Coast Guard Programs
Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer Gao ID: GAO-04-432 March 22, 2004The Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting America's ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions important to the nation's interests, such as conducting search and rescue and protecting important fishing grounds. GAO's past work found that despite substantial budget increases, the Coast Guard's extensive homeland security responsibilities resulted in a reduction in the levels at which the agency's ship, boat, and aircraft resources were applied to non- homeland security programs. GAO was asked to update and expand this work by analyzing: the trends in resource usage, the trends in performance results, and the implications of these trends.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard has experienced a 32 percent increase in its budget, a 9 percent increase in personnel, and major shifts in the hours in which its ships, boats, and aircraft are used in the agency's various programs. Hours these resources are used for most homeland security programs greatly exceed their pre-September 11 levels, in part because of an infusion of new boats, with the number of hours for the ports, waterways, and coastal security program up more than twelve-fold. Conversely, with the exception of hours for ice operations, hours dedicated to each non-homeland security program remained below their pre-September 11 levels. The Coast Guard's performance results--measures used to track each program's annual progress--generally did not mirror the trends in resource use. Instead, results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or improved regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the programs that GAO reviewed met their performance targets--the goals they set out to achieve--in fiscal year 2003. Coast Guard officials said that various factors besides resources, such as increased operating efficiencies or unexpected events, also affected performance results, but they have limited information for assessing the impact of these factors. Initial steps have been taken to better develop this capability, but many are in early stages, and the Coast Guard does not have a time frame for completing the work or assurance that they will result in a systematic approach for assessing the results.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-432, Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2004:
Coast Guard:
Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be
Clearer:
GAO-04-432:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-432, a report to the Subcommittee on Oceans,
Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting America‘s ports,
waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks. At the same
time, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions
important to the nation‘s interests, such as conducting search and
rescue and protecting important fishing grounds.
GAO‘s past work found that despite substantial budget increases, the
Coast Guard‘s extensive homeland security responsibilities resulted in
a reduction in the levels at which the agency‘s ship, boat, and
aircraft resources were applied to non–homeland security programs. GAO
was asked to update and expand this work by analyzing: the trends in
resource usage, the trends in performance results, and the implications
of these trends.
What GAO Found:
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard has
experienced a 32 percent increase in its budget, a 9 percent increase
in personnel, and major shifts in the hours in which its ships, boats,
and aircraft are used in the agency‘s various programs. Hours these
resources are used for most homeland security programs greatly exceed
their pre-September 11 levels, in part because of an infusion of new
boats, with the number of hours for the ports, waterways, and coastal
security program up more than twelve-fold. (See fig. below.)
Conversely, with the exception of hours for ice operations, hours
dedicated to each non–homeland security program remained below their
pre-September 11 levels.
Percentage Change in Boat, Ship, and Aircraft Resource Hours, by
Program, Pre-September 11 Baseline through Fiscal Year 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Coast Guard‘s performance results”measures used to track each
program‘s annual progress”generally did not mirror the trends in
resource use. Instead, results for programs GAO reviewed were generally
stable or improved regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all
of the programs that GAO reviewed met their performance targets”the
goals they set out to achieve”in fiscal year 2003. Coast Guard
officials said that various factors besides resources, such as
increased operating efficiencies or unexpected events, also affected
performance results, but they have limited information for assessing
the impact of these factors. Initial steps have been taken to better
develop this capability, but many are in early stages, and the Coast
Guard does not have a time frame for completing the work or assurance
that they will result in a systematic approach for assessing the
results.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop a time frame for proceeding
with plans to more accurately account for resources expended, and
ensure that it develops a strategy for identifying the intervening
factors affecting performance results, and systematically assesses the
relationship between these factors, resources used, and results
achieved. The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report and generally
agreed with the facts and recommendations presented, but did not take a
formal position on the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-432.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Margaret Wrightson at
(415) 904-2200 or wrightsonm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Generally, Resource Hours Devoted to Homeland Security Programs Have
Increased Substantially, while Hours for Other Programs Have Decreased:
Performance Results Remained Largely Unchanged or Improved for the
Eight Programs We Assessed:
More Systematic Understanding of Resource Usage and Performance Results
Is Important for Management and Accountability:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours:
Programs with Increasing Resource Hours:
Programs with Declining Resource Hours:
Programs with Stable Resource Hours:
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance
Measures:
Programs with Generally Stable Performance Results:
Programs with Improved Performance Results:
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
Efficiency:
Intelligence:
Technology:
Tactics:
Partnerships:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area (as of March 2004):
Table 2: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2001 through
Fiscal Year 2003:
Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for Fiscal Year 2003:
Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies Cited by Coast
Guard Officials:
Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to Improve Linkages
between Resources and Performance Results:
Table 6: Coast Guard Performance Measures by Program:
Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence Efforts:
Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts:
Table 9: Selected Examples of New Tactics:
Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Partnership Efforts:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs:
Figure 2: Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-
September 11 Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003:
Figure 3: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Resource Hours:
Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours:
Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours:
Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours:
Figure 7: Foreign Fish Enforcement Resource Hours:
Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource Hours:
Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours:
Figure 10: Search and Rescue Resource Hours:
Figure 11: Aids to Navigation Resource Hours:
Figure 12: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Performance Results and
Target by Fiscal Year:
Figure 13: Illegal Drug Interdiction Performance Results and Targets by
Fiscal Year:
Figure 14: Ice Operations Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal
Year:
Figure 15: Living Marine Resources Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year:
Figure 16: Search and Rescue Performance Results and Target by Fiscal
Year:
Figure 17: Foreign Fish Enforcement Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year:
Figure 18: Aids to Navigation Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal
Year:
Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by Fiscal
Year:
Abbreviations:
CAG: collisions, allisions, and groundings:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
HITRON: Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron:
HSAS: Homeland Security Advisory System:
IACM: Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement:
LED: light-emitting diode:
MARSEC: Maritime Security Condition System:
NYPD: New York Police Department:
PWCS: ports, waterways, and coastal security:
VMS: Vessel Monitoring System:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 22, 2004:
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe:
Chairman:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
These are challenging times for the Coast Guard. As the lead federal
agency for maritime homeland security within the Department of Homeland
Security, the Coast Guard is facing extraordinary, heightened
responsibilities to protect America's ports, waterways, and waterside
facilities from terrorist attacks and from becoming an avenue for
terrorists to bring weapons of mass destruction into the country. The
Coast Guard also remains responsible for many other missions important
to the nation's interests, such as helping stem the flow of illegal
drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and
responding to marine pollution. These expanded responsibilities come at
a time when budget resources are increasingly constrained, making
prioritization among competing agencies and programs an even more
critical factor in congressional decision making. Our past work has
shown that notwithstanding substantial increases in the Coast Guard's
budget to accommodate its increased responsibilities, the Coast Guard's
emphasis on homeland security has resulted in a reduction in the level
of resources devoted to non-homeland security missions.
This report updates our earlier work on Coast Guard efforts to balance
its homeland security and non-homeland security missions.[Footnote 1]
At the committee's request, we have expanded the scope of the prior
work to examine both the trends in resource usage and corresponding
performance results between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Specifically,
as agreed with your offices, this report addresses the following
questions:
* What are the trends in resource usage for each Coast Guard program
within its homeland security and non-homeland security mission areas?
* What are the trends in performance results for each Coast Guard
program?
* What are the implications of these trends for Coast Guard management
and accountability?
To answer these questions, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed
documents and records, and visited Coast Guard installations to
determine how operations were being affected. Because the Coast Guard
does not have a system that tracks how its personnel spend their time
by program, our work on resource usage focused on resource hour data
showing the number of hours that Coast Guard ships, boats and aircraft
were used in conducting each Coast Guard program. This approach, while
covering a considerable amount of the Coast Guard's activities, could
not completely account for all of the resources used to achieve program
results. Most notably, two of the Coast Guard's 11 programs--marine
safety and marine environmental protection--are largely carried out
without using ships, boats, and aircraft, and thus much of the effort
dedicated toward these programs is not captured in the resource hour
data.[Footnote 2] Our work on performance results focused on data that
the Coast Guard collects and analyzes under the Government Performance
and Results Act (GPRA) to determine how well the agency is achieving
its goals.[Footnote 3] For this part of our work, sufficient data were
available to fully analyze 7 of the Coast Guard's 11 programs.[Footnote
4] For those programs that we could not fully analyze, because they had
only resource hour information or performance data but not both, we
provided limited information in relevant portions of this report. We
conducted our work at Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the Coast
Guard's nine districts that span three coasts--East, West, and Gulf.
Our work, which was conducted from June 2003 through March 2004, was
done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology appears
in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Total Coast Guard resource hours increased 39 percent over their pre-
September 11 levels in fiscal year 2003, and there have been major
shifts in the distribution of these resource hours among the various
Coast Guard programs as well. Not unexpectedly, homeland security
programs were the greatest beneficiaries of the increased hours, as
more vessels devoted to homeland security have been added to the fleet.
Conversely, the resource hours for most non-homeland security programs
have decreased as many more resources are now generally devoted to
protecting the nation's ports and waterways. For example, resource
hours for several programs that the Coast Guard has traditionally
conducted, such as living marine resources, and search and rescue,
declined by 26 percent and 22 percent, respectively.
The performance results--or indicators--that track a program's progress
from year to year--remained stable or improved for seven of the eight
programs we reviewed, when comparing fiscal year 2001 and 2003 results.
Although there was some fluctuation in fiscal year 2002, four programs
had stable performance results, three were improved and one had pending
results for fiscal year 2003. For example, the living marine resources
program--whose performance is assessed by measuring the percentage of
fishermen that the Coast Guard found in compliance with certain fishing
regulations--had stable results with a consistent compliance rate of
about 99 to 97 percent between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Results for
the aids to navigation program--which helps to ensure the safe passage
of vessels--fluctuated in fiscal year 2002, but showed improvement when
comparing fiscal years 2001 and 2003, as the number of vessel incidents
(such as collisions and groundings) decreased. In addition to
demonstrating stable or improved results in fiscal year 2003, five of
the eight programs we reviewed also met their pre-established
performance targets--the goals they aim to achieve each year. For
example, the search and rescue program's target for fiscal year 2003
was to save 85 percent of mariners in distress and the program achieved
this goal by saving over 87 percent of them. Two programs, defense
readiness and undocumented migrant interdiction, missed their
performance targets in fiscal year 2003--defense readiness achieved a
78 percent readiness status result with a 100 percent target, and
illegal migrant interdiction missed its target of interdicting 87
percent of illegal migrants by less than two percentage points. Results
for the drug interdiction program were not yet available for fiscal
year 2003.
When comparing the trends in the Coast Guard's use of resources and its
performance results, the relationship between resources used and
results was not always what might be expected--that is, the resources
expended and performance results achieved did not have consistent
direction of movement and sometimes bore an opposite relationship. For
example, performance remained stable for four programs, even though
resources dedicated to them increased or decreased; and three programs
demonstrated improved results despite decreases in resource hours for
two of them. These results have important implications for resource
management and accountability especially given the Coast Guard's
limited ability to explain them. In particular, the results prompt a
logical question as to why, despite substantial changes in the resource
hours of a number of programs over the period we examined, the
corresponding performance results for these programs were not
necessarily affected in the same way--that is, they did not rise or
fall in keeping with changes in resources. The Coast Guard cannot say
with any assurance why this occurred. For example, the resource hours
invested in the migrant interdiction program increased by 81 percent
and its performance results--which measure the program's success in
interdicting illegal migrants entering the United States by sea--
remained stable when comparing fiscal year 2001with fiscal year 2003.
