Aviation Security
Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations Gao ID: GAO-04-440T February 12, 2004Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing passenger and baggage screening and screening checked baggage using explosive detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and baggage screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and technologies.
TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November 2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some airports and TSA's hiring process have hindered TSA's ability to fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its screener training programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs. TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited performance data related to its baggage screening operations. However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future. TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to screen checked baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing initiatives designed to increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage, including implementing in-line baggage screening systems and streamlining screening processes. TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to develop next generation screening equipment. TSA faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, including balancing funding with competing priorities, and working with other components of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy for merging their R&D programs.
GAO-04-440T, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, February 12, 2004:
Aviation Security:
Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage
Screening Operations:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice:
GAO-04-440T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-440T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task”with hundreds of
airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of
passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the
security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous
enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing passenger
and baggage screening and screening checked baggage using explosive
detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and baggage
screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA‘s efforts to (1)
hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the
screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting
threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and
technologies.
What GAO Found:
TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by
November 2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and
deploying passenger and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some
airports and TSA‘s hiring process have hindered TSA‘s ability to fully
staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as
overtime. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its
screener training programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed
connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for
screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs.
TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance
of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts
include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and
conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making
progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it has
collected limited performance data related to its baggage screening
operations. However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance
data related to its baggage screening operations, and plans to
increase these efforts in the future.
TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging
screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection
Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to
screen checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize
this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to
screener shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance
and/or repairs. When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to
screen checked baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing
initiatives designed to increase the efficiency of screening checked
baggage, including implementing in-line baggage screening systems and
streamlining screening processes.
TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to
strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed
to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for
current technologies, and to develop next generation screening
equipment. TSA faces a number of challenges with its R&D program,
including balancing funding with competing priorities, and working
with other components of the Department of Homeland Security to
develop a strategy for merging their R&D programs.
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen airport passenger and baggage screening. GAO also have
several ongoing reviews related to the issues addressed in this
testimony, and will issue separate reports related to these areas at
later dates, with additional recommendations as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick,
(202) 512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss
progress and challenges in airport passenger and baggage screening.
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of
airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily
carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to
strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the President signed
into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on
November 19, 2001.[Footnote 1] ATSA created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed to strengthen
aviation security, including the federalization of passenger and
baggage screening at over 440 commercial airports in the United States
by November 19, 2002, and the screening of all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems.[Footnote 2] Notwithstanding these
efforts, recent reviews and covert testing conducted by us, the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General,
and TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review revealed
continuing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the screening system.
My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in developing
and deploying tools to enhance and measure screener performance and the
challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key
areas, including TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and
baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure
screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and
deploy screening equipment and technologies. My testimony is based on
our prior work and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of
TSA's passenger and baggage screening programs, and research and
development efforts.
In summary:
While TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by
November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying
its screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a
sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners trained and
certified in the latest TSA screening procedures and technology.
However, staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process have hindered the
ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)[Footnote 3] to provide
sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee
screening operations at their airports.
TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and
baggage screeners. In addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent
training programs, TSA is also enhancing and standardizing remedial
training for screeners who fail covert tests conducted by TSA's Office
of Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA has also established
leadership and technical training programs for screening supervisors.
Although TSA continues to make progress in this area, staffing
shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity[Footnote 4] at many
airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners to
fully utilize these programs and complete required training.
While TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance
of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects, it has collected
limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In
response to its July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement
Study, TSA developed a short-term action plan that identified key
actions TSA planned to take to strengthen the performance of passenger
screeners. These actions built on several initiatives that TSA already
had underway, including enhancing training for screeners and
supervisors, increasing covert testing, completing installation of the
Threat Image Projection System (TIP),[Footnote 5] and conducting annual
recertification of screeners. TSA has focused on assessing the
performance of passenger screeners, but has collected limited data
related to the performance of baggage screeners. However, TSA has begun
collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening
operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future.
Although TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening
operations, it continues to face operational and funding challenges in
its efforts to screen all checked baggage using Explosive Detection
Systems (EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA deployed
this equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage, but has been
unable to fully utilize this equipment due to screener and equipment
shortages and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or
repairs. When EDS and ETD equipment cannot be used, TSA continues to
use alternative screening means identified in ATSA,[Footnote 6]
including K-9 teams, manual searches, and positive passenger bag
match.[Footnote 7] TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the
efficiency of screening all checked baggage using EDS and ETD,
including the development and construction of in-line baggage screening
systems--which streamlines screening processes[Footnote 8] and airport
operations at larger airports. In addition, although TSA is funding
research and development (R&D) on several technologies designed to
improve the effectiveness of screening checked baggage and passengers
for explosives, progress has been delayed due to competing priorities
in a tight budget environment.
Background:
The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a long-
standing concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been
implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others
have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue to
exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able
to hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic
results. Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the
aviation system, as evidenced by the recent cancellations of several,
mostly transatlantic flights to and from the United States in response
to intelligence information regarding specific threats to those
flights.
In response to the attacks of September 11th, ATSA mandated specific
actions designed to strengthen aviation security, and established
ambitious deadlines for completing many of these initiatives.
Consequently, TSA initially focused on attempting to meet these
deadlines, particularly creating a federalized screener workforce at
commercial airports nationwide by November 19, 2002. TSA also focused
on screening 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection
systems by the original deadline of December 31, 2002.[Footnote 9]
These efforts resulted in the deployment of more than 55,000 federal
screeners at over 440 commercial airports nationwide by November 19,
2002, as well as the deployment of thousands of EDS and ETD systems.
Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA.
Two of the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and
checked baggage screening. Passenger screening involves the use of
metal detectors, X-ray machines, ETDs, and manual searches to examine
passengers and their carry-on baggage to identify threat objects.
Checked baggage screening involves the use of EDS, ETDs, K-9 teams,
positive passenger bag match, and manual searches to screen checked
baggage. Performing these screening functions can be cognitively
demanding and difficult for screening personnel.
The results I am presenting today are based on our preliminary
observations of TSA's passenger and baggage screening programs and
related research and development efforts, based on our ongoing reviews
of these areas for this committee. As part of our ongoing reviews of
TSA's passenger and baggage screening operations, we interviewed TSA
officials and visited 15 category X airports; 11 category I airports;
and 7 category II, III, and IV airports.[Footnote 10] During these
visits, we observed screening operations and interviewed FSDs, their
staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority and airline officials.
We plan to visit additional airports and conduct additional analysis
during the remainder of our review, including conducting a survey of
all 158 FSDs regarding their screening operations. Additionally, we
will continue to assess TSA's and DHS's research and development
programs and the views of a panel of security and technology experts
that we convened with the assistance of the National Academy of
Sciences. We will report on the results of these reviews later this
year.
Although Progress Has Been Made, Concerns Remain Regarding Hiring and
Deploying the Screener Workforce:
Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal
screener workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in
hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. To accomplish its
security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and
baggage screeners trained and certified in TSA security procedures and
technologies. TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts
created imbalances in the screener workforce and is taking steps to
address these imbalances. However, staffing shortages at some airports
and TSA's hiring process have hindered the ability of some FSDs to
fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures,
such as overtime and the use of a National Screening Force[Footnote
11].:
Staffing Shortages Affect Screening Operations:
TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than
55,000 passenger and baggage screeners by November 19, 2002. However,
TSA continues to struggle to maintain an adequate number of screeners
at airport checkpoints, and has not yet achieved a stable screener
workforce. Recognizing these difficulties, TSA has taken several steps
to address staffing imbalances--including enhancing its workforce
planning efforts, and deploying a National Screening Force to airports
with pressing screening needs.
