Aviation Security
Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches Gao ID: GAO-04-505T April 22, 2004The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from using private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the United States. These five airports are part of a pilot program, where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1) the challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and baggage screeners.
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences. TSA provided the screening contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. TSA officials said they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to implement. Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airport-specific practices. These practices include screening candidates before they are hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within their screener workforce rather than relying on the decisions of TSA's hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available at airports with federal screeners. Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results of the covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints. Although the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA recognized the need to improve screener performance and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs.
GAO-04-505T, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 22, 2004:
Aviation Security:
Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement
Innovative Approaches:
Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice:
GAO-04-505T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-505T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental
changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and
their property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from
using private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five
commercial airports in the United States. These five airports are part
of a pilot program, where private screeners perform screening
functions. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as
defined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test
the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport
level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1) the
challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program,
(2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private
screening companies, and (3) the performance of private and federal
screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony is based on our
prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and baggage screeners.
What GAO Found:
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was
not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the
differences in the performance of federal and private screening and
the reasons for those differences. TSA provided the screening
contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations,
achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the
minimum requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
TSA officials said they had not granted contract officials more
flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were
standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented
throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA
recently requested input from the private screening contractors about
the additional flexibilities they would like to implement.
Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only
limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some
airport-specific practices. These practices include screening
candidates before they are hired through the assessment centers,
hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more
efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener
supervisors from within their screener workforce rather than relying on
the decisions of TSA‘s hiring contractors. These practices have enabled
the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not
currently available at airports with federal screeners.
Little performance data are currently available to compare the
performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting
threat objects. The primary source of available performance data is
the results of the covert tests performed by TSA‘s Office of Internal
Affairs and Program Review, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to
pass threat objects through screening checkpoints. Although the test
results cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests
have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an
indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and
indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners performed
similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the
ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects.
TSA recognized the need to improve screener performance and has taken
steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs.
Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors
Responsible for Conducting Screening Operations:
Airport: San Francisco International;
Contract screening company: Covenant Aviation Security.
Airport: Kansas City International;
Contract screening company: First Line Transportation Security.
Airport: Greater Rochester International;
Contract screening company: McNeil Security.
Airport: Jackson Hole Airport;
Contract screening company: Jackson Hole Airport Board.
Airport: Tupelo Airport;
Contract screening company: Covenant Aviation Security.
Source: TSA
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports, GAO has made recommendations designed to strengthen
airport passenger and baggage screening. GAO also has several ongoing
reviews related to the issues addressed in this testimony, and will
issue separate reports related to these areas at later dates, with
additional recommendations as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-505T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin at
(202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) private screening
program. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in
fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport
passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was
the shift from the use of private screeners to perform screening
functions to the use of federal screeners at all but five commercial
airports in the United States. The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), enacted on November 19, 2001, mandated the federalization
of airport security screening and required that five airports be part
of a pilot program where screening functions are performed by private
screeners. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as
defined by TSA, is to test the effectiveness of increased operational
flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. ATSA
also includes a provision that allows an airport to apply to opt out of
using federal screeners beginning on November 19, 2004.
My testimony today addresses TSA's implementation and evaluation of the
contract screening pilot program. In particular, I will address (1) the
challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2)
the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening
contractors, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners
in detecting threat objects. My testimony is based on our prior work
and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA's
passenger screening program, all of which have been done in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
* A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it
was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the
differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the
reasons for those differences. TSA has provided the private screening
contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve
efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum
requirements of ATSA. Because TSA requires the pilot screening
contractors and Federal Security Directors (FSD) at airports with
federal screeners to operate under the same procedures, they faced many
of the same challenges.[Footnote 1] For example, the private screening
contractors, like FSDs at airports with federal screeners, must rely on
TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners and establish assessment
centers, where screener applicants are assessed.[Footnote 2] The
inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has limited their
ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA officials stated
that they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because
they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well
coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to
achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from
the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities
they would like to implement.
* Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only
limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some
airport-specific practices. Flexible practices implemented by private
screening contractors include screening candidates before they are
hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order
to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently,[Footnote 3] and, during
the initial hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within rather
than relying on the decisions of TSA's hiring contractors. These
practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve
efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs at airports with
federal screeners.
* Little performance data are currently available to compare the
performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting
threat objects. The primary source of available performance data is the
results of covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs
and Program Review (OIAPR), in which TSA undercover agents attempt to
pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked
baggage.[Footnote 4] Although the test results cannot be generalized
either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to
airports nationwide,[Footnote 5] they provide an indicator of screener
performance in detecting threat objects and indicate that, in general,
private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the
testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and
federal screeners to detect threat objects.[Footnote 6] TSA recognized
the need to improve the performance of both private and federal
screeners and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing
its training programs.
