Contract Management
INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of Homeland Security Gao ID: GAO-03-799 July 25, 2003With annual obligations for goods and services totaling $1.7 billion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is one of the largest of 23 entities coming into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). INS's procurement organization will continue to acquire goods and services under DHS. GAO was asked to review INS's contracting processes to assess whether INS has an adequate infrastructure to manage its acquisitions and to determine whether INS is following sound contracting policies and procedures in awarding and managing individual contracts.
INS does not have the basic infrastructure--including oversight, information, and an acquisition workforce--in place to ensure that its contracting activity is effective. Oversight of procurement is difficult because procurement managers are placed at a low level within the organization, and they do not have the leverage to hold employees across the agency accountable for compliance with procurement policies. Further, procurement activities are not coordinated well because INS has not made effective use of cross-functional teams--consisting of procurement, program, budget, financial, and legal representatives--throughout the acquisition process. Procurement managers are unable to make strategic decisions that would allow them to maximize spending power across the agency because INS's information systems do not provide visibility into what is being spent agencywide for goods and services and who the major vendors are. INS's acquisition workforce is struggling to manage effectively large and mission-critical procurements. Despite growth in mission requirements and the overall workforce during the past decade, the agency has not been able to attract and retain the necessary contracting staff. Further, INS lacks a strategic acquisition workforce plan to help identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities the agency needs to ensure it can meet current and future requirements. In addition, acquisition planning, competition, and contractor monitoring have been inadequate on some large contracts. The lack of adequate advanced planning for several detention center contracts and one large information technology management contract limited opportunities for full and open competition. Contractor performance monitoring has, in some cases, been inadequate to provide assurance that INS received the goods or services it paid for or that quality standards were met. GAO did not find significant or widespread compliance problems with other contract criteria we reviewed. Because INS has become a significant part of DHS and brings with it a procurement function that needs attention, it is imperative for DHS leadership to address these problems early in the development of the new department.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-799, Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of Homeland Security
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Report to the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
July 2003:
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT:
INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of
Homeland Security:
GAO-03-799:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-799, a report to House Government Reform
Committee
Why GAO Did This Study:
With annual obligations for goods and services totaling $1.7 billion,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is one of the largest
of 23 entities coming into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
INS‘s procurement organization will continue to acquire goods and
services under DHS.
GAO was asked to review INS‘s contracting processes to assess whether
INS has an adequate infrastructure to manage its acquisitions and to
determine whether INS is following sound contracting policies and
procedures in awarding and managing individual contracts.
What GAO Found:
INS does not have the basic infrastructure”including oversight,
information, and an acquisition workforce”in place to ensure that its
contracting activity is effective, principally, as follows:
* Oversight of procurement is difficult because procurement managers
are placed at a low level within the organization, and they do not
have the leverage to hold employees across the agency accountable for
compliance with procurement policies. Further, procurement activities
are not coordinated well because INS has not made effective use of
cross-functional teams”consisting of procurement, program, budget,
financial, and legal representatives”throughout the acquisition
process.
* Procurement managers are unable to make strategic decisions that
would allow them to maximize spending power across the agency because
INS‘s information systems do not provide visibility into what is being
spent agencywide for goods and services and who the major vendors
are.
* INS‘s acquisition workforce is struggling to manage effectively
large and mission-critical procurements. Despite growth in mission
requirements and the overall workforce during the past decade, the
agency has not been able to attract and retain the necessary
contracting staff. Further, INS lacks a strategic acquisition
workforce plan to help identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities
the agency needs to ensure it can meet current and future
requirements.
In addition, acquisition planning, competition, and contractor
monitoring have been inadequate on some large contracts. The lack of
adequate advanced planning for several detention center contracts and
one large information technology management contract limited
opportunities for full and open competition. Contractor performance
monitoring has, in some cases, been inadequate to provide assurance
that INS received the goods or services it paid for or that quality
standards were met. GAO did not find significant or widespread
compliance problems with other contract criteria we reviewed.
Because INS has become a significant part of DHS and brings with it a
procurement function that needs attention, it is imperative for DHS
leadership to address these problems early in the development of the
new department.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DHS take several actions to mitigate
procurement risk as it integrates INS‘s procurement function. DHS
should assess and develop strategies to improve oversight, strategic
use of information, workforce planning, and contract management. In
written comments on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the
recommendations and indicated that it will proceed in accordance with
them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-799.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact David Cooper at (617)
788-0555 or cooperd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results In Brief:
Background:
INS Lacks the Infrastructure Needed to Manage Its Procurement
Activities Effectively:
Acquisition Planning, Competition, and Contractor Monitoring Have Been
Inadequate in Some Cases:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Contract File Review Criteria:
Appendix IV: List of Active Contract Files Reviewed ($100 or More), as
of April 3, 2002:
Appendix V: Warrant Authority of INS Contracting Officers:
Table:
Table 1: Acquisition Workforce Occupation Codes:
Figures:
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2002 Contract Obligations:
Figure 2: Organization of the INS:
Figure 3: INS Procurement Dollars:
Abbreviations:
COTR: Contracting Officer's Technical Representative:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
IPRO: Intelligent Procurement System:
STARS: Service Technology Alliance Resources:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 25, 2003:
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
In January 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as high-risk due to the size
and complexity of the effort, the existing challenges faced by the
components being merged into the department, and the potentially
serious consequences should DHS fail to effectively carry out its
mission.[Footnote 1] DHS, which is expected to have some of the most
extensive acquisition requirements in government, is currently in the
process of integrating the mission functions and acquisition practices
of 23 incoming entities. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) is one of the largest agencies coming under the new department,
with a budget of $6.1 billion and contracts for goods and services
valued at $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2002. INS's procurement
organization will continue to acquire goods and services under DHS.
Given the heightened importance of INS's mission due to threats to the
security of our nation, you asked us to review INS's contracting
processes. Specifically, we assessed whether INS has an adequate
infrastructure--including oversight, information, and workforce--to
manage its acquisitions. In addition, you asked us to determine whether
INS is following sound contracting policies and procedures in awarding
and managing individual contracts.
We conducted our work at INS headquarters and administrative centers.
We also reviewed 42 randomly selected contracts for compliance with key
criteria in several functional areas of contract management. Specific
information on our scope and methodology is in appendix I. We performed
the bulk of our audit work prior to INS's becoming part of DHS. For
readability, we refer to INS in the present tense in this report.
Results In Brief:
INS does not have the basic infrastructure--including oversight,
information, and an acquisition workforce--in place to ensure that its
contracting activity is effective. Procurement managers are placed at a
low level within the organization, and they do not have the leverage to
hold employees across the agency accountable for compliance with
procurement policies. INS has not made effective use of cross-
functional teams--consisting of procurement, program, budget,
financial, and legal representatives--throughout the acquisition
process. Procurement managers are unable to make strategic decisions
that would allow them to maximize spending power across the agency
because INS's information systems do not provide visibility into what
is spent for goods and services agencywide and who the major vendors
are. In addition, while INS's mission requirements and the overall
workforce have greatly expanded in the past decade, the agency has not
been able to attract and retain the contracting staff needed to
effectively manage the increased workload. INS has not consistently
ensured that acquisition personnel are adequately trained to do their
jobs. Further, INS lacks a strategic acquisition workforce plan to help
identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities the agency needs to
ensure it can meet current and future requirements.