Screener Imbalances:
After meeting its deadline of deploying over 55,000 screeners by
November 19, 2002, TSA recognized that its initial efforts created
imbalances in the screener workforce, as some airports had too many
screeners while others had too few. To address these imbalances, as
well as congressional concerns regarding screener-staffing levels, TSA
began attempting to right-size its screener workforce. Specifically,
TSA established a goal to reduce its screener workforce by 3,000
screeners by June 1, 2003, and an additional 3,000 screeners by
September 30, 2003. These reductions were achieved through attrition,
voluntary transfers from full to part-time, and involuntary transfers
to part-time or terminations based on screeners' scores on competency-
based examinations.[Footnote 12]
Currently, a congressionally imposed staffing cap[Footnote 13]
prohibits TSA from exceeding a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-
time equivalents (FTE).[Footnote 14] Figure 1 shows that based on
annualized FTE data, TSA is currently below the 45,000 cap.[Footnote
15]
Figure 1: TSA Full-Time Equivalent Screeners, May 2003 through January
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: TSA annualized data.
[End of figure]
According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average annual
attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners. However, attrition among
the nation's more than 440 commercial airports is sometimes
considerably higher. For example, at 8 category X airports visited
during our review, FSDs reported that average annual attrition ranged
from 15 to 36 percent.
TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff, particularly
part-time staff. FSDs at 11 of the 15 category X airports we visited
reported that they were below their authorized staffing levels due to
attrition and difficulties in hiring new staff. In addition, 3 of these
FSDs noted that they were never successful in hiring up to the
authorized staffing levels. FSDs said that some of the factors
contributing to their inability to hire and retain screeners were the
location of their airport, the lack of accessible and affordable
parking and/or public transportation, and the high cost of living.
In addition, FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that
they experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners,
which they believed to be due to low pay and benefits, as well as
undesirable hours. Additionally, FSDs stated that very few full-time
screeners were interested in converting to part-time status, and TSA
officials stated that attrition rates for part-time screeners were
considerably higher than those for full-time screeners. TSA began
actively recruiting part-time screeners during the summer of 2003, and
continues to recruit part-time screeners at more than 80 airports.
Due to screener shortages, FSDs at 6 of the category X airports we
visited stated that they frequently had to require mandatory overtime,
particularly during the holiday season, to accomplish passenger and
baggage screening functions. FSDs' use of overtime was particularly
high during peak summer and holiday travel seasons. Figure 2 shows that
between May 2003 and January 2004, TSA used the equivalent of an
annualized average of 2,315 full-time-equivalent screeners in overtime
hours per pay period (every 2 weeks).
Figure 2: TSA Screener Overtime in Full-Time Equivalents, May 2003
through January 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: TSA annualized data.
[End of figure]
Workforce Planning Efforts:
In an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener workforce, TSA
hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a study of screener
staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports. Specifically, the
consultant was tasked with:
* evaluating TSA's current staffing methodology and systems to
establish a baseline for model development;
* developing a method for collecting and analyzing data to
realistically portray specific airport conditions rather than using a
generalized large/small airport protocol;
* developing a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details
to account for the considerable variability that occurs among
airports;[Footnote 16]
* integrating modeling parameters into TSA's screener scheduling
system;
* implementing a staffing analysis model to be used as a management
tool to determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model
to commercial airports nationwide; and:
* delivering user-friendly simulation software that will determine
optimum screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440
commercial airports with federal screeners.
TSA expects the consultant's study to be completed in April 2004. In
the interim, TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the
staffing allocation provided through their internal modeling efforts,
which, among other things, assesses air carrier and airport growth
patterns, and makes adjustments as appropriate. We will continue to
review TSA's efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for
passenger and baggage screeners during the remainder of our review.
National Screening Force:
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational
flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003,
TSA established a National Screening Force to provide screening support
to all airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other
special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than
regularly available to FSDs. This force replaced the Mobile Screening
Force--a regionally-based force--that was created in early 2002
primarily to support the initial deployment of federal screeners to
commercial airports. The National Screening Force currently consists of
over 700 full-time passenger and baggage screeners, of which about 10
percent are screening supervisors. Members of the National Screening
Force volunteer to participate on the force for a 1-year period. TSA
officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport to
which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening
staff approximately 70 percent of the year.
TSA officials stated that they determine where to deploy members of the
National Screening Force based on four priorities. The highest priority
is given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to
be able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. The
second priority is given to small airports that have never met their
authorized screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners.
TSA officials stated that several small airports have screening
checkpoints that are entirely staffed by the National Screening Force.
They also stated that some National Screening Force staff are deployed
to airports, particularly small airports, where they are only needed on
a part-time basis. The third priority is given to airports that are so
understaffed that significant screening delays would occur without
additional staff. Finally, the fourth priority is given to those
airports with peak seasonal needs, such as Palm Springs, airports that
have a shortage of female passenger screeners;[Footnote 17] and
airports offering new commercial service. Additionally, when DHS
recently increased the threat condition from yellow (elevated) to
orange (high),[Footnote 18] TSA reportedly redeployed about 50 percent
of the National Screening Force to airports determined to be at a
higher risk based on intelligence data.
TSA is also currently drafting standard operating procedures for the
National Screening Force. We will continue to examine TSA's use of the
National Screening Force during the remainder of our review.
TSA's Hiring Process Not Fully Responsive to FSD Needs:
TSA's hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices
are standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this
process has hindered the ability of some FSDs to adequately staff
passenger and baggage screening checkpoints. Several FSDs we
interviewed expressed concern that TSA's hiring process was not
responsive to their needs, and wanted to have more input in the hiring
process. These FSDs faced screener shortages that hindered their
screening capability.
To ensure consistency in its hiring process, TSA headquarters manages
hiring centrally through its Aviation Operations and Human Resources
offices. In general, the process includes the following steps.
* FSDs identify their need for additional passenger or baggage
screeners, within their authorized allocation of screeners, and request
headquarters to initiate the hiring process.
* Aviation Operations reviews and prioritizes each request in
consultation with FSDs.
* Human Resources develops a hiring plan that identifies a schedule of
hiring events - from vacancy postings to the establishment of centers
at which the applicants' skills are assessed.[Footnote 19]
* A recruiting contractor receives and assesses all screener
applications to ensure the applicants meet the basic requirements for
employment, including U.S. citizenship and specific education and work
experience. All applicants that meet the minimum qualifications are
invited to schedule themselves for the assessment process.[Footnote 20]
* Upon successfully completing the assessment process, the recruiting
contractor sends the list of qualified applicants to TSA's hiring/
personnel contractor responsible for making job offers.
* The hiring contractor schedules the candidates for orientation and
training once they have accepted the offers.
Many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with the lack of a
continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition,
and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as needed basis.
The FSDs also complained of the time lag between their request for
additional staff and having trained and certified screeners on board.
FSDs at 4 of the category X airports we visited stated that the time
lag between their request for additional staffing and the opening of an
assessment center took several months. For example, one FSD stated that
in response to continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in
advance that additional screeners would be needed before the peak
summer travel season. However, an assessment center was not opened
until mid-June and the initial training did not begin until July. The
FSD reportedly had to rely on the Mobile Screening Force and overtime
to accommodate the demand during the peak summer season. This same FSD
also stated that the lengthy hiring process limited his ability to
address screener performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness,
and contributed to screener complacency because screeners were aware
that they were unlikely to be terminated due to staffing shortages. In
another example, an FSD at one large airport found it difficult to fill
the more than 100 part-time approved screener positions because the
nearest assessment center was too far away for local applicants to be
processed.
