Homeland Security
Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness Gao ID: GAO-04-1009 September 15, 2004As requested, GAO reviewed coordination practices in various metropolitan areas to find regional programs with lessons learned that could be applied in the National Capital Region (NCR) and elsewhere. We addressed the following questions: (1) In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional coordination? (2) What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination? (3) How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the NCR incorporate features from other areas and federal programs? For detailed analysis, we selected Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Tampa-St. Petersburg--considered by DHS to be high-threat urban areas because of their population and critical infrastructure, among other factors. We also analyzed regional coordination in the planning and implementation of transportation and environmental programs because of their history of requiring such collaboration. DHS and the District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor/City Administrator generally agreed with our report regarding the characteristics of regional coordination and that the NCR's Urban Area Security Initiative governance structure was relatively advanced.
GAO's analysis of federal program documents and plans, and interviews with federal, state, and local officials in six metropolitan areas revealed several factors that characterize effective regional coordination of federally supported efforts. Regional coordination efforts are enhanced by the presence of a collaborative regional organization that includes representation from many different jurisdictions and different disciplines. Also, when regional civic and political traditions foster interjurisdictional coordination, flexibility in the membership and geographic area of the regional organization can enhance collaborative activities. In addition, a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives helps focus resources and efforts to address problems. Finally, funding regional organizations provides incentives for their collaborative planning activities. The federal government can provide support for regional coordination. In particular, through its grant design and requirements, it encourages structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts. For example, federal transportation law requires the existence of metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) before transportation funds can be awarded. Some programs have recognized the importance of flexibility by allowing local jurisdictions to organize themselves in ways consistent with their regional environment. For example, the DHS' Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program allowed three San Francisco Bay programs to pool some of their grant resources to establish a regionwide UASI effort. Moreover, some federal grants require regional organizations to prepare plans that guide funding decisions. Transportation law, for example, requires MPOs to prepare transportation improvement plans as a condition for awards. Finally, federal financial support can facilitate coordination activities. Several programs, including the MPO program, provide such support. The characteristics of effective regional coordination we identified are applicable to the NCR's efforts to coordinate emergency preparedness. If implemented as planned and as observed in its early stage, the NCR's UASI program would include a collaborative regional organization. However, as we reported in May 2004, the NCR did not include a full array of homeland security grants in its planning. The NCR's UASI program plans to address those issues by identifying non-UASI funding sources and collecting information about the funding allocations, expenditures, and purposes, as well as data on spending by NCR jurisdiction. DHS and UASI officials believe these data will enable program managers to avoid duplication of expenditures and to better utilize program funds. Regional approaches are changing quickly, and the nation is still in the early stages of building regional institutions across the country to deal with homeland security issues. Those important developments warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight.
GAO-04-1009, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
September 2004:
HOMELAND SECURITY:
Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness:
GAO-04-1009:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-1009, a report to Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
As requested, GAO reviewed coordination practices in various
metropolitan areas to find regional programs with lessons learned that
could be applied in the National Capital Region (NCR) and elsewhere. We
addressed the following questions:
(1) In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional
coordination?
(2) What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency
preparedness coordination?
(3) How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the
NCR incorporate features from other areas and federal programs?
For detailed analysis, we selected Dallas, Los Angeles, New York,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Tampa-St. Petersburg”considered by DHS
to be high-threat urban areas because of their population and critical
infrastructure, among other factors. We also analyzed regional
coordination in the planning and implementation of transportation and
environmental programs because of their history of requiring such
collaboration.
DHS and the District of Columbia‘s Deputy Mayor/City Administrator
generally agreed with our report regarding the characteristics of
regional coordination and that the NCR‘s Urban Area Security Initiative
governance structure was relatively advanced.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s analysis of federal program documents and plans, and interviews
with federal, state, and local officials in six metropolitan areas
revealed several factors that characterize effective regional
coordination of federally supported efforts. Regional coordination
efforts are enhanced by the presence of a collaborative regional
organization that includes representation from many different
jurisdictions and different disciplines. Also, when regional civic and
political traditions foster interjurisdictional coordination,
flexibility in the membership and geographic area of the regional
organization can enhance collaborative activities. In addition, a
comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives helps
focus resources and efforts to address problems. Finally, funding
regional organizations provides incentives for their collaborative
planning activities.
The federal government can provide support for regional coordination.
In particular, through its grant design and requirements, it encourages
structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts.
For example, federal transportation law requires the existence of
metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) before transportation funds
can be awarded. Some programs have recognized the importance of
flexibility by allowing local jurisdictions to organize themselves in
ways consistent with their regional environment. For example, the DHS‘
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program allowed three San
Francisco Bay programs to pool some of their grant resources to
establish a regionwide UASI effort. Moreover, some federal grants
require regional organizations to prepare plans that guide funding
decisions. Transportation law, for example, requires MPOs to prepare
transportation improvement plans as a condition for awards. Finally,
federal financial support can facilitate coordination activities.
Several programs, including the MPO program, provide such support.
The characteristics of effective regional coordination we identified
are applicable to the NCR‘s efforts to coordinate emergency
preparedness. If implemented as planned and as observed in its early
stage, the NCR‘s UASI program would include a collaborative regional
organization. However, as we reported in May 2004, the NCR did not
include a full array of homeland security grants in its planning. The
NCR‘s UASI program plans to address those issues by identifying non-
UASI funding sources and collecting information about the funding
allocations, expenditures, and purposes, as well as data on spending by
NCR jurisdiction. DHS and UASI officials believe these data will enable
program managers to avoid duplication of expenditures and to better
utilize program funds.
Regional approaches are changing quickly, and the nation is still in
the early stages of building regional institutions across the country
to deal with homeland security issues. Those important developments
warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1009.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Patricia A. Dalton at
(202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Collaborative Organizations and Strategic Planning Foster Regional
Coordination:
Some Federal Programs Contain Incentives for Regional Coordination:
NCR Emergency Preparedness Effort Can Benefit from Comprehensive
Planning and Application of Standards:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Deputy Mayor and City Administrator,
District of Columbia:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Letter September 15, 2004:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, regional
approaches have been recognized as a key way to address the threat of
terrorism. In many urban areas, the threat of terror is regionwide, and
resources for responding to that threat are distributed among many
jurisdictions. Therefore, the most effective responses are coordinated
and planned across the region, rather than being jurisdiction-specific.
The complexity of multijurisdictional urban areas--such as the National
Capital Region (NCR), composed of Washington, D.C., and numerous
surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia--with a range of
potential terrorism targets, presents significant challenges to
coordinating the development of effective homeland security
programs.[Footnote 1]
Following the initial allocation of billions of dollars to first
responders after September 11, 2001, the need to address the threat of
terrorism from a regional perspective began to be a focus of federal
policy. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to urban
areas that were considered to be at a high risk for a terror attack. In
fiscal year 2003, DHS granted seven high-threat metropolitan
regions[Footnote 2] UASI funding to address the unique needs of
emergency preparedness and response in large urban areas. Each of these
areas covered multiple city/county jurisdictions, and two (New York
City and the NCR) covered more than one state. In May 2003 DHS
announced an additional total of $500 million to augment the original
UASI areas' funding and provide funding for 23 more areas. Fiscal year
2004 funding was announced November 2003 to continue the thirty 2003
UASI programs and to fund an additional 20 areas.
In May 2004, we reported on the management by NCR jurisdictions and the
DHS' Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) of
approximately $340 million in first responder grants during fiscal
years 2002 and 2003.[Footnote 3] We found that managers of first
response agencies--police and fire, for example--as well as federal and
state emergency preparedness agencies did not have national
preparedness standards to assess existing first responder capabilities,
gaps in those capabilities, and progress made in achieving performance
goals. Similarly, those agencies had no regionwide, comprehensive,
strategic plan for establishing first responder preparedness goals,
needs, and priorities. Finally, the agencies had no consolidated,
readily available source of information on (1) the amount of first
responder grants available to each jurisdiction, (2) budget plans or
criteria used to determine spending priorities, and (3) data on funds
expended from the various sources. Without these components, the
federal grants were difficult to manage in a way that enabled first
response agencies to pursue and monitor goals and objectives.
As you requested, we followed up our NCR work with this review of
coordination practices in various other metropolitan areas around the
nation, with an emphasis on identifying characteristics of successful
regional coordination that could be applied in the NCR and elsewhere.
We agreed to address the following questions:
1. In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional
coordination?
2. What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency
preparedness coordination?
3. How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the NCR
incorporate features from other metropolitan areas and federal
programs?
We selected six metropolitan areas in which to examine regional
coordination: Dallas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles, New York City,
Philadelphia, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. We
selected these locations based on such factors as their vulnerability
to terror events indicated by the presence of potential targets, such
as critical infrastructure and important federal and commercial
facilities. We also selected metropolitan areas with a large number of
regional jurisdictions that indicated a level of complexity in
approaching emergency preparedness from a regional perspective. Within
each area, we examined certain federal programs--such as metropolitan
planning organizations (MPO), regional estuary preservation efforts,
and UASI, which require regional coordination. We included in our
analysis nonemergency preparedness programs, such as transportation
planning (involving MPOs) that have existed for decades and have
developed their own regional organizations and planning practices.
