Homeland Security
Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs Gao ID: GAO-05-81 October 14, 2004The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations, unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and there are plans to provide more. Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most of these officials said, however, that additional important steps remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to these challenges. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll systems, which are not a part of the shared services system. Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission productivity. Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and involving employees to gain ownership for changes.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-81, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2004:
Homeland Security:
Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs:
GAO-05-81:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-81, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for
the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS
bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-
standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland
Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration
functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1)
communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2)
integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3)
administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
What GAO Found:
Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized
communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in
their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that
in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations,
unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS,
and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential
for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field
officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and
there are plans to provide more.
Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial
steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs
investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most
of these officials said, however, that additional important steps
remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They
reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE
operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new
integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to
these challenges.
Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared
services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months
after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with
problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll
systems, which are not a part of the shared services system.
Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with
other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned
administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission
productivity.
Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have
undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS
in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming
immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include
establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and
involving employees to gain ownership for changes.
Reorganization of INS into DHS:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS use key practices to create a mechanism for
periodically obtaining and considering employee feedback on their ideas
and concerns and provides specific guidance on roles and
responsibilities and administrative services. DHS commented on a draft
of this report and generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-81.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202)
512-8777 or Stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent
by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on
Roles and Responsibilities:
Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating
Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE:
Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative
Services:
Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs
Regarding Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE
Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS:
Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS, and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared
Services:
Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational
Transformations:
Abbreviations:
ASAC: associate special agent in charge:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
COSS: Customs Overtime Scheduling System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FFMS: Federal Financial Management System:
FLETC: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
RAC: resident agent in charge:
SAC: special agent in charge:
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 14, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and led to the most substantial reorganization
of the federal government since the 1940s.[Footnote 1] The duties and
responsibilities of several former agencies were transferred to DHS,
including responsibility for immigration enforcement and services.
These functions were transferred from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), which was abolished in 2003. Transfer of
the immigration functions creates a great opportunity for DHS to
successfully address long-standing management and operational problems
within INS that we have reported over the years.
Our past work on transformations has shown that it is unrealistic to
expect DHS to have fully resolved these difficult and long-standing
problems after just one and a half years in operation. As we have
reported,[Footnote 2] successful organizational transformations can
take 5 to 7 years to implement, and the three DHS bureaus with primary
responsibility for immigration functions--U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--are in the process of
transformation as they develop new ways of dealing with each other and
managing their performance. We have also reported that in the short
term, the experience of private sector mergers is that productivity and
effectiveness, for example, decline as attention is concentrated on
critical and immediate issues. Given the gravity of DHS's mission, a
focus on critical and immediate issues is understandable. Nevertheless,
because any failure by DHS to effectively carry out its mission could
expose the nation to very serious consequences, it is important that
DHS start immediately to take advantage of its unique opportunity to
transform immigration management and program operations and provide the
immigration enforcement and services that the American people need.
The Homeland Security Act requires us to review the transfer of
functions from INS to DHS, and identify issues associated with the
transition.[Footnote 3] This report is intended to satisfy the
requirements of the mandate. To help formulate the objectives to
respond to this mandate, we spoke with immigration experts in the
public and private sectors and representatives of pro-and anti-
immigration advocacy groups in the Washington, D.C., area, and reviewed
prior reports that we and others have issued. From these efforts, we
identified three issues that, early in the transition, appeared to
represent significant management challenges and that we believed
related to a range of mission and mission support activities. Thus,
this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination
among immigration programs in DHS, (2) integration of immigration and
customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and
systems used following the transition into DHS. We did not assess
program performance or DHS's overall response to long-standing problems
in this review. Additionally, our analysis was based on a snapshot in
time, primarily during the first half of fiscal year 2004, and it is
possible our results may be different if our interviews were conducted
today.
In assessing the integration of immigration and customs investigators
in ICE, we briefly discuss the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs),
which transferred from the Department of the Treasury. Customs was
responsible for enforcing customs laws in regulating legitimate
commercial activity and for safeguarding U.S. borders against the
illegal entry of goods. Before September 11, 2001, Customs' enforcement
activities focused primarily on preventing the smuggling of drugs into
the United States.
To address the objectives, we reviewed laws; CBP, CIS, and ICE
transition documents; policies; and other relevant documents. We also
interviewed officials at headquarters who were responsible for managing
ICE's detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations programs;
CIS's adjudications program; and CBP's Border Patrol and inspections
programs between September 2003 and August 2004. We interviewed ICE,
CIS, and CBP officials responsible for developing plans for the
transition in September 2003. We interviewed officials in CBP, CIS, and
ICE field offices between December 2003 and March 2004 in the following
cities: Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York;
Miami, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California, and with
the U.S. Border Patrol field offices in Miami, Detroit, and San Diego.
We selected these locations because of their geographic dispersion,
their proximity to major ports of entry, and the relative proximity of
ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another. In these locations, we talked
with officials responsible for inspections, the Border Patrol, and
inspectors in CBP; officials responsible for adjudications and
adjudicators in CIS; and managers, supervisory investigators, and
investigators in ICE. Baltimore and Arlington were used as preliminary
site visits to form our interview questions. In the remaining four
cities and all remaining ICE field offices, we used a structured
interview to obtain information and opinions relevant to our objectives
from the two most senior ICE officials.[Footnote 4] In total, this
meant interviewing 49 SACs and ASACs in ICE's field offices. Many of
these officials provided specific examples to help explain their
arguments, which we did not verify.
We conducted our review between August 2003 and August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Most of the field officials in the CBP, CIS, and ICE offices with whom
we spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with
other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or
excellent. They attributed their positive views mainly to working
relationships that existed before the transition of INS to DHS--
particularly with inspections (in CBP), adjudications (in CIS), and
detention and removal (in ICE). While CBP, CIS, and ICE headquarters
offices have issued guidance on the various programs' roles and
responsibilities, some field officials in all three bureaus said they
would like additional guidance to provide a clearer understanding of
such roles and responsibilities. Officials noted that in some cases,
unresolved disagreements and confusion regarding the roles and
responsibilities of the DHS immigration bureaus related to various
investigative techniques and other operational issues has the potential
for serious consequences. As one example, field officials told us that
conflicting positions by ICE and the Border Patrol over an
investigative technique known as controlled deliveries has hampered
communication and coordination and can not only hinder the
accomplishment of ICE's mission but potentially put ICE investigators
at risk.[Footnote 5] According to headquarters and field officials,
there are plans to issue more guidance on operational roles and
responsibilities. Specifically, CBP and ICE plan to issue more guidance
clarifying the roles and responsibilities of Border Patrol agents and
investigators (in such areas as investigative techniques used in border
operations, asset forfeiture, and information sharing), although they
could not provide a specific date when the guidance would be issued to
the field.
Top officials in ICE's special agent in charge (SAC) offices said that,
although they had taken initial steps toward integrating the former
immigration and customs investigative workforces at the time of our
review, additional important steps remained to be completed at many
offices to fully integrate investigators. The initial steps most SACs
said their offices have taken include (1) assigning investigators from
the former INS and Customs offices to work in new investigative groups
that are in the same physical location, (2) providing classroom-based
cross-training and on-the-job-training so former INS investigators know
the laws and perform the functions of legacy Customs investigators and
vice versa; and (3) resolving the pay disparity between former INS and
Customs investigators. However, many of these officials reported that
the continuation of former INS and Customs investigators working in
separate locations has been an obstacle to integration. A headquarters
official told us that ICE has begun to co-locate some SAC offices and
that other offices would be co-located as existing leases expire. ICE
officials currently estimate that it would cost $150 million to co-
locate all SAC offices immediately. Field officials also reported that
the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has
caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture.
ICE headquarters officials told us that they are prioritizing the
establishment of uniform policies and that until a new ICE policy is
established, SAC offices are required to use the policies of the former
agencies. In addition, many field officials said that the lack of
unique public identifiers such as badges, credentials, and uniforms has
held up creation of a unified ICE agency and caused frustration and
embarrassment. In August 2004, ICE headquarters officials confirmed
there had been a delay in issuing symbols such as badges and raid
jackets and that such symbols were either already available or were in
the final stages of development.
In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems
and processes called "shared services." In December 2003, DHS
instituted a shared service system in which certain mission support
services--such as human resources--are provided by one bureau to the
other bureaus. Certain mission support services were not incorporated
into the shared services system. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE
expressed confusion about shared services when we interviewed them 3 to
4 months after the system was instituted. Many field officials said
they did not know what constitutes shared services, what processes they
should use for receiving assistance from a shared service provider, or
how many of their staff administrative positions would be reassigned to
positions in other offices as shared service providers. DHS
headquarters officials acknowledged in June 2004 (6 months after the
initiation of shared services) that although a communication strategy
was in place, communicating information about shared services was a
"work in progress" and that it was the responsibility of the individual
bureaus (both those providing and those receiving services) to
communicate to their field staff about how the shared services process
worked. CBP, CIS, and ICE officials also expressed frustration with
problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll--which
are administrative systems managed within the agencies and not a part
of shared services. At least in part because of problems with funding
codes in the travel software, some ICE staff have waited for months to
be reimbursed for government travel. Some ICE field officials also
expressed concern about their ability to manage their budgets and
payroll problems, because of the systems used for these functions. Some
mission staff in CBP, CIS, and ICE field offices also told us that
inspectors, investigators, and adjudicators have been assigned
administrative functions full-time or as a collateral duty because (1)
some administrative staff from their office were reassigned to other
offices to serve as shared service providers, (2) the increase in staff
because of mergers in inspections and investigations and, (3) hiring
freezes. One effect of assigning mission staff to administrative work
is that because they are not spending all of their time on duties
needed to accomplish the program's mission, they are not reaching the
full potential of the program position.
Carrying out this transformation will not be an easy or quickly
realized task, so it is understandable that challenges have arisen. In
July 2003, to help agencies like DHS in such transformations, we
reported on nine key practices that have been found at the center of
successful mergers and transformations.[Footnote 6] While all nine key
practices are important in this transformation, we believe two would be
particularly helpful to DHS in addressing the longstanding and new
challenges identified in this report relating to the transformation of
immigration programs in DHS: (1) establishing a communication strategy
to create shared expectations and report related progress and (2)
involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership of
the transformation. While we did not assess in this review the degree
to which these practices are being used, we did identify certain parts
of the key practices that have not been fully integrated into
immigration strategies, such as establishing a feedback mechanism to
identify and address employee concerns.
To help DHS address the challenges to the overall transformation of
immigration programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security help ensure that all parts of the key practices we identified
are used to address the new and pre-existing challenges related to
immigration enforcement and services. In particular, DHS should create
a mechanism to periodically obtain employee feedback, clarify roles and
responsibilities for field staff in the three bureaus with immigration
responsibilities, and provide additional detailed guidance on processes
and procedures to follow for the provision of shared administrative
services.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In its response,
DHS generally agreed with our overall findings and recommendations and
requested that we add more context in some areas, such as the
department's communication and employee feedback efforts. We discuss
some of these efforts in the relevant portions of this report but note
that many of these efforts were ongoing at the time the concerns were
raised during our fieldwork. DHS also said that our fieldwork coincided
with the implementation of the shared services initiative and, as such,
it did not believe the field managers views expressed in this report
accurately portray the initiative or the current level of comprehension
of the initiative. While things change over time, we believe that the
views expressed at the time of our interviews indicate a need in the
field for additional detailed guidance on the shared administrative
services initiative.
Background:
The primary mission of DHS is, among other things, to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The creation
of DHS brought together 22 agencies with responsibility for securing
the borders and coastal waters, transportation sector, ports, and
critical infrastructure (such as telecommunications systems), among
other things. In addition, DHS consolidated some nonsecurity agencies
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's natural disaster
response functions and maritime safety and drug interdiction by the
Coast Guard. The creation of DHS was also intended to coordinate the
sharing of homeland security information and foster closer coordination
with federal agencies that were not incorporated into DHS, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State.