Several FSDs we interviewed also stated that not all of the applicants
who were offered positions showed up for initial basic screener
training. For example, in November 2003, at one large category X
airport, the FSD reported that 80 individuals who accepted screener
positions were scheduled to report for basic screener training, but
following orientation, only 15 individuals (less than 20 percent)
reported for training. TSA headquarters reported that an average of 13
percent of screeners who are hired fail to attend basic screener
training.[Footnote 21]
FSDs also expressed concern regarding the lack of input they had during
the hiring process. Specifically, they stated that they do not have a
role in reviewing applications, interviewing applicants, or making
hiring decisions. In response to these concerns, TSA officials reported
that they plan to redesign and streamline their hiring process,
particularly the assessment center process (Phase II), to allow for
more involvement by FSDs and their staff. Specifically, officials
reported that they are beginning to (1) ensure that the recruiting
contractor includes the FSD in recruitment planning, including
obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor recruits; (2)
allow FSDs to participate with the contractor in the structured
interview of the candidates during Phase II of the hiring process; and
(3) ensure that FSDs swear in the candidates and provides
organizational briefings on their first day of orientation. Officials
also reported that they plan to establish an advisory council of FSDs
to help guide the piloting and implementation of this new process. The
goal of these efforts is to make the hiring process more responsive to
the wide range of airports' needs while ensuring efficiency and
quality. We will continue to review these initiatives as part of our
ongoing review of TSA's process for hiring and deploying passenger and
baggage screeners.
TSA Has Enhanced Its Screener Training Programs, but Access to Programs
Is Sometimes Limited:
TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and
baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed
connectivity[Footnote 22] at airport training facilities have made it
difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs. Specifically,
TSA recently revamped its screener training program to include three
main components: (1) dual training for both passenger and baggage
screeners (replaces basic screener training); (2) recurrent (skills
refresher) screener training; and (3) technical screener training/
certification for EDS.[Footnote 23] In addition to strengthening its
basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is also enhancing and
standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail a covert test
conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review.
Despite these efforts, however, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X airports
we visited stated that ensuring screeners received required training
continued to be a challenge.
Dual Passenger and Baggage Screener Training:
As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener training program
comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60
hours of on-the-job training for passenger and baggage screeners. The
initial basic screener training courses were updated at the end of
2003, respectively, to incorporate changes to standard operating
procedures. In addition to these updates, TSA officials stated that
they recently developed a new basic screener training program, "dual
function screener training," to address technical aspects of both
passenger and baggage screening. This training will utilize modular
courses to provide skills refresher (recurrent) training or to cross-
train screeners, such as refreshing baggage screening skills for a
screener who has worked predominately as a passenger screener. TSA
officials reported that beginning in April 2004, all newly hired
screeners will receive dual function screener training in order to
provide FSDs with the flexibility to staff them as either passenger or
baggage screeners.
Recurrent Training:
Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger and baggage
screeners' ability to detect threat objects. TSA requires passenger and
baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per
week, averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to
x-ray image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening
techniques or reviews of standard operating procedures.
We reported in September 2003 that TSA had not fully developed or
deployed a recurrent training program for passenger screeners.[Footnote
24] Since then, TSA has developed 12 recurrent training modules for
passenger and baggage screeners. Two of these modules have been
deployed to airports nationwide,[Footnote 25] while 9 additional
modules are expected to be deployed by March 2004. The final module, a
Web-based x-ray image interpretation tool, is scheduled for
implementation in April 2004.
As we reported in September 2003, many of the passenger screeners and
supervisors we interviewed expressed the need for recurrent
training.[Footnote 26] Screeners were particularly interested in
receiving additional training related to recognizing x-ray images of
threat objects, and also identified an interest in more realistic
training for the detection of improvised explosive devices. FSDs and
training coordinators also emphasized that screeners needed to receive
more hands-on training using threat simulators and emulators. TSA
headquarters also identified these training needs as part of a study of
passenger screener performance, and developed and deployed training
tools to help address these needs.[Footnote 27] For example, TSA
officials reported that they provided every airport with at least one
Modular Bomb Set kit and one weapons training kit. These Modular Bomb
Sets and weapons training kits are intended to fill an identified gap
in training by allowing screeners to touch and feel the threat objects
that they are looking for. TSA also instituted a training program
called "Threat In the Spotlight" that provides screeners with the
latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat
objects past screening checkpoints.
TSA is also in the process of developing specialized certification
training for technologies used by passenger and baggage screeners. TSA
has developed only one course, for EDS use, but plans to develop other
certifications and courses as new technologies are utilized and
integrated into the screening process. Additionally, in October 2003,
TSA fielded an Online Learning Center--a Web-based tool with 366 self-
guided training courses available to all screening staff. The courses
provided on the Online Learning Center Web site capture common
developmental needs identified by TSA. The Online Learning Center also
enables screeners to view the list of required and optional training
courses and materials, review their training records, and track their
training progress.
Remedial Training:
Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any passenger
or baggage screener who fails an operational test, and prohibits
screeners from performing the screening function related to the tests
they failed until they successfully complete the training.[Footnote 28]
FSDs must certify that screeners identified as requiring remedial
training complete the training before they can perform the screening
function identified as a performance weakness.
TSA is in the process of enhancing and standardizing remedial training
requirements required after failure of covert operational tests.
Program enhancements will provide specific guidance regarding materials
to be reviewed during remedial training and standardize the practice of
demonstrating proper techniques and procedures in the area of
deficiency noted during the failed test.
Supervisory Training:
TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review identified a lack
of supervisory training as a cause for screener testing failures. In
addition, both FSDs and TSA headquarters officials have recognized the
need to enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory
training. As we reported in September 2003, TSA had begun working with
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor USDA's
off-the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific needs of TSA's
screening supervisors. According to TSA, 500 screening supervisors
participated in the course during the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2003.[Footnote 29] Since then, TSA reportedly has sent an additional
1,500 of its approximately 3,600 screening supervisors to the enhanced
USDA Graduate School supervisory course, and expects all screening
supervisors to have received this training by April 2004. TSA officials
also stated that they intend to schedule recently promoted supervisors
to attend the USDA Graduate School supervisory course after March 2004
if they had not yet attended, and plan to extend the course offering to
include screening managers, once screening supervisors are trained.
In addition to the USDA Graduate School supervisory course, TSA
officials reported that the agency plans to have a Web-based technical
training course-required for all screening leads, supervisors, and
managers-by the end of February 2004. This course will cover technical
issues such as resolving alarms at screening checkpoints. Additionally,
TSA's Online Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses
designed to develop leadership and coaching skills. TSA officials noted
that they focused their efforts on training supervisors that were
initially hired into supervisory roles, rather than internally promoted
supervisors.
Challenges Exist in Providing Screeners Access to Available Training:
While TSA has begun developing and fielding recurrent training modules
to airports, staffing shortages and a lack of high-speed connectivity
at airports have made it difficult for all screeners to access these
courses. Specifically, due to staffing shortages, FSDs at 5 of the 15
category X airports we visited stated that it was difficult, if not
impossible, to comply with the requirement that screeners receive 3
hours of recurrent training each week, averaged over a 3-month period.
FSDs stated that due to staffing shortages, they were unable to let
screeners take this training because it would impact the FSDs' ability
to provide adequate screener coverage. Consequently, screeners received
an average of only 3 hours of recurrent training per month. In an
attempt to ensure screeners receive required training, several FSDs
provided training through overtime, or established training relief
teams with the sole purpose of staffing screening checkpoints while
screeners participated in training.
The lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities has
also limited access to TSA's training tools. TSA's Online Learning
Center was established to provide passenger and baggage screeners with
high-speed access to over 350 training courses. However, TSA did not
begin deploying high-speed connectivity to its training sites and
checkpoints until May 2003. Currently, TSA has reportedly provided
high-speed connectivity to 71 airport locations, including training
sites where 927 training computers are fully connected.[Footnote 30]
TSA expects to install high-speed connectivity at up to 81 additional
airports by the end of fiscal year 2004. Until high-speed connectivity
is fully achieved, TSA plans to continue to distribute new training
products using multiple delivery channels, including written training
materials and CD-ROMs.
