Homeland Security
Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism Gao ID: GAO-04-1075T September 22, 2004In an effort to increase homeland security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the executive branch issued seven national strategies related to combating terrorism and homeland security. Per the request of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, this testimony will focus primarily on the National Strategy for Homeland Security but also include relevant aspects of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Together, these two national strategies address preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from future attacks, if they occur. This testimony covers three topics: (1) To what extent are elements of the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies aligned with recommendations issued by the 9/11 Commission? (2) What key departments have responsibilities for implementing the Homeland Security strategy, and what actions have they taken to implement the strategy? and (3) What challenges are faced by key departments in assessing their progress towards achieving homeland security objectives? This testimony continues GAO's efforts to establish baseline assessments related to homeland security. Together, these baseline efforts are intended to aid congressional oversight in assessing the effectiveness of federal homeland security activities.
The 9/11 Commission issued 8 recommendations that were not addressed in the specific initiatives for the critical mission areas of the Homeland Security strategy or the goals and objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. These recommendations pertain to enhancing analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganizing the intelligence community, improving accountability of intelligence operations, leadership of the Department of Defense in paramilitary operations, continuity of national security policymaking, and modifying congressional oversight. As the national strategies are expected to evolve over time, they could reflect some of these recommendations. The remaining 33 Commission recommendations are aligned with the specific initiatives of the Homeland Security strategy or the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. For example, in the area of Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, the Commission recommended that the United States prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by expanding and supporting existing counter-proliferation initiatives. Similarly, the Homeland Security strategy includes an initiative to prevent terrorist use of nuclear weapons. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the United States engage with other nations in developing a strategy against terrorism and an approach toward detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. Likewise, the Combating Terrorism strategy includes an objective to establish and maintain an international standard and accountability with regard to combating terrorism. Our preliminary analysis identifies six departments--the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and State--as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. These six departments represent 94 percent of the proposed $47 billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. In addition, our preliminary analysis shows that these six departments have lead agency roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. For example, DHS was designated as the lead agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives in that strategy. According to information received from agency officials, at least one of these six departments has demonstrated planning and/or implementation activities in each of the 43 initiatives. While our preliminary analysis indicates that planning or implementation activities were occurring, it was not within the scope of the analysis to assess the status or quality of the various departments' activities on each initiative. In a forthcoming report for this committee, we will provide more detailed information on these departments' efforts, including an analysis of lead agencies' current implementation activities. As key departments continue to implement the Homeland Security strategy, the development of performance goals and measures will help them assess their progress in implementing homeland security efforts. Once they are established, performance measures, such as cost-effectiveness and net benefits, can be used to link costs to outcomes. Development of standards, particularly systems and service standards, will also provide an important means to measure preparedness and guide resource investments.
GAO-04-1075T, Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, September 22, 2004:
Homeland Security:
Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism:
Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues:
GAO-04-1075T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to address
national strategies related to homeland security.
We at GAO applaud the efforts of the 9/11 Commission and the dedicated
family members of the victims of that tragic day whose combined efforts
have resulted in a definitive account of the past events and 41
recommendations for the future. As the Commission notes, we are safer
today but we are not safe, and much work remains. We concur with the
Commission's conclusion that the American people should expect their
government to do its very best. We also acknowledge the efforts of
earlier congressionally chartered commissions--the Bremer, Gilmore,
and Hart-Rudman Commissions--that also analyzed terrorist incidents and
government programs and made recommendations to improve homeland
security.
In an effort to increase homeland security following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the executive branch
issued seven national strategies related to combating terrorism and
homeland security. Per your request, this testimony will focus
primarily on the National Strategy for Homeland Security but also
include relevant aspects of the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism. Together, these two national strategies address preventing
terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in
the recovery from future attacks, if they occur.
In my testimony today, I will cover three topics.
* To what extent are elements of the Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism strategies aligned with recommendations issued by the 9/11
Commission?
* What key departments have responsibilities for implementing the
Homeland Security strategy, and what actions have they taken to
implement the strategy?
* What challenges are faced by key departments in assessing their
progress towards achieving homeland security objectives?