Under INS, and now within DHS, immigration enforcement and service are
complex, multifaceted functions. Immigration enforcement includes,
among other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries
to prevent illegal entry into the United States; inspecting over 500
million travelers each year to determine their admissibility;
apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens;
disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband
as well as human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who
engage in benefit and document fraud; and enforcing compliance with
programs such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS) and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication
Technology (US-VISIT). Immigration service includes providing services
or benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and
naturalization of legal immigrants; processing millions of applications
each year; making the right adjudicative decision in approving or
denying the applications; and rendering decisions in a timely manner.
Some background about the long-standing management problems at INS is
useful to set the stage for the transformation task DHS inherited. In
this respect, over the years, we have written numerous reports that
identified management challenges INS experienced in its efforts to
achieve both effective immigration law enforcement and service
delivery. In assuming the responsibility for immigration enforcement
and services, DHS inherits many of these management challenges. For
example, in 1997 we reported that INS lacked clearly defined priorities
and goals and that its organizational structure was fragmented both
programmatically and geographically. Additionally, after a
reorganization in 1994, field managers still had difficulty determining
whom to coordinate with, when to coordinate, and how to communicate
with one another because they were unclear about headquarters offices'
responsibilities and authority. We also reported that INS had not
adequately defined the roles of its two key enforcement programs--
Border Patrol and investigations--which resulted in overlapping
responsibilities, inconsistent program implementation, and ineffective
use of resources. INS's poor communication led to weaknesses in
policies and procedures. In later reports, we reported that broader
management challenges affected efforts to implement programs to control
the border, deter alien smuggling, reduce immigration benefit fraud,
reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal aliens, and
manage the immigration benefit application workload and reduce the
backlog.[Footnote 7]
INS was abolished, effective in 2003, by the Homeland Security Act of
2002,[Footnote 8] and its functions were transferred to three agencies
within the Department of Homeland Security. INS's Immigration Services
Division, responsible for processing applications for immigration
benefits, was placed in CIS, which reports directly to the Deputy
Secretary of DHS. INS's interior enforcement programs--investigations,
intelligence, and detention and removal--were placed in ICE. Within
ICE, investigators and intelligence analysts from former INS and the
U.S. Customs Service were merged into the investigations and
intelligence offices, while staff from former INS's detention and
removal program were placed in the detention and removal office. CBP
incorporated inspectors from former INS, Customs, and Agriculture and
Plant Health Inspection Service, as well as former INS's Border Patrol
agents. CBP and ICE both report to the Undersecretary for Border and
Transportation Security, who in turn reports to the Deputy Secretary of
the DHS. See figure 1 for the organizational position of immigration
programs in DHS.
Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CBP, CIS, and ICE each have a separate chain of command and field
structure. Under former INS, there were 33 district offices, each
headed by a district director, who had responsibility for
adjudications, detention and removal, inspections, intelligence, and
investigations. In DHS, the responsibilities of the 33 district offices
under the former INS were distributed among 33 CIS district offices, 27
Special Agent in Charge investigations field offices, 22 detention and
removal field offices, 20 CBP offices for field operations (that
oversee about 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry), and 6 field
intelligence units. The former INS's 20 border patrol sectors remained
intact.[Footnote 9]
CBP brought together INS and Customs inspections programs that, prior
to the transition, largely worked side by side in many land ports of
entry around the country and that shared similar missions. CIS was a
direct transfer of the Immigration Services Division within INS, and
the program remained largely intact. In contrast, ICE is a patchwork of
agencies and programs that includes INS's investigations and
intelligence programs, Customs' investigations and intelligence
programs, Customs' air and marine interdiction division, the Federal
Protective Service, and the Federal Air Marshals. In combining the
investigations programs, ICE has been tasked with merging INS
investigators who specialized in immigration enforcement (e.g.,
criminal aliens) with Customs investigators who specialized in customs
enforcement (e.g., drug smuggling). The integration of INS and Customs
investigators into a single investigative program has involved blending
of two vastly different workforces, each with its own culture,
policies, procedures, and mission priorities. Both programs were in
agencies with dual missions that prior to the merger had differences in
investigative priorities. For example, INS primarily looked for illegal
aliens and Customs primarily looked for illegal drugs. In addition, INS
investigators typically pursued administrative violations, while
Customs investigators typically pursued criminal violations.
Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent
by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on
Roles and Responsibilities:
Most field officials with whom we spoke in CBP, CIS, and ICE
characterized communication and coordination with their local
counterparts as good or excellent. Officials also said that positive
relationships were primarily based on previous working relationships
built while the programs--particularly inspections, detention and
removal, and adjudications--were all within one agency, INS or Customs.
About a quarter of the officials we interviewed across the immigration
programs in CBP, CIS, and ICE also said that they would like a clearer
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each program. Those
ICE officials who characterized communication and coordination as fair
to poor attributed the inability to resolve their problems to various
reasons, depending on the program; these included a lack of
communication or conflicts in roles with the Border Patrol and the
intelligence program's distance from, and production of useful work
for, the SAC offices. Near the end of our work, some headquarters and
field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE told us efforts were under way,
and agreed upon, to clarify issues related to roles and
responsibilities that have arisen.
Most Officials Reported Positive Communication and Coordination among
Programs:
Communication among CBP, CIS, and ICE occurs at the headquarters and
field level in different ways. All three bureaus have liaisons at the
headquarters level. For example, ICE has liaisons to CBP and CIS that
serve as points of contact and facilitators in convening the
appropriate officials for discussions on cross-cutting issues, and
ICE's liaisons are to contact those agencies' liaisons should ICE
initiate discussions. In the field, officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE said
they typically used meetings to maintain contact with one another,
although the frequency of meetings varied--from not at all to
bimonthly--and there are no requirements for field officials to meet
regularly. Officials who said that they met regularly also said that
they found these meetings to be useful in sharing information and
addressing issues that cut across programs.
Overall, most field officials we contacted who responded to this
question in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized communication and
coordination among their programs as good or excellent. Most SACs and
ASACs said that communication and coordination with CBP's inspections,
CIS's adjudications, and ICE's detention and removal programs were good
or excellent. On the other hand, about one-third of SACs and ASACs who
responded to this question believed that communication and coordination
with CBP's Border Patrol and ICE's intelligence programs were fair to
poor. Some officials said they expressed this view concerning
communication and coordination with the Border Patrol because there
were conflicts or overlaps in roles and responsibilities or a lack of
communication. SACs and ASACs who characterized communication and
coordination with ICE's intelligence program as fair or poor said they
did so for such reasons as the intelligence office was not in close
proximity to the SAC office or they did not feel that intelligence
analysts were producing analyses useful to the SAC office. Table 1
presents the responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs regarding communication
and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs.
Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs
Regarding Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE
Programs:
(Continued From Previous Page)
Rating: Good or excellent;
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 21
(70%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 41
(91%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 36
(88%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal:
35 (83%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 28
(68%).
Rating: Fair or poor;
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 9
(30%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 4
(9%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 5
(12%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal:
7 (17%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 13
(32%).
Rating: Total;
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 30
(100%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 45
(100%);
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 41
(100%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal:
42 (100%);
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 41
(100%).
Source: GAO survey.
Note: Data are based on 40 telephone interviews and 9 face-to-face
interviews with SACs and ASACs. We did not include responses from the 2
SACs and 2 ASACs in the Baltimore and Arlington SAC offices, as our
interviews with them were preliminary and the questions were not close
ended. The total number of SAC and ASAC interview responses varies for
several reasons: (1) One SAC office had two ASACs; (2) we did not
interview one SAC who was new to his position; and we did not interview
an ASAC who was also new to his position. Additionally, the total
responses for each category varied because not all SACs and ASACs
responded to all of our questions.
[End of table]
Many SACs and ASACs indicated that their positive views of
communication and coordination with staff from other programs were
primarily based on previous working relationships built while the
programs were all in INS or Customs. In addition, officials we
contacted in CIS and CBP, and other officials in ICE, said that they
also relied on working relationships that existed before the transfer
to facilitate communication and coordination on cross-cutting issues.
Those SACs and ASACs who responded that they relied to a little or no
extent on pre-existing working relationships said that they provided
such a response because they did not have a prior relationship to rely
upon. In addition, such informal means of maintaining communication and
coordination among program officials, while helpful, can be short-lived
as personnel retire or resign. For the long term, processes that
provide a systematic way of building and maintaining such relationships
among program staff provide better assurance of effective communication
and coordination.
Providing guidance that outlines roles and responsibilities among the
programs is one way of helping to achieve systematic maintenance of
such relationships. In this respect, the headquarters offices for CBP,
CIS, and ICE have issued some guidance on roles and responsibilities of
certain aspects of the immigration programs. For example,
* CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on each bureau's roles and
responsibilities regarding how they would transfer the assets of
antismuggling investigators from the Border Patrol to ICE, and how they
would handle antismuggling investigations after the transfer of these
investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly issued by CBP and ICE in
April 2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector chiefs in field locations
outlined each program's basic responsibilities. ICE would assume
responsibility for administrative support; funding of the antismuggling
investigators; and all investigations and complex cases such as
international in nature or related to organizations or national
security. The Border Patrol would have lead responsibility for cross-
border and border-related interdiction activities, such as surveillance
to interdict illegal border crossings. According to CBP officials, the
intent of the memorandum was in part to provide each program with a
basic framework for working together.
* CBP and CIS convened a working group to decide who would correct
mistakes on aliens' arrival and departure forms. Several advocacy
groups argued in the months following the transfer that as a result of
the dispersal of immigration programs across DHS agencies, aliens
entering the country did not know who to go to if an error was made on
their arrival/departure form. The two bureaus agreed that an alien must
seek an official in CBP to correct a CBP mistake, and a CIS official to
correct a CIS mistake. Additionally, CBP and CIS agreed that if an
alien seeking a correction inquires at the wrong office, then that
person is to be directed to the appropriate authorities for making the
correction. CBP and CIS officials provided us with this policy in
written memos dated March 31, 2004, and March 30, 2004, respectively,
that they said each bureau provided to its staff.
* CIS issued guidance to its field offices in December 2003 stating
that its Office of Fraud Detection and National Security is to serve as
the focal point and clearinghouse for requests from law enforcement
agencies for benefits or "cover" documents.[Footnote 10] The guidance
outlined the procedures that CIS is to use in responding to law
enforcement agencies outside DHS (for example, the FBI and Drug
Enforcement Agency) that want to provide benefits for aliens they have
brought into the country as witnesses in a criminal case or as
informants.
Some Field Officials Expressed a Need for Additional Guidance on Roles
and Responsibilities:
Notwithstanding the above guidance, some officials we contacted across
CBP, CIS, and ICE said that they would like a clearer understanding of
the roles and responsibilities of each program. In addition, some
difficulties with coordination cannot be resolved locally or by pre-
existing working relationships because they reflect a lack of clarity
in the programs' roles and responsibilities and impede communication
and coordination between them. For example, four SAC officials were
unsure how the role of the senior inspector, inherited from INS and now
in CBP, would affect ICE investigators' roles in conducting
investigations in the ports of entry. [Footnote 11]
CBP has stated that cases are not always referred to ICE by the senior
inspectors, and there is no CBP policy to refer such cases to ICE. This
is because some cases concern immigration violations related only to
attempted illegal entry at a port of entry and as such are CBP matters
regarding admissibility, not ICE interior enforcement matters.
According to CBP headquarters officials responsible for inspections,
the bureau is exploring the concept of expanding the senior inspector
position to address broader types of investigations rather than only
immigration matters, but the role of the senior inspector in relation
to the role of ICE investigators has not yet been determined.