Examining such programs can provide insights into how to structure
regional homeland security efforts, which are relatively new, in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks.
We met with and obtained documentation from mayors' offices, city and/
or county offices of emergency management, state emergency management
offices, regional planning councils, or MPOs; other regional bodies,
offices, and task forces; and program directors for selected programs
that require coordination. We also contacted officials of the
responsible federal agencies, including DHS, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We
reviewed relevant reports, studies, and guidelines on homeland security
and emergency preparedness.
We conducted our review from July 2003 to September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I
for more details on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Regionally coordinated and planned programs have existed in such fields
as transportation and environmental planning for decades. For example,
the metropolitan transportation planning model came into being in
response to federal transportation planning requirements in the 1960s.
In contrast, homeland security is a relatively new public policy field,
emerging in prominence after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.
According to our work in six metropolitan areas, several factors
characterize effective regional coordination in those regions.
* Regional organizations that include representation from many
different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders serve as structured
forums for these parties to discuss public policy problems and agree on
possible solutions. These organizations exist in metropolitan regions
for a variety of purposes--for example, to coordinate transportation
planning or clean water initiatives. Decisions made collaboratively are
likely to have broader support than those that are unilateral. For
example, federal transportation law requires metropolitan planning
organizations (MPO) with multijurisdictional representation to work
together to agree on a regional transportation plan and allows the use
of federal funding for such planning. For example, in the NCR, the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) promotes
collaborative transportation decision making by requiring the majority
of the area's multijurisdictional board to support a regional
transportation improvement plan. Agreements on such projects as road
improvements associated with rebuilding the Woodrow Wilson Bridge were
approved by the MWCOG Transportation Planning Board and included in the
transportation plan for federal funding.
* Where regional collaboration is encouraged by the leadership and
political traditions of state, regional, and local entities,
flexibility for regional organizations to establish their membership
requirements and collaborative processes is important. Such flexibility
helps regional organizations function effectively in the existing
political and civic environment by allowing them to expand the scope of
the collaborative activities; under these circumstances, overly
prescriptive requirements could impede effective coordination. For
example, emergency preparedness officials in the San Francisco Bay area
told us that first responder agencies in that area have a longstanding
tradition of interjurisdictional coordination. However, in our view, in
cases where state and local traditions do not engender
interjurisdictional collaboration, more prescriptive requirements
regarding regional group members, decision-making processes, and
planning can establish minimum thresholds for those activities and may
provide an incentive for regional coordination.
* Strategic plans developed by regional organizations can be effective
tools to focus resources and efforts to address problems. Effective
plans often contain such features as goals and objectives that are
measurable and quantifiable. These goals and objectives allow problems
and planned steps to be defined specifically and progress to be
measured. For example, according to Tampa Bay Estuary Program
officials, the involvement of federal, state, and local government
partners, environmentalists, and the private sector in proposing and
implementing solutions to cleaning up Tampa Bay ensures agreement on
technically sound plans that are based on measurable goals and
objectives. An agreement involving state and local agencies, as well as
industry, committed these parties to specific actions to achieve those
goals, including an overall goal of restoring sea grasses to the
conditions of about 50 years ago. By specifying goals and objectives,
plans can also give planners and decision makers a structure for
allocating funding to those goals and objectives. Moreover, the
application of standards, where existent, can focus the strategic
planning process by allowing planners to measure the current status
(baseline) of performance, express measurable goals, and identify any
gaps between the baseline and goals.[Footnote 4]
The federal government can provide support for regional coordination.
In particular, through its grant design and requirements, the
government encourages structures and practices associated with
effective regional efforts.
* Some federal programs support the existence of regional organizations
that reach collaborative decisions, and several federal programs
require the grantee to establish such an organization before it can
receive federal funds. For example, under federal transportation law,
all transportation improvement plans must be prepared by MPOs prior to
the allocation of highway and transit funds. To avoid one party or type
of party being overrepresented in the regional group or wielding too
much power, some federal programs define acceptable requirements for
the group and the associated planning processes.
* Some federal grants allow local jurisdictions the flexibility to
organize themselves in ways consistent with their regional environment.
For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Dallas UASI region as defined by
DHS included the City of Dallas and its contiguous counties, but not
Tarrant County, Texas. Many regional, state, and city officials felt
that Tarrant County should be included in the UASI planning. To address
this issue, the state of Texas provided funding to Tarrant County from
the 20 percent of UASI funding that was not passed through to the City
of Dallas. On the other hand, if the regional environment is not
friendly to collaboration, then federal grantor agencies can specify
minimum requirements for a regional organization and procedures that
elicit collaborative decisions.
* Some grants require a strategic plan as a precondition for receiving
federal funds, but to be effective the plans should include measurable
goals and objectives. In addition, clear standards help to guide the
progress toward measurable objectives. For example, MPOs must show that
metropolitan transportation plans and programs conform to the goals of
the state (air quality) implementation plan for the region. Reducing
transportation emissions in the metropolitan planning process is
usually achieved by a combination of new construction, system
improvements, and demand reduction measures.
* We also found that federal funding targeted at collaborative regional
groups can encourage regional coordination. For example, federal
transportation funds pay for the coordination activities of MPOs.
Our observations about regional coordination in the implementation of
federal programs in metropolitan areas we visited are applicable to the
efforts to coordinate homeland security efforts in the NCR. Based on
planning documents obtained from officials of the NCR's regional UASI
governance structure and observations of the early stages of the
program,[Footnote 5] the region's UASI program would have some elements
of successful regional coordination, if the plans were fully
implemented. For example, the NCR is beginning to use regional working
groups--the Emergency Preparedness Council and the Chief Administrative
Officers Committee, among others--to bring stakeholders together to
agree upon goals and to consider funding for regional emergency
preparedness. However, at the time of our May 2004 report, the NCR had
not applied this regional coordination structure and plans to the full
array of federal homeland security grants, totaling about $340 million.
Moreover, the regional UASI plan would not be based on any preparedness
standards. In commenting on a draft of this report and as discussed at
a September 1, 2004, meeting of the UASI Senior Policy Group and Chief
Administrative Officers, DHS noted that the governance structure is in
place and being used to reach decisions for homeland security programs
in the region, including a broadening of the UASI decision-making
process to consider funding sources other than UASI. The governance
structure is developing information, including a centralized database
to be implemented fully by 2005, that would provide information on non-
UASI emergency preparedness funds available, allocated, and expended;
the reasons for their allocations; and to which jurisdictions they were
distributed. Having these data would help the UASI governance structure
avoid funding duplications and leverage UASI funds to extend
preparedness efforts to the entire region.
In summary, the federal government can encourage regional coordination
through its grant programs. Regional organization structures,
flexibility to account for local conditions, and strategic planning are
key characteristics of regional coordination. Given the important role
that regional planning and governance can play in improving national
preparedness, these developments warrant continuing congressional
oversight.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and officials of the NCR's
UASI governance structure for their review and comment. According to
DHS, the report contains information that will be valuable to
communities across the country as DHS encourages regional coordination
and capability building. DHS stated, however, that the governance
structure is currently active in the NCR--not proposed or interim--and
is acting to enhance emergency preparedness decision making and
planning in the region. As appropriate, we added information in our
report to reflect these refinements to the NCR's governance structure.
The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator, Washington, D.C., also provided
comments. Similar to DHS, he stated that the NCR's governance structure
reflected the building of a great deal of the foundation for meeting
the domestic preparedness challenges that affect the area. In addition,
he said that the NCR is unique compared to the six metropolitan areas
we chose for detailed analysis because only the NCR (1) involves two
states and a governmental entity that combines state and local
functions; (2) contains monuments and memorials that are the most
visible symbols of our national strength and patriotism; and (3) is the
seat of the federal government, creating a partnership between the
national government and NCR state and local governments. While we agree
that the NCR is an important and unique urban area, the areas we chose
for detailed analysis contain comparable features.
The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator also stated that the National
Estuary Program incorporates clean water standards and scientific
solutions to accomplish clean water. He stated that the federal
homeland security strategies and plans are not based on proven
standards and solutions. Hence, he concluded that the estuary program
is not comparable with federal homeland security strategies and plans.
We agree that the National Estuary Program is based on existing
standards and solutions; indeed, our report notes that for the most
part, standards are not yet extant for homeland security efforts.
However, the application of standards in the planning and
implementation of the National Estuary Program is the very reason we
chose to explore and elaborate upon it. Our report notes that the
preparation and implementation of plans that have goals and objectives
that are actionable and measurable--frequently based on the application
of standards--is a key factor in the success of regionally coordinated
programs.
Background:
Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal,
state, and local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for
addressing public policy issues from a regional, multijurisdictional
perspective. The autonomy of local jurisdictions and competing
priorities within and among them can make regional coordination
difficult. Efforts that seek to overcome these challenges to coordinate
regionally must take into account the different operational structures
and civic traditions of states and municipalities. For example, states
differ in their relationship to local governments and their promotion
of regional infrastructures. Local municipalities differ in their
history of multijurisdiction cooperation. Some local jurisdictions have
histories of mutual aid agreements and working together, while in other
regions federal homeland security programs may be bringing partners
together across jurisdictions to conduct planning efforts for the first
time.