TSA Continues to Strengthen its Efforts to Measure Screener Performance
in Detecting Threat Objects:
TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of
passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has
collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners.
In July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger
screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies.
These deficiencies were determined to be caused by a lack of skills and
knowledge, low motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or
missing incentives. In response to this study, TSA developed a short-
term action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to
strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These actions build
on several initiatives that TSA already had underway, including
enhancing training for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert
testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs, completing
installation of the TIP, and conducting annual recertifications of
screeners. While TSA is making progress in each of these areas, it has
collected limited data on the performance of its baggage screening
operations. Officials stated that they have collected limited
performance data related to baggage screeners due to their focus on
passenger screener performance, but plan to collect additional
performance data in the future.
Performance Improvement Study and Short-Term Action Plan:
In July 2003, TSA completed a Passenger Screener Performance
Improvement Study designed to identify root causes for gaps between the
current performance of passenger screeners and TSA's desired
performance--defined as 100 percent interception of prohibited items
coming through screening checkpoints. The study identified many of the
performance deficiencies that FSDs reported to us during our site
visits to more than 30 airports, including inadequate staffing and poor
supervision of screeners. While the study was focused on passenger
screening, TSA officials stated that many of the performance issues
cited also pertained to baggage screeners. TSA officials stated that
they plan to assess the performance of baggage screeners after
recommendations from the performance improvement study relative to
passenger screening have been implemented.
In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies
identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed
a "Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan." This plan
included nine action items that TSA plans to pursue to provide tangible
improvements in screener performance and security, and identified 6
week, 3 month, 6 month, and, in some cases, milestones of 1 year or
more. These action items include increasing covert testing at screening
checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing
screener training, and strengthening supervisor's skills through
leadership and technical training. TSA is also establishing a longer-
term plan that addresses identified deficiencies, such as the need to
establish adequate training facilities at airports and to reconfigure
checkpoints to eliminate screener distractions. Table 1 provides a
summary of TSA's short-term action items for strengthening passenger
screener performance.
Table 1: Summary of TSA's Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening
Passenger Screener Performance:
Category: People;
Action Item: 1; Increase FSD support and accountability;
Description: Hold FSDs accountable for screening performance and
delivery of security;
Benefit: Management accountability is driven down to the local
airport;
FSD performance is linked to screener performance, creating incentives
for maintaining and improving security.
Category: People;
Action Item: 2; Enhance training;
Description: Provide ongoing training for screeners and supervisors to
maintain their skills and provide new skills and techniques based on
evolving threats and lessons learned;
Benefit: Maintains and improves knowledge base of screeners;
Ensures proper oversight by supervisors;
Ensures that screeners are capable of addressing evolving threats.
Category: People;
Action Item: 3; Increase Internal Affairs covert testing;
Description: Increase the frequency of TSA covert testing;
Benefit: Improved identification of systemic vulnerabilities in
airport security systems;
Immediate implementation of limited remedial actions.
Category: People;
Action Item: 4; Continue to pursue human performance improvements;
Description: Better understand reasons and causes for human errors and
interactions with technology in order to identify opportunities for
performance improvements with a goal of identifying optimum work
conditions;
Benefit: Reduces human-based errors;
Increases workforce morale and working conditions, leading to improved
performance.
Category: Technology;
Action Item: 5; Continue to identify screening technology
improvements;
Description: Continue to research alternative technologies and seek
short-term technological solutions, especially for potential vectors;
Benefit: Identifies threats more accurately and quickly;
Decreases number of false positives from equipment.
Category: Technology;
Action Item: 6; Finish installing TIP;
Description: The TIP system is a series of 2,400 images of threat
objects that can be automatically fed into X-Ray machines during
actual screening;
Benefit: Maintains alertness of screeners;
Identifies individual screener performance issues.
Category: Technology;
Action Item: 7; Expedite high-speed connectivity to checkpoints and
training computers;
Description: Connect all TSA offices, checkpoints and screening
equipment (X-rays, EDS machines) to the internet in order to automate
and improve processes that are currently done manually or not at all;
Benefit: Provides immediate feedback on and response to screener
performance issues;
Improves communication with managers in the field.
Category: Process;
Action Item: 8; Refresh aviation operations policy, procedures and
practice;
Description: Conduct a thorough and expedited review of all policies
and procedures developed during the rollout of TSA with a focus on
increasing screening performance and capabilities;
Benefit: Maintains "freshness" of standard operating procedures based
on most recent intelligence about security threats;
Removes or updates outdated or unnecessary screening techniques based
on lessons learned.
Category: Process;
Action Item: 9; Action Item: Improve workforce management;
Description: Determine the optimal workforce staffing levels based on
latest passenger flows and other factors;
Benefit: Maximizes utilization of existing resources.
Source: TSA:
[End of table]
Covert Testing:
TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts
unannounced covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess
their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved
procedures. These tests, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass
threat objects through screening checkpoints, are designed to identify
systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners related to
their adherence to standard operating procedures and handling of
equipment. TSA's testing to date has identified weaknesses in the
ability of passenger and baggage screeners to detect threat objects.
In November 2003, we reported that the Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests at 92 airports of
passenger screeners at screening checkpoints.[Footnote 31] Since then,
TSA has conducted an additional 362 passenger screening checkpoint
tests through January 17, 2004, for a total of 1,095 tests, and
estimates that it will double the number of tests conducted during
fiscal year 2004. However, even with the doubling of these tests, only
a small percentage of the screener workforce is subject to a covert
test.
TSA initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather
than baggage screeners. While TSA began conducting covert tests of
passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting
covert tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003--after
Congress's initial deadline for 100 percent screening of checked
baggage using explosive detection systems had passed. Between January
2003 and September 2003, TSA conducted checked baggage tests as part of
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening selectee testing
protocol.[Footnote 32] In November 2003, TSA developed a protocol
specifically designed to test checked baggage. From January 2003
through January 17, 2004, TSA conducted 192 checked baggage tests at
128 airports, and plans to increase the number of checked baggage tests
it conducts this fiscal year. We plan to review the Office of Internal
Affairs and Program Review's covert testing in more detail during the
remainder of our reviews.
Threat Image Projection System:
Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting
threat objects is the TIP system, which places images of threat objects
on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether
screeners identify the threat objects. TIP was shut down immediately
following the September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it
would result in screening delays and panic, as screeners might think
that they were actually viewing threat objects. Recognizing that TIP is
a key tool in maintaining and enhancing screener performance, TSA began
reactivating and expanding TIP in October 2003. Additionally, TSA has
increased the number of TIP-ready X-ray machines at passenger screening
checkpoints from about 1,300 in October 2003 to over 1,770 as of
January 20, 2004. In January 2004, TSA also reported that it had
installed a new library of 2,400 threat images on all existing TIP
ready X-ray machines--a significant increase from the 200 images the
Federal Aviation Administration had in place. TSA has ordered an
additional 30 TIP-ready X-ray machines and expects TIP to be 100
percent operational by April 2004.
With an operational TIP program, FSDs have the capability to query and
analyze passenger screening performance data in a number of ways,
including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and
airports. However, until high-speed connectivity is available at
screening checkpoints, collecting this information for reporting and
analysis purposes will continue to be cumbersome.[Footnote 33] For
example, at airports where high-speed connectivity is not available,
TIP data have to be downloaded onto a disk and mailed to a remote
location where they are uploaded for analysis.
Although TIP is available to measure the performance of and train
passenger screeners, it is not currently available for baggage
screeners. TSA officials stated that they are currently working to
resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for checked
baggage screening on EDS machines and have started EDS TIP image
development.