Likewise, search and rescue resource hours dropped by 22 percent, but
the measurement of the Coast Guard's ability to save mariners in
distress remained stable for the same period. These results suggest
that performance was likely affected by factors other than resources.
One set of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as helping to keep
performance steady despite resource decreases, involved strategies such
as using new technology, better operational tactics, improved
intelligence, and stronger partnering efforts. For example, the Coast
Guard identified improved intelligence and technology, along with
efforts to partner more closely with other federal agencies, as
contributors to its stable performance results in protecting living
marine resources despite a decrease in hours dedicated to the program.
Coast Guard officials also pointed to another set of factors, which are
largely beyond its control (such as severe weather conditions), to
explain performance results that did not improve despite resource
increases. However the supporting data the Coast Guard was able to
provide to account for the effects of these two sets of factors was
limited. The Coast Guard has initiatives under way to better measure
its resource usage and manage program results, but many of these
initiatives are still in early stages of development and some do not
have a time frame for their completion. In addition, the Coast Guard
does not have a systematic approach for ensuring that these efforts
will allow the agency to link its resources and performance results. As
we have reported in previous studies on performance management,
agencies that understand the linkage between resources expended and
performance results achieved are better positioned to allocate and
manage their resources effectively. And by building this type of
environmental assessment into its strategic planning process,
organizations can stay focused on their long-term goals even as they
make changes in the way they intend to achieve them. An ability to
understand these types of effects is important to the Coast Guard and
the Congress to make informed decisions about resource needs.
We are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to (1) develop a time
frame for expeditiously proceeding with initiatives to account more
completely for resources expended and (2) ensure that through its
planning process the agency develops a strategy for identifying the
intervening factors that affect performance results, and systematically
assesses the relationship between these factors, resources used, and
results achieved.
Background:
Now a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast
Guard has grown considerably in the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks. The agency's operating budget in fiscal year 2003
was $4.9 billion--an increase of 32 percent in real terms over its
fiscal year 2001 operating budget.[Footnote 5] Corresponding to this
funding increase, the agency's personnel numbers have also grown
significantly, and at the end of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard had
almost 44,500 full time positions about 9 percent more than it had in
fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 6]
The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under 11 programs within
two broad missions--homeland security and non-homeland
security.[Footnote 7] (See table 1.) While maritime homeland security
duties are not necessarily new to the Coast Guard, the agency's
resources used for this mission area prior to September 11, 2001, had
been minimal when compared with most of its other programs.[Footnote 8]
After September 11, the Coast Guard focused much more of its efforts on
homeland security and established a new program area--the ports,
waterways, and coastal security program (PWCS).
Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area (as of March 2004):
Mission and program; Homeland security mission: Ports, waterways, and
coastal security;
Activities and functions of each program: Conducting harbor patrols,
vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and
other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage
from attacks that occur.
Mission and program; Homeland security mission: Illegal drug
interdiction[A];
Activities and functions of each program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft in high drug trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to
reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes.
Mission and program; Homeland security mission: Undocumented migrant
interdiction[A];
Activities and functions of each program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the
United States by maritime routes.
Mission and program; Homeland security mission: Defense readiness;
Activities and functions of each program: Participating with the
Department of Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying
cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force
mobilization operations.
Mission and program; Homeland security mission: Other law enforcement
(foreign fish enforcement)[B];
Activities and functions of each program: Protecting United States
fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally
harvest United States fish stocks.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Search and rescue;
Activities and functions of each program: Operating multi-mission
stations, and a national distress and response communication system,
conducting search and rescue operations for mariners in distress.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Living marine
resources;
Activities and functions of each program: Enforcing domestic fishing
laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Aids to
navigation;
Activities and functions of each program: Managing United States
waterways and providing a safe, efficient and navigable marine
transportation system;
maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids;
monitoring marine traffic through vessel traffic service centers.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Ice operations;
Activities and functions of each program: Conducting polar operations
to facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support
of scientific and national security activity;
conducting domestic icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round
commerce;
conducting international ice operations to track icebergs below the
48th north latitude.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Marine
environmental protection;
Activities and functions of each program: Preventing and responding to
marine oil and chemical spills;
preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage in United States
waters;
preventing biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species.
Mission and program; Non-homeland security mission; Marine safety;
Activities and functions of each program: Setting standards and
conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers
and crew aboard commercial vessels, cruise ships, ferries, and other
passenger vessels;
partnering with states and boating safety organizations to reduce
recreational boating deaths.
Source: Coast Guard.
[A] In previous GAO work, these programs were identified as non-
homeland security missions. However, with the implementation of the
Homeland Security Act, the Coast Guard considers these programs to be
under its homeland security mission. Prior to the passage of the act,
the Coast Guard did not categorize its programs into non-homeland
security and homeland security missions.
[B] Foreign fish enforcement is a key subset of the Coast Guard's other
law enforcement program. For the purposes of this report, we consider
only the resource hours and performance results associated with the
foreign fish aspect of the other law enforcement program. We
subsequently refer to this program as foreign fish enforcement.
[End of table]
To achieve its wide range of responsibilities, the Coast Guard is
organized into two major commands that are responsible for its overall
mission performance--one in the Pacific Ocean area and the other in the
Atlantic area, including the Gulf of Mexico region. These commands are
divided into nine districts, which in turn are organized into a number
of groups, marine safety offices, and air stations.[Footnote 9] Groups
provide more localized command and control of field units and
resources, such as multi mission stations, and patrol boats. Marine
safety offices are located at coastal ports and on inland waterways,
and are responsible for the overall safety and security of maritime
activities and for environmental protection in their geographic areas.
Air stations conduct search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental
response, ice, and defense operations.[Footnote 10]
The Coast Guard has systems in place to track its resource hours and
performance results for each of its program areas. Resource
hours,[Footnote 11] which are accumulated and reported by quarter,
represent the time spent by the Coast Guard's major assets--ships,
boats, and aircraft (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft)--conducting
its programs. The Coast Guard measures its performance, that is, what
these resource hours and its personnel hours accomplish, using a set of
performance measures developed in accordance with the Government
Performance and Results Act. The Coast Guard uses these performance
measures and their corresponding goals to annually track the agency's
progress in attaining its strategic goals.
Generally, Resource Hours Devoted to Homeland Security Programs Have
Increased Substantially, while Hours for Other Programs Have Decreased:
Total Coast Guard resource hours devoted to its various programs have
substantially increased since the terrorist attacks, and a major
redistribution of these hours has also occurred, as many hours shifted
from non-homeland security programs to homeland security programs.
Total Coast Guard resource hours (for boats, ships, and aircraft
devoted to all programs) increased by 39 percent from a level of about
534,000 resource hours prior to the terrorist attacks to about 741,000
hours by the end of fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 12] Coast Guard
officials told us that the addition of more ships, boats, and personnel
contributed to the overall increase in resource hours. In particular,
one official noted the acquisition of smaller boats as being a
contributor to the increase in ports, waterways, and coastal security
hours in fiscal year 2003.
As figure 1 shows, homeland security resource hours accounted for all
of the increase, while total hours for non-homeland security programs
decreased.
Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
On a program-by-program basis, there is a marked difference in the
degree to which resource levels rose or declined. (See fig. 2.) Of the
various programs, the ports, waterways, and coastal security program
saw by far the largest increase, over 1,200 percent. Before the
September 11 attacks, this program was a small component of the Coast
Guard, with a baseline level of slightly more than 19,000 hours--less
than 4 percent of the Coast Guard's overall resource hours.[Footnote
13] By the end of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard had expended nearly
255,000 resource hours on this mission, representing about 34 percent
of total resource hours. By contrast, resource hours spent during the
same period on the illegal drug interdiction program declined from
slightly less than 123,000 hours to just under 70,000 hours, a decrease
of 44 percent. (See appendix II for the program-by-program trends by
year.):
Figure 2: Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-
September 11 Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Coast Guard officials cited a number of factors that contributed to the
actual resource hours expended for its programs each year. One key
factor, noted by several officials, is the impact of unplanned events
on planned resource hours. For instance, although the agency may have
planned to spend resource hours in a certain way at the beginning of a
fiscal year, the actual resource hours expended often reflected the
unexpected circumstances or events to which the Coast Guard had to
react in that year. For example, when the nation shifts to an orange,
or high-alert, status,[Footnote 14] the Coast Guard concentrates more
of its resources on security-related activities than initially planned.
Severe weather, such as hurricanes, can also cause shifts away from
planned resource use to spending time repositioning navigation markers
that shift from their proper locations as a result of storms. The war
in Iraq is another example of where resource hours shifted from planned
usage when the Coast Guard deployed assets--11 ships, 24 boats, 2
aircraft, and 1,195 personnel in all--to the Persian Gulf; yet when the
fiscal year 2003 budget was developed, the Coast Guard had anticipated
using these assets for other programs.
The Coast Guard's Commandant noted that reductions in resource hours
did not necessarily reflect changes in the agency's program emphasis.
For example, while resource hours devoted to the search and rescue
program declined, this program remained a top agency priority. Coast
Guard officials suggested that the decline in resource hours for this
program was due to three key factors. First, search and rescue is
largely demand driven, and as a result, its hours largely reflect the
number of incidents referred to the Coast Guard for action. The Coast
Guard received fewer distress calls; therefore, resource hours
decreased. Second, Successful preventive efforts such as fishing vessel
safety examinations and boating safety classes may have prevented
mariners from getting into distress--again, resulting in fewer distress
calls to the Coast Guard. Third, Coast Guard boats were more frequently
on security patrols, and as a result, these boats were sometimes closer
to the search and rescue incident and thus could respond more quickly.
Performance Results Remained Largely Unchanged or Improved for the
Eight Programs We Assessed:
For the period we examined, the Coast Guard's performance results for
the eight programs we reviewed remained either largely unchanged or
improved. In addition, in fiscal year 2003, most of the programs also
met their pre-established performance targets.[Footnote 15] Still, some
caution is needed in interpreting the Coast Guard's performance results
because of limitations in some of the performance measures.
All Assessed Programs Had Stable or Improved Performance Results:
Of the eight programs we reviewed for performance,[Footnote 16] four
showed relatively stable performance results, although some minor
fluctuations existed. For example, one of the stable programs, search
and rescue, which measures its results as the percentage of lives saved
each year, varied only a few percentage points from a low of 84.2
percent in fiscal year 2001 to a high of 87.7 percent in fiscal year
2003. Three programs (foreign fish enforcement, aids to navigation, and
defense readiness), demonstrated improved results when comparing fiscal
year 2001 and fiscal year 2003, although their results fluctuated a
little within this period.[Footnote 17] We were unable to assess the
results of the remaining program--illegal drug interdiction--because
its performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not yet available at
the time we did our analysis. (See table 2.) Appendix III provides a
detailed summary of the performance results for all programs.
Table 2: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2001 through
Fiscal Year 2003:
Program: Stable results;
Undocumented migrant interdiction;
Performance measure: Percentage of interdicted illegal migrants
entering the United States through maritime means;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 82.5%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 88.3%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 85.3%.
