Coast Guard
Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine Gao ID: GAO-04-595 March 24, 2004Over the last several years, the Coast Guard has experienced what it considers to be serious reliability and safety problems with its workhorse HH-65 helicopter used for key missions, such as search and rescue, migrant and drug interdiction, and homeland security. Annually, the HH-65 contributes to saving 375 lives and assists on 2,065 drug interdiction cases, according to the Coast Guard. An increasing trend in the number and seriousness of safety-related HH-65 incidents in recent months, highlighted by some the Coast Guard deemed to be serious life-threatening incidents, prompted a Coast Guard decision in January 2004 to replace the existing engine and the associated engine control system in this helicopter with a different engine, which it believes will improve safety and reliability and substantially reduce incidents. In light of the Coast Guard's decision to replace the existing engine, and as part of our already ongoing work on the safety and reliability of the HH-65 helicopter, we determined (1) whether the Coast Guard's decision to replace the existing HH-65 helicopter engine was fact- and risk-based; (2) the management and efficiency implications, if any, of the Coast Guard's approach for addressing the safety and reliability issues with the existing HH-65 engine and acquiring the replacement engine; and (3) the extent to which the replacement decision aligns with the Coast Guard's long-term helicopter needs under its Deepwater program.
The Coast Guard made a decision that was both fact- and risk-based for replacing the engine on the HH-65 helicopter. Recently, the number of reported in-flight power losses and incidents has grown dramatically. Further, our interviews with pilots and our review of incident reports disclosed widespread Coast Guard concerns with the safety risks of flying the HH-65 helicopter because of the lack of reliability of its engine and engine control system. The Coast Guard's determination of the need for immediate engine and engine control system replacement was also based on the belief that improvements being made to the existing engine by the manufacturer and the Coast Guard were not working fast enough. Similarly, HH-65 helicopter upgrades under the Coast Guard's Deepwater program are not scheduled to begin until fiscal year 2006, and during the interim period, the Coast Guard did not want to further jeopardize the safety of its pilots and crew or those who depend on the Coast Guard during search and rescue operations. The Coast Guard is using a two-track approach for dealing with safety and reliability problems with the HH-65 in the short term, and this approach has a number of notable management and efficiency implications. With regard to the first track, which involves installing a modified version of the existing engine, the Coast Guard has already bought 61 modified engines and plans to purchase 38 more for $4 million before testing is completed on any of the modified engines. The second track of the Coast Guard's approach, which is to acquire a replacement engine, involves using a contractor to select and acquire the engine, rather than the Coast Guard managing the effort itself. Whether the requirements for the replacement engine will be aligned with Deepwater requirements for this helicopter is unclear because the requirements for all Deepwater aircraft and vessels are still under review in light of the Coast Guard's expanded homeland security responsibilities. If the two are not aligned, there are significant implications and risks related to the amount of money spent on engine replacements and the amount of time needed for replacement.
GAO-04-595, Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-595
entitled 'Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine' which
was released on March 24, 2004.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2004:
Coast Guard:
Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine:
GAO-04-595:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 24, 2004:
The Honorable John McCain Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Over the last several years, the Coast Guard has experienced what it
considers to be serious reliability and safety problems with its
workhorse HH-65 helicopter used for key missions, such as search and
rescue, migrant and drug interdiction, and homeland security.[Footnote
1] Annually, the HH-65 contributes to saving 375 lives and assists on
2,065 drug interdiction cases, according to the Coast Guard. An
increasing trend in the number and seriousness of safety-related HH-65
incidents in recent months, highlighted by some the Coast Guard deemed
to be serious life-threatening incidents, prompted a Coast Guard
decision in January 2004 to replace the existing engine and the
associated engine control system[Footnote 2] in this helicopter with a
different engine, which it believes will improve safety and reliability
and substantially reduce incidents.[Footnote 3]
In light of the Coast Guard's decision to replace the existing engine,
and as part of our already ongoing work on the safety and reliability
of the HH-65 helicopter, you asked us to determine (1) whether the
Coast Guard's decision to replace the existing HH-65 helicopter engine
was fact-and risk-based; (2) the management and efficiency
implications, if any, of the Coast Guard's approach for addressing the
safety and reliability issues with the existing HH-65 engine and
acquiring the replacement engine; and (3) the extent to which the
replacement decision aligns with the Coast Guard's long-term helicopter
needs under its Deepwater program.[Footnote 4] On March 12, 2004, we
briefed your staff on the preliminary results of our work to date.
Enclosure I contains the materials we presented at that time. Even
though the results of our work are preliminary, we are reporting now to
give the Coast Guard an opportunity to amply consider our findings as
it proceeds with its HH-65 engine modification and replacement
initiatives.
We conducted our work from June 2003 through March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Coast Guard made a decision that was both fact-and risk-based for
replacing the engine on the HH-65 helicopter. Recently, the number of
reported in-flight power losses and incidents has grown dramatically.