Annual Recertification Program:
ATSA requires that TSA collect performance information on all passenger
and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency evaluation to
ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and standards
related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet this
requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program.
Currently, there are two parts to recertification: a knowledge and
skills assessment program and a final rating on a screener's annual
assessment. The knowledge and skills assessment is comprised of three
modules: (1) knowledge of standard operating procedures, (2) image
recognition, and (3) a practical demonstration of skills. To be
certified, a passenger screener must pass all applicable modules of the
knowledge and skills assessment program and have a rating of "met" or
"exceeded" standards on a screener's annual assessment. However,
baggage-only screeners are not required to complete the image
recognition test.[Footnote 34] If a screener does not meet the
recertification requirements, he/she is not certified and may not
continue employment as a screener.[Footnote 35] According to TSA
officials, approximately 200 screeners have been terminated to date for
failure to pass the recertification program.
TSA began implementing its recertification program in October 2003, and
expects to complete testing at all airports in March 2004.[Footnote 36]
As of January 30, 2004, TSA reportedly had completed modules one and
two of its annual screener recertification program at 100 percent of
federalized airports, and had completed module three at 50 percent of
these airports. TSA does not have a recertification track specifically
for cross-trained screeners. However, TSA officials stated that they
plan to establish a dual functioning screener recertification track for
the 2004-2005 recertification cycle. Currently, all screeners who are
cross-trained and actively performing both passenger and baggage
screening functions are considered passenger screeners for the purpose
of recertification. However, the current recertification program
ensures that cross-trained screeners pass the image interpretation test
for x-ray threat image interpretation, as well as the ETD system and
manual bag search, which are also performed in checked baggage
screening. We will continue to examine TSA's progress in administering
its annual recertification program during the remainder of our reviews.
Performance Management Information System:
TSA's Performance Management Information System (PMIS) is designed to
collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening
performance data. While PMIS does not contain information on screener
performance in detecting threat objects, it collects information on
operational performance, such as wait times at selected airports,
workload data, and the performance and utilization of passenger and
baggage screening equipment. TSA headquarters uses PMIS data to support
external reporting on performance and internal decision-making
processes.
TSA recently surveyed FSDs or members of their staff who use PMIS by
inputting or analyzing data, to solicit their feedback on the
usefulness of the system.[Footnote 37] PMIS users who responded to the
survey identified several areas for improvement, including additional
capabilities, such as the ability to customize reports, and enhanced
technical features, such as split screen report viewing and data entry.
TSA reported that, to the extent possible, they plan to use feedback
from the survey to make enhancements to the system.
TSA provides FSDs and other PMIS users with monthly PMIS system updates
that include new functionalities and improvements to the system. These
enhancements have allowed TSA to collect additional information with
which to better analyze its operations. For example, when TSA began
collecting employee census data in June 2003, it only collected
information on the number of screeners. TSA is now able to collect more
detailed information on screeners including the number of part-time
screeners, hours worked per week, and screener gender. TSA also
developed pilot programs in order to determine the usefulness of PMIS
data before making systemwide changes. For example, TSA began to
collect additional data regarding checked baggage screening operations
during the spring of 2003 at 36 airports. Among other things, the 36
airports collect data on the number of checked bags screened, number of
prohibited items confiscated, and number of law enforcement officer
interventions. TSA is evaluating whether to expand collection of
baggage screening data to additional airports. TSA plans to
continuously enhance the system as it learns what data are needed to
best manage the agency.
To help ensure the quality of the data, TSA has also developed PMIS
user guides and procedures. TSA officials reported that headquarters'
staff and contactors provide consultation to and review the input from
FSDs to ensure that the data provided are complete and consistent. The
PMIS also contains checks for data entries that are out of normal
bounds. However, because the PMIS system relies on self-reporting by
FSDs, there may be inconsistencies in the way in which the data are
reported, reducing the overall usefulness of the system in aiding
management decisions. We will continue to review TSAs plans to enhance
the system and its reliability during the remainder of our review.
Performance Indexes for Screeners and Screening Systems:
In September and November 2003, we reported that in addition to making
improvements to PMIS, TSA was developing performance indexes for both
individual passenger and baggage screeners and the screening system as
a whole. The screening performance index will measure the effectiveness
of the screening system through nationwide TIP results and covert
testing data; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per
passenger screened or dollars spent per bag screened; and customer
satisfaction through a national poll, customer surveys, and customer
complaints at both airports and TSA's national call center. TSA is
currently developing baseline data for fiscal year 2004 and plans to
report the indexes to the DHS in fiscal year 2005 in support of its
Government Performance and Results Act performance measures.[Footnote
38]
TSA Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Deploy and Leverage Screening
Equipment and Technologies:
TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but
continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by ATSA.
Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, TSA
has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent
of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener
and equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for
maintenance and/or repairs. When TSA cannot screen 100 percent of
checked baggage using EDS and ETD, TSA continues to use alternative
means outlined in ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual bag search, and
positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase
the efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including the
development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at
larger airports--which, streamlines the screening processes. TSA is
also conducting research and development activities to strengthen
passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve
detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current
technologies, and to develop the next generation of EDS equipment.
TSA Is Not Fully Utilizing Equipment for Meeting the 100 Percent
Checked Baggage Screening Requirement:
While TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening processes,
it continues to face challenges in attaining 100 percent screening
using explosive detection systems[Footnote 39] 100 percent of the time.
Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has deployed over 1,100 EDS
machines and 6,000 ETD machines to over 440 airports nationwide.
However, TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to
screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener and equipment
shortages, and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or
repairs.
In its effort to meet ATSA's original requirement to screen 100 percent
of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31,
2002, TSA deployed hundreds of EDS and thousands of ETD machines to
over 440 airports. As it became apparent that TSA would be unable to
attain the December 31, 2002, deadline, the Congress authorized an
extension of that deadline for noncompliant airports until December 31,
2003. In its effort to meet these deadlines, in June 2002, TSA and its
contractors began to deploy EDS and ETD equipment to the nation's
commercial airports. This effort involved designing and implementing
facility modifications for EDS and ETD equipment, installing equipment,
and developing and administering equipment training for baggage
screeners. As EDS and ETD were being deployed to airports, TSA
implemented interim solutions to screen 100 percent of checked baggage,
until more permanent solutions could be designed and constructed. For
example, many large airports were equipped with stand-alone EDS
machines that were not integrated with baggage conveyor systems. These
minivan-sized machines were sometimes deployed in airport lobbies,
which led to crowding as passengers filled lobbies waiting to have
their checked baggage screened. In addition, stand-alone EDS machines
are both labor and time intensive to operate since each bag must be
physically carried to an EDS machine for screening and then moved back
to the baggage conveyor system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft.
Realizing the inefficiencies of these interim solutions, TSA and some
airport authorities are developing more permanent solutions, such as
in-line systems. TSA also continues to look for ways to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the baggage screening process,
especially ways that reduce reliance on screener personnel.
TSA has made progress during 2003 in its efforts to deploy equipment to
screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection
systems. However, some airports are currently unable to use this
equipment to screen all checked baggage for explosives, or reported
that they do not have enough EDS or ETD to conduct baggage screening.
These airports are unable to achieve the requirement to screen 100
percent of checked baggage, 100 percent of the time, using EDS and ETD
due to insufficient screener staff to operate screening equipment,
insufficient staff and equipment to meet surges in passenger volume,
and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. As a
way to monitor baggage-screening operations, FSDs are expected to
report, using TSA's PMIS, when they are unable to screen all checked
baggage using EDS and ETD and the reasons that prevented them from
doing so.[Footnote 40] We reviewed TSA's Aviation Operations division's
report on the status of checked baggage screening (based on PMIS data),
dated January 5, 2004, to determine whether airports were conducting
100 percent screening using EDS and ETD, and to identify reasons for
not achieving this deadline. Our preliminary review of that data showed
that the most frequently cited reasons for not being able to meet the
requirement--noted by about two-thirds of the FSDs that reported they
were not conducting 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD[Footnote 41]
---were staff shortages, absenteeism, and a lack of training. Almost
half of these FSDs also identified that they did not have sufficient
EDS and ETD equipment to screen all checked baggage, and/or that some
of their EDS and ETD equipment was inoperable.