As used in this report, regional coordination refers to the use of
governmental resources in a complementary way toward goals and
objectives that are mutually agreed upon by various stakeholders in a
region. Regional coordination can also help to overcome the fragmented
nature of federal programs and grants available to state and local
entities. Successful coordination occurs not only vertically among
federal, state, and local governments but also horizontally within
regions. The effective alignment of resources for the security of
communities could require planning across jurisdictional boundaries;
neighboring jurisdictions may be affected by an emergency situation in
many potential ways, from implementation of mutual aid agreements, to
accepting evacuated residents, to traffic disruptions.
Our work has previously noted the concerns of state and local
governments about fragmented federal grant programs with burdensome
application processes that are complicated by the inconsistency across
programs.[Footnote 6] State and local governments manage multiple
funding sources for distinct but often similar purposes. For instance,
GAO identified 25 emergency preparedness programs that provided funding
to the NCR.[Footnote 7] The short history of regional coordination for
homeland security is characterized by attempts of federal, state, and
local governments to overcome a fragmented federal grant system and
local jurisdictional barriers to assess needs, fill gaps, and plan for
effective prevention and emergency response.
GAO has consistently called for the development of a truly national,
rather than purely federal, strategy.[Footnote 8] For example, in
testimony given in 2003, GAO highlighted multiple barriers to
addressing one basic area of preparedness--interoperable
communications systems--including the lack of effective,
collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning.
[Footnote 9] Another GAO study of bioterrorism preparedness found that
although progress had been made in local planning, regional planning
involving multiple municipalities, counties, or jurisdictions in
neighboring states lagged.[Footnote 10] In July 2002, the President
issued the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which emphasized a
shared responsibility for security involving close cooperation among
all levels of government. To enhance emergency preparedness, the
strategy called for systems that avoid duplication and increase
coordination to better align public and private resources for homeland
security.
With the creation of DHS and the development of the National Strategy,
the federal government has developed several programs and provided
financial assistance to improve state and local governments' ability to
prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism. These grant programs
demonstrate a variety of approaches. For example, all states are
eligible for the State Homeland Security Grant Program to update and
implement their state Homeland Security Strategy. The UASI provides
support to metropolitan areas designated by DHS as high-threat areas.
The funds are distributed based on a formula that considers critical
infrastructure, population density, assessment of threats, and other
factors.
DHS' UASI program combines the elements of threat-based assessment and
funding with regional planning. UASI programs must create a working
group with representation from the region that will be responsible for
coordinating development and implementation of program elements. Before
funding can be distributed, DHS also requires each UASI program to
develop and submit a strategic plan that outlines the region's common
goals, objectives, and steps for implementation. The strategy is
intended to provide each program with direction for enhancing regional
capability and capacity to prevent and reduce vulnerability. UASI funds
can be used to purchase a range of goods and services to enhance the
preparedness of first responders, including approved equipment,
preparedness plans, exercises, and training.
Other federal programs that require regional coordination may be
instructive for homeland security. In the area of transportation
planning, the federal government has required states to establish MPOs
to address regional transportation impact and needs. Established in
response to federal planning requirements dating back to 1962, MPOs are
multijurisdictional regional bodies composed of local elected officials
and public agency representatives who review and approve transportation
investments in metropolitan areas as a condition for federal highway
and transit funding. In the area of environmental planning, the Clean
Water Act directs EPA to develop plans for attaining or maintaining
water quality in an estuary system. Congress established EPA's National
Estuary Program in 1987 to improve the quality of estuaries of national
importance. To be selected for the National Estuary Program, estuaries
must be nominated by state governors and demonstrate existing regional
infrastructure with the capacity to fulfill the requirements of the
Clean Water Act.
Collaborative Organizations and Strategic Planning Foster Regional
Coordination:
As corroborated by officials with whom we met, collaborative regional
organizations that include a wide range of stakeholders from multiple
jurisdictions and disciplines contribute to successful regional
coordination for a variety of public programs. In addition, effective
strategic planning that includes measurable objectives appropriately
aligned with resources is necessary for fostering regional approaches
that enhance emergency preparedness and achieve other public goals. The
application of standards, where existent, to the planning process can
help to define and measure a baseline status (e.g., a baseline of
preparedness), a desired level of performance (e.g., preparedness
levels that are to be achieved), and a gap between the baseline and
desired level that would be the focus of a program's efforts.
Regional Organizations and Collaborative Decision-making Process
Support Effective Coordination:
When regional organizations are structured so that they include a wide
range of stakeholders and promote collaborative decision making, they
can advance regional coordination by creating a forum for those
stakeholders to build rapport, solve problems regarding issues of
mutual concern, and engage in information and resource sharing.
Collaborative problem identification and problem solving promotes
cooperation in planning efforts to address public problems.
Collaborative decision making can encourage decisions that preclude one
party from dominating decisions about problems, potential solutions,
programmatic goals and objectives, and funding allocations; instead,
such decisions are made with input from many. Emergency management,
transportation, and estuary program officials reported that regional
organizations enabled their regions to work together on a variety of
emergency preparedness, environmental, and transportation issues. In
the emergency preparedness area, the UASI working group in the NCR has
achieved multijurisdictional agreement on regional plans that contain
21 specific efforts to be funded in equipment, training, exercises, and
planning to improve the NCR's preparedness regionwide, not just to
benefit individual jurisdictions. Also in the NCR, the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments promotes collaborative
transportation decision making by requiring the majority of the area's
multijurisdictional transportation planning board to support a
transportation plan that specifies projects to be funded that are
intended to address the region's traffic congestion and air quality
problems--seen as being among the worst in the nation. The region's
long-range transportation improvement plan contained agreements on such
projects as road improvements associated with rebuilding the Woodrow
Wilson Bridge. Similarly, the Tampa Bay Estuary Program has restored a
net increase of about 850 acres of sea grasses on the Tampa Bay seabed
since the program's inception, or about 6 percent of the 14,000 total
acreage to be restored.
Collaborative decisions made by many stakeholders represented in
regional organizations can formulate mutually agreed-upon responses to
public policy problems. The collaborative experiences we observed in
the Dallas-Fort Worth area provided examples of how regional
organizations can aid in solving problems. For example, the Dallas-Fort
Worth's Regional Emergency Managers Group has served as a forum for the
region's emergency preparedness officials to analyze, plan for, and
make decisions about various regional initiatives, such as improving
interjurisdictional communications interoperability. Within this
group, an associated subgroup explored technical issues related to
communications interoperability. The Regional Emergency Managers Group
evaluated technology options and is creating a regional purchasing plan
to facilitate the purchase of interoperable communications equipment.
Without interoperable radios and other communications equipment, police
and fire departments in different jurisdictions cannot easily
communicate when responding to an emergency.
Collaborative efforts through regional organizations can also result in
the integration of plans and programs that are implemented by
individual jurisdictions. In Dallas-Fort Worth, local first responder
agencies built upon the established working relationships and their
trust of the local council of governments to enhance regional
coordination of homeland security. For example, the City of Dallas
contracted with the North Central Texas Council of Governments (NCTCOG)
to facilitate the development of the UASI strategy. In addition, most
of the jurisdictional and private sector stakeholders had their own
emergency preparedness plans that were not integrated. Acting upon a
request from local officials, NCTCOG initiated a process to coordinate
and integrate these various plans that reflected the NCTCOG's
reputation as an impartial and fair arbiter. The resulting plan
identifies the roles of the various first responder agencies across
jurisdictional boundaries, thereby increasing the police, fire, and
emergency medical resources that can respond to an emergency.
Regional organizations can also facilitate coordination by fostering
information and resource sharing. For example, in response to problems
coordinating the construction schedules on roads in the New York-New
Jersey region, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey created
the Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee (TRANSCOM) in
1986--a coalition of 18 independent transportation and public safety
agencies in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. TRANSCOM's
significance was exhibited on September 11, 2001, when it facilitated
efforts among member agencies such as the Port Authority, New Jersey
State Police, New Jersey Transit, New Jersey Department of
Transportation, and New Jersey Turnpike to reopen a major Manhattan bus
terminal to transport thousands of people home.
DHS and state and local emergency management officials have cited the
Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) as an example of an
information-sharing network focused on the prevention of terrorist
acts. Created in 1996 by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
the primary focus of TEW is to provide a coordinated and focused
response to acts of terrorism based on assessment and dissemination of
intelligence information. The core team of TEW includes the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Police Department, City and County
Fire Departments, Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cooperating agencies include about
30 other agencies representing a number of disciplines, such as
emergency management, transportation, and criminal justice. As a group,
TEW monitors trends and assesses threats that could potentially result
in terrorist attacks within Los Angeles County. Because of its ability
to develop terror threat information from a variety of sources and
disseminate it to first response officials throughout a large
metropolitan region, DHS is encouraging states and local agencies to
utilize their federal homeland security funding to replicate the Los
Angeles TEW model within the framework of their UASI plans.