Background:
ATSA created TSA to ensure security for all modes of transportation,
including aviation. ATSA set forth specific enhancements to aviation
security for TSA to implement and established deadlines for completing
many of them. These enhancements included federalizing passenger
screeners at more than 440 commercial airports in the United States by
November 19, 2002; enhancing screener hiring and training standards;
and establishing and managing a 2-year pilot program at 5 airports--one
in each airport security category[Footnote 7]--where screening of
passengers and property would be conducted by a private screening
company and overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA included a provision
that allows airport operators to apply to TSA to use private rather
than federal screeners beginning in November 2004. TSA has acknowledged
that one of its key challenges in 2004 will be designing appropriate
criteria for the potential expansion of contract screening.
As required by ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract
screeners in lieu of federal screeners at 5 commercial airports--one in
each airport security category. ATSA sets forth numerous requirements
regarding the pilot program. Specifically, it requires that:
* the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of
the United States;
* the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment
standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance
requirements that apply to federal screeners;
* all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications
as federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship,[Footnote 8] high
school diploma or equivalent, English proficiency, and pass a criminal
background check; and:
* all private screener candidates undergo the same battery of
employment screening tests that federal screener candidates undergo.
In June 2002, TSA selected the 5 airports that would comprise the
contract screening pilot program. In October 2002, TSA awarded
contracts to four private screening contractors to provide passenger
and baggage screening services. TSA's role at the airports with private
screeners is to provide on-site federal supervision of all passenger
and property screening.[Footnote 9] Table 1 provides a list of the
airports participating in the pilot program and the private contractors
responsible for conducting screening operations.
Table 1: Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors
Responsible for Conducting Screening Operations:
Airport security category: X;
Airport: San Francisco International;
Contract screening company: Covenant Aviation Security.
Airport security category: I;
Airport: Kansas City International;
Contract screening company: First Line Transportation Security.
Airport security category: II;
Airport: Greater Rochester International;
Contract screening company: McNeil Security.
Airport security category: III;
Airport: Jackson Hole Airport;
Contract screening company: Jackson Hole Airport Board.
Airport security category: IV;
Airport: Tupelo Airport;
Contract screening company: Covenant Aviation Security.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for
screening passengers and most used private security firms to perform
this function. Long-standing concerns existed regarding screener
performance in detecting threat objects during covert tests at
passenger screening checkpoints. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13
percent of the potentially dangerous objects Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) undercover agents carried through checkpoints
during tests--a level that was considered "significant and alarming."
In 1987, screeners did not detect 20 percent of the objects during the
same types of tests. In addition, we reported that FAA tests conducted
between 1991 and 1999 showed that screeners' ability to detect objects
was not improving, and in some cases, was worsening. In tests conducted
in the late 1990s, as the testing objects became more realistic and the
tests more closely approximated how a terrorist might attempt to
penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects
declined even further. Inadequate training and poor supervision, along
with low wages, rapid turnover, and inadequate attention to human
factors,[Footnote 10] were historically identified as key contributors
to poor screener performance.
The results I am presenting today are based on preliminary observations
of our ongoing review of TSA's passenger screening program, which
includes a review of TSA's efforts to implement and evaluate the
contract screening pilot program. As part of our ongoing review, which
we are conducting for this subcommittee, we interviewed TSA officials
and visited all 5 pilot program airports and 23 airports with federal
screeners. During these visits, we observed screening operations and
interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and, at some airports, airport
authority and airline officials. At the 5 pilot program airports, we
also interviewed representatives of the private screening contractors.
Additionally, we interviewed representatives of several aviation
associations. We plan to conduct additional analysis during the
remainder of our review, including assessing the results of our recent
survey of all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations. We will
also review the results of the final report submitted to TSA by
BearingPoint, Inc., which compared the performance of private screeners
to federal screeners.[Footnote 11]
Private Screening Contractors Have Had Little Opportunity to
Demonstrate Innovations and Achieve Efficiencies:
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was
not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the
differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the
reasons for those differences. TSA has provided the private screening
contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations and
achieve efficiencies. Because TSA requires the pilot screening
contractors and FSDs at airports with federal screeners to operate
under the same procedures, they faced many of the same challenges. For
example, the private screening contractors, like FSDs at airports with
federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of
screeners and establish assessment centers, where screener applicants
are assessed. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has
limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA
officials stated that they had not granted contract officials more
flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were
standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented
throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA
recently requested input from the private screening contractors about
the additional flexibilities they would like to implement.