Additional examples included problems (1) between ICE investigations
and CBP's Border Patrol in negotiating controlled deliveries, (2)
between ICE investigations and CIS in the area of benefit fraud, and
(3) among CBP, CIS, and ICE in the area of issuing paroles to
aliens.[Footnote 12]
Controlled Deliveries Have Reportedly Been Hampered by Communication
and Coordination between Border Patrol and ICE:
According to some of the field officials we contacted, how the Border
Patrol and ICE should communicate and coordinate with each other on
controlled deliveries had not been fully defined. An ICE official told
us that prior to the transition, this technique was used by both INS
and Customs agents and, while INS typically coordinated with the Border
Patrol, Customs agents, because they were often dealing with narcotics,
did not necessarily coordinate with INS unless the controlled delivery
was going through Border Patrol checkpoints. Based on what we were
told, since the transition, ICE and the Border Patrol have had
conflicting positions that hamper communication and coordination about
controlled deliveries. Border Patrol officials we contacted stated that
their mission is to prevent and detect illegal entry of persons or
contraband between ports of entry. Some ICE investigators we contacted
said that they believe, on the other hand, that in order to dismantle
smuggling organizations--one of ICE's priorities--they need to do more
than arrest the individual drivers or couriers. We talked with ICE
officials in one field office who told us that there have been
occasions when the Border Patrol deployed additional agents to an area
after learning that ICE intended to conduct a controlled delivery. ICE
investigators stated that this not only can hinder the accomplishment
of their mission but potentially puts ICE investigators at risk. This
is because Border Patrol agents can unsuspectingly encounter an
undercover ICE agent in the course of interdicting persons attempting
to cross the border, and if a gunfight ensues, the undercover ICE agent
risks revealing his or her identity to the smugglers, or the ICE and
Border Patrol agents risk injuring each other. A Border Patrol chief
and deputy chief we interviewed stated that if CBP headquarters issued
a formal memorandum stating that controlled deliveries by ICE were
allowed, they would be willing to coordinate with local ICE managers.
A Border Patrol official in headquarters told us that after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, former Customs investigators began
to lead operations on the border and between ports of entry, and saw
their program as having authority to conduct operations on the border.
When these investigators transitioned to ICE in March 2003, both
agencies eventually sought to clarify their roles and responsibilities
concerning controlled deliveries. The two bureaus formed a working
group to do this in April 2004.
An outcome of the working group discussions, according to CBP
headquarters officials, is that Border Patrol and ICE plan to issue
guidance in the form of a memorandum of understanding concerning the
general roles and responsibilities of their respective staffs for
controlled deliveries.[Footnote 13] This new guidance, according to the
Border Patrol official in headquarters who chaired the working group,
is to state that all controlled deliveries between ports of entry have
to be approved by the local Border Patrol chief, who will make a
decision based on guidance from headquarters. Additionally, according
to this same official, the guidance will state that the Border Patrol
will have the responsibility, during controlled deliveries, for
inspections to ensure that there are no weapons of mass destruction,
for example, in vehicles or on persons in addition to the known
smuggled goods or persons. Officials told us the guidance will also
outline a process for grievances when local managers cannot agree.
Border Patrol officials said they did not have a date when the guidance
would be finalized, but that as of August 2004, a final draft was sent
to CBP's Commissioner to be signed, after which ICE's Assistant
Secretary would be given the draft for signature.
Focus of Benefit Fraud Investigations Reported as a Source of
Disagreement among CIS and ICE Field Officials:
At the time of our site visits, how ICE and CIS should communicate and
coordinate with each other in cases of suspected benefit fraud has not
been formally defined by either CIS or ICE headquarters, and the field
officials we contacted said that this has caused disagreement among CIS
and ICE field officials. The difficulty between CIS and ICE
investigations regarding benefit fraud is not new. We have noted in a
past report that INS had numerous problems related to its enforcement
of benefit fraud, including a lack of protocols for adjudicators and
others in coordinating benefit fraud and a lack of criteria for
investigators in prioritizing benefit fraud cases.[Footnote 14] Prior
to the transition, INS had begun to place a priority on investigating
benefit fraud perpetrated by large-scale organizations or persons of
special interest, and this priority has continued under ICE. As a
result, some CIS field officials told us that ICE would not pursue
single cases of benefit fraud. ICE field officials who spoke on this
issue cited a lack of investigative resources as to why they could not
respond in the manner CIS wanted. For example, one ASAC acknowledged
that CIS depended on ICE to go forward with leads on benefit fraud but
said that his office could not commit large numbers of investigators to
benefit fraud until more investigators were cross-trained. An ASAC and
group supervisor in another office also cited the lack of investigators
to address benefit fraud and acknowledged that the vast majority of the
CIS cases referred to that ICE office we not investigated because of
this lack of resources.
According to CIS officials, adjudicators refer single cases of benefit
fraud to ICE, in part because they rely on ICE to conduct database
checks on systems CIS adjudicators cannot access. For example, ICE's
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) may have information
on individuals that could help adjudicators determine whether to
approve or deny an application for benefits.[Footnote 15] However, CIS
officials in three cities we visited stated that the applicants' files
they send over to ICE are sometimes kept without notification of
whether an investigation was initiated or not by ICE investigators for
long periods of time. An ICE official in headquarters responsible for
managing benefit fraud explained that SAC offices may investigate
single cases of alleged fraud but the extent to which that is done
depends on the assessment of the SAC office's staff resources and the
priorities of the local U.S. Attorney's Office.[Footnote 16] Without
having information from ICE that might form the basis for denying an
application, CIS still has the responsibility to adjudicate the
application and instead may even approve applications or take other
temporary action when fraud is suspected. For example, in one office we
visited, CIS officials said that they had 154 cases of alleged benefit
fraud that they had referred to ICE since June 2003. They said they had
not received responses from ICE on the status of these cases or whether
ICE intended to investigate them. In the interim, CIS officials said,
their office could not close the cases and instead had been granting
the suspect applicants temporary employment authorization or advance
parole.[Footnote 17] One CIS manager and one ICE manager in the field
indicated that while dismantling large-scale smuggling rings is
important, single cases of benefit fraud can have national security
implications. For example, a person who is allowed to remain in the
country as a result of committing marriage fraud can become a
naturalized citizen in 3 years and facilitate the entry of other
persons into the United States who could possibly pose security risks.
CIS and ICE officials in headquarters agreed that benefit fraud was
important to national security as well as the integrity of the
immigration process. CIS officials in three cities told us that ICE's
lack of responsiveness to some CIS referrals for benefit fraud
investigations hindered their ability to meet their district and bureau
goals for reducing the backlog of applications.
While challenges were reported, there have been efforts by ICE and CIS
to address benefit fraud. After the transition, CIS created a Fraud
Detection and National Security office devoted to deterring fraud. ICE
has established Benefit Fraud Units composed of investigative
assistants and intelligence analysts who were working in CIS's three
regional offices and in the three of the four CIS service centers (who
were working in these offices prior to the transition).[Footnote 18]
CIS has Fraud Detection Units composed of adjudications staff in its
four service centers who process applications, analyze applications to
identify trends in fraud, and refer potential benefit fraud cases to
ICE. ICE investigative assistants and intelligence analysts, in turn,
are to refer cases to the local SAC investigations offices. Two CIS
offices we visited were referring potential benefit fraud cases through
this new process. Alternatively, in the other four offices we visited,
CIS adjudicators were directly referring benefit fraud cases to local
ICE investigators, who must determine whether to reject, postpone, or
pursue the cases.
Headquarters officials from CIS and ICE told us that the two bureaus
were planning to do more to address benefit fraud. These officials told
us that CIS and ICE are working on a memorandum of understanding that
will document the creation of standard protocols for adjudicators to
refer and investigators to accept, alleged cases of benefit fraud
(including time frames for ICE in responding to CIS) and for CIS and
ICE to communicate and coordinate in matters involving benefit fraud.
Additionally, CIS created a new fraud position description to address
single cases of fraud, and a CIS official told us that as of August
2004, the agency has hired 95 of 100 newly funded staff positions to
work on benefit fraud and some of these staff have completed one
training course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC).[Footnote 19] In addition, while neither official knew when the
memo of understanding would be final, in the interim, CIS and ICE have
established time frames for SAC offices to review fraud referrals for
criminal investigation.
CBP, CIS, and ICE Lack Formal Guidance for Addressing Overlapping
Responsibilities for Parole:
CBP, CIS, and ICE have the authority to grant aliens parole--temporary
admission into the United States for such reasons as humanitarian
purposes, public benefit (e.g., participating in a legal proceeding for
the U.S. government), or for further inspection. A CIS official told us
that the authority to make decisions regarding parole, under former
INS, rested with the district director, who had responsibility for all
of the immigration programs. However, since the transition, CBP, CIS,
and ICE had yet to make formal the roles and responsibilities for each
program regarding who has authority to grant parole and when it is most
appropriate for one agency rather than the other to make decisions
about a parole application. Without this guidance on roles and
responsibilities, CBP, CIS, and ICE officials in local areas were
making determinations as to how the parole process will work. For
example, in one city we visited, as a result of monthly meetings, ICE
investigations, CBP inspections, and CIS coordinated a panel of
representatives from their local offices to review the applications or
requests for parole and, depending on the facts of each case, decided
what program would make the decision for granting parole to aliens. By
contrast, in another city we visited, CBP and CIS were unsure as to who
had the authority to make decisions about parole. CBP officials in
headquarters who are responsible for inspections told us that the
current practice is that the bureau that has possession of the person
makes the decision about parole, and while there are ongoing
discussions among managers in the three bureaus regarding authority,
there have not been final decisions. In August 2004, CBP and ICE
headquarters told us that the two bureaus have now drafted protocols
regarding parole and that the completion of the protocols is contingent
upon a decision by DHS on the placement and funding of the Parole and
Humanitarian Assistance Branch. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DHS said that the issues regarding parole operations have now
been resolved.
Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating
Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE:
SAC offices have taken initial steps toward integrating the former INS
and Customs investigative workforces. However, most SAC officials and
investigators we spoke with said that one or more steps that are
important for full integration remain to be completed. While officials
in some SAC offices said they have not received enough specific
guidance, such as performance measures from ICE headquarters on how to
gauge their progress in merging INS and Customs investigators, many of
the ones we contacted said there are some common initial steps SAC
offices have completed in integrating investigators.[Footnote 20] These
include (1) assigning former INS and Customs investigators to work
together in mixed investigative groups, (2) providing formal and on-
the-job cross-training to investigators so that former INS
investigators can perform the functions of former Customs investigators
and vice versa, and (3) establishing pay parity for all former INS
investigators and supervising investigators. Many SAC officials with
whom we spoke also noted that several important steps to fully
integrate former INS and Customs investigators remain to be taken.
These include (1) co-locating former INS and Customs investigators so
their offices are in the same building, (2) establishing uniform ICE
policies and procedures, and (3) issuing symbols for ICE's Office of
Investigations that identify all ICE investigators as being part of one
agency. ICE headquarters officials told us in August 2004 that efforts
are under way to address all of these steps.
Mixing Investigative Groups, Classroom-Based Cross-Training, and Pay
Parity Are among the Initial Steps Reported in Integrating INS and
Customs Investigators:
Of the 49 SACs and ASACs who responded to our question, 27 stated that
investigators in their offices had been integrated to a great or
moderate extent; 15 said they had been integrated to some extent, and 3
said they had been integrated to a little extent. SACs and ASACs who
responded to our question indicated they had generally maintained the
investigative focus that existed before the merger (e.g., groups
continued focusing on money laundering, strategic investigations, and
benefit fraud) but had mixed or intended to mix some of the former INS
and Customs investigators into these investigative groups. An ICE
official in headquarters said that the extent to which investigative
groups would be integrated has been left up to individual SACs, and the
characteristics of some geographic locations may make integration more
difficult. Eleven SACs said they were working toward having former INS
and Customs investigators work within mixed investigative groups. One
SAC noted that he did not want to integrate investigators and group
supervisors until they were formally cross-trained--training where
former INS and Customs investigators learn the laws and regulations of
each other's discipline from experienced lawyers and trainers.[Footnote
21]
Ten of 49 SACs and ASACs we spoke with indicated that former INS and
Customs investigators in their offices were being assigned to work with
one another on a case-by-case basis, and two of these said mixing of
investigators in this way provided the investigators with opportunities
to learn each other's discipline through on-the-job-training. Such
opportunities included having a joint duty roster where investigators
from each former discipline responded to a call for an investigation
together and having some investigators from former INS and Customs work
in the same investigative groups.[Footnote 22] Eleven of 49 SACs and
ASACs we contacted told us their offices had a joint duty roster such
that investigators from different former agencies responded to cases
together and learned from one another on the job. In one of the SAC
offices, we were told that investigators from the former INS and
Customs respond together to calls for investigations, but former
Customs investigators process immigration-related cases and customs-
related cases are processed by former INS investigators so they can
learn the policies and procedures of the other discipline in a real-
life setting.
