9/11 Commission Report
Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing Gao ID: GAO-04-1033T August 3, 2004The sorrow, loss, anger, and resolve so evident immediately following the September 11, 2001, attacks have been combined in an effort to help assure that our country will never again be caught unprepared. As the 9/11 Commission notes, we are safer today but we are not safe, and much work remains. Although in today's world we can never be 100 percent secure, and we can never do everything everywhere, we concur with the Commission's conclusion that the American people should expect their government to do its very best. GAO's mission is to help the Congress improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO has been actively involved in improving government's performance in the critically important homeland security area both before and after the September 11 attacks. In its request, the House Committee on Government Reform have asked GAO to address two issues: the lack of effective information sharing and analysis and the need for executive branch reorganization in response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Further, the Committee has asked GAO to address how to remedy problems in information sharing and analysis by transforming the intelligence community from a system of "need to know" to one of a "need to share."
The 9/11 Commission has recommended several transformational changes, such as the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for joint operational planning and joint intelligence and replacing the current Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director (NID) to oversee national intelligence centers across the federal government. The NID would manage the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it. On August 2, 2004, the President asked Congress to create a NID position to be the principal intelligence advisor, appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate and serving at the pleasure of the President. Unlike the 9/11 Commission, the President did not propose that the NID be within the Executive Office of the President. He also announced that he will establish a NCTC whose Director would report to the NID, and that this center would build upon the analytic work of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center. He suggested that a separate center may be necessary for issues of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, he endorsed the 9/11 Commission's call for reorganization of the Congressional oversight structure. There are, however, several substantive differences between the President's proposal and the Commission's recommendations. While praising the work of the 9/11 Commission, and endorsing several of its major recommendations in concept, the President differed with the Commission on certain issues. These differences reflect that reasoned and reasonable individuals may differ, and that several methods may exist to effectuate the transformational changes recommended. However, certain common principles and factors outlined in this statement today should help guide the debate ahead. Although the creation of a NID and a NCTC would be major changes for the intelligence community, other structural and management changes have occurred and are continuing to occur in government that provide lessons for the intelligence community transformation. While the intelligence community has historically been addressed separately from the remainder of the federal government, and while it undoubtedly performs some unique missions that present unique issues, its major transformational challenges in large measure are the same as those that face most government agencies. As a result, GAO's findings, recommendations, and experience in reshaping the federal government to meet Twenty-First Century challenges will be directly relevant to the intelligence community and the recommendations proposed by the 9/11 Commission. The goal of improving information sharing and analysis with a focus upon the needs of the consumers of such improved information for specific types of threats can provide one of the powerful guiding principles necessary for successful transformation. This testimony covers four major points. First, it describes the rationale for improving effective information sharing and analysis, and suggest some ways to achieve positive results. Second, it provides some overview perspectives on reorganizational approaches to improve performance and note necessary cautions. Third, it illustrates that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative or any effort to transform the cultures of government agencies, including that of the intelligence community. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of results-oriented strategic planning and implementation for the intelligence arena, focusing management attention on outcomes, not outputs, and the need for effective accountability and oversight to maintain focus upon improving performance. It concludes by applying these concepts and principles to the challenges of reform in the intelligence community.
GAO-04-1033T, 9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
9/11 Commission Report:
Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing:
Statement of the Honorable David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
GAO-04-1033T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We at GAO applaud the efforts of the 9/11 Commission and the dedicated
family members of the victims of that tragic day whose combined efforts
have resulted in a definitive account of the past events, and a number
of constructive recommendations for the future. The sorrow, loss,
anger, and resolve so evident immediately following the September 11,
2001, attacks have been combined in an effort to help assure that our
country will never again be caught unprepared. As the Commission notes,
we are safer today but we are not safe, and much work remains. Although
in today's world we can never be 100 percent secure, and we can never
do everything everywhere, we concur with the Commission's conclusion
that the American people should expect their government to do its very
best.
GAO's mission is to help the Congress improve the performance and
ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of
the American people. GAO has been actively involved in improving
government's performance in the critically important homeland security
area both before and after the September 11 attacks. For example, GAO
issued over 100 reports on homeland security-related issues and
recommended the creation of a national focal point for homeland
security before the attacks. We have also been privileged to actively
support this Congress and the 9/11 Commission through details of key
personnel, testimony before the Congress and the Commission, and
sharing our research, products, and experiences.
Just a few days after the tragic events of September 11, I testified
about various challenges and strategies to address both our short-and
long-term homeland security needs and outlined a framework for
addressing our nation's efforts. I emphasized that we as a nation must
find the best ways to sustain our efforts over a significant time
period, and leverage our finite human, financial, and technological
resources in ways that would have the greatest impact. At that time, I
identified several key questions that our government needed to address
in order to improve the security of the homeland:[Footnote 1]
1. What are our vision and national objectives to make our homeland
more secure?
2. What essential elements should constitute the government's strategy
for securing the homeland?
3. How should the executive branch and the Congress be organized to
address these issues?
4. How should we assess the effectiveness of any homeland security
strategy implementation to address the spectrum of threats?
During the past few years, we have seen major efforts to address these
questions, such as the formation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and major initiatives such as strengthened passenger and baggage
screening, increased border patrols, reform of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the creation of the Northern Command. However,
as the 9/11 Commission and our own work indicates, these questions are
yet to be fully addressed.