Private Screening Contractors Lack Authority to Determine Staffing
Levels and Conduct Hiring:
TSA determined the screener staffing needs of the private screening
contractors using the same computer-based staffing model that was used
for airports with federal screeners.[Footnote 12] This staffing model
was based on the congressionally mandated nationwide ceiling of 45,000
full-time equivalent[Footnote 13] federal screeners. Both the
contractors and FSDs at airports with federal screeners have raised
concerns about the adequacy of the staffing model in accounting for the
unique needs of each airport, particularly given that the model is
based on a full-time equivalent ceiling. Two representatives of the
private screening contractors that were at or near their TSA authorized
staffing levels told us in February 2004 that they were concerned about
having adequate staffing levels to meet demand during the peak 2004
travel season. TSA had required one of these contractors to lay off
screeners in 2003 as part of its nationwide screener downsizing effort,
even though, according to TSA, private screeners do not count toward
TSA's ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalent screeners. TSA
acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in
the screener workforce and hired a consultant in September 2003 to
conduct a study of screener staffing levels, including levels for the 5
pilot program airports.[Footnote 14] The study, which TSA initially
expected to be completed in April 2004, is now scheduled for completion
in May 2004. We will continue to review TSA's efforts to determine
appropriate staffing levels during the remainder of our review.
The private screening contractors' concerns regarding their staffing
levels are compounded by TSA's requirement that the contractors
coordinate their hiring through TSA headquarters. These contractors,
like FSDs at airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to
authorize the hiring of screeners and establish assessment centers--a
process that can take several months. The inability to conduct hiring
on an as needed basis has limited their ability to respond quickly to
staffing shortages. In one instance, an FSD for an airport with private
screeners stated that in response to continued attrition at his
airport, he notified TSA in advance that additional screeners would be
needed before the peak summer travel season. However, an assessment
center was not opened until mid-June 2003, and the FSD had to request
assistance from TSA's Mobile Screening Force,[Footnote 15] a team of
TSA screeners deployed around the country where additional screening
staff are needed. These screeners were in place for 2 months while TSA
scheduled and conducted screener applicant assessments and trained
candidates who were selected for employment by the private screening
company. The private screening contractor and the FSD at this airport
told us that the inability to hire screeners during the first several
months of the attrition problem contributed to screener performance
issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and screener complacency
because screeners were aware that they were unlikely to be terminated
due to staffing shortages.
Pilot program contractors have requested the opportunity to
independently establish and operate assessment centers on an as needed
basis. Accordingly, in December 2003 and February 2004, TSA submitted
to the screening contractors requests for proposals for additional
flexibilities. TSA's December 12, 2003, request for proposal, which
solicited input from the private screening contractors on potential
program innovations regarding day-to-day operations, was followed by a
more specific request for proposals, dated February 24, 2004, to
provide human resource services, such as screener assessments,
qualification, examination, and selection of security screener
candidates.[Footnote 16] TSA received proposals from 3 of the private
screening contractors, and found that they were insufficient in meeting
the requirements set forth in the request for proposal.[Footnote 17]
However, TSA officials said they are providing the contractors a second
chance to clarify their proposals.
Private Screening Contractors Have Limited Authority to Implement
Training:
According to TSA, there are three key elements of passenger screening
training: (1) basic training, (2) recurrent (refresher) training, and
(3) remedial training. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic
screener training program comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of
classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training for all
passenger and baggage screeners. TSA also requires private and federal
screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week,
averaged over a quarter. Consistent with ATSA, TSA further requires
remedial training for any private or federal screener who fails an
operational test.[Footnote 18]
Representatives of the private screening contractors stated that a
challenge they face in implementing their screening functions is the
limitations TSA places on them in developing and implementing locally
based training programs. Private screening contractors at the pilot
program airports are required to participate in the basic screener
training provided by TSA's training contractor and to maintain the same
recurrent and remedial training curriculums used by TSA. To provide
training beyond TSA's curriculums, the private screening contractors
must have their training reviewed and approved by TSA. Contractors
expressed concern that TSA had either rejected or was slow to approve
their requests to provide additional training outside of TSA's approved
curriculum. This was of particular concern during the first year of the
pilot program when TSA had not yet deployed a recurrent or supervisory
training program to airports to ensure that screeners were effectively
trained and supervised. TSA officials told us, on the other hand, that
the private screening contractors have yet to submit any requests for
approval of locally developed recurrent training.
Private screening contractors also expressed concerns about the lack of
specific feedback regarding screeners' performance on the annual
recertification tests, which assess their proficiency in identifying
threat objects and adhering to standard operating procedures. TSA
stores the results of the recertification tests in a database that FSDs
can access to determine whether screeners for their respective airports
passed or failed. However, private screening contractors told us they
cannot view how screeners performed on specific questions. These
performance data would provide private screening contractors with
information on the specific training needs of screeners, and enable
them to appropriately tailor training to address screener performance
deficiencies at their airports.