Where Consistent with Civic and Political Traditions, Flexible
Approaches Can Enhance Regional Organizations:
Metropolitan regions differ in their civic and political traditions.
Some regions have leadership and/or long-running civic and political
traditions that promote collaborative efforts. For example, according
to national associations and emergency preparedness officials in the
San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, fire and emergency services in
California jurisdictions have longstanding traditions of coordinating
and operating jointly, across city and county lines. This tradition is
expressed through a strong mutual aid system. In other regions,
however, tradition can work against regional collaboration. In one
state we visited, metropolitan transportation planning was
characterized by a practice of having one MPO for each county.
Officials in the region we visited explained that local development
patterns in the region traditionally isolated each county from the
next, but in recent decades the counties' development had merged as new
migrants moved into the area. As a result, the county-based planning
structure may be outdated, because it is based on previously existent
development patterns. In response to the lack of a regionwide MPO, the
county-based MPOs have formed a regional MPO alliance that includes MPO
chairs, representatives from the regional councils of government, and
the state transportation department.
To function effectively, regional organizations must take into account
the impact of political and civic traditions. In regions where
leadership or cultural factors encourage collaborative efforts,
regional organizations that are formed locally, instead of being
imposed by federal and state government, are more likely to have
identified a coherent regional area based upon natural boundaries,
population, and established mutual aid relationships. Where appropriate
and considering regional leadership or culture, federal or state
programs can preserve the benefits of existing, locally formed regional
organizations by allowing local jurisdictions to organize together. The
following examples illustrate this point:
* Pennsylvania's Counterterrorism Planning, Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002 (Act 227) legally established the state's nine regional
counterterrorism task forces to coordinate the activities of county law
enforcement agencies in addressing terror threats.[Footnote 11]
However, in most cases, Pennsylvania allowed counties to divide
themselves into regions based upon their natural mutual aid alliances,
rather than imposing a new organizational boundary.
* In Texas, the Governor requested assistance from regional councils of
governments to facilitate a variety of collaborative efforts to build
regional emergency preparedness capacity across the state.
Specifically, regional councils of governments were able to unite
public and private stakeholders to develop, maintain, and coordinate
regional emergency preparedness management plans and actions. While
many cities, counties, and private sector stakeholders in Dallas-Fort
Worth had extensive emergency preparedness plans, many of these plans
were not integrated. The North Central Texas Council of Governments
played a key role in facilitating emergency preparedness coordination
and integrating preparedness plans through its efforts to coordinate
and integrate the emergency preparedness initiatives of the
metropolitan area. Those efforts culminated in the Regional Emergency
Managers meeting--a forum through which emergency managers shared
information, discussed best practices and technology, built rapport,
and developed mutual aid agreements. At the time of our study, the
group was continuing to meet on a quarterly basis and is developing a
regional emergency plan and associated schedule for achieving emergency
preparedness goals.
Regional leadership or traditions that are focused on achieving
collaboration can advance regional coordination by expanding
collaborative efforts throughout a region. In such cases, allowing
regional organizations the flexibility to define their geographic areas
or membership requirements can foster increased degrees of regional
coordination. However, in our view, in cases where state and local
traditions do not engender interjurisdictional collaboration, more
prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-making
processes, and planning serve as minimum thresholds for those
activities. In some cases, leaders bring together stakeholders to agree
upon common objectives and to act to achieve them. Those leaders play
an important role in fostering trust among partners and facilitating
progress. According to a report by the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA), leadership dedicated to stakeholder involvement
is a critical characteristic of high-performing partnerships, second
only to achieving results.[Footnote 12]
Collaborative leadership contributed to the expansion and success of
regional coordination efforts we studied in both emergency preparedness
and transportation programs. For example, emergency managers in the San
Francisco Bay Area developed the area's Regional UASI working group,
recognized by DHS and the State of California as a good example of
regional coordination. They brought the working group together to
discuss emergency issues and develop solutions for the entire Bay Area,
which includes three subregions with individual UASI programs--San
Francisco, San Jose, and Oakland. While there was no requirement to
work collaboratively across UASI programs, these emergency management
leaders took the initiative to establish a regional approach to
facilitate coordination throughout the area. They created a regionwide
group that meets for planning, and they obtained funding to implement
the UASI efforts by combining a portion of the individual UASI
program's funds for use in the whole of the San Francisco Bay Area. The
group has effectively developed a regionwide emergency preparedness
strategic plan that includes eight goals, such as regional mutual aid
exercises and communications interoperability.
Comprehensive Strategic Planning Based on Measurable Objectives and
Resource Alignment Contributes to Regional Coordination:
The deliberations of regional collaborative entities can result in
mutually agreed upon problems and solutions. Moreover, strategic plans
are a valuable tool to articulate goals, objectives, tasks, and
measures. By adding specificity to more general discussions about
problems and solutions, strategic plans can help to focus and
operationalize efforts to deal with identified problems. In addition,
standards, if existent, can be applied to help measure baseline
performance levels (e.g., the existing level of preparedness), define
measurable goals and objectives, and identify any gaps in performance.
In other words, the application of standards can give measurability and
benchmarking to strategic planning and performance monitoring.
Regional organizations' collaborative efforts can result in achieving
mutual agreement, expressed in plans, among diverse stakeholders on
priority problems and on specific steps to be taken to address them.
Moreover, the goals and objectives in plans allow problems and planned
steps to be defined specifically and progress to be measured. Two
examples follow.
* In the case of the Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP), a regional
organization's collaborative efforts identified environmental
problems, goals, and objectives that were expressed in a comprehensive
strategic plan. Estuary program officials pointed to the program's
focus on a limited number of measurable and achievable restoration
goals as key to its success, with respect to the strategic planning
process. Such planning addressed how to restore and recover the Tampa
Bay sea grass to conditions of 1950 via measurable and actionable
goals, objectives, and tasks. By specifically defining what could be
done in an action plan, TBEP involved a wide cross-section of
stakeholders, including federal, state, and local government partners,
local environmental groups, and the private sector. Using EPA's primer
dated August 1989, "Saving Bays and Estuaries" as a guideline for
developing missions and policies, the program's planning component
involved a diverse and comprehensive set of stakeholders. For example,
a technical advisory committee proposes technical solutions to the
restoration effort; a nitrogen mitigation consortium involves local
industry in proposing solutions; and a management board involves
environmental agencies in providing advice to the Policy Board--chaired
by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and EPA--that
approves all major decisions. Program officials credited the
involvement of scientists and citizens from the Tampa Bay region as
vital to the process of identifying and ranking the Bay's problems, as
well as developing measurable goals and objectives that are included in
its comprehensive restoration plan. Specifically, the strategic plan
identifies the restoration of 14,000 acres of sea grasses and
protection of the remaining sea grasses as a major goal and also
establishes a nitrogen management strategy (action plan) to encourage
sea grass recovery. The comprehensive strategic plan and nitrogen
management strategy include specific and measurable goals by reducing
nitrogen levels, identifying interim indicators (including water
clarity and chlorophyll concentrations), as well as monitoring
mechanisms to measure progress toward goals.
* In the Dallas-Fort Worth area, emergency management officials
reported that the UASI requirement for a regional emergency
preparedness plan initiated development of a comprehensive plan for
emergency preparedness policy guidance and coordination. They noted
that planning helped the region to prioritize goals and resulted in a
systematic decision-making process to determine spending for the UASI
funds. Other UASI areas, including Tampa Bay and Los Angeles, reported
that the strategic planning process was a driving force in streamlining
administration of the program.
Another example of the role of strategic planning with well-defined
goals and measurable objectives in encouraging regional coordination is
the MPO's requirement to develop a realistic transportation plan that
includes short-term and long-term strategies. According to officials,
such planning forces stakeholders to determine the relative importance
of various transportation projects. Federal transportation law requires
MPOs to plan for projects using a process that considers financial
resources that are budgetarily constrained, thereby forcing
stakeholders to resolve disputes and agree on common goals and
realistic objectives at the outset. In the San Francisco Bay Area, the
planning process led to transportation projects that served the region
as a whole instead of disparate projects in different jurisdictions.
For example, the regional MPO planned for an extension between two rail
systems that enhanced regional access to the San Francisco Airport with
the surrounding area, including San Jose and Oakland.
In addition, a strategic plan can be used in making decisions about
funds and other resources. Funds and resources can be allocated based
on the goals and objectives of the strategic plan. For example, the
NCR's UASI plan aligned $60 million to 21 lines of effort that were
categorized in functional areas that included equipment, training,
exercises, and planning. Those projects were linked to eight points
contained in a multistate agreement. At the same time, to be truly
effective strategic planning needs to be comprehensive by addressing
most of the resources available to address a public policy problem.
Failure to do so can result in overfunding some ongoing efforts, and
underfunding or not funding other activities. For example, in our May
2004 report on the management of first responder grants in the NCR, we
found that the UASI planning effort for the NCR would have been
improved by considering not only the uses of $60 million in UASI funds,
but also the uses of $280 million in funding from other first responder
grants.[Footnote 13] While we found no evidence of duplicative
purchases, consideration of the other $280 million in funds within the
framework of the UASI plan would have reduced opportunities for
excessive expenditures in some areas, while gaps remained in other
areas. More comprehensive planning could have better ensured that
funding would have been focused on the highest priority emergency
preparedness needs of the region. The NCR's UASI governance structure
is now taking steps to implement more comprehensive planning.