GAO has continued to explore these topics on behalf of this Committee
and the Congress, issuing over 200 homeland security related products
since the September 11 attacks, developing over 500 recommendations for
action, testifying on over 90 occasions before the Congress, and
working closely with the Congress and federal agencies, including the
FBI, the Department of Defense (DOD), and DHS, to implement key
recommendations to improve homeland security mission performance,
improve government efficiency, and promote enhanced accountability and
oversight to assure the American people that the federal government is
doing all that can reasonably be expected.
In your request, you have asked me to address two issues: the lack of
effective information sharing and analysis and the need for executive
branch reorganization in response to the 9/11 Commission
recommendations. Further, you have asked me to address how to remedy
problems in information sharing and analysis by transforming the
intelligence community from a system of "need to know" to one of a
"need to share." The 9/11 Commission has recommended several
transformational changes, such as the establishment of a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for joint operational planning and joint
intelligence and replacing the current Director of Central Intelligence
with a National Intelligence Director (NID) to oversee national
intelligence centers across the federal government. The NID would
manage the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that
contribute to it.
Yesterday, on August 2, 2004, the President asked Congress to create a
NID position to be the principal intelligence advisor, appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate and serving at the
pleasure of the President. Unlike the 9/11 Commission, the President
did not propose that the NID be within the Executive Office of the
President. He also announced that he will establish a NCTC whose
Director would report to the NID, and that this center would build upon
the analytic work of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
He suggested that a separate center may be necessary for issues of
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, he endorsed the 9/11 Commission's
call for reorganization of the Congressional oversight structure. There
are, however, several substantive differences between the President's
proposal and the Commission's recommendations.
While praising the work of the 9/11 Commission, and endorsing several
of its major recommendations in concept, the President differed with
the Commission on certain issues. These differences reflect that
reasoned and reasonable individuals may differ, and that several
methods may exist to effectuate the transformational changes
recommended. However, certain common principles and factors outlined in
my statement today should help guide the debate ahead.
Although the creation of a NID and a NCTC would be major changes for
the intelligence community, other structural and management changes
have occurred and are continuing to occur in government that provide
lessons for the intelligence community transformation. While the
intelligence community has historically been addressed separately from
the remainder of the federal government, and while it undoubtedly
performs some unique missions that present unique issues (e.g., the
protection of sources and methods) its major transformational
challenges in large measure are the same as those that face most
government agencies.
As a result, GAO's findings, recommendations, and experience in
reshaping the federal government to meet Twenty-First Century
challenges will be directly relevant to the intelligence community and
the recommendations proposed by the 9/11 Commission. Reorganizing
government can be an immensely complex activity with both opportunities
and risks. As a result, those who propose to reorganize government must
make their rationale clear and build a consensus for change if proposed
reorganizations are to succeed and be sustained. All key players must
be involved in the process.
The goal of improving information sharing and analysis with a focus
upon the needs of the consumers of such improved information for
specific types of threats can provide one of the powerful guiding
principles necessary for successful transformation. The elevated threat
advisory (orange alert) issued this past weekend for certain financial
institutions in particular regions dramatically illustrates the value
of improved analysis and sharing of information specific enough to
guide effective and efficient preparedness actions by those most at
risk. Earlier threat advisories issued by DHS were criticized for lack
of specificity, "one size fits all" applicability, and lack of
"actionable" information.
In my testimony today, I will cover four major points. First, I
describe the rationale for improving effective information sharing and
analysis, and suggest some ways to achieve positive results.
Improvements would include, for example, developing a comprehensive and
coordinated national plan to facilitate information sharing and
relationships. Second, I provide some overview perspectives on
reorganizational approaches to improve performance and note necessary
cautions. For example, the Congress has an important role to play in
the design and implementation of a new structure, and oversight will be
key to success. Third, I illustrate that strategic human capital
management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management
initiative or any effort to transform the cultures of government
agencies, including that of the intelligence community. Strategic
management includes, for example, consideration of human capital
flexibilities. Finally, I emphasize the importance of results-oriented
strategic planning and implementation for the intelligence arena,
focusing management attention on outcomes, not outputs, and the need
for effective accountability and oversight to maintain focus upon
improving performance. For example, much more attention needs to be
paid to defining goals and measures, and providing for increased
oversight of the performance of the intelligence community. I conclude
by applying these concepts and principles to the challenges of reform
in the intelligence community.
This testimony draws upon our wide-ranging, completed, and ongoing
work, and our institutional knowledge on homeland security, combating
terrorism, and various government organizational and management issues.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Stronger Intelligence Sharing Is Needed:
Mr. Chairman, there is a continuing and heightened need for better and
more effective and comprehensive information sharing. We agree the
intelligence community needs to move from a culture of "need to know"
to "need to share." The 9/11 Commission has made observations regarding
information sharing, and recommended procedures to provide incentives
for sharing and creating a "trusted information network." Many
Commission recommendations address the need to improve information and
intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis within the intelligence
community itself. In addition, we must not lose sight of the fact that
the purpose of improving information analysis and sharing is to provide
better information throughout the federal government, and ultimately
also to state and local governments, the private sector, and our
citizens, so that collectively we are all better prepared. I want to
make it clear that such information sharing must protect confidential
sources and methods, and we do not propose any changes that would
infringe upon those protections.
In addition, as the Congress considers the Commission's
recommendations, I would also recommend that it consider the role that
state and local agencies and the private sector should play as informed
partners in homeland security. The Commission's work, as is the case
with our own observations, notes the changing perspective of "federal"
versus "other entities'" roles in homeland security and homeland
defense. In performing its constitutional role of providing for the
common defense, we have observed that the federal government must
prevent and deter terrorist attacks on our homeland as well as detect
impending danger before attacks occurs. Although it may be impossible
to detect, prevent, or deter every attack, steps can and must be taken
to reduce the risk posed by the threats to homeland security.