FSDs at Airports with Federal Screeners Faced Similar Challenges as
Contractors:
FSDs at airports with federal screeners faced many of the same
challenges as the private screening contractors, particularly regarding
imposed staffing levels, a cumbersome hiring process, and limited
flexibility in implementing local training programs. In September 2003,
we reported that FSDs had little input in determining their screener
staffing levels.[Footnote 19] Since then, FSDs have continued to
express concerns about their limited role in establishing airport-
specific staffing levels and the need for realistic staffing levels
based on the unique needs of each airport. In February 2004, we
reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with
the lack of a continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost
through attrition, and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an
as needed basis.[Footnote 20] The FSDs also complained of the time lag
between their requests for additional staff and having trained and
certified screeners onboard. Some FSDs reported that this time lag has
hindered their ability to provide sufficient resources to staff
screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their
airports. Contractors at 3 of the pilot program airports reported
difficulties in getting an assessment center established for hiring at
their airport, particularly after the first cadre of screeners had been
hired, trained, and deployed. Likewise, an FSD at an airport with
federal screeners reported that inadequate staffing is his most
critical issue. He stated that to address the staffing inadequacies and
maintain a reasonably acceptable passenger wait time level, FSD staff
and screening management personnel have assisted in staffing of exit
lanes, checking boarding passes, and transporting bags, among other
tasks. However, he noted that these practices are not sustainable in
the long term.
We recently surveyed all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations.
As of April 13, 2004, we had a response rate of about 90 percent for
our general survey and about 85 percent for our airport-specific
survey.[Footnote 21] We asked the FSDs the extent to which they needed
additional authority to perform their staffing and screening
operations. As shown in table 2, the overwhelming majority of the FSDs,
and in two instances all five of the FSDs at the pilot program
airports, reported that they needed additional authority to a great or
very great extent.
Table 2: Summary of Selected FSD Survey Responses as of April 13, 2004:
"In your opinion, to what extent, if at all, do you need or would you
like to have the following to better address specific staffing or
security needs at the airport(s) that you oversee?"
Greater authority in determining the number of screeners;
Very great extent: Federal: 78%;
Very great extent: Pilot: 100%;
Great extent: Federal: 15%;
Great extent: Pilot: 0;
Moderate extent: Federal: 6%;
Moderate extent: Pilot: 0;
Some or little extent: Federal: 1%;
Some or little extent: Pilot: 0;
No extent: Federal: 0;
No extent: Pilot: 0.
Greater authority in the selection of screeners;
Very great extent: Federal: 67%;
Very great extent: Pilot: 100%;
Great extent: Federal: 19%;
Great extent: Pilot: 0;
Moderate extent: Federal: 10%;
Moderate extent: Pilot: 0;
Some or little extent: Federal: 3%;
Some or little extent: Pilot: 0;
No extent: Federal: 1%;
No extent: Pilot: 0.
More flexibility to design and conduct local training;
Very great extent: Federal: 44%;
Very great extent: Pilot: 80%;
Great extent: Federal: 24%;
Great extent: Pilot: 20%;
Moderate extent: Federal: 25%;
Moderate extent: Pilot: 0;
Some or little extent: Federal: 4%;
Some or little extent: Pilot: 0;
No extent: Federal: 1%;
No extent: Pilot: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of survey of 155 FSDs, including the five FSDs at
airports with private screeners.
Note: The percentages do not total 100 because we did not include the
not applicable/no opinion response.
[End of table]
Flexibilities Have Been Provided to Private Screeners in a Few Areas:
Although, overall, TSA has not provided private screening contractors
with much operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement
some airport-specific practices. Practices implemented by the private
screening contractors include screening candidates before they are
hired though the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order
to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and promoting screener
supervisors from within rather than hiring them directly from the
assessment center. These practices have enabled the private screening
contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available to
FSDs at airports with federal screeners.
Contractors Have Greater Role than FSDs in Screener Selection Process:
Although the private screening contractors can only hire applicants who
have been screened through the assessment center, the contractors have
greater flexibility than FSDs at airports with federal screeners in
weeding out candidates they deem unsuitable. For example, at one
airport, following the applicants' successful completion of the first
assessment phase at the assessment center, the private screening
contractor interviews the candidates to assess whether the company
thinks they are a good fit for the job. Individuals whom the contractor
agrees to hire are sent through the second phase at the assessment
center and, upon successful completion of that assessment phase, to
training. FSDs at airports with federal screeners have expressed the
need for a role in the hiring process. Several FSDs told us that it is
important for them or their staff to participate in the hiring process
to both build a rapport with the screeners early in the process and to
determine whether the screener candidates would be a good fit for their
airport, thereby possibly reducing the high levels of attrition. TSA
officials told us that they are planning to redesign and streamline
TSA's hiring process, particularly the assessment center process, to
allow for greater involvement by FSDs and their staff. Specifically,
officials reported that they are beginning to (1) ensure that the
recruiting contractor includes the FSD in recruiting planning,
including obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor
recruits; (2) allow FSDs to participate with TSA's hiring contractor in
the structured interview of the candidates; and (3) ensure that FSDs
swear in the candidates and provide organizational briefings on their
first day of orientation.