Our review of 42 contracts, randomly selected from a total of 185
active contracts, identified problems in two key areas: acquisition
planning and contractor monitoring. The lack of adequate advanced
planning for several detention center contracts and one large
information technology management contract limited opportunities for
competition. In addition, contractor performance monitoring has, in
some cases, been inadequate to assure that INS received the goods or
services it paid for or that quality standards were met. We did not
find significant or widespread compliance problems with other contract
criteria we reviewed.
The creation of DHS brings an opportunity to address the issues we have
identified in this report. We are recommending that the Secretary of
DHS direct the Under Secretary for Management to take several actions
to mitigate these problems as the INS procurement function is
integrated into DHS. In written comments on a draft of this report, DHS
agreed with our recommendations and indicated that it will proceed in
accordance with them. DHS comments are included in their entirety in
appendix II.
Background:
As of March 1, 2003, INS ceased to exist as an agency.[Footnote 2] It
is now in the process of being incorporated into DHS. INS's multi-
faceted mission includes securing the borders; enforcing immigration
laws; and providing immigration services, such as work permits,
naturalization, and asylum. Under DHS, the INS mission has been split
between three bureaus within the department,[Footnote 3] and the INS
procurement organization will continue to procure goods and services
under the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
In fiscal year 2002, INS contracted for $1.7 billion in goods and
services. The headquarters procurement office is responsible for
procuring information technology, as well as goods and services of a
general nature that are used agencywide. DHS continues to operate the
three INS administrative centers (Dallas, Texas; Laguna Niguel,
California; and Burlington, Vermont) that were formerly a part of INS.
The administrative centers have responsibility for awarding and
managing INS's detention center management contracts and contracts for
goods and services for INS field offices. Figure 1 shows the breakdown
of procurement responsibility between INS headquarters and the
administrative centers in fiscal year 2002.
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2002 Contract Obligations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: These amounts include $600 million in goods and services that
were provided by other government agencies through interagency
agreements.
[End of figure]
INS also has more than 600 field offices across the United States. The
field offices' authority to award contracts is generally limited to
$25,000 for open market purchases and $100,000 for delivery orders
against existing contracts. Field office contract obligations totaled
$66.5 million in fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 4]
DHS officials are currently working out the details of how to merge the
procurement functions of the incoming agencies, including INS. A Chief
Procurement Officer was recently appointed and will report to the Under
Secretary for Management. In preparing to implement DHS-specific
procurement policies, a working group is drafting a DHS supplement to
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). DHS officials are currently
assessing the incoming agencies' (1) major procurements to determine
whether duplication exists and to identify ways of maximizing the DHS's
purchasing power by consolidating like procurements where feasible; (2)
procurement and financial systems to determine whether any of the
existing systems are adequate to meet the department's future needs;
and (3) acquisition workforce to identify gaps and the need for DHS-
specific training requirements.
INS Lacks the Infrastructure Needed to Manage Its Procurement
Activities Effectively:
INS does not have in place a basic infrastructure to effectively manage
its contracts. INS procurement managers lack leverage to ensure that
employees comply with procurement policies, and managers cannot make
strategic procurement decisions due to the absence of comprehensive and
reliable information about the goods and services being procured across
the agency. Further, INS's acquisition workforce is not adequate to
manage the agency's increased mission requirements. INS has not
developed a strategic acquisition workforce plan to help ensure that
acquisition personnel across the agency have the right skills and that
gaps in the workforce are addressed proactively.
INS Procurement Managers Lack Leverage to Oversee Contracting Activity
Effectively:
INS procurement managers have little oversight and control over
procurement activities throughout the agency, a situation that
increases the risk that taxpayers are not getting the best value for
their dollars. Our prior work has identified a number of factors that
promote efficient, effective, and accountable procurement.[Footnote 5]
We found that successful, leading companies had reengineered their
procurement practices to move from a fragmented approach to a more
coordinated and strategically oriented approach. By elevating the
procurement function in the structure of the organization and
establishing strong oversight mechanisms, these companies were able to
make and implement strategic decisions to improve companywide outcomes.
In addition, the companies ensured that the procurement function was
integrated across the organization through the use of cross-functional
teams, consisting of procurement, program, and financial personnel.
Responsibility for acquiring goods and services is dispersed throughout
INS headquarters, administrative centers, and field offices.
Headquarters procurement managers have responsibility for some
agencywide functions, such as providing policy, overseeing compliance
with procurement laws and regulations, and preparing required reports
on agencywide procurement activities. These managers also review
proposed administrative center contracts of more than
$500,000.[Footnote 6] However, they have little insight into
transactions conducted by INS's field offices. Headquarters procurement
managers were only able to provide us summary data for field office
transactions, because they do not have information on the number and
dollar amount of individual transactions.
In addition, the headquarters procurement office is placed far down in
the organizational structure, buried under several layers of
management. This placement increases the likelihood that the
procurement function will not receive attention from the highest levels
of the organization. As illustrated in figure 2, the Bureau Procurement
Chief reports at a lower organizational level than Files and Forms
Management. At the administrative centers, the procurement function is
combined with property management.
Figure 2: Organization of the INS:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
INS headquarters procurement managers lack the leverage to ensure that
administrative center and field office contracting personnel follow INS
procurement directives and policies. While contracting officers in
these offices derive their contracting authority from headquarters,
they report through the administrative center or field office chain of
command, not to headquarters procurement managers. This situation has
been especially problematic in the field offices, which rely heavily on
"collateral duty" contracting officers who perform contracting duties
in addition to their mission-related responsibilities and who are not
career contracting officers. The performance appraisals of the
collateral duty contracting officers reflect only their mission-related
duties and do not address their procurement activities. For example,
the performance rating of a Border Patrol agent, who is a collateral
duty contracting officer, is based on whether he accomplishes the
Border Patrol's mission and does not take into account whether he
follows INS's procurement procedures.
Further, according to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration,
the procurement office has little leverage to stop employees from
entering into unauthorized commitments.[Footnote 7] In fiscal year
2002, INS had 60 unauthorized commitments valued at more than $700,000.
For example, an employee arranged for a vendor to conduct a training
class without first contacting the procurement office to award a
contract for this service, for which INS ended up paying $15,800. In
another case, an employee asked a subcontractor to provide $3,181 in
computer upgrade services. While these services may have been
necessary, only warranted contracting officers have authority to enter
into and modify contracts with vendors. Unauthorized commitments are
counterproductive in that they require additional time and effort from
procurement personnel to ratify the commitments and to work with the
parties involved to avoid future occurrences.[Footnote 8] Procurement
officials have attempted to educate and train employees about proper
procedures, but the officials expressed frustration that unauthorized
commitments continue to occur.