Furthermore, in order to be successful in this area, the federal
government must partner with a variety of organizations, both domestic
and international.
Traditionally, protecting the homeland against threats was generally
considered a federal responsibility. To meet this responsibility, the
federal government (within and across federal agencies) gathers
intelligence, which is often classified as national security
information. This information is protected and safeguarded to prevent
unauthorized access by requiring appropriate security clearances and a
"need to know." Normally, the federal government did not share
national-level intelligence with states and cities, since they were not
viewed as having a significant role in preventing terrorism. Therefore,
the federal government did not generally grant state and city officials
access to classified information. After the September 11 attacks,
however, the view that states and cities do not have a significant role
in homeland security changed, and the "need to share" intelligence
information became clear.[Footnote 2]
However, reconciling the need to share with actually sharing has been
at the heart of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and our own
findings and observations on practices to improve information sharing.
In work begun before the September 11 attacks,[Footnote 3] we reported
on information-sharing practices of organizations that successfully
share sensitive or time-critical information. We found that these
practices include:
* establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and
nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially
useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents,
* developing standards and agreements on how shared information will be
used and protected,
* establishing effective and appropriately secure communications
mechanisms, and:
* taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not
inappropriately disseminated.
As you might recall, we also testified before this committee last year
on information sharing. GAO has made numerous recommendations related
to sharing, particularly as they relate to fulfilling DHS's critical
infrastructure protection responsibilities.[Footnote 4] The Homeland
Security Information Sharing Act, included in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), requires the President to prescribe and
implement procedures for facilitating homeland security information
sharing and establishes authorities to share different types of
information, such as grand jury information; electronic, wire, and oral
interception information; and foreign intelligence information. In July
2003, the President assigned these functions to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, but no deadline was established for developing such
information sharing procedures.
To accomplish its missions, DHS must gain access to, receive, and
analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and
other threat, incident, and vulnerability information from federal and
nonfederal sources, and it must analyze such information to identify
and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. DHS must also
share information both internally and externally with agencies and law
enforcement on such things as goods and passengers inbound to the
United States and individuals who are known or suspected terrorists and
criminals (e.g., watch lists).
As we reported in June 2002,[Footnote 5] the federal government had
made progress in developing a framework to support a more unified
effort to secure the homeland, including information sharing. However,
this work found additional needs and opportunities to enhance the
effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies with
homeland security or homeland defense responsibilities, and with
various state and city law enforcement agencies that have a key role in
homeland security, as well as with the private sector.
As we reported in August 2003,[Footnote 6] efforts to improve
intelligence and information sharing still needed to be strengthened.
Intelligence-and information-sharing initiatives implemented by states
and cities were not effectively coordinated with those of federal
agencies, nor were they coordinated within and between federal
entities. Furthermore, neither federal, state, nor city governments
considered the information-sharing process to be effective. For
example, information on threats, methods, and techniques of terrorists
was not routinely shared; information that was shared was not perceived
as timely, accurate, or relevant; and federal officials have not
established comprehensive processes or procedures to promote effective
information sharing. At that time, we recommended that the Secretary of
Homeland Security work with the heads of other federal agencies and
state and local authorities to:
* incorporate the existing information-sharing guidance that is
contained in the various national strategies and information-sharing
procedures required by the Homeland Security Act,
* establish a clearinghouse to coordinate the various information-
sharing initiatives to eliminate possible confusion and duplication of
effort,
* fully integrate states and cities into the national policy-making
process for information sharing and take steps to provide greater
assurance that actions at all levels of government are mutually
reinforcing,
* identify and address the perceived barriers to federal information
sharing, and:
* use a survey method or a related data collection approach to
determine, over time, the needs of private and public organizations for
information related to homeland security and to measure progress in
improving information sharing at all levels of government.
* DHS concurred with the above recommendations.
DHS and other federal agencies have instituted major counterterrorism
efforts involving information and intelligence sharing over the past 2
years. For example, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) was
designed to improve the collection, analysis, and sharing of all
counterterrorism intelligence gathered in the United States and
overseas. The DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(IAIP) Directorate is intended to receive intelligence from a variety
of federal sources and act as a central fusion point for all
intelligence relevant to homeland security and related critical
infrastructure protection. Furthermore, the FBI has created a new
Office of Intelligence, established a National Joint Terrorism
Taskforce, expanded its Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs), and
recently made operational an interagency joint Terrorist Screening
Center.
Although improvements had been made, we continue to identify needs,
such as developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to
facilitate information-sharing on critical infrastructure protection
(CIP); developing productive information sharing relationships among
the federal government and state and local governments and the private
sector; and providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to
increase information sharing with the federal government and enhance
other critical infrastructure protection efforts. As we recently
reported, information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) have
identified a number of challenges to effective CIP information sharing
between the federal government and state and local governments and the
private sector, including sharing information on physical and cyber
threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures,
and best practices. Such challenges include building trusted
relationships; developing processes to facilitate information sharing;
overcoming barriers to information sharing; clarifying the roles and
responsibilities of the various government and private sector entities
that are involved in protecting critical infrastructure; and funding
ISAC operations and activities.[Footnote 7]
Although DHS has taken a number of actions to implement the public/
private partnership called for by federal CIP policy, it has not yet
developed a plan that describes how it will carry out its information-
sharing responsibilities and relationships, including consideration of
appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase information
sharing with the federal government, increase sector participation, and
perform other specific tasks to protect the critical infrastructure.