The Coast Guard reported 37 incidents in the first 3½ months of fiscal
year 2004, when it made the engine replacement decision. That number
had risen to 67 incidents as of March 1, 2004. In fiscal year 2003,
pilots had reported a total of 32 incidents.[Footnote 5] We verified
the data used to support the recent trends and incidents cited by the
Coast Guard as a basis for making the engine replacement decision.
Further, our interviews with pilots and our review of incident reports
disclosed widespread Coast Guard concerns with the safety risks of
flying the HH-65 helicopter because of the lack of reliability of its
engine and engine control system. For example, some pilots and crew
characterized flying the helicopter akin to "playing Russian roulette,"
indicating that failures could occur at any time in flight. They also
stated that they routinely employ atypical work-around solutions, such
as dumping fuel and leaving a rescue swimmer behind, to accomplish
missions when power failures and other engine-related problems occur.
The Coast Guard also performed a risk analysis, using information on
frequency of occurrence, severity of incidents, and assumptions about
their relative importance that showed that the current situation
warranted the highest possible risk category, sufficient to ground the
fleet unless substantive steps were taken to improve safety and
reliability. The Coast Guard's determination of the need for immediate
engine and engine control system replacement was also based on the
belief that improvements being made to the existing engine by the
manufacturer and the Coast Guard were not working fast enough.
Similarly, HH-65 helicopter upgrades under the Coast Guard's Deepwater
program are not scheduled to begin until fiscal year 2006, and during
the interim period, the Coast Guard did not want to further jeopardize
the safety of its pilots and crew or those who depend on the Coast
Guard during search and rescue operations.
The Coast Guard is using a two-track approach for dealing with safety
and reliability problems with the HH-65 in the short term, and this
approach has a number of notable management and efficiency
implications. With regard to the first track, which involves installing
a modified version of the existing engine, the Coast Guard has already
bought 61 modified engines and plans to purchase 38 more for $4 million
before testing is completed on any of the modified engines.[Footnote 6]
According to the Coast Guard, serious problems occurred with the
modified engine during early testing, and further engine modifications
were made.[Footnote 7] Moreover, installation of the first 61 modified
engines is not scheduled to be completed on selected HH-65 helicopters
until November 2004--at a time when installation of the replacement
engines is scheduled to be underway on other HH-65 helicopters. Hence,
the remaining 38 modified engines may not be needed until November 2004
at the earliest, depending on the results of the testing program. In
light of these circumstances, we believe that proceeding with the 38-
engine purchase is premature, at least until testing is completed in
April 2004. Also, given that installation of the replacement engine
likely will have already started by the time the 38 engines are ready
for installation, a further Coast Guard review of the cost
effectiveness of purchasing and installing these engines should be
considered, in our opinion. The second track of the Coast Guard's
approach, which is to acquire a replacement engine, involves using a
contractor to select and acquire the engine, rather than the Coast
Guard managing the effort itself.[Footnote 8] The Coast Guard believes
that this approach will both take advantage of the contractor's
acquisition expertise and reduce the Coast Guard's legal risks by
providing independence to the acquisition decision--thereby reducing
potential disputes and protests over the engine replacement decision.
However, as the Coast Guard recognizes, this approach most likely will
cost more because of the contractor's charges for profit and overhead,
which could add 15 percent to total costs. Also, relying on the
contractor adds another layer of administration and carries the risk of
additional time to negotiate acquisition decisions, even after the
initial contract award is made.
Whether the requirements for the replacement engine will be aligned
with Deepwater requirements for this helicopter is unclear because the
requirements for all Deepwater aircraft and vessels are still under
review in light of the Coast Guard's expanded homeland security
responsibilities.[Footnote 9] If the two are not aligned, there are
significant implications and risks related to the amount of money spent
on engine replacements and the amount of time needed for replacement.
For example, if the replacement engine does not meet power requirements
for the Deepwater helicopter, a second new engine may have to be
installed, largely negating the estimated $150 million to $250 million
investment in the first replacement engine. Also, the Coast Guard would
have to go through two replacement cycles--one for the first
replacement engine and a second for the engine needed to meet Deepwater
requirements. This could result in fewer helicopters being available to
fulfill mission responsibilities.