INS has made limited use of internal controls, such as internal reviews
and performance goals and measures, that could help monitor procurement
activity across the agency. For example, while some officials said that
the Office of Internal Audit's periodic reviews are helpful in
identifying problem areas, others noted that these reviews are not
thorough or frequent enough (each office is scheduled for review once
every 3 years). In addition, while headquarters and administrative
centers established performance goals and measures to help evaluate the
effectiveness of the procurement function, these efforts have not been
effective. A consulting firm helped the INS headquarters procurement
office set goals, such as obligating funds in a timely manner;
providing clear, consistent customer guidance; maximizing private and
public sector resources; and complying with statutory requirements.
Similarly, the administrative centers attempted to standardize
processes and establish time frames for various procurement services.
However, INS headquarters officials told us that they were unable to
monitor whether they achieved their goals because the data and analyses
necessary to track progress were unavailable. Administrative center
procurement managers said that the time frames they were given were not
meaningful, as the targets set were very low.
Further, INS has not made effective use of cross-functional teams--
consisting of procurement, program, legal, budget, and financial
representatives--throughout the acquisition process. Stakeholders
outside of the procurement offices are often involved only on an ad hoc
basis. Personnel across the agency told us that the relationship
between program and procurement officials has been particularly
problematic and that these offices often have not worked
collaboratively to define project requirements and perform other
acquisition-related functions. In fact, in some cases, the relationship
has been adversarial. One INS procurement official said the program
offices sometimes "throw the requirements over the transom," leaving
the procurement office to try to meet the program office's needs in a
vacuum. Procurement managers said that they have difficulty getting
program offices to comply with procurement requirements such as
planning acquisitions, monitoring contractor performance, and
attending required training. Some managers attributed the problem to
INS's culture, where program offices have traditionally been highly
independent.
On the other hand, program officials stated that procurement personnel
are not customer-oriented or proactive in finding ways to meet program
needs. Program officials said that they are unsure of their roles and
responsibilities in the procurement process and that they lack needed
procurement guidance. For example, one program manager said that
procurement personnel expect her office to choose a contract type or to
complete independently contracting-related paperwork. She believes
this responsibility is best left to personnel with procurement
expertise.
INS Lacks Information It Needs to Make Strategic Procurement Decisions:
INS managers are unable to make strategic procurement decisions because
they do not have sufficient information about the goods and services
being procured across the agency and who their major vendors are. In
the past, we have reported that when leading companies obtain improved
knowledge about the goods and services that are being procured, these
companies can create significant cost savings and service
improvements.[Footnote 9] Agencies need the capability to analyze how
much is being spent on each good and service--through the use of
interfaced procurement and financial systems--so the agencies can
identify opportunities to reduce costs, improve service, and better
manage their suppliers.
INS procurement personnel primarily use two mechanisms to collect
procurement data. The Intelligent Procurement System (IPRO) is an
automated system used to generate solicitation and contract documents
and to track basic procurement data such as requisition numbers,
obligations, date of contract awards, and the amount of time to process
requisitions. Procurement personnel also use a variety of informal data
collection tools--including manual entry logbooks, spreadsheets, and
stand-alone databases--to track administrative information, such as
contract status, and to provide data to the Federal Procurement Data
System.[Footnote 10] However, the data collected through these means
are not comprehensive or reliable. Contract administration information,
such as contract closeout status, is often missing and contract
modifications are often not up to date. In addition, IPRO contains weak
internal edit checks that render the data potentially inaccurate, and
it does not automatically populate forms and fields with existing data.
INS internal audits[Footnote 11] have reported that administrative
center officials have not been proactive in giving feedback to field
staff who input the data so that errors can be corrected.
Because INS cannot aggregate procurement data across the agency, it
cannot gain the strategic visibility into purchasing behavior required
to negotiate vendor discounts or otherwise leverage buying power.
Procurement data are stored in separate regional databases or files on
local networks that are inaccessible to users in other regions.
Procurement managers frequently rely on active contracts lists--manual
spreadsheets separately maintained by the administrative centers and
headquarters--for information about ongoing procurement activity. When
we requested data on active contracts, INS procurement managers had to
separately request this information from each administrative center and
headquarters. Further, these lists contain duplicative records and, in
some instances, contradictory data about contract expenditures. INS
managers stated that they have difficulty developing INS budget
submissions because of the absence of useful procurement data.
Even if basic information, such as the active contracts lists, were
accurate, INS procurement managers would be hindered in their ability
to make strategic decisions about agencywide procurements because IPRO
does not interface with INS's financial management system. If the
systems were interfaced, procurement managers would have improved
access to financial data, such as real-time reports on obligations and
payments for goods and services. Managers could then analyze spending
patterns to determine what they are buying--and from whom--and use this
information to more confidently plan future spending.
INS's Acquisition Workforce Is Inadequate to Manage Increased Workload:
INS's mission and overall workforce have expanded greatly in the past
decade, and spending on contracts has also increased significantly.
However, the size of INS's contracting workforce has not grown in
sufficient numbers to manage this increased workload effectively.
Further, INS has not ensured that its acquisition personnel are
adequately trained to do their jobs. A strategic acquisition workforce
plan could help INS ensure that acquisition personnel across the agency
have the right skills and that gaps in the workforce are addressed
proactively.
From 1997 to 2002, INS's workload increased greatly and its overall
workforce expanded by 38.5 percent, from 25,750 to 35,676. In
conjunction with the increased workload, procurements almost doubled,
as shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: INS Procurement Dollars:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite this growth, the procurement offices at headquarters and the
administrative centers remain understaffed. While INS's overall
acquisition workforce has grown, from 101 in 1997 to 148 in 2002, the
agency is still short of critical contracting officer
positions.[Footnote 12] Two outside studies, in 2000 and 2001,
concluded that INS's acquisition workforce was understaffed. One study
determined that the understaffing caused delays in completing required
tasks, and another recommended an additional 17 positions in the
administrative center procurement offices. INS headquarters and
administrative center procurement offices have attempted to address
this understaffing by requesting additional positions and trying to
fill the procurement positions they already have in place. However,
neither effort has been successful.
Headquarters officials requested 13 additional contracting officers in
2001; 11 in 2002; and 12 in 2003; and the administrative centers also
requested additional positions. However, procurement officials told us
that these requests were denied.[Footnote 13] Further, the agency has
not been able to fill many of its existing vacancies. As of March 2003,
14 authorized procurement positions were vacant in headquarters.
