their goods originated,
the physical security and integrity of their overseas plants and those
of their foreign suppliers, the background of their personnel, the
means by which they transport goods, and those who they have chosen to
transport their goods into the country. BCBP has reaffirmed to
importers the importance of knowing their customers and has examined
the security practices of their freight forwarders and the routes their
shipments travel.
Although BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that
are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of commercial
activities, additional challenges remain, particularly in view of the
new and heightened emphasis on terrorism. These challenges include (1)
continuing to improve its evolving trade compliance program and (2)
acquiring a new trade processing system.
Implementing the Customs Modernization Act:
Although tempered recently by the global economic slowdown, growth in
the volume and value of imports continues to create profound challenges
for BCBP to facilitate and enforce U.S. trade laws and regulations. The
volume of trade is expected to surpass $2 trillion in the year 2006. To
speed the processing of imports and improve compliance with trade laws,
specifically, the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act of
1993 (also known as the "Mod Act"),[Footnote 9] BCBP's predecessor,
Customs, developed an "informed compliance strategy.":
In 1999, we recommended that the Customs Service develop and implement
an evaluation of the effectiveness of its informed compliance strategy.
Customs agreed with our recommendation and completed its Trade
Compliance Strategy Study on May 24, 2001. The study indicated that the
strategy improves compliance, but the impact on overall compliance
rates is small. For example, one initiative, the Company Enforced
Compliance Process (CECP), was to address large importers'
noncompliance that had a significant negative impact on the overall
national compliance rates. According to the study, Customs was to
punish noncomplying companies by imposing "confirmed risk"
designations, increasing examinations, removing privileges, and
referring for penalties. However, the confirmed risk status was only
used six times, and loss of privileges and referral for penalties were
never used. The study concluded that CECP was not much of an enforced
compliance process, and it was discontinued.
On the other hand, the study found that the companies' compliance rates
increased after they participated in the other initiatives such as
compliance assessment and account management initiatives. While it is
not possible to attribute the increase in compliance totally to these
initiatives, the study concluded that these programs had a positive
impact.
Acquiring a New Trade Processing System:
Customs' ongoing effort to acquire a new trade processing system is key
to modernizing how Customs tracks, controls, and processes all
commercial goods imported into and exported out of the United States.
This large and complex system, known as the Automated Commercial
Environment (ACE), is expected to cost about $1.7 billion and is to
replace Customs' antiquated system. Expected benefits from ACE include
speeding the flow of legitimate commerce into and out of the United
States, identifying and targeting high-risk commerce requiring greater
scrutiny, and providing a single interface between the trade community
and the federal government for trade data. In April 2001, Customs
awarded a 5-year contract, with options to extend the contract to not
more than 15 years, to a system integrator responsible for developing
and deploying ACE.
Successfully managing a project as large and complex as ACE is a
challenging undertaking. Over the last 4 years, we have reported on ACE
and recommended steps Customs needed to take to minimize project risks.
To its credit, Customs has taken action to implement our
recommendations, as follows:
* We recommended Customs incrementally justify the ACE investment.
Customs defined and committed to implement process controls for
justifying and making ACE investment decisions incrementally. After
implementing the first ACE release, Customs plans to verify that actual
costs and benefits meet expectations and plans to continue this
incremental investment approach for the remaining ACE releases.
* We recommended Customs ensure ACE alignment with its enterprise
architecture. Customs ensured that its enterprise architecture
contained sufficient detail to build the first ACE release and has
aligned the release with the enterprise architecture. Customs plans to
continue to extend its enterprise architecture as necessary to build
subsequent ACE releases.
* We recommended Customs have sufficient human capital resources.
Customs developed and plans to implement a human capital management
strategy for the Customs modernization office, which is responsible for
managing the ACE acquisition.
* We recommended Customs develop rigorous and analytically verifiable
cost estimating. Customs began developing and plans to implement a
cost-estimating program that employs the tenets of effective cost
estimating as defined by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI).
* We recommended Customs employ effective software acquisition
processes. Customs continues to make progress and has plans to
establish effective software acquisition process controls, as embodied
primarily in the second level of SEI's Software Acquisition Capability
Maturity Model.[Footnote 10]
Customs has made progress in implementing some, but not all, of our
recommendations. Moreover, because Customs is in the early stages of
acquiring ACE, many challenging tasks remain before Customs will have
implemented full ACE capability.