Such a plan could encourage improved information sharing among the
ISACs, other CIP entities, and the department by clarifying the roles
and responsibilities of all the entities involved and clearly
articulating actions to address the challenges that remain.
The department also lacks policies and procedures to ensure effective
coordination and sharing of ISAC-provided information among the
appropriate components within the department. Developing such policies
and procedures would help ensure that information is appropriately
shared among its components and with other government and private
sector CIP entities. GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct officials within DHS to (1) proceed with the
development of an information-sharing plan that describes the roles and
responsibilities of DHS, the ISACs, and other entities and (2)
establish appropriate department policies and procedures for
interactions with other CIP entities and for coordination and
information sharing among DHS components. DHS has generally agreed with
our findings and recommendations.
DHS has also implemented the Homeland Security Advisory System.
Utilizing five color-coded threat levels, the system was established in
March 2002 to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist
acts to federal agencies, states and localities, and the public. Our
recent work indicates that DHS has not yet officially documented
communication protocols for providing threat information and guidance
to federal agencies and states, with the result that some federal
agencies and states may first learn about changes in the national
threat level from media sources. Moreover, federal agencies and states
responding to our inquiries indicated that they generally did not
receive specific threat information and guidance, and they believed
this shortcoming hindered their ability to determine whether they were
at risk as well as their ability to determine and implement appropriate
protective measures.[Footnote 8]
In addition, there is a need for an improved security clearance process
so that state, local, and private sector officials have the access to
information they need, but with appropriate security safeguards in
place, while efforts to improve information sharing continue. In a
recent report,[Footnote 9] we described the FBI's process for granting
access to classified information for state and local law enforcement
officials. The FBI's goal is to complete the processing for secret
security clearances within 45 to 60 days and top secret security
clearances within 6 to 9 months. While the FBI's processing of top
secret security clearances has been generally timely, that was not the
case for secret clearances. However, the FBI made substantial
improvements in 2003 to the timeliness of processing secret clearances.
We also have conducted a body of work that has found that long-standing
security clearance backlogs and delays in determining clearance
eligibility affect industry personnel, military members, and federal
employees. For example, as we reported in May of this year,[Footnote
10] more than 187,000 reinvestigations, new investigations, or
clearance adjudications were not completed for industry personnel alone
within established time frames. Delays in conducting investigations and
determining clearance eligibility can increase national security risks,
prevent industry personnel from beginning or continuing work on
classified programs and activities, or otherwise hinder the sharing of
classified threat information with officials having homeland security
or homeland defense responsibilities.
The FBI has also taken a number of steps to enhance its information
sharing with state and local law enforcement officials, such as
providing guidance and additional staffing. The FBI has further
increased the number of its JTTFs, increasing them from 35 prior to the
September 11 attacks to 84 as of July 2004 and state and local law
enforcement officials' participation on these task forces has been
increased. The FBI has at least one JTTF in each of its 56 field
locations and plans to expand to 100. The FBI also circulates
declassified intelligence through a weekly bulletin and provides threat
information to state and local law enforcement officials via various
database networks.
These critical needs for better information and information sharing
identified by federal, state, and local governments and the private
sector must form the clear rationale and basis for transformation of
the intelligence community. Reorganization isn't the objective; rather
it is improving government performance to meet twenty first century
information sharing requirements. 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas H.
Kean and Vice-Chairman Lee H. Hamilton, in their testimony before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on July 30, 2004, noted:
"There is a fascination in Washington with bureaucratic solutions--
rearranging the wiring diagrams, creating new organizations. We do
recommend some important institutional changes. We will articulate and
defend those proposals. But we believe reorganizing governmental
institutions is only a part of the agenda before us. Some of the
saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so
many individual officials straining, often without success, against the
boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad structures.
They should not have to. We have the resources and the people. We need
to combine them more effectively, to achieve unity of effort."
GAO agrees with this comment, and we have noted several related
suggestions below.
While Changes May be Needed, Caution and Care Must be Taken:
As the committee is aware, GAO has done extensive work on federal
organizational structure and how reorganization can improve
performance. The 9/11 Commission has recommended major changes to unify
strategic intelligence and operational planning with a National
Counterterrorism Center and provide the intelligence community with a
new National Intelligence Director. As the Congress and the
administration consider the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, they
should consider how best to address organizational changes, roles and
responsibilities, and functions for intelligence-sharing
effectiveness.
In response to the emerging trends and long-term fiscal challenges the
government faces in the coming years, we have an opportunity to create
highly effective, performance-based organizations that can strengthen
the nation's ability to meet the challenges of the twenty first century
and reach beyond our current level of achievement. The federal
government cannot accept the status quo as a given--we need to
reexamine the base of government policies, programs, structures, and
operations. We need to minimize the number of layers and silos in
government, emphasize horizontal versus vertical actions, while moving
our policy focus to coordination and integration. The result, we
believe, will be a government that is effective and relevant to a
changing society--a government that is as free as possible of outmoded
commitments and operations that can inappropriately encumber the
future, reduce our fiscal flexibility, and prevent future generations
from being able to make choices regarding what roles they think
government should play.
Many departments and agencies, including those of the intelligence
community, were created in a different time and in response to
challenges, threats, and priorities very different from today's world.