Several of these vacancies have remained open for extended periods of
time--one up to 2 years. Procurement officials said that they have
trouble recruiting college graduates and experienced acquisition
personnel because of the perception of INS as a dysfunctional
organization and the uncertainty of the transition to DHS. They
indicated that many of the applicants they get are not qualified. In
addition, the procurement office does not use human capital
flexibilities--such as recruitment and retention bonuses--made
available by the Office of Personnel Management. A headquarters
procurement official said that his office considered using a relocation
bonus but determined it was too expensive. He planned to fill six of
the current vacancies with individuals from the outstanding scholar
program; however, as of June 2003, none of the positions had been
filled.[Footnote 14] INS procurement officials stated that 55
contracting positions were filled at the end of fiscal year 1998, and
that as of May 2003 only 56 contracting positions were filled.
Our prior work has shown that high performing organizations identify
their current and future human capital needs and then create
strategies--such as targeted investments in employees or recruiting and
retention bonuses--in acquisition workforce plans. [Footnote 15] These
plans enable the organization to determine the critical skills and
competencies needed to achieve future results. A workforce plan could,
for example, allow INS to correct the current imbalance of contracting
skills among the administrative centers. INS has four warrant levels
that grant contracting officers authority to contract on behalf of the
agency and that specify the limits of this authority.[Footnote 16] The
Burlington administrative center has five employees with warrant levels
of three or higher, which enable them to award open-market contracts
for at least $1 million and to make unlimited buys from the Federal
Supply Schedule.[Footnote 17] In contrast, for a year, the Dallas
administrative center had only one warrant-level-four officer and one
level-two officer. When the level-four officer was out of the office,
no other employee had the authority to award a contract of more than
$100,000. The center has since hired another specialist with a level-
four warrant.
Another factor affecting INS's acquisition workforce is the
administrative centers' use of term appointments.[Footnote 18] Term
appointments are intended to address short-term workforce needs;
however, procurement managers have used these positions to fulfill
their long-term needs because of a lack of funding for permanent
positions. As a result, INS has committed resources and time to train
employees who cannot be retained by the agency. A consulting firm
recommended ending the use of short-term positions because of reduced
productivity, high turnover rates, and constant training of new term
employees. Administrative center procurement officials said that they
had requested several times that their term appointments be converted
to permanent positions, but that no action was taken.
Further, INS procurement managers have not ensured that contracting
officers receive consistent training across the agency. Internal audits
in 2000 and 2001 revealed that some contracting officers in the
administrative centers and field offices had not completed the 40 hours
of annual training that INS requires. In response, INS began tracking
contracting officers' training and sending reminders to complete
training before the end of the year. At the end of calendar year 2001,
procurement officials rescinded the warrants of contracting officers
who had not met the training requirement, and additional warrants were
rescinded at the end of calendar year 2002. In addition,
inconsistencies in the training budgets for procurement personnel
administrative center and headquarters have resulted in disparate
training for new hires across INS. For example, one administrative
center received only enough funding to provide the required 40 hours of
annual training for newly hired personnel. However, each of four recent
hires at the headquarters procurement office received 400 hours or more
of training over a 2-year period. If this amount of training is needed
for each new hire, agency planning could help ensure that sufficient
resources are available to provide needed training to all new staff in
a more consistent manner.
Finally, we found that contracting officers are not provided consistent
training due to a lack of centralized coordination of training
materials. For example, each administrative center created and
conducted its own training program on IPRO, resulting in duplication of
effort. Similarly, although INS created one purchase card procedures
manual, administrative center and headquarters procurement offices
created their own training presentations and supporting materials. INS
officials commented that procurement training within the INS
contracting community is affected by the geographic dispersion of the
procurement function as well as the placement of the procurement
function within three separate agency chains of command. They noted
that INS recently began a purchase card refresher training program that
has provided training to over 1,000 agency employees since January
2003.
Acquisition Planning, Competition, and Contractor Monitoring Have Been
Inadequate in Some Cases:
Our review of 42 contracts, randomly selected from a total of 185
active contracts awarded by headquarters and each administrative
center, found that INS did not adequately plan for several of its large
acquisitions or effectively involve key stakeholders, such as the
program and legal offices. In some cases, this lack of advanced
planning and collaboration limited opportunities for full and open
competition. Further, INS did not consistently monitor contractor
performance on many of the contracts we reviewed, meaning that INS
could not be assured that it received the goods and services it paid
for or that the contractors met the quality standards in the contract.
We did not find significant or widespread compliance problems with FAR
requirements and INS's own acquisition policies in the areas of market
research, evaluation of contractors' proposals, documentation of source
selection decisions, and contract modifications.[Footnote 19] The
contracts we reviewed are listed in appendix IV.
For Several Large Contracts, Acquisition Planning Was Inadequate to
Ensure Full and Open Competition:
The FAR establishes uniform policies and procedures for the acquisition
of supplies and services by all executive agencies, including INS. It
requires acquisition planning in order to promote full and open
competition and to ensure that the government meets its needs in the
most effective, economical, and timely manner.[Footnote 20] During the
acquisition planning process, the efforts of all personnel responsible
for an acquisition are to be coordinated and integrated through a
comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency's requirement in a timely
manner and at a reasonable cost. An overall strategy for managing the
acquisition is required to be developed well in advance of the planned
contract's award date. The acquisition planning process requires a
close partnership between the program and contracting offices and
involvement of other key stakeholders, such as legal and financial
personnel. When agencies fail to adequately plan for acquisitions, they
risk limiting the opportunity for full and open competition and
receiving inadequate goods and services at a higher cost.
In three of the five detention facility contracts that we reviewed, INS
failed to plan adequately for its acquisitions and to involve key
stakeholders effectively. As a result, short-term sole-source contracts
were continuously awarded to incumbent contractors until a permanent
contract could be competitively awarded. These "bridge" contracts were
awarded without the full and open competition normally required for the
solicitation and award of government contracts. [Footnote 21]
For example, the Dallas administrative center's original contract for
the Houston Detention Facility expired on September 30, 1998. The
solicitation for a new contract was not issued until August 5, 1998,
which did not allow adequate time for environmental assessments and any
new construction. As a result, a bridge contract was awarded and is
still in place. The contracting officer justified this sole source
contract based on "unusual and compelling urgency" (the incumbent
contractor had the only detention facility in the area with the
necessary capacity). However, the justification documentation did not
explain why planning did not occur earlier in the procurement process.
It merely stated that in the future, the program office would be
required to ensure that the acquisition process was started 2 to 3
years in advance of the contract's expiration date. INS awarded the
sole source contract despite the opinion of the INS General Counsel's
office that the basis for using other than full and open competition
was not legally sufficient.[Footnote 22]
In another example, in May of 1998, the Laguna Niguel administrative
center announced the need for a larger detention facility in San Diego.
Because the existing contract was due to expire shortly, there was
insufficient time to complete routine environmental assessments and
evaluations of proposals for new facility space. As a result, INS
awarded a 1-year sole source contract, again citing "unusual and
compelling" need as justification. Only the incumbent contractor was
capable of providing the required space in the necessary timeframe.