TSA Allowed Contractor to Hire Baggage Handlers:
TSA has also allowed a private screening contractor to hire baggage
handlers to enhance checked baggage screening operations. The
contractor uses baggage handlers instead of trained baggage screeners
to move checked baggage to and from the explosive detection system or
explosive trace detection equipment and onward through the baggage
system. While the baggage handlers still count toward the full-time
equivalent authorized staffing level established by TSA for that
individual airport, both TSA and the contractor report that this
flexibility has provided a means to reduce costs without diminishing
security by allowing trained baggage screeners to devote a greater
proportion of time to screening bags. The contractor officials also
told us that while they were operating below their authorized staffing
levels, they were still able to effectively operate screening
checkpoints due in part to their use of baggage handlers.[Footnote 22]
TSA has not provided FSDs with the authority to hire baggage handlers,
and thus, FSDs at airports with federal screeners where baggage
handlers would be useful are more limited in their ability to
efficiently maximize staffing resources.
This contractor is working with a local university to set up a program
where college students working as baggage handlers would earn a regular
hourly wage and tuition reimbursements in lieu of benefits. Officials
at this company told us that the use of baggage handlers would provide
relief to current full-time screeners by relieving them of time spent
carrying bags to and from checked baggage screening systems and enable
them to focus more on screening functions. While this proposal has yet
to be implemented, it demonstrates how private screening contractors
might use their flexibility to recruit employees. In contrast, TSA
officials told us that the agency has not established a tuition
reimbursement program for federal screeners.
Selecting Screener Supervisors from Within:
TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense
in detecting threat objects. During the initial hiring of screeners,
TSA's hiring contractor selected screener supervisors for both the
airports with federal and private screeners. However, one of the
private screening contractors did not hire screener supervisors
directly through TSA's assessment center process, but instead hired all
applicants as screeners and, after monitoring their performance,
promoted screeners to the supervisor position. Thus, rather than
accepting the decisions of TSA's hiring contractor regarding applicants
who would be suitable supervisors, it determined which screeners should
be made supervisors based on actual screener performance. This decision
to promote from within gave the private screening contractor more
decision-making authority in the staffing selection process. In
contrast, many of the FSDs we interviewed and numerous FSDs who have
responded to our FSD survey reported that they were dissatisfied with
the quality of the screening supervisors initially assigned to the
airport. FSDs have attempted to address this performance gap by
conducting subsequent promotions based on their observations of
screeners' ability to effectively supervise staff.
Little Information Exists to Measure Differences in Performance of
Private and Federal Screeners:
Little performance data are currently available to compare the
performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting
threat objects. The primary source of performance data currently
available is the results of the covert tests performed by TSA's OIAPR,
in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through
screening checkpoints and in checked baggage. However, relatively
limited testing has been conducted to date. Although the results of the
covert testing cannot be generalized either to the airports in which
the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide
an indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects. The
results indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners
performed similarly. Specifically, the covert testing identified
weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to
detect threat objects. TSA is in the process of collecting and
analyzing additional performance data on screener performance,
including data from the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which
places images of threat objects on the x-ray screen during actual
operations and records whether screeners identify threat objects, and
the annual screener recertification program. TSA has recognized the
need to enhance screener performance and has taken steps in this
direction, including enhancing its recurrent training program.
TSA Has Enhanced Efforts to Measure Screener Performance:
TSA recognized the need to strengthen its assessment of the private and
federal screener workforces and has taken action in this vein.
Specifically, TSA has increased its covert testing, fully activated TIP
and deployed a new library of 2,400 TIP images, and implemented the
screener recertification program. However, with the exception of the
covert testing and recent TIP data, data are not yet available to
assess how well screeners are performing; how the performance of
federal and private screeners compare; and what steps, if any, TSA
needs to take to improve performance. In September 2003, TSA also hired
BearingPoint, a consultant, to evaluate the performance of the contract
screening program. The consultant's report was delivered to TSA on
April 9, 2004, but TSA has not yet publicly released the results of the
study.