Challenges Related to Immigration Control:
To prevent illegal entry of individuals into the United States between
the ports of entry, BCBP has deployed significant resources but
estimates significantly more are needed. Continued implementation of
the southwest border strategy faces a range of challenges, including
meeting hiring goals and obtaining needed approvals to deploy fencing
and technology to implement its strategy while simultaneously
addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern
border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on
communities that experience an increase in illegal alien traffic, and
responding to continuing concerns over the safety of aliens who cross
in remote and desolate areas. At our nation's ports, BCBP faces an
array of challenges, including improving inspectors' ability to verify
the identity of travelers and whether they can be admitted into the
country, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and complying with
the congressional mandate to implement a system to track the entry and
exit of all aliens.
Deterring Illegal Entry between the Ports of Entry:
Deterring illegal entry between the nation's ports of entry will
continue to be a challenge for BCBP. In previous work, we reported that
the Border Patrol had estimated that significantly more resources would
be needed to fully implement its border control strategy and that
various factors had impeded the Border Patrol's ability to implement
its strategy as originally planned.
Since 1994, the Border Patrol has been implementing a phased strategy
to increase deterrence to illegal entry beginning, first, with the
areas that had the largest influx of illegal aliens. The strategy
postulated that as resources were applied in one area, the flow of
illegal alien traffic would shift to other locations along the
southwest border where resources had yet to be applied.
In our last report on the southwest border strategy in August 2001, we
reported that the Border Patrol estimated it would need between 11,700
and 14,000 agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of
millions of dollars in additional technology and infrastructure to
fully implement the Southwest border strategy.[Footnote 11] We reported
that it would take at least 5 more years (until 2006) to reach the
minimum number of agents the Border Patrol believed it needed along the
Southwest border if (1) the administration's agent hiring goals at that
time were maintained and met and (2) all new agents were deployed to
the southwest border. However, this estimate was made before the
September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent concerns regarding the
need for additional resources to deter illegal entry along the northern
border.
BCBP continues to face hiring challenges to meet its estimated needs.
The Border Patrol currently has about 9,500 agents deployed along the
southwest border. While nearly a 3-fold increase from the 3,400 agents
the Border Patrol had along the southwest border in 1994, it is still
about 2,200 agents short of the minimum number, 11,700, the Border
Patrol said it needed to fully implement the southwest border strategy.
Currently, the Border Patrol has 567 agents deployed along the northern
border.
We also reported on various factors that had impeded the Border
Patrol's ability to implement its strategy, some of which still appear
to be problematic. For example, it had taken the Border Patrol longer
to implement the strategy than originally planned because, among other
things, the Border Patrol experienced difficulties hiring agents and
delays in obtaining approvals needed to deploy technology and build
fences.
The Border Patrol also recognized the need to make outreach efforts to
communities because its initial failure to warn some communities about
anticipated increases in illegal alien traffic caught community
officials by surprise and angered some residents due to the negative
effects the increased traffic had on the community. When apprehensions
surged in communities into which the illegal alien traffic was
reportedly pushed, officials and residents in one community reported
experiencing loss of business, destruction of private property, and
environmental degradation. Concerns have been raised over the
environmental impact of current plans to build additional fencing along
the border in Arizona. A recent news article described how some local
residents in the border area southwest of Tucson, Arizona, are
patrolling the border to report illegal crossings raising the concern
of law enforcement officials. The Border Patrol has realized its goal
of shifting illegal alien traffic away from urban areas into more
remote areas. However, rather than being deterred from attempting
illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death by
trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers. This prompted the
Border Patrol to implement a Border Safety Initiative consisting of,
among other things, a media campaign to warn aliens about the dangers
of crossing illegally, as well as establishing search-and-rescue units.
We further reported in August 2001 that although alien apprehensions
had shifted along the border as expected, overall apprehensions along
the southwest border had continued to increase to over 1.6 million in
fiscal year 2000--raising questions about the strategy's effect on
overall illegal entry along the southwest border. However, since then
apprehensions along the southwest border have declined to less than 1
million in fiscal year 2002.
While there may be many reasons for the decline in apprehensions, in
response to our recommendation, the Border Patrol has developed a plan
designed to evaluate the impacts of its southwest border strategy.
However, the evaluation has yet to be completed.
Preventing Illegal Entry at Ports of Entry:
Our recent work at ports of entry and our ongoing work specifically at
land border ports, indicate that BCBP inspectors continue to face
challenges that those from their predecessor agencies also faced in
balancing the need to identify violators of immigration and other laws
while facilitating the movement of lawful travelers. Today, I will
touch on several issues relating to the inspection of entry documents,
inspector training, intelligence information needs of the field, and
BCBP plans for implementing the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indication Technology system, known as the U.S. VISIT system.
Determining Traveler Admissibility:
At land border ports of entry, inspectors must quickly make decisions
about whether to admit a traveler into the United States or refer
travelers for more intensive inspection if admissibility cannot be
readily determined. Two of the factors that challenge inspectors'
ability to verify the travelers' identity and admissibility are that
(1) some travelers may enter the United States without having to
present a travel document and (2) travelers can present a variety of
documents to gain entry into the United States, some of which can be
easily counterfeited.