Historically, INS has had great difficulty in stimulating competition
for detention center contracts--even when advanced planning was done--
particularly in situations where a contractor has an established
facility in the locale. For example, when the Dallas administrative
center issued a solicitation for its Laredo detention facility contract
in March 1997, only one contractor, the incumbent, submitted a
proposal, leading the procurement office to refer to this contract as
"essentially a sole source acquisition." Likewise, the incumbent
contractor was the only offeror when the Burlington administrative
center awarded its current Newark Detention Facility contract. A 1998
INS memo stated that, as a result of the difficulties in stimulating
competition, "negotiations and award of attractively priced [detention
facility] contracts has become increasingly more difficult." Under the
authority of the Attorney General, INS is developing longer-term
contracts for its detention centers.[Footnote 23]
Inadequate acquisition planning also limited the opportunity for
competition under a large information technology support contract for
INS's Entry/Exit program.[Footnote 24] This contract provides program
management and support services to INS for development of its Entry/
Exit system, an automated system for collecting information about
foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States and
identifying those that have overstayed their visits. The Department of
Justice contracting officer, who initially awarded the contract, told
us that he was provided with the program requirements March 8, 2002,
only 3 weeks before the contract had to be awarded. Just 5 months after
award, INS modified the contract to provide additional services,
increasing the base-year value of the contract by over $4 million, to
$5.3 million. The INS General Counsel's office did not concur with
modifying the contract, citing the "dramatic" mission expansion and
inadequate program planning. Nevertheless, INS implemented the
modification. INS procurement officials stated that they are currently
re-competing the contract, based on their continuing need for
technology support for the program.
In contrast, the Service Technology Alliance Resources (STARS)
contract, a multiple award contract designed to provide INS with a full
range of information technology products and services, included the
most extensive acquisition planning documentation of any contract we
reviewed. Headquarters procurement officials indicated this was a high-
visibility procurement and therefore received more upfront planning
than is normally the case. The procurement was also much larger than
usual, at slightly more than $3 billion.
In some cases, the lack of collaboration between procurement and
program officials hindered acquisition planning, resulting in failure
to obtain competition. For example, INS's contract for uniforms for the
Border Patrol, Detention and Removal, and Inspection and Immigration
offices was due to expire in 1999. Procurement officials began to work
with these program offices to develop requirements for a new contract.
However, due to difficulties in getting the program offices actively
involved in developing the requirements and evaluating contractor
proposals, the procurement office had to award a sole source bridge
contract until a new contract could be competitively awarded in
December 2000. The uniform contract is currently valued at $32 million.
Another example of the lack of collaboration in acquisition planning
occurred when the contract for the Houston detention facility was about
to expire. According to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration,
because the program office was unresponsive to questions posed by
potential bidders, the contracting officer was faced with either
issuing a sole source contract or not having a detention facility
available in time to meet program needs. Therefore, he awarded a
temporary sole source contract until a long-term contract could be
competitively awarded.
INS Has Not Sufficiently Monitored Contractor Performance:
It is important that agencies monitor contractors' performance to
ensure that the government receives the goods and services it contracts
for and that quality standards in the contract are met. In addition,
the FAR calls for quality assurance surveillance plans to be prepared
in conjunction with the statement of work, when necessary, to determine
that the supplies or services conform to contract requirements.
[Footnote 25] The plans should specify all work requiring surveillance
and the method of inspection. Further, the FAR requires that the
government inspection be documented.
We found inconsistent attention to monitoring contractor performance at
INS. Headquarters procurement personnel told us that their focus is
primarily on pre-award activities. The Assistant Commissioner for
Administration characterized the contracting function as an "obligation
machine" that is able to award contracts for goods and services but is
not adequately staffed to oversee the contracts once they are awarded.
Officials at one administrative center commented that their method of
contract administration is reactive versus proactive, citing several
examples where they found out about contract problems months after they
occurred. We found evidence of inadequate contractor performance
monitoring in many of the contract files we reviewed, as in the
following examples:
* The Houston Detention Facility contract was awarded in 1998. A June
1999 INS internal audit report noted that the contractor's performance
did not meet all the criteria in the contract and that the Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) was not performing the
required functions as outlined in the contract. For example, the COTR
was not conducting quality assurance reviews or maintaining records to
validate whether services were received. COTR surveillance of the
contractor is now taking place, but not every month as required under
the terms of the contract. The contracting office, however, sends the
COTR e-mail reminders when the monthly reports are not received.
* Under the Laguna Niguel administrative center's janitorial services
contract, the contractor did not clean the facility's kitchen, as
called for in the contract, for an entire year. This service was being
performed by detainees at the program office's request, but because the
COTR failed to notify the contracting officer of this change, the
contract was not modified to reflect the revised requirements. Thus, no
mechanism was in place to ensure that the government was billed for
services actually provided. In fact, the invoices and receiving reports
had been approved, allowing the contractor to be paid $28,000 for
services never provided. Administrative center officials told us that,
because the COTR's primary job was a time-consuming one, the COTR had
little time to dedicate to his contracting monitoring responsibilities.
After becoming aware of the change, the contracting officer modified
the contract and the contractor agreed to reimburse INS the amount it
was overpaid.
In contrast, appropriate surveillance at the Burlington administrative
center led to identified savings for the government. Burlington is the
only location that has staff dedicated to contract administration, of
which contractor monitoring is a key component; and administrative
center officials said that this increased attention has paid off.
Payments were reduced by $264,861 in fiscal year 2002 because
contractors did not perform to the contracts' quality standards or did
not perform tasks called for in the contracts.
Procurement officials told us that program offices--which have the
authority to select COTRs--often do not dedicate the personnel required
to monitor contractor performance adequately. For example, the COTR for
the INS Immigration Student Services contract, valued at over $73
million, has been deployed on military leave since February 2003. The
program office responded to the INS procurement office's call for
another COTR by designating the program manager as the COTR, even
though he had not attended the requisite training. More than $8 million
has been paid to the contractor during the original COTR's absence.
Further, the files we reviewed suggest that INS is inconsistently
implementing quality assurance surveillance plans. For example, 2
months after INS awarded the Dallas Unarmed Guard Services contract,
the program office still had not provided the contracting office a plan
outlining how the COTRs would monitor contractor performance or
establishing a monthly inspection schedule. The contract file did not
contain evidence that the monitoring or inspections were ever
accomplished. Documentation of the government's quality assurance plan
is important because it outlines the method and frequency with which
contractor performance will be monitored.
The FAR also requires agencies to prepare contractor performance
evaluations for completed contracts over $100,000 in order to provide
current information for source selection purposes.[Footnote 26] At INS,
the COTRs, program office employees, are responsible for completing
these reports. The reports are designed to formally provide contractors
with documented evaluation of their performance each year, and the
information is entered into a database for use by government agencies
in evaluating contractors' past performance. We found that the required
evaluations had not always been done. Ten of 29 of the contract files
we reviewed that required contractor performance reports (e.g., where
the value exceeded $100,000) did not contain evidence that the reports
were completed. By not completing contractor performance reports, INS
limits its own awareness, as well as that of other government agencies,
of contractor performance.