Covert Testing:
TSA's OIAPR conducts unannounced covert tests of screeners to assess
their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved
procedures. These tests, in which undercover OIAPR inspectors attempt
to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked
baggage, are designed to identify systematic problems affecting the
performance of screeners in the areas of training, policy, and
technology.[Footnote 23] Currently, OIAPR's covert test results are the
primary available data source on screener performance in detecting
threat objects. However, relatively limited testing has been conducted
to date. Between September 9, 2002, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR
conducted 1,164 checkpoint tests on passenger screeners at 127 airports
and 245 tests on baggage screeners at 119 airports.[Footnote 24] Of the
1,164 checkpoint tests OIAPR conducted, 98 were performed at the 5
pilot program airports and 1,066 were performed at airports with
federal screeners. Of the 245 checked baggage tests, 10 were performed
at the 5 pilot program airports and 235 were performed at airports with
federal screeners. Overall, these tests have shown weaknesses in both
private and federal screeners' ability to detect threat objects. While
the results of OIAPR's covert tests cannot be generalized either to the
airports in which the tests have been conducted or to airports
nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in
detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in general,
private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the
testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and
federal screeners to detect threat objects. Similar testing conducted
by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General
has also identified comparable screener performance weaknesses.
OIAPR initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger
rather than baggage screeners. While OIAPR began conducting covert
tests of passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin
conducting covert tests of checked baggage screeners until January
2003. Consequently, OIAPR has collected less data related to the
performance of baggage screeners. OIAPR has increased the number of
checkpoint and checked baggage tests it conducts in recent months.
Additionally, TSA is developing protocols to help FSDs conduct their
own airport level screening testing--a practice that TSA had previously
prohibited at all airports, including those with private screeners.
TIP System:
Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting
threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to
test screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat images,
including guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened during
actual operations. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying
the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted,
TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then
records the screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed
for performance trends. TSA only recently began collecting and
analyzing TIP data and TIP is not yet available for baggage
screening.[Footnote 25]
TSA is not currently using TIP data as a formal indicator of screener
performance, but instead is using TIP to identify individual screeners'
training needs in terms of identifying threat objects on the X-ray
machine.[Footnote 26] TSA recently completed deploying and activating
TIP with the new library of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the more than
1,800 passenger screening lanes nationwide.[Footnote 27] TSA considers
February 2004 to be the first full month of TIP reporting with the new
library of 2,400 images. TSA collected these data in early March 2004.
Officials told us that they plan to analyze at least 3 months of data-
-February, March, and April 2004--to determine more precisely how the
data can be used to measure screener performance in detecting threat
objects and to validate what the data tells TSA about screener
performance. Additionally, officials stated that they plan to use TIP
as an evaluation tool once sufficient data are collected to establish
firm performance standards.
Annual Recertification Program:
A third indicator of screener performance is the results of the annual
recertification testing. ATSA requires that TSA collect performance
information on all screeners by conducting an annual proficiency
evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications
and standards related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet
this requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program
comprised of two assessment components, one of the screener's knowledge
and skills and the other of the screener's performance. The knowledge
and skills assessment program consists of three modules: (1) knowledge
of standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3)
practical demonstration of skills. As part of the performance
assessment, screeners are rated on both organizational and individual
goals, such as maintaining the nation's air security, vigilantly
carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will prevent
security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to
travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction with screening
services. To be certified, a screener must have passed all the
applicable modules and have a rating of "met" or "exceeded" standards
on their annual performance assessment.
Screeners have completed all three modules of the knowledge and skills
assessment program. TSA is currently analyzing the results of the
fiscal year 2004 recertification tests and plans to report on the
results of the certification process to TSA's Acting Administrator in
late April 2004.[Footnote 28] The report will include the results of
all three modules of the knowledge and skills assessment tests, the
outcomes of screener performance assessments, and the total number of
screeners terminated due to failure to successfully pass the
recertification program.[Footnote 29]
TSA Efforts to Enhance Performance of Private and Federal Screeners:
In October 2003, TSA began implementing a screening performance
improvement program for private and federal screeners. The goal of the
program is to improve screener performance through several training and
management initiatives, including increasing covert testing at
screening checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports,
enhancing screener training, and strengthening supervisors' skills
through leadership and technical training. As part of TSA's efforts to
enhance screener performance, TSA requires all screeners to participate
in 3 hours of training per week averaged over each quarter. One hour is
required to be devoted to X-ray image interpretation and the other 2
hours to screening techniques or reviews of standard operating
procedures. TSA recently provided FSDs at all airports, including
airports with private screeners, with additional training tools.
Specifically, according to TSA officials, TSA has:
* provided every airport, including the 5 pilot program airports, with
at least one Modular Bomb Set (MBS II) kit--containing components of an
improvised explosive device--and one weapons training kit, in part
because screeners had consistently told OIAPR inspectors that they
would like more training with test objects similar to ones used in the
tests;[Footnote 30]
* instituted a program called "Threat in the Spotlight" that, based on
intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat
information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past
screening checkpoints;
* established video training and fielded the first two videos in the
series; and:
* fielded an Online Learning Center--a Web based tool with 366 self-
guided training courses available to all screening staff, including
staff at the 5 pilot program airports.