SACs and ASACs we spoke with said that in addition to on-the-job
training, formal cross-training is key to eventually creating a unified
workforce. ICE headquarters issued a cross-training curriculum to all
SAC offices in January 2004 with a deadline for all investigators to
complete cross-training by September 30, 2004. ICE headquarters
officials did not set a deadline for the completion of training for
group supervisors or senior managers, although these persons could
choose to participate in the investigator training.
ICE officials responsible for developing the cross-training curriculum
indicated that the intent of the cross-training was to ensure that all
investigators from the former agencies were prepared to address all
components of ICE's mission. The investigators are to participate in 8
days of classroom training, taught by investigators and attorneys,
covering both legal and operational issues of the other discipline. For
example, former INS investigators receive training in areas such as
commercial fraud investigations, financial investigations, trade
compliance, and drug smuggling, while former Customs investigators
receive training in areas such as determining citizenship, benefit and
document fraud, initiation of removals, and alien detention.
Investigators must pass, with a score of 70 percent or higher, a series
of nine written tests in order to be certified as cross-trained. As of
late August 2004, ICE headquarters reported that 2,175 out of
approximately 5,400 former INS and Customs investigators had taken and
passed at least one of the nine exams, including 1,210 former INS and
Customs investigators who had fully completed cross-training. In August
2004, ICE headquarters said that they still expected most investigators
to complete the cross-training and nine examinations by the September
30, 2004, deadline.[Footnote 23]
ICE officials cited the achievement of pay parity between former INS
and Customs investigators as one of the successes of the merger. Prior
to the merger and for approximately a little more than a year after the
transfer, former INS investigators and their supervisors were paid at a
lower grade level than their counterparts from former Customs.
Specifically, most former INS investigators were paid at the GS-12 pay
grade and most former INS group supervisors were paid at the GS-13
grade; most former Customs investigators were paid at the GS-13 grade
and most former Customs group supervisors were paid at the GS-14 grade.
In our site visits and during telephone interviews, many ICE officials,
including most former INS investigators, said that the lack of pay
parity had affected morale, made former INS investigators feel as if
they were second class, and made integrating the investigative groups
more difficult as the former INS investigators were doing the same work
for less pay. In April 2004, DHS approved an upgrade from GS-12 to GS-
13 for the majority of former INS investigators, and in June 2004
approved an upgrade from GS-13 to GS-14 for the majority of former INS
group supervisors. Investigators and group supervisors we spoke with
after pay parity went into effect said they believed morale had
increased since pay parity was implemented, and former INS
investigators felt they are now equal to their former Customs
counterparts.
Many Officials Stated That Important Steps to Fully Integrate
Investigators Remain to Be Completed:
Twenty-one SACs and ASACs we spoke with stated that other efforts
important to integration --such as co-locating all ICE investigators in
a given field location so they are in one building, establishing
uniform operational policies and procedures, and "branding" ICE's
Office of Investigations with symbols that identify investigators as
belonging to one agency --have been delayed.
Complete Co-Location Has Not Yet Been Achieved:
According to 19 of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted, one of the obstacles
to integration has been the fact that numerous investigators from
former INS and Customs have continued to work in separate locations.
Although INS's and Customs' investigations programs were merged into
ICE, former INS investigators generally continued to work in former INS
buildings, and former Customs investigators generally continued to work
in former Customs buildings. Eight SACs and ASACs with whom we spoke
noted that the lack of co-location of former INS and Customs
investigators perpetuated the view among investigators that ICE is not
yet integrated. For example, 3 officials said that creating a unified
organization is difficult when members of a work group--8 to 12
investigators--are dispersed in different offices, sometimes miles
apart. Some SAC officials reported they have moved some investigative
groups, such as the benefit fraud and criminal aliens, to the same
buildings in an effort to better co-mingle former INS and Customs
investigators. Officials in some other locations told us this has not
been possible because of lack of space. Fourteen of 20 SACs we spoke
with by phone noted that their offices have been unable to co-locate
former INS and Customs investigators because space in their current
buildings was limited and building leases were signed before the
transfer or because they could not secure additional funding from DHS
to lease new buildings before existing leases expire. An ICE
headquarters official said there are a few SAC offices that are
completely co-located and there are additional SAC offices that have
submitted co-location plans to ICE headquarters and requested
additional space. This official also said that ICE will begin to co-
locate offices that have had Occupational Safety and Health
Administration violations or where leases will soon expire, and the
goal is to have all SAC offices co-located in the next 5 to 7 years.
ICE headquarters officials recently estimated that complete co-location
immediately would cost about $150 million.
Lack of Uniform Policies and Procedures for Some Operations Reportedly
Causes Confusion and Hinders the Creation of a New Culture:
Some officials told us that ICE has been slow to establish uniform
operational policies and procedures, causing confusion and some delay
in the creation of a new unified ICE culture. Policies and procedures
on such things as the use of firearms or the steps to take when
investigators are involved in car accidents while working in an
official capacity vary between former INS and Customs investigators. In
the absence of uniform policies and procedures, ICE headquarters
officials said they directed SAC offices to continue to use former
policies from both INS and Customs, applying the policy from the former
agency to the agent from that agency. SAC officials from some offices
said they have created new local office policies for all ICE
investigators.
One SAC official said that a lack of unified operational policies and
procedures has in some cases resulted in confusion or the establishment
of local policies. Other SAC officials told us this can be problematic
if investigators working together are relying upon different policies
and procedures to carry out their investigative work. In one city, we
were told that two investigators--one from the former INS and one from
the former Customs--were involved in an auto accident. The former
agencies had different procedures for filing paperwork on an accident,
and no one knew which policy to follow. The SAC made a local decision
to use the policy of the driver's former agency. In another city, the
SAC decided to adopt a former Customs policy concerning making an
arrest at a residence. Customs policy had called for a minimum of four
investigators in making an arrest, while INS did not have a policy on
the minimum number of investigators required for an arrest. The former
INS investigators and supervisors said they did not understand the
rationale for this policy, given the volume of arrests they typically
had in a day. Officials in ICE headquarters explained the rationale to
us, stating that under INS investigators often engaged in
administrative arrests of individuals for administrative crimes, such
as visa overstays or document fraud. Under ICE, they said investigators
are often engaging in criminal law enforcement arrests and possibly
arresting more dangerous suspects. As a matter of officer safety, ICE
requires that investigators work in groups of four when making an
arrest. Knowing this rationale may have helped the former INS staff
avoid confusion over this change. Additionally, ICE headquarters
officials told us that the investigations program prioritized the
establishment of uniform policies, for example, focusing on a unified
policy for undercover operations. These headquarters officials also
said that, in the interim, SAC offices were instructed by ICE
headquarters to use the policy of the former agencies.
Pending Name Change Caused Delay in Creating a Unified ICE:
After more than a year as ICE, field officials said that investigators
and managers were continuing to use their former agency badges and
credentials, and ICE headquarters officials had spent months waiting on
a request for a name change.[Footnote 24] Some SACs we spoke with said
that at the time we contacted them, ICE still did not have the public
identifiers that separate it from the former agencies of which it is
composed. We were told that incomplete branding of the agency with a
unique logo has at times contributed to frustration and
embarrassment.[Footnote 25] Some of the former INS investigators and
managers we spoke with said that the delay in branding ICE has held up
the creation of a unified ICE agency.
According to officials at ICE headquarters, one element in the process
of establishing ICE is to brand it with a unique identity by creating
badges, raid jackets, business cards, and other identifying materials
or symbols. When DHS was created, INS staff were directed to retire all
emblems and paraphernalia. However, Customs was not given the same
orders. In some ICE offices, we observed Customs emblems and
paraphernalia on display. In another example of the divide between INS
and Customs, in one city we visited, former Customs investigators had
created a mock-up of the new ICE badge that they said was for former
INS investigators, which referred to the INS investigators as "Junior
Officers" of the U.S. Customs Service.
During one site visit, a group of former INS investigators we spoke
with questioned why headquarters had been so slow to implement
branding, and one investigators said the branding should have been
completed prior to the transition or shortly thereafter. In another
site visit, one investigator said this lack of an identity has proven
to be frustrating and embarrassing when acting in an official capacity,
such as testifying in court. One ASAC we spoke with said that he tried
to board a plane with his weapon and was questioned by airline
officials when he showed his INS badge to verify that he was law
enforcement. Airline officials said that INS had been abolished, and
the ASAC had to explain that ICE did not yet have its own badges. The
ASAC was eventually allowed to proceed but said he knew this problem
had plagued other investigators as well. In another example, an agent
in one city said that he went out and purchased his own ICE raid jacket
because he did not like having his authority questioned when he wore an
INS raid jacket.
Most of the decisions about branding were made at the DHS level, and
there are written guidelines for the use of the DHS seal and agency
signatures for such things as business cards, letterhead, and
flags.[Footnote 26] According to an official in ICE headquarters who is
responsible for branding, certain branding activities that are
particular to ICE are in the final stages. At the time of our interview
in July 2004 and confirmed in August 2004, ICE headquarters officials
acknowledged the delay and said that raid jackets were made available
for purchase locally in January 2004, badges will be issued beginning
in September 2004, and uniforms were in the final stages of production.
Many See Positive Aspects of the Transition:
Many of those we spoke with from both the former INS and Customs noted
that there have been benefits to merging the INS and Customs
investigations programs. They noted that combining the expertise of
former INS and Customs investigators has provided expanded authority in
conducting investigations and could contribute to more thorough
investigations. Other SAC officials said that expanded authority has
been beneficial in investigating money laundering in alien smuggling
cases and going after the assets of foreign-born persons running
prostitution rings as they can now prosecute someone for multiple
offenses. Four SACs and ASACs said they expect the benefits to increase
as cross-training is completed and investigators more fully learn the
expertise of the other former agency.
Former INS investigators we spoke with also noted beneficial aspects of
the merger. Many of the former INS investigators we spoke with in our
site visits said they are now able to concentrate on investigative work
rather than services and they have received a pay increase to bring
them up to par with the former Customs investigators. In one location,
former INS investigators said that prior to the merger, the District
Director would task investigators to assist with naturalization exams
or to fill guard duties at district offices or ports of entry. In
another location, former INS investigators said they now have more
employees to carry out missions.
Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative
Services:
Although DHS has issued guidance via Email on how administrative
support shared services would function, several CBP, CIS, and ICE field
officials told us that they were confused about what constitutes shared
services, the processes for receiving services from a shared service
provider, and how many of the administrative staff in their offices
would be transferred to other offices. One official in headquarters
told us in July 2004 that decisions about shared services were not
completely resolved. Additionally, officials in all three agencies
cited problems with administrative computer systems for travel, budget,
and payroll--administrative functions that are handled by the
individual bureaus and are not a part of shared services. As a result
of several problems and changes that have occurred, according to
officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE, some field offices have assigned
administrative duties to inspectors, adjudicators or senior
adjudications managers, or investigative staff because the office
needed additional administrative support.
In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems
and processes called "shared services." DHS initiated the shared
services system in December 2003, making determinations about the
realignment of approximately 6,100 administrative positions. In January
2004, the Undersecretaries for Management and Border and Transportation
Security and the heads of CBP, CIS, and ICE signed an agreement
finalizing the interbureau governance of shared services. In commenting
on a draft of this report, DHS said that the Department encountered
delays in the execution of service level agreement and resource
allocation. Consequently, the implementation phase did not begin until
late in the spring/summer of 2004. According a to DHS official, shared
services is intended to represent a new model for government on
delivering and managing administrative services.
DHS's shared services system utilizes four different approaches in
providing and receiving services for CBP, CIS, and ICE staff. The
shared services system's approaches are (1) each bureau provides its
staff some of its own services itself, (2) one bureau provides a
certain service to staff in all three bureaus, (3) one bureau provides
a service to its own workforce and staff in one other agency while the
third bureau provides that service for its own staff, and (4) each
bureau provides selected services to its own workforce as well as to
selected staff in other bureaus. For example, CBP is providing human
resource management to its workforce, in addition to workforces in CIS
and ICE~. ICE is providing training for supervisors in ICE, CIS, and
CBP but handles equal employment opportunity issues for only its own
workforce, and CIS. CBP, CIS, and ICE are each providing their own
workforces with procurement, budget, labor and employment relations,
and professional development training, among other services. According
to DHS officials, the decisions about which bureau would provide a
certain service were made on the basis of an assessment of such factors
as each bureau's adaptability to an increased workload, level of
modernization, and historical expertise with each shared service. See
figure 2 for a description of the services each bureau is to provide
under shared services.
Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS, and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared
Services:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite Communication about Recently Implemented Shared Services
System, Officials Say Confusion Persists:
A DHS briefing document and communication strategy indicated that
through such means as the bureau's intranet, chain of command,
memorandums, fact sheets, and video broadcasts, DHS would communicate
the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE for providing
shared services. DHS provided us evidence that it has used some of
these communication methods. However, a senior official at DHS told us
in June 2004 (6 months after the initiation of shared services) that
although a communication strategy was in place, communicating about
shared services to the field is a work in progress. This official also
said that it is the responsibility of the bureaus both receiving and
providing services to communicate information about shared services to
the field offices and staff. DHS officials also stated that the
responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE under shared services are still
under development. One official who was involved in the formation of
shared services told us that DHS would like to change some
administrative functions that the bureaus currently handle for
themselves--for example, procurement--into shared services. Further,
even though CBP was designated as the provider of personnel services to
CIS, the extent of that service is still in negotiation.[Footnote 27]
Field officials told us that numerous officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE
were uncertain about what constitutes shared services, the process for
receiving services from a shared service provider, and which
administrative staff would be re-aligned from their positions in local
offices to work for providers of shared services. In our telephone
interviews with SACs and ASACs, 33 of 40 said that their offices were
experiencing problems with shared services to a moderate or great
extent.[Footnote 28] The 4 SACs and ASACs who said they were
experiencing problems to little or no extent provided such reasons as
not interacting with shared services providers or relying on the staff
who assisted them prior to the initiation of shared services in
December 2003.[Footnote 29]
Our meetings with field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE indicated that
despite communication from DHS, field office officials varied in their
understanding about what constitutes shared services. For example, one
ASAC believed that shared services consisted of sharing resources, such
as buildings and computer technology, rather than having one bureau
provide a certain administrative service for the other two.
Additionally, in April 2004, approximately 3 to 4 months after the
initiation of shared services, four ICE officials and one CBP
inspections official were not aware that this occurred.
Officials in four of the six sites we visited were unsure about who
specifically to call or the process they were to use in obtaining a
shared service from CBP, CIS, or ICE.[Footnote 30] For example, after
the person responsible for facilities was transferred to ICE, an
official in a CIS district office did not know who to call for
assistance with setting up vacant office space for CIS staff who were
being moved to that location. This official ultimately learned that the
process was not a shared service but was instead handled within CIS. A
SAC official in another office we visited said he and administrative
staff did not know how to obtain an authorization to repair a vehicle
that had been damaged in an accident in October 2003. The officials
initiated a purchase order request in November 2003 for services to
repair the vehicle and submitted it to ICE. However, under the shared
services system, CBP was designated responsibility for authorizing
fleet repairs for CBP, CIS, and ICE. The SAC official said that he and
administrative staff spent several months contacting multiple officials
at CBP offices and ICE headquarters about approval for the repair and
how to pay for it. In March 2004 the car was scheduled to be sold at an
auction.[Footnote 31] In late June 2004, CBP issued an informal policy,
by Email to the SAC office, for receiving approval for repairs and
invited the SAC office to resubmit a request (as it had been previously
denied) if it had not already sold the car. Before SAC officials were
informed of this process, we were told that the office paid
approximately $1,000 for storage of the vehicle and stopped saving the
funds initially set aside for the repair.
In five of the six sites we visited, officials expressed uncertainty
and unmet expectations about which administrative staff in their
offices would be reassigned to shared services positions and
transferred to other programs or agencies. The decision about the
reassignment of administrative staff for shared services was made at
the headquarters level by a working group of CBP, CIS, and ICE
officials and led by DHS. For example, in one SAC office that we
visited, approximately 50 administrative staff from former INS had been
supporting CBP and CIS in addition to ICE, and all but 1 were moved
because of the realignment of staff for shared services. Because the
SAC had expected to retain 3 rather than 1 of the 50 administrative
staff, he assigned administrative work to several investigators as a
collateral duty. Administrative staff in one CBP office for field
operations that we visited had received e-mail messages from CBP
headquarters notifying them that, within a few days, they would be
transferred to another program or bureau. We were told that some
reassignments came as a surprise and involved moving from one office
building to another, but usually they were in the same general
geographic location.
ICE provided us with a written statement explaining that it, along with
CBP and CIS, could not begin delivering administrative services to one
another under shared services until "reimbursable agreements"--the
arrangement of costs and funding for a particular administrative
service--were finalized. As such, this delayed notifications to
administrative staff about reassignments and affected the agencies'
ability to provide information to the field.
Travel, Budget, and Other Computer System Problems Seen as Significant:
Many officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said that problems
with travel and budget, and computer systems have at times adversely
affected office operations. For example, because of problems with
travel computer systems, many officials in ICE's SAC offices said that
staff are not receiving reimbursements. Thirty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs
responding to our question about shared services cited Travel Manager-
-ICE's off-the-shelf computer system for processing travel requests and
vouchers--and/or the Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)--the
computer system ICE SAC offices use to track their budgets--as
significant administrative problems. Additionally, CBP officials
identified such problems as cumbersome procedures for accessing data
systems and the lack of computer program updates to reflect changes on
time and attendance cards. In August 2004, headquarters officials told
us they were making efforts to resolve the problems by providing
training, reducing funding strings for Travel Manager, and
reprogramming FFMS.
Twenty-six of 49 SACs and ASACs responding to our question about shared
services also discussed the problems they were having with Travel
Manager. ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager is a
new system to the former Customs field staff in ICE's investigations
program. It was used in the former INS's headquarters and in some field
offices prior to the transfer. ICE headquarters officials told us that
Travel Manager was chosen because it could interface with ICE's
accounting system and automate the process for managing travel
documents. ICE investigations officials in the field and headquarters
told us that with Travel Manager, the funding strings (codes that tell
the system what account to charge and to what program to attribute
travel) have caused problems for staff in the field and headquarters.
ICE headquarters investigations officials estimated that there are
approximately 80,000 separate funding strings, each approximately 48
characters long, from which field staff have to choose in carrying out
a transaction such as completing a travel voucher. They explained that
because the system is new to many staff and the funding strings are not
labeled so that the user can select words rather than a string of
numerical characters, some ICE staff may choose incorrect funding
strings, causing their vouchers to "disappear" in the system or be
routed to the wrong approving official. When this occurs, ICE
headquarters officials for investigations told us, neither the traveler
nor the approving official receives a notice that the voucher has
failed to be processed. Additionally, because ICE's Travel Manager
interfaces with its Federal Financial Management System, if staff
choose the wrong funding string, the voucher may be routed to an
account that does not have the funds. If this happens, ICE officials
said the system would reject the voucher. As a result, they said that
some ICE investigators and managers have not received timely or
accurate reimbursements for their travel.
According to some ICE field officials we contacted, when staff
inadvertently select the wrong funding string, it takes from several
weeks to months to process the voucher. A few officials said that when
staff do not receive timely reimbursements, they sometimes use their
personal funds to pay their government credit card bills. For example,
one SAC said that an agent in his office used personal funds to pay
$15,000 for bills incurred from business travel. Another SAC official
said that not all investigators are able to use their personal funds to
pay for their business travel expenses. One SAC said that he was
waiting to be reimbursed for $11,000 in travel bills that he had
accrued on his government credit card. Because he had not been
reimbursed, he felt he was in danger of having his government credit
card revoked. These examples are to illustrate the types of concerns
reported to us. We did not verify the facts reported to us or the
circumstances surrounding these specific examples, e.g., whether the
problems were caused by the travel system, the individual, or both.
ICE headquarters investigations officials responsible for Travel
Manager said that they have made some changes to Travel Manager to aid
ICE staff. For example, they reduced the number of funding strings from
the initial 800,000 to about 80,000, and added alphabetical codes to
help facilitate the use of the software. They also said they have
suggested to an ICE group working on finance issues that either the
system or a staff member should send notification to the approving
official and traveler when vouchers cannot be successfully
processed.[Footnote 32] Officials responsible for all of ICE's
financial management told us that the office responsible for mission
support for all of ICE had provided over 200 contacts in the field to
assist with Travel Manager, held a training conference, and provided
training opportunities in the field and in headquarters for staff
regarding Travel Manager. However, they recognized that 48-character
numerical funding strings are difficult to use. They also discussed
additional reasons why staff in the field were having problems with
Travel Manager. First, because ICE did not have a full accounting of
its staff, [Footnote 33] Travel Manager did not recognize all of the
staff and was unable to route all of the vouchers. Second, many staff
were unfamiliar with Travel Manager, so they did not know how to
determine whether their vouchers have been approved or rejected. Third,
in situations where staff did not travel for their home program office,
e.g., if an investigator was traveling on behalf of the Federal Air
Marshals, the travel documents could not be managed through Travel
Manager.
Twenty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs also discussed problems with FFMS, but
the problems were not as numerous as those with Travel Manager. FFMS is
a financial accounting system that allows the tracking of budget
expenditures and balances. It was previously used by INS and ICE chose
to adopt it, although DHS plans to transition to a new departmentwide
financial system. The problems with FFMS are new to former Customs
managers and administrative staff, but not necessarily new to former
INS staff who began using the software shortly before the transition.
The SACs and ASACs who stated that they had problems with FFMS said
that it mostly affected their ability to manage the office budgets. In
response to this problem, five SACs we contacted told us that they are
tracking their budgets manually, with some using Excel spreadsheets so
they can know how much they are spending from each budget area. One SAC
said he is using over 20 Excel spreadsheets to track the office budget,
and another bought an off-the-shelf budget software system to
supplement FFMS. The officials in ICE headquarters responsible for
finance told us that the limitations of FFMS were known, but FFMS was
chosen after three studies were conducted by independent consultants
approving its use by ICE and it was certified to meet auditing
standards. Additionally, ICE officials in headquarters responsible for
finance said in June 2004 that they have attempted to address field
concerns by reprogramming FFMS to allow SAC offices to track their
budgets in the manner they were used to doing in Customs and by
providing weekly training to program officers in headquarters.
CBP officials in inspections and Border Patrol in four of the six sites
we visited also told us they were having problems with administrative
computer systems and applications, mostly in the area of time and
attendance. Inspections officials cited problems with CBP's
computerized time and attendance system, Customs Overtime Scheduling
System (COSS), and in some cases, inspections officials said they were
not accurately paid overtime. Officials we spoke with in CBP's Border
Patrol also cited problems with COSS and overtime payments and added
that in some cases, staff were maintaining a manual record of actual
time and attendance but inputting into COSS only the 40 hours per week
recognized by COSS. CBP officials in Border Patrol headquarters
acknowledged the problems with COSS when we talked with them in June
2004. However, in August 2004, CBP headquarters officials responsible
for program management of COSS told us that there were initial problems
with overtime payments for former INS staff that were attributed to
errors in the calculation of pay after transmission from COSS to the
Department of Agriculture for processing and the method the Border
Patrol had used to schedule hours worked, while under former
INS.[Footnote 34] They said that all problems with COSS had been
resolved by January 1, 2004. We did not verify whether or when specific
problems were addressed or the actual causes of the problems reported
to us by Border Patrol and inspections officials but did note a
difference in the causes field officials mentioned and the reasons
provided by CBP headquarters officials.
Mission Staff Sometimes Assigned Administrative Work Full-Time or as
Collateral Duty:
One criticism we had of the former INS was that because of staffing
shortages, mission staff often had to assume administrative or other
functions as a collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff
to administrative work is that they are not spending all of their time
on duties needed to accomplish the program's mission and thus are not
reaching the full potential of the program position. In our site
visits, we found that this continues to be a problem in some offices.
