Aviation Security
Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems Gao ID: GAO-05-365 March 15, 2005Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This report assesses (1) TSA's use of budgeted funds to install EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems.
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines--mainly in airport lobbies--that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis. Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these systems. Moreover, TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhance efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that these in-line systems could yield significant savings for the federal government. TSA further estimated that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little over 1 year.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-365, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2005:
Aviation Security:
Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked
Baggage Screening Systems:
GAO-05-365:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-365, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment:
explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography
X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives
trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect
traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This report assesses
(1) TSA‘s use of budgeted funds to install EDS and ETD systems and the
impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport
actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems,
and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3)
actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening
systems.
What GAO Found:
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at
the nation‘s more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen
all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by
Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA
placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines”mainly in
airport lobbies”that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage
conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency‘s ability to
initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs
and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby
solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a
greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-
line with baggage conveyor systems.
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage
screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce
screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports
we surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering
installing full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not
been made available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-
scale basis. Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage
screening systems at each airport are unknown, the availability of
future federal funding is uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding
the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and
air carriers in funding these systems.
Moreover, TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to
determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and
enhance efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or,
where in-line systems may not be economically justified, by making
greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-
intensive and less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine
airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line
baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit
analysis which showed that these in-line systems could yield
significant savings for the federal government. TSA further estimated
that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at
these airports in a little over 1 year.
EDS and ETD Machines Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direct
TSA to take several actions needed to systematically evaluate baggage
screening needs at airports, including identifying the costs and
benefits of installing in-line EDS systems or stand-alone EDS machines
in lieu of ETD machines, and prioritizing those airports where TSA
would benefit by such actions. DHS generally concurred with GAO‘s
findings and recommendations and described corrective actions that it
has initiated or plans to take to address the issues identified.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-365.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at
(202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage for
Explosives, but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational
Inefficiencies, and Additional Security Risks:
Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-
line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made
Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis:
TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost-
Effective Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation:
Appendix III: Airports Receiving TSA Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for In-line Systems:
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Glossary:
Tables:
Table 1: Airport Modification, Procurement, and Installation Funding
for EDS/ETD Equipment for Fiscal Years 2002-2004:
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Installation Obligations as of September 30, 2004:
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 EDS/ETD Procurement Obligations as of
September 30, 2004:
Table 4: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 2004:
Table 5: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened
Using EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around
February 29, 2004:
Table 6: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines
and ETD Machines:
Table 7: Source of Federal Funding Used for Airport Modification
Planning and Construction of In-line EDS Systems as of July 2004:
Table 8: Airports Awarded LOIs:
Table 9: Highlights of Authorizations in Laws Related to Checked
Baggage Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:
Table 10: Highlights of Appropriations in Laws Related to Checked
Baggage Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:
Table 11: Listing of Airports Receiving Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for Developing In-line EDS Baggage
Screening Systems as of September 30, 2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: EDS Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage:
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage:
Figure 3: In-line Checked Baggage Screening System:
Figure 4: Crowded Airport Lobby with Stand-alone EDS Screening:
Figure 5: Status of In-line EDS Systems for Category X, I, and II
Airports Included in Survey of Federal Security Directors as of July
2004:
Figure 6: TSA Criteria for Prioritizing Letters of Intent:
Figure 7: Airport Modification Costs Per In-line EDS Machine at Nine
Airports:
Figure 8: Cost Savings from In-line EDS Systems Compared to Stand-alone
EDS at Nine Airports:
Figure 9: Costs and Savings at Nine Airports:
Abbreviations:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EDS: explosives detection system:
ETD: explosives trace detection:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
LOI: letter of intent:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 15, 2005:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. airliner over Lockerbie,
Scotland, U.S. commercial aircraft have long been a target for
terrorist attacks through the use of explosives carried in checked
baggage. In 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established
a long-term goal of screening all checked baggage for explosives to
prevent such attacks and a timetable for deploying explosive detection
systems at all airports by 2014. The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, however, increased the federal government's focus on screening
checked baggage for explosives at U.S. airports. On November 19, 2001,
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)[Footnote 1] was
signed into law, creating the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and mandating, among other things, the screening of all checked
baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002. To
satisfy this mandate, TSA deployed two types of screening equipment to
all airports in the United States where screening is required: (1)
explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography
X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives and (2) explosives trace
detection (ETD), which uses chemical analysis to detect traces of
explosive materials' vapors and residue.
As we reported in February 2004, largely because of shortages of
equipment and insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS
machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002
congressionally established deadline to screen all checked baggage for
explosives using EDS and ETD machines.[Footnote 2] Recognizing the
obstacles encountered by TSA, Congress passed, and the President signed
into law, the Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 3] which, in
effect, extended the deadline for screening all checked baggage for
explosives until December 31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was
unable to meet the earlier deadline established by ATSA. We also
reported that TSA fell short of fully satisfying the extended 2003
mandate and continued to face challenges in deploying and leveraging
screening equipment and technologies. To further assess TSA's efforts
to deploy equipment and screen checked baggage for explosives using EDS
and ETD, we addressed the following questions: (1) How did TSA use the
funds it initially budgeted to procure and install EDS and ETD systems
and make associated airport modifications, and what was the impact of
the initial deployment of EDS and ETD systems? (2) What actions are
airports and TSA currently taking to install automated in-line EDS
baggage screening systems,[Footnote 4] and what are the federal
resources that have been made available to fund these systems? (3) What
actions, if any, is TSA taking to plan for the optimal deployment of
EDS and ETD equipment, including in-line checked baggage screening
systems, in order to ensure the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and
security of its checked baggage screening operations?
To address these objectives, we reviewed available documentation on
TSA's checked baggage screening program, including contract obligations
for modifying airports and procuring and installing EDS and ETD
systems, inventory listings of EDS and ETD systems, funding and
planning documentation for in-line systems, and cost analysis of in-
line and stand-alone EDS equipment. Although we could not independently
verify the reliability of all of this information, we compared it with
other supporting documents, when available, to determine data
consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of these efforts, we
believe the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for this
report. We also reviewed the results of covert testing (undercover and
unannounced) of checked baggage screening operations conducted by TSA's
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review and questioned TSA
officials about the procedures used to ensure the reliability of the
covert test data. Based on their answers, we believe that the covert
test data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.
Further, we interviewed officials from TSA, air carriers, airports, EDS
and ETD equipment manufacturers, and airport industry associations to
obtain information regarding TSA's efforts to improve checked baggage
screening operations using EDS machines. We performed our work at TSA
headquarters and 22 airports throughout the United States. At the
airports we visited, we observed baggage screening procedures and
discussed these procedures with TSA, airport, and airline officials. We
chose these 22 airports based on one or more of the following factors:
a large number of passenger boardings, the existence of an operational
in-line system, whether the airport had received or requested TSA
funding for an in-line system, whether the airport had begun screening
all checked baggage using EDS or ETD, and the proximity to a larger
airport also being visited by GAO. In addition, we surveyed all 155
federal security directors, who oversee federal security operations at
one or more airports in the United States where screening is required
to obtain their perspectives on the implementation of checked baggage
screening operations at 263 airports under their supervision, and to
obtain information on these airports' plans regarding the incorporation
of EDS machines within the airports' baggage conveyor systems for
screening checked baggage for explosives. We conducted our work from
September 2003 through January 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. A detailed discussion of our
scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. Terms used in this
report are further defined in a glossary at the end of this report.
Results in Brief:
From its creation in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA
obligated about $2.5 billion (93 percent) of the approximately $2.7
billion it had budgeted for fiscal years 2002 through 2004 for
procuring and installing explosive detection equipment--predominantly
to screen checked baggage for explosives--and making associated airport
modifications to accommodate the equipment.[Footnote 5] Specifically,
TSA procured and placed about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000 ETD
machines at over 400 airports and modified airports for the
installation of this equipment. Although TSA made significant progress
in fielding EDS and ETD equipment to the nation's airports, TSA placed
this equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--to
conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather
than integrating EDS machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor
systems. TSA officials stated that they use EDS machines in stand-alone
mode and ETD machines as an interim solution in order to meet the
congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage for
explosives. Officials stated that they employed these interim solutions
because of the significant costs required to install in-line systems
and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor systems to
accommodate the equipment. These interim screening solutions led to
operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of
screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each hour, as
compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems.
Performing primary screening using ETD machines, as is the case for
more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient than
screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding,
which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security risks for
passengers and airport workers. Certain information we obtained and
analyzed regarding explosive detection technologies and their
effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage screening operations are
classified or are considered by TSA to be sensitive security
information. Accordingly, the results of our review of this information
have been removed from this report.[Footnote 6]
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems--to streamline airport and TSA operations,
reduce screening costs, and enhance security--but resources have not
been made available to fund these systems on a large-scale basis. Most
airports that have installed or are planning to install these capital-
intensive in-line systems have relied on or plan to rely on some form
of federal funding to help install the systems. Although TSA and
airports operators are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage
screening systems, identifying the resources to fund the systems on a
large-scale basis continues to be a challenge. The issuance of letter
of intent (LOI) agreements--TSA's primary method for funding in-line
systems--has been limited to nine airports. An LOI, though not a
binding commitment of federal funding, represents an intent by TSA to
provide funds in future years if they are appropriated by Congress.
This in turn enables an airport to proceed with a project, such as
installing in-line baggage screening systems, because the airport and
investors are aware that allowable costs will likely be reimbursed.
Further, TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line
EDS baggage screening systems at airports determined to need these
systems, the availability of funding for in-line systems is uncertain,
and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal
government and airport operators in funding these systems.
Moreover, TSA has not yet conducted the systematic analyses needed to
plan for optimally deploying EDS and ETD equipment--including
installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems or replacing ETD
machines with stand-alone EDS machines--at the nation's more than 400
airports to enhance security and reduce TSA staffing requirements and
long-term costs. Although TSA established criteria to prioritize
airport eligibility for receiving LOI funds for in-line EDS systems and
conducted a limited retrospective analysis for the nine airports that
received LOI agreements, TSA has not conducted a prospective analysis
to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and
improved security benefits by installing in-line baggage screening
systems rather than continuing to rely on labor-intensive stand-alone
EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives. TSA's
retrospective cost-benefit analysis conducted on the nine airports with
signed LOI agreements to install in-line screening systems found that
significant savings and other benefits, including reduced screener
staffing requirements and increased baggage throughput, may be achieved
through the installation of in-line systems. Also, for airports where
in-line systems may not be economically justified because of the high
cost of installing these systems, TSA has not conducted an analysis to
determine whether it could achieve savings and other benefits by making
greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the use
of less efficient and more labor-intensive ETD machines at these
airports. Further, although Congress has directed TSA to continue
submitting quarterly reports on its plans for installing in-line
baggage screening systems, TSA has not yet provided all of the
information requested by Congress.[Footnote 7]
We are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) direct the TSA Administrator to systematically evaluate
baggage screening systems at the nation's airports to include the costs
and benefits associated with installing in-line EDS baggage screening
systems and deploying stand-alone EDS machines--in lieu of ETD
machines--to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage at
airports where an in-line system would not be cost-effective or for
justified other reasons. We also made a recommendation to DHS
addressing TSA's protocols for screening checked baggage and associated
screener training, which is included in the restricted versions of this
report.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations, and agreed that efforts to implement the
recommendations are critical to a successful checked baggage screening
program. DHS described some actions TSA has initiated to implement
these recommendations, including conducting an analysis of the
deployment of in-line checked baggage screening systems, and an
analysis of those airports that would benefit from replacing ETDs with
stand-alone EDS equipment. A copy of DHS's comments is included as
appendix V.
Background:
With the passage of ATSA in November 2001, TSA assumed from FAA the
majority of the responsibility for securing the commercial aviation
system.[Footnote 8] Under ATSA, TSA is responsible for ensuring that
all baggage is properly screened for explosives at airports in the
United States where screening is required, and for the procurement,
installation, and maintenance of explosive detection systems used to
screen checked baggage for explosives. ATSA required that TSA screen
100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by
December 31, 2002. As it became apparent that certain airports would
not meet the December 2002 deadline to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage for explosives, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in effect
extended the deadline to December 31, 2003, for noncompliant
airports.[Footnote 9] Prior to the passage of ATSA in November 2001,
only limited screening of checked baggage for explosives occurred. When
this screening took place, air carriers had operational responsibility
for conducting the screening, while FAA maintained oversight
responsibility. With the passage of ATSA, TSA assumed operational
responsibility from air carriers for screening checked baggage for
explosives. Airport operators and air carriers continued to be
responsible for processing and transporting passenger checked baggage
from the check-in counter to the airplane.
Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines (see figs. 1
and 2). EDS machines use computer-aided tomography X-rays adapted from
the medical field to automatically recognize the characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. By taking the equivalent of hundreds
of X-ray pictures of a bag from different angles, the EDS machine
examines the objects inside of the baggage to identify characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. TSA has certified, procured, and
deployed EDS machines manufactured by two companies. ETD machines work
by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect
samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to
identify any traces of explosive materials. ETD is used both for
primary, or the initial, screening of checked baggage, as well as
secondary screening, which resolves alarms from EDS machines that
indicate the possible presence of explosives inside a bag. TSA has
certified, procured, and deployed ETD machines from three manufacturers.
Figure 1: EDS Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: ETD Machine Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The operational processes for conducting screening of checked baggage
for explosives using ETD and EDS machines differ. Specifically, the ETD
screening process requires the screener to manually screen checked
baggage by (1) swabbing an area of, or item in, the checked bag and (2)
placing the swab in the ETD machine. The ETD machine then evaluates the
sample on the swab to detect trace amounts of explosive residue. If
these steps are not conducted correctly, the test may fail to detect
explosives that are present. Since the first steps of this process
require screeners to collect explosive particles, they are vulnerable
to human error. In contrast, when using EDS machines as the primary
means of detection, the screening is automated and the machine either
alarms indicating the possible presence of explosives or does not alarm
without screener involvement.