Some Federal Programs Contain Incentives for Regional Coordination:
Some federal programs contain features that encourage regional
solutions by providing incentives for local jurisdictions to join
together to obtain federal grant funding. A federal grant whose award
is conditioned on the recipient working through a collaborative
regional organization can encourage regional coordination. Grant
programs can also require the regional groups to express their
agreements regarding problems and solutions by preparing a strategic
plan with measurable goals and objectives. Such plans can guide grant
expenditures. Grant requirements that take into account local and
regional conditions and histories of collaboration by providing
appropriate flexibility can further enhance regional coordination.
Finally, federal financial assistance for coordination activities can
provide important support.
Some Federal Requirements Support Regional Organizations:
Federal grantor agencies support the existence of regional
organizations by requiring the grantee to establish such an
organization before receiving federal funds. Importantly, such
requirements can promote interjurisdictional cooperation in areas where
civic and political traditions work against such cooperation. For
example, federal transportation law requires an MPO to write
metropolitan transportation improvement plans before federal highway
and transit funds can be allocated.[Footnote 14] Moreover, UASI
requires a regional working group representing first responder agencies
and policymakers in a core city, core county, and other local
jurisdictions to write a regional UASI plan.
In addition, a federal agency may define a collaborative decision-
making process that fosters wide participation by a variety of
stakeholders and tries to avoid one party or type of party being
overrepresented in the regional group or wielding too much power within
the group. In that regard, a federal program may define minimally
acceptable requirements for such a group and the planning processes
associated with it. For example, DHS' UASI assigns funding to
predefined core cities and core counties. In addition, in one location
that we visited, the working group was required to agree unanimously to
the UASI regional strategic plan and budget, representing a high state
of consensus. In another case, federal transportation law requires MPOs
to be broad-based bodies that include representation from elected
officials of various jurisdictions in the defined service area of the
MPOs. In addition, MPOs must include the state transportation agencies
and operators of publicly owned transit services.
Flexibility in Grant Requirements Accommodates Regional Variations:
Federal grant designs can take into account the uniqueness of
leadership and political traditions at the state, local, and regional
levels by allowing local jurisdictions the flexibility to pursue
working arrangements that can facilitate regional coordination. By
allowing jurisdictions to identify the boundaries of the region, they
can take advantage of regional leadership or political relationships
that can bring additional stakeholders, resources, or ideas to the
process. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Dallas UASI region as
defined by DHS included the City of Dallas and its contiguous counties-
-Collin, Dallas, Denton, Kaufman, and Rockwall. However, many regional,
state, and city officials felt that Tarrant County also should be
included in the UASI planning, since Tarrant County includes a large
portion of the Dallas-Fort Worth population, including the entire city
of Fort Worth. To address this issue, the state provided funding to
Tarrant County from the 20 percent of UASI funding that was not passed
through to the City of Dallas.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also exhibited a commitment to
regional collaboration when it overlaid the regional Philadelphia UASI
area onto a preexisting regional task force. Member jurisdictions of
that task force--five emergency management coordinators from the
counties in the Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force--had been
working together for 5 years. As a result, the UASI program in
Philadelphia benefited from strong preexisting working relationships.
The cordiality built up among the UASI task force members fostered
relatively coequal funding and planning efforts that extended to
suburban parties well beyond the core city and core county.
Other locations, however, may not have traditions or leadership that
encourage interjurisdictional collaboration. For example, in some
locations, we found power imbalances, as well as political traditions
and histories of competition that challenged regional coordination.
Such challenges, for example, have been manifested by one or two
jurisdictions making decisions about how federal dollars would be spent
and how much funding other jurisdictions would receive. In such cases,
regional cooperation might be facilitated by designing grants that
require representation and collaboration through regional
organizations.
Federal Grant Requirements for Comprehensive Strategic Planning with
Measurable Objectives and Resource Alignment Encourage Effective
Regional Coordination:
Some federal grant programs require strategic plans as a precondition
for receiving federal grant dollars to encourage regional coordination,
but for the plans to be effective they should include measurable
objectives and corresponding resource alignment. In addition, the
application of preparedness standards to define the baseline status and
goals for regions can enhance strategic plans by adding an element of
measurability and specificity to them.
Our previous study of a number of leading public sector organizations
shows that strategic plans work most effectively when they contain
goals and objectives that are measurable and actionable.[Footnote 15]
The presence of measurable goals and objectives allows program managers
to ascertain progress being made and required action--such as
reallocating funding and/or making programmatic changes--needed to meet
those goals and objectives. For example, in the Tampa Bay Estuary
Program, a community of state, local government, nonprofit, and
commercial stakeholders determined four key program goals, as well as
mechanisms through which to achieve these goals prior to receiving
funding. Upon obtaining the funding, the program's management built
upon the stakeholders' support to proceed efficiently with the plan.
As previously noted, the existence and applicability of standards can
enhance the ability of decision makers to define measurable
programmatic goals and objectives and enable them to assess and
demonstrate progress being made. DHS' recently issued strategic plan
makes reference to establishing, implementing, and evaluating
capabilities through a system of national standards. In emergency
planning, preparedness standards can serve to define the preparedness
requirements of an area or jurisdiction, the current status of
preparedness, and the gap that exists between the requirements and
current status. Emergency preparedness officials told us that when
developing their strategic plan, national standards would have been
helpful to identify gaps and determine appropriate actions to address
them.
Clear standards help to guide the progress toward measurable
objectives. For example, MPOs must show that projects identified in
transportation plans for federal funding do not worsen air quality
conditions of the nonattainment[Footnote 16] metropolitan area. Their
analysis must demonstrate that the total emissions projected for a
transportation plan or program are within the emission limits
established by the State Implementation Plan.[Footnote 17] Reducing
transportation emissions in the metropolitan planning process is
usually achieved by a combination of new construction, system
improvements, and demand reduction measures.
Federal Funding for the Costs of Coordination Supports Regional
Efforts:
Some federal grant programs provide regional organizations recurring
funding for costs associated with regional coordination. The federal
government sometimes facilitates regional collaboration by paying
specifically for some of the costs of regional coordination. For
example, the coordination activities of MPOs are paid in part with
federal transportation funds.
Estuary program officials said annual EPA grants allow spending for
administrative needs and are important for facilitating regional
estuary efforts. They reported that federal EPA funding, even though a
relatively small portion of their overall budgets, was important to
program sustainability, because it is often the only funding available
to cover the critical operations that enable the rest of the estuary
program's activities to take place.
Federal grants also may facilitate regional coordination by enabling
organizations to use federal grant dollars to leverage partner
organizations to fund administrative costs. Officials with TRANSCOM in
the New York-New Jersey region said that federal funding for technical
infrastructure and maintenance costs enabled them to leverage funding
from partner jurisdictions for administrative costs.
NCR Emergency Preparedness Effort Can Benefit from Comprehensive
Planning and Application of Standards:
Our observations about regional coordination in the implementation of
federal programs in metropolitan areas we visited are applicable to the
efforts to coordinate homeland security in the NCR. Importantly, DHS'
UASI program allowed the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland,
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and regional jurisdictions to exercise a
high degree of flexibility in organizing the UASI governance structure.
Based on our review early developments, the NCR's UASI program would
exhibit key elements of successful regional coordination in UASI-
related emergency preparedness efforts. As envisioned in the current
UASI plans, the NCR's UASI program may be on the way to developing
multilayered regional coordination structures for the UASI. For
example, the NCR is beginning to use regional working groups--the
Emergency Preparedness Council (EPC) and the Chief Administrative
Officers Committee (CAO), among others--to bring stakeholders together
to agree upon goals and to consider funding allocations for regional
emergency preparedness. However, at the time of our May 2004 report,
the NCR had not applied this regional coordination structure and plans
to the full array of federal homeland security grants in the region,
totaling about $340 million.[Footnote 18] As discussed at a September
1, 2004, meeting of the UASI governance structure's Senior Policy Group
(SPG) and CAOs committee, the UASI governance structure plans to
implement comprehensive planning by identifying funding other than UASI
and developing centralized information on the uses of those funds.
NCR UASI Program Could Demonstrate Some Elements of Successful Regional
Coordination:
Based on our work in six urban areas, effective regional collaboration
is characterized by, among other things, the presence of a regional
organization of many diverse stakeholders that identifies problems and
possible solutions. The combined outcome of the collaborative
interaction of those parties is a strategic plan that is made
actionable by the presence of goals and objectives. As currently
envisioned and as being implemented in the initial stages, the NCR's
UASI governance structure appears to incorporate those features and
thereby has the potential to identify, fund, and implement emergency
preparedness regionwide, rather than having those decisions made either
by one dominant jurisdiction or in a fragmented, jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction manner.