First, some travelers do not need to present proof of citizenship at
the border. U.S. and certain Canadian citizens are exempt from having
to present any document upon entry. Instead, they can make an oral
claim of citizenship, if this satisfies the inspector. According to
immigration data, inspectors at land border ports intercepted nearly
15,000 people in 2002 who falsely claimed to be U.S. citizens in order
to gain illegal entry, suggesting an unknown number of travelers
successfully entered the United States this way.
Second, a variety of documents are accepted at ports, and many can be
counterfeited or used fraudulently with apparent ease. With nearly 200
countries issuing unique passports, official stamps, seals, and visas,
the potential for document fraud is great. A wide variety of documents
can be presented for inspection--including more than 8,000 state and
local offices issue birth certificates, driver's licenses, and other
documents, any of which could potentially be counterfeit. According to
immigration data, inspectors at land ports intercepted nearly 60,000
fraudulent documents in fiscal year 2002, including over 10,000 U.S.
citizenship-related documents. Clearly, others have successfully
gained access to this country using counterfeit documents. Earlier this
year, we testified on how our investigators entered the country from
Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through land, air, and sea ports of entry
using fictitious names, and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth
certificates made using readily available software.[Footnote 12] INS
and Customs Service inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the
counterfeit documents, and our investigators encountered no difficulty
in entering the country using them.
Unifying and Enhancing Inspector Training:
BCBP will also face an array of challenges in ensuring that its border
inspectors are adequately trained, including ensuring appropriate
training is provided in the detection of fraudulent documents. For
example, former INS and Customs inspectors are still being trained at
separate basic training academies using two different curricula. If
border inspectors are to wear "one face" at the border, a unified
curriculum and training approach will need to be developed and
implemented. These training challenges will continue beyond the
academy--BCBP will also need to ensure that a field training program is
established that meets the needs of the newest as well as experienced
inspectors at the ports. For example, neither the former INS nor
Customs agencies had a standard on-the-job training program for their
inspectors working at land border ports. The prior work I mentioned in
which our investigators used counterfeit documents to enter the United
States, as well as our ongoing work at 15 land border ports, suggest
that one training challenge for BCBP will be to ensure that both new
and experienced border inspectors are capable of readily detecting
fraudulent documents.
Meeting Field Intelligence Needs:
Our ongoing work at land border ports suggests that the Bureau will
also face challenges regarding the collection, analysis, and use of
intelligence information in the field. The former INS recognized the
need for more intelligence support in the field. In 1997, an INS-
contracted study reported the lack of an intelligence capability at all
INS locations, including districts and ports.[Footnote 13] More recent
studies suggest needs in this area persist. Although some steps have
been taken to bring the intelligence function to the field level,
additional steps remain if the intelligence needs of the field are to
be met. These challenges include, but are not limited, to decisions
related to staffing and training, as well as merging intelligence
positions from the former Customs and INS.
Implementing the New U.S. VISIT System:
One of the most significant challenges facing DHS at ports of entry is
the implementation of the U.S. VISIT system. This significant
undertaking is intended to capture both entry and exit data on
travelers. It will also have many implications for operations at U.S.
ports of entry, including expenditures, staffing, inspection
procedures, and infrastructure. We reviewed INS's fiscal year 2002
expenditure plan and associated system acquisition documentation and
system plans. We reported that INS's preliminary plans showed that it
intended to acquire and deploy a system that will satisfy the general
scope of capabilities required under various laws. However, we found
that the initial plan did not provide sufficient information about INS
commitments for the system, such as what specific system capabilities
and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. We concluded
that this lack of detail is a material limitation in the first plan
that will become even more problematic in the future as the magnitude
and complexity of the system acquisition increases, as will the
importance of creating plans with the appropriate level and scope of
information.[Footnote 14] Responsibility for implementing U.S. VISIT
now resides in the Border and Transportation Security directorate. We
are currently reviewing the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan and will
ascertain whether these problems were addressed.
Challenges Related to Implementing and Transforming DHS:
We designated implementation and transformation of the new Department
of Homeland Security as high risk based on three factors. First, the
implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking
that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner.
Second, components to be merged into DHS--including those that now form
BCBP--already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which
we have described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively
carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very
serious consequences.
In the aftermath of September 11, invigorating the nation's homeland
security missions has become one of the federal government's most
significant challenges. DHS, with an anticipated budget of almost $40
billion and an estimated 170,000 employees, will be the third largest
government agency; not since the creation of the Department of Defense
(DOD) more than 50 years ago has the government sought an integration
and transformation of this magnitude. In DOD's case, the effective
transformation took many years to achieve, and even today, the
department continues to face enduring management challenges and high-
risk areas that are, in part, legacies of its unfinished integration.