As we reported in February 2004, to initially deploy EDS and ETD
equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA
implemented interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage
screening systems.[Footnote 10] The interim lobby solutions involved
placing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in the nation's airports, most
often in airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is
sorted for loading onto aircraft. For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not
integrated with airport's or air carrier's baggage conveyor system) and
ETD, TSA screeners are responsible for obtaining the passengers'
checked baggage from either the passenger or the air carrier, lifting
the bags onto and off of EDS machines or ETD tables, using TSA
protocols to appropriately screen the bags, and returning the cleared
bags to the air carriers to be loaded onto departing aircraft.
In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport
lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated with some airport
operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line EDS baggage
screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems. While each in-
line baggage screening system is unique, these systems generally
operate in a similar manner, as shown in figure 3. Typically, in-line
systems involve checked baggage undergoing automated screening while on
a conveyor belt that sorts and transports baggage to the proper
location for its ultimate loading onto an aircraft. During this
automated process, all checked baggage on the conveyor belt passes
through EDS machines where the bags are screened for explosives. If no
explosives are detected during this primary screening, the bag
continues forward on the main conveyor belt to be loaded onto the
aircraft. If an EDS machine alarms, indicating the possibility of
explosives, TSA screeners, by reviewing computer-generated images of
the inside of the bag, attempt to determine whether a suspect item is
actually a threat.[Footnote 11] If the screener determines that the
suspect item is not a threat, the cleared bag continues on the conveyor
belt system to be loaded onto the aircraft. If the screener is unable
to make this determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor
belt into an area where it receives a secondary screening in which the
bag is opened and the contents of the bag are screened by a screener
using an ETD machine and physical inspection. If the bag successfully
clears secondary screening, it is placed on the main conveyor belt
system to be loaded onto the aircraft. If the bag tests positive for
explosives during secondary screening, TSA screeners are required to
notify the appropriate officials.
Figure 3: In-line Checked Baggage Screening System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Both airports and the federal government have cooperated to jointly
fund the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems. The
federal government has used three funding mechanisms to modify airport
facilities to install in-line EDS systems--LOIs, other transaction
agreements, and Airport Improvement Program funds from the
FAA.[Footnote 12] In 2003, Congress authorized TSA to issue LOIs for
airport modifications related to the installation of in-line baggage
screening systems.[Footnote 13] When an LOI is established to provide
multiyear funding for a project, the airport operator is responsible
for providing--up front--the total funding needed to complete the
project, even though the LOI is not a binding commitment of federal
funds. Work proceeds with the understanding that TSA will, if
sufficient funding is appropriated, reimburse the airport operator for
a percentage of the facility modification costs. Congress initially
mandated a 75 percent federal government cost-share for LOIs in
February 2003, but in December of that year it increased the cost-share
to 90 percent.[Footnote 14] However, the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act subsequently re-established the federal government
cost-share at 75 percent for fiscal year 2005. Also, the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA proposes to maintain the 75
percent federal government cost share for projects funded by LOIs at
large and medium airports.
TSA also uses other transaction agreements, which are administrative
vehicles used by TSA to directly fund airport operators engaged, or
planning to engage, in smaller in-line airport modification projects
without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions, which
can take many forms and are generally not required to comply with
federal laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements, enable the federal government and others
entering into these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are
mutually agreeable.
In addition, airports have utilized Airport Improvement Program grants,
which are awarded by the Secretary of Transportation for airport
planning and development to maintain a safe and efficient nationwide
system of public airports and for limited aviation security purposes.
Some airport operators used the Airport Improvement Program in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 to fund facility modifications needed to
accommodate installing in-line systems. However, provisions of ATSA and
the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100),
as well as fiscal years 2004 and 2005 appropriations language, have
limited the future availability of the Airport Improvement Program to
fund in-line systems.[Footnote 15]
TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage for
Explosives, but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational
Inefficiencies, and Additional Security Risks:
Since its inception in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA
obligated about $2.5 billion (93 percent) of the approximately $2.7
billion it budgeted for fiscal years 2002 through 2004 for the
procurement and installation of EDS and ETD machines to screen checked
baggage for explosives and to modify airport facilities to accommodate
this equipment. Although TSA made significant progress in fielding this
equipment, TSA used most of the $2.5 billion to design, develop, and
deploy interim lobby screening solutions rather than install more
permanent in-line EDS baggage screening systems. TSA employed these as
interim solutions in order to meet the congressional deadline for
screening all checked baggage for explosives because of the significant
costs required to install in-line systems and the need to reconfigure
many airports' baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the equipment.
TSA officials also stated that they did not have time to conduct the
planning needed or make airport modifications required for longer-term
and more streamlined baggage screening operations. However, these
interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA resulted in operational
inefficiencies and additional security risks. Specifically, TSA's use
of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a greater number of
screener staff and resulted in screening fewer bags for explosives per
hour, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor
systems. Also, screening with ETD machines, as is the case for more
than 300 airports, is more labor-intensive and less efficient than
screening using the EDS process. TSA officials also raised concerns
about the possible security risks caused by baggage screening equipment
being located in airport lobbies--causing overcrowding due to
passengers waiting to have their bags screened.
TSA Procured and Installed Explosive Detection Equipment and Modified
Airports to Integrate this Equipment to Screen Checked Baggage for
Explosives:
TSA used most of the airport modification and equipment procurement and
installation funds to deploy interim lobby screening solutions at more
than 400 airports to provide the means for screening all checked
baggage for explosives as mandated by the Congress. As shown in table
1, the Congress earmarked about $1.5 billion of the $2.7 billion
budgeted amount specifically to install EDS and ETD equipment, and to
modify and prepare airport facilities to incorporate the use of this
equipment for screening checked baggage for explosives. Congress
earmarked and TSA budgeted the remaining $1.2 billion for the
procurement of EDS and ETD machines.
Table 1: Airport Modification, Procurement, and Installation Funding
for EDS/ETD Equipment for Fiscal Years 2002-2004:
Dollars in millions.
Fiscal year 2002 TSA budget (not earmarked): EDS/ETD procurement;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $0.0;
Dollars in millions: EDS/ETD procurement funds: $703.5;
Total: $703.5.
Fiscal year 2002 TSA budget (not earmarked): Other nonearmarked TSA
funding;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $0.0;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $156.0;
Total: $156.0.
Fiscal year 2002 TSA budget (not earmarked): Total nonearmarked budget;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $0.0;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $859.5;
Total: $859.5.
Earmarked TSA appropriations[A]: Fiscal year 02 supplemental;
Public law: 107-206;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $738.0;
Total: $738.0.
Earmarked TSA appropriations[A]: Fiscal year 03 consolidation;
Public law: 108-7;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $265.0;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $174.5;
Total: $439.5.
Earmarked TSA appropriations[A]: Fiscal year 03 emergency wartime
supplemental;
Public law: 108-11;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $235.0; Total:
$235.0.
Earmarked TSA appropriations[A]: Fiscal year 04 DHS appropriations;
Public law: 108-90;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $249.4;
EDS/ ETD procurement funds: $149.7;
Total: $399.1.
Earmarked TSA appropriations[A]: Total earmarked appropriations;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $1,487.4;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $324.2;
Total: $1,811.6.
Total fiscal year 2002-2004 EDS/ETD funding[B];
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: $1,487.4;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $1,183.6;
Total: $2,671.1.
Less amount obligated as of September 30, 2004;
Airport modification and EDS/ETD installation funds: ($1,307.4);
EDS/ETD procurement funds: ($1,183.4);
Total: ($2,490.8).
Amount available for additional obligation as of September 30, 2004[B];
Airport modification and EDS/ ETD installation funds: $180.0;
EDS/ETD procurement funds: $0.3;
Total: $180.3.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[A] These earmarked appropriations are funds that Congress has
specified can be spent by TSA only for the particular purpose indicated
in the table.
[B] Totals may not add because of rounding.
[End of table]
As of the end of fiscal year 2004, TSA used about one-half of the $2.5
billion that it had obligated to modify airport facilities and to
install EDS and ETD machines, and the remaining half primarily to
procure EDS and ETD machines. As of September 30, 2004, TSA had
obligated approximately $1.3 billion of the approximately $1.5 billion
that had been earmarked for airport modifications and the installation
of EDS and ETD equipment. As shown in table 2, TSA had used about $885
million (about 68 percent) of these obligated funds for the general
deployment and installation of EDS and ETD equipment at various
airports as part of interim lobby solutions to quickly install checked
baggage screening equipment. Also included in this amount are funds
that TSA used for installing interim partial in-line baggage screening
systems at some airports. In general, these systems were for sections
of an airport, were not fully integrated into the airport's baggage
handling system, and most often were temporary until a permanent in-
line system could be installed. For example, TSA awarded the Port of
Seattle about $9 million for the construction of interim partial in-
line systems and modification of the baggage handling systems serving
four airlines at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. These
interim partial in-line systems, which are not fully integrated with
the baggage handling systems, will be replaced by permanent in-line
baggage screening systems that will be fully integrated with the
airport's baggage handling systems by March 2007. Most of the remaining
airport modification and equipment installation obligations are being
used by TSA for work related to the permanent in-line integration of
EDS baggage screening equipment into airportwide or individual terminal
baggage conveyor systems at 33 airports. See appendix III for a listing
of the 33 airports having in-line baggage screening systems installed
and the source of TSA funding for the in-line systems.
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Installation Obligations as of September 30, 2004:
Dollars in millions.
Funding for general interim lobby deployment and integration of EDS and
ETD equipment for screening checked baggage:
Planning, designing, and airport structural modification work performed
at over 400 airports by TSA's prime contractor, Boeing Service Company
and its subcontractors[A];
Amount obligated: $843.3.
Work performed by other individual contractors and EDS manufacturers;
Amount obligated: $32.8.
Costs associated with transporting and upgrading EDS/ETD equipment;
Amount obligated: $8.5.
Subtotal[B];
Amount obligated: $884.7;
Percentage[B]: 68%.
Funding for permanent in-line integration of EDS screening equipment
into airportwide or individual terminal baggage conveyor systems at 33
airports:
Initial letter of intent funding to nine airports for airport
modification;
Amount obligated: $259.4.
Other transaction agreement funding to eight airports for airport
modification;
Amount obligated: $82.6.
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, and EDS manufacturers at 25
airports;
Amount obligated: $52.2.
Subtotal[B];
Amount obligated: $394.3;
Percentage[B]: 30%.
Funding for engineering, testing, and analytical support services:
Engineering, testing, and analytical support services to TSA for
airport facility modification and EDS/ETD installation activities;
Amount obligated: $28.4;
Percentage[B]: 2%.
Total obligated[B];
Amount obligated: $1,307.4.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[A] Some of these funds were used for the permanent in-line
installation and integration of EDS equipment into baggage conveyor
systems at eight airports including two category X, and six category I
and II airports. We were unable to determine the amount expended for
this effort because at the time the work was accomplished, TSA did not
require Boeing Service Company, the prime contractor responsible for
deploying EDS and ETD equipment, to track obligations and expenditures
at the airport level.
[B] Totals and subtotals may not add because of rounding.
[End of table]
TSA contracted with Boeing Service Company in June 2002 to be the prime
contractor for deploying EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's
airports. This effort involved designing and implementing airport
facility modifications for EDS and ETD equipment, such as new
construction, infrastructure reinforcement, and modification of
electrical systems required to install the EDS and ETD equipment.
Originally, the period of performance for this contract was to expire
on December 31, 2002. However, TSA extended the contract's period of
performance in order for Boeing to perform activities associated with
installing interim lobby solutions to help airports meet or to maintain
compliance to screen 100 percent of checked baggage with explosive
detection systems. These contract extensions have resulted in a $486.3
million increase in TSA obligations against this contract for work
related to airport modifications and EDS and ETD installation from
$372.6 million in fiscal year 2002 to $858.8 million as of September
30, 2004.[Footnote 16] Boeing had expended most (98 percent) of these
funds for interim lobby screening solutions.
As of September 30, 2004, TSA had obligated almost 100 percent of the
approximately $1.2 billion that had been budgeted or earmarked for
procurement of EDS and ETD machines. As shown in table 3, about 80
percent of these funds has been obligated for procuring EDS machines,
with most of the remaining funding being obligated for procuring ETD
machines.
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2002-2004 EDS/ETD Procurement Obligations as of
September 30, 2004:
Dollars in millions.
Procurement of EDS machines and associated equipment: Invision EDS
machines and associated equipment: CTX 2500 EDS designed for stand-
alone configuration;
Number of units: 82;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $31.0.
Procurement of EDS machines and associated equipment: Invision EDS
machines and associated equipment: CTX 5500 EDS designed for both stand-
alone or in-line configurations;
Number of units: 357;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $190.5.
Procurement of EDS machines and associated equipment: Invision EDS
machines and associated equipment: CTX 9000 EDS designed for in-line
configuration;
Number of units: 246;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $284.4.
EDS machine manufacturing ramp-up, engineering services and other
costs;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $17.3.
L3 Examiner 6000 EDS designed for both stand-alone or in-line
configurations;
Number of units: 519;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $428.7.
Total EDS procurement;
Number of units: 1,204;
Amount obligated: Total: $951.9;
Percent: 80%.
Procurement of ETD machines, parts and consumables: Ionscan 400B ETD
machines, parts, and consumables;
Number of units: 3,162;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $121.5.
Procurement of ETD machines, parts and consumables: Itemiser ETD
machines, parts, and consumables;
Number of units: 1,785;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $65.5.
Procurement of ETD machines, parts and consumables: EGIS-II ETD
machines, parts, and consumables;
Number of units: 700;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $32.5.
Procurement of ETD machines, parts and consumables: Total ETD
procurement;
Number of units: 5,647;
Amount obligated: Total: $219.5;
Percent: 19%.
Other services and equipment procurement: Other engineering, testing,
and analytical support services to TSA for airport facility
modification and EDS/ETD installation activities;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $6.6.
Other services and equipment procurement: X-ray machines and other
services;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $3.6.
Other services and equipment procurement: Transportation of EDS
equipment within and between airports;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $1.0.
Other services and equipment procurement: Other charges for services
and supplies;
Amount obligated: Subtotal: $0.9.
Other services and equipment procurement: Total other services and
equipment;
Amount obligated: Total: $12.1;
Percent: 1%.