Of the airports reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of
checked baggage using EDS or ETD, the number of consecutive days that
they were not conducting this screening ranged from 1 to 371 days. In
addition, almost one-third of these FSDs reported that they did not
conduct 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD less than 10 consecutive
days, while half of the FSDs reported not conducting 100 percent
screening using EDS or ETD for more than 200 consecutive days. This
reporting status can change daily as the events that caused airports to
not conduct 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems may
be corrected. FSDs are also expected to report whenever there is need
to use alternative screening means because fewer than 100 percent of
checked bags are being screened using EDS and ETD.
Furthermore, in our visits to several category X and I airports, FSDs
identified EDS and ETD machines that were unable to be used due to an
insufficient number of screeners to operate the equipment or because
the equipment was not in the locations where it was needed. FSDs at
some of these airports expressed concerns about not being able to
resolve operational issues that were causing them to be noncompliant
with the requirement for 100 percent screening using explosive
detection systems.
To comply with a requirement from the Homeland Security Act that TSA
report on its status in achieving the checked baggage-screening
deadline,[Footnote 42] TSA provides classified reports monthly to
selected committees of the Congress identifying its progress in
deploying EDS and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage. As of December 31, 2003, TSA reported that it fell short of
this goal at several large airports, primarily because these airports
did not have the EDS and ETD equipment needed and/or experienced
staffing shortages to operate the equipment. We compared TSA's January
5, 2004, Aviation Operations Reports to the December 2003 monthly
report provided to the selected congressional committees, and
identified additional airports that were not using EDS and ETD to
screen checked baggage 100 percent of the time. TSA officials stated
that the discrepancies were caused because the primary focus of their
report to the selected congressional committees was on initial
deployment of the equipment, rather than fluctuations in staffing and
maintenance issues that affect TSA's ability to utilize the equipment.
We will continue to monitor TSA's compliance with the requirement to
screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems
during the remainder of our review.
TSA Faces Funding and Operational Challenges in Achieving Efficiencies
in Checked Baggage Screening:
TSA has two major initiatives underway to achieve efficiencies in its
baggage screening operations--integrating EDS machines into the
airports' baggage handling systems and resolving EDS alarms using
computer images, referred to as on-screen resolution. Reconfiguring
airports for in-line checked baggage screening could be extensive and
costly, especially when new construction or extensive conveyor belt
systems are required. TSA estimates that the systemwide costs to
complete installations of in-line baggage screening systems may be as
high as $3 to $5 billion, not including the costs of EDS and ETD
equipment. In addition, TSA's efforts to develop protocols for on-
screen resolution, which may permit more efficient screening operations
without increasing security risks, have taken longer than anticipated.
Many large airports are planning to install in-line baggage screening
systems--installing EDS machines as an integrated part of the airport
baggage handling systems--to improve throughput of baggage and reduce
crowding in airport lobbies. These in-line systems have been funded in
part through letters of intent (LOI) signed by TSA.[Footnote 43] To
date, TSA has signed 6 LOIs covering 7 airports promising multiyear
financial support totaling about $772 million for in-line integration
of EDS equipment. For example, LOIs are to provide $87 million in
airport modifications at Boston Logan International Airport, and over
$104 million at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. In addition,
TSA is negotiating LOIs with 4 additional airports. The 7 airports with
signed LOIs and the 4 airports negotiating LOIs with TSA are shown in
table 2.
Table 2: Airports Receiving or Negotiating Letters of Intent:
Letter of intent issued: Airport: BOS - Boston;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $87,000,000.
Letter of intent issued: Airport: DEN - Denver;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $71,250,000.
Letter of intent issued: Airport: DFW - Dallas/Fort Worth;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $104,437,359.
Letter of intent issued: Airport: LAS - Las Vegas;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $93,750,000.
Letter of intent issued: Airport: LAX/ONT - Los Angeles International
and Ontario;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $256,467,000.
Letter of intent issued: Airport: SEA - Seattle;
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $159,000,000.
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: ATL - Atlanta;
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $175,700,000.
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: IAH - Houston;
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $101,520,000.
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: MCO - Orlando;
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $80,000,000.
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: PHX - Phoenix;
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $65,565,000.
Source: Transportation Security Administration:
Note: Amounts reflected are TSA's contribution, which is 75% of funding
needed for an in-line EDS screening solution.
[End of table]
TSA also reported that 23 additional airports, shown in table 3, have
requested LOIs.[Footnote 44]
Table 3: Additional Airports Requesting Letters of Intent:
Airports: SNA - Orange County, California;
Airports: TPA - Tampa;
Airports: CLE - Cleveland;
Airports: MCI - Kansas City, Missouri;
Airports: PVD - Providence;
Airports: MIA - Miami;
Airports: PHL - Philadelphia;
Airports: FLL - Fort Lauderdale;
Airports: SJC - San Jose;
Airports: MDW - Chicago-Midway;
Airports: RSW - Ft. Meyers;
Airports: SFO - San Francisco;
Airports: SAN - San Diego;
Airports: SLC - Salt Lake City;
Airports: MSP - Minneapolis/St. Paul;
Airports: PDX - Portland, Oregon;
Airports: STL - St. Louis;
Airports: MKE - Milwaukee;
Airports: ANC - Anchorage;
Airports: PBI - West Palm Beach;
Airports: RIC - Richmond;
Airports: BDL - Bradley, Connecticut;
Airports: GPT - Gulfport-Biloxi;
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
TSA officials stated that they are assessing requested LOIs based on a
security evaluation, as well as a determination of return on
investment. Officials stated that top priority would be given to
airports that need in-line systems to comply with the requirement for
100 percent screening of checked baggage using explosive detection
systems. However, officials stated that they would also assess other
airports that are currently conducting 100 percent baggage screening
using EDS and ETD. Officials gave the following reasons why these
airports may be good candidates for in-line checked baggage screening
systems.
* airports that will fall out of compliance at peak passenger load
times due to seasonal fluctuations and/or carrier moves, additions, or
changes;
* airports with highly disruptive operational implementations and high
staffing levels; and:
* airports with a heavy reliance on ETDs that would benefit by improved
operational efficiencies and cost reductions.
In December 2003, the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act shifted the funding formula for LOIs from a 75 percent TSA (25
percent local contribution) to a 90 percent TSA (10 percent local
contribution).[Footnote 45] This increase in TSA's required
contribution for both future and previously issued LOIs could diminish
TSA's capacity to accommodate additional LOIs.
In addition, TSA has not yet approved protocols for on-screen
resolution of EDS alarms. TSA's promulgation of these protocols is an
important element in enabling efficiencies in in-line baggage screening
systems and affects the design of the systems being constructed or
planned.[Footnote 46] Under these protocols, EDS operators would be
able to view images of alarmed bags and either clear the bags or divert
them for further screening. Using on-screen resolution, baggage
screeners could be able to view images of the baggage from a remote
location electronically connected to the EDS machines, raising the
throughput rate of bags screened. Currently, TSA is testing protocols
for on-screen resolution at 4 airports. Officials from TSA's Office of
Security Technologies initially reported that they anticipated the
protocols being completed by December 2003. However, to date, the
protocols have not been approved for nationwide use. Advance knowledge
of on-screen resolution protocols could assist airports in developing
in-line systems by providing valuable information that could be used to
design the systems for optimal efficiency. We are examining TSA's
baggage screening program, including both development of in-line
systems and its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing review.