As the UASI program is currently planned and implemented in the early
stages, the governance structure is bringing together various
stakeholders to identify regional emergency preparedness projects to be
funded with UASI funds, and to solicit and obtain funding priorities,
other input, and concurrence from federal, state, and local
governmental stakeholders (including first responders); the commercial
sector; the not-for-profit sector; and the health community, among
others. For example, the CAO committee uses several technical
committees--e.g., police chiefs, fire chiefs, public information
officers, and health care committees--to identify security gaps and
make recommendations on how to close them. Those recommendations are to
be reviewed by the CAO committee, which is comprised of the 19 CAOs (in
effect, county executives and city and town managers) of the
Metropolitan Washington Area Council of Government's (MWCOG)
jurisdictions, and consolidated, where necessary. In addition, the CAOs
would discuss preparedness expectations for the region, including
strategic objectives and commitments to action by Maryland, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia. The CAOs would obtain UASI proposals by
asking NCR jurisdictions and technical committees to provide their top
priorities. According to the CAO Committee's chairman, those priorities
would be consolidated by the CAO committee and used to generate final,
rank-ordered funding priorities for the fiscal year 2004 UASI funds.
Under current plans, the EPC, which serves as the UASI working group,
would have the authority to approve all funding initiatives. The EPC
represents the federal, state, and local levels of government, a
variety of first responder disciplines, and the commercial and not-for-
profit sectors, among others. It meets to discuss and approve the UASI
funding recommendations that have been made by the CAO Committee.
The SPG--representing the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, the Mayor
of Washington, D.C., and the DHS Office of National Capital Region
Coordination (ONCRC)---has final budget authority over projects
discussed, recommended, and approved by the CAOs and EPC. MWCOG staff
and the CAO Committee's Chairman do not envision disagreements between
the different elements of the UASI governance structure, because they
share membership on the same committees.
Management of Most Emergency Preparedness Grants in the NCR Affected by
Lack of Comprehensive Regional Planning and Preparedness Standards:
In our report and testimony of May and June 2004, respectively, we
concluded that the NCR efforts to implement an efficient and effective
regional preparedness approach were hampered by not having a
coordinated strategic plan for enhancing NCR preparedness. Moreover,
the regional UASI plan would not be based on any performance standards.
Specifically, the NCR's UASI plan could not be considered to be a
comprehensive strategic preparedness plan because it excluded non-UASI
funds totaling $280 million in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As we
reported, at the time of our May 2004 report, there existed no reliable
central source of data on funds available and expended and the purposes
for which they were spent.[Footnote 19] Instead, those funds were
allocated on a grant-by-grant basis within each jurisdiction largely
based on requests from first responder and emergency management
officials. To the extent there was consensus on regional goals and
knowledge of regional capacities, funds could be allocated in a more
coherent manner. Moreover, federal emergency preparedness grants were
often spent by each jurisdiction without considering whether assets and
resources purchased already existed in neighboring jurisdictions and
could be shared. Decisions about those purchases generally were not
based on knowledge of the current level of preparedness or requirements
to reach a desired preparedness level. According to comments provided
by DHS and as discussed at a September 1, 2004, meeting of the UASI
governance structures SPG and CAOs Committee, the UASI governance
structure now plans to address these issues by gathering information
from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia on funding
sources other than UASI, how the funds were allocated and for what
purposes, and how they were distributed by jurisdiction. In that
regard, the governance structure's working group is converting hard-
copy data on funds available and expended to a centralized database
that would be fully populated by 2005. This would help the UASI
governance structure avoid duplication of funding and leverage UASI
funds to extend preparedness efforts to the entire region. In addition,
as stated in DHS' comments on our draft report and as discussed at the
September 1, 2004, meeting of the SPG and CAOs Committee, a committee
has been assigned to work on an analysis of regional preparedness gaps
that would consider the local assets that could be applied to closing
those gaps. Stakeholders at the meeting mentioned that such a gap
analysis could be based on likely scenarios that would need to be
addressed during an emergency.
The NCR's UASI plan sets broad strategic goals of preventing terror
attacks, reducing the region's vulnerability to terror, and minimizing
damages and recovery from any terror attacks that do occur. The plan
endorses an eight-point agreement signed by Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia to achieve those three strategic objectives by
focusing action on (1) preventing terror; (2) promoting citizen
involvement in preparedness; (3) working in partnership to implement a
coordinated decision-making process; (4) implementing emergency
protective measures; (5) promoting a public/private partnership to
protect the infrastructure; (6) working to develop a Joint Information
System for the media; (7) enhancing mutual aid agreements, including
dealing with any liability issues; and (8) partnering to coordinate
plans for terrorism and security-related training and exercises across
the area.
Concluding Observations:
Federal programs frequently rely on regionally coordinated approaches
to deliver important services to program beneficiaries and clientele.
This fact is especially important in the relatively young field of
homeland security, because the urgency of addressing the terror threat
calls for effectively and efficiently managing the use of federal
homeland security grant dollars. Based on our work, we have concluded
that regional approaches to manage federal homeland security dollars
help to ensure that those funds are spent in a complementary,
coordinated fashion that is targeted at known security gaps. Our work
further shows that regional approaches to emergency preparedness and
other fields are characterized by several broad features that the
federal government can encourage, frequently through the design and
requirements of its grants. These lessons can be applied in the NCR and
elsewhere to improve the management of federal emergency preparedness
grant dollars by enlisting the support of a variety of stakeholders in
identifying and supporting solutions to preparedness requirements and
targeting the use of scarce resources to address preparedness gaps.
The federal government can encourage effective coordination in its
grant requirements in four ways:
* First, some federal grants require the existence and operation of a
regional collaborative organization and establish a minimum threshold
of regional collaboration by requiring a variety of stakeholders,
resulting in widespread agreement on what problems should be addressed
and what steps should be taken.
* Second, where favorable political and civic conditions exist, some
federal grants have allowed regional organizations to exercise
flexibility in how they operate--for example, in establishing their
membership boundaries.
* Third, some grants provide minimum thresholds for planning by
requiring that regional organizations prepare regional strategic plans
that contain goals and objectives that are specific and measurable.
Strategic plans provide a focal point for establishing goals and
aligning resources. The application of standards, where existent, adds
a measure of precision and measurability to a plan's goals and
objectives.
* Fourth, some grants fund the costs of regional organizations, thereby
providing additional incentives for localities to collaborate
interjurisdictionally.
Regional approaches for homeland security continue to evolve quickly,
but the nation is still in the early stages of building institutions
and processes to address emergency preparedness. Also, the federal
government is still in the early stages of developing preparedness
standards to guide local initiatives. Based on our work and given the
important role that regional planning and governance can play in
improving national preparedness, these developments warrant continued
congressional monitoring and oversight. As local initiatives continue
to evolve and federal guidance becomes more definitive, the use of
regional structures and plans in guiding the allocation and use of all
major federal homeland security assistance will likely become more
important.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and officials of the NCR's
UASI governance structure for their review and comment. DHS commented
that the report contains information that will be valuable to
communities across the country as DHS encourages regional coordination
and capability building. DHS also states that the UASI governance
structure is currently active and is not proposed or interim. We agree
that the governance structure is not proposed or interim, and we state
in our report that the regional coordination activities of the NCR's
UASI governance structure have evolved to begin to display many of the
characteristics of regional coordination. For example, our report
reflects information regarding the establishment and evolution of
structures associated with the UASI governance structure, including the
Senior Policy Group, the Emergency Preparedness Council, and the Chief
Administrative Officers Committee. DHS also remarked that, as discussed
at a September 1, 2004, meeting of the UASI Senior Policy Group and
Chief Administrative Officers Committee, the UASI governance structure
will take steps to ensure that planned uses of federal emergency
preparedness funds consider all funding sources, including non-UASI
sources. Specifically, the UASI governance structure plans to gather
information from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia on
funding sources other than UASI, how the funds were allocated and for
what purposes, and how they were distributed by jurisdiction. In that
regard, the governance structure is converting hard-copy data on funds
available and expended to a centralized database that would be fully
populated by 2005. In response, we added information in our report to
reflect these refinements to the NCR's governance structure.
The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator of Washington, D.C., also provided
comments. Similar to DHS, he stated that the NCR's governance structure
reflected the building of a great deal of the foundation for meeting
the domestic preparedness challenges that affect the area. He also
commented that the NCR is unique compared to the six metropolitan areas
we chose for detailed analysis because only the NCR (1) involves two
states and a governmental entity that combines state and local
functions; (2) contains monuments and memorials that are the most
visible symbols of our national strength and patriotism that, if
attacked, would create a perception of vulnerability on the part of the
federal government; and (3) is the seat of the federal government,
creating a partnership between the national government and state and
local governments. While we agree that the NCR is an important and
unique urban area, the areas we chose for detailed analysis contain
comparable features. For example, the New York City region contains
three states and a very large city; that same region, as well as other
areas we visited, also contains a significant federal presence and many
buildings and icons that could be at risk for a terror event. Moreover,
other regions we studied contained extensive partnerships between
federal, state, and local governments.