Some officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they had to use
mission staff in this way because they did not have enough
administrative support to compensate for the realignment of
administrative staff to shared services, the addition of mission
personnel that have come as a result of mergers of some programs in the
transition, and hiring freezes. As a result, inspectors, adjudicators,
and investigators in some field offices were taking on administrative
work full-time or as a collateral duty:
* In three of the six sites we visited, we found examples where CBP
inspectors were assigned to handle various administrative functions as
a collateral duty. For example, an inspector in one city was detailed
to resolving problems related to time and attendance and payroll for
former INS inspectors. In another city, supervisory inspectors were
detailed to perform scheduling duties normally performed by
administrative staff.
* In three of the six CIS district offices we visited, we found
examples of adjudicators or senior managers taking on administrative
functions in addition to their work as a collateral duty. In two
district offices, adjudicators were taking on such functions as
managing office space and monitoring the budget. In another city, the
third highest manager in a district office was assigned to handle
personnel, procurement, and vacancies rather than duties related
specifically to managing the adjudication of applications. Because
these mission staff were spending time on administrative functions,
they were spending less time addressing program missions such as
reducing the backlog of applications.
* In two of our six site visits and in telephone interviews, we learned
that ICE investigators are also taking on administrative functions as a
collateral duty. In one SAC office we visited, the SAC assigned 10
special investigators, including 1 associate special agent in charge, 1
assistant special agent in charge, 2 group supervisors, and 6 junior
investigators, to administrative duties. In our telephone interviews,
we found examples consistent with our site visits. For example, we were
told that special investigators in a subordinate office of one SAC
office were assigned all of the clerical work in addition to their
normal duties when the office lost its administrative support staff.
Rather than assign administrative duties to investigators, other SAC
offices said they are converting unfilled agent positions to
administrative positions. For example, an official in one office said
he would have to convert unfilled agent positions to administrative
positions, and an official in another office gained an administrative
staff member from CBP by transferring (through a personnel action) one
of its staff vacancies to CBP.
Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations:
The challenges we identify in this report highlight the importance of
using the transition of immigration functions into DHS as an
opportunity for further addressing long-standing and new challenges
through positive transformation. We realize that carrying out this
transformation will be no easy or quickly realized task. In this
regard, we and others have studied the experiences of other public and
private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and
transformations. In a July 2003 report, we identified nine key
practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful
mergers and transformations, as shown in figure 3.[Footnote 35] This
report was done to help federal agencies implement successful
transformations of their cultures, as well as help the new DHS merge
its various originating components into a unified department.
Collectively, in our view, these key practices and related
implementation steps discussed in our July 2003 report can help
transform the sometimes diverse cultures of DHS legacy agencies into a
cohesive unit that fulfills its new mission, meets current and emerging
needs, maximizes performance, and ensures accountability.
Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational
Transformations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We did not perform an in-depth analysis comparing these key practices
with the transfer of immigration functions into DHS. Nonetheless, we
believe that all nine are important for DHS in its transformation of
immigration programs and noted two key practices that we think would be
particularly helpful as it addresses the challenges we identified in
this report. We realize that DHS has started using many of these nine
practices and, while we did not assess how well each of the practices
has been followed, we did identify certain parts of the two practices
that we believe would further assist DHS in its transformation efforts.
Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations and
Report Related Progress:
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to
implementing a merger or transformation. Communication is most
effective when done early, clearly, and often, and is downward, upward,
and lateral. Organizations must develop a comprehensive communication
strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and
seeks to genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation
process. Implementation steps that accompany this key practice include
communicating early and often to build trust and understanding,
ensuring consistency of message, encouraging two-way communication, and
providing information to meet specific needs of employees.
DHS's office responsible for shared services provided us with a
communication strategy dated May 2004 and a briefing, dated February
2004, outlining communication strategies, both with the objectives of
raising awareness and promoting understanding of shared services within
and outside of DHS. CBP told us that the agency has developed and
implemented a communications strategy and provided us with examples of
communications activities. Additionally, 22 of the 36 SACs and ASACs
responding to our question by telephone told us that concerning
communication, they received information from headquarters regarding
transition goals and milestones.[Footnote 36] In addition, a few of the
SACs and ASACs who responded that they had received transition
information said that the information was received through such means
as e-mail, broadcast messages, ICE's intranet, and SAC conferences.
These efforts, however, do not appear to have been completely effective
since, as previously discussed, about a quarter of the officials we
contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE wanted a clearer understanding of their
roles and responsibilities with other immigration programs.
Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their Ownership for
the Transformation:
A successful merger and transformation must involve employees and their
representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership of the
changes that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement
strengthens the transformation process by including frontline
perspectives and experiences. Further, employee involvement helps to
create the opportunity to establish new networks and break down
existing organizational silos, increase employees' understanding and
acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership
of new policies and procedures. Implementation steps that accompany
this key practice include using employee teams, involving employees in
planning and sharing performance information, incorporating employee
feedback into new policies and procedures, and delegating authority to
appropriate organizational levels.
In conducting our field work and in meetings with headquarters
officials, we did not identify any indication that the bureaus
responsible for immigration programs had formal mechanisms for
obtaining periodic feedback from field staff (other than the top
manager in the office) about how well the transition was occurring or
their concerns or ideas for improvement. In addition, several
headquarters officials seemed somewhat surprised by the concerns
reported to us by field officials when we discussed them in August
2004. On the other hand, while we did not conduct an exhaustive search
of employee involvement by all field staff, our work did identify
examples of such involvement. For example, we found two instances where
field officials had participated in working groups held at headquarters
regarding issues related to roles and responsibilities. That is, the
working group to outline roles and responsibilities between the Border
Patrol and ICE investigations involved field managers, two of whom we
interviewed. Additionally, we were told that a meeting held in July
2004 involved CIS and ICE headquarters managers, field staff,
investigators, and adjudicators in discussions about benefit fraud.
Without a formal mechanism for obtaining employee feedback, however,
the bureaus run the risk of missing opportunities for improvement and
of allowing field-related problems to arise and continue without
adequate responses.
Conclusions:
With its critical roles in helping protect national security and
enforcing immigration laws, it is very important that INS's integration
into DHS and its related transformation successfully address
longstanding and new management challenges. To accomplish this, DHS's
three immigration bureaus are tasked with establishing clear
communication and coordination among one another and with the efficient
and effective integration of the roles and responsibilities of the
former immigration and customs investigative workforces, all while
implementing a new system for providing administrative services. In
managing this transformation, DHS is faced with not only the previous
management challenges that beset INS for years, but with new challenges
that come with creating a new department and managing diverse agencies.
Notwithstanding this daunting endeavor, the transformation provides DHS
with a unique opportunity to successfully address these inherited and
new challenges and thus better accomplish its important mission.
While DHS has started addressing many of the challenges and has
experienced some successes in its communication and coordination and
other efforts, the challenges and uncertainties reported by field
officials and discussed in this report show that these efforts have not
been sufficient to fully realize the potential benefits of this
transformation. The sentiment among the field officials within CBP,
CIS, and ICE we contacted demonstrates the importance of them having
additional explanation and guidance from DHS and the headquarters
management of each of the respective bureaus that delineates the (1)
specific roles and responsibilities for conducting uniform immigration
program operations, such as benefit fraud investigations, parole
decisions, and controlled deliveries and (2) processes and procedures
for making the shared services system work more efficiently. Without
clear guidance, conflicts that the programs have had prior to and after
the transition will likely persist and staff in the field will lack a
complete road map for addressing cross-cutting issues that may arise in
the future, as well as the necessary information to efficiently utilize
the administrative services they need to accomplish their mission.
Collectively, the nine key practices and related implementation steps
that we identified in our 2003 report can help DHS transform the
diverse cultures of former agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills
its new mission, meets current and emerging needs, maximizes
performance, and ensures accountability. Specifically, while DHS
efforts to incorporate the key practices and implementation steps we
discuss in this report into its transformation plans should help
address the challenges, in our view, a communication strategy that
obtains and considers employee feedback to create shared expectations
and gains their ownership in changes would improve the likelihood of
success in addressing the integration challenges. We realize that
carrying out a successful transformation is no easy or quickly realized
task and believe that this makes having a strategy that fully
incorporates these key practices all the more important.
Recommendations:
To assist DHS in successfully transforming its immigration related
programs and address the challenges discussed in this report, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the heads of
CBP, CIS, and ICE, as appropriate, in consultation with the
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, to take the
following three actions.
* First, the bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically
obtaining employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider
this feedback in its future transformation and communications
strategies, including assessing the challenges reported to us.
* Second, the bureaus should provide additional specific guidance to
field managers and staff that establishes uniform policies and
procedures on all cross-cutting integration issues that affect
operational effectiveness, including specific descriptions of the roles
and responsibilities of each bureau and its staff in investigative
techniques such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and
controlled deliveries.
* Finally, the bureaus should provide additional detailed written
guidance to field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.
Agency Comments:
DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, and these
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS said that, while there are
instances where contextual clarification is needed, it generally agreed
with our overall findings and recommendations and that our analysis
would be beneficial to the department.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus-CBP, CIS, and ICE-
should create a mechanism for periodically obtaining employee feedback.
DHS commented that there have been accomplishments in this area and
provided examples for each of the three bureaus. The examples include
both existing and new efforts started since our field work, including a
contract by CBP in September 2004 for a professional services firm to
take periodic surveys of randomly sampled employees to measure the
effectiveness of communications. If effectively implemented, the new
efforts should provide the bureaus with additional employee ideas and
concerns to consider in its transformation and communication efforts.
Concerning our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional
specific guidance to the field on cross-cutting issues, DHS said that
it has provided clear and thorough guidance and uniform policies and
procedures in critical cross-cutting integration issues. It also said
that the transition challenges it faced were compounded because the
overarching priority was to accomplish all of the department's
missions. DHS said there has been progress related to the consistency
and delivery of guidance on cross-cutting issues that should be
acknowledged in the final report. While we have not assessed the
results of some of these examples of progress, we considered them and
added them to the report where needed to add context. Further, we note
that many of the examples DHS provided of its progress were ongoing
during our fieldwork and staff still raised the concerns we report and
said that more guidance on cross-cutting immigration issues is needed.
Although these recent efforts, if properly implemented could address
some of the deficiencies we identified, we believe that this feedback
from field officials shows that more attention is needed in this area
to address uncertainties and confusion about cross-cutting issues.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional
guidance on the processes and procedures in providing shared services
but noted its concern about our discussion of communication problems
during the transition to shared services. DHS said that it used best
practices to develop a communication strategy and plan to realign
various administrative or support services into a shared services
environment. It said that it experienced delays in rolling out the
shared services initiative, so it is understandable that field managers
lacked familiarity with certain issues at the time of our interviews.
However, DHS did not believe the field managers views expressed in this
report accurately portray the initiative or the level of comprehension
of the initiative. We commend DHS for developing a communication
strategy and plan for this initiative but believe that the views
expressed in this report do portray the level of comprehension of the
initiative by those officials at the time of our interviews. The
concerns they raised, along with additional feedback DHS obtains in
future employee surveys, should assist DHS in accomplishing the goals
of this initiative.
DHS also offered technical comments, which we considered and
incorporated where appropriate.
We plan to provide copies of this report to other appropriate
committees, the Secretary of DHS, and other interested parties. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov. If your or your staff have any questions, please call me
at (202) 512-8777. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix II.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch:
Chairman:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on The Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on The Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Harold Rodgers Chairman:
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The Homeland Security Act --(P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1)--mandated us
to review the transfer of functions from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and identify issues associated with the transition. Our overall
objectives were to assess the status of (1) communication and
coordination among immigration programs in DHS field offices, (2)
integration of immigration and customs investigators in U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field offices, and (3)
administrative services and systems used by DHS's immigration agencies'
field offices. We did not assess program performance or DHS's overall
response to long-standing problems in this review. Additionally, our
analysis was based on a snapshot in time, primarily during fiscal year
2004, and it is possible our results would have been different if our
interviews had been conducted today.
To obtain information on our objectives, we reviewed laws; U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and ICE transition
documents; DHS, CIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE
memos on communicating and coordinating; DHS shared services
implementation plans; our past reports; and other relevant documents.
We also spoke with immigration experts in the public and private
sectors, and with representatives of pro-and anti-immigration advocacy
groups in the Washington, D.C., area. These included the American
Immigration Lawyers' Association, the Arab-American Antidiscrimination
Committee, the Center for Immigration Studies, Electronic Data Systems
Corporation Inc., the Institute for the Study of International
Migration, the Migration Policy Institute, the National Immigration
Forum, and the National Council of La Raza.