Total obligated[A];
Amount obligated: Total: $1,183.4.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[A] Total does not add because of rounding.
[End of table]
Table 4 summarizes the location of EDS and ETD equipment at the
nation's airports by airport category,[Footnote 17] based on a June
2004 TSA inventory listing. The number of machines shown in table 4
includes EDS and ETD machines procured by both TSA and FAA prior to and
during the establishment of TSA.
Table 4: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 2004:
Airport category;
Number: Airports: 21;
Number: EDS machines: 679;
Number: ETD machines: 2,833.
Airport category: I;
Number: Airports: 61;
Number: EDS machines: 467;
Number: ETD machines: 2,401.
Airport category: II;
Number: Airports: 50;
Number: EDS machines: 71;
Number: ETD machines: 695.
Airport category: III;
Number: Airports: 124;
Number: EDS machines: 9;
Number: ETD machines: 744.
Airport category: IV;
Number: Airports: 190;
Number: EDS machines: 2;
Number: ETD machines: 473.
Airport category: Total;
Number: Airports: 446;
Number: EDS machines: 1,228;
Number: ETD machines: 7,146.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[End of table]
TSA's Initial Deployment of EDS and ETD Machines Resulted in Interim
Solutions for Screening with Stand-alone Equipment Located Mainly in
Airport Lobbies:
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding EDS and ETD
equipment to the nation's airports to screen checked baggage for
explosives, as mandated by Congress, TSA primarily used this equipment
as part of interim lobby solutions to screen checked baggage for
explosives, rather than the permanent integration of EDS machines in-
line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA fielded most of the EDS
and ETD machines needed to screen checked baggage for explosives to the
nation's over 400 airports by the congressionally mandated date of
December 2003 (extended from the original deadline of December 2002),
despite limited time to deploy the equipment and some of the equipment
not being available when needed. In 1996, FAA, the organization then
responsible for the procurement of checked baggage screening equipment,
established a long-term goal of fielding explosive detection systems at
all airports within 18 years--by 2014. As of June 2002, we reported
that FAA had fielded 200 EDS and 200 ETD systems to 56
airports.[Footnote 18] In about two and one-half years following the
mandate to screen all checked baggage for explosives, TSA's deployment
of equipment resulted in 1,228 EDS machines and 7,146 ETD machines
being available in over 400 airports, as shown in table 4. Initially,
EDS manufacturers were unable to produce and deliver the number of
machines needed by TSA, and TSA determined that a mix of EDS and ETD
technologies would provide an efficient and effective means of
passenger protection.
During our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II airports, we
observed that in most cases, TSA used stand-alone EDS machines and ETD
machines as the primary method for screening checked baggage.[Footnote
19] Generally, this equipment was located in airport lobbies and in
baggage makeup areas. In addition, in our survey of 155 federal
security directors, we asked the directors to estimate, for the 263
airports included in the survey, the approximate percentage of checked
baggage that was screened on or around February 29, 2004, using EDS,
ETD, or other approved alternatives for screening baggage such as
positive passenger bag match or canine searches.[Footnote 20] As shown
in table 5, the directors reported that for 130 large to medium-sized
airports in our survey (21, 60, and 49 category X, I, and II airports,
respectively), most of the checked baggage was screened using stand-
alone EDS or ETD machines. The average percentage of checked baggage
reported as screened using EDS machines at airports with partial or
full in-line EDS capability ranged from 4 percent for category II
airports to 11 percent for category X airports. In addition, the
directors reported that ETD machines were used to screen checked
baggage 93 to 99 percent of the time at category III and IV airports,
respectively.
Table 5: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened
Using EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around
February 29, 2004:
Airport category: Number of airports;
X: 21;
I: 60;
II: 49;
III: 73;
IV: 60;
Total: 263.
Airport category: Percentage of checked baggage screened using: EDS (at
airports with no in-line EDS capability);
X: 59%;
I: 59%;
II: 27%;
III: 6%;
IV: 0%;
Total: 25%.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: EDS (at airports with
partial or airportwide in-line EDS capability);
X: 11%;
I: 8%;
II: 4%;
III: 0%;
IV: 0%;
Total: 3%.
Airport category: Total[A] EDS;
X: 70%;
I: 67%;
II: 32%;
III: 6%;
IV: 0%;
Total: 28%.
Airport category: ETD;
X: 18%;
I: 33%;
II: 66%;
III: 93%;
IV: 99%;
Total: 69%.
Airport category: Total[A] EDS and ETD;
X: 88%;
I: 99%;
II: 98%;
III: 99%;
IV: 99%;
Total: 98%.
Airport category: Other approved method;
X: 12%;
I: 1%;
II: 2%;
III: 2%;
IV: 1%;
Total: 2%.
Airport category: Total[A];
X: 100%;
I: 100%;
II: 100%;
III: 100%;
IV: 100%;
Total: 100%.
Source: Analysis of GAO federal security director survey data.
[A] Percentages may not add because of rounding.
[End of table]
Interim Solutions Resulted in Operational Inefficiencies and Additional
Security Risks:
TSA's interim solution of using stand-alone EDS and ETD machines as the
primary method to screen checked baggage for explosives led to
operational inefficiencies including (1) the increased use of screener
staff, (2) a lower baggage throughput rate per hour for screening
baggage for explosives, and (3) an increase in on-the-job injuries.
Further, at many airports, TSA's placement of the minivan-sized stand-
alone EDS machines and ETD machines in airport lobbies at times
resulted in passenger crowding, which presented unsafe conditions and
may have added security risks for passengers and airport workers.
Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor-and time-intensive to
operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD
machine for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor
system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS
system, checked baggage is screened within an airport's baggage
conveyor system, eliminating the need for a baggage screener or other
personnel to physically transport the baggage from the check-in point
to the EDS machine for screening and then to the airport baggage
conveyor system. Further, according to TSA officials, ETD machines and
stand-alone EDS machines are less efficient in the number of checked
bags that can be screened per hour per machine than are EDS machines
that are integrated in-line with the airport baggage conveyor systems.
As shown in table 6, as of October 2003, TSA estimated that the number
of checked bags screened per hour could more than double when EDS
machines were placed in-line versus being used in a stand-alone mode.
According to a senior TSA official in the Office of Security
Technology, these throughput numbers could change as TSA gains greater
operational experience.
Table 6: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines
and ETD Machines:
Type of equipment: EDS machines: CTX 2500--stand-alone only;
Bags per hour: Stand- alone: 120;
Bags per hour: In-line: NA.
Type of equipment: EDS machines: CTX 5500;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 180;
Bags per hour: In-line: 250.
Type of equipment: EDS machines: CTX 9000--in-line only;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: NA;
Bags per hour: In-line: 425.
Type of equipment: EDS machines: L3 6000;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 180;
Bags per hour: In-line: 425.
Type of equipment: EDS machines: ETD machines--stand-alone only;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 36;
Bags per hour: In-line: NA.
Source: TSA.
NA: Not applicable.
[End of table]
In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting, and
acquisition of security screening equipment, reported to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line
rather than stand-alone EDS are significant, particularly with regard
to bags per hour screened and the number of TSA screeners required to
operate the equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a
typical lobby-based screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS
machine with three ETD machines had a baggage throughput of 376 bags
per hour with a staffing requirement of 19 screeners. In contrast, TSA
estimated that approximately 425 bags per hour could be screened by in-
line EDS machines with a staffing requirement of 4.25 screeners.
In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number
of screener staff needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems,
TSA (1) uses a screening procedure known as "on-screen alarm
resolution" and (2) networks multiple in-line EDS machines together,
referred to as "multiplexing," so that the computer-generated images of
bags from these machines are sent to a central location where TSA
screeners can monitor the images of suspect bags centrally from several
machines using the on-screen alarm resolution procedure. When an EDS
machine alarms, indicating the possibility that explosive material may
be contained in the bag, the on-screen alarm resolution procedure
allows screeners to examine computer-generated images of the inside of
a bag to determine if suspect items identified by the EDS machines are
in fact suspicious. If a screener, by viewing these images, is able to
determine that the suspect item or items identified by the EDS machine
are in fact harmless, the screener is allowed to clear the bag, and it
is sent to the airline baggage makeup area for loading onto the
aircraft. If the screener is not able to make the determination that
the bag does not contain suspicious objects, the bag is sent to a
secondary screening room where the bag is further examined by a
screener. In secondary screening, the screener opens the bag and
examines the suspect item or items, and usually swabs the items to
collect a sample for analysis using an ETD machine. TSA also uses this
on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS
machines.[Footnote 21]
A TSA official estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure
with in-line EDS baggage screening systems will enable TSA to reduce by
40 to 60 percent the number of bags requiring the more labor-intensive
secondary screening using ETD machines. In estimating the potential
savings in staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect
to achieve a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the
number of staff needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from
in-line EDS machines.
TSA also reported that because procedures for using stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines require screeners to lift heavy baggage onto and off of
the machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA led to
significant numbers of on-the-job injuries.[Footnote 22] In addition,
in responding to our survey about 263 airports, numerous federal
security directors reported that on-the-job injuries related to lifting
heavy baggage onto or off the EDS and ETD machines were a significant
concern at the airports for which they were responsible. Specifically,
these federal security directors reported that on-the-job injuries
caused by lifting heavy bags onto and off of EDS machines were a
significant concern at 65 airports, and were a significant concern with
the use of ETD machines at 110 airports. To reduce on-the-job injuries,
TSA has provided training to screeners on proper lifting procedures.
However, according to TSA officials, in-line EDS screening systems
would significantly reduce the need for screeners to handle baggage,
thus further reducing the number of on-the-job injuries being
experienced by TSA baggage screeners.
In addition, during our site visits to 22 large and medium-sized
airports, several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed concern
regarding the security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD and
stand-alone EDS machines being located in airport lobbies. The location
of the equipment resulted in less space available to accommodate
passenger movement and caused congestion due to passengers having to
wait in lines in public areas to have their checked baggage screened.
TSA headquarters officials also reported that large groups of people
congregating in crowded airport lobbies, as shown in figure 4,
increases security risks by creating a potential target for terrorists.
The TSA officials noted that crowded airport lobbies have been the
scenes of terrorist attacks in the past. For example, in December 1985,
four terrorists walked to the El Al ticket counter at Rome's Leonardo
DaVinci Airport and opened fire with assault rifles and grenades,
killing 13 and wounding 75. On that same day, three terrorists killed
three people and wounded 30 others at Vienna International Airport.
Figure 4: Crowded Airport Lobby with Stand-alone EDS Screening:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-
line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made
Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis:
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these
systems. However, airport operators and TSA have made limited progress
in installing in-line baggage screening systems on a large-scale basis
because sufficient resources have not been made available for the
installation of these capital-intensive systems. To install in-line
systems, airport operators and TSA work cooperatively, with airport
operators responsible for the baggage conveyor systems and utilities,
and TSA responsible for the EDS and ETD machines. Airport operators and
TSA have also shared in the total costs--25 percent and 75 percent
respectively under LOI agreements, which have been TSA's primary method
for funding in-line systems. Most airports that have installed or are
planning to install in-line systems have relied on or plan to rely on
some form of federal funding to help install the systems. However, as
of January 2005, TSA has not used LOIs to fund the installation of in-
line systems beyond nine airports. Further, TSA has not determined the
total cost of installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems at
airports determined to need these systems. In addition, perspectives
differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government and
airport operators in funding these systems.
Many Airports Have, Are Planning to Have, or Are Considering Installing
In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems:
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these
systems. Our survey of federal security directors and interviews with
airport officials revealed that 86 of 130 category X, I, and II
airports (66 percent) included in our survey either have, are planning
to have, or are considering installing in-line EDS baggage screening
systems throughout or at a portion of their airports. As shown in
figure 5, as of July 2004, 12 airports had operational in-line systems
airportwide or at a particular terminal or terminals, and an additional
45 airports were actively planning or constructing in-line systems. Our
survey of federal security directors further revealed that an
additional 33 of the 130 category X, I, and II airports we surveyed
were considering developing in-line systems.
Figure 5: Status of In-line EDS Systems for Category X, I, and II
Airports Included in Survey of Federal Security Directors as of July
2004:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The total number of airports having, planning to have, or
considering an in-line system is 86. The pie charts above include three
category X and one category I airports twice because they currently
have operating in-line systems either covering the total airport or a
particular terminal or terminals and are in the process of planning and
constructing additional in-line systems.
[End of figure]
In addition to the expected benefits of reduced TSA screening
personnel, enhanced security, and increased baggage throughput, airport
officials anticipate that they will be able to streamline their airport
operations from installing in-line baggage screening systems. For
example, some airport and air carrier officials we interviewed
anticipate that in-line systems will result in less congestion at
airline ticket counters by removing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines
from crowded airport lobbies, thereby improving airline passenger flow
and queuing in the terminals by not forcing passengers to wait in long
lines at ticket counters to have their bags screened. Officials also
believe that the installation of in-line systems would allow for
airport growth because in-line EDS systems could screen checked baggage
faster than stand-alone EDS and ETD systems and could be upgraded to
accommodate growth in airline passenger traffic. Officials further
stated that in-line systems would allow them to retain greater control
and autonomy of their baggage handling systems by creating a
streamlined process for moving checked baggage directly from where
baggage is checked to the aircraft.
Total Costs of In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems Are Unknown, and
Federal Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on
a Large-Scale Basis:
While in-line EDS baggage screening systems have a number of potential
benefits, the total cost to install these systems is unknown, and
limited federal resources have been made available to fund these
systems on a large-scale basis. In-line baggage screening systems are
capital-intensive because they often require significant airport
modifications, including terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt
systems, and electrical upgrades.
TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems at airports that it had determined need these systems
to maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen all
checked baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems, or to
achieve more efficient and streamlined checked baggage screening
operations. However, TSA and airport industry association officials
have estimated that the total cost of installing in-line systems is--a
rough order-of-magnitude estimate--from $3 billion to more than $5
billion. TSA officials stated that they have not conducted a detailed
analysis of the costs required to install in-line EDS systems at
airports because most of their efforts have been focused on deploying
and maintaining a sufficient number of EDS and ETD machines to screen
all checked baggage for explosives. TSA officials further stated that
the estimated costs to install in-line baggage screening systems would
vary greatly from airport to airport depending on the size of the
airport and the extent of airport modifications that would be required
to install the system. While we did not independently verify the
estimates, officials from the Airports Council International-North
America and American Association of Airport Executives estimated that
project costs for in-line systems could range from about $2 million for
a category III airport to $250 million for a category X
airport.[Footnote 23]
Airport operators have relied on several sources of federal funding to
help pay for the planning and construction of in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. We interviewed airport officials from 53 airports
that either have or are in the process of planning or constructing in-
line systems to determine the extent to which they have relied on or
plan to rely on federal funding to install in-line systems.[Footnote
24] As shown in table 7, officials at 42 of the 53 airports we
interviewed reported that they relied on the use of federal funds from
the FAA Airport Improvement Program and TSA to help fund the planning
and construction of these systems. However, there was no readily
available information that would allow us to determine to what extent
these 42 airports relied on or plan to rely on the use of federal funds
for constructing or planning their in-line systems. Only one of the 53
airports completed its in-line system without first receiving federal
funds for the project, while an additional 10 airports have started
planning or constructing their in-line systems without receiving
federal assistance or a commitment to receive federal assistance.
Table 7: Source of Federal Funding Used for Airport Modification
Planning and Construction of In-line EDS Systems as of July 2004:
Airports that have either constructed or are in the process of
planning;
Number by airport category: X: 19;
Number by airport category: I: 27;
Number by airport category: II: 7;
Number by airport category: Total: 53.
Source of federal funding used: Combination of Airport Improvement
Program and TSA funding;
Number by airport category: X: 5;
Number by airport category: I: 0;
Number by airport category: II: 0;
Number by airport category: Total: 5.
Source of federal funding used: Airport Improvement Program funding
only;
Number by airport category: X: 7;
Number by airport category: I: 17;
Number by airport category: II: 4;
Number by airport category: Total: 28.
Source of federal funding used: TSA funding only;
Number by airport category: X: 3;
Number by airport category: I: 5;
Number by airport category: II: 1;
Number by airport category: Total: 9.
Total;
Number by airport category: X: 15;
Number by airport category: I: 22;
Number by airport category: II: 5;
Number by airport category: Total: 42.
No federal funding used;
Number by airport category: X: 4;
Number by airport category: I: 5;
Number by airport category: II: 2;
Number by airport category: Total: 11.
Source: GAO analysis of information received from interviews with
airport officials.
[End of table]
TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their
principal method for funding the modification of airport facilities to
incorporate in-line baggage screening systems. The fiscal year 2003
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution approved the use of LOIs as a
vehicle to leverage federal government and industry funding to support
facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. When an LOI is established to provide multiyear
funding for a project, the airport operator is responsible for
providing--up front--the total funding needed to complete the project,
even though the LOI is not a binding commitment of federal funds. Work
proceeds with the understanding that TSA will, if sufficient funding is
appropriated, reimburse the airport operator for a percentage of the
facility modification costs, with the airport funding the remainder of
the costs. LOIs issued by TSA for in-line baggage screening systems
provide for reimbursement payments over a multiple year period,
contingent upon the appropriation of sufficient funding to cover such
projects.
As of January 2005, TSA had issued eight LOIs to reimburse nine
airports for the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems
for a total cost of $957.1 million to the federal government over 4
years. In addition, TSA officials stated that as of July 2004, they had
identified 27 additional airports that they believe would benefit from
receiving LOIs for in-line systems because such systems are needed to
screen an increasing number of bags due to current or projected growth
in passenger traffic. TSA officials stated that without such systems,
these airports would not remain in compliance with the congressional
mandate to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD.[Footnote 25]
However, because TSA would not identify these 27 airports, we were
unable to determine whether these airports are among the 45 airports we
identified as in the process of planning or constructing in-line
systems. Table 8 identifies the nine airports awarded LOI agreements,
total project costs, and the cost-share for the federal government and
the airport.
Table 8: Airports Awarded LOIs:
Airport: Atlanta;
Total project cost: $125.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $93.8;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $31.3;
Estimated in-line operational date: December 2005.
Airport: Boston;
Total project cost: $116.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $87.0;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $29.0;
Estimated in-line operational date: Completed January 2003.
Airport: Dallas-Fort Worth;
Total project cost: $139.2;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $104.4;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $34.8;
Estimated in-line operational date: June 2005.
Airport: Denver;
Total project cost: $95.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $71.2;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $23.8;
Estimated in-line operational date: January 2005.
Airport: Las Vegas (McCarran);
Total project cost: $125.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $93.8;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $31.3;
Estimated in-line operational date: July 2005.
Airport: Los Angeles and Ontario, Calif;
Total project cost: $341.9;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $256.5;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $85.4;
Estimated in-line operational date: September 2007.
Airport: Phoenix;
Total project cost: $122.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $91.5;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $30.5;
Estimated in-line operational date: Fall of 2006.
Airport: Seattle;
Total project cost: $212.0;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $159.0;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $53.0;
Estimated in-line operational date: March 2007.
Airport: Total;
Total project cost: $1,276.1;
Total federal cost-share (75 percent): $957.1;
Airport cost-share (25 percent): $319.1.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: Total project costs do not include costs to procure and install
EDS machines.
[End of table]
TSA officials stated that they also use other transaction agreements as
an administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term
commitments, airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification
projects.[Footnote 26] Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA,
the airport operator also provides a portion of the funding required
for the modification. As of September 30, 2004, TSA had negotiated
arrangements with eight airports to fund small permanent in-line
projects or portions of large permanent in-line projects using other
transaction agreements.[Footnote 27] These other transaction agreements
range from about $640,000 to help fund the conceptual design of an in-
line system for one terminal at the Dallas Fort-Worth airport to $37.5
million to help fund the design and construction of in-line systems and
modification of the baggage handling systems for two terminals at the
Chicago O'Hare International Airport. TSA officials stated that they
would continue to use other transaction agreements to help fund smaller
in-line projects.[Footnote 28]
Airport operators also used the FAA's Airport Improvement Program--
grants to maintain safe and efficient airports--in fiscal years 2002
and 2003 to help fund facility modifications needed to accommodate
installing in-line systems. As shown in table 7, 28 of 53 airports that
reported either having constructed or planning to construct in-line
systems relied on the Airport Improvement Program as their sole source
of federal funding.
Airport Officials Report That They Will Require Federal Funding to
Install In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems, but the Availability of
this Funding Is Uncertain, and Perspectives Differ Regarding Funding
Responsibilities of the Federal Government and the Aviation Industry:
Airport officials at over half of the 45 airports that we identified
are in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems stated
that they will require federal funding in order to complete the
planning and construction of these in-line systems. Despite this
reported need, however, the President's fiscal year 2005 and 2006
budget requests do not provide, and the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act does not include, funding for additional LOIs for in-
line EDS baggage screening systems beyond the eight already issued.
Also, the availability of federal funds from the Airport Improvement
Program for future planning and construction of in-line baggage
screening systems is limited. In addition, perspectives differ
regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport
operators, and air carriers in funding these capital-intensive systems.
Officials at 28 of the 45 airports that we identified in figure 5 as
planning or constructing in-line baggage screening systems stated that
they could not or would not move forward with installing these systems
without funding support from TSA.[Footnote 29] Also, in our review of
correspondence to TSA regarding 26 airports' interest in receiving
LOIs, officials from half of the 26 airports stated that they would
have to delay, suspend, or abandon their plans for installing in-line
systems until TSA committed to funding these projects. According to TSA
officials, the high cost of developing final design plans for in-line
systems has resulted in airports delaying plans to install the systems
until they are confident that TSA will be able to support their funding
needs.
Although airport officials stated that they will require federal
funding to install in-line systems--and TSA officials reported that
additional airports will require in-line systems to maintain compliance
with the congressional mandate to screen 100 percent of checked baggage
for explosives--TSA officials stated that they do not have sufficient
resources in their budget to fund additional LOIs beyond the eight LOIs
that have already been issued. Vision 100, among other things, provided
for the creation of the Aviation Security Capital Fund to help pay for
placing EDS machines in line with airport baggage handling
systems.[Footnote 30] However, according to OMB officials, the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, which referred to the
Vision 100-mandated appropriation of $250 million for the Aviation
Security Capital Fund, only supported continued funding for the eight
LOIs that have already been issued and does not provide resources to
support new LOIs for funding the installation of in-line systems at
additional airports. Further, while the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act provides $45 million for installing explosive
detection systems in addition to the $250 million from the Aviation
Security Capital Fund, Congress directed, in the accompanying
conference report, that the $45 million be used to assist in the
continued funding of the existing eight LOIs. Further, the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA provides approximately $240.5
million for the continued funding of the eight existing LOIs and
provides no funds for new LOI agreements for in-line system integration
activities.
In addition, the availability of Airport Improvement Program funds for
airport security-related improvements, though expanded for a time, is
presently limited as a resource for the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems. Following the events of September 11, ATSA
authorized the use of Airport Improvement Program funds for security-
related enhancements through fiscal year 2002. ATSA also provided for
the use of Airport Improvement Program funds to replace airport baggage
handling systems and to reconfigure airport terminal baggage areas as
required to install explosive detection equipment, but Vision 100
amended this provision to allow only a specific portion of Airport
Improvement Program funds to be used for this purpose after December
12, 2003.[Footnote 31] Subsequent prohibitions found in the fiscal year
2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, enacted in January 2004, and
again in the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, enacted
in December 2004, prohibit the use of Airport Improvement Program funds
for activities related to the installation of in-line explosive
detection systems.
A 75 percent federal cost-share will apply to any project under an LOI
for fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 32] Further, the President's fiscal year
2006 budget request for TSA requests to maintain the 75 percent federal
government cost share for projects funded by LOIs at large and medium
airports. However, in testimony before Congress, an aviation industry
official expressed a different perspective regarding the cost sharing
between the federal government and the aviation industry for installing
in-line checked baggage screening systems. Testifying in July 2004, the
official said that airports contend that the cost of installing in-line
systems should be met entirely by the federal government, given its
direct responsibility for screening checked baggage, as established by
law, in light of the national security imperative for doing so, and
because of the economic efficiencies of this strategy. Although the
official stated that airports have agreed to provide a local match of
10 percent of the cost of installing in-line systems at medium and
large airports, as stipulated by Vision 100, he expressed opposition to
the administration's proposal, which was subsequently adopted by
Congress for fiscal year 2005, to reestablish the airport's cost-share
at 25 percent.[Footnote 33]
In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States (the 9/11 Commission) also addressed the issue of the
federal government/airport cost-share for installing EDS in-line
baggage screening systems.[Footnote 34] Specifically, the commission
recommended that TSA expedite the installation of in-line systems and
that the aviation industry should pay its fair share of the costs
associated with installing these systems, since the industry will
derive many benefits from the systems. Although the 9/11 Commission
recommended that the aviation industry should pay its fair share of the
costs of installing in-line systems, the commission did not report what
it believed the fair share to be.[Footnote 35]
TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost-
Effective Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits:
TSA has not conducted the analyses needed to plan for optimally
deploying EDS and ETD equipment--including installing in-line EDS
baggage screening systems or replacing ETD machines with stand-alone
EDS machines--at the nation's more than 400 airports to enhance
security and reduce TSA staffing requirements and long-term costs.
Although TSA established criteria to prioritize airport eligibility for
receiving LOI funds for in-line EDS baggage screening systems, it has
not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which
airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced security by
installing in-line systems rather than continue to rely on labor-
intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage
for explosives. TSA's retrospective analysis of the nine airports that
received LOIs identified the potential for significant cost savings
through the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems and
the merit of conducting prospective analyses of other airports to
provide information for future funding decisions. Further, for airports
where in-line systems may not be economically justified because of the
high cost of installing the systems, TSA has not conducted an analysis
to determine whether it could achieve savings by making greater use of
stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the use of more labor-
intensive ETD machines. OMB has provided guidance for agencies to
conduct these types of cost analyses to help build a business case for
funding their programs. Moreover, Congress directed that TSA continue
submitting plans for installing in-line baggage screening systems.
However, TSA has not yet provided Congress with all of the information
requested.
TSA Applied Criteria to Award Initial LOIs to Fund In-line Systems but
Has Not Systematically Determined Which Additional Airports Should
Receive Future In-line Systems to Increase Efficiencies and Enhance
Security:
In October 2003, TSA reported to OMB criteria it used to prioritize
airports eligible to receive LOI funds to install in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. However, TSA did not systematically determine which
airports could achieve long-term savings and improved security by
installing in-line systems rather than continuing to rely on labor-
intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage
for explosives.
The criteria TSA established for prioritizing airport participation in
the LOI program, as shown in figure 6, included airports that were not
yet conducting 100 percent screening of checked baggage with EDS or
ETD, and airports that would fall out of compliance with the
requirement to screen checked baggage with EDS or ETD at peak load
times. In July 2004, TSA officials reported that they had recently
expanded these criteria to take into account additional security
benefits that an in-line baggage screening system would provide an
airport. Specifically, TSA officials stated that they compared airport
operational needs with identified threats, based on information
received from TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service, to
consider security needs for specific airports. TSA officials further
reported that an airport's circumstances, such as passenger load
increases or decreases, may change how it is prioritized, given these
criteria, and that an airport could qualify to receive LOI funding
based on more than one criterion.
Figure 6: TSA Criteria for Prioritizing Letters of Intent:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSA officials stated that they selected the first nine airports to
receive LOIs to fund in-line baggage screening systems because, in
general, they were the first to submit applications for an LOI, and
they agreed to pay 25 percent of airport modification costs in
accordance with the LOI requirements.[Footnote 36] TSA officials also
stated that the nine airports generally met their criteria even though
seven of the airports had received LOIs in July and September 2003,
before the TSA's promulgation of the criteria in October 2003.