This testimony continues GAO's efforts to establish baseline
assessments related to homeland security. In February, we testified on
the desired characteristics of national strategies, and whether various
strategies--including the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism
strategies--contained those desired characteristics.[Footnote 1] In
March, we summarized strategic homeland security recommendations by GAO
and congressionally chartered commissions that preceded the 9/11
Commission in issuing their reports.[Footnote 2] We organized this
March analysis by critical mission area, as defined in the Homeland
Security strategy. In July, we reported on GAO recommendations to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the department's progress in
implementing such recommendations.[Footnote 3] We organized this July
analysis by DHS directorate or division. Together, these baseline
efforts are intended to aid congressional oversight in assessing the
effectiveness of federal homeland security activities.
Summary:
The 9/11 Commission issued 8 recommendations that were not addressed in
the specific initiatives for the critical mission areas of the Homeland
Security strategy or the goals and objectives of the Combating
Terrorism strategy. These recommendations pertain to enhancing
analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency,
reorganizing the intelligence community, improving accountability of
intelligence operations, leadership of the Department of Defense in
paramilitary operations, continuity of national security policymaking,
and modifying congressional oversight. As the national strategies are
expected to evolve over time, they could reflect some of these
recommendations. The remaining 33 Commission recommendations are
aligned with the specific initiatives of the Homeland Security strategy
or the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. For example, in
the area of Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, the Commission
recommended that the United States prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction by expanding and supporting existing
counterproliferation initiatives. Similarly, the Homeland Security
strategy includes an initiative to prevent terrorist use of nuclear
weapons. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the United States
engage with other nations in developing a strategy against terrorism
and an approach toward detention and humane treatment of captured
terrorists. Likewise, the Combating Terrorism strategy includes an
objective to establish and maintain an international standard and
accountability with regard to combating terrorism.
Our preliminary analysis identifies six departments--the Departments of
Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice,
and State--as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security
strategy. These six departments represent 94 percent of the proposed
$47 billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. In
addition, our preliminary analysis shows that these six departments
have lead agency roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy.
For example, DHS was designated as the lead agency for 37 of the 43
initiatives in that strategy. According to information received from
agency officials, at least one of these six departments has
demonstrated planning and/or implementation activities in each of the
43 initiatives. While our preliminary analysis indicates that planning
or implementation activities were occurring, it was not within the
scope of the analysis to assess the status or quality of the various
departments' activities on each initiative. In a forthcoming report for
this committee, we will provide more detailed information on these
departments' efforts, including an analysis of lead agencies' current
implementation activities.
As key departments continue to implement the Homeland Security
strategy, the development of performance goals and measures will help
them assess their progress in implementing homeland security efforts.
Once they are established, performance measures, such as cost-
effectiveness and net benefits, can be used to link costs to outcomes.
Development of standards, particularly systems and service standards,
will also provide an important means to measure preparedness and guide
resource investments.
Background:
Terrorism is generally defined as politically motivated violence to
coerce a government or civilian population. The term "combating
terrorism" generally refers to the full range of policies, strategies,
programs, and activities to counter terrorism both at home and abroad.
The distinction between "homeland security" and "combating terrorism
overseas" is that federal efforts on homeland security have a domestic
focus whereas combating terrorism overseas efforts have an
international focus.[Footnote 4]
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush
issued several national strategies related to homeland security and
combating terrorism. These included the National Strategy for Homeland
Security (July 2002), the National Money Laundering Strategy (July
2002), the National Security Strategy (September 2002), the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003), the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets (February 2003), and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(February 2003).[Footnote 5] This testimony focuses on the Homeland
Security and Combating Terrorism strategies.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security:
The Homeland Security strategy, with a domestic focus, sets out a plan
to organize federal, state, local, and private sector organizations, on
an array of functions. The strategy organizes these functions into six
critical "mission areas"[Footnote 6]
* Intelligence and Warning (which involves the collection, analysis,
and distribution of information appropriate for preempting or
preventing a terrorist attack).
* Border and Transportation Security (which emphasizes the efficient
and reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders, while
deterring terrorist activity).
* Domestic Counterterrorism (which focuses on law enforcement efforts
to identify, halt, prevent, and prosecute terrorists in the United
States.)
* Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (which stresses
securing the nation's individual pieces and interconnecting systems
that, if disrupted, may cause significant damage to the nation).
* Defending Against Catastrophic Threats (which emphasizes the
detection, deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist use of weapons of
mass destruction).
* Emergency Preparedness and Response (which focuses on damage
minimization and recovery from terrorist attacks).