We interviewed officials at DHS headquarters who were responsible for
managing ICE's detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations
programs; CIS's adjudications program; and CBP's inspections and the
Border Patrol. We also interviewed ICE, CIS, and CBP officials
responsible for developing plans for the transition and officials in
the former INS Office of Statistics and Office for Policy and Planning.
We conducted structured interviews with officials in ICE's special
agent in charge (SAC) offices, CIS's district offices, and CBP's
offices for field operations in 6 of the 27 cities that have SAC
offices and with U.S. Border Patrol sector headquarter offices in 3 of
those 6 cities. The 6 cities we visited were Arlington, Virginia;
Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York; Miami, Florida; Detroit,
Michigan; and San Diego, California. Our visits to Arlington and
Baltimore were used as preliminary site visits to design our interview
questions. We selected these locations because of their geographic
dispersion; their proximity to ports of entry; and the relative
proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another.
* In site visits to CBP's Offices for field operations, we met with
directors for field operations, assistant directors for field
operations, and, in some cases, inspectors. In these interviews, we
collected information and documentation on (1) communication and
coordination with ICE investigations and other DHS components, (2) the
role of ICE investigators at the ports of entry, and (3) administrative
services.
* In site visits to CBP Border Patrol offices, we met with Border
Patrol sector chiefs, directors for administration, and administrative
officers. In these interviews, we collected information and
documentation on (1) communication and coordination with ICE
investigations and other immigration components, (2) the Border
Patrol's work on antismuggling, and (3) administrative services.
* In site visits to CIS offices, we met with district directors,
assistant district directors, as well as section chiefs. In these
interviews, we collected information and documentation on (1)
communication and coordination with ICE investigations and other
immigration components, (2) benefit fraud, and (3) administrative
services.
* In site visits to four ICE field offices, we used a structured
interview instrument to obtain information from the SAC and associate
special agents in charge (ASAC). In one location, we spoke with the two
ASACs. In all four visits, we also met with assistant special agents in
charge and administrative staff. In some locations, SACs and ASACs were
in interim positions until ICE made permanent appointments. In New
York, Miami, Detroit, and San Diego, we also conducted individual and
group interviews with investigators and supervising investigators from
the former INS. In these interviews, we collected information and
documentation on (1) ICE's investigative mission and performance
measures for the program, (2), communication and coordination with
other immigration components in DHS, (3) communication and coordination
with other federal agencies, (4) integrating immigration and customs
investigators, and (5) administrative services.
We used our structured interview instrument to obtain information from
ICE's SAC offices with telephone interviews with the two most senior
managers in the 21 ICE field offices we did not visit--20 SACs and 20
ASACs. We conducted these interviews between March and April of 2004
and made some follow-up calls in June 2004. In our telephone interviews
we asked about (1) ICE's mission and performance measures; (2)
communication and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs;
(3) communication and coordination with other federal agencies; (4)
integrating immigration and customs investigators; and (5)
administrative services. We did not speak with one SAC because he was
new to the position and did not believe he could provide us with useful
information. We had previously interviewed him as the ASAC in another
city. We did not speak with one ASAC because he, too, was new to the
position. In total, we spoke with 49 SACs and ASACs in person and by
telephone.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
Homeland Security:
October 7, 2004:
Richard Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
RE: Homeland Security: Better Strategic Framework Needed to Transform
Immigration Programs, GAO-04-1067 (Job Code 440233):
Dear Mr. Stana:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates this opportunity
to submit agency comments on the above referenced draft report. The
information gathered from your analysis and interviews with DHS field
personnel will prove beneficial as we continue to strengthen and
realign personnel and operations in the Department. While we generally
concur in the overall findings and recommendations, there are instances
that require contextual clarification; and, accordingly, we offer the
following comments.
Recommendation: The bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically
obtaining employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider
this feedback in its future transformation and communications
strategies, including assessing the challenges reported to us.
The Department wholeheartedly agrees with your recommendation, and we
ask that this report list at least a few of our accomplishments.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE):
* ICE's Office of Investigations (OI) has implemented a direct
communication mechanism to open two-way communications between the
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) field office personnel and OI
Headquarters management. To foster this two-way communication, senior
level managers have been appointed as the OI Ombudsman. During their
term as the OI Ombudsman, each senior level manager is physically
detailed to OI/HQ for a 30-day period, during which time he or she
serves as a liaison to the field. To ensure a spirit of inclusion, each
of the 27 SAC offices will participate in this program by having an
employee detailed into this rotating position. To further underscore
the importance of this initiative, the SAC is the individual who
occupies the Ombudsman position. By appointing the SAC, an individual
who has the authority to propose and make final decisions, the
initiative has increased and enhanced the field's ability to forward
specific issues requiring a HQ remedy. It also provides a direct forum
to the Director of OI for issues requiring immediate attention.
The results and feedback that have been gleaned from this initiative
have been positive, and OI plans to continue the program.
* In contrast to the new initiative discussed above, the OI SAC
Conferences is a decades-long established process. Two have been held
thus far this calendar year (i.e., March and June). The conferences are
attended by the SACS and the Attaches from the 35 foreign offices.
Prior to each conference there is a formal submission to OI/HQ of areas
of concern by each field office. The conference is designed so that HQ
subject matter experts or program oversight staff can address specific
issues, operations, and/or investigative concerns. Because the SAC
Conferences pull information up from the field so that HQ staff can
tailor guidance back to the field, it is a classic example of two-way
interaction and teamwork. Consequently, it is understandable that there
is extensive participation and interaction at these conferences.
Therefore, OI intends to continue its regular schedule of bi-annual SAC
Conferences throughout FY 2005.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP):
CBP employee feedback forums were established as early as July 2003. A
sample of the opportunities that employees had to provide feedback to
the agency includes, but is not limited to, the following:
* In July 2003, CBP contracted with a professional services firm to
conduct a series of focus groups with CBP employees around the country
to assess the effectiveness of internal communications in the newly
created agency. Representatives from the Office of Field Operations,
the Office of Border Patrol, and other mission support employees
participated in these sessions conducted by a third party contractor.
Results of the focus groups were presented to senior CBP leadership for
action.
* In September 2003, senior CBP officials conducted more than 30 town
hall meetings with CBP employees around the country to announce the
"One Face at the Border" initiative. These town hall meetings were
intended as opportunities for CBP leadership to share new information
and receive feedback from employees.
* In March 2004, senior CBP officials conducted dozens of town hall
meetings with employees around the country to commemorate the one-year
anniversary of the creation of DHS. These town hall meetings provided
CBP employees a forum for asking questions directly to the senior
leadership.
* In July and August 2004, senior CBP officials conducted dozens of
ceremonies around the country in which CBP frontline employees received
the first DHS law enforcement badges. These ceremonies were accompanied
by supervisory roundtable discussions with senior CBP officials and
local managers/supervisors. These sessions provided CBP employees a
forum for asking questions directly to senior leadership. Similar
sessions were conducted with regional CBP leaders, at the Director of
Field Operations and Port Director level, with additional field
personnel.
* In September 2004 CBP contracted with another professional services
firm to take frequent "pulse surveys" to measure the effectiveness of
communications. CBP employees will be randomly sampled on a periodic
basis and asked for their opinion of the effectiveness of
communications at CBP. The contractor will analyze the data and provide
specific recommendations for ways in which CBP can improve its employee
communications.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS):
* USCIS has worked diligently since it was formed to enhance
communication throughout the organization.
* USCIS sends out daily email broadcasts to USCIS staff providing them
with news on developing issues in the organization.
* The USCIS Director has visited with over two-thirds of the USCIS
workforce to get the staff's thoughts and ideas.
* USCIS launched Project Ingenuity in May 2004. Through Project
Ingenuity, the Director has asked employees, supervisors and managers
at every level to bring forth their good ideas on how USCIS can achieve
its top three goals (i.e., backlog reduction, national security
enhancement, and customer service improvement).
* Project Ingenuity provides a forum for suggestions ranging from
changes in processes, procedures, and policy to regulations and law. As
of August USCIS had received more than 170 suggestions.
* USCIS keeps its staff informed on the initiatives undertaken by
Project Ingenuity suggestions.
* USCIS created, as a component of Public Affairs, its INTERCOM office.
This office is responsible for improving the internal communications of
USCIS. For example, the office has a key role with the following by:
* Working on branding issues, employee surveys, and leading USCIS
communications efforts with respect to shared services;
* Updating the Intranet web-site and publishing alerts for employees;
and
* Arranging quarterly electronic town hall meetings between top
management and employees. These meetings allow employees to address
questions and suggestions to top management directly.
Recommendation: The bureaus should provide additional specific guidance
to field managers and staff that establish uniform policies and
procedures on all cross-cutting integration issues that affect
operational effectiveness, including specific descriptions of the
roles and responsibilities of each bureau and its staff in
investigative techniques such as benefit fraud investigations, paroled
decisions, and controlled deliveries.
Due to safety and the criticality of the DHS law enforcement mission,
the Department has provided clear and thorough guidance, even if this
precludes an immediate response. Additionally, DHS has articulated
uniform policies and procedures in critical crosscutting integration
issues, and achieved significant law enforcement accomplishments that
could not have been undertaken prior to the DHS integration. The
transition of immigration functions, performed by legacy Immigration
and Naturalization Service, (INS), to the DHS was part of the most
significant reorganization the Government has undertaken in 50 years.
The report acknowledges that such a transition will take years to
implement fully and the GAO team's discussions with field and
headquarters staff within the first 17 months of the transition
demonstrates the challenges faced by all. Moreover, the challenges were
compounded because the reorganization was done in an environment where
the overarching priority was ensuring that no mission would fail.
We also offer the following for your consideration.
Adjudicator's Field Manual:
The report suggests there was confusion concerning which organization
has authority to grant aliens parole. We do not believe the situation
has been as confusing as stated. USCIS has authority for advance
parole, which is documented in its Adjudicator's Field Manual, Chapter
54. ICE has authority over parole of individuals outside of the U.S.,
except for those appearing at a port-of-entry. Individuals appearing at
a port-of-entry come under the jurisdiction of CBP. We agree that
international operations, including humanitarian parole, are one of the
areas that took a long time to resolve. However, we also believe that
the report should reflect the fact that those issues have been
resolved. Moreover, USCIS and appropriate Organizational Elements (OEs)
within DHS formally work together on a number of operational issues at
the Headquarters level. For example, USCIS participates with BTS
officials and its OEs on a number of crosscutting projects and
programs. These include, shared services, U.S. Visit, biometrics,
background checks, anti-fraud investigations, secure document
development, intelligence, etc.
The GAO also recommends that each OE should provide additional guidance
and establish uniform policies and procedures on all crosscutting
integration issues that affect operational effectiveness, to include
benefit fraud and parole decision. Given the progress that we have
already made in this area, we request that the final report
acknowledges some of the initiatives that have been implemented to
improve consistency and the delivery of guidance. For example, USCIS
has developed the Adjudicator's Field Manual that replaced the legacy
INS Operating Instruction and placed it on the Intranet web site so
that it is available to all employees. Similarly, policy memos (i.e.,
reporting and analysis of fraud indicators within the benefit process)
are posted on the Intranet to ensure there is consistent and complete
delivery of policy at all levels.
The Arizona Border Control (ABC):
The ABC Initiative was established in March 2004 as a vehicle to
control the threat of illegal traffic across the southwest border. It
is an outstanding example of a crosscutting DHS law enforcement
operation. The USCIS and the BTS Directorate recognized the importance
of integration and the definition of roles and responsibilities for the
field officers and provided an innovative method to jump-start that
integration. The ABC Initiative provided for an Integrator and Deputy
Integrator, appointed by the Under Secretary for the BTS Directorate.
The Integrators were top members of the BTS field management leadership
within Arizona. The ABC Initiative Planning Cell was comprised of field
managers who met regularly and developed operational plans for the
"boots on the ground" day-to-day operations and coordination of
resources.