Program: Stable results;
Ice operations;
Performance measure: Number of waterway closure days;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 7;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 7;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 7.
Program: Stable results;
Living marine resources;
Performance measure: Percentage of fishermen found in compliance with
regulations;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 98.6%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 97.3%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 97.1%.
Program: Stable results;
Search and rescue;
Performance measure: Percentage of distressed mariners' lives saved;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 84.2%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 84.4%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 87.7%.
Program: Improving results;
Foreign fish enforcement;
Performance measure: Number of detected Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)[A] incursions by foreign fishing vessels;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 219;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 250;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 153.
Program: Improving results;
Aids to navigation;
Performance measure: Number of collisions, allisions,[B] and
groundings;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 1,677;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 1,936;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 1,523.
Program: Improving results;
Defense readiness;
Performance measure: Percentage of time units meet combat readiness
status at C-2 level[C];
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 67%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 70%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: 78%.
Program: Pending results;
Illegal drug interdiction;
Performance measure: Percentage of cocaine seized out of total
estimated cocaine entering the United States through maritime means[D];
Performance results by fiscal year: 2001: 11.7%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2002: 10.6%;
Performance results by fiscal year: 2003: NA[E].
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.
[A] The EEZ is defined by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act as an area within 200 miles of U.S.
shores in which U.S. citizens have primary harvesting rights to fish
stocks.
[B] The Coast Guard defines an "allision" as a vessel collision with a
fixed object.
[C] According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as
the level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.
[D] The illegal drug interdiction performance measure only includes
cocaine as cocaine has an analyzed flow rate, and it constitutes the
preponderance of illegal drugs entering the United States through
maritime means (that is, cocaine shipments are measured in tons while
heroin, marijuana, and other illegal drugs are measured in pounds).
[E] The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year
2003 will not be calculated until the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement (IACM) publishes its flow rate in spring of 2004.
[End of table]
Most Assessed Programs Also Met Their Performance Targets:
Another way that the Coast Guard assesses its performance is by
determining whether programs have achieved their performance targets
each year. These targets--which represent the goals that the programs
aim to achieve each year--were met in fiscal year 2003 by five of the
eight programs we reviewed.[Footnote 18] (See table 3.) Two of the
programs that did not meet their performance targets were defense
readiness and undocumented migrant interdiction. Coast Guard officials
reported that the defense readiness program did not meet its target, in
part, because of equipment problems associated with operating aging
ships, and unit training deficiencies, such as cutters not having
sufficient training time to perform gunnery exercises.[Footnote 19] As
for the undocumented migrant interdiction program, Coast Guard
officials reported that they consider their results to be a minimal
decline in light of the substantial increase in the number of migrants
they successfully interdicted during the year.[Footnote 20] For
example, of the key migrant populations tracked by the Coast Guard,
about 5,300 illegal migrants were interdicted in fiscal year 2003
compared with about 2,400 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of 120
percent.[Footnote 21] We could not determine whether the remaining
program, illegal drug interdiction, met its performance target because
the performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not yet available at
the time we conducted our work. (See app. III for a detailed summary of
the performance targets and results for all programs.):
Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for Fiscal Year 2003:
Program: Undocumented migrant interdiction;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Interdict or deter at least 87
percent of illegal migrants entering the United States through maritime
means;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 85.3%;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: No.
Program: Illegal drug interdiction;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Seize 20.7 percent or more of
cocaine entering the United States through maritime means;
Fiscal year 2003 result: To be determined[A];
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: To be determined[A].
Program: Ice operations;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Limit waterway closures to 8 days
during severe winters;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 7 days;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: Yes.
Program: Living marine resources;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Raise percentage of fishermen
found in compliance with regulations to 97 percent or above;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 97.1%;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: Yes.
Program: Search and rescue;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Save at least 85 percent of all
mariners in distress;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 87.7%;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: Yes.
Program: Foreign fish enforcement;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Reduce number of detected EEZ
incursions by foreign fishing vessels to 202 or less;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 153 incursions;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: Yes.
Program: Aids to navigation;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Reduce five-year average of
collisions, allisions, and groundings (CAGs) to 2,010 or less;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 1,523 CAGs;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: Yes.
Program: Defense readiness;
Fiscal year 2003 performance targets: Maintain an overall combat
readiness status at C-2 level or better for 100 percent of assets;
Fiscal year 2003 result: 78%;
Target met in fiscal year 2003?: No.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.
[A] The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year
2003 will not be available until spring of 2004.
[End of table]
Continuing Efforts Are Under Way to Strengthen Performance Measures:
While the Coast Guard has been recognized in the past for its
performance measurement efforts,[Footnote 22] Coast Guard officials
also recognize that, as is true for all organizations, continual
improvements are needed in their measures, and they are working toward
these enhancements. And while the Coast Guard's performance for the
majority of its programs was favorable in fiscal year 2003, there are
reasons to be cautious in interpreting these results. That is, Coast
Guard officials acknowledged that limitations exist in the measures and
efforts are under way to improve their clarity and
objectivity.[Footnote 23] Coast Guard officials provided the following
illustrative examples:
* Some measures do not currently distinguish among critical factors--
such as how certain items are weighted--within the measure. For
example, Coast Guard officials stated that the foreign fish enforcement
performance measure--which counts the number of times foreign fishing
vessels are identified as illegally entering into the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)--does not distinguish the severity of
each entry. As a result, a single fisherman in a small boat catching a
few fish in the Western Pacific is weighted equally with a large
foreign trawler in Alaskan waters that is harvesting fish by the tons.
Each of these events would be counted as one incursion even though
their impact could be significantly different. The Coast Guard is
currently reevaluating the Fisheries Enforcement Strategic Plan to
address this issue.
* Some measures are affected by fluctuations in demand; thus, the
results may not directly reflect agency efforts. For example, the
foreign fish enforcement performance measure--which counts the number
of EEZ incursions by foreign fishing vessels--can be affected by
oceanic and climatic shifts that can cause significant fluctuations in
the migratory patterns of fish. As a result, EEZ encroachments could
increase (or decrease) as fishermen follow their intended catch across
EEZ boundaries (or stay within their own territories), depending on
where the fish are located. According to Coast Guard officials, this
type of migratory factor can influence the number of encroachments in a
given year, and they are reviewing issues such as these to refine the
measure. They plan to have a revised target in early 2004.
* Coast Guard officials reported that some measures might have
inaccurate estimates that affect the quality of the measure. For
example, the undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure
contains estimated information, such as the number of illegal migrants
entering the United States.[Footnote 24] As a result, the Coast Guard
reported that the estimated number of potential migrants, which is a
key part of this performance measure, might contain significant error.
Coast Guard officials explained that they are working to strengthen
this measure, in part through an external program evaluation that will
be completed by the summer of 2004. At this time, however, they believe
their current measure is the best available.
* Some performance measures rely on the Coast Guard's presence or
direct observation of events. A change in Coast Guard presence could
skew results for these indicators. For example, an increased Coast
Guard presence in a fishing area could result in more incursions being
observed, and a decreased presence could result in fewer observations.
To the extent such factors come into play, the results may be
inaccurate. For example, the number of incursions might not have
increased or decreased, but instead the Coast Guard simply had greater
or lesser ability to identify them. The Coast Guard has acknowledged
that some of its measures are subject to these weaknesses and directed
its field personnel to be mindful of these issues in its planning
guidance.
One measure--for illegal drug interdiction--was recently refined and
illustrates how the Coast Guard can improve upon and incorporate better
performance measures into this refinement process. The illegal drug
interdiction performance measure was recently reevaluated because the
former measure--cocaine seizure rates--did not adequately account for
cocaine thrown overboard or destroyed by smugglers. Consequently, the
Coast Guard changed its illegal drug interdiction performance measure
for fiscal year 2004 to measure the cocaine removal rate--a measure
that includes not only the cocaine seized but also cocaine that was
jettisoned or lost. Coast Guard officials stated that the new measure,
which encompasses both the cocaine lost to the smuggler (through
seizures, jettison, burning, and other non-recoverable events) as well
as the cocaine seized, will more accurately reflect the Coast Guard's
counterdrug efforts and results.
More Systematic Understanding of Resource Usage and Performance Results
Is Important for Management and Accountability:
While resource hours changed substantially for some programs between
fiscal years 2001 and 2003, their corresponding performance results did
not necessarily reflect the direction of these changes. In particular,
performance remained stable for four programs even though resources
increased for two and decreased for the other two. This suggests that
performance results were likely affected by factors other than usage of
these resources. One set of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as
helping to keep performance steady in some programs despite decreases
in resources, involves strategies such as using new technology, better
tactics and operations, and stronger partnering with other agencies.
Coast Guard officials also pointed to a set of other factors, often
called externalities, which are largely beyond its control but have the
ability to negatively affect performance results despite resource
increases. For the Coast Guard, such externalities include such
developments as an increase in the number of immigrants seeking to
enter the country by sea and unpredictable or severe weather
conditions. The Coast Guard has a variety of initiatives under way to
better measure resource usage and manage program results. However, many
of these initiatives are still in early stages of development and some
do not have a time frame for their completion. In addition, the Coast
Guard does not have a systematic framework that would allow it to
better understand how the various factors are affecting the link
between resources and performance. As we have reported in the past,
agencies that understand the linkage between expended resources and
performance results are better able to allocate and manage their
resources effectively.
Coast Guard Officials Cite Various Factors Affecting Consistency
between Expended Resources and Results Achieved:
For most of the Coast Guard programs we reviewed, there was no clear
relationship between the change in resource hours from pre-September 11
levels to fiscal year 2003 levels and the performance results reported
for the program between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. One might expect
that a significant change in resource hours over time would result in a
corresponding change in performance results. However, for most of the
seven programs we reviewed with complete performance results in fiscal
year 2003, this was not the case.[Footnote 25] For example, the four
programs with stable performance results were evenly divided--two
(undocumented migrant interdiction and ice operations) had increased
resource hours of at least 44 percent, and two (living marine resources
and search and rescue) had decreased resource hours of at least 22
percent. Similarly, of the remaining three programs, two (foreign fish
enforcement and aids to navigation) had improved results despite
decreases in their resource hours. The only program with consistent
direction of movement between its resource hours and performance
results was the defense readiness program, which had improved results
and a 518 percent resource hour increase.
Coast Guard officials acknowledged the apparent disconnect between
resource hours expended and performance results achieved and offered
two types of explanations for it. The first involved operational
efficiencies--strategies that essentially allowed the Coast Guard to
accomplish the same or greater results with fewer resources. These
efficiencies were of four main types--improved technology, improved
tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence. A limited
sample of these efficiencies, described by Coast Guard officials during
our visits to Coast Guard districts, is highlighted in table 4, and
additional efficiencies are discussed in more detail in appendix IV.
Many of these efficiencies stemmed from internal changes within the
Coast Guard, such as using new equipment, a different procedure, or a
new organizational alignment to do a task more quickly. However, some
of the efficiencies, particularly those related to partnerships,
involved the use of non-Coast Guard resources as well.
Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies Cited by Coast
Guard Officials:
Improved technology: New ships. The recapitalization of the buoy tender
fleet offers a number of improvements, including greater transit speed,
reducing travel time and allowing more work to be done in a day; a
larger buoy deck, allowing the completion of more work during a single
deployment and fewer trips back to base; and improved navigation
systems, enabling safer navigation with fewer people.