The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator also stated that the National
Estuary Program incorporates clean water standards and scientific
solutions to accomplish clean water. He stated that the federal
homeland security strategies and plans are not based on proven
standards and solutions. Hence, he concluded that the National Estuary
Program is not comparable with federal homeland security strategies and
plans. We agree that the National Estuary Program is based on existing
standards and solutions; indeed, our report notes that for the most
part, standards are not yet extant for homeland security efforts.
However, the application of standards in the planning and
implementation of the National Estuary Program is the very reason we
chose to explore and elaborate upon it. Our report notes that the
preparation and implementation of plans that have goals and objectives
that are actionable and measurable--frequently based on the application
of existing standards--is a key factor in the success of regionally
coordinated programs. Indeed, our May 2004 report on the management of
first responder grants in the NCR recommends that the Secretary, DHS,
identify and address gaps in emergency preparedness and evaluate the
effectiveness of expenditures in meeting those needs by adapting
standards and preparedness guidelines based on likely scenarios for the
NCR and conducting assessments based on them.[Footnote 20]
As agreed with your office, unless you release this report earlier, we
will not distribute it until 30 days from the date of this letter. At
that time, we will send copies to relevant congressional committees and
subcommittees, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and to other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at 202-512-6806. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Patricia A. Dalton:
Director, Strategic Issues:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our overall goal for this engagement was to identify features of
regional collaboration in urban areas outside of the National Capital
Region (NCR) that could be transferred to homeland security efforts in
the NCR and elsewhere. In pursuit of that overall goal, we met with
representatives and officials of the National Academy of Public
Administration, the Association of Metropolitan Planning
Organizations, the National Association of Regional Councils, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. We asked these parties to recommend specific urban areas that,
in their view, had significant regional coordinative activities that we
should examine. We also sought out areas that presented challenges for
regional coordination through such features as having a multitude of
jurisdictions within a region, an interstate geographic area, and
geographic bifurcation characterized by the presence of a large body of
water. We also obtained information regarding factors--such as the
presence of significant federal and commercial facilities, national
monuments, critical infrastructure (bridges, tunnels, airports, and
seaports), population density, and ranking as a high-threat urban area
per the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Urban Area Security
Initiative--that indicated a metropolitan area was at risk for a terror
event.
Based on these various considerations and recommendations, we
identified the Dallas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, New
York, Philadelphia, and Tampa-St. Petersburg areas as sites meeting one
or more of these criteria and selected them for a more detailed
analysis of regional coordination across a variety of federal programs.
We also used information from these parties, along with a review our
previous work in the area of intergovernmental relations, to identify
federal programs with regional coordination features that could be
useful for enhancing regional emergency preparedness coordination.
Based on our assessment of this information, we selected for
examination the transportation planning program that utilizes
metropolitan planning organizations to prepare regional transportation
improvement plans and related plans to guide the expenditure of federal
highway and transit dollars. In the area of environmental protection,
we selected estuary programs in which state agencies; local
governments; or other public, nonprofit, or private agencies, research
institutions, and individuals develop programs to protect and restore
coastal resources through comprehensive planning and joint action. We
also selected a homeland security program--the Urban Area Security
Initiative--that apportions domestic preparedness funding for
equipment, training, exercises, and planning on the basis of a regional
plan that is prepared by a regional working group.
To meet our first objective of identifying factors of successful
regional coordination, we met with representatives of regional
organizations and with federal, state, and local government officials
in the areas selected. Regional organization representatives that we
met with came from regional councils, councils of governments,
metropolitan planning organizations, air quality districts, and estuary
programs (where applicable). We also met with local and state officials
responsible for homeland security and emergency preparedness, first
responders, and other region-specific officials with responsibility for
transportation, environmental, or homeland security planning. We asked
these officials about characteristics of their organizations and
regional political and civic factors that fostered regional
coordination. We also obtained, analyzed, and followed up on such
documentation as: stakeholder lists and the decision-making procedures
of regional organizations, strategic planning documents, indicators of
progress made against program goals and objectives, and plans for
future enhancements of regional coordination.
In pursuit of the second objective of identifying features of federal
programs that enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination, we
met with local officials and officials from state emergency management
agencies at all six case study locations. We also met with federal
grantor agency officials from the Department of Transportation, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and DHS's Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness. We obtained information and
examined documentation (i.e., program guidance, grant requirements, and
reporting requirements) about the federal guidelines and objectives for
these programs. Based on those discussions and documentation
examinations, we were also able to identify traits and characteristics
that provided incentives to state, regional, and local governmental,
commercial, and not-for-profit entities to collaborate in pursuit of
public policy purposes.
To address our third objective of examining the state of emergency
preparedness regional coordination in the NCR, we determined current
NCR regional coordination practices by meeting with officials from the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Government's Divisions of
Transportation, Environment (Air Quality), and Homeland Security and
Public Safety. We also met with officials from the DHS's Office of
National Capital Region Coordination and the Chair of the NCR Chief
Administrative Officers Committee, and we attended meetings of the NCR
Emergency Preparedness Council as well as the Senior Policy Group and
Chief Administrative Officers Committee. We relied on oral and
documentary evidence from these officials as well as our previous
review of the management of first responder grants in the NCR to
understand the state of regional coordination in the NCR as of
September 2004.
We conducted our review from July 2003 to September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
Homeland Security:
September 10, 2004:
Patricia A. Dalton:
Director, Strategic Issues:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Dalton:
RE: Draft Report GAO-04-1009, Homeland Security: Effective Regional
Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness (GAO Job Code 450263):
Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject draft report. The
report contains information on the characteristics of effective
regional coordination that will be valuable to many communities across
the country as the Department continues to encourage regional
coordination and capability building. The Department acknowledges that
regional coordination efforts in the National Capital Region (NCR)
already display many of the characteristics of effective regional
coordination cited in the report. Additionally, the NCR is moving
quickly towards putting into place all the aspects of effective
regional coordination noted in the report including a comprehensive
regional strategic plan.
It should be noted, however, that the regional coordination governance
structure that is currently active in the NCR is not a proposed or
interim structure as the report suggests. In fact, there has been a
working regional governance structure since August 2002 when the
Governors and the Mayor publicly committed to regional coordination and
cooperation. The NCR Senior Policy Group (SPG) was constituted. This
governance structure was further broadened in late 2003 and codified in
2004. The regional current governance structure for the NCR was adopted
by the key regional stakeholders in February 2004 at the NCR Emergency
Preparedness Council and has been fully implemented since that time.
The structure is solidly in place and being used for reaching decisions
regarding the ongoing homeland security programs in the region.
As the report discusses, the governance structure for the NCR is broad-
based and inclusive of all jurisdictions and disciplines. It is also
flexible, so that other groups can be added to the structure as the
need is identified. One recent example of this flexibility is the
inclusion of the Metro Chief Information Officers (CIOs) committee as a
supporting committee for the Chief Administrative Officials (CAO). Now
technical proposals that impact State and local information technology
enterprises can be vetted through the Metro CIOs to ensure a
coordinated solution is achieved. This is just one example of the
flexibility that is built into the NCR regional coordination structure.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Program incorporates most or
all of the elements identified in the report that characterize
effective coordination, such as representation from different
stakeholder groups and multiple jurisdictions; development of strategic
plans; and formation of a regional organization for collaborative
decision making. The NCR and the UASI work group have fulfilled these
program requirements, and have established themselves as a viable
operation for further enhancement of emergency preparedness.
The report indicates NCR has not included other homeland security funds
that the respective jurisdictions have received when considering how to
allocate its UASI funds. The UASI work group currently is gathering
information from the States of Maryland and Virginia, and the District
of Columbia on other funding sources and how funds have been allocated,
for what purpose, and to which jurisdictions the funds have been
distributed. Having this data available will help the UASI work group
avoid duplication of funding, and leverage the UASI funds to extend the
preparedness efforts of the respective jurisdictions, and thus the
entire NCR.
A report finding suggests there is no reliable central source of data
on funds available and expended and the purposes for which they were
spent. This information is available at DHS/ODP through hard copy grant
files. The Department is in the process of converting this information
to a centralized database, which can provide queries upon request. This
database will not be fully populated until early 2005, but DHS/ODP is
able to provide this information upon request.
The report also identifies the importance of a comprehensive strategic
plan with measurable goals and objectives to help focus resources and
efforts to address problems. Over the past few months the CAOs have
tasked the Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Committee (DEPC) to
develop recommendations on performance standards that could or should
be adopted by the region. These recommendations will form the larger
over all strategy that will clearly identify preparedness priorities
and the measurable performance standards.
Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 calls
for the development of a national preparedness goal which will
establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources
required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will also
include readiness metrics and elements that support the national
preparedness goal including standards for preparedness assessments and
strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation's overall
preparedness to respond to major events, especially those involving
acts of terrorism. This guidance will inform the development of
measurable goals and objectives at the State and local level. The
Office of National Capital Region Coordination is committed to support
the integration of the national guidance with State and local
performance measures.
For all the progress made in the NCR to increase preparedness, the
Department realizes, and your report supports the fact, that we need to
continue on the path of improvement by developing preparedness
standards, and clear performance goals. We have already built a great
deal of the foundation for effective regional coordination as noted in
the report and will continue to work toward improving that
coordination.