Conclusion:
The fact that INS has become a significant part of DHS makes it
imperative for DHS leadership, as it grapples with the challenge of
putting in place a procurement structure, to take immediate action to
address the problems we have identified in this report. DHS is expected
to spend billions annually to acquire a broad range of products,
technologies and services, and these contractor-provided goods and
services will be critical to the department's ability to achieve its
mission of protecting the nation from terrorism. INS, one of the
largest agencies coming under DHS, brings with it a procurement
function that needs attention. Its acquisition workforce is struggling
to effectively manage the large and mission-critical procurements for
which it is responsible. The creation of DHS brings an opportunity to
address these problems.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the Under Secretary for
Management to take the following actions as part of ongoing efforts to
implement DHS procurement policies.
To improve the effectiveness of the procurement function, we recommend
that the Under Secretary for Management:
* ensure that cross-functional acquisition teams, consisting of
program, procurement, legal, budget, and financial officials,
effectively collaborate in planning and administering contracts;
* create and review meaningful procurement performance measures and
indicators to ensure that management directives are carried out by the
large number of field activities in the department; and:
* as part of its assessment of existing information systems coming into
the department, determine what procurement and financial information
must be gathered to obtain strategic knowledge of spending behavior
across the department.
To address acquisition workforce issues, we recommend that the Under
Secretary for Management do the following:
* Develop a data-driven assessment of the department's acquisition
personnel, resulting in a workforce plan that identifies the number,
location, and skills and competencies of the workforce. The plan should
also identify key strategies to attract and retain this workforce,
including use of available recruiting and retention flexibilities or
other targeted approaches. As part of this planning, ensure that term
appointments for procurement personnel are used as intended and not to
meet long-term needs.
* Explore ways of making collateral duty contracting officers in field
locations more accountable through the procurement hierarchy for their
contracting work.
To ensure that the department's contracts are well-managed, we
recommend that the Under Secretary for Management:
* develop a system for tracking the status of current detention
facility contracts so that contracting officers and program managers
are automatically alerted to begin the planning process at least two
years before a new contract has to be awarded; and:
* implement ways of holding designated COTRs responsible for
monitoring, reporting, and documenting contractor performance (e.g.,
require them to report on a regular basis to the contracting officer).
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with our
recommendations and stated that it plans to proceed in accordance with
them. DHS stated that it recognizes the need to formalize the
acquisition workforce and plans to model the training and
certifications of an Acquisition Corps along the lines of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.[Footnote 27] Further, the
department stated that all collateral duty contracting officers will be
phased out and that only professional procurement personnel with the
requisite training will have warrants. DHS also stated that a 5-year
strategic planning process has been established, enabling program
offices to plan acquisitions in advance.
The department also provided technical comments that we have
incorporated as appropriate. In these comments, some concern was
expressed about our description of the program offices' position that
they sometimes lack guidance from the procurement office about their
roles and responsibilities in the procurement process. Because this
description reflects comments made by the program officials with whom
we spoke, we have retained it in the report. Further, the department
recommended changes to the draft report that would place full
responsibility on the program offices for acquisition planning.
Because acquisition planning is a joint responsibility of both the
program and procurement offices, we did not make this change.
We conducted our review from October 2002 through May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As requested by your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this
report to other interested congressional committees and the Secretary
of Homeland Security. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-4841 or Michele Mackin, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-
4309. Other major contributors to this report were Lara Carreon, Andria
Key, Gary Middleton, Jeff Miller, Susan Tindall, and Adam Vodraska.
David E. Cooper:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by David E. Cooper:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the level of oversight and control and stakeholder
involvement in contracting activities at the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), we reviewed INS organizational charts to
gain insight into where the procurement offices fall in the hierarchy
and to determine the lines of responsibility and authority between the
various stakeholders in the acquisition process. We reviewed Department
of Justice and INS policies and procedures governing acquisition and
analyzed internal audit reports to determine if those policies and
procedures were being followed. We obtained statistics from INS
headquarters on unauthorized commitments and viewed a training
videotape, which is used agencywide, on unauthorized commitments. At
headquarters, we interviewed the Assistant Commissioner for
Administration and two of his branch chiefs. We visited each of the
administrative centers and interviewed key contracting personnel. We
also interviewed program managers in several INS program offices.
Lastly, we reviewed previous GAO work regarding best acquisition
practices and organizational alignment and oversight for leading
organizations.
To assess how effective existing INS information and financial
management systems are in enabling the tracking and reporting of
acquisition data and facilitating strategic decisionmaking, we attended
demonstrations of INS's Intelligent Procurement (IPRO) and Federal
Financial Management systems. We analyzed the spreadsheets and reports
used by the administrative centers to track their procurement activity.
We interviewed IPRO systems administrators at headquarters and each of
the administrative centers, as well as officials from Customs Service
and the Coast Guard to gauge their use of IPRO and to determine if
their experience with the system was similar to INS's. We also reviewed
our previous best practices work dealing with information systems and
strategic tracking and reporting of acquisition data.
To assess INS's effectiveness in recruiting, training, and retaining
its acquisition workforce, we interviewed contracting and human
resource officials at headquarters and the three administrative
centers. We analyzed INS's processes and procedures for tracking
acquisition workforce training, reviewed training materials for all
acquisition-related training courses, and attended two headquarters-
sponsored training courses. We obtained and analyzed information on
procurement vacancies and hiring rates at headquarters and the
administrative centers. In addition, we analyzed INS acquisition
workforce information obtained from the Office of Personnel
Management's Central Personnel Data File. To define the overall
acquisition workforce, we used the occupation codes included in our
report Federal Procurement: Spending and Workforce Trends, GAO-03-443
(Apr. 30, 2003). These codes are listed in table 1.
Table 1: Acquisition Workforce Occupation Codes:
Occupation code: 246; Definition: Industrial relations.
Occupation code: 346; Definition: Logistics management.
Occupation code: 511; Definition: Auditing.
Occupation code: 1101; Definition: General business and industry.
Occupation code: 1102; Definition: Contracting.
Occupation code: 1103; Definition: Industrial property management.
Occupation code: 1104; Definition: Property disposal.
Occupation code: 1105; Definition: Purchasing.
Occupation code: 1106; Definition: Procurement clerical and technician.
Occupation code: 1150; Definition: Industrial specialist.
Occupation code: 1152; Definition: Production control.
Occupation code: 1910; Definition: Quality assurance.
Occupation code: 2003; Definition: Supply management.
Occupation code: 2010; Definition: Inventory management.
Source: OPM.