In addition to the nine airports currently receiving LOI funds, TSA
officials stated that, based on their criteria, in July 2004, they
identified 27 additional airports that are potential candidates for 22
future LOIs.[Footnote 37] TSA officials stated that an in-line
screening system at each of these airports would provide enhanced
security and efficiencies. More important, officials stated that if the
27 airports did not receive an LOI to install an in-line baggage
system, these airports could fall out of compliance with the
requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive
detection systems during peak passenger traffic load periods or because
of passenger load increases or new air carrier service--TSA's second
prioritization criterion shown in figure 6. Although TSA officials
asserted that in July 2004, 27 airports were good candidates for in-
line systems, they would not identify the 27 airports. TSA officials
also did not provide the analyses they conducted to determine that
these airports would fall out of compliance with the mandate to screen
all checked baggage using explosive detection systems or state why
these airports were more at risk than other airports for not complying
with this mandate. Rather, TSA officials stated that they identified
these 27 airports as good candidates for LOIs based on their day-to-day
working knowledge of airports and professional judgment about airport
operations. TSA officials were also unable to provide information on
what the associated costs, benefits, and time frames would be for
installing in-line systems at these 27 airports.
Although TSA developed criteria to use as a guide for determining which
airports should receive LOI funding for in-line EDS baggage screening
systems, TSA has not yet conducted a systematic, prospective analysis
of individual airports or groups of airports to determine at which
airports installing in-line EDS systems would be cost-effective in
terms of reducing long-term screening costs for the government and
would improve security. Such an analysis would enable TSA to determine
at which airports it would be most beneficial to invest limited federal
resources for in-line systems rather than continue to rely on the stand-
alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives,
and it would be consistent with best practices for preparing benefit-
cost analysis of government programs or projects called for by OMB
Circular A-94.[Footnote 38] TSA officials stated that they have not
conducted the analyses related to the installation of in- line systems
at individual airports or groups of airports because they have used
available staff and funding to ensure all airports have a sufficient
number of EDS or ETD machines to meet the congressional mandate to
screen all checked baggage with explosive detection systems. During the
course of our review, in September 2004, TSA contracted for services
through March 2005 to develop methodologies and criteria for assessing
the effectiveness and suitability of airport screening solutions
requiring significant capital investment, such as those projects
associated with the LOI program. However, TSA officials could not
provide us with information on how they plan to use the results of the
effort in planning for the installation of in-line systems.
In October 2004, the conference report accompanying the 2005 Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act directed that TSA continue
submitting quarterly reports on its plans for the installation of in-
line baggage screening systems. However, TSA has not yet provided
Congress with all of the information requested. Specifically, the
conference report directed that TSA provide information describing,
among other things, the universe of airports that could benefit from an
in-line EDS baggage screening system or other physical modifications;
costs associated with each airport's project, along with a tentative
timeline for award and completion; and information reflecting the
anticipated cost savings--particularly personnel savings--that would be
achieved through the use of in-line checked baggage systems instead of
ETD and stand-alone EDS systems. TSA, directed to provide a report on
September 1, 2003, and every quarter thereafter, provided two reports
to Congress. However, TSA was asked to submit amended reports because
the original reports lacked the requested information. As of January
2005, TSA had not submitted the amended reports or subsequent reports
to Congress. The conference report further directed TSA to develop a
comprehensive plan for expediting the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems, including the formulation of detailed budget
requirements to provide for both equipment acquisition and the capital
costs of installing these system configurations at airports. In
addition, the December 2004, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, among other things, directs TSA to develop a schedule
to expedite the installation of in-line explosive detection systems.
According to TSA officials, TSA recently began to conduct an analysis
of alternatives to determine the best manner to acquire, deploy, and
maintain EDS and ETD equipment for screening checked baggage as part of
the Department of Homeland Security Investment Review process.[Footnote
39] However, according to TSA officials who prepared the review, the
Investment Review Board review did not include a prioritization of
which airports should receive funding for in-line systems or an
analysis of screening needs at individual airports. TSA would not
provide us with the baggage screening program data and analysis that it
provided to the Investment Review Board for the review that occurred in
late October 2004.
The Installation of In-line EDS Baggage Screening Systems May Result in
Significant Savings and Benefits:
Although TSA has not conducted a systematic analysis of cost savings
and other benefits that could be derived from the installation of in-
line baggage screening systems, TSA's limited, retrospective cost-
benefit analysis of in-line projects at the nine airports with signed
LOI agreements found that significant savings and other benefits may be
achieved through the installation of these systems. This analysis was
conducted in May 2004--after the eight LOI agreements for the nine
airports were signed in July and September 2003 and February 2004--to
estimate potential future cost savings and other benefits that could be
achieved from installing in-line systems instead of using stand-alone
EDS systems. TSA estimated that in-line baggage screening systems at
these airports would save the federal government $1.3 billion[Footnote
40] compared with stand-alone EDS systems and that TSA would recover
its initial investment in a little over 1 year. [Footnote 41] TSA's
analysis also provided data to estimate the cost savings for each
airport over the 7-year period. According to TSA's data, federal cost
savings varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of
the nine airports, while at one airport, there was an estimated $90
million loss. The individual airport results are described in appendix
IV.
According to TSA's analysis of the nine LOI airports, in-line cost
savings critically depend on how much an airport's facilities have to
be modified to accommodate the in-line configuration. Savings also
depend on TSA's costs to buy, install, and network the EDS machines;
subsequent maintenance cost; and the number of screeners needed to
operate the machines in-line instead of using stand-alone EDS systems.
In its analysis, TSA also found that a key factor driving many of these
costs is throughput--how many bags an in-line EDS system can screen per
hour compared with the rate for a stand-alone system. TSA used this
factor to determine how many stand-alone EDS machines could be replaced
by a single in-line EDS machine while achieving the same throughput.
According to TSA's analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78 percent the
number of TSA baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen
checked baggage at these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 screeners
and supervisors. However, the actual number of TSA screeners and
supervisor positions that could be eliminated would be dependent on the
individual design and operating conditions at each airport.
TSA also reported that aside from increased efficiency and lower
overall costs, there were a number of qualitative benefits that in-line
systems would provide over stand-alone systems, including:
* fewer on-the-job injuries, since there is less lifting of baggage
when EDS machines are integrated into the airport's baggage conveyor
system;
* less lobby disruption because the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines
would be removed from airport lobbies; and:
* unbroken chain of custody of baggage because in-line systems are more
secure, since the baggage handling is performed away from passengers.
TSA's retrospective analysis of these nine airports indicates the
potential for cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems at other airports, and it provides insights
about key factors likely to influence potential cost savings from using
in-line systems at other airports. This analysis also indicates the
merit of conducting prospective analyses of other airports to provide
information for future federal government funding decisions as required
by the OMB guidance on cost-benefit analyses.[Footnote 42] This
guidance describes best practices for preparing benefit-cost analysis
of government programs or projects, one of which involves analyzing
uncertainty. Given the diversity of airport designs and operations,
TSA's analysis could be modified to account for uncertainties in the
values of some of the key factors, such as how much it will cost to
modify an airport to install an in-line system. Analyzing uncertainty
in this manner is consistent with OMB guidance. Appendix IV illustrates
how analyzing uncertainty in TSA's cost estimates can help identify
which cost factors to focus on when determining the appropriateness of
installing EDS baggage screening systems for a particular airport.
TSA Has Not Systematically Assessed Needs of Airports to Gain
Efficiencies by Making Greater Use of Stand-alone EDS Systems:
TSA also has not systematically analyzed which airports could benefit
from the implementation of additional stand-alone EDS systems in lieu
of labor-intensive ETD systems at more than 300 airports that rely on
ETD machines, and where in-line EDS systems may not be appropriate or
cost-effective. More specifically, TSA has not prepared a plan that
prioritizes which airports should receive EDS machines (including
machines that become surplus because of the installation of in-line
systems) to balance short-term installation costs with future
operational savings. Furthermore, TSA has not yet determined the
potential long-term operating cost savings and the short-term costs of
installing the systems, which are important factors to consider in
conducting analyses to determine whether airports would benefit from
the installation of EDS machines. TSA officials said that they had not
yet had the opportunity to develop such analyses or plans, and they did
not believe that such an exercise would necessarily be an efficient use
of their resources, given the fluidity of baggage screening at various
airports.
There is potential for TSA to benefit from the introduction of smaller
stand-alone EDS machines--in terms of labor savings and added
efficiencies--at some of the more than 300 airports where TSA relies on
the use of ETD machines to screen checked baggage. Stand-alone EDS
machines are able to screen a greater number of bags in an hour than
the ETD used for primary screening while lessening reliance on
screeners during the screening process. For example, TSA's analysis
showed that an ETD machine can screen 36 bags per hour, while the stand-
alone EDS machines can screen 120 to 180 bags per hour. As a result, it
would take three to five ETD machines to screen the same number of bags
that one stand-alone EDS machine could process. In addition, greater
use of the stand-alone EDS machines could reduce staffing requirements.
For example, one stand-alone EDS machine would potentially require 6 to
14 fewer screeners than would be required to screen the same number of
bags at a screening station with three to five ETD machines. This
calculation is based on TSA estimates that 4.1 screeners are required
to support each primary screening ETD machine, while one stand-alone
EDS machine requires 6.75 screeners--including staff needed to operate
ETD machines required to provide secondary screening.
Without a Plan for Installing In-line Systems and EDS Equipment, It Is
Unclear How TSA May Make Use of New Technologies to Screen Checked
Baggage for Explosives:
Without a plan for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems,
and for using additional stand-alone EDS systems in place of ETD
machines at the nation's airports, it is unclear how TSA will make use
of new technologies for screening checked baggage for explosives, such
as the smaller and faster EDS machines that may become available
through TSA's research and development programs. For example, TSA is
working with private sector firms to enhance existing EDS systems and
develop new screening technologies through its Phoenix project. As part
of this project, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost $2.4 million to
develop a new computer-aided tomography explosives detection system
that is smaller and lighter than systems currently deployed in airport
lobbies. The new system is intended to replace systems currently in
use, including larger and heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment. The
smaller size of the system creates opportunities for TSA to transfer
screening operations to other locations such as airport check-in
counters. TSA certified this equipment in December 2004 and will pilot
the machine in the field to evaluate its operational efficiency. Also,
the ARGUS program was initiated in 1999 to develop EDS equipment that
would cost less to build and install--even though baggage throughput
may be lower--in order to provide a more uniform level of security
using EDS machines at U.S. airports. TSA's Transportation Security
Laboratory has certified three varieties of these machines, though the
machines have not been procured and deployed at U.S. airports.
Conclusions:
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at
the nation's airports--mainly as part of interim lobby screening
solutions--to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for
explosives, as mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially
fielding this equipment largely accomplished, TSA needs to shift its
focus from equipping airports with interim screening solutions to
systematically planning for the more optimal deployment of checked
baggage screening systems. The need for sound planning is also
recognized by Congress through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 and through the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act Conference Report, which, among other things,
directs TSA to develop a comprehensive plan for expediting the
installation of in-line explosive detection systems. Part of such
planning should include analyzing which airports should receive federal
support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems based on cost savings
that could be achieved from more effective and efficient baggage
screening operations and on other factors, including enhanced security.
Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be economically
justified because of high investment costs, a cost effectiveness
analysis could be used to determine the benefits of additional stand-
alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more labor-
intensive ETD machines that are currently being used at the more than
300 airports. In addition, TSA should consider the costs and benefits
of the new technologies being developed through its research and
development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS machines that have
the potential to reduce the costs associated with installing in- line
EDS baggage screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used
as the primary method for screening. We believe that without such
analyses, and without associated plans for the installation of in-line
baggage screening systems and replacing stand-alone EDS machines, TSA
cannot ensure that it is efficiently allocating its limited resources
to maximize the effectiveness of its checked baggage screening
operations.
An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would also help enable
TSA to determine whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher
baggage throughput, and increased security would justify the
significant up-front investment required to install in-line baggage
screening. TSA's retrospective analysis of nine airports installing in-
line baggage screening systems with LOI funds, while limited,
demonstrated that cost savings could be achieved through reduced
staffing requirements for screeners and increased baggage throughput.
In fact, the analysis showed that using in-line systems instead of
stand-alone systems at these nine airports would save the federal
government about $1 billion over 7 years and that TSA's initial
investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. In considering
airports for in-line baggage screening systems or the continued use of
stand-alone EDS and ETD machines, a systematic analysis of the costs
and benefits of these systems would help TSA justify the appropriate
screening for a particular airport, and such planning would help
support funding requests by demonstrating enhanced security, improved
operational efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the affected
airport.
In addition to identifying the most optimal baggage screening solutions
at the nation's airports, a systematic analysis of baggage screening
operations and solutions--including an estimate of savings that could
be achieved through the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening
systems--would assist the Administration and Congress in determining
the appropriate role of the federal government and aviation industry in
funding capital-intensive in-line baggage screening systems. By
identifying efficiencies that could be achieved for both TSA--such as
savings achieved through reduced TSA staffing needs for screeners--and
the airports and airlines--such as increased security due to less
crowding in airport lobbies and the faster processing of baggage and
passengers--the Administration and Congress would have information
identifying the costs and benefits of in-line baggage screening systems
for all parties involved to assist in determining an appropriate cost-
share between the federal government and aviation industry in funding
these systems.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In developing the comprehensive plan for installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems, as directed by the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriation Act Conference Report, and in satisfying the requirements
set forth in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security direct the Administrator for the Transportation Security
Administration to systematically assess the costs and benefits of
deploying in-line baggage screening systems at airports that do not yet
have in-line systems installed. As part of this assessment, the
Administrator should take the following four actions:
* identify and prioritize the airports where the benefits--in terms of
cost savings of baggage screening operations and improved security--of
replacing stand-alone baggage screening systems with in-line systems
are likely to exceed the costs of the systems, or the systems are
needed to address security risks or related factors;
* consider the projected availability and costs of baggage screening
equipment being developed through research and development efforts;
* estimate total funds needed to install in-line systems where
appropriate, including the federal funds needed given different
assumptions regarding the federal government and airport cost-shares
for funding the in-line systems; and:
* work collaboratively with airport operators, who are expected to
share the costs and benefits of in-line systems, to collect data and
prepare the analyses needed to develop plans for installing in-line
systems.