Some have achieved their one time missions and yet they are still in
business. Many have accumulated responsibilities beyond their original
purposes. Many are still focused on their original mission that may not
be relevant or as high a priority in today's world. Others have not
been able to demonstrate how they are making a difference in real and
concrete terms. Still others have overlapping or conflicting roles and
responsibilities. Redundant, unfocused, uncoordinated, outdated,
misaligned, and nonintegrated programs and activities waste scarce
funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit overall
efficiency and effectiveness.[Footnote 11] These are the charges
highlighted by the 9/11 Commission's findings and recommendations.
The problems the 9/11 Commission has described with our intelligence
activities indicate a strong need for reexamining the organization and
execution of those activities. However, any restructuring proposal
requires careful consideration. Fixing the wrong problems or even
worse, fixing the right problems poorly, could cause more harm than
good.
Past executive reorganization authority has served as an effective tool
for achieving fundamental reorganization of federal operations. As I
have testified before this committee,[Footnote 12] the granting of
executive reorganization authority to the President can serve to better
enable the President to propose government designs that would be more
efficient and effective in meeting existing and emerging challenges
involving the intelligence community and information sharing with other
entities. However, lessons learned from prior federal reorganization
efforts suggest that reorganizing government can be an immensely
complex activity that requires consensus on both the goals to be
achieved and the process for achieving them. Prior reorganization
authority has reflected a changing balance between legislative and
executive roles. Periodically, between 1932 and 1984, the Congress
passed legislation providing the President one form or another of
expedited reorganization authority.[Footnote 13]
Congressional involvement is needed not just in the initial design of
the reorganization, but in what can turn out to be a lengthy period of
implementation. The Congress has an important role to play--in both its
legislative and oversight capacities--in establishing, monitoring, and
maintaining progress to attain the goals envisioned by government
transformation and reorganization efforts. However, as the 9/11
Commission has noted, past oversight efforts in the intelligence area
have been wholly inadequate.
To ensure efficient and effective implementation and oversight, the
Congress will also need to consider realigning its own structure. With
changes in the executive branch, the Congress should adapt its own
organization. For example, the Congress has undertaken a reexamination
of its committee structure, with the implementation of DHS. The DHS
legislation instructed both houses of Congress to review their
committee structures in light of the reorganization of homeland
security responsibilities within the executive branch. Similarly, the
9/11 Commission recommends realigning congressional oversight to
support its proposals to reorganize intelligence programs.
Addressing Intelligence Human Capital Needs Requires Strategic
Management:
The 9/11 Commission stresses the need for stronger capabilities and
expertise in intelligence and national security to support homeland
security. For example, the Commission recommends rebuilding the Central
Intelligence Agency's analytical capabilities, enhancing the agency's
human intelligence capabilities, and developing a stronger language
program.
We believe, Mr. Chairman, that at the center of any serious change
management initiative are the people involved--people define the
organization's culture, drive its performance, and embody its knowledge
base. They are the source of all knowledge, process improvement, and
technological enhancement efforts. As such, strategic human capital (or
people) strategy is the critical element to maximizing government's
performance and ensuring accountability of our intelligence community
and homeland security efforts.
Experience shows that failure to adequately address--and often even
consider--a wide variety of people and cultural issues is at the heart
of unsuccessful organizational transformations. Recognizing the
"people" element in these initiatives and implementing strategies to
help individuals maximize their full potential in the new environment
is the key to a successful transformation of the intelligence community
and related homeland security organizations. Thus, organizational
transformations that incorporate strategic human capital management
approaches will help to sustain agency efforts and improve the
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the federal
government. To help, we have identified a set of practices that have
been found to be central to any successful transformation
effort.[Footnote 14]
Committed, sustained, highly qualified, and inspired leadership, and
persistent attention by all key parties in the successful
implementation of organizational transformations, will be essential, if
lasting changes are to be made and the challenges we are discussing
today are to be effectively addressed. It is clear that in a knowledge-
based federal government, including the intelligence community, people-
-human capital--are the most valuable asset. How these people are
organized, incented, enabled, empowered, and managed is key to the
reform of the intelligence community and other organizations involved
with homeland security.
We have testified that federal human capital strategies are not yet
appropriately constituted to meet current and emerging challenges or to
drive the needed transformation across the federal government. The
basic problem has been the long-standing lack of a consistent approach
to marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to
maximize government performance and ensure its accountability to the
people. Thus, federal agencies involved with the intelligence community
and other homeland security organizations will need the most effective
human capital systems to address these challenges and succeed in their
transformation efforts during a period of sustained budget constraints.
This includes aligning their strategic planning and key institutional
performance with unit and individual performance management and reward
systems.
Fortunately, the Congress has passed legislation providing many of the
authorities and tools agencies need. In fact, more progress in
addressing human capital challenges was made in the last 3 years than
in the last 20, and significant changes in how the federal workforce is
managed are under way. For example, the Congress passed legislation
providing governmentwide human capital flexibilities, such as direct
hire authority, the ability to use category rating in the hiring of
applicants instead of the "rule of three," and the creation of chief
human capital officer (CHCO) positions and the CHCO Council. In
addition, individual agencies--such as the National Aeronautical and
Space Administration (NASA), DoD, and DHS--received flexibilities
intended to help them manage their human capital strategically to
achieve results.