[End of table]
To determine if INS has followed sound contracting policies and
regulations, we reviewed 42 of 185 contracts on INS's active contracts
list.[Footnote 28] The contracts were selected using random sampling
and included 18 headquarters and 24 administrative center contracts.
The value of the contracts ranged from $24,000 to $1.1 billion and
represented procurements for a variety of goods and services, including
detention facility services, information technology support, guard
services, ammunition, program management support, and data entry. Only
one of the 42 contracts fell below the simplified acquisition threshold
($100,000).[Footnote 29] We did not address the effectiveness of the
contracts in terms of meeting organizational requirements, but limited
our review to the issues set forth in appendix III. We held follow-on
discussions with headquarters and administrative center contracting
officers to clarify issues and discuss discrepancies noted in the
files. Appendix IV lists the contracts we reviewed.
We conducted our review from October 2002 through May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
July 23, 2003:
Mr. David Cooper:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team U.S. General
Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Cooper:
We have received the General Accounting Office draft report GAO-03-799,
entitled Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention
from the Department of Homeland Security. As you know, the INS was
retired on March l, 2003 and the functional area of this report is now
the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security. We
appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report.
The Department of Homeland Security generally concurs with the report
recommendations and will proceed in accordance with them. Specific
comments on the report are as follows:
* DHS recognizes the need to formalize the acquisition workforce and
plans to model the training and certifications of an Acquisition Corps
along the lines of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA).
* DHS is also in the process of hiring a Director of Acquisition
Workforce to oversee hiring, training, and retention of procurement
professionals.
* All collateral duty contracting officers will be phased out and only
professional procurement personnel with the requisite training will
have warrants.
* DHS will utilize a balanced scorecard approach similar to the
performance measures currently under development by the Federal
Acquisition Council (FAC) for all of the Bureaus procurement offices.
* An Investment Review Process has been established at DHS in which all
Capital Investments must be approved with a minimum threshold of $5M.
* A 5-year strategic planning process has also been established at DHS,
which will enable program offices to plan acquisitions in advance.
Thank you again for the opportunity to respond to the draft report. If
you have any questions, please contact Anna Dixon, Audit Liaison, at
(202) 772-9580.
Sincerely,
Ashley J. Lewis:
Acting Chief Procurement Officer:
Signed by Ashley J. Lewis:
Washington, D. C. 20528:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Contract File Review Criteria:
Acquisition Planning:
Does contract file contain evidence that acquisition planning was
accomplished?
Does the service or product being acquired fall into categories exempt
from acquisition planning?
Does planning documentation address the issues required in FAR 7.105?
Market Research:
Does contract file contain evidence that market research was conducted?
Competition:
Is the contract a Federal Supply Schedule buy?
Is the contract an order placed against an existing contract vehicle?
Was this a simplified acquisition?
Were sources excluded before competition was conducted?
Was full and open competition used?
If not competed, was other than full and open competition justified in
accordance with FAR 6.302?
Small Business:
Were small business requirements addressed? For example, was the
contract set aside for small business or was participation in the 8(a)
program[Footnote 30] considered?
Contractor Evaluation/Contract Award:
Does the solicitation state all factors that will affect contract award
and their relative importance?
For contracts exceeding $100,000, is past performance a factor for
evaluation?
Does the contract file contain a rationale to support the source
selection decision?
Contract Administration:
Is the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative identified in the
contract file?
Is a quality assurance surveillance plan in the file?
Is there evidence that surveillance of the contractor is being
performed as stated in the contract?
If the contract value exceeds $100,000, is documentation of a
contractor performance evaluation contained in the file in accordance
with FAR 42.1502?
Contract Modifications:
How many changes were issued subsequent to contract award? What were
the reasons for the changes?
[End of section]
Appendix IV: List of Active Contract Files Reviewed ($100 or More), as
of April 3, 2002:
Contract #: Headquarters contracts.
Contract #: COW-7-C-0011; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Systemic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system; Total
contract value: Headquarters contracts: $82,746,489.
Contract #: COW-O-A-0075; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: E-
form support; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 500,000.
Contract #: COW-O-C-1517; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Access to fingerprint database; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 2,173,920.
Contract #: COW-9-C-0059; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Computer-aided facility management; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 695,228.
Contract #: COW-2-P-1072; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Extended warranty-uninterruptible power switch; Total contract value:
Headquarters contracts: 24,500.
Contract #: COW-9-C-0013; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Leased parking; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 320,256.
Contract #: COW-2-A-002*; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Data
entry; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 73,781,361.
Contract #: COW-8-C-0051; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: STARS
Performance-CSC; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
1,042,012,160.
Contract #: COW-8-C-0049; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: STARS
Performance-Lockheed Martin; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 935,560,889.
Contract #: COW-8-C-0052; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: STARS
Performance-EDS; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
1,136,699,808.
Contract #: COW-O-A-0022; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Acquisition Support-UTA; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
80,000,000.
Contract #: COW-O-A-0023; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Acquisition Support-Tessada; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 80,000,000.
Contract #: COW-2-J-0470; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Entry/Exit Program Mgmt. Spt.; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 3,369,524.
Contract #: COW-O-C-0063; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Tunnel detection system - R&D; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 299,641.
Contract #: COW-2-D-1267; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Drug
testing; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 500,000.
Contract #: COW-2-A-0008; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Body
Armor-Safariland; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
5,000,000.
Contract #: COW-2-A-0007; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Body
Armor-PACA; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 5,000,000.
Contract #: COW-2-A-0078; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Restructuring/transition to DHS; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 3,900,000.
Contract #: Burlington administrative center contracts.
Contract #: ACB-OC-0002; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Newark
Detention Facility; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
$73,053,762.
Contract #: ACB-2-C-0005; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Queens Detention Facility; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 65,007,332.
Contract #: ACB-9-C-0005; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Food
service; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 619,014.
Contract #: ACB-OC-0013; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Message switch; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 543,435.
Contract #: ACB-OC-0006; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Ammunition; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 10,404,891.
Contract #: ACB-2-C-0002; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Guard
services; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 1,422,608.
Contract #: ACB-1-C-0002; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Food
services; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 2,962,468.
Contract #: ACB-2-P-0759; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Sub-
machine guns; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 258, 249.
Contract #: Dallas administrative center contracts.
Contract #: ACD-8-C-0009; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Laredo Detention Facility; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: $40,647,128.
Contract #: ACD-9-C-0001; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Houston Detention Facility; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 52,870,735.
Contract #: ACD-2-C-0009; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Unarmed guard service; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
46,242,666.
Contract #: ACD-O-C-0038; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Janitorial services; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
$295,439.
Contract #: ACD-2-J-0682; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Mail
processing machine; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
134,615.
Contract #: COW-1-C-0070; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Untrained dogs; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
1,775,000.
Contract #: ACD-2-J-0386; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Data
entry; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 190,594.
Contract #: ACD-O-J-0345; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Administrative support; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
253,112.