We also recommend that the Administrator for the Transportation
Security Administration assess the feasibility, expected benefits, and
costs of replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS machines for
primary screening at those airports where in-line systems would not be
either economically justified or justified for other reasons. In
conducting this assessment, the Administrator should consider the
projected availability and costs for screening equipment being
developed through research and development efforts.
We also made a recommendation to DHS addressing TSA's protocols for
screeners using ETD systems and associated screener training, which is
included in the restricted versions of this report.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On
February 18, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report,
which are reproduced in appendix V.[Footnote 43] DHS generally
concurred with our findings and recommendations, and agreed that
efforts to implement the recommendations are critical to a successful
checked baggage screening deployment program. Regarding our
recommendation that TSA systematically assess the costs and benefits of
deploying in-line baggage screening systems at airports that do not yet
have in-line systems installed, DHS stated that TSA has initiated an
analysis of deploying in-line checked baggage screening systems and is
in the process of formulating criteria to use to identify those
airports that would benefit from an in-line system. According to DHS,
TSA believes that it can focus on approximately 40 airports that handle
anywhere from 60 to 80 percent of all checked baggage nationwide. Once
TSA officials have finalized the criteria and determined those airports
at which in-line systems should be installed, they plan to conduct an
airport-specific analysis to determine the individual costs and
operational benefits. We are encouraged that TSA is proceeding with
this analysis, which should provide a sound business case to justify
resource allocation decisions. It is important, however, that TSA
establish milestones and time frames for completing the analysis and
documenting and reporting the results, such that they are available in
a timely manner for DHS and congressional budget decisions.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA assess the feasibility, expected
benefits, and costs of replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS
machines for primary screening at those airports where in-line systems
would either not be economically justified or justified for other
reasons, DHS stated that TSA has started conducting an analysis of the
airports that rely on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage
screening technology to identify those airports that would benefit from
replacing ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment. Again, we are pleased
that TSA officials are conducting this analysis, which should provide
them with the basis for optimizing the use of its EDS machines for
screening checked baggage. Further, DHS stated that TSA continues to
review and refine the protocols and training of all screening
procedures including screening checked baggage, and are in the process
of implementing the recommendations made by the DHS Inspector General
regarding improved screener training and other improvements for both
the passenger and checkpoint and checked baggage.
TSA also provided additional technical comments on our draft report,
which we have incorporated where appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional
committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-3404, berrickc@gao.gov or Christine Fossett, Assistant Director at
(202) 512-2956, fossettc@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To assess efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
to screen checked baggage for explosives using explosives detection
system (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment, we
addressed the following questions: (1) How did TSA use the funds it
initially budgeted to procure and install EDS and ETD systems and make
associated airport modifications, and what was the impact of the
initial deployment of EDS and ETD systems? (2) What actions are
airports and TSA currently taking to install automated in-line EDS
baggage screening systems,[Footnote 44] and what are the federal
resources that have been made available to fund these systems? (3) What
actions, if any, is TSA taking to plan for the optimal deployment of in-
line baggage screening systems in order to ensure the efficiency, cost
effectiveness, and security of its checked baggage screening operations?
To determine how TSA used its funding for procuring and installing EDS
and ETD systems and modifying airports, we obtained and analyzed
relevant legislation and appropriate budget documents, contracts, and
inventory reports from TSA related to checked baggage screening with
EDS and ETD machines. We interviewed TSA officials from the Office of
Budget and Performance, the Office of Acquisition, and TSA's Security
Technology Deployment Office. We also obtained and reviewed funding and
contractual documents from these locations. To determine what impact
the initial deployment of EDS and ETD systems had on TSA and airport
operations, we conducted a literature search to obtain information on
the purpose and use of explosive detection screening equipment to
screen checked baggage at airports for explosives. This search
identified various TSA reports, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Inspector General reports, Congressional Research Service reports, and
aviation industry reports documenting TSA's use of this equipment for
screening checked baggage. Also, we obtained and reviewed relevant
documents from TSA and interviewed TSA headquarters officials from
TSA's Office of Aviation Operations, Office of Chief Counsel, Office of
Technology Deployment and Maintenance, and Office of Internal Affairs
and Program Review. This documentation included information on staffing
requirements and the number of bags per hour that can be screened by in-
line EDS systems as compared with stand-alone EDS and ETD machines. We
also interviewed officials from TSA, air carriers, airports, explosive
detection systems equipment manufacturers, and airport industry
associations to obtain information regarding TSA's efforts to improve
checked baggage screening operations using EDS machines. Although we
could not independently verify the reliability of all of this
information, we compared it with other supporting documents, when
available, to determine data consistency and reasonableness. Based on
these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently
reliable for this report. Further, we reviewed the results from
unannounced, undercover covert testing of checked baggage screening
operations conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review and questioned TSA officials about the procedures used to ensure
the reliability of the covert test data. On the basis of their answers,
we believe that the covert test data are sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review.
To address our second and third objectives--to determine what actions
airports and TSA are taking to develop in-line EDS baggage screening
systems and what resources are available for these systems; and to
determine what TSA is doing to optimally deploy these systems in order
to improve the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and security of its
checked baggage screening operations--we obtained briefings and other
documents related to the planned use and installation of in-line
systems and interviewed officials from the Office of Chief Counsel and
the Office of Security Technology. We also interviewed officials from
the TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, to discuss the agency's efforts to examine future baggage
screening technologies and the certification process for EDS and ETD
equipment. We also used information related to checked baggage
screening from a Web-based survey of all 155 federal security directors
about 263 of the airports under their supervision. This survey is
described below. We also followed up by telephone with airport
officials from 70 of those airports to obtain additional information
about their plans for in-line systems. These airports were selected
primarily based on the responses from the federal security directors
regarding whether the airport had or planned on installing in-line EDS
checked baggage screening systems. In addition, GAO's Office of General
Counsel formally requested that TSA describe its means for compliance
with the baggage screening requirements of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and
inquired how TSA would approach its letters of intent for funding in-
line checked baggage screening systems in light of changes mandated by
the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.[Footnote 45]
Also, to assess potential savings, we reviewed a TSA cost model showing
savings expected to be achieved with in-line rather than stand-alone
EDS equipment at nine airports. We assessed the model's logic to ensure
its completeness and correctness of calculations. Also, as discussed in
appendix IV, we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to: (1) illustrate
sensitivity of potential cost savings of replacing stand-alone with in-
line EDS systems to alternative values of key cost drivers and (2) to
explore the variability in the key factors used by TSA in their model.
Based on our review of TSA's cost model, we believe that it is
sufficiently reliable for the analyses we conducted and the information
included in this report.
In addition, in addressing all three objectives, we conducted site
visits and a Web-based survey. Specifically, we conducted site visits
at 22 airports (12 category X airports, 9 category I airports, and 1
category II airport) to observe airport security baggage screening
procedures and discuss issues related to the baggage screening
processes with TSA, airport, and airline officials. We chose these
airports on the basis of one or more of the following factors: a large
number of passenger boardings; the existence of an operational in-line
system; whether the airport had received or requested TSA funding for
an in-line system; whether the airport had begun screening all checked
baggage using EDS or ETD; and the proximity to a larger airport being
visited by GAO. The results from our airport visits provide examples of
checked baggage screening operations and issues but cannot be
generalized beyond the airports visited because we did not use
statistical sampling techniques in selecting the airports. We
administered a Web-based survey to all 155 federal security directors
who oversee security at each of the airports falling under TSA's
jurisdiction. The questionnaire contained questions related to the
status of checked baggage screening operations and planning and
implementation of in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems. A GAO
survey specialist designed the questionnaire in combination with other
GAO staff knowledgeable about airport security issues. We conducted
pretest interviews with six federal security directors to ensure that
the questions were clear, concise, and comprehensive. In addition, TSA
managers and an independent GAO survey specialist reviewed the
questionnaire.
For this Web-based survey, each federal security director received one
or two airport-specific questionnaires to complete, depending on the
number of airports for which he or she was responsible. Where a federal
security director was responsible for more than two airports, we
selected the first airport based on the federal security director's
location and the second airport to obtain a cross-section of all
airports by size and geographic distribution. In all, we requested
information on 265 airports. However, two airports were dropped from
our initial selection because the airlines serving these airports
suspended operations and TSA employees were redeployed to other
airports. As a result, our sample size was reduced to 263 airports,
which included all 21 category X airports, 60 category I airports, 49
category II airports, 73 category III airports, and 60 category IV
airports. In that we did not use probability sampling methods to select
the sample of airports, we cannot generalize our findings beyond the
selected airports in these categories.
We conducted this Web-based survey from late March to mid-May 2004. We
received completed questionnaires from all 155 federal security
directors for all 263 separate airports for which we sought information
for a 100 percent response rate. We called selected survey respondents,
or other TSA officials designated to respond on the respondent's
behalf, to obtain answers to key survey questions that may have been
left blank, to look into situations where instructions were not
followed and to investigate answers that looked suspicious or out of
range. The survey results are not subject to sampling errors because
all federal security directors were asked to participate in the survey
and we did not use probability sampling techniques to select specific
airports. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey
may introduce errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For
example, inconsistencies in how a particular question is interpreted,
in the sources of information that are available to respondents, or in
how the data are entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce
unwanted variability in the survey results. We took steps in the
development of the questionnaires, the data collection, and the data
editing and analysis to minimize these non-sampling errors. Also, in
that these were Web-based surveys whereby respondents entered their
responses directly into our database, data entry or transcription
errors were possible. In addition, all computer programs used to
analyze the data were peer-reviewed and verified to ensure that the
syntax was written and executed correctly.
We performed our work from September 2003 through January 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosive
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
screening operations are classified or are considered by TSA to be
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review
of this information have been removed from this report. [Footnote 46]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Checked Baggage Screening Legislation:
Table 9: Highlights of Authorizations in Laws Related to Checked
Baggage Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:
Authorizations found in public laws: Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001);
Key provisions: Established the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) as the agency responsible for security in all modes of
transportation, including civil aviation.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Appointed federal
security managers to oversee the screening of passengers and baggage at
airports.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Deployment of
federal personnel to screen all passengers and baggage at airports.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Mandated the
screening of all checked baggage with explosive detection systems by
December 31, 2002, and authorized alternative means to screen checked
baggage (positive passenger bag match, manual search, canine search in
combination with other means, other technology approved by TSA) where
explosive detections systems are unavailable.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Mandated the
imposition of passenger security fees (and authorized the imposition of
air carrier fees, if necessary).
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Authorized use of
Airport Improvement Program funds to replace baggage conveyor systems
and reconfigure terminal baggage areas for installing bulk explosive
detection systems; for other security-related activities required by
law or the Secretary of Transportation from September 11, 2001, through
October 1, 2002; and waived the local matching share for fiscal 2002
security related projects.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Required that the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, or any successor
system, evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft and that
procedures exist to ensure adequate screening of selected individuals
and their checked baggage.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public lawsHomeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002):
Authorized $50 million for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 for
research, development, testing and evaluation of technologies such as
explosive detection systems.
Authorizations found in public laws: Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002);
Key provisions: Extended ATSA's mandate to screen all checked baggage
using explosive detection systems to December 31, 2003, for
noncompliant airports and required that all baggage at noncompliant
airports be screened by alternative means until the mandate is
fulfilled.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Requires the
submission of a classified report describing TSA's progress toward
meeting the baggage screening mandate every 30 days to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public lawsConsolidated
Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 386 (Feb.
20, 2003): Requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with the
Secretary of Homeland Security before approving applications for
Airport Improvement Program grants as they relate to security equipment
or the installation of bulk explosive detection systems.
Authorizations found in public laws: Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 386 (Feb. 20, 2003);
Key provisions: Authorized $500 million for each of fiscal years 2003
through 2007 for TSA to issue letters of intent (LOIs) to airports,
with a government cost-share of 75 percent at airports with at least
0.25 percent of total passenger boardings each at all airports (90
percent at any other airport).
Authorizations found in public laws: Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559 (Apr. 16,
2003);
Key provisions: Authorized LOIs to assist in the installation of
explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003.
Authorizations found in public laws: Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (Dec. 12,
2003);
Key provisions: Limited the availability of Airport Improvement Program
funds for replacing baggage conveyor systems and reconfiguring terminal
baggage areas to install bulk explosive detection systems to
entitlement funds.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Required the
Secretary of Homeland Security to study the effectiveness of the
aviation security system, including checked baggage, and to report that
study within 6 months of the act's passage to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Authorized TSA to
make grants for projects to replace baggage conveyer systems related to
aviation security, to reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to
install explosive detection systems, to enable TSA to deploy explosive
detection systems behind the ticket counter, in the baggage sorting
area, or in line with the baggage handling system, and for other
airport security capital improvement projects TSA determines will
improve security at an airport or improve the efficiency of the airport
without lessening security.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Authorized up to
$500 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007 for TSA to make
grants under 49 U.S.C. § 44923:
$250 million mandatory appropriation derived from passenger security
fees to constitute the Aviation Security Capital Fund: $125 million
available on the basis of airport size and aviation security risks;
$125 million available for discretionary grants with priority to
fulfilling LOIs; $250 million authorized appropriation for each of
fiscal years 2004 through 2007: 50 percent available on the basis of
airport size and aviation security risks; 50 percent available for
discretionary grants with priority to fulfilling LOIs.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public lawsIntelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (Dec. 17, 2004): Authorizes LOIs for airport security improvement
projects at a 90 percent government cost-share at medium or large hub
airports (95 percent at any other airport) and provides that TSA shall
revise LOIs issued before the date of enactment to reflect the new cost-
share with respect to grants made after September 30, 2003.
Authorizations found in public laws: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17,
2004);
Key provisions: Requires that TSA take action to expedite the
installation and use of baggage screening equipment and requires that
TSA submit schedules to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure for expediting the installation and
use of in-line baggage screening equipment that estimate the impact
that such equipment, facility modification, and baggage conveyor
placement will have on staffing needs and levels related to aviation
security and for replacing trace detection equipment with explosive
detection system equipment as soon as practicable and where
appropriate, within 180 days of enactment.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with air carriers,
airport operators, and other interested parties, to submit, in
conjunction with its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, a proposed
formula for cost sharing among federal, state and local governments and
the private sector for the installation of in-line baggage screening
systems, recommendations for defraying the costs of in-line systems,
and a review of innovative financing approaches and possible cost
savings associated with installing in-line systems at airports.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public laws: Amends 49 U.S.C. §
44923(i) by increasing the authorized appropriations for each of fiscal
years 2005 through 2007 to $400 million.