Improved technology: Different lighting for navigation aids. In its
aids to navigation program and in other aspects of its operations, the
Coast Guard now uses lanterns with light emitting diodes (LEDs). Using
LEDs results in fewer and quicker service visits, freeing time for
other work.
Improved technology: Improved data-monitoring system. Coast Guard
officials stated that the National Marine Fisheries Service's Vessel
Monitoring System (VMS) helped to improve their operational efficiency
in protecting United States fisheries. The Coast Guard leveraged this
technology-- which monitors fishing vessel information such as the
vessel's name, catch data, and location--and used it in conjunction
with industry intelligence and efforts to work more closely with
federal and state enforcement partners. Although not yet fully
operational, according to the Coast Guard, the system was responsible
for 7 of the 97 significant violations detected in fiscal year 2003.
Improved tactics; Use of armed helicopters. The Coast Guard reported
that the Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) provides
personnel, training, and resources necessary to employ armed
helicopters in support of counter drug operations. Prior to November
2002, the Coast Guard used two armed helicopters simultaneously with
two cutters when responding to drug interdiction operations. The Coast
Guard has since changed its tactics to use one HITRON with one cutter
per operation and has seen no degradation in the effectiveness of this
drug interdiction tactic.
Improved tactics; Use of helicopters for at-sea boardings. One Coast
Guard district identified a procedure whereby it uses helicopters
rather than ships to conduct at-sea boardings of vessels of interest
bound for United States ports. Doing so allows Coast Guard boarding
personnel to reach their destination more quickly--for example, in 30
minutes rather than 2 or 3 hours. The time that the helicopters are in
use is incorporated into the mandatory training schedule, resulting in
no additional usage of air resources and a decrease in ship hours for
this purpose.
Stronger partnerships; Interagency flight schedules. In Miami, the
Coast Guard and another Department of Homeland Security agency, the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement office have developed a combined
flight schedule to integrate patrol schedules and assets, which has led
to less overlap in response efforts, saving time and resources for both
agencies.
Stronger partnerships; Coast Guard/police department partnership. The
Coast Guard and the New York Police Department (NYPD) have a formalized
partnership, and officials of the two organizations communicate several
times daily on a variety of topics. They also often participate in
joint training and first responder exercises. This partnership with
NYPD adds significant communication and intelligence networks as well
as a large number of additional assets to the Coast Guard's
capabilities in New York.
Improved intelligence; Intelligence-sharing arrangements. In 2001, the
Coast Guard joined the United States Intelligence Community, a
federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work
separately and together in intelligence-gathering activities. According
to Coast Guard officials, this step greatly enhances the agency's
access to information.
Improved intelligence; New intelligence centers. Created in 2003, one
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center is located on each coast. These
centers increase collection and analytical capabilities, enhancing the
Coast Guard's ability to fuse intelligence from various sources and
improving the timeliness and quality of theater-level intelligence
support to Coast Guard operational forces.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
The second type of explanation provided by Coast Guard officials
involved externalities--events or developments that were largely beyond
the Coast Guard's control but had an influence on the amount of work
the Coast Guard had to confront. In fiscal year 2003, these factors
included such things as "surge" demands, related to the Iraq War; a
large increase in the number of undocumented migrants attempting to
enter the United States by maritime routes, and poor weather conditions
that increased icebreaking needs. According to Coast Guard officials,
these externalities had a negative effect on performance results--that
is, they made it more difficult for the Coast Guard to meet its goals,
even when more resources were added. In the case of ice operations,
because the Great Lakes region had one of the most "severe" winters it
has experienced in the past 50 years and unpredicted amounts of ice
formed ahead of forecasted dates, icebreaking needs in this region were
higher than normal in fiscal year 2003. Despite this, the Coast Guard
was still able to meet its performance goal in fiscal year 2003.
However, according to Coast Guard officials, externalities were a
factor in not meeting its goal for undocumented migrant interdiction
because of the very large increase in illegal immigrants seeking to
enter the United States by sea during fiscal year 2003.
Coast Guard Lacks Clear Understanding of Extent to Which These Factors
Affect Results:
While the factors cited by the Coast Guard likely have an effect on
mission performance, the extent of that effect is largely unknown. Our
site visits suggested that the efficiency factors cited by Coast Guard
officials likely had positive effects on the agency's performance by
improving its effectiveness and productivity. For example, Coast Guard
officials acknowledge that local authorities such as police and fire
departments have assumed some of the Coast Guard's search and rescue
workload. Likewise, our site visits suggested that the various
externalities cited by Coast Guard officials could have negatively
affected the performance of some missions as well. For example, as
noted, the Coast Guard did not meet its undocumented migrant
interdiction program's fiscal year 2003 performance target of
interdicting or deterring 87 percent of the illegal migrants entering
the United States by sea. Coast Guard officials identified the
significant increase in migrants attempting to enter the United States
in fiscal year 2003 (an externality that the Coast Guard has no control
over) as one factor that contributed to the program missing its goal.
However, the Coast Guard does not have a mechanism in place to
systematically determine the extent to which either of these factors
affects performance. For instance, it does not have data on the search
and rescue cases handled by local responders and, therefore, is unable
to determine the extent to which this assistance has reduced the
workloads of small boat stations.
Accounting for the effects of such factors can be a difficult task. In
past work, we have examined the efforts of a number of agencies to
understand and assess the many factors that influence their performance
results as a basis for better allocating and managing their
resources.[Footnote 26] Like the Coast Guard, other federal agencies
face the challenge of having limited control over the achievement of
their intended objectives. In past work, we have found that when
various federal agencies attempted to assess performance, their
greatest challenge in the analysis and reporting stage of the
performance review process was separating a program's impact on its
objectives from the impact of external factors, primarily because the
program's objectives were the result of complex systems or phenomena
outside the program's control. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Coast Guard would have difficulty in attempting to account more
precisely for the effects of these various factors, both internal and
external.
Our reviews of various efforts to address these analytic challenges
showed that agencies employed a wide range of strategies to respond to
them. For example, some broke out data on subgroups or made statistical
adjustments to attempt to reduce the influence of external factors on
their measures. While there is no simple or standard approach, best
practices suggest that managers should stay alert to the many factors-
-both inside and outside their organizations--that can influence their
ability to achieve their goals. The successful organizations we studied
tracked and monitored their internal and external environments
continuously and systematically. By building environmental assessment
into the strategic planning process, organizations can stay focused on
their long-term goals even as they make changes in the way they intend
to achieve them. An ability to understand the effects of these various
factors is also important in helping Coast Guard managers and the
Congress make informed decisions about resource needs.
The Coast Guard's ability to evaluate its resource needs is also
affected by the lack of data about resource usage in two of its
programs--marine safety and marine environmental protection. While the
Coast Guard collects some resource hour data for these programs, the
vast majority of time dedicated to these two programs is not captured
because these are people-intensive rather than asset-intensive
programs, and the Coast Guard lacks a data collection mechanism for
capturing these hours. More specifically, these programs may involve
Coast Guard personnel conducting a facility inspection or responding to
an oil spill in a marina--activities that often do not involve using
Coast Guard ships, boats or aircraft. This "information deficit" became
particularly significant after September 11 when the Coast Guard
undertook significant additional port security responsibilities under
the ports, waterways, and coastal security program. Coast Guard
officials have acknowledged that resource hour shifts occurred from the
marine safety and marine environmental programs to the ports,
waterways, and coastal security program. However, they are generally
unable to estimate the total effort dedicated to these programs or
determine the level of resources the agency is likely to need to
maintain program performance levels. In addition, to help meet its new
responsibilities in the ports, waterways, and coastal security program,
the Coast Guard issued guidance to its field units authorizing the
suspension of certain marine safety and marine environmental protection
program requirements. For example, Coast Guard units were given the
flexibility to not perform lower-priority vessel boardings and to
reduce the frequency of certain vessel inspections. They were also
directed to leverage state and local agencies to respond to small
spills to the maximum extent possible. While the guidance indicates
that the marine safety office personnel should use risk-based decision
making in implementing these types of measures, and negative impacts
from these actions have not yet become evident, the potential effects
of such reductions on future program performance could become a
concern.
Coast Guard Has Started Efforts to Better Understand Effects of
Internal and External Factors, but Impact Is Uncertain:
Coast Guard officials agreed there is value in taking a more systematic
approach to assessing performance, including better understanding of
the effects of internal and external factors that affect their
performance. As a result, the agency has begun a number of steps
directed at improving various aspects of performance assessment. Many
of these steps are still in their early stages, and while they
represent a good beginning, it is not yet clear when they will be
completed and whether they will tie together to address the weaknesses
we have identified.
One step the Coast Guard has begun involves addressing the information
gaps that currently exist regarding resource usage in the marine safety
office programs, but the time frame for completing these projects is
unknown. Specific actions under way that are expected to improve
information about the level of Coast Guard personnel hours dedicated to
various programs include measuring the personnel overtime hours for
certain programs, and a survey of Coast Guard units to assess how
personnel hours were reallocated within the programs after September
11. In addition to making these efforts, the Coast Guard also recently
estimated the marine safety office personnel hours it believes will be
necessary to implement its new port security responsibilities--a
positive step toward determining what its resource needs are likely to
be in order to successfully implement these requirements.[Footnote 27]
The Coast Guard has also begun a broader effort to develop a system for
tracking personnel hours at marine safety offices and related units.
Development of this system is currently in a pilot stage, and Coast
Guard officials did not know when it might be implemented Coast Guard-
wide. As a result, the Coast Guard currently remains unable to account
for the vast majority of the hours dedicated to two programs--marine
safety and marine environmental protection, and this is a concern
considering that together these programs account for 11 percent of the
fiscal year 2004 enacted operating budget.
In addition to obtaining a better understanding of how resources are
used to produce results, the Coast Guard has also made some program-
specific efforts to better manage and allocate resources. In the
illegal drug interdiction program, the Coast Guard has taken steps to
better quantify the effect of specific operational strategies on
performance results. By examining successful drug seizures, the Coast
Guard has been able to determine how it is getting the most results.
For example:
* Stationing Coast Guard personnel aboard Navy ships. According to
Coast Guard officials, certain Coast Guard law enforcement units
operating aboard navy ships (including those from the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium) were responsible for
58 percent of the Coast Guard's cocaine seizures in fiscal year 2003.
* Using armed instead of unarmed helicopters. Use of armed helicopters
was deemed an effective approach for the drug interdiction program, as
Coast Guard officials determined that these helicopters could more
effectively deter drug smugglers from escaping. According to the Coast
Guard, this strategy accounted for 34 percent of cocaine seizures in
fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 28]
These specific efforts are noteworthy, but there is no indication that
efforts such as these are occurring across the broad range of Coast
Guard missions. Coast Guard officials were unable to identify similar
actions across all programs to quantify operational strategies and
establish more systematic linkages between resources expended and
performance achieved.
Separate from these program-specific efforts, the Coast Guard is
beginning an agency-wide strategic planning effort to better assess
linkages between the agency's strategic goals and mission programs and
the agency's overall strategic intent. Specific actions involve data
collection and development of analytical models and decision support
systems. Table 5 shows some of the specific actions. If properly
designed and implemented, such actions should help the Coast Guard with
its long-term strategic planning and its ability to make connections
between the agency's resources and performance. Again, however, whether
these efforts will address the weaknesses we identified or result in
reliable means to link resources expended with performance achieved is
unknown, since most of the efforts have just begun or are in progress.
Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to Improve Linkages
between Resources and Performance Results:
Mission cost model: Readiness management system; Designed to capture
mission operating costs on a program-by-program basis, this model
allows the Coast Guard to calculate the operating expenses (including
the direct costs, support costs, and overhead costs) associated with
each program.: This Coast Guard-wide system, currently under
development, is designed to assess the agency's ability to respond to
mission requirements in accordance with standards. This system will
assess six facets of readiness: people, training, equipment, supplies,
infrastructure, and information.
Mission cost model: Analysis of long-term strategic planning needs;
Designed to capture mission operating costs on a program-by-program
basis, this model allows the Coast Guard to calculate the operating
expenses (including the direct costs, support costs, and overhead
costs) associated with each program.: The Coast Guard is using a
"scenario planning" approach to analyze its future long-term strategic
planning needs. Called Project Evergreen, it involves developing
"alternative future world scenarios," developing strategies for
addressing these future scenarios, and determining potential resource
needs.
Mission cost model: Model for examining maritime operations; Designed
to capture mission operating costs on a program-by-program basis, this
model allows the Coast Guard to calculate the operating expenses
(including the direct costs, support costs, and overhead costs)
associated with each program.: This computer model was designed to help
the Coast Guard address the complexities of the deepwater maritime
environment as the agency assessed its core needs for the Integrated
Deepwater System, a 30-year, $17 billion acquisition program. It
simulates the core functions of the Coast Guard's maritime operations,
analyzes alternative approaches, and projects performance results
derived from adding and subtracting different asset combinations from
its vessel and aircraft fleets.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
In discussions with us, the Coast Guard has not clearly articulated a
strategy for how these various efforts will weave together. However,
Coast Guard officials told us that more information regarding these
efforts will be included in the agency's strategic blueprint.
Conclusions:
The Coast Guard, like other federal agencies, needs to continue
transforming itself into a more efficient, results-oriented
organization if it is to meet the many fiscal, management, and policy
challenges it is likely to face. At present, the Coast Guard lacks a
systematic approach for explaining the relationship between its
expenditure of resources and its performance results, limiting its
ability to critically examine its resource needs and prioritize program
efforts. Its new steps to improve the tracking of resource usage and
assessment of external factors that may also have a bearing on its
ability to meet performance goals are laudable, though it is still too
early to determine the effect they will have. However, there is
currently no assurance that such efforts will give the Coast Guard a
systematic means to effectively understand and link resources expended
with performance achieved. Without a clear understanding of this
linkage or a time frame to ensure that it gets completed, the agency is
at risk of misdirecting resources and missing further opportunities to
increase productivity and efficiency to ensure the best use of its
funds.
In our view, the Coast Guard needs to be clearer about two matters: how
soon it will be able to have comprehensive program-by-program data
about how its personnel spend their time, and how the many actions
under way in its agency-wide strategic planning effort can collectively
be used to establish clearer links between resources and performance.
With regard to the first point, the Coast Guard's project for tracking
personnel time is currently in the pilot stage and has no time frame
for completion. With regard to the second point, the agency's strategic
blueprint, which is a likely place for explaining how the Coast Guard
will go about analyzing the relationship between resources and results,
is still in development. Action on both fronts is necessary to provide
information that allows the Coast Guard to manage more effectively and
the Congress to balance the Coast Guard's resource needs against those
of other agencies and programs at a time when our nation's financial
condition and fiscal outlook are sobering.
Recommendations:
To provide the Coast Guard and the Congress with critical information
necessary for an efficient and effective allocation of resources, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant
of the Coast Guard to:
* develop a time frame for expeditiously proceeding with plans for
implementing a system that will accurately account for resources
expended in each of its program areas, and:
* ensure that the Coast Guard's strategic planning process and its
associated documents include a strategy for (1) identifying intervening
factors that may affect program performance and (2) systematically
assessing the relationship between these factors, resources used, and
results achieved.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Coast
Guard generally agreed with the facts and recommendations presented in
the report. Coast Guard officials provided a number of technical
clarifications, which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of our
report. Neither the Department of Homeland Security nor the Coast Guard
took a formal position on GAO's recommendations. In its response, the
Coast Guard raised two points that merit specific responses. The Coast
Guard believes that early in the report, GAO does not fully consider
the changing environment in which the Coast Guard operates, and how
this affects the resources used and results achieved. We believe that
we addressed this issue fully later on in the report where we outline a
number of intervening factors and externalities that could have
affected the agency's performance results. In addition, although the
Coast Guard generally agreed with our recommendations, the agency
believes that its multimission nature poses a higher degree of
difficulty for the agency to implement these recommendations. We
recognize this added challenge, but we do not believe that it mitigates
the Coast Guard's responsibility to take these steps.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report
to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (415) 904-2200. Other contacts and acknowledgments are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Margaret T. Wrightson:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To determine the trends in resource hours for each Coast Guard program
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, we reviewed our previous
report and resource hour data from the Coast Guard's Abstract of
Operations (AOPS), and the Coast Guard's Aviation Logistics and
Maintenance Information System (ALMIS). The resource hour data,
reported by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours
that these assets spent in each of the Coast Guard's program areas. We
analyzed resource hour data from fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. We
then compared the fiscal year 2003 data with a pre-September 11
resource hour baseline level developed by the Coast Guard. This
baseline is calculated by determining the average of the eight quarters
of resource hour data from fiscal year 1999 quarter 4 through fiscal
year 2001 quarter 3 and then multiplying this quarterly average by four
to obtain a full year's average. We recognize that there is an overlap
between the pre-September 11 baseline data and some of the fiscal year
2001 data. However, because the comparisons we made were between the
baseline and fiscal year 2003 data we were not concerned that this
overlap would affect our results or our ability to meet our objectives.
To determine the reliability of the data, we (1) reviewed existing
documentation about the data and the systems that produced them, and
(2) interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the
data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
However, we did not analyze resource hour data for the marine
environmental protection, marine safety, or the other law enforcement
programs. We did not analyze the resource hour data for marine safety
and marine environmental protection programs because these programs are
largely carried out without using Coast Guard assets, and thus the vast
majority of effort related to these programs is not captured in AOPS or
ALMIS. And furthermore, there are no data available that would allow us
to make similar comparisons in the levels of effort for these programs.
In addition, the Coast Guard reported that a surge in resource hours
for the other law enforcement program (hours that were not related to
foreign fish enforcement), was the result of a misinterpretation of
port security activities, and as a result, we did not analyze changes
in hours specifically related to the other law enforcement program.
We reviewed the resource hour data for the remaining programs--search
and rescue; aids to navigation; defense readiness; foreign fish
enforcement; ice operations; illegal drug interdiction; living marine
resources; undocumented migrant interdiction; and ports, waterways, and
coastal security--to identify how resources were utilized across
programs both before and after September 11. In addition, we also spoke
with officials at Coast Guard headquarters and at the Atlantic Area
Command in Portsmouth, Virginia, and in various Coast Guard district
offices and operational units in Boston, Portsmouth, Miami, New
Orleans, and Seattle, as well as personnel at operational units under
these district commands.
To identify changes in performance results compared with increases or
decreases in resource hours, we analyzed the Coast Guard's Periodic
Table of Program Performance as well as its 2003 Performance Report. We
assessed the reliability of the performance data by reviewing existing
documentation about the data and the systems that produced them, and we
interviewed knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We reviewed the performance data to determine how performance changed
between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. We also interviewed Coast Guard
officials within the Coast Guard's Office of Plans, Policy, and
Evaluation and program officials in all 11 of the Coast Guard's
programs. We also reviewed incomplete drafts of the Coast Guard's
Strategic Blueprint.
To identify the Coast Guard's efforts to utilize intelligence,
technology, tactics, and partnerships to enhance mission effectiveness,
we reviewed our previous reports, and Congressional Research Service
reports. In addition, we discussed efforts in utilizing intelligence
and technology, developing partnerships, and employing new tactics at
Coast Guard headquarters and district offices that we visited, as well
as at local Coast Guard units under these districts' commands. We also
reviewed Coast Guard mission planning guidance and the Coast Guard's
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.
We conducted our work between June 2003 and March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours:
This appendix shows, for the nine Coast Guard programs with measurable
resource hours, the trend in these hours from the Coast Guard's pre-
September 11 baseline through fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In
all, four of the nine programs saw resource hours increase, four saw
declines, and one remained essentially the same.
Programs with Increasing Resource Hours:
Homeland security programs such as ports, waterways, and coastal
security; undocumented migrant interdiction; and defense
readiness[Footnote 29] were the primary beneficiaries of the growing
Coast Guard resource hours. One non-homeland security program, ice
operations, also experienced an increase in resource hours. However,
compared with the other programs, this program accounted for relatively
few hours.
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security:
Prior to the events of September 11, the ports, waterways, and coastal
security program was relatively small, with few resource hours.
However, the program grew significantly after fiscal year 2001. (See
fig. 3.) The program surged from a pre-September 11 baseline of 19,291
resource hours to 254,640 resource hours in fiscal year 2003. A Coast
Guard official in Group Seattle attributed this substantial increase in
resource hours to the many additional homeland security activities it
was performing, including conducting port security patrols.
Figure 3: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction:
The undocumented migrant interdiction program's resource hours surged
significantly in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 4.) From its pre-September
11 baseline of 29,642 hours, undocumented migrant interdiction resource
hours declined to 21,836 hours in fiscal year 2001 and then grew to
53,559 hours in fiscal year 2003. A District 7 Coast Guard official
indicated that the additional hours resulted, in part, from increased
priority for this program because of a growing recognition that illegal
migrants successfully entering the United States were the equivalent of
a security breach. In addition, another District 7 Coast Guard official
also attributed the increase to the growing political instability in
the Caribbean, which increased the flow of migrants from that region.
Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Defense Readiness:
Defense readiness resource hours grew incrementally until fiscal year
2003 and then surged upward. The pre-September 11 baseline level of
about 6,000 hours accounted for 1 percent of total Coast Guard hours;
by fiscal year 2003, the number of hours had grown to nearly 40,000
hours, or about 5 percent of total hours. (See fig. 5.) The increased
hours were generally a result of 11 cutters and 24 boats being deployed
to Iraq, where they provided security for United States assets.
Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Ice Operations:
Ice operations is the one non-homeland security program with resource
hours that increased from its pre-September 11 baseline levels. Ice
operations resource hours increased from a pre-September 11 baseline of
11,935 hours to 17,217 hours by fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 6.) Coast
Guard officials told us that the icebreaker Healy became fully
operational in 2001 and that the addition of this asset contributed to
the increased icebreaking hours as well. Furthermore, according to the
Coast Guard, the weather conditions in fiscal year 2003 contributed to
the increased hours as icebreaking assets needed additional time to
address the more severe ice conditions. However, the increase in hours
was smaller, on both a percentage and an actual basis than the
increases for homeland security programs, and this program has
considerably fewer resource hours than most of the other Coast Guard
programs. In fiscal year 2003, the program accounted for about 2
percent of total Coast Guard resource hours.
Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Programs with Declining Resource Hours:
Resource hours for foreign fish enforcement, living marine resources,
illegal drug interdiction, and search and rescue have declined from
their pre-September 11 levels. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that
the continued emphasis on ports, waterways, and coastal security has
made it difficult for some programs to rebound to their pre-September
11 resource hour levels.
Foreign Fish Enforcement:
Resource hours for the foreign fish enforcement program remained below
their pre-September 11 baseline. From the baseline of about 8,000
hours, foreign fish enforcement hours declined to about 5,100 hours in
fiscal year 2001. By fiscal year 2003, the number of hours had
increased to approximately 6,700 hours, but this was still 16 percent
below the pre-September 11 baseline level. (See fig. 7.) Coast Guard
officials explained that the program is largely demand-driven, in that
the incentive for foreign fishermen to violate regulations is based on
such factors as weather, currents, market rates for fish, and where the
fish are located.
Figure 7: Foreign Fish Enforcement Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Living Marine Resources:
Living marine resources showed a similar decline in resource hours
between its pre-September 11 level and fiscal year 2003. Resource hours
declined from the pre-September 11 baseline of 91,255 to 67,576 in
fiscal year 2003--a 26 percent decline. (See fig. 8.) Coast Guard
officials said the early part of fiscal year 2003 was an unusually low
year for domestic fish; because of the harsh winter weather fishermen
did not venture out to fish. Coast Guard officials also said resource
hours in the program tended to decline when the security threat level
was raised, because boats, ships, and aircraft were reassigned to high
security risk areas.
Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Illegal Drug Interdiction:
The pre-September 11 baseline for illegal drug interdiction resource
hours totaled 122,694 but declined in fiscal year 2002 to 78,002 hours
and then to 69,268 hours in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 9.) Overall,
illegal drug interdiction resource hours declined 44 percent between
the baseline and fiscal year 2003. According to Coast Guard officials,
the illegal drug interdiction program continued to successfully seize
illegal drugs, despite the decrease in resource hours, in part because
improved intelligence allowed them to better target their drug
interdiction operations. Another factor that the Coast Guard believes
has contributed to their drug interdiction efforts is a 1997 bilateral
agreement with the government of Colombia that has improved cooperation
and resulted in additional seizures and information.
Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Search and Rescue:
The search and rescue program's resource hours also remain below pre-
September 11 levels. From its pre-September 11 baseline of 82,689
hours, search and rescue declined to 64,383 resource hours in fiscal
year 2003. (See fig. 10.) Coast Guard headquarters officials stated
that the drop in search and rescue hours after September 11 probably
resulted from increased security concerns that discouraged people from
boating and fewer boaters could have resulted in fewer distress calls-
-a reduced caseload for the Coast Guard. In addition, a Group Seattle
official believed that the group's prevention efforts and more frequent
security patrols may have contributed to a reduction in hours as well.
Figure 10: Search and Rescue Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Programs with Stable Resource Hours:
Only one Coast Guard program, aids to navigation, which is a non-
homeland security program, had stable resource hours between the pre-
September 11 baseline and fiscal year 2003.
Aids to Navigation:
From their pre-September 11 baseline of 112,148 hours, aids to
navigation resource hours rose to 127,827 hours in fiscal year 2001,
(an increase of 14 percent), and then declined to 110,456 hours in
fiscal year 2003, which was 2 percent below the pre-September 11 level.
(See fig. 11.) A Coast Guard official said the slight decline resulted
from the addition of more technologically advanced assets, which allow
the Coast Guard to achieve the same results in less time.
Figure 11: Aids to Navigation Resource Hours:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance
Measures:
To measure its accomplishments, the Coast Guard uses a set of
performance measures developed in accordance with the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA). GPRA is a key component of a
statutory framework that the Congress put in place during the 1990s to
promote a new focus on results.[Footnote 30] Finding that waste and
inefficiency in federal programs were undermining confidence in
government, the Congress sought to hold federal agencies accountable
for the results of federal spending through regular and systematic
performance planning, measurement, and reporting. With the
implementation of GPRA, federal agencies, including the Coast Guard,
are required to set goals, measure performance, and report on their
accomplishments. The act requires that federal agencies establish long-
term strategic goals, as well as annual goals. Agencies must then
measure their performance against the goals they set and report
publicly on how well they are doing.
Coast Guard officials said their performance measures help focus
efforts and link performance to a strategic outcome, manage programs at
the headquarters level, and identify performance gaps.
The Coast Guard currently has performance measures for 10 of its 11
programs.[Footnote 31] While some programs have historically contained
multiple measures, they have been adjusted to one measure per program
since the Coast Guard's transition to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), as shown in table 6 below. The performance measures
consist of performance results, which track the annual progress of each
program, and performance targets, which are the goals their results aim
to meet each year.
Table 6: Coast Guard Performance Measures by Program:
Mission and program;
Homeland security mission: Defense readiness;
Performance measure: Percentage of time units meet combat readiness
status at C-2 level[A].
Mission and program;
Homeland security mission: Foreign fish enforcement;
Performance measure: Number of detected Exclusive Economic Zone
incursions by foreign fishing vessels.
Mission and program;
Homeland security mission: Illegal drug interdiction;
Performance measure: Percentage of cocaine seizures entering the United
States through maritime means.
Mission and program;
Homeland security mission: Ports, waterways, and coastal security;
Performance measure: Not yet determined.
Mission and program;
Homeland security mission: Undocumented migrant interdiction;
Performance measure: Percentage of interdicted illegal migrants
entering the United States through maritime means.
Mission and program;
Non-homeland security mission: Aids to navigation;
Performance measure: Number of collisions, allisions, and
groundings.
Mission and program;
Non-homeland security mission: Ice operations;
Performance measure: Number of waterway closure days.
Mission and program;
Non-homeland security mission: Living marine resources;
Performance measure: Percentage of fishermen found in compliance with
regulations.
Marine environmental protection;
Performance measure: Number of chemical and oil spills greater than 100
gallons per 100 million short tons shipped.
Mission and program;
Non-homeland security mission: Marine safety;
Performance measure: Number of passenger vessel, maritime worker, and
recreational boating fatalities and injuries.
Mission and program;
Non-homeland security mission: Search and rescue;
Performance measure: Percentage of distressed mariners' lives saved.
Source: Coast Guard performance data.
[A] According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as
the level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.
[End of table]
For the purposes of this report, we studied performance for 8 of the 10
programs with performance measures. We did not analyze the marine
safety and marine environmental protection programs' performance
results because we were unable to obtain any reasonable measurement of
the levels of effort being directed into these programs, and therefore
had no basis for comparing their resource levels with their performance
results.
Overall, for the eight programs we studied, performance results
remained stable or improved between fiscal years 2001 and
2003.[Footnote 32] Of these programs, all but defense readiness and
undocumented migrant interdiction met their performance targets for
fiscal year 2003.
Programs with Generally Stable Performance Results:
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction:
The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure, which
measures the percentage of migrants interdicted or deterred on maritime
routes, had a result that remained relatively stable, between 82.5
percent to 88.3 percent. (See fig. 12.) Although the Coast Guard did
not reach the program's target level of 87 percent in fiscal year 2003,
the result has remained in this range, plus or minus about six
percentage points, since fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 33] Coast Guard
officials said they could not explain the decline but consider it to be
minimal. According to the Coast Guard, in fiscal year 2003 there were
3,793 successful arrivals and an estimated threat--the estimated flow
of migrants into the United States--of 25,750 migrants, yielding the
85.3 percent result. Although the interdiction rate decreased slightly,
the activity level was up, reflecting the increase in resource hours
dedicated to this mission. (The 2003 Mission Planning Guidance
stipulated that 28,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used for
undocumented migrant interdiction, whereas the 2004 guidance stipulated
47,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used.):
In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard reported 5,331 migrant
interdictions compared with 2,409 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of
over 120 percent.[Footnote 34] By comparison, the estimated threat rose
by about 18 percent.
Figure 12: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Performance Results and
Target by Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Illegal Drug Interdiction:
The illegal drug interdiction performance measure--the rate at which
the Coast Guard seizes cocaine--remained relatively steady between
fiscal years 2001 and 2002, ranging from 10.6 percent to 11.7
percent.[Footnote 35] (See fig. 13.) The seizure rate is defined as the
metric tons of cocaine seized by the Coast Guard each fiscal year,
divided by the estimated maritime flow of cocaine for the same
year.[Footnote 36] The goal is based on a 1997 Department of
Transportation requirement setting the target baseline at 8.7 percent
and raising it 10 percent every 5 years. The Coast Guard did not meet
its performance target for the drug program in fiscal years 2001 and
2002. Starting in fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard is changing its
illegal drug interdiction performance measure to a removal rather than
a seizure rate. This new measure includes cocaine that is jettisoned or
lost as well as cocaine that is seized. Coast Guard officials believe
this new measure more accurately reflects the total impact of the
program on disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States.[Footnote 37]
Figure 13: Illegal Drug Interdiction Performance Results and Targets by
Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Ice Operations:
Ice operations showed both stable performance results that met
performance targets in fiscal years 2001 and 2003. (See fig. 14.) To
meet the target, the ice operations program must keep winter waterway
closures under 8 days per year for severe winters and under 2 days per
year for average winters. The Coast Guard met this target in fiscal
year 2003, with only 7 days of closures during the severe winter
season. Ice operations program managers attribute their success to good
planning. Each year officials from the Canadian Coast Guard, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the United States
Coast Guard hold a planning conference to develop a winter severity
assessment. If the assessment determines the weather will be severe,
they develop a strategy to dedicate more assets to ice operations in
order to meet the target.
Figure 14: Ice Operations Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal
Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Living Marine Resources:
The performance measure for living marine resources--defined as the
percentage of fishermen complying with federal regulations--remained
stable between 97.1 and 98.6 percent over the past 3 years. The program
also met its target of 97 percent, which was first established in
fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 15.) Coast Guard officials attribute these
results to concerted efforts to improve operational efficiency
particularly through a vessel monitoring system and better intelligence
sharing while working more closely with federal and state enforcement
partners. Coast Guard officials said 16 of the 97 significant
violations detected in fiscal year 2003, such as damage to the fish
stock, were accomplished through these new efforts.
Figure 15: Living Marine Resources Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Search and Rescue:
Between fiscal years 2001 and 2003, the search and rescue program's
performance results were steady. The performance measure for this
program is the percentage of mariners' lives saved from imminent
danger. The range over the 3 years was 84.2 percent to 87.7 percent,
and the result in fiscal year 2003 was above the target of 85 percent.
(See fig. 16.) Coast Guard officials attributed the improvement to
continued focus on the search and rescue program. The Coast Guard has
also added 950 new positions to the program since 2001. The Coast Guard
indicated that this personnel increase is reportedly helping manage
surge requirements as they occur.
Figure 16: Search and Rescue Performance Results and Target by Fiscal
Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Programs with Improved Performance Results:
Foreign Fish Enforcement:
The performance results for foreign fish enforcement, which indicate
the number of foreign vessel incursions into the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),[Footnote 38] dropped from 250 incursions
in fiscal year 2002 to 153 incursions in fiscal year 2003. (See fig.