As we reported in February 2004,[Footnote 31] staffing shortages and
lack of high-speed connectivity[Footnote 32] at airport training
facilities have made it difficult for screeners to fully utilize these
programs. According to TSA officials, the Online Learning Center is now
available via the Internet and the Intranet; therefore the issues of
connectivity have been mitigated.[Footnote 33] In January 2004, OIAPR
began to gather data on selected training initiatives and to conduct
repeat covert testing at airports. At each of the airports OIAPR
visited to conduct covert tests between January 5, 2004, and February
1, 2004, OIAPR inspectors interviewed screeners about whether they had
participated in the training initiatives. Based on these interviews,
OIAPR found that the training initiatives they discussed with the
screeners had not been fully implemented at every airport.
TSA officials said that they have begun to focus attention on airports
where screeners performed particularly poorly on covert tests. For
example, TSA officials said that mobile training assist teams were
deployed in November 2003 to identify causes of poor performance at
these airports and work with FSDs to devise and implement solutions.
Additionally, in January 2004, OIAPR began conducting repeat covert
testing at airports to determine whether TSA's initiatives designed to
enhance screener performance, such as additional recurrent training,
have in fact improved performance.[Footnote 34] Furthermore, FSDs are
to be held accountable for screening performance and delivery of
security. Specifically, annual performance assessments for all FSDs are
to be tied to the overall performance level of their screeners as well
as to their ability to address deficiencies quickly and adequately.
Despite its efforts to collect screener performance data and enhance
screener performance, TSA officials acknowledged that they had not
established overall performance targets by which to assess whether
screeners within and across airports are achieving a desired level of
performance. However, TSA has made progress in establishing performance
standards for one screening function--X-ray image interpretation. In
March 2004, TSA established interim TIP performance standards and plans
to finalize these standards in May 2004. TSA is currently considering
developing performance indexes for representing the performance of
passenger and baggage screeners. During the remainder of our review, we
plan to continue to examine TSA's efforts to measure screeners'
performance, establish performance standards, and assess the
performance of the private screening pilot program. As part of this
effort, we will review the results of the BearingPoint, Inc. evaluation
of the private screening pilot program, which was provided to TSA on
April 9, 2004.
Concluding Observations:
The private screening pilot program was not established in a way to
enable an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of
federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences. In
developing the pilot program, TSA did not develop an evaluation plan or
performance targets by which to assess how the performance of federal
and private screening compares. Additionally, TSA did not collect data
in ways that would enable it to reach generalizable conclusions about
the performance of private screeners. Further, the program was not
designed to achieve its intended mission, as defined by TSA--to test
the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport
level that contractors may provide. Key operational areas, such as
staffing and training have to a large extent been held constant across
all airports, and therefore, are not within the control of the private
screening contractors. Therefore, it is not surprising that TSA's
available screener performance data indicate little difference between
federal or private screeners in detecting threat objects. It would have
been informative to have an evaluation of a true pilot program where
the private screening contractors were provided with operational
flexibility that could assist in identifying practices that lead to
improved screener performance and higher security at the most efficient
cost to the taxpayer. Without data to better assess the performance of
private screening operations and flexible practices, TSA and airport
operators have little information on which to plan for the possible
transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening
contractor. We will continue our work and make recommendations for TSA
actions, as appropriate, in a future report.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information and Acknowledgements:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin
at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Dave Hooper, Christopher
Jones, Thomas Lombardi, Stuart Kaufmann, Maria Strudwick, Cady Summers,
and Susan Zimmerman.
FOOTNOTES
[1] FSDs are responsible for providing day-to-day operational direction
for federal security at airports. Additionally, the FSD is the ranking
TSA authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA
security activities at the airports.
[2] An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA's hiring
contractor assembles to conduct assessments of screener applicants. The
centers are generally constructed at locations such as hotels and TSA
training facilities that are in close proximity to the airport(s) where
the FSDs have requested additional staff.
[3] Baggage handlers move baggage from carts to belts and back. They do
not perform any screening functions, nor are they hired through TSA's
assessment centers.
[4] OIAPR conducts covert tests designed to (1) assess screeners'
ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved
procedures and (2) identify systemic problems in the areas of training,
policy, and technology.
[5] The results of the tests cannot be generalized either to the
airports in which the tests have been conducted or to airports
nationwide because the sample tests were not identified using the
principles of probability sampling. For cost and operational reasons,
however, using probability sampling techniques to identify sample tests
may not be feasible.
[6] We cannot disclose the actual results of the covert tests because
they are classified.
[7] There are five categories of airports--X, I, II, III, and IV.
Category X airports have the largest number of enplanements and
category IV airports have the smallest number.
[8] Federal screeners must be either United States citizens or
nationals of the United States (persons who, though not citizens of the
United States, owe permanent allegiance to the United States).
[9] A federal security director and his or her management team,
including screening managers, oversee screening operations at each of
the airports with private screening contractors.