While many agencies have received additional human capital
flexibilities, additional ones may be both needed and appropriate for
the intelligence, homeland security, national defense, and selected
other agencies. While the above authorities are helpful, in order to
enable agencies to rapidly meet their critical human capital needs, the
Congress should consider legislation granting selected agency heads the
authority to hire a limited number of positions for a stated period of
time (e.g., up to 3 years) on a noncompetitive basis. The Congress has
passed legislation granting this authority to the Comptroller General
of the United States and it has helped GAO to address a range of
critical needs in a timely, effective, and prudent manner over many
years.
Recent human capital actions have significant precedent-setting
implications for the rest of government. They represent progress and
opportunities, but also present legitimate concerns. We are fast
approaching the point where "standard governmentwide" human capital
policies and processes are neither standard nor governmentwide. As the
Congress considers the need for additional human capital authorities
for the intelligence community, it should keep in mind that human
capital reform should avoid further fragmentation within the civil
service, ensure reasonable consistency within the overall civilian
workforce, and help maintain a reasonably level playing field among
federal agencies in competing for talent. Importantly, this is not to
delay needed reforms for any agency, but to accelerate reform across
the federal government and incorporate appropriate principles and
safeguards.
As the Congress considers reforms to the intelligence communities'
human capital policies and practices, it should require that agencies
have in place the institutional infrastructure needed to make effective
use of any new tools and authorities. At a minimum, this institutional
infrastructure includes a human capital planning process that
integrates the agency's human capital policies, strategies, and
programs with its program goals and mission and desired outcomes; the
capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital
system; and, importantly, a set of appropriate principles and
safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate
accountability mechanisms, to ensure the fair, effective, credible,
nondiscriminatory implementation and application of a new system.
Managing for Results:
As Chairman Kean and Vice-Chairman Hamilton caution, organizational
changes are just a part of the reforms needed. The Commission rightly
says that effective public policies need concrete objectives, agencies
need to be able to measure success, and the American people are
entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with
the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are
being met. To comprehensively transform government to improve
intelligence and homeland security efforts, we must also carefully
assess and define mission needs, current capabilities, resource
practicalities, and priorities. And we must implement our plans to
achieve those mission needs.
The federal government is well short of where it needs to be in setting
national homeland security goals, including those for intelligence and
other mission areas, to focus on results--outcomes--not inputs and
outputs which were so long a feature of much of the federal
government's strategic planning. We are concerned that the tenets of
results management--shifting management attention from inputs,
processes, and outputs to what is accomplished with them (outcomes or
results)--still are elusive in homeland security goal setting and
operational planning. We advocate a clear and comprehensive focus on
homeland security results management, including the mission of
intelligence and information sharing. Results management should have
the elements to determine (1) if homeland security results are being
achieved within planned timeframes, (2) if investments and resources
are being managed properly, (3) if results are being integrated into
ongoing decision making and priority setting, and (4) what action is
needed to guide future investment policies and influence behavior to
achieve results. These actions go far beyond a limited focus on
organizational structure.
As the Gilmore Commission stated, a continuing problem for homeland
security has been the lack of clear strategic guidance from the federal
level about the definition and objectives of preparedness and how
states and localities will be evaluated in meeting those
objectives.[Footnote 15] The 9/11 Commission's broad recommendations,
if adopted, will require a thoughtful, detailed, results-oriented
management approach in defining specific goals, activities, and
resource requirements.
The track record for homeland security results management to date is
spotty. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued by the
administration in July 2002, was intended to mobilize and organize the
nation to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks.[Footnote 16]
Intelligence and warning was one of its critical mission areas. Despite
the changes over the past two years, the National Strategy has not been
updated. In general, initiatives identified in the strategy do not
provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to
assess and improve preparedness, stressing activities rather than
results. For example, for intelligence and warning, the National
Strategy identified major initiatives that are activities, such as
implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System, utilizing dual-use
analysis to prevent attacks; and employing "red team" techniques.
Establishing clear goals and performance measures is critical to
ensuring both a successful and a fiscally responsible and sustainable
preparedness effort. We are currently doing work on the extent to which
the National Strategy's goals are being implemented by federal
agencies. Senator Lieberman has recently introduced legislation
requiring executive branch efforts to produce a national homeland
security strategy. We support the concept of a legislatively required
strategy that can be sustained across administrations and provides a
framework for congressional oversight. Before the administration's
National Strategy for Homeland Security was issued, we had stated that
the strategy should include steps designed to (a) reduce our
vulnerability to threats; (b) use intelligence assets and other broad-
based information sources to identify threats and share information as
appropriate; (c) stop incidents before they occur; (d) manage the
consequences of an incident; and (e) in the case of terrorist attacks,
respond by all means available, including economic, diplomatic, and
military actions that, when appropriate, are coordinated with other
nations.[Footnote 17] Earlier this year we provided a set of desirable
characteristics for any effective national strategy that could better
focus national homeland security decision making and increase the
emphasis on outcomes.[Footnote 18]
Strategic planning is critical to provide mission clarity, establish
long-term performance strategies and goals, direct resource decisions,
and guide transformation efforts. In this context, we are reviewing the
DHS strategic planning efforts. Our work includes a review of the
manner by which the Department's planning efforts support the National
Strategy for Homeland Security and the extent to which its strategic
plan reflects the requirements of the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993.
DHS's planning efforts are evolving. The current published DHS
strategic plan contains vague strategic goals and objectives for all
its mission areas, including intelligence, and little specific
information to guide congressional decision making. For example, the
strategic plan includes an overall goal to identify and understand
threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts, and
disseminate timely information to DHS's homeland security partners and
the American public. That goal has very general objectives, such as
gathering and fusing all terrorism-related intelligence and analyzing
and coordinating access to information related to potential terrorist
or other threats. Discussion of annual goals are missing, and
supporting descriptions of means and strategies are vague, making it
difficult to determine if they are sufficient to achieve the objectives
and overall goals. These and related issues will need to be addressed
as the DHS planning effort moves forward.