17.) Because of this improvement, foreign fish enforcement met its
target for fiscal year 2003. (In this case, since the goal is to
minimize incursions, a decline is a positive result.) The decrease was
greatest along the United States/Russian maritime boundary line (6
incursions versus 22 incursions in fiscal year 2002) and in the Central
and Western Pacific region (15 incursions versus 89 in fiscal year
2002). The Coast Guard reported that the drop along the United States/
Russian boundary line was due to a near-constant enforcement presence,
increased presence of Russian patrol vessels in the vicinity, and a
stronger enforcement posture on the Coast Guard's part, including the
option of employing warning shots and disabling fire against violators.
The decrease in observed incursions in the Central and Western Pacific
was more difficult for the Coast Guard to explain. One potential
explanation the Coast Guard gave was reduced cutter and aircraft
coverage, brought on by the need to shift resources to thwart known
ongoing illegal high seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific.
According to the Coast Guard, this lack of enforcement could have
reduced detections, but since most detected incursions in recent years
have come from third party reports and intelligence sources rather than
directly from Coast Guard enforcement assets, they do not believe lack
of enforcement to be the cause of this shift.
Figure 17: Foreign Fish Enforcement Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Aids to Navigation:
The aids to navigation program performance measure--which assesses the
total number of collisions, allisions[Footnote 39], and groundings--
also demonstrated improved results between fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
The number of incidents declined from 1,936 in fiscal year 2002 to
1,523 in fiscal year 2003, a decrease of 21 percent in the last year.
(See fig. 18.) Furthermore, the program met its target level in each of
the three years. Coast Guard officials attribute their performance
success to two reasons--an improved navigational infrastructure, and
use of activities such as vessel inspection and mariner licensing and
examination to reduce causal factors in collisions, allisions, and
groundings.
Figure 18: Aids to Navigation Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal
Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Defense Readiness:
Defense readiness, as measured by the percentage of time units meet
combat readiness status at a C-2 level,[Footnote 40] improved during
fiscal years 2001 to 2003. The percentage of time that defense
readiness was at a C-2 level rose from 67 percent fiscal year 2001 to
78 percent in fiscal year 2003. However, defense readiness did not meet
its target of 100 percent readiness. (See fig. 19.) The Coast Guard
reported that this was due to equipment problems associated with
operating aging ships and unit training deficiencies such as cutters
not having sufficient training time to perform gunnery exercises.
Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by Fiscal
Year:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
Efficiency:
One of the issues that we discussed with agency officials at Coast
Guard headquarters and all five districts we visited was their efforts
to utilize intelligence, technology, tactics, and partnerships to
leverage existing resources. Coast Guard officials provided examples of
new efforts that ranged in scope from agency-wide to location-specific.
Greater access to intelligence information, new technologies and
tactics, and a number of new or improved partnerships have likely
increased efficiency to a degree, but in most cases the Coast Guard is
unable to measure the impacts.
The following tables show selected examples of these efforts. The
examples provided in the tables are not a comprehensive list of all
Coast Guard efforts in these four areas, but they serve to illustrate
the variety of efforts under way.
Intelligence:
Intelligence efforts are primarily aimed at increasing the Coast
Guard's collection and analytical capabilities to enhance the usage of
intelligence information. Greater coordination with external entities
is another emphasis, adding to the amount of intelligence that the
Coast Guard receives and is able to act upon. Table 7 shows examples of
efforts at various Coast Guard levels.
Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence Efforts:
Coast Guard location: Coast Guard-wide; Intelligence effort:
Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). This strategic intelligence
center serves as the focal point for interaction with the intelligence
components of the Department of Defense, other law enforcement
agencies, and the intelligence community. The ICC supports all Coast
Guard missions and is the center for Coast Guard intelligence
collection and management.
Coast Guard location: Atlantic area; Intelligence effort: Joint Harbor
Operations Center (JHOC). The Hampton Roads JHOC is a collaborative
effort of the Navy and Coast Guard that provides an effective command,
control, communications, and computer system and information,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. The JHOC is to be
assigned 9 Navy and 22 Coast Guard positions and is currently staffed
with Coast Guard and Navy reservists.
Coast Guard location: Districts; Intelligence effort: Field
intelligence support teams. These consist of Coast Guard intelligence
analysts and Coast Guard special agents. They provide tactical
intelligence support to Coast Guard captains of the port by collecting
information and reporting suspicious or criminal activity in the port
areas, sharing information with other agencies at the local level, and
rapidly disseminating intelligence to the captain of the port and other
local commanders.
Coast Guard location: Sector New Orleans; Intelligence effort: Combined
Operations and Intelligence Node (COIN). This effort includes a shared
operations center staffed by personnel from the four Coast Guard
commands located in or around New Orleans. The chief goal of COIN is to
improve mission performance and tactical awareness through the
efficient use of limited resources.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Technology:
Most technology acquisitions are done Coast Guard-wide, and the
examples in table 8 reflect this focus. However, some districts and
units have purchased or developed unique technologies to operate in
their environment. The table shows several examples, including one
unique to the fifth district (Portsmouth, VA), where a database has
been designed to provide the real-time status of assets and personnel.
Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts:
Coast Guard location: Coast Guard-wide; New technology: Night vision
goggles. Used by cutter, aircraft, and maritime safety and security
team personnel during periods of darkness, these goggles allow for
safer operations and enhanced ability to detect intrusions.
Coast Guard location: Coast Guard-wide; New technology: Pilot program
in various Coast Guard locations: Self-locating datum marker buoys. For
the search and rescue program, these new buoys provide more up-to-date
data that can be used to better determine where to begin a search. The
Coast Guard intends for this technology to improve both search
effectiveness and efficiency.
Coast Guard location: Pilot program in various Coast Guard locations;
New technology: Personal data assistant (PDA). In several locations,
PDAs are being used by boarding officers and marine inspectors to
conduct their work. The Coast Guard expects that using PDAs will reduce
redundant paperwork and facilitate electronic database entries.
Coast Guard location: District 5 Portsmouth, Va; New technology:
SMARTS. This is a database created by personnel in District 5 to
provide information about assets and personnel. This database is
updated throughout the day by groups within the district and can also
be used to analyze trend data. Officials in the fifth district told us
that this data system saves both time and resources, because the
information it provides would typically require numerous phone calls
throughout the day.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Tactics:
Modifying standard operating procedures and improving the way that
routine activities are carried out can lead to greater efficiencies,
enhancing mission effectiveness. Coast Guard officials cited various
examples of how they had done so--often with the help of the other
types of efforts (intelligence, technology, and partnerships). Table 9
outlines examples of new Coast Guard tactics that officials described
to us as improving efficiency.
Table 9: Selected Examples of New Tactics:
Coast Guard location: Coast Guard-wide; New tactic: Advanced notice of
arrival (NOA). The former 24-hour NOA prior to entering a United States
port has been extended to 96 hours. The information provided with the
NOA includes details on the crew, passengers, cargo, and the vessel
itself. This increase in notice has enabled the Coast Guard to screen
more vessels in advance of arrival and allows additional time to
prepare for boardings.
Coast Guard location: Pacific and Atlantic area commands; New tactic:
Maritime safety and security teams (MSSTs). These 100-person units,
established after the September 11 attacks, provide a fast-deployment
capability for homeland security, search and rescue, and law
enforcement programs. MSSTs will deploy in support of national security
special events such as Super Bowls and Olympics, as well as for severe
weather recovery operations, protection of military load-outs,
enforcement of security zones, defense of critical waterside facilities
in strategic ports, and interdiction of illegal activities.
Coast Guard location: District 8 New Orleans, La; New tactic: Inland
River Vessel Movement Center. Starting in March 2003, vessels with
certain dangerous cargos must report their crew and cargo as they move
on the Mississippi River. The integration software the Coast Guard
utilizes for this tracking is new, but there is no new technology
required for the industry participants. This tactic allows for easier
and more consistent tracking of these cargos during transits through
densely populated areas.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Partnerships:
In a past examination of Coast Guard activities, we commented that
leveraging resources through partnerships provides mission efficiency
to the Coast Guard.[Footnote 41] The Coast Guard has attempted to
develop ways to partner more effectively with local, state, and federal
agencies, as well as with public and private entities, and we found a
number of examples in the locations that we visited, especially for
homeland security. Coast Guard officials told us that these
relationships were not necessarily new but had certainly improved since
September 11. Table 10 highlights some of these examples. They include
new efforts in collaborating with other DHS entities. Coast Guard
officials told us that while in some instances these relationships
existed prior to the formation of DHS, they have grown stronger with
the creation of the new department.
Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Partnership Efforts:
Coast Guard location: District 7 Miami; Partnership: DHS Partners Forum
Southeast Florida Region. This group was formed to promote closer
cooperation in southeast Florida among agencies moving to DHS. The
objectives include sharing information and developing and implementing
new coordinated initiatives. There are four interagency working groups
that include operations/communications, intelligence, information
management and public affairs, and mass migration planning.
Coast Guard location: District 8 Sector New Orleans; Partnership: Field
Targeting Center (FTC). Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of
Field Operations brings together members of CBP, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard to screen and
target vessels. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans placed a watch stander
at FTC to establish a cooperative screening of all incoming vessels. As
a result of the partnership, the Coast Guard was also able to get
access to two systems that greatly improved information about incoming
vessels and their crewmembers and passengers.
Coast Guard location: District 5 Group Hampton Roads; Partnership:
Navy. In addition to collaborating with the Navy on the Joint Harbor
Operations Center (highlighted in table 7), the Coast Guard partners
with the Navy on a number of different initiatives in the fifth
district to combine resources and avoid overlap. Since 2001, the Navy
has provided vessels to the Coast Guard for naval escorts, and now some
of these vessels are staffed with law enforcement detachments and
MSSTs. Group Hampton Roads also maintains an active working group with
Navy officials, and the group meets often to discuss overlapping issues
including enforcement of the local security zone and joint law
enforcement boardings.
Coast Guard location: District 13 Marine Safety Office Puget Sound;
Partnership: Washington State Ferries (WSF). WSF is the largest ferry
system in the United States and one of the Coast Guard's greatest
security concerns in the Northwest. WSF, the Washington State Patrol,
and local Coast Guard officials have established a committee to
identify goals and recommendations concerning ferry security, including
the refinement of a rapid response information network to be used when
specific threats are detected.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Margaret Wrightson (415) 904-2200 Randall B. Williamson (206) 287-4860:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, William Bates, Elizabeth Curda,
Michele Fejfar, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Dawn Locke, Allen Lomax,
Heather MacLeod, Eileen Peguero, and Stan Stenersen made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April 1, 2003).
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T,
March 12, 2003).
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions
to the New Department (GAO-03-467T, February 12, 2003).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 12, 2002).
Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans with
Budgets and Financial Statements (GAO-02-236, January 4, 2002).
Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences under the Results Act in
Linking Plans with Budgets (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67, April 12, 1999).
Managing for Results: Measuring Program Results That Are under Limited
Federal Control (GAO/GGD-99-16, December 11, 1998).
The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency Annual
Performance Plans (GAO/GGD-10.1.20, April 1998).
Managing for Results: The Statutory Framework for Performance-Based
Management and Accountability (GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 1998).
Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance
(GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 1997).
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996).
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Challenges during the
Transition to the Department of Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April
2003); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Comprehensive
Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure
Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T, March 2003); U.S. General
Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and
Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November
2002).