Contract #: Laguna administrative center contracts.
Contract #: ACL-9-C-0045; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Design/Build checkpoint; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
$365,000.
Contract #: ACL-1-C-0005; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Construction 2nd story addition; Total contract value: Headquarters
contracts: 580,588.
Contract #: ACL-9-K-0006; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Janitorial services; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
274,729.
Contract #: ACL-O-C-0002; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Horseshoeing; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 193,495.
Contract #: ACL-0-C-0004; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: Boxed
lunches; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 1,716,750.
Contract #: ACL-6-C-0003; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Unarmed guard service; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
45,000,000.
Contract #: ACL-8-K-0011; Contract title: Headquarters contracts:
Meals; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts: 2,308,605.
Contract #: ACL-O-C-0001; Contract title: Headquarters contracts: San
Diego Detention Facility; Total contract value: Headquarters contracts:
134,711,980.
Source: INS.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Warrant Authority of INS Contracting Officers:
The following levels of warrant authority are from the INS Procurement
Career Management Handbook:
Level I: Authority not to exceed $25,000 for open market procurements,
and $100,000 for orders against Federal Supply Schedules, other FAR
Part 8 required sources, and other existing, priced federal contracts.
Level II: Authority not to exceed $100,000 for open market
procurements, and unlimited authority for delivery orders against
Federal Supply Schedules, other FAR Part 8 required sources, and other
existing, priced federal contracts.
Level III: Authority not to exceed $1,000,000 for open market
procurements, and unlimited authority for delivery orders against
Federal Supply Schedules, other FAR Part 8 required sources, and other
existing, priced federal contracts.
Level IV: Unlimited authority for open market procurements and for
delivery orders from Federal Supply Schedules, other FAR Part 8
required sources, and other existing, priced federal contracts.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks--Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).
[2] Section 471 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296,
enacted Nov. 25, 2002) abolished the INS following the transfer of its
functions to DHS. The President's reorganization plan transferred the
functions of the INS to the new department on March 1, 2003.
[3] The three bureaus are the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration.
[4] For the purposes of this report, "field offices" refer to sites
receiving administrative services from INS's administrative centers.
Field offices include INS's districts, sectors, and suboffices. The
$66.5 million is a component of the $1.7 billion in contract
obligations cited on p. 1.
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Taking a Strategic
Approach Could Improve DOD's Acquisition of Services, GAO-02-230
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2002).
[6] Of the administrative center contracts active in November 2002,
more than half--39 of 68--were valued at more than $500,000.
[7] Under FAR 1.602-3, an unauthorized commitment is an agreement with
a vendor that is not legally binding on the government because the
government representative who placed the order lacked the authority to
enter into the agreement on behalf of the government, such as by
lacking a written contracting officer's warrant or exceeding the
specified authority of a warrant.
[8] Ratification involves a determination by the official authorized to
ratify unauthorized commitments that the resulting contract would have
otherwise been proper if made by an appropriate contracting officer,
that the price of the unauthorized commitment is fair and reasonable,
that payment is recommended (with concurrence from legal counsel), and
that funds are available and were available at the time the
unauthorized commitment was made.
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Taking a Strategic
Approach Could Improve DOD's Acquisition of Services, GAO-02-230
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2002) and Best Practices: Improved
Knowledge of DOD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings,
GAO-03-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003).
[10] The Federal Procurement Data System is the central repository of
statistical information on federal contracting.
[11] INS refers to these audits as "INSpect reviews."
[12] The acquisition workforce encompasses 14 different occupation
codes, 2 of which comprise these contracting officer positions.
Appendix I lists the codes we used in this report to define the
acquisition workforce.
[13] INS budget documents did not provide sufficient detail for us to
determine at what level the requests for additional procurement
personnel were denied, because the distinction between procurement
positions and other support positions is not maintained in the budget
documentation. Further, the administrative center requests are combined
into one request and submitted to INS headquarters.
[14] The outstanding scholar program is intended to allow agencies to
quickly hire college graduates with superior academic credentials for
entry-level positions.
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, High Risk Series: Strategic Human
Capital Management, GAO-03-120 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).
[16] See appendix V for description of individual warrant limits.
[17] The Federal Supply Schedule offers a large group of commercial
products and services, ranging from office supplies to information
technology services.
[18] Term appointments are temporary appointments that are intended to
last the length of a project of more than 1 year, and they can be
renewed up to 4 years. At the end of the 4 years, the appointment is
terminated. According to an INS official, the employee may not apply
for another term appointment with a similar job description. Term
employees receive the same pay, benefits, and training requirements as
permanent employees with the same job description.
[19] Our scope and methodology section, in appendix I, discusses in
more detail how we drew the sample of contracts and appendix III lists
the criteria we used in our file review.
[20] FAR 7.102.
[21] Some of these bridge contracts may have been modifications to the
incumbent contractor's expiring contract in order to continue
performance until the competitive award of a successor contract.
[22] FAR 6.301 states that contracting without providing for full and
open competition shall not be justified on the basis of a lack of
advanced acquisition planning by the requiring activity. This reflects
language in the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 41 U.S.C.
253(f)(5)(A) that in no case may an executive agency enter into a
contract for property or services using other than competitive
procedures on the basis of the lack of advance planning. In this
example, the General Counsel's office pointed out that the lack of
collaboration between the program and the procurement offices "placed
contracting in an untenable and precarious position" and cited a
similar situation with a 1996 Denver detention center contract, which
was also awarded by the Dallas administrative center.
[23] The 2001 Department of Justice Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-553,
app. B, section 119, at 114 Stat. 2762A-69) authorized the Attorney
General, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to enter into
contracts and other agreements, of any reasonable duration, for
detention or incarceration space or facilities, including related
services, on any reasonable basis. Because INS is no longer part of the
Department of Justice, DHS should determine whether this authority
still applies to its INS procurement function and, if not, whether
similar authority is needed to continue developing long-term detention
center contracts.
[24] On April 29, 2003, the Secretary of DHS renamed the Entry/Exit
system the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology
System (U.S. VISIT).
[25] FAR 46.401.
[26] FAR 42.1502 requires the completion of contractor performance
evaluations at the time work under the contract is completed. For
contracts with a period of performance lasting more than one year,
agencies are required to specify when an interim evaluation should be
prepared. INS requires an interim evaluation at the time an option is
exercised for the next contract period.
[27] The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (P.L. 101-510,
Title XII) recognized acquisition as a multi-disciplinary career field
for the Department of Defense.
[28] INS's active contracts list includes contracts valued at more than
$100.
[29] Government contracting personnel are allowed to use certain
streamlined procedures to buy goods and services up to the simplified
acquisition threshold of $100,000 (and up to $5 million for commercial
items).
[30] The Small Business Administration's 8(a) Business Development
Program, named for a section of the Small Business Act, is a business
development program created to help small disadvantaged businesses
compete in the American economy and access the federal procurement
market.
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