In another effort to set expectations, the President, through Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8,[Footnote 19] has tasked the
Department of Homeland Security with establishing measurable readiness
priorities and targets appropriately balancing the potential threat and
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies
with resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.
The task also is to include readiness metrics and elements supporting
the national preparedness goal, including standards for preparedness
assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the nation's
overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially involving
acts of terrorism. However, those taskings have yet to be completed,
but they will have to address the following questions:
* What are the appropriate national preparedness goals and measures?
What are appropriate subgoals for specific areas such as critical
infrastructure sectors?
* Do these goals and subgoals take into account other national goals
such as economic security or the priority objectives of the private
sector or other levels of government?
* Who should be accountable for achieving the national goals and
subgoals?
* How would a national results management and measurement system be
crafted, implemented, and sustained for the national preparedness
goals?
* How would such a system affect needs assessment and be integrated
with funding and budgeting processes across the many organizations
involved in homeland security?
However, even if we have a robust and viable national strategy for
homeland security, DHS strategic plan, and national preparedness goals,
the issue of implementation remains. Implementation cannot be assured,
or corrective action taken, if we are not getting the results we want,
without effective accountability and oversight. The focus for homeland
security must be on constantly staying ready and prepared for unknown
threats and paying attention to improving performance. In addition to
continuing our ongoing work in major homeland security mission areas
such as border and transportation security and emergency preparedness,
GAO can help the Congress more effectively oversee the intelligence
community, and any changes should consider, in our view, an appropriate
role for the GAO.
With some exceptions, GAO has broad-based authority to conduct reviews
relating to various intelligence agencies. However, because of
historical resistance from the intelligence agencies and the general
lack of support from the intelligence committees in the Congress, GAO
has done limited work in this community over the past 25 years. For
example, within the past 2 years, we have done a considerable amount of
work in connection with the FBI and its related transformational
efforts. In addition, GAO has recently had some interaction with the
Defense Intelligence Agency in connection with its transformation
efforts. Furthermore, GAO has conducted extensive work on a wide range
of government transformational and homeland security issues over the
past several years. As always, we stand ready to offer GAO's assistance
in support of any of the Congress' oversight needs.
The Challenges Faced in Intelligence Reform:
In conclusion, on the basis of GAO's work in both the public and the
private sector over many years, and my own change management
experience, it is clear to me that many of the challenges that the
intelligence community faces are similar or identical to the
transformation challenges applicable to many other federal agencies,
including GAO. Specifically, while the intelligence agencies are in a
different line of business than other federal agencies, they face the
same challenges when it comes to strategic planning and budgeting,
organizational alignment, human capital strategy, and the management of
information technology, finances, knowledge, and change.
For the intelligence community, effectively addressing these basic
business transformation challenges will require action relating to five
key dimensions, namely, structure, people, process, technology, and
partnerships. It will also require a rethinking and cultural
transformation in connection with intelligence activities both in the
executive branch and in the Congress.
With regard to the structure dimension, there are many organizational
units within the executive branch and in the Congress with
responsibilities in the intelligence and homeland security areas. Basic
organizational and management principles dictate that, absent a clear
and compelling need for competition or checks and balances, there is a
need to minimize the number of entities and levels in key decision
making, oversight, and other related activities. In addition,
irrespective of how many units and levels are involved, someone has to
be in charge of all key planning, budgeting, and operational
activities. One person should be responsible and accountable for all
key intelligence activities within the executive branch, and that
person should report directly to the President. This position must also
have substantive strategic planning, budget, operational integration,
and accountability responsibilities and opportunities for the
intelligence community in order to be effective. In addition, this
person should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
in order to help facilitate success and ensure effective oversight.
With regard to the oversight structure of the Congress, the 9/11
Commission noted that there are numerous players involved in
intelligence activities and yet not enough effective oversight is being
done. As a result, a restructuring of intelligence and homeland
security related activities in the Congress is also needed. In this
regard, it may make sense to separate responsibility for intelligence
activities from personal privacy and individual liberty issues in order
to ensure that needed attention is given to both while providing for a
check and balance between these competing interests.
With regard to the people dimension, any entity is only as good as its
people, and as I stated earlier, the intelligence community is no
exception. In fact, since the intelligence community is in the
knowledge business, people are of vital importance. The people
challenge starts at the top, and key leaders must be both effective and
respected. In addition, they need to stay in their positions long
enough to make a real and lasting difference. In this regard, while the
FBI director has a 10-year term appointment, most agency heads serve at
the pleasure of their appointing official and may serve a few years in
their respective positions. This is a problem when the agency is in the
need of a cultural transformation, such as that required in the
intelligence community, which typically takes at least 5 to 7 years to
effectuate.
In addition to having the right people and the right "tone at the top,"
agencies need to develop and execute workforce strategies and plans
helping to ensure that they have the right people with the right skills
in the required numbers to accomplish their missions. Many of these
missions have changed in the post-Cold War and post September 11 world.
This is especially critical in connection with certain skills that are
in short supply, such as information technology and certain languages,
such as Arabic. In addition, as the 9/11 Commission and others have
noted, it is clear that additional steps are necessary to strengthen
our human intelligence capabilities.