[2] Although resource hour data is captured for all of the Coast
Guard's programs, to a much greater extent than other programs, the
marine safety and marine environmental protection programs are carried
out in ways other than using Coast Guard assets--ships, boats, and
aircraft. Instead, marine safety office personnel are extensively
involved in such things as conducting ship inspections in port,
examining shore-side facilities, and carrying out port security
activities. The Coast Guard's current information systems do not
capture the majority of the time devoted to these activities, which
appear to be increasing in importance as a result of the Coast Guard's
new port security responsibilities.
[3] These performance measures were developed following the
implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act in 1993.
Many agencies, including the Coast Guard, began developing performance
measures to strengthen government performance and accountability by
focusing on the results of activities and spending. The act required
agencies to establish missions, goals, and performance measures as well
as clearer linkages between resources and results.
[4] We excluded the marine safety and marine environmental protection
programs because they did not have complete resource-hour data that
would allow us to compare resource-hour trends with performance
results. We provided only resource hour information for the Coast
Guard's newest program--called ports, waterways, and coastal security,
or PWCS--because the Coast Guard has not yet established performance
measures for it. Finally, we provided limited performance results
information for the illegal drug interdiction program because
performance results for this program for fiscal year 2003 were not yet
available.
[5] The fiscal year 2003 operating budget included $628 million in
supplemental funding for Iraqi Freedom and Liberty Shield (P.L. 108-11,
April 16, 2003). It also included a .65 percent rescission (P.L. 108-7,
Feb. 20, 2003).
[6] In fiscal year 2003, there were about 38,300 military and 6,200
civilian personnel. In addition, the agency had about 7,900 reservists
who support the national military strategy and provide additional
operational support and surge capacity during emergencies, such as
natural disasters. Furthermore, about 36,000 volunteer auxiliary
personnel helped with a wide array of activities, ranging from search
and rescue to boating safety education.
[7] The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security
missions are delineated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L.
107-296, Nov. 25, 2002).
[8] Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard
included maritime security activities under its marine safety program
area.
[9] In total, the Coast Guard has 32 group commands, 75 marine safety
offices or related units, and 31 air stations located throughout the
United States and its territories.
[10] The Coast Guard recently announced an organizational restructuring
that would combine marine safety offices and groups into single command
structures to be known as sectors. The Coast Guard stated that the
purpose of this new organizational structure is to strengthen unity of
command in port, waterway, and coastal areas of operation by specific
geographic areas of responsibility. According to the Coast Guard,
sweeping changes to the agency's operational environment brought about
since September 11 reinforce the need for these combined commands that
will provide an interdependent approach to mission accomplishment, a
common operating picture, and a focal point for intra-departmental,
interagency, and other maritime stakeholders.
[11] The Coast Guard maintains information, on a program-by-program
basis, about how resources (assets such as ships, boats, or aircraft)
are used to conduct its program missions including search and rescue;
aids to navigation; defense readiness; other law enforcement (foreign
fish enforcement); ice operations; marine environmental protection;
illegal drug interdiction; living marine resources; undocumented
migrant interdiction; ports, waterways, and coastal security; and
marine safety. Each hour that these resources are used is called a
resource hour. However, resource hours do not include such things as
the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent in
maintaining it. Resource hours associated with Coast Guard training for
personnel and asset maintenance are captured in the miscellaneous
support category of resource hours. Resource hours also do not
represent the vast majority of marine safety and marine environmental
protection efforts carried out by marine safety office personnel as
these programs are largely carried out without using Coast Guard
assets, and there are no similar data for making comparisons in the
levels of effort. As a result, resource levels and performance results
for the marine safety and the marine environmental protection programs
were not analyzed for this report. In addition, the hours reported in
the miscellaneous support category are not included in the total
resource hours analyzed in this report.
[12] The Coast Guard calculated a resource hour baseline from which the
change in resource hours since the September 11 attacks can be
estimated. This baseline is an average of the eight fiscal year
quarters preceding September 11, 2001 multiplied by four to put it in
terms of a full fiscal year. For the purposes of this report, we refer
to this calculation as the pre September 11 baseline or as pre-
September 11 levels. According to Coast Guard officials, there is no
special significance to this baseline period, other than it represents
the historical mission activity of the Coast Guard at that period in
time.
[13] According to a Coast Guard official, while the ports, waterways,
and coastal security program did not exist as a separate program prior
to September 11, 2001, resource hours related to this program's
activities were collected under four categories: port safety, port
security-military, port security-other, and military operations-peace.
The hours from these categories were combined after September 11 to
make up the pre-September 11 baseline of resource hours for what the
Coast Guard now defines as the ports, waterways, and coastal security
program. After September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard began identifying
resource hours under a ports, waterways, and coastal security program
category.
[14] According to a Coast Guard official, the Maritime Security
Condition System (MARSEC) alerts all Coast Guard components of any
perceived threats or risk to various Coast Guard ports or a particular
industry. MARSEC 1 is equivalent to the Department of Homeland
Security's Advisory System's (HSAS) threat level green (low risk of
terrorist attack), blue (guarded or general risk of terrorist attack),
and yellow (elevated or significant risk of terrorist attack). MARSEC 2
is equivalent to HSAS orange (high risk of terrorist attack) and MARSEC
3 is equivalent to HSAS red (severe risk of terrorist attack). In
fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003, higher security levels existed for 19
days, 73 days, and 90 days, respectively.
[15] According to GPRA, performance results are defined as the outcome
of direct products and services delivered by a program. Performance
targets or goals are defined as a set of annual goals that establish
the agency's intended performance, stating a particular level of
performance in either an absolute value or as a targeted level of
improvement.
[16] We did not analyze detailed performance results for the marine
safety and marine environmental protection programs because we were
unable to obtain complete information on the resource hours for these
programs; therefore, we had no basis for comparing resource levels with
performance results. However, the performance results for the marine
safety program for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 showed that there were
1,651 and 1,459 maritime injuries and fatalities in those years,
respectively. Marine safety program performance results for fiscal year
2003 were not available at the time we completed our work. The marine
environmental protection program had not yet developed a performance
measure in fiscal year 2001, but its results for fiscal years 2002 and
2003 respectively showed that there were 43.3 and 29.4 spills (oil
spills over 100 gallons and chemical spills) per 100 million tons of
oil and chemicals shipped.
[17] For the purposes of this report, we were most interested in
comparing performance results for our baseline year--fiscal year 2001-
-with the most currently available results--fiscal year 2003. As a
result, we defined programs as "stable" or "improved" based on the
known results for these two years. All programs defined as "stable"
showed a differential of less than 4 percentage points when comparing
fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003 results.
[18] The marine environmental protection program also met its
performance target in fiscal year 2003 but was not included in our
analysis. Also, since the marine safety program does not yet have
performance results for fiscal year 2003, discussing its target is not
relevant here.
[19] According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as
the level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.
[20] The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure
indicates the percentage of migrants interdicted or deterred from
entering the United States via maritime routes. More specifically, it
is the number of interdicted migrants divided by the estimated flow of
undocumented migrants (which includes the number of law enforcement
interdictions, known successful migrant arrivals, and the estimated
number of migrants deterred from leaving their countries of origin).
This estimate is prepared annually by the Coast Guard's Intelligence
Coordination Center.
[21] According to the Coast Guard, the 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant
numbers stated here include only those counted in the undocumented
migrant performance measure, which uses the following four migrant
populations, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the People's
Republic of China. The total number of all migrants interdicted in
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were 4,104 and 6,054 respectively.
[22] In recent years, the Coast Guard has been publicly recognized in
several forums for its performance efforts including receiving one of
the highest grades of 20 agencies identified by the Clinton
administration as having a high impact on the American public. The
Coast Guard was one of two agencies that received an agency grade of A
in the Government Performance Project grading system--compiled by
journalists from Government Executive and academics from the Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University--and it
was one of two agencies that received an A for managing for results.
The criteria for managing for results included engaging in results-
oriented strategic planning; measuring progress toward results and
accomplishments; using results for policymaking, management, and
evaluation of progress; and communicating results to stakeholders.
[23] Clarity issues relate to whether data in the measure could be
confusing or misleading to users; objectivity issues relate to whether
the performance assessment may be systematically over-or understated.
[24] The Coast Guard reported that the number of illegal migrants
entering the United States is an estimated flow number generated by the
Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and Immigration and
Naturalization Services. And, according to the Coast Guard, because of
the speculative nature of the information used, and the secretive
nature of illegal migration, particularly where professional smuggling
organizations are involved, the estimated potential flow of migrants
may contain significant error.
[25] The ports, waterways, and coastal security program does not yet
have a performance measure, the illegal drug interdiction and marine
safety programs' performance results have not yet been calculated for
fiscal year 2003, and we did not analyze performance results for the
marine environmental protection program.
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/
GGD-96-118, June 1996); U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for
Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance (GAO/HEHS/
GGD-97-138, May 1997); and U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for
Results: Measuring Program Results That Are under Limited Federal
Control (GAO/GGD-99-16).
[27] Responsibilities that are required under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) (P. L. 107-295, November 25, 2002).
[28] According to a Coast Guard official, the results obtained from
these two strategies (law enforcement units on navy ships and armed
helicopters) are not mutually exclusive. In some cases, these two
strategies worked in tandem, so there is some overlap in the seizure
results.
[29] One additional program, other law enforcement (Other LE) also
experienced an increase in resource hours. However, according to Coast
Guard officials, it is likely that the surge in hours in fiscal year
2002 was the result of a misinterpretation of port security activities.
Some Coast Guard crew entered what should have been PWCS hours under
Other LE because of their interpretation of this data category. Coast
Guard officials took action in fiscal year 2003 to clarify the
appropriate categorization of port security activities and the hours
have subsequently declined.
[30] For a fuller discussion of the framework, see Managing for
Results: The Statutory Framework for Performance-Based Management and
Accountability (GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 1998).
[31] According to Coast Guard officials, performance measures for the
ports, waterways, and coastal security program are under development.
[32] Illegal drug interdiction was the only exception. Because its
fiscal year 2003 performance results will not be calculated until the
spring of 2004, we were unable to assess its results between fiscal
years 2001 and 2003.
[33] According to Coast Guard officials, the undocumented migrant
interdiction performance measure target was set at 87 percent based on
a study done to incorporate deterrence as a measure of Coast Guard
performance.
[34] The 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant numbers include only those
counted in the undocumented migrant performance measure, which uses the
following four migrant populations, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, and the People's Republic of China.
[35] The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year
2003 will not be calculated until the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement publishes its flow rate in spring 2004.
[36] The illegal drug interdiction performance measure includes only
cocaine, because cocaine has an analyzed flow rate and is the
preponderant illegal drug.
[37] The target for the new illegal drug interdiction measure was set
at 15 percent, determined by looking at the trend of seizures across
agencies and forecasting out 1 year. Coast Guard officials said they
will not be confident in the target for at least 3 years, when they are
able to look at trends in the removal rate and adjust the target to
reflect a more realistic goal.
[38] The EEZ, established by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, is the United States' maximum
exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 miles from U.S. shores.
Within the EEZ, U.S. citizens have primary harvesting rights to fish
stocks.
[39] The Coast Guard defines allisions as vessel collisions with fixed
objects versus collisions, which are vessel collisions with moveable
objects.
[40] According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as
the level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.
[41] U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard Strategy Needed for
Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155,
November 2002).
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