The Homeland Security strategy also identifies "major initiatives" to
be addressed within each of these six mission areas. For example,
within the Intelligence and Warning critical mission area, five major
initiatives are indicated: (1) enhancing the analytic capabilities of
the FBI; (2) building new capabilities through the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Division of the proposed DHS; (3)
implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System; (4) utilizing dual-
use analysis to prevent attacks; and (5) employing "red team"
techniques.[Footnote 7] In all, the strategy cites 43 major initiatives
across the 6 critical mission areas.
Since the Homeland Security strategy was issued in July 2002, the
President has also released 12 Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPDs) that provide additional guidance related to these
mission areas. For example, HSPD-4 focuses on defending against
catastrophic threats, and HSPD-7 focuses on protecting critical
infrastructure.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:
The Combating Terrorism strategy, with an overseas focus, emphasizes
identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the
United States. This strategy calls for fighting terrorist organizations
of global reach and reducing their scope and capabilities to the
regional and then local levels. The goal is to reduce the scope of
terrorism to make it more localized, unorganized, and relegated to the
criminal domain. The strategy seeks to accomplish this through four
goals and 15 subordinate objectives. Together, these goals comprise the
"4D Strategy:"
* Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their
sanctuaries; leadership command, control, and communications; material
support; and finances.
* Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist by
ensuring that other states accept their responsibilities to take
actions against these international threats within their sovereign
territory.
* Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by
enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and
resources on the areas most at risk.
* Defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home and
abroad by both proactively protecting the homeland and extending
defenses to identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.
Congressionally Chartered Commissions:
Congress, because of concerns about terrorism in recent years,
chartered four commissions to examine terrorist threats and the
government's response to such threats, as well as to make
recommendations to federal, state, local, and private organizations.
These commissions included:
* The Bremer Commission (the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired
by Ambassador Paul Bremer), which issued its report in June 2000.
* The Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore, III), which issued
its final report in December 2003.
* The Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National Security/
21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman),
which issued its final report in February 2001.
* The 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean), which
issued its final report in July 2004.
The 9/11 Commission was established by Congress on November 27, 2002,
to (1) investigate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) identify, review, and
evaluate lessons learned from these attacks; and (3) report to the
President and Congress on findings, conclusions, and recommendations
that generate from the investigation and review. The Commission's
investigations were to focus on intelligence agencies; law enforcement
agencies; diplomacy; immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border
control; the flow of assets to terrorist organizations; commercial
aviation; the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation;
and other areas of the public and private sectors determined to be
relevant by the Commission for its inquiry. As a result of its work,
the 9/11 Commission issued a report on July 22, 2004, which included 41
primary recommendations[Footnote 8] for improvements in the United
States' approach to securing the homeland and combating terrorism.
Of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, 30 are strategic
in the sense that they are broad in focus and implementation would
require coordination across multiple departments, levels of government,
and sectors. Examples of such recommendations are tracking terrorist
financing and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. In contrast, 8 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission
are agency-specific and could be addressed in a single agency's
implementation plan. The departments and agencies targeted by these
recommendations are DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). For example, the
Commission recommended that DOD and its oversight committees regularly
assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning and
that the FBI should establish a specialized and integrated national
security workforce. The remaining 3 recommendations are foreign-
country-specific. For example, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the
U.S. support Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists,
with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support
for better education. While some of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations are specific to an individual agency, department, or
foreign country, the national strategies guide agencies in their
implementation of homeland security efforts, whether these efforts are
collaborative or individual, broad or specific. Therefore, we have
included all of the Commission's recommendations in our comparative
analysis with the national strategies.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the 9/11 Commission recommendations
are aligned with the national strategies, we took a number of steps. We
looked at each of the primary 9/11 Commission recommendations in the
context of one or more of the six mission areas of the Homeland
Security strategy. Then, to the extent appropriate, we matched each
recommendation with one or more of the major initiatives for each
mission area. For those recommendations that were not associated with
any of the mission areas, we determined the extent to which these
recommendations were covered in the objectives of the Combating
Terrorism strategy. Our detailed analysis first focused on the Homeland
Security strategy because it is more comprehensive in describing its
purpose, scope, and objectives than the Combating Terrorism strategy.
To determine what key departments have implementation responsibilities
for the Homeland Security strategy, we examined the latest available
homeland security funding data for federal agencies. We then selected
the six departments with the largest proposed homeland security
budgets--DHS, DOD, the Department of Energy (Energy), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and
the Department of State (State)--which together account for 94 percent
of the President's proposed $47 billion budget for homeland security in
fiscal year 2005. Additionally, we reviewed the language in the
Homeland Security strategy and HSPDs to determine whether these
departments had been designated as "lead agencies" in implementing the
initiatives. We then determined whether the six key federal departments
addressed these 43 strategy initiatives in their planning and
implementation activity by conducting a review of each department's
high-level strategic planning documents related to homeland security.
As part of this analysis, we determined whether each department was
specifically engaged in conducting planning and implementation
activities related to each of the 43 initiatives. We provided the
results of our analyses to officials from the various departments for
their verification. Departments provided the data during fiscal year
2004; however, we did not conduct our own audit to verify the accuracy
of the data or the progress of particular activities. Nor did we assess
the status, extent or quality of the work being planned or implemented,
as it was not in the scope of our engagement. We further recognize that
the departments may continue to plan and implement at least some of
their strategies and programs through the remainder of fiscal year
2004, resulting in a change in findings over time.
To determine the challenges faced by key departments in measuring
progress in implementing homeland security efforts, we reviewed and
summarized our products related to strategic planning and performance
measurement.
We conducted our work between February and September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The National Strategies Are Generally Aligned with the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations:
While we would not expect to see a direct correlation between the
national strategies' objectives and the 9/11 Commission
recommendations, it is nevertheless helpful to examine them side-by-
side, to ascertain whether there is some alignment.
Although the Commission's recommendations are broadly aligned with the
two strategies, 8 of the 41 recommendations are not addressed in the
specific initiatives of the critical mission areas of the Homeland
Security strategy or the objectives of the Combating Terrorism
strategy. For example, the 9/11 Commission recommendations suggest
enhancing the analytical capabilities of the CIA and reorganizing the
intelligence community--initiatives that are not identified in either
strategy.[Footnote 9] Table 1 lists these 8 recommendations.
Table 1: 9/11 Commission Recommendations that are Not Addressed in the
Mission Area Initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security
or the Objectives of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:
"The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA's analytic
capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its
human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d)
renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so
they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring a seamless
relationship between human source collection and signals collection at
the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between
unilateral and liaison operations."
"We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national
government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint
operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from
the various agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to
evaluate the performance of the people assigned to the Center."
"The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be
replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of
responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on
specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to
manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that
contribute to it."
"Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the
overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence
and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress
should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending
the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been
assigned among the varieties of intelligence work."
"Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary
operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense
Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for
training, direction, and execution of such operations already being
developed in the Special Operations Command."
"Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, we
should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security
policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the
process for national security appointments. We think the process could
be improved significantly so transitions can work more effectively and
allow new officials to assume their new responsibilities as quickly as
possible."
"Congress should create a single principal point of oversight and
review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to
judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and
its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to
choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee
should be a permanent standing committee with nonpartisan staff."
"Congressional oversight for intelligence - and counterterrorism - is
now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have
considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each
house of Congress, combining authorization and appropriating
authorities, is another."
Source: GAO analysis of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
[End of table]
Of the remaining 33 initiatives, 22 are aligned with at least one
initiative related to the critical mission areas of the Homeland
Security strategy and 11 were aligned with at least one of the
objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. For example, the 9/11
Commission recommended that a specialized and integrated national
security workforce be established at the FBI in order to enhance the
agency's expertise in intelligence and national security. Similarly,
the Homeland Security strategy includes initiatives regarding the
restructuring and enhanced capabilities of the FBI. The 9/11 Commission
also recommended that the United States provide economic and
development support to Muslim nations to help prevent the use of these
nations as terrorist sanctuaries. Likewise, one of the objectives of
the Combating Terrorism strategy is to strengthen weak states and
prevent the emergence or reemergence of terrorism.
While the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies are
aligned with the vast majority of recommendations made by the 9/11
Commission, the additional recommendations may be considered in future
updates of the national strategies.
Preliminary Results Indicate Key Federal Departments Have Initiated
Planning and Implementation of Homeland Security Strategy Initiatives:
We identified six departments--DOD, Energy, HHS, DHS, DOJ, and State--
as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. As
shown in figure 1, these six departments have the highest level of
funding and together comprise 94 percent of the proposed $47 billion
budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. While not shown in
figure 1, these departments also dominate funding for most of the
individual homeland security mission areas. For example, DHS features
prominently across all critical mission areas, representing the
majority of funding requested in intelligence and warning, border and
transportation security, and emergency preparedness and response, as
well as substantial portions of the budget submissions for domestic
counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and catastrophic
threat defense. Similarly, three of these departments comprise the
majority of funding requested in three mission areas, respectively -
DOJ in domestic counterterrorism, DOD in critical infrastructure
protection, and HHS in catastrophic threat defense.
Figure 1: Figure 1. Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding
by Federal Department (budget authority in millions of dollars):
[See PDF for image]
Note: Other agencies includes the Departments of Agriculture ($651
million), Veterans Affairs ($297 million), Transportation ($243
million), Commerce ($150 million), and Treasury ($87 million), as well
as the National Science Foundation ($344 million), National Aeronautics
and Space Administration ($207 million), Social Security Administration
($155 million), Environmental Protection Agency ($97 million), U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers ($84 million), General Services Administration
($80 million), and several smaller agencies.
[End of figure]
Our preliminary analysis of these six departments reinforced their
position as key players because they have lead agency roles in
implementing the Homeland Security strategy. Specifically, the strategy
and HSPDs designate the six departments as lead agencies for particular
initiatives (or functions within the initiatives). DHS was clearly the
most important department for implementation because it was designated
as a lead agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives in the Homeland Security
strategy. The other 5 departments were also designated as a lead as
follows--DOJ (a lead on 9 initiatives); HHS and State (each a lead on 5
initiatives); DOD (a lead on 4 initiatives); and Energy (a lead on 3
initiatives).
While we consider the designation of lead agencies as a positive step
in establishing accountability, 14 of the 43 initiatives have multiple
lead agencies. This indicates that interagency coordination of roles
and activities will be important, particularly on those initiatives
involving multiple leads (e.g., domestic counterterrorism and critical
infrastructure protection).
Based on our preliminary analysis, it appears that the six key
departments have incorporated the Homeland Security strategy's
initiatives in their strategic planning and implementation activities.
Our initial analysis shows that all 43 of the strategy's initiatives
were included in some of the activities implemented by the six
departments; however, we have not assessed the status, extent, or
quality of the various departments' activities on each initiative, as
it was not in the scope of our review. All five Intelligence and
Warning initiatives have been covered by at least one department in
each of the initiatives. There are six initiatives under the Border and
Transportation Security mission area, each addressed by at least two
departments' planning or implementation activities. Domestic
Counterterrorism has six initiatives, each of which are covered by at
least one department's planning or implementation activities. The
strategy identifies eight initiatives under the Protecting Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets mission area, in which each of the
initiatives are addressed by at least four departments. There are six
initiatives under the Defending Against Catastrophic Threats mission
area; all of the initiatives feature planning or implementation
activities by at least two departments. For the Emergency Preparedness
and Response mission area, the strategy identifies 12 initiatives with
coverage of each initiative by at least one department's activities. In
a forthcoming report for this committee, we will provide more detailed
information on these departments' efforts, including an analysis of
current implementation activities.
Development of Performance Goals and Measures May Assist Key Agencies
in Assessing Progress Towards Implementing Homeland Security Efforts:
Developing clear performance measures and standards for implementing
the Homeland Security strategy is important for agencies to assess
their progress in achieving their mission-related goals and objectives.
However, as we stated in an earlier testimony, the strategy's
initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of performance goals
and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness.[Footnote
10] Thus, is it a challenge for the nation to ensure both a successful
and a fiscally responsible preparedness effort.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) required
federal agencies to develop strategic plans with long-term, outcome-
oriented goals and objectives, annual goals linked to achieving the
long-term goals, and annual reports on the results achieved.
We identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors
for new organizations.[Footnote 11] For example, as part of its
implementation phase, we noted that DHS should engage in strategic
planning through the involvement of stakeholders, assessment of
internal and external environments, and an alignment of activities,
core processes, and resources to support mission-related outcomes. We
are currently reviewing DHS's first strategic plan to, among other
things, assess the extent to which it reflects GPRA requirements and
supports the Homeland Security strategy.
Additionally, we have reported that expanding agency use of performance
measures that link costs to outcomes is important. However, we have
found that agencies are generally weak on linking costs to performance,
whether through measures such as cost-effectiveness, net benefits, or
others. Such measures are broadly required for planning regulatory and
investment decisions but are seldom used to evaluate actual
performance, even though the planning documents can sometimes provide a
basis to compare forecasts and actual outcomes.[Footnote 12] The
Congressional Committee report on the establishment of GPRA devoted
considerable attention on links between performance and cost.