Key provisions: Authorizations found in public lawsKey provisions:
Allows for a reimbursement period under any LOI to extend for a maximum
of 10 years after issuance.
Source: GAO analysis of public laws related to checked baggage
screening since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
[End of table]
Table 10: Highlights of Appropriations in Laws Related to Checked
Baggage Screening in Aviation Transportation Security since the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:
Appropriations found in public laws: 2002 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks
on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220 (Sept. 18,
2001);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $40 billion (available
until expended) for, among other things, the costs of providing
increased transportation security; no specific baggage screening-
related appropriation.
Appropriations found in public laws: Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-87, 115 Stat. 833
(Dec. 18, 2001);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $1.25 billion (available
until expended) for necessary expenses of TSA related to providing
civil aviation security services pursuant to ATSA; no specific baggage
screening-related appropriation.
Funding appropriated and other key provisionsDepartment of Defense
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2002;
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117,
115 Stat. 2230 (Jan. 10, 2002): H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107- 308 (2001)
directed $97.5 million from "FAA, Facilities and Equipment": $38
million for bulk explosive detection systems; $12 million for trace
detection equipment; $12 million for threat image projection systems;
$2 million for computer-based training; $33.5 million for system
integration.
Appropriations found in public laws: Department of Defense Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States, 2002;
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117,
115 Stat. 2230 (Jan. 10, 2002); Funding appropriated and other key
provisions: Funds to be obligated from amounts made available in Public
Law 107-38:
$108.5 million to "FAA Facilities and Equipment" (available until Sept.
30, 2004) for procurement and installation of explosive detection
systems; $50 million to "FAA Research and Development" (available until
Sept. 30, 2003), of which H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350 (2001) directed
$2 million for a demonstration of 100 percent positive passenger bag
match technology at DCA.
Appropriations found in public laws: 2002 Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (Aug. 2, 2002);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $738 million (available
until expended) for physical modifications to commercial service
airports for installing checked baggage explosive detection systems.
Appropriations found in public laws: Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 386 (Feb. 20, 2003);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $3.0379 billion
(available until expended) for screening activities, of which H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 108-10 (2003) directed $1.4159 billion for baggage
screening activities:
The Resolution earmarked $265 million for the physical modification of
commercial service airports to install, and $174.5 million for the
procurement of, checked baggage explosive detection systems; The
Conference Report directed $900 million for baggage screeners, $75
million for detection equipment maintenance, and $1.4 million for a
checked baggage data system.
Appropriations found in public laws: Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559 (Apr. 16,
2003);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $235 million (available
until expended) for the physical modification of commercial service
airports to install checked baggage explosive detection systems.
Appropriations found in public laws: Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137 (Oct. 1,
2003); Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $1.3187 billion
(available until expended) for baggage screening activities:
The act earmarked $250 million for physical modification of commercial
service airports to install, and $150 million for the procurement of,
checked baggage explosive detection systems; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-
280 (2003) directed $774.2 million for personnel, compensation and
benefits; $69.5 for training and other purposes; and $75 million for
explosive detection system maintenance.
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $45 million (available
until expended) for research and development of explosive detection
devices.
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (Jan. 23,
2004): Precludes the obligation or expenditure of funds appropriated or
otherwise made available by this or any other act to carry out
provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 44923(h)--the Aviation Security Capital Fund--
during fiscal year 2004.
Appropriations found in public laws: Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (Jan. 23, 2004);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: Precludes the
availability of Airport Improvement Program funds for the replacement
of baggage conveyor systems, reconfiguration of terminal baggage areas,
and other improvements necessary to install bulk explosive detection
systems.
Appropriations found in public laws: Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (Oct.18,
2004);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $1.45246 billion
(available until expended) for baggage screening activities:
The act earmarks $180 million for procurement of, and $45 million to
install, checked baggage explosive detection systems; H.R. Conf. Rep.
108-774 (2004) directs $848.86 million for personnel, compensation and
benefits; $203.66 million for training and other purposes; $174.94
million for maintenance; and at least $30 million of the $180
procurement earmark to install next-generation explosive detection
systems to permit more efficient handling of checked bags and reduce
dependence on baggage screeners, particularly at medium-sized and small
airports. It further recognizes the mandatory $250 million mandatory
appropriation to the Aviation Security Capital Fund.
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: $54 million earmarked
for research and development of next generation explosive detection
devices, of which the Conference Report directs $10 million for the
Manhattan II project.
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: Reestablishes, for
fiscal year 2005, the 75 percent government cost-share for the eight
LOIs issued for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems.
Funding appropriated and other key provisionsConsolidated
Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8,
2004): The Conference Report directs that TSA:
comprehensively plan for expediting the installation of in-line
explosive detection systems, including the formulation of detailed
budget requirements to provide for both equipment acquisition and the
capital costs of installing such system configurations at airports;
continue submitting quarterly reports, consistent with the requirement
of H.R. Rep. No. 108-169 (2003), on its plans for the installation of
in-line systems.
Appropriations found in public laws: Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8, 2004);
Funding appropriated and other key provisions: Precludes the
availability of Airport Improvement Program funds for the replacement
of baggage conveyor systems, reconfiguration of terminal baggage areas,
and other improvements necessary to install bulk explosive detection
systems.
Source: GAO analysis of public laws related to checked baggage
screening since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Airports Receiving TSA Airport Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for In-line Systems:
Table 11: Listing of Airports Receiving Modification and EDS/ETD
Equipment Installation Funding for Developing In-line EDS Baggage
Screening Systems as of September 30, 2004:
13 Category X Airports:
Name of airport: Hartsfield Atlanta International;
LOI funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Boston Logan International;
LOI funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Baltimore/Washington International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Denver International;
LOI funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Dallas-Fort Worth International;
LOI funding for airport modification;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Detroit Metro Wayne County;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Houston George Bush Intercontinental;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Los Angeles International;
LOI funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Miami International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Orlando International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: San Francisco International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Seattle-Tacoma International;
LOI funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Subtotal;
LOI funding for airport modification: 6;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification: 4;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers: 9.
16 Category I Airports:
Name of airport: Anchorage Ted Stevens International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Santa Ana John Wayne;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Las Vegas McCarran International;
LOI funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Metropolitan Oakland International Airport;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Oklahoma City Will Rogers World;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Ontario International;
LOI funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
LOI funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Greensboro Piedmont Triad International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Pittsburgh International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Sacramento International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification.
Name of airport: Southwest Florida International;
Name of airport: Spokane International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Tampa International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Tulsa International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Subtotal;
LOI funding for airport modification: 3;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification: 3;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers: 12.
3 Category II Airports:
Name of airport: Harrisburg International;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Juneau International;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Name of airport: Manchester;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Subtotal;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification: 1;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers: 3.
1 Category III Airport:
Name of airport: Okaloosa County Air Terminal;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers.
Subtotal;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers: 1.
Total (33 Airports);
LOI funding for airport modification: 9;
Other transaction agreement funding for airport modification: 8;
Airport modification and EDS equipment installation work performed by
Boeing Service Company, other contractors, or EDS manufacturers: 25.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA obligation and commitment data and contract
files.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Analysis of TSA's Cost Savings Estimates for In-line EDS
Checked Baggage Screening Systems:
TSA estimated that baggage screening operations at the nine airports
receiving letters of intent (LOIs) will result in a savings to the
federal government of $1.26 billion over 7 years--and would recover the
initial investment in 1.07 years--as a result of installing in-line
rather than stand-alone EDS systems.[Footnote 47] To make these
estimates, TSA made a variety of assumptions about in-line and stand-
alone EDS systems, including how many bags can be processed per hour by
both, how many screeners both would need, and how much it would cost to
purchase, install, and operate these systems.[Footnote 48] In addition,
TSA used data on how much it cost to modify these nine airports to
accommodate in-line systems. In considering the accuracy of TSA's
estimates, uncertainties inherent in many of these assumptions should
be considered. TSA could have analyzed uncertainty in their estimate by
conducting sensitivity or other analyses to determine how variations in
these assumptions would change its estimate of cost savings. Analyzing
uncertainty in this way is consistent with best practices for preparing
benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects called for by
OMB Circular A-94. Nonetheless, TSA's cost model for these nine
airports offers insights about key factors likely to influence
potential cost savings at other airports.
To illustrate taking uncertainty into account, we conducted a Monte
Carlo analysis using TSA's cost model.[Footnote 49] We found that TSA's
cost savings estimate of $3.5 million per in-line EDS machine as
compared to stand-alone could range from a loss of $1.6 million to a
savings of $8.3 million per machine using generalized assumptions about
cost uncertainty in TSA's model. The most important source of
uncertainty causing this wide range in possible savings was the cost to
modify an airport to accommodate an in-line EDS system. Variation in
modification costs explained over 60 percent of the variation in
potential cost savings from in-line EDS as compared to stand-alone EDS.
The next most important variable, the number of bags per hour that in-
line and stand-alone machines can screen per hour, each accounted for
about 15 percent of the variation in cost savings. In this way, Monte
Carlo analysis can offer insights on factors to focus on when
determining the appropriateness of an in-line EDS baggage screening
system for a particular airport.[Footnote 50]
The analysis provided by TSA aggregated the nine airports to present a
total estimate. Using TSA's analysis, we were able to determine the
results for each of the nine airports. Figure 7 illustrates the
variation in modification costs at the nine airports TSA studied,
ranging from over $14 million per in-line EDS machine at Seattle to
less than $2 million for Boston and Dallas-Fort Worth.[Footnote 51]
Figure 8, which shows the cost savings from in-line EDS compared to
stand-alone EDS, identifies that Seattle could end up spending more for
an in-line EDS system than from using stand-alone EDS machines.
Further, as shown in figure 9, at Seattle the relatively large costs
for upfront in-line EDS are not offset by the estimated $48 million in
operation and maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS
system may be more costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at Dallas-
Fort Worth, the upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-
alone EDS, and there is an estimated $252 million in operation and
maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS system at Dallas-
Fort Worth may be less costly than stand-alone EDS.
Figure 7: Airport Modification Costs Per In-line EDS Machine at Nine
Airports:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Cost Savings from In-line EDS Systems Compared to Stand-alone
EDS at Nine Airports:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Costs and Savings at Nine Airports:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
February 18, 2005:
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
RE: Draft Report GAO-05-365, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning
Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems:
(GAO Job Code 440386):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done to
identify areas for improvement in the Transportation Security
Administration's explosive detection systems (EDS) and explosive trace
detection (ETD) checked baggage screening systems. We generally concur
with the report and its recommendations and appreciate the discussion
of challenges and next steps this report contains.
The report acknowledges the substantial progress the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has made in installing EDS and ETD
systems to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for
explosives, as required by Congress, and notes resource limitations and
uncertainties associated with funding these capital-intensive systems
on a large scale basis. However, there are areas within the report
about which DHS would like to comment.
GAO made the following two recommendations regarding the deployment of
checked baggage screening systems:
1. Systematically assess the costs and benefits of deploying in-line
baggage screening systems at airports that do not yet have in-line
systems installed.
a. Identify and prioritize the airports where the benefits, in terms of
cost savings of baggage screening operations, of replacing stand-alone
baggage screening systems with in-line systems are likely to exceed the
costs of the systems;
b. Consider the projected availability and costs of baggage screening
equipment being developed through research and development efforts;
c. Estimate total funds needed to install in-line systems where
appropriate, including the federal funds needed given different
assumptions regarding the federal government and airport cost shares
for funding the in-line systems; and:
d. Work collaboratively with airport operators, who are expected to
share in the costs and benefits of in-line systems, to collect data and
prepare the analyses needed to develop plans for installing in-line
systems.
2. Assess the feasibility, expected benefits, and costs to replace ETD
machines with stand-alone EDS machines for primary screening at those
airports where in-line systems would not be economically justified.
DHS agrees that efforts to implement these recommendations are critical
to a successful checked baggage screening deployment program and has
taken or is taking the following actions:
1. TSA is already in the process of conducting an analysis of deploying
in-line checked baggage screening systems. Currently, TSA is evaluating
the most effective criteria to use to determine the top airports that
would benefit from an in-line system. TSA officials believe that they
can focus on approximately 40 airports that handle anywhere from 60-80%
of all checked baggage nationwide. Once TSA officials have finalized
the criteria and determined the top airports, they will conduct an
airport specific analysis to determine the individual cost and
operational benefits. Additionally, TSA officials will strive to
estimate the per airport cost to install an in-line system. This is a
difficult task because there are numerous variables that cannot always
be identified without developing a costly, very detailed design plan.
TSA will continue to work closely with airports and all appropriate
stakeholders in achieving the most cost and operationally effective
checked baggage screening system.
2. TSA is currently conducting an analysis of the airports that rely
heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening
technology. Officials will identify the airports that would benefit
from replacing ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment. The EDS equipment
that is being considered will be surplus from the airports receiving in-
line systems. Furthermore, the newly certified EDS is less expensive
than currently deployed EDS equipment and has a throughput capacity
that would be appropriate for smaller airports.
In addition, TSA officials are working towards development of a variety
of automated technology solutions under the Research and Development
Next Generation EDS program. TSA recognizes that any system that relies
heavily on human interaction has vulnerabilities that are not as
prevalent with an automated system. While new automated technologies
are being developed, TSA continues to review and refine the protocols
and training for all screening procedures to include primary ETD
screening for checked baggage. Officials have implemented or are in the
process of implementing all of the recommendations made by the DHS
Inspector General regarding screener improvement for both the
checkpoint and checked baggage. The recommendations include improved
screener training, the development and deployment of innovations and
improvements to aviation security technologies, revisions to the
Checked Baggage Standard Operating Procedures, and improvements to
management and supervisory oversight of screeners.