Sincerely:
Signed for:
Anna F. Dixon:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Deputy Mayor and City Administrator,
District of Columbia:
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
Executive Office of the Mayor:
Robert C. Bobb:
Deputy Mayor and City Administrator:
September 10, 2004:
Patricia Dalton:
Director, Strategic Issues:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Dalton:
As the State Administrative Agent (SAA) for the National Capital Region
(NCR), I would like to thank you for forwarding the Draft GAO report,
GAO-04-1009, entitled Homeland Security: Effective Regional
Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness for review. This draft
report was provided to the NCR to obtain advance review and comment for
subjects it discusses. We understand that the report has not been fully
reviewed within GAO and is, therefore subject to revision. In general,
the report describes factors that enhance regional coordination in
selected metropolitan areas, the features of federal programs that
enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination, and how to
incorporate regional coordination for emergency preparedness features
from other metropolitan areas into the NCR.
The report selected six metropolitan areas to examine regional
coordination. These six areas were chosen based on their vulnerability
to terror events indicated by the presence of potential targets and the
level of complexity as it relates to regional coordination. Based on
the uniqueness of the NCR, it is difficult to compare the NCR with the
six metropolitan areas identified. The following describes the
differentiating factors associated with the NCR:
* The NCR is the only urban area to include two states and a government
entity that serves city, county, state functions in combination (the
District of Columbia). The NCR comprises eight major jurisdictions with
a number of additional municipalities that reside within the boundaries
of these eight jurisdictions. In line with regional homeland security
coordination and the guidance set forth by the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP), the NCR adopted a comprehensive governance
structure that includes elected leaders and Chief Administrative
Officers (CAO's) from each jurisdiction as well as the State Homeland
Security Advisors and Emergency Management Directors that comprise the
Senior Policy Group (SPG).
* The NCR's monuments and memorials are some of the most visible in the
country and are symbols of national strength and patriotism. A
terrorist threat to anyone of these monuments or memorials is likely to
have a major negative psychological and emotional impact that would be
felt throughout the country and the world. This would create a
perception of vulnerability on the part of the Federal government.
* The NCR is also the seat of the Federal government. A partnership
exists between the NCR state and local governments and the Federal
government entities to coordinate homeland security efforts.
For these reasons, the NCR must be viewed as unique in comparison to
other urban areas designated by the Department of Homeland Security.
The report recognizes the importance of regional organizations to serve
as structured forums for diverse parties to discuss public policy
problems and agree on possible solutions. The report specifically
refers to the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG)
multi-jurisdiction transportation board as an example of such an
organization and forum for collaborative decision making. As discussed
in the Office of National Capital Region's response to the previous GAO
report (GAO-04-433), the NCR recognizes the importance of such an
entity through the formal NCR Review and Recommendation Process. This
process ensures coordination of resources among all jurisdictions
within the NCR and utilizes MWCOG public safety cluster committees
(i.e., Law Enforcement, Fire Chief, Emergency Manager, etc ...) to
ensure coordination throughout the NCR within their particular area of
expertise and provide the associated priorities and needs. This allows
the NCR to leverage longstanding tradition of inter-jurisdictional
coordination to provide recommendations through the regional process
and accompanying governance structure. This regional collaborative
process has been encouraged by the leadership of the NCR and has
resulted in the NCR Chief Information Officers (CIO's) to formulate a
MWCOG committee to discuss information technology issues and develop
solutions as it pertains to homeland security.
The report also recognizes the importance of strategic plans developed
by regional organizations can be effective tools to focus resources and
efforts to address problems. Such plans often contain features as goals
and objectives that are measurable and quantifiable. The report
specifically refers to the Tampa Bay Estuary Program involving multiple
entities from the private and public sectors (federal and state) to
implement solutions to cleaning up Tampa Bay on technically sound plans
that are based on measurable goals and objectives. The National Estuary
program identifies federal standards that have been established for
hazardous substances, through scientific data, that must be obtained
within the water through specific sampling methods to determine if the
Estuary is considered "clean". These standards are based on remedial
technologies (solution) that currently exist for remediating a source
as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency.
The NCR recognizes the importance of technically sound plans that are
based on measurable goals and objectives when federal standards exist
to define the quantifiable standard to be met with existing remedies or
solutions. Such quantifiable federal standards currently do not exist
for defining a level of preparedness or established remedies or
solutions to meet such standards. For the reasons stated above, GAO has
incorrectly compared a well established, federal estuary program with
baseline performance measures with homeland security strategies and
plans that do not have well developed, scientifically tested, baseline
performance measures.
That said, the NCR has in place a structure to enable good planning. To
assist in future coordination efforts the SPG has developed a team to
assist in administering state and regional grant funds, and
coordination of programmatic planning and response issues. A detailed
outline of theses processes were described with the response to the
draft GAO report, GAO-04-433 entitled: Homeland Security: National
Capital Region Grant Management Issues Reflect the Need for Coordinated
Planning and Performance Standards. The processes described allow for
coordinated grants administration and strategic planning for enhancing
the NCR's preparedness, performance standards, and a reliable, central
source of data on funds available and the purpose for which they are
spent.
The report further recognizes the importance of regional organizations
that reach collaborative decisions prior to receiving grant funds. As
the report points out, this avoids one party or type of party being
over-represented in the regional group or wielding too much power. As
stated on page 32 of the report, the NCR utilizes regional working
groups for collaborative decision making, as stated above when
referring to the public safety committees of MWCOG. This was also
exemplified in the September 2, 2004 CAO/SPG meeting, which GAO
representatives attended to view the NCR's collaborative decision-
making process at work.
In line with regional homeland security coordination and the guidance
set forth by ODP, the NCR adopted a comprehensive governance structure
that includes the CAO's from each jurisdiction as well as SPG, which is
comprised of the homeland security advisor and the director of the
emergency management agency of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. This governance process is required to ensure collaborative
decision making throughout the NCR. The governance structure of the NCR
is all encompassing to include not only the strategic decision makers
and the senior leaders of the region but also the tactical decision
makers, the Public Safety department heads, and their subordinate field
experts.
For all the progress made in the NCR to increase preparedness, the NCR
realizes, and your report supports the fact, that we need to continue
to implement and enhance our collaborative decision-making process and
continue to redefine our performance goals. We have already built a
great deal of the foundation for meeting the challenges noted in the
report and will continue to work toward meeting our goals.
Your cooperation is appreciated. If you have additional questions,
please call Steve Kral, Administrator for the Office of Homeland
Security, at (202) 727-5934.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Robert C. Bobb:
Deputy Mayor / City Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Patricia A. Dalton, Director, (202) 512-6806:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, Ernie Hazera, Joseph Byrns, Chelsa Kenney, Laurie Latuda,
Jeanine Lavender, Amy Rosewarne, Susan Sato, and Amelia Shachoy made
key contributions to this report.
(450263):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Section 882 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-
296 (Nov. 25, 2002)) incorporates the definition of the NCR from 10
U.S.C. 2674(f)(2) as the geographic area consisting of the District of
Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George's Counties in Maryland;
Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties and the City
of Alexandria in Virginia; and all cities and other units of government
within those jurisdictions.
[2] In addition to the NCR, the Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New
York, San Francisco, and Seattle areas were designated as high-risk
urban areas during the first round of UASI funding in fiscal year 2003.
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the
National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).
[4] Preparedness standards include functional standards for equipment,
such as personal protection suits; performance standards, such as the
number of persons per hour that could be decontaminated after a
chemical attack; and best practice benchmarks, if applicable.
[5] According to current plans, the NCR's UASI governance structure
includes the Emergency Preparedness Council (EPC) and Chief
Administrative Officers (CAO) Committee, and the Senior Policy Group
(SPG). The EPC contains representation from various first response
disciplines, several regional jurisdictions, the private sector, and
the nonprofit sector, among others. The CAOs represent the city and
town managers and county executives of the 19 jurisdictions. The SPG
represents the governors of Maryland and Virginia, the mayor of
Washington, D.C., and the Department of Homeland Security and has final
budget authority over UASI-related emergency preparedness projects for
the NCR.
[6] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the
Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local
Preparedness, GAO-02-550T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2002).
[7] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the
National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).
[8] See GAO-02-550T and GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of
Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an
Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable
Communications for First Responders, GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 6, 2003).
[10] GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local
Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003).
[11] 2002 Pa. Laws 227. This act codified the task forces, which were
administratively created in 1998.
[12] National Academy of Public Administration, Powering the Future:
High Performance Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).
[13] GAO-04-433.
[14] 23 U.S.C. §134.
[15] GAO, Comptroller General's Forum: High-Performing Organizations:
Metrics, Means, and Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the
21st Century Public Management Environment, GAO-04-343SP (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004).
[16] Nonattainment areas are those that do not meet or previously have
not met air quality standards for ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate
matter, or nitrogen dioxide.
[17] States are required by the Clean Air Act to develop State
Implementation Plans that demonstrate how the designated area will
reduce emissions and meet air quality standards.
[18] GAO-04-433.
[19] GAO-04-433.
[20] GAO-04-433.
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