[10] Human factors refers to the demands a job places on the
capabilities of, and the constraints it imposes on the individuals
performing the function. Some of these factors include repetitive tasks
screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to detect
threat objects, and the stress involved in dealing with the public who
may dislike being screened or demand faster action to avoid missing
their flights.
[11] ATSA gave TSA the responsibility to review the requests for those
airports wishing to opt out of using TSA screeners in November 2004.
TSA contracted with BearingPoint Inc., to develop an evaluation plan
for assessing screening at the pilot program airports, and conduct an
evaluation of the performance of private screening contractors, as well
as compare screener performance at airports with TSA screeners.
[12] The staffing model took into account factors such as the number of
screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers;
projected air carrier service increases and decreases during calendar
year 2003; and hours needed to accommodate screener training, leave,
and breaks.
[13] One full-time equivalent is equal to 1 work year or 2,080 non
overtime hours.
[14] Specifically, the consultant is to, among other tasks, develop a
model for collecting and analyzing data to realistically portray
specific airport conditions rather than using a generalized large/small
airport protocol; develop a comprehensive modeling approach with
appropriate details to account for the considerable variability that
occurs among airports; and implement a staffing analysis model to be
used as a management tool to determine daily and weekly staffing levels
and deploy the model to commercial airports nationwide.
[15] TSA's Mobile Screening Force--replaced by the National Screening
Force--was created in early 2002 primarily to support the initial
deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports. The National
Screening Force provides screening support to all commercial airports
in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special
circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than currently
available to FSDs.
[16] In addition to stating the required standards that each private
contractor must meet during the hiring process, the request details
TSA's expectations for the proposals. For example, the request requires
the contractor to propose the manner in which administration of the
assessments will be accomplished, including the most effective and
efficient way to deliver the assessments.
[17] TSA officials said they had not received any proposals in response
to the December 2003 request for proposal.
[18] ATSA requires that screeners who fail an operational test be
prohibited from performing the screening function related to the test
they failed until they successfully complete remedial training on that
screening function.
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening:
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining,
GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges
Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening
Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[21] We sent two surveys to the Federal Security Directors on March 23,
2004. In the general survey, we asked FSDs to answer security-related
questions that will pertain to all of the airports for which he/she is
responsible. In the airport-specific survey, we asked FSDs a number of
airport-specific questions about screening and other security concerns.
[22] The same contractor also has a system in place to continuously
monitor lines at checkpoints and check-in counters in order to deploy
resources where they are most needed. This system, which uses security
cameras at an airport operations center that was already in place at
the airport, is used to determine if and where screeners should be
redeployed. The monitoring system has also contributed to the
contractor's ability to effectively operate below its authorized
staffing level. TSA officials told us that any FSD could work with an
airport that has such an operations center in place to implement this
effort.
[23] The descriptions of OIAPR's various covert tests are classified.
OIAPR designs its covert testing methods based, in part, on
intelligence regarding the most recent threats.
[24] As of February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted covert tests at 137
airports, of which 109 included tests of both passenger and checked
baggage screening. Additionally, OIAPR conducted repeat testing at 27
airports--2 of which were tested three times and 25 of which were
tested twice. Of the 5 pilot program airports, 1 was tested 3 times and
the remaining 4 were tested twice.
[25] TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve
technical challenges associated with using TIP for checked baggage
screening on explosives detection systems (EDS) and have started EDS
TIP image development. On April 15, TSA issued a request for proposal
inviting EDS vendors and other third-party vendors to submit research
proposals to improve TIP training technology for EDS.
[26] TSA officials said TIP performance information has been available
to FSDs on a local level since full activation in January 2004.
[27] TIP is not yet operational at one airport (an airport with federal
screeners) due to construction at the screening checkpoint to prepare
for its installation. However, the TIP-ready X-ray machines have
already been procured for the airport and will be installed once the
construction issues have been resolved.
[28] Screeners certified at the end of their on-the-job training on or
before June 30, 2003, must complete the fiscal year 2004
recertification program. All other screeners are to participate in the
annual certification process for fiscal year 2005.
[29] Based on the results of the screener recertification testing, TSA
officials anticipate terminating less than 1 percent of the screener
workforce due to failure to successfully pass the recertification
testing.
[30] The MBS II and weapons training kits were fielded to airports to
address the identified training gap by allowing screeners to see and
feel the threat objects that they are looking for. These kits contain
some of the test objects used by OIAPR to conduct the covert testing.
[31] GAO-04-440T.
[32] High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.
[33] TSA officials stated that the Chief Information Officer's office
is currently working with FSDs who have not received high-speed
connectivity to identify alternative means of connectivity.
[34] Between January 5, 2004, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted
repeat testing at 15 airports. OIAPR officials reported that they
conducted repeat testing at an additional 29 airports between February
2, 2004, and March 31, 2004.