This ABC Initiative combined assets of DHS OEs such as USCIS, CBP, ICE,
and TSA along with various other Federal agencies. All of the BTS OEs
worked at both the leadership and field levels to address the threat,
and to provide support for controlling the flow of illegal activity
along the Arizona Mexico border. Weekly reporting, intelligence
analysis, and conference calls with DHS HQ provided direct
communications to address the needs of both the initiative and the
operational plans.
Since DHS kicked off the ABC initiative on March 16, 2004, agents have
made more than 351,700 illegal immigrant apprehensions at the Arizona
border --evidence of substantial progress at securing the border
against illegal incursions. Prosecutions of human smuggling
organizations, another key indicator, have increased by 68 percent.
Migrant desert rescues have more than doubled, potentially saving 697
lives. In addition, narcotics seizures have risen from 165,057 lbs. in
2003 to 359,604 lbs. during the same period in 2004.
Asset Forfeiture:
Since the creation of ICE, the INS, and Customs Asset Forfeiture
Programs have merged completely and are being funded by one asset
forfeiture fund-the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. While originally a
Customs concept, the Asset Identification and Removal Group (AIRG)
concept has been expanded and enhanced to support the broadened
authorities. The INS Vermont Asset Forfeiture Support Group has been
integrated into the AIRG structure and continues to support a cross
section of ICE investigations. Since the realignment, AIRGs provide
investigative support to the entire area of responsibility covered by
the SAC Office. The AIRG groups open second or collateral
investigations in support of the substantive investigations being
worked by other groups within the SAC. The support provided by the AIRG
allows investigators conducting the substantive investigations to focus
attention and resources on the principal violations, while the AIRG
investigators are responsible for asset identification and removal.
Recommendation: The bureaus should provide additional detailed written
guidance to field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.
The Department concurs and has addressed this issue, and we are
particularly concerned regarding the report's frequent references to a
failure of communications at particular stages during the transition.
Shortly after the March 2003 formation of DHS, senior leadership
recognized opportunities where we could realign various administrative
or mission support services; and thereby leverage personnel and
resources while at the same providing services more efficiently in a
shared services environment. To accomplish this challenge, the Tri-
Bureaus (e.g., CBP, ICE, and USCIS) established a shared services
internal communications team to develop and implement a Communication
Strategy and Plan. The purpose of our efforts is to:
* generate a flow of timely, accessible, accurate, and consistent
messages about the realignment/reorganization;
* manage stakeholder expectations, address concerns, ease anxiety, and
reduce misconceptions; and:
* promote and facilitate stakeholders input into the decision-making
process.
The Communications Plan defines the specific communication vehicles and
sequence of the development and implementation of the communications. A
separate Communication Strategy establishes a structured approach to
communicating with Tri-Bureau stakeholders throughout the mission
support/administrative realignment/reorganization. The strategy serves
as a guide for developing future communications by targeting audiences
and crafting messages to achieve specific goals within a given
timeframe. Both documents establish the framework for implementing our
shared services communications with stakeholders.
The internal communications team identified audiences and their
particular concems/issues. Core messages have been identified for each
audience. Depending on the target audience, our primary goals are to:
* raise awareness of the Tri-Bureau's mission support/administrative
realignment/reorganization efforts and the proposed changes taking
place;
* promote a clear understanding of the Tri-Bureau's mission support/
administrative realignment/reorganization decisions; and:
* build commitment to the Tri-Bureau's mission support/administrative
realignment/reorganization among stakeholders, leading to buy-in on the
decisions and the new organization.
Communication on shared services is ongoing in a coordinated manner
both at the Departmental and OE levels. For example, upon establishment
of USCIS, its Human Capital Management Office produced and disseminated
brochures entitled Services at a Glance for all human resource
functions, including issues dealing with workers compensation and
safety and health. In the area of health and safety, USCIS also has
worked collaboratively with CBP, the service provider, in conducting
training sessions for field personnel with collateral duties. USCIS and
other DHS OEs regularly use established internal communications
vehicles such as the Leadership Alert and USCIS Daily News to provide
current information to the workforce. Additionally, DHS and its OEs
have established a Department-wide web site to disseminate and receive
employee feedback on the new HR system. To foster this dialogue, we
have posted and catalogued employees' questions and responses. In
addition, there has been a plethora of televised HR Town Hall meetings,
video teleconferencing, and presentations to Regional Directors and
Service Center Directors providing service updates.
This is a long-term and complex process ranging from the identification
and adoption of best practices to the complex execution of prerequisite
service level agreements (to assure compliance with Federal
accountability laws, and organizational/personnel issues). The draft
report incorrectly states that this initiative was implemented in
December 2003 when all that was approved at that time was the policy
decision. There is a sharp distinction between the approval of a policy
decision and the implementation or execution phase of that policy.
Regrettably, the Department encountered delays in accomplishing the
execution of service level agreements and resource allocation. In fact,
the execution phase did not begin until late in the spring/summer
timeframe of 2004. Consequently, we consider timing as a significant
factor when reviewing the comments in this report, because the draft
report cites field managers' lack of familiarity with such issues. This
initiative was rolled out in the spring/summer of 2004, and it is
entirely understandable that the field managers lacked familiarity with
the issue because the draft report's fieldwork is based largely on
information gained during the February/March 2004 timeframe. Even
though the statements are understandable given the timing of events, it
does not accurately portray the initiative or the level of
comprehension of the initiative.
Again, we appreciate your analysis and thank you for providing us with
the opportunity to comment. We consider your review thorough and the
fieldwork findings have been helpful to us. We will continue to
reevaluate our processes in light of this report, and we ask that you
review the report in light of our comments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Anna F. Dixon:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Evi Rezmovic (202) 512-2580 or rezmovice@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
David Alexander, Gabrielle Anderson, Leo Barbour, Carole Cimitile,
Randall Cole, Patricia Dalton, Katherine Davis, Nancy Finley, Larry
Harrell, Tahra Nichols, Rachel Seid, and Sarah Veale made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] P.L. 107-296 (2002).
[2] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[3] P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1).
[4] Special agents in charge (commonly referred to as SACs) are law
enforcement officers responsible for directing ICE investigation
operations and resources in a specific geographic area. SACs are the
most senior managers in the field offices of ICE's investigations
program. Associate special agents in charge (commonly referred to as
ASACs) are the second most senior managers in the field offices of
ICE's investigations program. During our review the title ASAC was
changed to deputy special agent in charge.
[5] Controlled delivery is an ICE investigative method that involves
allowing a known group of illegal aliens or contraband to enter the
country so they can be followed to their destination and arrested by
ICE investigators.
[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[7] GAO, INS's Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues
Remain after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: August 2,
2001); GAO, Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements
Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-103 (Washington, D.C.:
May 1, 2000); GAO; GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is
Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2002); GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS
Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2002); GAO, Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove
Imprisoned Aliens Need to be Improved, GAO/T-GGD-97-154 (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 1997) and Criminal Aliens: INS's Efforts to Identify and
Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, GAO/T-GGD-99-47
(Washington, D.C.: Feb., 25, 1999); GAO, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
[8] P.L. 107-296, Sec. 471(a).
[9] In addition to the 33 district offices, CIS also runs four Service
Centers, three regional offices, eight asylum offices, and a number of
application support centers, and sub-offices. The SAC offices also have
subordinate and smaller Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) offices that
report to them. Each of the 20 Border Patrol sectors has subsector
stations within its geographical area.
[10] "Cover" immigration documents are those used by law enforcement
confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, for example, in
furtherance of a particular investigation or intelligence collection
effort. These documents are not actual benefits.
[11] The senior inspectors, in addition to performing the duties of the
CBP officer, present criminal cases to the United States Attorney
regarding certain potential criminal immigration violations that occur
at ports of entry. Such criminal violations are, for example, re-entry
after removal and alien smuggling and involve an administrative removal
action and a potential criminal case.
[12] Benefit fraud includes the willful misrepresentation of a material
fact to gain an immigration benefit in the absence of lawful
entitlement. Benefit fraud includes such schemes as marriage fraud and
non-immigrant visa fraud.
[13] The guidance is also to cover other issues, such as Title 21
authority (covers the importation, distribution, manufacture, and
possession of illegal narcotics), asset forfeiture, and sharing of
intelligence and information.
[14] Investigators in both INS's service centers and district offices
investigated possible benefit fraud on the basis of information that
they received from staff who processed benefit applications
(adjudication officers), other INS investigative units, INS regional
units, the public, and other federal and local law enforcement
agencies.
[15] TECS was developed and maintained by the Customs Service (U.S.
Department of the Treasury), and is a mainframe-based enforcement and
inspection support system that prior to the transition was used by
Customs, INS inspectors and intelligence analysts, and other federal
agencies. The system was developed to store information about people
who are of interest to law enforcement agencies so that their entry
into the United States may be monitored or, if necessary, prevented.
[16] We previously reported in GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66, (Washington, D.C.,
January 2002) that U.S. attorneys accept fraud cases under established
prosecutorial priorities and resource availability and that the
priority on fraud varies among the U.S. attorney's offices around the
country.
[17] Advance parole is a benefit that allows an alien residing in the
United States (in other than lawful permanent resident status) to gain
permission to travel out of and return into the United States when the
conditions of the alien's stay do not otherwise allow for re-admission
after departing the Untied States.
[18] ICE has Benefit Fraud Units in the Texas, Vermont, and California
Service Centers. Now under CIS, the former INS's four Service Centers-
-California, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont--were created in 1990 to help
reduce application backlogs in the district offices. Service Centers
process 35 types of applications, including petitions for permanent and
temporary workers, petitions for admission of spouses, and applications
for employment-based adjustment of status to permanent resident. The
Service centers also share responsibility with the District offices for
processing naturalization applications.
[19] According to a CIS official, every district office, service
center, and asylum office will receive at least one of these positions,
and large district offices will receive several positions.
[20] In an interview with ICE headquarters officials in July 2004, we
were told they are just starting to provide guidance to SAC offices on
integration and only doing so on a case-by-case basis.
[21] Group supervisors are senior special agents responsible for
overseeing an investigative group of 8 to 12 special agents in a
particular investigative field, such as benefit fraud, antismuggling,
or money laundering.
[22] Before the transfer, both INS and Customs investigations programs
rotated agents on a roster to serve 24-hour shifts to respond to issues
that arose, for example, at the ports of entry or after regular
business hours.
[23] There are a limited number of agents who are unable to complete
cross-training as they are on detail assisting the United States Secret
Service in carrying out protective duties during this election year or
are assisting in training the Federal Air Marshal Service.
[24] For a number of months ICE delayed issuing new badges,
credentials, name signs, business cards, and other printed material
because of a pending request for a name change. ICE formally requested
a name change--to Investigations and Criminal Enforcement--to more
accurately reflect the work of all ICE divisions, as well as to further
remove the agency from the legacy immigration and customs brands. In
late June 2004, the Assistant Secretary for ICE announced that it was
clear the name change would not be approved in the near future and ICE
would go forward with the procurement of new badges and credentials.
[25] DHS defines branding as all the things and symbols that create the
recognition for an agency. Branding provides an organization with an
identity and provides information to others about what that agency is.
[26] All agencies, with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Secret Service, are required to use the DHS seal and the agency's name
as their logos.
[27] CBP stated in September 2004 that the two bureaus finalized the
agreement for shared services on July 2, 2004.
[28] The 9 SACs and ASACs we visited face-to-face were not asked the
same question.
[29] Three SACs and ASACs said that they were experiencing problems
with shared services to "some extent."
[30] We visited two sites before the official initiation of shared
services in December 2003.
[31] The vehicle registered approximately 4,000 miles on the odometer
at the time of the accident, and the repairs were valued at
approximately $6,500.
[32] In August 2004, ICE provided a statement that indicated that if
staff chose an incorrect accounting string, the system would indicate
an error before routing the document to the approving official.
[33] According to ICE officials responsible for finance, when the
Office of Management and Budget allocated staffing and funding to the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate and CIS, the funding for
several programs such as general counsel and information technology
went to CBP and CIS but the staff went to ICE. These ICE officials told
us that because ICE was funding additional support staff, the agency
did not have an accurate account of staff funded by ICE and staff in
ICE whose funding was with CBP and CIS.
[34] The National Finance Center, an office within the Department of
Agriculture, handles payroll and other administrative services for some
government agencies.
[35] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[36] Four of the 40 we contacted did not respond to our question.
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