Effectively implementing and transforming DHS may be an even more
daunting challenge. DOD was formed almost entirely from agencies whose
principal mission was national defense. DHS will combine 22 agencies
specializing in various disciplines: law enforcement, border security,
biological research, disaster mitigation, and computer security, for
instance. Further, DHS will oversee a number of non-homeland-security
activities, such as the Coast Guard's marine safety responsibilities
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) natural disaster
response functions. Yet, only through the effective integration and
collaboration of these entities will the nation achieve the synergy
that can help provide better security against terrorism. The magnitude
of the responsibilities, combined with the challenge and complexity of
the transformation, underscores the perseverance and dedication that
will be required of all DHS's leaders, employees, and stakeholders to
achieve success.
Further, it is well recognized that mergers of this magnitude in the
public and private sector carry significant risks, including lost
productivity and inefficiencies. Generally, successful transformations
of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous
reorganizations and with less pressure for immediate results, can take
from 5 to 7 years to achieve. Necessary management capacity and
oversight mechanisms must be established. Moreover, critical aspects of
DHS's success will depend on well-functioning relationships with third
parties that will take time to establish and maintain, including those
with state and local governments, the private sector, and other federal
agencies with homeland security responsibilities, such as the
Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
Intelligence Agency, DOD, and the Department of Health and Human
Services. Creating and maintaining a structure that can leverage
partners and stakeholders will be necessary to effectively implement
the national homeland security strategy.
The new department is also being formed from components with a wide
array of existing major management challenges and program risks. For
instance, one DHS directorate's responsibility includes the protection
of critical information systems that we already consider a high risk.
In fact, many of the major components merging into the new department,
including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FEMA and
the U.S. Coast Guard, face at least one major problem, such as
strategic human capital risks, critical information technology
challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities; they also confront
an array of challenges and risks to program operations. For example,
TSA has had considerable challenges in meeting deadlines for screening
baggage, and the agency has focused most of its initial security
efforts on aviation security, with less attention to other modes of
transportation. The Coast Guard faces the challenges inherent in a
massive fleet modernization.
DHS's national security mission is of such importance that the failure
to address its management challenges and programs risks could have
serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens'
health and safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of the
implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area stems from
the importance of its mission and the nation's reliance on the
department's effectiveness in meeting its challenges for protecting the
country against terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Seto J. Bagdoyan, Michael P.
Dino, Darryl W. Dutton, Barbara Guffy, E. Anne Laffoon, and Lori Weiss.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Following the creation of DHS and its absorption of Customs, the
Secretary of the Treasury retained authority over Customs' revenue
functions.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 2003); Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C., Jan.
2003); Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury, GAO-03-109 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003); and High-Risk
Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Customs Service: International
Mail and Package Inspection Processes at Selected Locations, GAO-02-967
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2002).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service: Acquisition and
Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 2002).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS' Southwest Border Strategy:
Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland
Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning,
GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants
into the United States, GAO-03-438T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003)
and Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain
Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected, GAO-03-713T (Washington,
D.C.: May 13, 2003).
[8] The cargo inspection work was requested by the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce. The individual inspections at land ports of entry
work is being done pursuant to a mandate in the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Since this work is
ongoing and involves information that BCBP considers to be law
enforcement sensitive, we are precluded from further discussing it in
this unclassified statement.
[9] P.L. 103-183, title VI. The Mod Act fundamentally altered the
relationship between importers and, at the time, Customs by giving the
importer the legal responsibility for declaring the value,
classification, and rate of duty applicable to merchandise being
imported into the United States. Customs, however, is responsible for
determining the final classification and value of the merchandise. The
Mod Act also gave Customs and importers a shared responsibility for
ensuring compliance with trade laws.
[10] Capability Maturity ModelSM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon
University, and CMM is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. The SA-CMM identifies key process areas that are necessary to
effectively manage software-intensive system acquisitions. Achieving
the second level of the SA-CMM's five-level scale means that an
organization has the software acquisition rigor and discipline to
repeat project successes.
[11] See U.S. General Accounting Office, INS' Southwest Border
Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years,
GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants
into the United States, GAO-03-438T (Washington D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003)
and Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain
Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected, GAO-03-713T (Washington
D.C.: May 13, 2003).
[13] INS Intelligence Program Strategic Plan, September 30, 1997
(submitted by LB&M Associates, Inc.).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland
Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit system Expenditure Planning,
GAO-03-563 (Washington D.C.: Jun. 2003).