With regard to the process and technology dimensions, steps need to be
taken to streamline and expedite the processes used to analyze and
disseminate the tremendous amount of intelligence and other information
available to the intelligence community. This will require extensive
use of technology to sort and distribute information both within
agencies and between agencies and other key players in various sectors
both domestically and internationally, as appropriate. The 9/11
Commission and others have noted various deficiencies in this area,
such as the FBI's information technology development and implementation
challenges. At the same time, some successes have occurred during the
past 2 years that address process and technology concerns. For example,
the Terrorist Screening Center, created under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6 is intended to help in the consolidation of
the federal government's approach to terrorism screening.[Footnote 20]
This center has taken a number of steps to address various
organizational, technological, integration, and other challenges, and
it may serve as a model for other needed intra-and interorganizational
efforts.
With regard to partnerships, it has always been difficult to create an
environment of shared responsibility, shared resources, and shared
accountability for achieving difficult missions. Effective
partnerships require a shared vision, shared goals, and shared trust in
meeting agreed-upon responsibilities. Partnerships also mean that power
is shared. Too often we have seen both public and private sector
organizations where the term "partnership" is often voiced, but the
reality is more a jockeying for dominance or control over the
"partner." The end result is that resources are not shared, the shared
mission is never complete or adequate, and opportunities for true
strategic alliance are squandered. In the intelligence arena, we know
the potential end result is failure for the nation.
With regard to the cultural dimension, this is both the softest and the
hardest to deal with. By the softest, I mean it involves the attitudes
and actions of people and entities. By the hardest, I mean that
changing long-standing cultures can be a huge challenge, especially if
the efforts involve organizational changes in order to streamline,
integrate, and improve related capabilities and abilities. This
includes both execution and oversight-related activities. As the 9/11
Commission and others have noted, such a restructuring is needed in
both the executive branch and the Congress. This will involve taking on
the vested interests of many powerful players, and as a result, it will
not be easy, but it may be essential, especially if we expect to go
from a "need to know" to a "need to share' approach. As I have often
said, addressing such issues takes patience, persistence, perspective,
and pain before you prevail. Such is the case with many agency
transformational efforts, including those within our own GAO. However,
given the challenges and dangers that we face in the post 9/11 world,
we cannot afford to wait much longer. The time for action is now.
Conclusion:
Mr. Chairman, in its final report, the Gilmore Commission stated:
"There will never be an end point in America's readiness. Enemies will
change tactics, citizens' attitudes about what adjustments in their
lives they will be willing to accept will evolve and leaders will be
confronted with legitimate competing priorities that will demand
attention—.In the end, America's response to the threat of terrorism
will be measured by how we manage risk. There will never be a 100%
guarantee of security for our people, the economy, and our society. We
must resist the urge to seek total security--it is not achievable and
drains our attention from those things that can be
accomplished."[Footnote 21]
Managing risk is not simply about putting new organizations in place.
It requires us to think about what must be protected, define an
acceptable level of risk, and target limited resources while keeping in
mind that the related costs must be affordable and sustainable. Perhaps
more important, managing risk requires us to constantly operate under
conditions of uncertainty, where foresight, anticipation,
responsiveness, and radical adaptation are vital capabilities.
We can and we must enhance and integrate our intelligence efforts as
suggested by the 9/11 Commission to significantly improve information
sharing and analysis. Several models to achieve this result exist, and
despite the unique missions of the intelligence community can readily
be adapted to guide this transformation.
We at the GAO stand ready to constructively engage with the
intelligence community to share our significant government
transformation and management knowledge and experience in order to help
members of the community help themselves engage in the needed
transformation efforts. We also stand ready to help the Congress
enhance its oversight activities over the intelligence community,
which, in our view, are an essential element of an effective
transformation approach. In this regard, we have the people with the
skills, experience, knowledge, and clearances to make a big difference
for Congress and the country.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions that you or members of your committee may have at this
time.
Contacts:
For information on this testimony, please contact Randall Yim at (202)
512-6787 or yimr@gao.gov.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. Homeland Security: A Framework for
Addressing the Nation's Efforts, GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
21, 2001).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Efforts to
Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760
(Washington, D.C.: August 2003).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Sharing: Practices That
Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office. Homeland Security: Information
Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-
03-1165T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2003); GAO-03-715T (May 8, 2003).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Key Elements to
Unify Efforts Are Under Way but Uncertainty Remains, GAO-02-610
(Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002).
[6] GAO-03-760.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Improving Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780
(Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Communication
Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the
Advisory System, GAO-04-682 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office. Security Clearances: FBI Has
Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials,
GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel Clearances:
Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in
Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-
04-632 (Washington, D.C: May 26, 2004).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing in the New Millennium:
Shaping a More Efficient and Effective Government for the 21st Century,
GAO/T-OCG-00-9 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Reorganization
Authority: Balancing Executive and Congressional Roles in Shaping the
Federal Government's Structure, GAO-03-624T (Washington, D.C.: April 3,
2003).
[13] Ronald C. Moe, Congressional Research Service, The President's
Reorganization Authority: Review and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
8, 2001).
[14] U. S. General Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[15] The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging America's
New Normalcy, (Arlington, VA.: Dec. 15, 2003).
[16] The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security,
(Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Challenges and
Strategies in Addressing Short-and Long-Term National Needs, GAO-02-
160T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2001).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation
of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to
Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004)
[19] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
(National Preparedness), (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003).
[20] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6
(Integration and Use of Screening Information), Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 2003.
[21] V. Forging America's New Normalcy, p. 2.