TSA is Funding R&D on Screening Technologies, but Deployment Is Years
Away, and TSA Faces Several Challenges:
TSA is funding R&D on several technologies designed to improve the
screening of checked baggage and passengers at the nation's airports.
However, while the majority of these technologies are scheduled for
pilot testing within the next 12 to 18 months, they are not scheduled
to be deployed in quantity for 2 to 5 years. Furthermore, progress on
this research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used more than
half of its R&D funds for other programs that TSA viewed as higher
priorities. As TSA moves forward with its R&D program, it faces a
number of challenges, including maintaining its schedule while planning
for a merger with the DHS's Science and Technology Directorate. TSA
must also balance funding for competing priorities in a tight budget
environment, not only between R&D and other requirements, but also
between aviation and other modes of transportation.
Checked Baggage Screening Technologies:
To improve the detection capability and operational efficiency of its
current checked baggage-screening program, TSA has both near-term (2 to
5 years) and long-term (more than 5 years) approaches designed to
develop, test, acquire, and deploy checked baggage screening equipment.
In fiscal year 2003, TSA obligated about $12 million for near-term
activities, significantly more than the $75,000 it obligated for long-
term activities. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for
the development of next generation explosive detection systems, which
encompass technologies for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage,
and individuals. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a
total of $155 million for TSA's R&D program, of which $45 million is
planned for the development of next generation explosive detection
systems.[Footnote 47]
The near-term activities for developing next-generation checked baggage
screening equipment are largely reflected in the Phoenix program, which
is funded jointly by government and industry. In September 2003, TSA
obligated about $9.4 million of the $12 million obligated for near-term
activities to enter into five cooperative agreements with private
sector firms under the Phoenix program.[Footnote 48] While the five
agreements are designed to enhance existing systems and develop new
screening technologies, TSA was not able to provide us with scheduled
deployment dates. The five agreements are described below:
* Two cooperative agreements, totaling $4.7 million, provide
enhancements to existing systems. These upgrades are intended to reduce
false alarm rates, advance screener user-interface tools, and improve
service diagnostics, thereby increasing reliability, maintainability,
and availability.
* One cooperative agreement, for $1.2 million, is intended to enhance
detection capabilities and reduce false alarm rates by combining two
new and emerging detection technologies, X-ray diffraction, and
quadrupole resonance, with currently deployed EDS technology, and
computed tomography.[Footnote 49]
* Two cooperative agreements, totaling $3.5 million, are aimed at
developing new screening technologies that perform substantially better
than current technologies. One technology is intended to triple the
pace of checked baggage screening (throughput), reduce false alarms by
75 percent, and enhance detection through superior spatial resolution.
The other technology is intended to take up less space at less than
half the unit cost of current systems.
In addition to these checked baggage-screening technologies, TSA is
testing radio frequency identification (RFID) baggage tags at several
airports, including those in Jacksonville, Atlanta, San Francisco, and
Las Vegas.[Footnote 50] The RFID tags, which identify baggage much more
accurately than the bar code tags that are currently used, are intended
to allow TSA to track luggage, such as bags that must be searched by
hand because they triggered alarms. The tags are also intended to allow
TSA to redirect bags that require further screening because of receipt
of updated intelligence information or interactions with the passenger
who checked the bag. TSA expects these tags to also benefit industry by
reducing the incidence of lost, mishandled, or misdirected luggage. TSA
expects the pilot systems at the previously mentioned airports to be
fully operational by May 2004.
TSA's long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening
systems, called the Manhattan II program, is in the planning stages.
This program will consist of several initiatives and technologies that
are designed to achieve "revolutionary" improvements in detection
capability and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new
screening technologies. TSA intends to award this project's first
contracts in fiscal year 2004.
Passenger Screening Technologies:
To better detect explosives and weapons that an individual may try to
carry into an aircraft cabin, TSA obligated about $1.2 million in
fiscal year 2003 for research, development, testing, and evaluation of
checkpoint screening technologies. As mentioned previously, for fiscal
year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for the development of next-
generation explosive detection systems, which encompass technologies
for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals. For
example:
* TSA has conducted tests of two explosive trace detection portals at
airports in Orlando and Knoxville. These portals analyze the air for
explosives as passengers pass through them. TSA anticipates that these
portals will be ready for limited deployment in 2004.
* TSA is funding the development of a document scanner capable of
detecting traces of explosives on a document handled by a passenger,
such as a boarding pass. TSA anticipates that the scanner will be ready
for limited deployment in 2004.
* TSA is evaluating body-scanning technologies--such as backscatter X-
ray, millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz wave
technology[Footnote 51]--that can detect a variety of weapons and
explosives on passengers. However, TSA acknowledges that it needs to
resolve issues related to passenger privacy before deploying any of
these technologies.
Future Challenges:
As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it faces
a number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges. One
challenge will be to sustain its R&D efforts during a period of
organizational uncertainty and a possible merger. Under the Homeland
Security Act, TSA is mandated to operate as a distinct entity until
November 25, 2004, but after that date its organizational future is not
specified in statute. According to a DHS official, the Secretary of
Homeland Security intends to transfer TSA's R&D program from DHS's
Border and Transportation Security Directorate to DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate, which is responsible for homeland security R&D.
One of the key areas that we will be reporting on later this year is
the extent to which TSA and DHS have developed strategies for the
merger of their R&D programs.
Balancing funding for competing priorities may also pose challenges for
TSA. In a tight budget environment, TSA may be under pressure to use
R&D funds for other purposes, as it did during fiscal year 2003, when
it reprogrammed about $61 million, or more than half of its $110
million R&D appropriations to programs outside of R&D. As a result, TSA
had to delay several key R&D projects, including developing a device to
detect weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found
in carry-on baggage or passengers' effects, and further development and
testing of a walk-through chemical trace detection portal for detecting
explosives on passengers. Competition for resources may also increase
the difficulty that TSA already faces in allocating funds to address
security threats in modes of transportation other than aviation. While
aviation has historically faced, and continues to face, significant
security threats, and improving aviation security is an important goal,
TSA is also responsible for security in the other transportation modes,
and these modes have significant vulnerabilities that remain to be
addressed.[Footnote 52]
Concluding Observations:
Having achieved many of ATSA's deadlines designed to strengthen
passenger and baggage screening, TSA has begun to focus on longer-term
planning to assist in stabilizing its screener workforce and screening
operations. Carefully considering how it strategically hires, deploys,
and manages its screener workforce will help TSA meet its mission and
stabilize its passenger and baggage screening operations. We are
encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the tools needed
to train its screener workforce and measure their performance. However,
as TSA works toward improving the performance of individual screeners
and screening operations, it will also be important that the agency
deploy and leverage screening equipment and technologies and sustain
its research and development efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Tammy Conquest, Kevin
Copping, Gerald Dillingham, Christine Fossett, David Goldstein,
Christopher Jones, Lemuel Jackson, Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi, Jan
Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Maria Strudwick, Mark Tremba,
and Susan Zimmerman.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[2] According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive
Trace Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for
meeting ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage
using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and
use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify
the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect
samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to
identify any traces of explosive materials.
[3] Federal Security Directors are responsible for overseeing security
at each of the nation's commercial airports.
[4] High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.
[5] TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by
projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as
they are screened. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying
the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted,
TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then
records the screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed
for performance trends.
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110, 115 Stat. 597, 617, requires the use of
alternative means for screening any piece of checked baggage not
screened by an explosive detection system. Authorized alternative means
include a bag match program, manual search, K-9 explosive detection
units, and other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.
[7] Positive passenger bag match is an alternative means of screening
checked baggage, conducted by the airline, which requires that the
passenger be on the same aircraft as the checked baggage.
[8] In-line baggage screening systems integrate EDS equipment into
airport baggage handling systems to improve the pace of checked baggage
screening (i.e., throughput).