Scope and Methodology:
Our work for this report involved reviewing and analyzing a variety of
Coast Guard documents, decision papers, and data elements, as well as
conducting site visits to Coast Guard air stations and other
facilities. To assess the re-engine decision and replacement engine
acquisition approach, we reviewed the Coast Guard decision memo and
related documents, aircraft mishap data, and contractor data, and
interviewed contractor and Coast Guard officials, including those in
the offices of the Chief of Staff, Budget, Safety, HH-65, and Deepwater
programs, Aircraft Repair and Supply Center, and Aviation Training
Center. We also talked with pilots, crew, and other personnel who
operate and maintain the HH-65. We verified the reported mishap data
and conducted an assessment of the procedures and internal controls
established for the database. To assess the management and efficiency
implications, if any, of the Coast Guard's approach to acquiring the
replacement engine, we reviewed Coast Guard documents and a legal
analysis as well as interviewed Coast Guard officials from the Chief of
Staff's office. To assess the alignment between the short-and long-term
requirements, we reviewed Coast Guard planning documents, performance
objectives, and information prepared for potential contractors, and
interviewed Coast Guard and contractor officials.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Coast Guard for review and comment. Generally, the
Coast Guard agreed with the facts presented in the report. Coast Guard
officials provided a number of technical comments and clarifications,
which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of our report. The Coast
Guard agreed with our position regarding the timing of and need for
purchasing the additional 38 modified (LTS-101-850) engines for the HH-
65 helicopter. The Coast Guard agreed that purchasing the 38 additional
modified engines before testing on them is completed would be
premature, and the agency does not plan to do so, according to
cognizant officials. In addition, Coast Guard officials said that based
on these test results and the timetable for the HH-65 engine
replacement effort, they plan to review the decision to purchase the 38
engines.
Copies of this report are being sent to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and other
interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (415) 904-2200 or by e-mail at
wrightsonm@gao.gov or Randall B. Williamson, Assistant Director at
(206) 287-4860 or by e-mail at williamsonr@gao.gov. Other key
contributors to this report were Odi Cuero, Marco Gomez, Bonnie Hall,
Stan Kostyla, Julie Leetch, and Stan Stenersen.
Margaret T. Wrightson
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
Signed by Margaret T. Wrightson:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Briefing Slides:
[See PDF for slides]
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Coast Guard operates 84 HH-65 helicopters that are dispersed
geographically across the United States to perform various missions.
The HH-65 is the Coast Guard's only cutter deployable aircraft.
[2] "Engine," as used throughout the report, refers to the engine and
engine control system. The function of the overall engine and engine
control system is to maintain rotor speed and provide engine load-
sharing under all normal flight conditions. Engine components include
such parts as the fuel control unit, power turbine governor, and the
airflow modulator. Engine control system components include the
anticipator actuator, anticipator control box, and the dual collective
potentiometer. The engine manufacturer (Honeywell) and the Coast Guard
are each responsible for various separate engine and engine control
system components.
[3] The Coast Guard decided on January 15, 2004, to replace the
existing HH-65 engine within 24 months. The estimated investment for
the replacement engine is $150 million to $250 million.
[4] The Coast Guard's Deepwater program includes replacement and
modernization of the agency's entire fleet of cutters and aircraft. The
procurement is expected to cost over $17 billion over 30 years. The
Deepwater program's prime contractor acts as a system integrator with
responsibility for identifying and delivering an integrated system of
assets to meet the Coast Guard's missions. Apart from its HH-65 engine
replacement decision in January 2004, the Coast Guard had already
planned to modernize its HH-65 fleet and upgrade its capability as part
of the Deepwater program. Planned HH-65 upgrades include a new engine
and improved avionics for this helicopter. Under the Deepwater program
timetable, delivery of the upgraded helicopters is scheduled to begin
in fiscal years 2007 and be completed by 2013.
[5] To minimize continued safety risks associated with the HH-65
engine, the Coast Guard imposed operational restrictions on its use in
October 2003. Operational restrictions included limiting helicopter
landings on helipads and restricting cutter takeoffs and landings.
[6] The modified engine, referred to as the LTS-101-850, is advertised
to provide a 14 percent power increase over the LTS-101-750 engine,
which currently powers the HH-65. The LTS-101-750 engine, manufactured
by Honeywell, relies on a complex engine and engine control system.
Since its introduction in 1984, the helicopter has experienced a
variety of engine problems, initially with the core engine and in
recent years with the control system. Further, the performance
requirements (for weight) for the HH-65 have grown 17 percent over time
without a corresponding growth in engine power.
[7] On November 5, 2003, an HH-65 that was being tested with the
modified engines at the Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and Supply Center
had an engine that would not start. Three days later, a similar event
occurred on another modified engine. Subsequent investigations
indicated that the clearance for engine-related blades was inadequate
so that the blade tip was rubbing against the engine shroud. The
material that rubbed away accumulated while the engine was running, and
upon cool down, welded the blades to the shroud, causing the engine not
to re-start.
[8] This contractor, also the system integrator for the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program, is a business entity jointly owned by Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems and Lockheed Martin Corporation.
[9] In general, the requirements refer to the engine's capability with
respect to the helicopter's weight and weather conditions. For example,
the requirements for the replacement engine call for an engine that
must provide at least a 10 percent power margin during hover out of
ground effect at 9,200 pounds on a 35 degree centigrade day at sea
level.
GAO's Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW,
Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548:
