Aviation Security
Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls Gao ID: GAO-06-203 November 28, 2005The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections--a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress on the transition to employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful transition. FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-203, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls
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Report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2005:
Aviation Security:
Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and
Controls:
Aviation Security:
GAO-06-203:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-203, a report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio,
House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of
changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back
to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals‘ operating procedures is
the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their
flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This
report discusses FAMS‘s (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that
could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-
related incidents that affect air marshals‘ ability to operate
discreetly.
What GAO Found:
DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its
transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a ’surge“
capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal
air marshals‘ career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed
some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but
suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional
concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources
and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge
effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-
training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized
that federal air marshals‘ career opportunities were limited, it had
not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other
duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition
objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall
strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to
help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections”a
key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress on the transition to employees and other
stakeholders”another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA,
DHS‘s prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful
transition.
FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-
related incidents that affect air marshals‘ ability to operate
discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has
not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and
how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents
they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate
controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these
incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally
reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage
federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials
have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use
and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop
such policies in the near future.
Federal Air Marshals Protect Passengers, Crew, and Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) adopt key practices for successful mergers and
transformations, to include developing an overall strategy with
implementation goals and milestones and a communication strategy. GAO
is also recommending that the Secretary direct FAMS to improve
management controls for recording, tracking, and addressing mission
incidents and communicating the outcome of actions taken to address
them.
DHS reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAO‘s findings and
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-203.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at
(202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving its Stated Objectives in
Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation
Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA:
FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal
Air Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Abbreviations:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
BTS: Border and Transportation Security Directorate:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service:
GS: General Schedule:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
SAC: Special Agent-in-Charge:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
November 28, 2005:
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. DeFazio:
With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United
States each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a
critical role in securing our nation's commercial aviation system by
detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. In recent years, FAMS has
undergone a number of significant changes to its organizational
structure, workforce, and mission. In response to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS was faced with the formidable task of
ramping up its workforce--from an agency with fewer than 50 federal air
marshals to thousands--and expanding its mission to include the
protection of both domestic and international flights.[Footnote 1]
Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)--
enacted in November 2001--authority over FAMS shifted from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation
(DOT).[Footnote 2] Over the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more
times. FAMS's most recent transfer during that timeframe[Footnote 3]
occurred in November 2003, when FAMS moved from TSA to the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE)--the largest law
enforcement component within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).[Footnote 4]
There were two stated objectives related to FAMS's transfer to ICE.
According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first
objective involved cross-training customs agents and immigration
officers to function as federal air marshals during heightened threat
levels, thereby providing a "surge" capability that could be deployed
in response to an increased threat. In announcing the second objective,
the Secretary stated that the transfer would also provide federal air
marshals a greater range of law enforcement career options within a
single agency. That is, because of the limited number of nonairborne
(i.e., ground-based) positions within FAMS, federal air marshals had
few career opportunities, which, if left unaddressed, could lead to
morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years after FAMS transferred to
ICE--in July 2005--the newly appointed Secretary of DHS announced that
FAMS would be transferred back to TSA to increase operational
coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of aviation
security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed
federal air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and
aircraft from terrorist activities. According to FAMS's mission
deployment procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as
"discreet" (semicovert) professionals when checking-in at airports,
passing through security screening checkpoints, and boarding the
aircraft during their missions. In doing so, federal air marshals are
to blend in with passengers while covering high-risk domestic and
international flights on U.S. aircraft. While FAMS's procedures focus
on discretion, there are times when federal air marshals encounter
mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that affect their ability
to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents may include
miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline staff
regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the
aircraft.
In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its
stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices
that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the
extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related
incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly. Some information related to FAMS and federal air marshals'
ability to operate discreetly is considered sensitive security
information. Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted version of
this report containing that information.[Footnote 5]
To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations,
operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation.
We also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to
discuss FAMS's transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior
work on key practices used by public and private sector organizations
that have undergone successful mergers and transformations.[Footnote 6]
The nine key practices are described in greater detail in appendix II.
We did not conduct an in-depth analysis comparing all of these
practices with the transfer of FAMS to ICE. However, using the
documentation provided and interviews we conducted, we examined the
information gathered in light of two of the nine transformation
practices to determine the extent to which the agency (1) established
an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to guide
the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a communication
strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of the integration.
We selected these two practices as criteria for this review because
they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning
framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation efforts--
which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS.
In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special
Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the
country. Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of
geographical dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C; Dallas, Texas;
New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Federal air marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so
their experiences potentially cover airports throughout the United
States. During these interviews, we obtained information on a range of
issues related to the transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these
interviews, we also gained a more complete understanding of federal air
marshals' mission deployment procedures and their experiences regarding
incidents that affect their ability to operate discreetly during their
mission. However, the information we obtained during these interviews
cannot be generalized to all federal air marshals. A more detailed
description of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. We
conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary
of Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to
TSA. This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that
DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in
effecting a successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report
addresses key lessons learned from the earlier transition to help
facilitate FAMS's movement back to TSA.
Results in Brief:
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge
capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these
efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the
cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and
training.[Footnote 7] DHS indicated that it would continue to support
the surge effort but had not determined whether and when it would
resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS
recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were
limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by providing
additional opportunities through investigative or other duties.
Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives
would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to
include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target
performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones--a key practice for a
successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within
the organization and report related progress on the transition to
employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. Our previous
reports have underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar
practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.[Footnote 8] With
its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its
experience, including how these key practices can help to facilitate
FAMS's transfer back to TSA.
In addition, FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure
that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to
operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example,
FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for
when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on
incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks
adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to
address these incidents are communicated to the federal air marshals
who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve
to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS
officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern
the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to
develop such policies in the near future.
To help the department in its efforts to achieve a successful
transformation effort in returning FAMS to TSA, we are recommending
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security adopt, for
this transformation, key practices for successful mergers and
transformations that we have previously recommended to the department,
which include developing an overall strategy with implementation goals
and a timeline to build momentum and show progress as well as a
communication strategy to share expectations and report related
progress. We are also recommending that the Secretary take four actions
to establish better management controls related to recording, tracking,
and addressing mission incidents as well as communicating the outcome
of actions taken to address these incidents.
We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report. The full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix III.
Background:
Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to
counter hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required
a dramatic increase in FAMS's mission and workforce and mandated the
deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk
flights.[Footnote 9] To create an expanded workforce, FAA began an
intensive effort on September 17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals
in unprecedented numbers. Until FAA could hire, train, and deploy the
first few classes of federal air marshals, other federal agencies made
law enforcement officers available to augment FAMS. Since that time,
FAMS has grown from a relatively centralized organization with one
office to a highly decentralized agency with thousands of federal air
marshals assigned to 21 field offices--each headed by a Special Agent
in Charge, or SAC--throughout the United States.
In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone
several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving
from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003.
Several months later--in November 2003--FAMS was transferred from TSA
to ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTS-
commissioned internal working group.[Footnote 10] Tasked with
determining the merits of a potential transfer, the working group
concluded that transferring FAMS to ICE could improve the security of
the nation's aviation system by providing a surge capability during
times of increased aviation threats by augmenting federal air marshals
with ICE agents. The working group also concluded that FAMS's transfer
to ICE could provide federal air marshals with the same type of law
enforcement career options that were available to ICE agents. In July
2005--nearly 2 years after its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE--DHS
announced that FAMS would be returned to TSA to increase operational
coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of aviation
security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board
flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based
on FAMS's Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal
air marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers
and perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue
attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS
procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security
screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft.[Footnote 11] According to
FAMS, these procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to
carry out their missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect
their identities, while facilitating coordination and communication
with crew and airline staff.
While FAMS's mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal
air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their
ability to conduct their missions discreetly.[Footnote 12] FAMS has
directed that, in the event that federal air marshals encounter such
incidents, they should contact the FAMS Mission Operations
Center,[Footnote 13] to the extent they believe that the incident could
be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss later in this report,
federal air marshals are not required to file a "mission report" for
every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission Operations Center
staff may or may not request that the federal air marshal who
encountered the incident file a written mission report.
DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in
Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation
Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA:
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge
capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents,[Footnote 14] but
suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional
concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources
and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge
effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-
training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized
that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had
not developed plans to expand them by providing additional
opportunities through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had
not determined how these stated transition objectives would be met
because it had not developed an overall strategy to include
implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target
performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones--a key practice for a
successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within
the organization and report related progress on the transition to
employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. Our previous
reports have underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar
practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.[Footnote 15] With
its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its
experience, including how these key practices can facilitate FAMS's
transfer back to TSA.
Some Surge Capacity Had Been Developed, but DHS Suspended Efforts to
Cross-Train ICE Agents:
One of DHS's objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a
"surge capacity;" that is, strengthening aviation security in a
heightened threat environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to
supplement FAMS's existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S.
aircraft. The Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this
surge capacity would be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE
agents from ICE's Office of Investigations.[Footnote 16] Specifically,
these agents, who typically conduct immigration and customs-related
investigations, could also be deployed to supplement federal air
marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing a manpower reserve
from which DHS could draw upon when heightened threat conditions
warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the Assistant
Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations Committees that
ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less than 800 ICE
agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 17]
Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents received
cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air
marshals during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were
deployed and temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on
flights in response to a heightened threat alert.[Footnote 18]
According to FAMS, these ICE agents were chosen for surge deployment
based on their previous FAMS training--including extensive firearms
training--and flying experience as temporary federal air
marshals.[Footnote 19] That is, these agents, employees of the former
U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law enforcement officers who
had previously flown as temporary federal air marshals to augment FAMS
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, from October 2001 through
May 2002.[Footnote 20] To prepare for the surge deployment, these ICE
agents received a 3-day refresher training in current FAMS's
procedures, policies, and updated firearms techniques.
Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and
implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they
could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This
training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal
air marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of
firearms and boarding procedures.
In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response
to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective
use of resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House
Appropriations Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns
regarding how ICE agents would maintain their skills as federal air
marshals since they did not regularly perform federal air marshal
duties. The Committee directed that each cross-trained ICE agent fly
missions with a federal air marshal for a minimum of 24 hours per
quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.[Footnote 21] However, in the
October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the cross-
training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of
resources.[Footnote 22] The Committee further suggested that the
training of ICE agents to serve as federal air marshals in a surge
capacity be discontinued. In response, DHS suspended its cross-training
efforts at that time. ICE later stated that it would continue to
support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it
would resume cross-training to support this initiative. With DHS's
transfer of FAMS to TSA, it is unclear whether or how cross-training
will be used to augment federal air marshals during heightened threat
levels.
DHS Recognized That Federal Air Marshals' Career Opportunities Were
Limited but Had Not Developed Plans to Expand Them:
Another of DHS's objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was
to expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and
ICE officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide
federal air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying
supervisory or other positions and thus establish additional career
opportunities for federal air marshals. These officials told us that
federal air marshals cannot sustain a career in an airborne position,
based on such factors as the frequency of flying, their irregular
schedules, and the monotony of flying repetitive assignments.
A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over
federal air marshals' limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE
commissioned IBM to determine, among other things, the current status
of federal air marshals' career development and advancement
opportunities. The study found that the overwhelming majority of
federal air marshals were expected to reach the highest pay level in
their job position by August 2004, and that FAMS had only a limited
number of supervisory opportunities beyond that pay level. The study
concluded that without career development and promotion opportunities,
FAMS could experience a decline in employee morale and an increase in
attrition rates.
As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS management
has advocated that federal air marshals' current position as a "civil
aviation security specialist" be re-classified to that of a criminal
investigator.[Footnote 23] Recognizing that career paths for criminal
investigators provide greater opportunity for movement than civil
aviation security specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private
contractor to determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among
other things, the study concluded that because the mission of air
marshals had changed after September 11, 2001--from enforcing FAA
regulations onboard aircraft, to detecting, deterring, and defeating
criminal acts in the aviation domain--federal air marshals satisfied
the requirements of a criminal investigator position. The study further
stated that career opportunities were more prevalent for those
qualified as criminal investigators because these positions possess
knowledge, skills, and abilities that are interchangeable across
different agencies. In addition, the study found that criminal
investigators could more successfully compete for similar positions in
other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater opportunities for
advancement and higher compensation in the federal government.
In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the
management of DHS's Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
directorate for their consideration. In reviewing the study's findings
and additional research conducted by ICE's legal and human resources
staff, BTS, along with ICE management, concluded that the
reclassification of federal air marshals from an aviation security
specialist position to a criminal investigator position was not an
appropriate course of action. In addressing the study's conclusions,
officials maintained that the primary duties of a federal air marshal-
-to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities-
-were "not investigative in nature" and were inconsistent with the
Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) classification standards for the
criminal investigator series. DHS also concluded that without any
significant changes in the duties of federal air marshals, it did not
see a basis for the conversion.
In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related
to FAMS's transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals'
career opportunities.[Footnote 24] ICE senior management officials, who
served as members of the board, stated that they would have liked to
expand career opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to
continue to reside in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based
mission assignments. One of these officials said that federal air
marshals could have potentially assumed a limited intelligence and
surveillance role, such as assessing aircraft vulnerability and
interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard aircraft. As of June 2005,
however, ICE had not developed any plans for doing so. With FAMS's
transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how federal air marshals'
career opportunities may be expanded.
Key Practices Could Facilitate FAMS's Return to TSA:
In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an
opportunity to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE,
including the importance that key practices can have in leading to
successful transformation efforts within public and private sector
organizations. Our July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist
mergers and transformations identified nine key practices followed by
public and private sector organizations that have led to successful
transformations.[Footnote 25] All nine key practices and associated
implementation steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices
are important, we identified two practices that, in our view, could
have enhanced DHS's efforts to meet its stated objectives in
transferring FAMS to ICE. These practices are (1) developing an overall
strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and
show progress, and (2) establishing a communication strategy to create
shared expectations and report related progress. We believe these
practices would be particularly helpful for DHS and could increase its
likelihood for a successful transformation effort in returning FAMS to
TSA.
As we discussed earlier, one of DHS's stated objectives in transferring
FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat
levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less
than 800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an
overall strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity.
Such a strategy could have contained implementation goals, measures,
and milestones to help target performance shortfalls and suggest
midcourse corrections. Another of DHS's stated objectives was to expand
career opportunities for federal air marshals. However, DHS had not
identified any implementation goals nor time frames for how and when it
planned to develop these career opportunities, such as the types of
opportunities to be provided or when federal air marshals could expect
these opportunities to become available.
Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical
to ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals
and timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for
a merger or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically
goes beyond what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides
more specific operational and tactical information to manage a
sustained effort. Our previous work has also underscored the importance
of DHS adopting similar practices to help guide its overall management
integration effort.[Footnote 26]
Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create
shared expectations within the organization and report related progress
on FAMS's transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders--
another key practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE
officials shared with us various forms of communications they had
issued to employees over the period of a few months, between September
and December 2003. Those communications included e-mails, broadcast
messages, and agency press releases. Officials also provided us with an
agenda for a televised roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to
ICE employees at various times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the
transition. The discussion centered on an exchange between the Director
of FAMS and the Acting Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among
other things, issues related to personnel and the cross-training of ICE
agents and federal air marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not
identify any subsequent communications made to keep ICE employees
informed about the progress of the transition--specifically, what
employees could expect and by when. Further, 14 of the 19 federal air
marshals we interviewed during our review felt that ICE management had
not kept them adequately informed about the progress of the transition.
Also, 13 of the 19 federal air marshals said they were unclear or
confused about how they would become integrated into ICE.
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to
implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a
communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to
genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not
just "push the message out." For example, communication should help
employees understand how the changes from the transformation will
affect them and how their responsibilities might change with the new
organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially
crucial in the public sector where policy-making and program management
demands transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not
only what results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to
be used to achieve those results.
FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal
Air Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly:
FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that
affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls
comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations'
missions, goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control
define the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in
the federal government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1)
internal controls and all transactions and other significant events be
clearly documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that
ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and
(3) pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to
allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.[Footnote 27] Our
review of FAMS's mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of
these control areas.
FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air
marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are
recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not
maintain a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report
is filed. Standards for internal control in the federal government
require that all transactions and other significant events be clearly
documented in a manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to
managers and others involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has
directed that, in the event that federal air marshals encounter
incidents affecting their ability to operate discreetly, they are to
contact the Mission Operations Center to the extent the air marshals
believe that the incident could be evidence of a systemic
problem.[Footnote 28] In contacting the Operations Center, the federal
air marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The
Operations Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a
mission report to FAMS's Office of Field Operations (Field Operations)
to describe the incident in greater detail.[Footnote 29] However, if
the federal air marshal does not submit a mission report, FAMS does not
maintain a record of the incident. In addition, FAMS has not developed
a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how mission
reports are to be completed and filed. According to FAMS, instruction
in the use and completion of mission reports is communicated orally
through FAMS training and not through formal written guidance. Without
a means for ensuring that all incidents are recorded, and absent
written criteria that defines when and how mission reports are to be
completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable assurance that it is aware of
the full extent of incidents that federal air marshals encounter.
FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are
systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on
reported incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents.
Federal standards for internal control require that controls generally
be designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course
of normal operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to
capture and retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a
tool limits FAMS's ability to track and analyze relevant information
and monitor trends to identify operational areas in need of improvement
based on the reported incidents and thereby preventing potential
incidents.
In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and
addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and
issued guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has
not established formal written policies and procedures to document the
process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal
controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily
available for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing
and addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field
Operations' review of the mission reports to determine if further
action is warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as
part of this review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as "local
issues;" for example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal
and an airline staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can
board the aircraft. Mission reports involving local issues are
forwarded to the relevant FAMS field office and may be resolved through
the on-site airport liaisons or the local Special Agent in Charge for
the airport where the incident occurred.[Footnote 30] Field Operations
may also deem some incidents as "national issues;" that is, incidents
that are not unique to a specific airport, such as an incident
involving the flight crew of a particular airline. These types of
incidents are forwarded to FAMS's Liaison Division (located within the
Office of Flight Operations). In attempting to address the issue, the
Liaison Division may contact TSA or the airline's corporate security
office, depending on whether the incident involved check-in, security
checkpoint, or boarding procedures.
Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of
actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are
communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the
reports. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal
air marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal
control state that pertinent information should be communicated
throughout an organization to allow employees to perform their duties
efficiently. According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to
the relevant field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in
the mission reports. The SAC's communication of these results to the
federal air marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the
15 federal air marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a
mission report, 12 said they had not received feedback on the outcome
of the report. Some federal air marshals identified the importance of
having feedback on the outcome of the reports, noting that not having
feedback discourages them from filing future reports. For example, one
federal air marshal stated that he and other federal air marshals in
his office had stopped filing mission reports because they did not
receive feedback on the outcome of the reports they had previously
filed. Another federal air marshal said that federal air marshals in
his field office were generally dissatisfied with the lack of feedback
on the mission reports they had filed.
FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written
policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated
that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how
FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and
provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner.
Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the
management of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for
when these would be completed.
Conclusions:
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited
progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a
surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career
opportunities. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity
to learn from its experiences and adopt key practices for successful
mergers and transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back
into TSA. Such key practices include developing an overall strategy to
include implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the
organization's progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress
towards these goals, DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that real
progress is being made. In addition, having a strategy with
implementation goals and milestones could help target performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections, including any
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones. In addition,
developing a communication strategy would help to inform employees
about the status of the transition and provide transparency about
specific actions to be taken and time frames for their completion. In
light of the number of transformations FAMS has undergone in recent
years, providing open communication to create shared expectations among
all staff and stakeholders takes on added significance.
Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation's
commercial aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate
controls to manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals
encounter during their missions that could compromise their mission.
Such controls take on added importance in light of FAMS's growth from a
small, centralized organization with only one office and the ability to
cover a few missions to a larger decentralized organization with
thousands of federal air marshals and a capacity to provide
significantly expanded coverage. Absent adequate management controls,
FAMS does not have a full account of reported incidents or a means for
tracking, analyzing, and monitoring these incidents. Such information
is necessary for identifying the full extent of reported incidents and
for determining the operational areas in need of improvement. In
addition, such controls would help to ensure that actions taken to
resolve these incidents are reported to the federal air marshals who
filed them.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the
planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge
the Federal Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security
Administration, we are recommending that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security adopt key practices that have led to
successful transformation efforts within public and private sector
organizations by taking the following two actions:
² Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline
to build momentum and show progress.
² Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and report
related progress.
In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service's management
of incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly during their missions, we are recommending that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of
the Federal Air Marshal Service to take the following four actions:
² Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission
Operations Center that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal
air marshals to complete a mission report.
² Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission reports
to enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and systemic incidents.
² Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and
addressing reported incidents.
² Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and outcome of
FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who submit them.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On
November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report,
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed with the
findings and recommendations in the report and described actions it had
started or planned to take to implement them. With regard to our two
recommendations related to key practices that have led to successful
transformation efforts, DHS stated that FAMS and TSA will work closely
with DHS's Under Secretary for Policy and Assistant Secretary for
Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable
goals and a timeline to assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will
work with TSA and DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy
intended to facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In
addition, regarding our recommendations related to FAMS's management of
incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the
process of drafting a written directive to establish policies and
procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. The directive
is intended to restructure FAMS's management of mission reports to
enable timely dissemination of and access to information, including
feedback to management and employees. The directive will also establish
a formalized tracking system for reporting incidents. Shortly after
receiving comments from DHS, FAMS provided us with an official written
directive that establishes policies and procedures for reporting and
managing mission incidents. We reviewed this directive and believe that
it addresses our recommendations related to (1) developing a means for
recording all incidents reported to the Mission Operations Center that
affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly and criteria
for determining which incidents require federal air marshals to
complete a mission report and (2) establishing written policies and
procedures for reviewing and addressing reported incidents.
In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS
provided technical comments on the report under separate cover, and we
revised the draft report where appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional
committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress DHS
made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and
the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to
TSA; and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage
mission-related incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to
operate discreetly. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant
regulations, internal planning documents, agency policies and
procedures, and federal air marshal mission reports, and interviewed a
variety of federal officials and federal air marshals in selected field
office locations. Some information related to FAMS and federal air
marshals' ability to operate discreetly is considered Sensitive
Security Information. Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted
version of this report.[Footnote 31]
To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated objectives
in transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed key documents
about the transition effort as well as interviewed key officials from
BTS, FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents included, but were not
limited to, agency memorandums, various transition documents, materials
from offices involved with implementing the transition effort, and
studies that addressed issues related to career opportunities for
federal air marshals. We also analyzed surge training information on
the number of ICE agents cross-trained between December 2003 and
October 2004 by geographical location. In addition, we spoke with
officials at DHS, BTS, ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and
progress related to the transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a
surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career
opportunities. Further, we assessed DHS's progress in meeting its
stated objectives by using key practices consistently found at the
center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These
practices were identified to assist DHS in its consolidation before the
department was created and were based on useful practices and lessons
learned from major private and public sector organizational mergers,
acquisitions, and transformations.[Footnote 32] We selected two of
these nine key practices as criteria for this review because they are
especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning framework
necessary to guide and monitor its efforts--which we have also
underscored in our previous work on DHS--and to facilitating trust and
transparency within the organization. The two selected practices were:
setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show
progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy that
will serve to create shared expectations within the organization and at
the same time report related progress on the merger.
In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters
offices in Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center in
Herndon, Virginia. Specifically, we spoke with officials in FAMS'
Mission Support, Flight Operations, Training and Development, and Field
Operations offices to discuss the types of mission-related incidents
that federal air marshals encounter during the course of their mission
and how FAMS manages these incidents. Further, to determine the extent
to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents
that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly, we
used our Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government and
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool.[Footnote 33]
Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted structured
interviews with FAMS officials--including 5 SACS--and 19 federal air
marshals in 5 of FAMS's 21 field offices. Generally, we chose these
offices on the basis of geographical dispersion. They included:
Washington, D.C; Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia;
and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Among other things, we asked questions
about the federal air marshals' understanding of the transition of FAMS
to ICE, including whether their roles and mission had changed as a
result of the transition. We also asked the federal air marshals in
these interviews a series of questions related to their mission
experience at various airports. For example, we asked about the check-
in, screening, and boarding practices that they have experienced while
carrying out their missions. The results of these interviews provide
examples of FAMS officials' and federal air marshals' experiences and
perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond those we interviewed
because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting the
field offices, officials, and federal air marshals. We conducted these
interviews between October and November 2004 and in April 2005. We also
made some follow-up calls in May and July of 2005. We conducted our
work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations:
Practice: Ensure top leadership drives the transformation;
Implementation step: * Define and articulate a succinct and compelling
reason for change* Balance continued delivery of services with merger
and transformation activities.
Practice: Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals
to guide the transformation;
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices for results-oriented
strategic planning and reporting.
Practice: Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset
of the transformation;
Implementation step: * Embed core values in every aspect of the
organization to reinforce the new culture.
Practice: Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and
show progress from day one;
Implementation step: * Make public implementation goals and timeline*
Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate follow-up
actions* Identify cultural features of merging organizations to
increase understanding of former work environments* Attract and retain
key talent* Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills
inventory to allow knowledge exchange among merging organizations.
Practice: Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation
process;
Implementation step: * Establish networks to support implementation
team* Select high-performing team members.
Practice: Use the performance management system to define the
responsibility and assure accountability for change;
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices to implement effective
performance management systems with adequate safeguards.
Practice: Establish a communication strategy to create shared
expectations and report related progress;
Implementation step: * Communicate early and often to build trust*
Ensure consistency of message* Encourage two-way communication* Provide
information to meet specific needs of employees.
Practice: Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership
for the transformation;
Implementation step: * Use employee teams* Involve employees in
planning and sharing performance information* Incorporate employee
feedback into new policies and procedures* Delegate authority to
appropriate organizational levels.
Practice: Build a world-class organization;
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices to build a world-class
organization.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528:
Homeland Security:
November 7, 2005:
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice;
Issues U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
RE: Draft Report GAO-06-203, "Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal
Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls"
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurs with the
recommendations. The Federal Air Marshal (The FAMS) and Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) leadership will work closely with the new
DHS Under Secretary for Policy and the Assistant Secretary for
Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable
goals and a timeline to assure progress. The FAMS also will work with
TSA and DHS leadership to formulate a communication strategy which
facilitates shared expectations and reports progress.
The Department and FAMS recognize that formalization is required as a
function of continued development and incident and mission reporting.
Accordingly, earlier this year, FAMS began formulating a FAMS Reporting
System Policy and Procedure. A draft of this proposed directive is
under review by FAMS management. When issued, the Directive will
establish the reporting and policy and procedures for the Federal Air
Marshal Service. Its purpose is to restructure the management of FAMS
official reports to enable timely dissemination of and access to
information, feedback to management and employees, and its further
operational use. This proposed Directive will address the use and
format of Activity Reports and Reports of Investigation, and
establishes a formalized tracking system, which will utilize elements
of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.
Among the envisioned improvements is the standardization of incident
nomenclature. For example, all reportable matters will be addressed in
Activity Reports. These reports will be categorized as Class 1 and
Class 2 Activities. Class 1 Activities are irregularities involving
routine FAM mission procedures that do not present a direct or imminent
threat to an aircraft, passenger, crew or other persons or property.
These irregularities are the actions of an employee of an external
organization that may affect the security of a FAM mission. Class 2
Activities are events that require a law enforcement response. The
coordination and follow-up of these reports also will be more
cohesively administered under the new system.
DHS appreciates your review, analysis and discussion of FAMS planning
and controls.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve Caldwell,
Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles Johnson, Thomas
Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson, Jack Schulze, Angela
Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
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Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program
Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken Steps to
More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22,
2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO-
05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to
Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 28,
2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Budget Issues: Reprogramming of Federal Air Marshal Service Funds in
Fiscal Year 2003. GAO-04-577R. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-
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Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
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Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24,
2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities
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Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
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Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plans to Build a
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2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
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Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
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October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots. GAO-02-822R.
Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
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September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
[End of section]
(440468):
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[End of figure]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.
[2] Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[3] In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FAMS,
along with TSA, was transferred from the Department of Transportation
to the Department of Homeland Security. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135.
[4] FAMS was formerly located within DHS's Border and Transportation
Security Directorate (BTS), one of five operational directorates within
the department. As part of his July 2005 reorganization announcement,
the Secretary of DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the
enactment of legislation to effect this change. With the passage of the
fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
(Pub. L. No. 109-90), signed into law on October 18, 2005, the
functions of BTS have been merged into other offices and component
agencies throughout DHS.
[5] The report containing sensitive security information is GAO,
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept.
29, 2005).
[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14,
2002).
[7] The exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is
considered sensitive security information and discussed in the
restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
[8] See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14,
2002).
[9] § 105 of ATSA amended title 49 of the United States Code by
inserting § 44917 into chapter 449.
[10] Members of the working group included the Director of FAMS and
representatives from BTS, DHS, TSA, and ICE.
[11] Federal air marshals are also subject to certain TSA operating
procedures--which vary by airport--and to airline procedures in
boarding aircraft, which differ by air carrier. In this regard, federal
air marshals must interact, to varying degrees, with airline and
airport personnel and TSA staff during the course of their daily
mission.
[12] More specific information regarding the nature of these incidents
is considered sensitive security information and discussed in the
restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
[13] The Mission Operations Center controls daily operations and
monitors ongoing missions by, among other things, tracking federal air
marshal teams that are in the aviation domain worldwide.
[14] As we noted earlier, the exact number of ICE agents who received
cross-training is considered sensitive security information and
discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
[15] See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14,
2002).
[16] With agents located in 27 field offices throughout the United
States, ICE's Office of Investigations enforces trade and immigration
laws through the investigation of activities, persons, and incidents
that may pose a threat to U.S. safety and security. These include the
illegal trafficking in weapons, narcotics and contraband smuggling,
human smuggling and trafficking, violations of the immigration system,
money laundering and other financial crimes, fraudulent trade
practices, child pornography, and child sex tourism. Its key missions
are strengthening national security, combating smuggling and promoting
public safety, and securing the nation's economic system from terrorist
and criminal exploitation.
[17] For example, see Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of
Homeland Security, before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 30, 2004.
[18] The exact number of ICE agents who were deployed is considered
sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version
of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
[19] Once these agents completed FAMS's 40-hour training program, they
were temporarily assigned to the FAA's air marshal program to augment
their security mission.
[20] These agents were among the federal law enforcement officers used
from various agencies who had been trained and deployed as temporary
air marshals to augment the small number of federal air marshals
employed at that time. These officers acted as a stopgap measure, while
FAMS selected, hired, trained, and deployed permanent air marshals.
[21] H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 32, 36 (June 15, 2004).
[22] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2004).
[23] Under OPM's position classification standards, aviation security
specialists are classified within the general inspection,
investigation, and compliance occupational series (referred to as a GS-
1801), which involves ensuring compliance with federal laws,
regulations, or mandatory guidelines. Criminal investigator positions
are classified within the "criminal" investigation occupational series
(referred to as a GS-1811), which involves planning and investigating
alleged or suspected criminal violations.
[24] Board members included ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the
senior advisor to ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the special counsel
to ICE's Assistant Secretary, FAMS's Deputy Director, and two FAMS
field senior executives.
[25] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[26] For example, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A
Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management
Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005) and GAO,
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-
957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
[27] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[28] Specifically, the federal air marshal contacts a designated
controller at the Mission Operations Center to describe the details of
the incident. The controller then attempts to provide guidance to the
federal air marshal to help resolve the incident. If the controller
cannot resolve the situation at that point in time, he/she refers the
federal air marshal to a designated watch officer at the Operations
Center who will attempt to resolve the incident directly or provide
guidance to the federal air marshal for resolving the issue.
[29] According to FAMS, mission reports do not include incidents that
present a direct or imminent threat to aircraft, passengers, crew, or
other persons or property. In the event that federal air marshals
encounter incidents that pose such threats, they can file an "incident
report."
[30] FAMS field offices have assigned federal air marshal supervisors
to serve as on-site airport liaisons at various airports that are
within their geographical location. In general, these liaisons assist
in establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with
airport, law enforcement, and private industry officials. Liaison
duties include, among other things, addressing with the local Federal
Security Director at their assigned airport various incidents
identified in mission reports, providing a consistent federal air
marshal presence at airports, performing surveillance detection and
counter-surveillance in their airport, and following up on suspicious
individuals and activities reported by federal air marshals while
carrying out their mission.
[31] The report containing sensitive security information is GAO,
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept.
29, 2005).
[32] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformations:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-292SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
[33] GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal
government as required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c). GAO first issued the standards in
1983. GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards provide the overall
framework for establishing and maintaining internal control and for
identifying and addressing major performance challenges and areas at
greatest risk for fraud, waste and abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued
its Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G
(Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or
implementing effective internal control and, when needed, to help
determine what, where, and how improvements can be implemented.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
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