[9] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 425,
116 Stat. 2135, 2185-86 (2002), the deadline for screening all checked
baggage using explosive detection systems was extended until December
31, 2003, at airports the Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security determined could not meet the December 31, 2002, deadline due
to TSA's inability to deploy sufficient explosive detection systems to
those airports.
[10] There are five categories of airports--X, I, II, III, and IV.
Category X airports have the largest number of enplanements and
category IV airports have the smallest number.
[11] TSA's National Screening Force provides screening support to all
commercial airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under
other special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners
than currently available to FSDs.
[12] TSA instructed FSDs to use competency-based testing at airports
that were over their authorized screener staffing levels as the
identification method for involuntary conversions to part-time and
reductions-in-force. Based on an airport's staffing plan, the FSD was
required to identify the number of screeners and screening supervisors
to be converted to part-time or be reduced-in-force. Screeners were
ranked based on testing scores. The competency-based tests consisted of
two computer-based tests, including image recognition and knowledge of
standard operating procedures.
[13] The fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland and Security
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1141-42 (2003).
[14] One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-
overtime hours.
[15] According to TSA, an annualized number represents an estimate of
the usage of FTEs over the fiscal year assuming that the usage in a
given pay period remains constant over all future pay periods.
[16] TSA officials stated that it required the contractor to validate
the staffing model using statistical samples of all staff and equipment
operations at all category X airports and as many category I, II, III,
and IV airports as necessary.
[17] TSA's standard operating procedures require that a screener of the
same gender as the passenger conduct secondary searches (i.e., hand
wanding and pat downs) of the passenger.
[18] DHS's Homeland Security Advisory System consists of 5 threat
conditions, ranging from low (green) to severe (red).
[19] An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA's hiring
contractor assembles to conduct assessments of screener applicants. The
centers are generally constructed at locations such as hotels and TSA
training facilities that are in close proximity to the airport(s) where
FSDs have requested additional staff.
[20] The assessment process consists of three phases. Phase I includes
three computer-based tests (1) the English Proficiency Test; (2) the
Screener Object Recognition Tests, which assesses an applicant's
ability to identify an X-ray images through visual observation and
identification and mental rotation; and (3) the Aviation Security
Screener Employment Test, which evaluates interpersonal skills such as
customer service and dependability and work values. Applicants who pass
Phase I of the assessment process are scheduled to attend Phase II,
which includes (1) a structured interview; (2) physical ability tests,
such as luggage lift and baggage search; (3) a medical examination such
as vision, color vision, hearing, physical coordination, and motor
skills; and (4) a drug test. Applicants who pass Phase II proceed to
Phase III, which entails a background investigation including credit
and criminal checks. TSA officials reported that approximately 8
percent of applicants pass both the Phase I and II assessments, and
about 90 percent of applicants pass Phase III. Officials further
reported that nearly 80 percent of offers made are accepted.
[21] TSA attempts to contact hired screeners who do not show up for
basic screener training, and reschedule training when possible.
[22] High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.
[23] TSA plans to develop other certifications as new technologies are
utilized and integrated into the screening process.
[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening:
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining,
GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).
[25] The 2 completed modules are videos that provide training on
procedures for conducting handheld metal detector, pat down, and manual
bag searches.
[26] As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners
and supervisors to interview, the views of those we interviewed should
not be considered representative of the views of all screeners and
supervisors at the airports we visited.
[27] While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA officials
stated that many of the performance issues identified also pertained to
baggage screening.
[28] Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to
participate in corrective action training based on their observations
of performance deficiencies, such as failure to follow a standard
operating procedure.
[29] The USDA course covers topics related to supervising staff within
the federal government.
[30] TSA defines fully connected as a training computer with the new
network image installed and connected to the TSA broadband network.
[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to
Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
[32] The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a stand-alone
application residing in an air carrier's reservation system that
analyzes certain behavioral patterns to score and calculate each
passenger's risk level for determining the appropriate level of
screening.
[33] TSA began deploying high-speed connectivity to screening
checkpoints in May 2003.
[34] Checked baggage screeners will not recertify on EDS as part of the
current recertification program. EDS is a separate certification
program under development. The need for other skills or equipment-
certifications is under consideration for future certification
programs.
[35] Screeners that fail any module will receive study time,
remediation, and one retest opportunity.
[36] At the time the recertification testing began, TSA considered
about 28,000 screeners as having already completed the first two
components of the knowledge and skills assessment because they
successfully passed competency tests TSA administered at many airports
as part of a screener workforce reduction effort.
[37] The PMIS user survey was conducted in July 2003 and had a response
rate of 21.9%. Given this low response rate, the results of the survey
may not be representative of the views and opinions of PMIS users. TSA
plans to administer a second survey in March 2004.
[38] The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-62, 107 Stat. 285, shifts the focus of government operations from
process to results by establishing a foundation for examining agency
mission, performance goals and objectives, and results. Under the act,
agencies are to prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general
direction for their efforts, and annual performance plans that
establish connections between the long-term strategic goals outlined in
the strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of managers and
staff. Finally, the act requires that each agency report annually on
the extent to which it is meeting its annual performance goals and the
actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that have not been met.
[39] According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive
Trace Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for
meeting ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage
using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and
use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify
the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect
samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to
identify any traces of explosive materials.
[40] FSDs are expected to list all reasons that prevented them from
screening 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. Also, FSDs
are to report when they do attain 100 percent screening of checked
baggage using EDS and ETD.
[41] The number of airports unable to attain 100 percent screening of
checked baggage using EDS and ETD is Sensitive Security Information
and, therefore, is not included in this testimony.
[42] The baggage-screening requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d)(1), on
which TSA must report, include: (A) that explosive detection systems
are deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all airports described
in § 44903(c) have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all
checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002 (as discussed earlier,
the Homeland Security Act extended this deadline to December 31, 2003,
for airports that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
determines could not meet the original deadline), and that as soon as
these systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at the
airport is screened by those systems; (B) that all systems deployed
under subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and (C) if explosive
detection equipment at an airport is unavailable, all checked baggage
is screened by an alternative means.
[43] A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an
agency to provide multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current
authorization period. Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed
with a project without waiting for future federal funds because the
airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be
reimbursed.
[44] In addition, in-line systems have been funded through the Federal
Aviation Administration's AIP funds. The Airport Improvement Program
trust fund is used to fund capital improvements to airports, including
some security enhancements, such as terminal modifications to
accommodate explosive detection equipment. Thirteen airports are using
AIP funds to make infrastructure upgrades to support EDS equipment that
TSA will supply.
[45] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 605, 2490 Stat. 2566-68 (2003).
[46] On-screen resolution could also be used with stand-alone EDS
machines to potentially increase screening efficiencies.
[47] The President's fiscal year 2005 budget is requesting a total of
$155.2 million for TSA's R&D program.
[48] The remaining about $2.7 million was obligated for continuous
improvement to currently deployed equipment and for contractor support
activities for the Phoenix program.
[49] X-ray diffraction technology is based on the detection of scatter
patterns as X-rays interact with crystal lattice structures of
materials. Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe
bags by eliciting unique responses from explosives based on their
chemical characteristics. Computed tomography uses an X-ray source that
rotates around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional
images that are integrated by a computer, which displays the densities
of objects in the bag. The machine automatically triggers an alarm when
objects with high densities, characteristic of explosives, are
detected.
[50] RFID is a technology that uses radio waves to automatically
identify individual items, such as checked luggage, for tracking
purposes.
[51] Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an
image that highlights organic materials such as explosives on a
passenger. Millimeter wave energy analysis provides a 360-degree image
of the human body in order to detect weapons and explosives. Terahertz
imaging penetrates many common materials and reveals not only the shape
but also the composition of hidden objects, including explosives.
[52] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal
Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