To find an example of the need for baseline performance goals and
measures we need look no further than the nation's efforts at emergency
preparedness and response. We have reported that there is not yet a
comprehensive set of preparedness standards for measuring first
responder capacities, identifying gaps in those capacities, and
measuring progress in achieving performance goals. Additionally, in our
past work on bioterrorism preparedness,[Footnote 13] we reported that
state and local officials were concerned about the lack of specific
standards for measuring preparedness, and these officials noted that
specific benchmarks would help them determine whether they were
adequately prepared to respond to a bioterrorism incident. Moreover, in
our past work on interoperable communications,[Footnote 14] we
discussed the need to establish national interoperability performance
goals and standards. Finally, we have reported on the lack of reliable
information on existing federal, state, and local capabilities for
combating terrorism and the need to develop a comprehensive inventory
of existing capabilities. Without standards linked to such
capabilities, it will be a challenge to assess preparedness gaps and
efforts to address the gaps.[Footnote 15]
Since homeland security relies upon the coordinated actions of federal,
state, local governments, and the private sector--and, in many cases,
upon "layers" of defenses--a challenge exists in measuring progress
across numerous dimensions. Systems and services standards--which focus
on the performance, design, and overall management of processes and
activities--hold great potential to both improve coordination across
such dimensions and enhance measurement of continued preparedness. Such
standards could assist in overcoming challenges in identifying
interdependencies, defining roles and relationships, assigning
responsibilities, and linking federal, state, and local governments,
and the private sector in a measurable, dependable, and reliable
manner. The private sector already sets standards within various
business chains, such as in the design, raw materials, supply,
manufacture, sales, delivery, and customer support chain. Within
homeland security process chains, standards will be essential to
overcome the challenge of assuring the stability and reliability of all
links in the interdependent business chains of all involved parties
responsible for homeland security.
Standards can also aid in identifying and fixing fragile links that
could lead to particularly catastrophic cascading events, such as
widespread power outages or domino effect impacts on food supply or
product distribution systems. Systems, services, and management
standards can also help clarify the important roles each organization,
level of government, and public or private sector plays in improving
homeland security. Standards will factor in costs, legal,
jurisdictional and other constraints, and identify ways to imbed
homeland security principles into business and government systems in
ways compatible with other important social and economic goals.
Standards will also enable more effective oversight by providing means
to measure preparedness and guide resource investments.[Footnote 16]
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We look forward to
providing you with a more detailed report on department plans,
activities and challenges regarding the implementation of the Homeland
Security strategy. I will now be pleased to respond to any questions
that you or other members of the committee have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Norman J.
Rabkin at 202-512-8777. Other key contributors to this statement were
Stephen L. Caldwell, Kristy N. Brown, Jared Hermalin, Wayne A. Ekblad,
Ricardo Marquez, and Amy Bernstein.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
[2] GAO, Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from
Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO, GAO-04-591 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
[3] GAO, Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its
Legacy Agencies, GAO-04-865R (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).
[4] For a more detailed discussion of the definition of terrorism and
related terms, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and
Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat, GAO-03-165 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2003), pp. 12-15.
[5] For our detailed analysis of all of these strategies, see GAO,
Combating Terrorism, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National
Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[6] The strategy also includes a discussion of "foundations" which we
did not identify separately in our analysis. The strategy describes
these foundations as unique American strengths that cut across all
sectors of society, such as law, science and technology, information
sharing and systems, and international cooperation. The discussion of
these foundations overlaps with the six mission areas. For example,
improving international shipping security is covered by the mission
area of border and transportation security as well as the foundation
area of international cooperation.
[7] Red-team techniques are those where the U.S. government would
create a team that plays the role of terrorists in terms of identifying
vulnerabilities and planning attacks.
[8] We define "primary recommendations" as those recommendations that
were highlighted in bold and specifically identified as a
recommendation in the 9/11 Commission report.
[9] In August 2004, the President issued a series of executive orders
related to the management of the intelligence community and sharing
terrorist information. We have not evaluated the extent to which these
orders address the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
[10] GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination
is Key to Success, GAO-02-1011T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2002).
[11] GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
[12] For example, OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94.
[13] GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local
Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003).
[14] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-963T (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004) and
Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable
Communications for First Responders, GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 6, 2003).
[15] GAO, Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed
to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region,
GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004).
[16] GAO, Homeland Security: The Need for National Standards, Statement
of Randall Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Homeland
Security and Justice, before The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003).