In summary, DHS appreciates your review of the deployment of checked
baggage screening systems and thanks you for the thorough analysis and
discussion that comprises this report. We continue to be cognizant of
the areas upon which we can improve.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven Pecinovsky:
Acting Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Office of the Chief Financial Officer:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404;
Christine A. Fossett (202) 512-2956:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Leo Barbour, Charles
Bausell Jr., Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Kevin Dooley, David
Hooper, Lemuel Jackson, Stuart Kaufman, Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi,
Jan Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Keith Rhodes, Minette
Richardson, and Mark Tremba were key contributors to this report.
[End of section]
Glossary:
Airport categories:
TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States that require
screening into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on
various factors, such as the total number of take-offs and landings
annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the airport,
and other special security considerations. In general, category X
airports have the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV
airports have the smallest. TSA periodically reviews airports in each
category, and, if appropriate, changes an airport's categorization to
reflect current operations.
Airport Improvement Program:
The Airport Improvement Program has provided federal grants since the
passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324. Administered by the Federal Aviation
Administration, Airport Improvement Program grants have supported
airport planning and development. Grants are issued to maintain and
enhance airport safety, preserve existing airport infrastructure, and
expand capacity and efficiency throughout the airport system. Funds
obligated for the Airport Improvement Program are drawn from the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which is supported by user fees and fuel
taxes.
Checked baggage:
An individual's personal property offered to and accepted by an
aircraft operator for transport, which will be inaccessible to the
individual during flight.
Cost-effectiveness analysis:
A program is cost effective if, on the basis of life cycle cost
analysis of competing alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest
costs expressed in present value terms for a given amount of benefits.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate whenever it is unnecessary
or impractical to consider the dollar value of the benefits provided by
the alternatives under consideration. This is the case whenever (1)
each alternative has the same annual benefits expressed in monetary
terms; or (2) each alternative has the same annual affects but dollar
values cannot be assigned to their benefits.
Explosives Detection System (EDS):
A TSA certified automated device that has the ability to detect in
checked baggage, the amounts, types, and configurations of explosive
material specified by the TSA. An EDS machine uses computer-aided
tomography to automatically measure the density of objects in baggage
to determine whether the objects have the same density as explosives.
The system automatically triggers an alarm when objects with high
densities characteristic of explosives are detected.
Explosives Trace Detection (ETD):
A device that has been certified by TSA for detecting explosive vapors
and residues on objects intended to be transported aboard an aircraft.
Explosives trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials. ETD is used both for primary screening of baggage and
secondary screening to resolve alarms from EDS machines.
Interim lobby solutions:
Solutions employed by TSA to initially deploy explosive detection
systems to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, until
more permanent solutions could be designed and constructed. Efforts
involved designing and implementing facility modifications, such as new
construction, infrastructure reinforcement, and modification of
electrical systems required to install the EDS and ETD equipment; and
developing and administering equipment training for baggage screeners.
In-line system (also known as integrated checked baggage screening
system or integrated EDS system):
A baggage conveyor system with incorporated EDS machines. The EDS's
baggage feed and output belts are directly connected to an airline's or
airport's baggage belt system. The checked baggage undergoes automated
screening in the EDS while on the conveyor belt system that sorts and
transports baggage to the proper location for its ultimate loading on
an aircraft. Baggage is introduced into the EDS without manual loading
or unloading by TSA screeners.
Letters of intent (LOI):
The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L.
No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, authorized an LOI program for shared federal
government and aviation industry funding to support facility
modification costs associated with the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems. The Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003), also
authorized the use of LOIs for this purpose.
Multiplex:
EDS machines are networked together so that images from multiple EDS
machines can be sent to a centralized location where screeners can
resolve alarms by studying EDS generated images.
On-screen alarm resolution of EDS alarms:
When an EDS machine alarms, indicating the possibility of explosives,
TSA screeners, by reviewing computer generated images of the inside of
the bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or items
are in fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to make this
determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an
area where it receives a secondary screening by a screener with an ETD
machine.
Other Transaction Agreements:
Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to
directly fund airport operators for smaller in-line airport
modification projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These
transactions, which undertake many forms and are generally not required
to comply with Federal laws and regulations that apply to contracts,
grants, and/or cooperative agreements, enable the federal government
and others entering into these agreements to freely negotiate
provisions that are mutually agreeable.
Positive passenger bag match:
An alternative means of screening checked baggage, conducted by the
airline, which requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft as
his or her checked baggage.
Stand-alone EDS machines:
EDS machines that are placed in terminal lobbies, curbside or in
baggage makeup areas, not integrated with baggage conveyor systems as
part of in-line systems.
Throughput:
Bags screened per hour as a measure of efficiency.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001).
[2] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004).
[3] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
[4] In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve
checked baggage undergoing automated screening with EDS machines while
on a conveyor belt that sorts and transports baggage to the proper
location for its ultimate loading onto an aircraft.
[5] Obligations are amounts of orders placed or contracts awarded
during a given period that will require payment during the same or a
future period.
[6] We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our
review, which discuss results deemed to be classified or sensitive
security information. The report that contains classified and sensitive
security information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning
Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-135C (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing
sensitive security information but not the classified information is
GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-302SU
(Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005).
[7] Conference Report 108-774 (Oct. 9, 2004), which accompanies the
fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004), directs that TSA continue
submitting quarterly reports on its plans for installing in-line
systems, consistent with similar language included in House Report 108-
169 (June 23, 2003), directing that TSA submit quarterly reports
beginning September 1, 2003.
[8] For additional details on ATSA and other legislation related to
checked baggage screening, see appendix II.
[9] ATSA also authorized the use of alternative means to screen checked
baggage, such as positive passenger bag match (i.e., air carriers
determining whether the passenger is on the same aircraft as the
checked baggage), canine searches, and searches of bags by hand for
time periods when airports were not able to screen 100 percent of
checked baggage using explosive detection equipment.
[10] GAO-04-440T.
[11] This review procedure is known as on-screen alarm resolution,
which TSA began to implement in May 2004 after pilot testing the
procedure at several airports. To enhance the efficiency of an in-line
screening system, TSA also may network several EDS machines together so
that images from multiple EDS machines that alarm can be sent to a
centralized location for screeners to review and resolve using the on-
screen resolution procedure. This process is known as "multiplexing."
[12] As described below and in appendix II, Congress has supported in-
line EDS baggage screening systems by authorizing funding mechanisms
and appropriating funds, and issuing calls for expediting the
installation of such systems. However, Congress does not require that
in-line systems be installed to satisfy the 100 percent explosive
detection system screening mandate.
[13] Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, §
367, 117 Stat. 11.
[14] The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution mandated that each LOI
provide for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the project's cost, with
the remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator at airports
with at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings
each year at all airports (and 90 percent for projects at all other
airports).
The Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100),
Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003), instituted a 90 percent
federal cost-share of the project's cost, with the remaining 10 percent
to be paid by the airport operator at medium and large hub airports
(and 95 percent for projects at any other airport).
[15] Section 119 of ATSA significantly increased the amount of Airport
Improvement Program funds available for security-related projects but
also provided that this increase would be substantially reduced at the
conclusion of fiscal year 2002. In December 2003, section 142 of Vision
100 further reduced the availability of Airport Improvement Program
funds by limiting the sources from which Airport Improvement Program
funds could be used for security-related improvements. Subsequent
prohibitions on the use of Airport Improvement Program funds for
activities related to the installation of in-line explosive detection
systems arose in the fiscal year 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 283, enacted in January 2004, and again
in the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, enacted in December 2004.
[16] As of September 30, 2004, TSA has obligated $1.3 billion against
the Boeing contract; in addition to the $858.8 million for airport
modification and EDS/ETD installation, Boeing is receiving $297.4
million for EDS/ETD maintenance, $134.9 million for training baggage
screeners, and $2.5 million for EDS/ETD transportation and other costs.
[17] TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one
of five categories--X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X
airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category
IV airports have the smallest number.
[18] GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2002).
[19] The 22 airports included 12 category X, 9 category I, and 1
category II airports.
[20] A TSA federal security director oversees federal security
operations at one or more U.S. commercial airports and has operational
responsibility for the screening of passengers and checked baggage.
[21] TSA began implementing the on-screen alarm resolution procedure in
May 2004 after pilot testing the procedure.
[22] TSA was unable to provide GAO with data on the on-the-job injuries
sustained during baggage screening operations.
[23] Joint Statement of David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA) and Todd Hauptli, Sr. Executive
Vice President, American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
before the House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing on Passenger and Baggage
Screening Problems; February 12, 2004. GAO did not independently verify
cost figures provided in this testimony.
[24] These 53 airports were among 70 airports identified by federal
security directors during our Web-based survey as either having or in
the process of planning or constructing in-line systems. Officials at
the remaining 17 airports indicated that their airports had not
developed plans for in-line baggage screening systems.
[25] TSA officials stated that the number of airports that could
benefit most from in-line checked baggage screening systems varies
depending on changing airport circumstances, such as adding new
terminals or an increased or decreased number of flights.
[26] Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by
TSA to directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification
projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions
take many forms and are generally not required to comply with federal
laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into
these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually
agreeable.
[27] The eight airports included four category X airports: Dallas Fort-
Worth International, Chicago O'Hare International, Detroit Metro Wayne
County, and San Francisco International; three category I airports:
Piedmont Triad International (North Carolina), Pittsburgh
International, and Sacramento International; and one category II
airport Harrisburg International (Pennsylvania). These eight airports
were among the 45 airports that we identified as being in the process
of planning or constructing in-line systems.
[28] TSA also used four other transaction agreements to fund work
related to interim solutions, three of these agreements were for
partial in-line systems that eventually were to be replaced by
permanent in-line systems.
[29] These 28 airports include 8 of the 9 airports that have been
awarded LOIs by TSA for planning and constructing in-line systems.
[30] Vision 100 authorizes up to $500 million for aviation security for
each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007, of which $250 million is a
mandatory appropriation to the Aviation Security Capital Fund. Of that
mandatory amount, the act designates $125 million as priority funding
to fulfill intentions to obligate under LOIs. In the fiscal year 2004
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Congress provided
$250 million for the physical modification of airports to install
checked baggage explosive detection systems but did so separate from
the Aviation Security Capital Fund because a provision of that act
precluded the use of funds to establish the Fund in fiscal year 2004.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, enacted in December 2004, increases the
authorized appropriation for aviation security from Vision 100 from
$250 million to $400 million for each of fiscal years 2005 through
2007. The $250 million mandatory appropriation remains the same.
[31] Vision 100 limited the source of funding available to carry out
this provision (49 U.S.C. § 47102(3)(b)(x)) to amounts apportioned
under 49 U.S.C. § 47114.
[32] The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution
authorized TSA to issue LOIs for terminal modifications related to the
installation of in-line baggage screening systems and mandated that
each LOI provide for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the project's
cost, with the remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator
at airports with at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger
boardings each year at all airports (and 90 percent for projects at all
other airports). Subsequently, Vision 100 instituted a 90 percent
federal cost-share of the project's cost, with the remaining 10 percent
to be paid by the airport operator at medium and large hub airports
(and 95 percent for projects at any other airport) though TSA continued
to operate at the 75 percent cost-share. The fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act, signed into law in October 2004, reestablished the
federal cost-share at 75 percent for any medium or large hub airport
during fiscal year 2005.
[33] TSA officials stated that the increased cost-share to 90 percent
stipulated in Vision 100 would further constrain their ability to fund
future LOIs, as well as impact their ability to assist airports to
achieve and maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to
screen all checked baggage for explosives.
[34] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington,
D.C.: July 2004).
[35] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a cost-sharing
study that must include, among other things, a proposed formula for
cost sharing among the federal, state, and local governments and the
private sector for projects to install in-line baggage screening
equipment that reflects the benefits that each such entity will derive
from the projects, including national security benefits and labor and
other cost savings.
[36] TSA did not have a formal, standardized process for soliciting or
responding to requests for LOIs.
[37] LOI agreements can include multiple airports, as was the case with
one of the original eight LOIs including both the Los Angeles
International and Ontario airports.
[38] OMB Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs, January 22, 2002. Agencies use this
guidance to support government decisions to initiate, review, or expand
programs that would result in measurable costs or benefits extending
for 3 or more years into the future.
[39] The Department of Homeland Security Investment Review Board
reviews the department's capital asset programs with acquisition costs
exceeding $100 million to ensure that projects meet mission needs at
the expected levels of cost and risk.
[40] This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.
[41] For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-94 stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to
compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real
discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost
savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal
government does not pay for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project
costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total costs, as
recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million.
[42] OMB Circular A-94.
[43] DHS's initial comments on our draft report were dated January 12,
2005 , and we have included in the version of this report that contains
classified and sensitive security information----GAO-05-135C---and in
our report containing sensitive security information but not the
classified information----GAO-05-302SU. In its February18, 2005 letter,
DHS removed comments considered by TSA to be security sensitive
information.
[44] In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve
checked baggage undergoing automated screening while on a conveyor belt
that sorts and transports baggage to the proper location for its
ultimate loading onto an aircraft.
[45] The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act re-established the federal cost-share for letters of
intent at the pre-Vision 100 level.
[46] We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our
review, which discuss results deemed to be classified or sensitive
security information. The report that contains classified and sensitive
security information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning
Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-135C (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing
sensitive security information but not the classified information is
GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-302SU
(Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005).
[47] This is the present value of cost savings over a seven-year
period. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures cited are present
values. As noted earlier, this estimate falls to $1.14 billion after
adjustments to the discount rate following Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-94 guidance.
[48] Costs to install and multiplex in-line EDS systems were based on
budget assumptions rather than true requirements.
[49] Our analysis was conducted using what is called Monte Carlo
simulation, which uses random numbers to measure the effects of
uncertainty. In the absence of additional information, our simulation
is based on some general assumptions about the probability
distributions characterizing values used by TSA for most of the cost
factors. In the case of modification costs, we were able to use
information on the variation of those costs across the nine airports.
[50] TSA's model covers nine airports handling relatively large numbers
of passengers, reflecting the fact that in-line EDS has been limited
mostly to larger airports.
[51] TSA's data shows zero cost shown for Ontario, but it may be due to
it being combined with Los Angeles.
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